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EAST INDIA (ARMY SYSTEM).

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Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
11 *November* 1884.

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H.—6. 2. 85.

EAST INDIA (ARMY SYSTEM).

RETURN to Two Addresses of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 8 May and 9 June 1884;—*for*,

(ADDRESS, 8 May 1884.)

"COPY of CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Secretary of State in Council, respecting the PROPOSED CHANGES in the INDIAN ARMY SYSTEM."

(*Mr. Stanhope.*)

(ADDRESS, 9 June 1884.)

"COPIES of any DISSENTS, and of DESPATCHES, against the CHANGES Proposed or Ordered in the INDIAN ARMY SYSTEM (in addition to the Return of the 8th day of May 1884)."

(*Sir George Balfour.*)

India Office,
21 July 1884.

J. K. CROSS,
Under Secretary of State for India.

CX K 64

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COPY of CORRESPONDENCE between the Government of *India* and the Secretary of State in Council respecting the PROPOSED CHANGES in the INDIAN ARMY SYSTEM; and, COPIES of DISSENTS, and of DESPATCHES, against the CHANGES proposed or ordered in the INDIAN ARMY SYSTEM.

—I.—

INDIAN ARMY REORGANIZATION.

GENERAL QUESTION.

PROPOSED CREATION OF FOUR ARMY CORPS

TO BE

SUBORDINATED TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 168 of 1879, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 16 *June* 1879).

My Lord, Simla, 22 May 1879.

WE have, by this mail, addressed to your Lordship a Financial Despatch, No. 138, concerning the reductions in our civil expenditure which have been forced upon us in consequence of the heavy and increasing loss entailed on our finances by the unfavourable state of the exchange with London. It remains for us to describe the measures we propose to adopt for effecting all possible reductions in our military expenditure.

2. The retrenchment of our military expenditure is a graver and more complicated task than the reduction of our civil establishments, or of our outlay on Public Works. A contraction of our expenditure on Public Works must, doubtless, as we have said, retard the material progress of the country, and postpone the complete protection of the inhabitants of districts exposed to famine; but it does not directly affect the security of the Empire. Curtailment of the cost may impair the efficiency of our civil establishments, and thus cause administrative inconvenience; but it will not seriously imperil the supremacy of the British power in India. Any parsimony, however, tending to impair the efficiency of the army whereby that power is maintained would unquestionably involve risks which hardly any circumstances could justify us in incurring. We cannot, therefore, attempt any substantial reduction of our military expenditure except in combination with such improvements in the organization as will preserve intact the efficiency of the army as a whole.

3. In our Financial Despatch, No. 66, dated 8th February 1878, we discussed at length the whole subject of our military expenditure, and showed how greatly it weighed upon our resources. We need not recite the details contained in that Despatch.

4. The net expenditure recorded in our accounts under the head of the Army may be now estimated, in times of peace, at about 15¼* millions sterling; of which about four millions sterling is incurred at the Home Treasury, and the rest in India.

* *Net Expenditure.*

Year.	In England.	In India.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.
1873–74 -	3,328,900	10,890,200	14,219,100
1874–75 -	3,592,500	10,793,800	14,386,300
1875–76 -	3,476,100	10,786,800	14,262,900
1876–77 -	3,902,300	10,964,300	14,866,600
1877–78 -	4,221,300	11,548,400	15,769,700
1878–79 -	3,968,300	11,412,000*	15,380,300*
1879–80 -	4,084,200	11,290,000†	15,374,200†

* Exclusive of 670,000 *l.* for operations in Afghanistan.
† Exclusive of 2,000,000 *l.* ditto, ditto, ditto.

5. A large part of the Home expenditure is for pensions, furlough allowances, the Overland Troop Transport Service, and stores. The remainder is for payments to the Imperial Government on account of the Imperial troops; payments which have been repeatedly investigated, but with results we have not hitherto been able to accept as equitable or satisfactory. In our Financial Despatch, No. 86, dated 21st March 1879, we have again given our reasons for thinking that justice to India requires the reduction of these payments (by about half a million sterling) to a consolidated yearly payment of 850,000*l.*; and we now reiterate the expression of our earnest hope that some such greatly needed relief to our finances will result from the labours of the Committee at present inquiring into the matter afresh under the presidency of the Earl of Northbrook.

6. Unless we find it possible to effect further economy in the use of stores (and to this we shall continue to give our best attention), we cannot anticipate much other immediate or early reduction of the expenditure at home. Eventually, no doubt, as the officers who entered the army before 1866 pass away, there will be a considerable reduction of the heavy dead-weight charge for Colonel's allowances.

7. As pointed out in paragraph 5 of our Financial Despatch, No. 66 of 1878, the portion of our military expenditure recorded in the Indian Section of our Accounts has shown, since 1875–76, a serious increase. This is to be explained partly by the high prices of food and forage during these years; partly by the increased purchase of malt liquor in India, to the relief of the Home Treasury; partly by an increase to the pay of our Native troops; and partly by additions to the pay and allowances of Her Majesty's troops, originating in England, but unavoidably imposing fresh charges upon the revenues of India, without adding a man to the strength of the army.

8. In reference to these additional burdens, we desire to recall attention to the following remarks of our Honourable colleague Sir John Strachey, in his Financial Statement for 1877–78:—

"I have only to add that the Government of India must certainly endeavour to find the means of meeting the increased military charges, some of which are apparently inevitable, by economies in other Departments of the Military Service: their endeavours must be largely dependent for success upon the support of Her Majesty's Government. I do not assert that the whole of the additional expenditure on the army has not been incurred for excellent objects, or that it could have been avoided, but that the Indian revenues are liable to have great charges thrown upon them without the Government of India being consulted, and almost without any power of remonstrance, is a fact the gravity of which can hardly be exaggerated."

9. A review of former discussions respecting the possibility of a reduction of our military expenditure, a consideration of our present military requirements, and the contemplation of future demands for military expenditure (demands of which some were referred to in our Despatch, No. 66 of 1878, and others are now coming forward), all alike point to the conclusion that there is no hope of our obtaining that reduction of our military expenditure in India which is so urgently needed, unless, after a careful and exhaustive inquiry by competent authorities, we should find it practicable to make considerable changes in our military system.

10. Apart, altogether, from the pressure of our financial difficulties, there are, we think, reasons connected with our military administration why it is desirable that such an inquiry should now be undertaken.

11. Our

11. Our actual military system, and, to a great extent, the present distribution of our forces, is based on the Report of the Royal Commission of 1859. Since then many conditions have changed. The construction of railways, and the development of communications, have greatly increased our powers of concentrating our troops, and thus altered strategical conditions; districts which, 20 years ago, were unsettled, and required military coercion, are now peaceful and settled, and our troops have been re-armed with improved weapons, which vastly enhance their fighting superiority over any Asiatic troops likely to be opposed to them. On the other hand, as evidence that these considerations have by no means been neglected, we remark that the cost of the army in India was reduced, between 1869-70 and 1875-76, by about a million sterling.

12. The improvements in arms and in military administration, during the last 20 years, have revolutionised every great army in Europe; but, perhaps, the greatest and most important change effected in this period has been the introduction, or immense extension and improvement, of the system of Reserves. The Indian Army is now the only large army in the world which has no Reserves. In other words, India is the only country which, maintaining a large army, pays in peace time for the whole available force which it can put into the field in war. The expense of such a system is patent. Without, therefore, committing ourselves to any premature opinion as to how far a Reserve system can or cannot be worked in India, we think that there is at least such *primâ facie* evidence in its favour as to demand the fullest consideration for it, and we would go further and say that, so far as we can at present judge, it is in this direction that there is the best prospect of an important diminution of our military expenditure.

13. The military operations in Afghanistan, now we hope approaching a termination, have given us a new and improved frontier, with the command of all the great passes between India and Afghanistan; but the occupation of this new line will entail the permanent withdrawal of troops from other parts of India, and a general redistribution of the Indian Armies, a subject for careful inquiry, in which the several Presidencies must be duly represented.

14. The status of the Punjab Frontier Force has already been brought under the consideration of your Lordship in connection with proposed frontier arrangements. The advance, however, of our frontier, which has materially altered the conditions under which the question has been hitherto discussed, renders necessary a reconsideration of the constitution and functions of that force.

15. Our recent operations have revealed certain deficiencies in the organization of our army for field service, notably in the Commissariat and Transport Departments, the correction of which may probably require increased expenditure, but it is clear that, in the present condition of our finances, such additional expenditure is impracticable, unless we can find the means of making other counterbalancing reductions.

16. We consider, therefore, that an immediate, thorough, and exhaustive inquiry into our whole military system in India is rendered necessary alike by our financial exigencies, by the altered conditions of the country, and by our recent operations in Afghanistan, and we have accordingly decided to appoint a Commission to undertake such an inquiry as soon as circumstances admit.

17. As this Commission will deal with questions affecting the general Civil administration and our relations to the Native Princes and their armies, we propose to associate with the military members of the Commission two representatives of our Civil and Political services. We are also anxious to secure the aid of an officer having practical knowledge of the working of the Reserve system in England and on the Continent, and shall feel obliged if your Lordship will nominate such an officer to serve on the Commission.

 18. The

18. The Commission will accordingly be constituted as follows:—

President.

A military officer of high rank.

Members.

A military officer nominated by the Secretary of State for India.
Ditto, ditto, by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.
Ditto, ditto, by the Government of India.
Ditto, ditto, ditto, Madras.
Ditto, ditto, ditto, Bombay.
A Civil Officer.
A Political Officer.

19. We annex Minutes of dissent by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, and Mr. Rivers Thompson.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Lytton.*
F. P. Haines.
A. J. Arbuthnot.
A. Clarke.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.

Enclosures referred to.

(1.)

MINUTE by the Commander-in-Chief in India on a Discussion in Council on the 7th May 1879, on the Reduction and Reorganization of the Army, and on a Despatch to the Secretary of State for India.

I AM strongly opposed to bringing these subjects before a Committee, because I believe the Executive is sufficiently strong to deal with the purely military part of the question. Transport, Commissariat, and perhaps the Reserve question are different, and may well be made the subject of consideration of such Committee as Government may see fit to appoint.

2. I object to bringing the purely military subjects before a Committee, because the time is singularly inopportune. We have a large number of troops now serving beyond the frontier under circumstances of no ordinary hardship, not only to themselves, but to their comrades left behind in the provinces, in the shape of increased duties, deprivation of furlough, &c. This class of pressure commenced with the Jowaki Campaign in 1877, when a curtailment of the highly-prized indulgence of furlough fell upon a large portion of the Native Army. In the following year the dispatch of troops to the Mediterranean, the anticipation of further demands, and subsequently the advent of the Russian Mission to Kabul, caused this indulgence to be accorded generally to the troops in 1878 in a most fragmentary and unsatisfactory manner.

3. Nothing can exceed the high spirit which actuates the men of the three armies; but who can doubt that the manner in which the armies are administered, and the liberal accord of indulgences of this nature, foster this feeling?

4. It is well known that the manifold duties entrusted to the Native Armies are performed, even in ordinary times, with a minimum of means. The slightest strain caused by extraordinary circumstances makes itself felt throughout.

5. It was admitted that natural alarm may be excited by proposals for military retrenchment. I am one subject to such alarm, believing, as I do, that our military establishments are dangerously small. I cannot for one moment admit that a reduction of our strength is a proper subject for inquiry even.

6. The admitted disadvantages in the unsettling effects of such an inquiry are so great, so manifest, and so vastly detrimental to the spirit and content-

ment

ment of the men, that I am unable to put them aside so lightly as many may do. I have witnessed its ill effects in the Madras Army.

7. Having admitted that many authorities hold our military establishments to be dangerously weak, and that no one can contemplate, without anxiety, any enfeeblement of the force on which our authority rests, we shall, I trust, withhold from discussion by the Committee the subject of the strength of the Armies of India. I cannot listen to what has been said on this point, without feeling that such a course is incumbent on us.

8. It is unaccountable to me how it has come to pass that no answer has ever yet been rendered to a Despatch from the Duke of Argyll calling for a report on the duties, strength, and distribution of the Native Army, a Despatch dated so far back as 1871. In 1870, Lord Napier of Magdala, anticipating the demands of the Secretary of State, prepared with great care and labour a complete review of the disposition of the Bengal Army. This was, I am aware, rendered under a sense of the responsibility which rested on him to provide for these services and for the safety of the Empire, in the most economical manner that efficiency rendered possible. This has been our guide ever since, and would be so still, had not circumstances recently developed far larger and more onerous military responsibilities which will rest upon us for the future, and must be provided for instantly.

9. In 1871, Lord Napier, then Governor of Madras, called upon me to furnish the Madras Government with a redistribution of the Madras Army, issuing at the same time a powerful and comprehensive Minute on the whole question himself. This I furnished as promptly as I could, following his Lordship in his discussion of certain questions of strength and reform. I am aware that both these statements are in the hands of the Government of India. They contain, I believe, all the information the military authorities of those two Presidencies could furnish (I have never seen that furnished by Bombay). It is not for me to say why these papers were not made use of in satisfaction of the Duke of Argyll's demands.

10. A redistribution of the Bengal Army has become a matter of necessity, but this is a question the Executive is fully competent to deal with, and it is a matter, moreover, which properly falls to the Commander-in-Chief and his staff.

11. The internal wants of Madras appear to me to be much the same in 1879 as they were in 1871; but, in the interval, the value of that army as a Reserve has been proved without a doubt. Madras has managed to assist us with one regiment of Cavalry, 10 regiments of Native Infantry, and three companies of Sappers. None but the most short-sighted can pretend to affirm that this is evidence of excessive establishments for ordinary times of peace. Our existence in India as a ruling race, our holding the country with so small a proportion of troops to population as we do, are facts of such an extraordinary nature, that we are bound to be at all times prepared to deal with events somewhat out of the ordinary course. From the year 1876 we have had a quick succession of extraordinary events to deal with, calling for extra exertion on the part of the authorities, and imposing an unusual strain on the spirit, self-denial, and valour of the men. The ever-recurring Russo-Afghan difficulty, our own border land, the Mediterranean regions, Burmah, Zululand, all have given us reason for active military preparations or for consideration. Who can say these causes of excitement shall not recur; who can say that the small cloud now rising in the Deccan shall not assume such proportions as may cause graver trouble nearer home; who can say that the relations now existing between Russia and China, in which our own interests cannot fail to be mixed up, may not impose upon us far more onerous military liabilities than we have hitherto had to face in that country? We must view this as a question of insurance; our risks are manifestly great; the rates to be paid will be proportionately high; but failing to pay them, we shall fail in our duty, not only to ourselves, but to posterity. The military power of this country should not be tampered with on account of the necessities of the moment, whether they arise out of pressure of public opinion at home, or financial disturbances in India. Any reduction of our armies below the moderate strength at which they now stand would, in my opinion, be

be carried out at a risk for which the saving effected would be no compensation whatever.

12. It is true that for the last 20 years nothing of moment has been done towards reorganizing the Indian Armies, except in the way of reduction, a measure which has fallen more heavily on Madras and Bombay than on Bengal. Indeed, for the latter reconstruction only was required.

13. It is also true that, in the meantime, almost all Continental armies have been largely reorganized, augmented, and improved in efficiency. Vast sums have been expended on them, in some instances in defiance of popular outcry and vehement Parliamentary opposition. It remains for India to approach the subject of army reorganization with empty pockets and in obedience to a political cry for retrenchment, or under the pressure caused by what may prove temporary financial collapse.

14. It is satisfactory to know that the British element, whether officers or men, is not to be interfered with; also, that it is not proposed to reduce the actual fighting power of the Army in India. This would be altogether satisfactory had it not been previously asserted with regard to one of the armies in India, that "war, in anything like a serious form, has been unknown to the "sepoys of the Madras Army for many generations, and, as a natural result, "the martial feelings and characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no "longer to be found in its ranks. On what principle and on what good grounds "can any one recommend its continuance at its present strength?"

15. To Sir Garnet Wolseley, therefore, and to those who are like-minded with him, the reduction of the Madras Army by one-half would in no degree lessen or impair the fighting power of the Armies of India. To this I absolutely demur.

16. It is much to be regretted that the Government of India has not seen fit to answer the Despatch of the Secretary of State for India, No. 131, of 12th April 1877, which gave cover to Sir Garnet Wolseley's memorandum, for I submit that, in the consideration of this question, Honourable Members who formed part of a majority when those papers were reviewed, are by this omission placed at a considerable disadvantage in the discussion of the question now before us.

17. As regards the formation of a Reserve, it is a question which deserves every consideration. I would, however, emphatically assert that no saving can be looked for from such a measure. The establishment on which we work is a peace establishment, and, in my belief, dangerously weak as such. Anything in the shape of a Reserve must, I submit, be over and above our present means; in other words, a source of outlay rather than economy. I am opposed to the scheme of a Reserve, as it cannot, in my opinion, be worked in accord with our system of service in the Native Armies; nor is it, I think, in accord with the instincts of our sepoys, who, for the most part, look to the service as affording them provision for a lifetime. Some there are, no doubt, who would gladly sever their connection with it early, but these are few, and from amongst them some would not desire service with the Reserve.

18. I deprecate any radical change of the terms under which men now enlist for our Native Armies, to facilitate the formation of a Reserve, or the application of rules not hitherto in force to the men now serving. Such a measure would have almost as serious a disturbing effect as rumours of pending reduction.

19. From my experience of the Native Armies in India, I venture to suggest that the conviction on the part of the men composing them that they live under a system which is stable and not liable to constant change and derangement on account of political complications or of financial need, is a feeling tending to keep our soldiers in a contented mind, and that this feeling is of greater value to the Government of India than any saving in military expenditure likely to accrue from the proposed measures.

20. I commenced this paper by affirming that this movement in favour of reorganization and reduction is most inopportune, and instanced what may be called

called the domestic view. If we look abroad, the objections on the score of time and opportunity appear to me more cogent still. We may consider that we have opened the gateway of Afghanistan, but what have we beyond? Military liabilities of far greater magnitude than we have ever had to encounter before, for granted that the terms on which we are henceforth to live with the Afghans are all we can desire, we stand face to face with Russia and in immediate contact with her, through Afghan interests, along the whole line from Herat to Balkh, and further along the whole course of the Oxus to Badakshan.

21. Is it likely that throughout this long line of contact no friction will arise between such neighbours as Russians and Afghans? Who shall say that such will not arise at any moment in Badakshan? Hardly a week passes without news of Russian activity on the Caspian and on the banks of the Attrek. This is not an activity of retrenchment caused by exhaustion after her enormous expenditure in Turkey, but a concentration of means and force which can have but two objects, viz., Merv, and through it Herat.

22. I protest, with these grave and onerous military liabilities standing plainly before us, against any inquiry which may result in military reduction, or tend to unsettle the minds of our Native soldiers in any part of India.

23. I have no objection to the wording of the Despatch.

(signed) *Fred. P. Haines.*

Simla, 20th May 1879.

Heads of Discussion in Council on Matters connected with Army Reorganization, on 7th May 1879.

1. The anxious nature of our present financial circumstances and necessity for reduction.

2. Necessity for inquiry into conditions of military expenditure.

3. The gravity of the question admitted, as the maintenance and security of our rule is more closely involved in these charges than any others. Caution in conducting this inquiry is therefore insisted on.

4. Alarm which may naturally arise out of proposals for military retrenchment, as many hold that our military establishments are dangerously weak, and no one can contemplate without anxiety the enfeeblement of military force.

5. Reduction of British troops or of British Officers with Native troops not contemplated.

6. It may be possible to reduce army expenses without sacrificing military efficiency. To effect this, careful and impartial inquiry necessary.

7. Economy to be looked for from reorganization with a view to increased efficiency, rather than to reduction with a view to immediate saving. Inquiry therefore necessary into organic conditions, as well as financial results.

8. No answer yet given to the Duke of Argyll's Despatch, dated in 1871, calling for report on duties, strength, and distribution of the Native Army. Therefore inquiry should now be instituted into military expenditure.

9. Inopportuneness of present time. But it was urged that present state of affairs on the frontier gives additional weight to demands for early inquiry into such subjects as the garrisoning of the frontier, future position of the frontier force, &c.

10. Necessity for inquiry into the organization of Commissariat and Transport branches, which may demand increased expenditure. Inquiry into the whole military administration therefore necessary. It was urged that nothing has been done since 1859, though meanwhile conditions have much changed, frontier has been altered, railways have been opened, troops armed with improved weapons, &c.

&c. Within these 20 years nearly every great European army has undergone complete reorganization.

11. Sweeping alterations such as have taken place elsewhere will probably not be required in India, but there is ample field for the investigations of a competent Committee. Some redistribution inevitable. Difference between the Armies of Bengal and Madras.

12. A strong opinion reiterated that neither our fighting power nor the European element, the essence of that power, should be reduced, considerable addition to fixed establishment having been found necessary in order to carry on the present campaign. Doubt expressed whether fighting power is maintained on the most economical principles.

13. Probable advantages to be derived from the introduction of some system of military reserves adapted to India, viz., increase of fighting power and a substantial reduction in the cost of peace establishments.

14. The future of the Punjab Frontier Force could best be considered by a Committee; as also questions connected with the commands and separate staffs and establishments of the Presidential Armies which would probably suggest themselves to it.

15. The "short service" system threatens to increase military expenditure of India very seriously, whilst affording no corresponding advantage to her military strength, but this question must be left to the deliberations of the Committee now sitting in England upon the Home charges.

16. Urgent necessity, both on financial and administrative grounds, for the institution of an inquiry into military charges in India before a Commission. Composition of the Commission.

17. Decision of Council on the above-mentioned points to be communicated to Secretary of State by telegraph, as well as Despatch.

Simla, 20th May 1879. (signed) *Fred. P. Haines.*

(2.)

MINUTE by Sir *Alexander Arbuthnot.*

I REGRET that I am unable to concur with the decision which is reported to the Secretary of State in the 16th paragraph of this Despatch. While I am very sensible of the necessity for retrenchment, and while fully admitting that the Army, which unavoidably forms the most expensive item of our expenditure, should not be exempted from the inquiry which is now being carried on in regard to every other branch of the administration, I cannot think that the method in which it is proposed to investigate the possibility of reducing our military charges, and reforming our military system, is that best adapted to secure the object in view. I have very little faith in the efficiency of Commissions and especially of large Commissions. Their practical working is almost invariably characterised by slowness, and by a very undesirable amount of compromise. And in India there is the additional objection, that they are very costly, owing to the high scale of salaries which prevails. At this moment we have before our eyes an instance of the slowness with which such Commissions work, in the case of the Famine Commission, which, established more than a year ago, has not yet furnished, and is not likely for many months to come to furnish, its report; and although we may hope that the Commission which it is now proposed to appoint will not be subjected to the vicissitudes (to use a very mild term) which have attended the Famine Commission, I greatly regret to see the Government of India, with such an example before it, entrusting to another large Commission a duty which, in my opinion, it is perfectly competent to discharge through the agency of its own Departments. It must be remembered that the Government of India is in itself a very costly machine. The officers connected with the military administration, whether those

those immediately attached to the Government, or those serving as the Head-quarters Staff of the Army, or in the other military Departments of the State, are highly paid, and, as a rule, are competent men, well able to work out and aid the Government in the disposal of such questions as those which it is now proposed to entrust to a Commission.

2. We have recently embarked upon important measures of reduction in the Civil Departments of the State, measures which will necessarily involve more or less of reorganisation; but in this case it has not been deemed necessary to supersede the established Departments; and for my part I cannot perceive any valid reason for adopting a different course as regards the question of military retrenchment and organisation. Indeed, I consider one branch of the inquiry which it is proposed to institute, that relating to a redistribution of the Army, to be one which especially appertains to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and which should be conducted by the Military Department of the Government of India, with the aid of his Excellency, and in consultation with the Governments and Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay; and here I may, perhaps, take the liberty of observing that, in the present Commander in Chief and in our Military Colleague in Council, the Government of India possesses advisers of very varied experience, thoroughly conversant with the merits and defects of our military system, and eminently free from prejudice.

3. As regards such questions as the Commissariat and Transport, the Government of India has, in my opinion, ample means of conducting such inquiries as may be necessary, without resorting to the machinery of a cumbrous and costly Commission. Allusion is made in the 15th paragraph of the Despatch to the deficiencies in the organisation of the Commissariat and Transport Departments having been revealed in the course of the late operations in Afghanistan. However this may be, it should not be forgotten that the best organised Commissariat must have time to prepare for a campaign, and that in the present case the notice which the Commissary General received of the demands to be made upon him, was extremely short.

4. The question of introducing a system of Army Reserves is one of greater difficulty; but it is not one which, as far as I can judge, is beyond the capacity of the ordinary Departments of the Government of India, acting in consultation with the Local Governments. If any special agency be needed to deal with this question, I should think that the deputation of a single selected officer to confer with the Local Governments on the subject would be far more effective than the appointment of a Commission of eight members. At the same time, while I do not see any particular objection to the investigation of this question, I am bound to say that I do not anticipate any practical result from it; for, when it is said that "the Indian Army is now the only large army in the "world which has no reserves," it seems to be forgotten that the Indian Army, meaning thereby the Native Army of India, is the only large army in the world which is entirely composed of mercenary troops, alien in race to the rulers of the country; and that, under these circumstances, it may well be doubted whether the system of Army Reserves, which in recent years has been introduced into the armies of European States, is applicable to the Native Army of India.

5. I have said at the beginning of this Minute that I recognise the necessity, in the present financial condition of the Empire, of investigating the possibility of effecting retrenchments in the cost of the army, which is admittedly a very heavy burthen upon our finances; but, before I conclude, I wish to say a few words to guard against its being supposed that I believe it to be possible to make any reduction whatever in the numerical strength of the Army, European or Native. I share the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that we cannot spare a man. I see every reason to anticipate that for some years to come, and until the border tribes on our North-West Frontier have been reduced to order, the extension of the frontier which is now taking place will necessitate some further addition to our Native Army. It has often been proposed, and notably in a Memorandum by Sir Garnet Wolseley, which was sent officially to the Government of India about two years ago, but which, I understand, has not yet been replied to, that the armies of Madras and Bombay, and especially the army of Madras should be reduced. Sir Garnet Wolseley

proposed that the Madras Army should be reduced by one half, accompanying his proposal by the singular remark, that he "attached no importance whatever to the circumstance of the Madras Army not having broken out into "mutiny in 1857." Holding as I do the opinion that it is wise to pay some attention to the lessons of experience, and that, in the case of our Native Army, the principle of water-tight compartments has been proved to be a sound principle, I am convinced that it would be unsafe to make any reduction in the strength of either of the two armies in question, thereby increasing the numerical superiority of the Army of Bengal. It is in other branches of military expenditure, and not by reducing the numerical strength of the Army, that economies must be looked for; and I venture to think that some economy might be effected in the administration of the Armies of Madras and Bombay without prejudice to their efficiency, by placing them under the command of the Commander in Chief in India, while retaining them as separate *corps d'armée*, an economy which would facilitate other economies in the system of administering the civil government of the two minor Presidencies, which would not only save money, but would, I am convinced, increase the efficiency of the civil administration. But the chief economies which I believe to be feasible in our military system are those connected with the supply of our European force, which, under the short service system, is at present carried out upon a most expensive plan. It is perhaps almost, if not quite, useless to advocate a return to the system of a local European Army, and that upon a far more extended scale than formerly existed: but I am nevertheless convinced that this is the measure which the advocates of military retrenchment should press, if they desire to bring our military expenditure within the limits which our financial necessities demand, without detriment to the practical efficiency of the army.

(signed) *Alex. J. Arbuthnot.*

22nd May 1879.

(3.)

MINUTE by the Honourable *Rivers Thompson.*

WHILE I share Sir Alexander Arbuthnot's objection to the form of the Commission which it is proposed to appoint to inquire into the question of military expenditure, I do so rather on the ground that it is to be composed, with one exception, of Military Officers. I believe a smaller Commission in which the civil element was more largely represented would do the work more efficiently, cheaply, and quickly than that which the Despatch recommends; and, holding as I do, that without risk to the Empire, considerable savings are possible, by changes in the constitution and reduction in the numbers of the separate armies of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, I do not think that such a question would receive the full consideration which its importance demands, if Military Officers are to be almost the sole judges of the matter.

22nd May 1879. (signed) *Rivers Thompson.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 179 of 1879, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 28 *June* 1879.)

My Lord, Simla, 2 June 1879.

IN continuation of our Military Despatch, No. 168, dated the 22nd May 1879, we now have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a Minute by our honourable colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, which we beg may be added to the minutes which accompanied that letter.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Lytton.*
Fred. P. Haines.
A. J. Arbuthnot.
A. Clarke.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.

Enclosure referred to.

MINUTE by Sir *E. B. Johnson.*

I HAVE only this day had an opportunity of reading the dissent by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to the Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated the 22nd May 1879.

It was sent to me in manuscript at four o'clock on the day on which the Despatch was forwarded to the Secretary of State, too late even for me to read through it, much less to make myself master of its contents.

Had I then been able to peruse it, I should have felt it necessary to ask the Governor General to permit me to attach a short minute, expressing my concurrence in a great portion of the Commander in Chief's opinions. For, in abstaining from comment, and in signing the Despatch without reservation, I feel that my views on this important subject may be very much misunderstood, and that I may appear committed to a full concurrence in the contents of that Despatch, whereas, in signing it, I only desired to express my opinion that inquiry was advisable.

From what passed at the discussions which took place on the subject of the proposed commission, his Excellency the Viceroy and my colleagues are well aware of the opinion I hold on the cardinal points embraced in the Despatch, and that my opinions are, for the most part, those which are held, and which have been put forward, by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in his minute of dissent.

I expressed myself in the strongest terms in Council as to the impossibility of reducing our Army, but at the same time I stated that I entirely subscribed to the proposal to institute inquiry, because, whilst I felt convinced that the result of such inquiry would lead to a confirmation of my opinion that our Forces are quite incapable of reduction, with any regard to the safety of our position in this country, I held, and do hold, that the question of Army Reserves in India is one which might, with great advantage, be inquired into by a commission such as is proposed.

The discussions that take place in the Executive Council are not recorded, and it appears to me that, without some such minute as I now ask permission to forward to the Secretary of State, it may be assumed that my opinions on the whole question differ from those of the Commander in Chief.

I am anxious, therefore, to have it on record that I share with his Excellency his objection to any reduction of our Military Forces.

Simla, 27th May 1879. (signed) *E. B. Johnson.*

MILITARY DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 198) to the Government of India.

My Lord, India Office, London, 17 July 1879.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Confidential (Military) Letter, No. 168, dated 22nd May 1879, in which you state that you have decided to appoint a Commission to undertake an immediate, thorough, and exhaustive inquiry into the whole military system in India, in view to an important diminution of military expenditure.

2. Though attaching full weight to the minutes of dissent by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, and Mr. Rivers Thompson, and that subsequently received from General Sir E. B. Johnson, I cordially agree with your Lordship's Government as to the expediency of instituting this inquiry, and I have, in furtherance of your wish, nominated your Excellency's Military Secretary, Colonel Baker, as an officer fully qualified to aid the Commission with his special knowledge of the working of the reserve system in England and on the Continent, referred to in para. 17 of the letter under acknowledgment.

 3. I do

3. I do not propose to offer any opinion on this particular question, nor on any of the points to be brought before the Commission, until I am in possession of their report, and of the views of your Excellency's Government thereon, while of course no action on such important questions as those indicated will be taken by your Government in anticipation of the decisions I may come to.

4. I have already, by telegram, asked for the detailed instructions to be issued to the Commission to be sent to me as early as possible, and I request that any further points which it may have seemed fit to refer to it may be also communicated to me.

5. The composition of the Commission, as sanctioned, will necessarily involve considerable expenditure, and it is desirable, therefore, that its deliberations should extend over as short a period as possible, and be confined to the broad general principles of what they propose to recommend, leaving all details to be subsequently dealt with by the responsible departments.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cranbrook.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 48 of 1880, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received 26 February* 1880.)

My Lord, Fort William, 4 February 1880.

Note.—The four volumes of the Appendices already printed are deposited in the Library of the House of Commons for the use of Members, and are not re-printed in this Collection.

WE forward, for the information of your Lordship in Council, the accompanying copies of the Report of the Army Organisation Commission which was assembled last year at Simla under your Lordship's sanction, as conveyed in Military Despatch No. 198, dated 17th July 1879.

2. The subjects so fully treated in this Report demand, and will receive, our most earnest consideration, and we trust to be able at no distant date to communicate to your Lordship in Council the conclusion to which we may come on the highly important recommendations of the Commission.

3. Meanwhile it appears very desirable that Her Majesty's Government should be aware of the nature of the subjects under our consideration, and of the direction in which change is proposed in our existing military system.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Lytton.*
Fred. P. Haines.
A. J. Arbuthnot.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.

CHANGES IN THE INDIAN ARMY SYSTEM.

REPORT of the SPECIAL COMMISSION appointed by His Excellency the Governor General in Council to inquire into the ORGANIZATION and EXPENDITURE of the ARMY in INDIA.

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LETTER of INSTRUCTIONS and APPOINTMENT.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Honourable Sir *A. Eden*, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant Governor of Bengal (No. 202 S., dated Simla, the 7th of July 1879).

THE heavy loss to the revenues of India, caused by the unfavourable rate of exchange, has rendered extensive reductions in public expenditure imperatively necessary. A Commission, of which you are President, has been appointed with a view to assist Government in determining what share of this unavoidable reduction can be borne by the military charges without injury to the general efficiency of the army, and in what manner such savings can best be effected.

2. In order that the Government may be put in a position to decide on this most important question, the investigation of your Commission must be comprehensive and exhaustive; embracing, in fact, the whole subject of military organization and expenditure in India. You are requested to study carefully the improvements in administration which have been recently introduced into the British and other European armies, and consider how far such changes can advantageously be introduced into the Indian armies. The great problem of modern military organization is to provide the largest and most efficient force in war with the smallest permanent peace establishment and expenditure; and it is to a solution of this problem that the labours of your Commission must especially be directed. You will have the advantage of the experience of recent operations

operations to assist you; and it will be your duty to report how far the present organization has been found adapted to the requirements of the troops on active service, and what amendments, if any, can be effected.

3. The following are the points on which your Commission will especially report, in the order indicated:—

1. What number of troops, British and Native, must necessarily be maintained in India in peace time, for the maintenance of the internal peace of the country, and performance of the necessary garrison duties only?

2. What should be the distribution of that force, and its proportionate allotment to the several provinces? To aid the Commission in forming their opinion on these points, the heads of Local Governments and Administrations have been called upon to furnish the Commission with full particulars as to the population, condition, state of feeling, and special elements of danger in their respective provinces; as to the strength, distribution, and efficiency of the local police; and to state their views as to military requirements of their several provinces.

3. What should be the full war establishments of the Indian army, calculated under the two heads of—

(*a.*) The number of troops that India ought to be able to place and maintain in the field for service wherever required?

(*b.*) The garrisons and reserves to be maintained in India?

4. By what means, short of permanently maintaining the army on a war footing, can the difference between 1 and 3 be most efficiently provided for?

5. Having regard to 1, 3, and 4, what number of troops must be kept permanently under arms to garrison the country in peace time and furnish the required cadres for war; and what organization will best combine the necessary elasticity with efficiency in peace and war?

6. Assuming that the British force now in the country is not to be reduced, can the cost of its maintenance be diminished by alterations in its organization, or in the system under which it is recruited and relieved?

7. What should be the territorial organization and division of commands, and proportion of superior officers and staff?

8. What units of organization for field service seem best suited to the usual conditions of Indian warfare; and can these be adapted to, or connected with, the territorial organization, as in Europe?

9. Is it desirable to maintain the Presidential armies distinct as at present; and are the large staffs and separate departments now maintained essential to the efficiency of the army administration under the present Presidential system?

10. Should the troops of the several Presidential armies, as a rule, serve in their own presidencies only, except when called out for war; or should they take a recognized share of frontier and other general duty?

11. Having regard to the alterations made in our frontier, and redistribution of our frontier garrisons, is it desirable to retain the Punjab Frontier Force on its present footing, or to place it, in part or altogether, under the orders of the Commander in Chief?

12. Assuming that Sind is to be annexed to the Punjab, should the Sind regiments remain localised as at present, and under whose command should they be placed?

13. Is the present organization of the Supply and Transport Departments of the army that best adapted to its requirements in peace and war, or are any changes desirable; and, if so, of what nature?

14. Are the warlike stores now procured and maintained in the manner most economical consistent with efficiency?

15. What

15. What lines should be considered and maintained, as our main military lines of communication; and what new lines of road and railway are of most urgent importance?

4. The Commission will also make any other recommendations that suggest themselves, as the result of their inquiries, for improving the administration and reducing the cost of the army; bearing in mind that as the object of the assembling the Commission is to ascertain what reduction of expenditure can be effected, any recommendation involving outlay should, as far as possible, be accompanied by proposals for saving in other directions.

5. The Commission will be requested to send in a general report not later than the 31st October next. Details may afterwards be worked out and separately reported upon by Sub-Committees or specially appointed officers.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION.

The Honourable Sir *Ashley Eden*, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, President.
C. E. Bernard, Esq., C.S.I., C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.
Major General Sir *P. S. Lumsden*, K.C.B., C.S.I., Bengal Staff Corps, Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, Adjutant General in India.
*Major General Sir *F. S. Roberts*, K.C.B., V.C., Royal Artillery.
Brigadier General *R. Phayre*, C.B., Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, Bombay Staff Corps.
Brigadier General *H. H. O'Connell*, Madras Staff Corps, Quartermaster General, Madras Army.
*Brigadier General *H. T. Macpherson*, C.B., V.C., Bengal Staff Corps.
*Colonel *T. D. Baker*, C.B., 18th Foot, Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, Military Secretary to the Viceroy.
*Colonel *C. M. MacGregor*, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Bengal Staff Corps.
Major *O. R. Newmarch*, Bengal Staff Corps, Accountant General, Military Department, Government of India.

Secretary.

Captain *E. H. H. Collen*, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

CHAPTER I.

THE APPOINTMENT AND WORK OF THE COMMISSION.

Appointment and work of the Commission.

1. We have, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to us in the letter from the Military Department of the Government of India, No. 202 S., dated 7th July 1879, considered what reduction in expenditure can be borne by the military charges of India, without injury to the general efficiency of the army, and in what manner a real saving can best be effected. We have made our investigation as comprehensive and exhaustive as the time allowed to us for the completion of our report would permit. We have examined the whole subject of military organization and expenditure in India, and have considered how far the improvements in administration and organization recently introduced into the British and other European armies, can advantageously be applied to the Indian army; and we have endeavoured to show how, in our opinion, the problem of providing the largest and most efficient force in war, with the smallest permanent peace establishment and expenditure, can best be solved.

Commission has considered opinions of many officers, correspondence, and previous reports.

2. We have had the benefit of considering the opinions of the chief military authorities in this country, and of a great number of experienced officers on the staff of the army, and commanding regiments and batteries. We have examined a mass of correspondence, in the different departments, bearing on the subjects regarding which we were desired to report; and we have carefully studied the reports

* On the departure of these officers on field service, Major General Napier Campbell, R.A., Inspector General of Ordnance, was appointed a Member of the Commission.

reports which have, from time to time, been submitted by various Parliamentary Commissions on the subject of military organization, and the condition of the Indian army.

Withdrawal of four members.

3. During the progress of our discussion, our work was much impeded by the withdrawal of four of our colleagues, who were suddenly ordered away on service to Afghanistan. Fortunately, however, our inquiries were at that time so far advanced, that we were in complete possession of their views on all the principal questions of army organization before us. We have been able to keep them informed, from time to time, of the progress which we have made in working out a scheme of re-organization determined upon before they left, and it is a great satisfaction to us to find that they are in a position to join with us in our recommendations. At this time the Commission was strengthened by the appointment of Major General Napier Campbell, R.A.

Appointment of Major General Napier Campbell.

Operations in Afghanistan as affecting our proposals.

4. From one point of view the recent operation in Afghanistan, and the present occupation of a portion of the country by our troops, have placed us at a disadvantage, for they have given rise to a feeling that a time, when the Government of India is engaged in important military operations, involving a very heavy pressure upon every branch of the army, is not the most suitable for endeavouring to effect economies in military administration. No doubt, if the sole end of our inquiries had been the attainment of greater economy, there would have been some force in this objection; but the principle which we have from first to last kept in view has been the increase of the efficiency of the army, combined with a reduction of only such expenditure as, in our opinion, does not conduce, or is not absolutely essential, to efficiency. Our endeavours have been directed to the elaboration of a system of army organization, under which a more perfect concentration and increase of fighting-power, a sounder administration, and a better method of distributing commands, may be attained than those which now exist. Under present circumstances, a large number of weak battalions are dispersed, in a wasteful and unscientific manner, among isolated and unimportant positions throughout the country; the system under which the military administration is carried out, and the manner in which commands are distributed, are no longer adapted to the state of things with which we have to deal in the present day; and superfluous establishments are maintained that have long ceased to be useful. We have attempted to show how our military resources may best be utilized in peace and war, with the least expenditure of money and men; and we venture to affirm that at no former period in the history of India has there arisen greater necessity for the consideration of questions of this kind, than exists at present, when all the energies of Government are directed to meet the severe strain which, by the force of circumstances, has been imposed upon the resources of the country.

Recommendations based on position when Commission was appointed.

5. In dealing with the questions of military finance and organization, we have based our recommendations on the constitution and strength of the military establishments of India as they stood when our Commission was appointed. We have not considered the question of the future military occupation of Afghanistan Proper, or any part of it, not embraced in the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. We are well aware that, if there is to be a permanent, or even a lengthened military occupation of Afghanistan, it can no more be provided from the army, or the distribution of the army that we propose, than it could be from the army as it now is. There can be no doubt that the duty of garrisoning Afghanistan will not be popular with the regular Native troops, and that, if the occupation of the country is of any duration, constant reliefs of regiments will be called for, which will involve the maintenance in India of a number of regiments extra to the present establishment. We presume, therefore, that, if Afghanistan is to be occupied for any great length of time, a matter on which, as far as we know at present, no decision has been arrived at, regiments will be specially raised in India, and perhaps to some extent in Afghanistan itself, for local service in that country, thus obviating the necessity of a sytem of constant relief from the regular Native army.

Reduction of Native regiments to be postponed.

6. We would venture to suggest that any actual reduction of Native regiments should not, if our proposals are accepted, be carried into effect until the question of the future occupation of Afghanistan has been finally settled. We are of opinion

opinion that, if possible, regiments which have done good service in the late war should not be selected for reduction.

7. Our recommendations in respect to the changes which we propose in the various branches of military administration and organization detailed, will be found under the following heads: Heads of report.

The maintenance of internal order, Chapter III.
The strength, distribution, and general organization of the army for peace and war, Chapter IV.
The military administration of India, Chapter V.
The organization of the British Army in India, Chapter VI.
The organization of the Native Army, Chapter VII.
The officering of the Native Army, Chapter VIII.
The organization of the Medical Service in India, Chapter IX.
The Departments of the Army, Chapter X.:—

Commissariat and Clothing, Section 1.
Transport, Section 2.
Ordnance Department, Section 3.
Military Works and Barrack Departments, Section 4.
Remount and Veterinary Departments, Section 5.
Military Account Department, Section 6.

The lines of communication in India, Chapter XI.
The mobilization of the Army for war, Chapter XII.

CHAPTER II.

THE RISE, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRESENT STATE OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

8. THE existing organisation of the three armies of India has been to such a great extent the result of historical association and tradition, that a brief abstract of the various stages through which each army has passed since its first formation, may tend to a clearer comprehension of its present position. In the early days of the East India Company, when the English settlements in India were confined to small tracks round four or five factories, the armed servants of the Company consisted of a few European guards, and of 200 or 300 Natives at each factory. As the Company's agents extended their territories, their forces increased in numbers and improved in discipline. From the year 1644 A.D., when Fort St. George was built and garrisoned, until 1748, when the first European and Native regiments were formed, the troops of the East India Company consisted of small European and Native detachments. The Native soldiers were commanded by Natives, some of whom, especially in Southern India, distinguished themselves by remarkable courage and skill. Early soldiers of the East India Company.

9. In 1744–48 the Company's soldiers in Madras and Bombay were formed into battalions, the first European regiment being organised at Madras, and the Native soldiery being formed into battalions of 1,000 strong, with an European officer at the head of each. The Madras European and Native regiments were, at a very early period, employed on distant and active service; for, in the year 1757, they were sent to Bengal and helped to fight the battle of Plassy. The honours of that field were shared by Her Majesty's 39th Foot, the first Royal regiment that ever came to India, which bears now on its colours the legend *Primus in Indis*. About the time of Plassy the first of the Bengal Native regiments was organised. And in the 40 years of constant warfare and increase of territory which followed 1757, the three armies of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, though they occasionally acted in concert, remained distinct from each other, and were managed by the several Governments of the three Presidencies. During the long wars of the Carnatic, and in the fierce campaigns against Mysore, Native troops of the Madras and other armies displayed endurance, loyalty, and courage, though they were often many months in arrears of pay, Indian army from 1744 to 1794.

 though

though they encountered many privations, and though the history of the Native army during those 40 years was chequered by mutiny and disaster. Not only did the disciplined troops of the East India Company vanquish superior Native forces, led by Hyder Ali's and Tippoo's best captains, but they fought side by side with the King's English foot and horse; and they met the European soldiers of the French in the days when France was contending with England for supremacy in India. At the end of this period, that is to say, in the year 1794, the British forces in India consisted of about 16,000 Europeans and 82,000 Natives.

From 1796 to 1823.

10. In the year 1796 the Indian armies were re-organised; the Native troops were formed into regular regiments of the line, with an increased number of European officers to each corps, while regular territorial commands were formed and distributed between the officers of the King's army and the servants of the Company. For the next 30 years India remained in a state of chronic war. The power of the Moslem princes of Mysore was shattered in 1798 at Seringapatam, and Tippoo Sultan was slain; the Mahratta Confederacy was broken on the field of Assaye; the Pindari hordes were successfully put down, and the hardy mountaineers of Nepal were conquered. In the early years of this period the Madras army bore the brunt of the fighting; but after the Mysore power was crushed the Bombay and Bengal armies had their full share of service. In the expedition to Egypt of 1800, and on the occasions when they were captured by French cruisers and carried to the Isle of France, the sepoys of the Bombay army proved their loyalty and endurance, even when employed beyond the sea. During this period Madras sent to the siege of Seringapatam, in 1798, a column of 5,000 European and 14,000 Native troops, with 64 field-guns; and in the year 1808 the English forces in India had reached a total of 24,500 Europeans and 154,500 Natives. By the end of this period the supreme authority of the Governor General over all the military affairs to the two lesser presidencies of Madras and Bombay had been firmly established; but the Madras and Bombay armies were still under their respective Governments and Commanders in chief; and the three armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, though they fought together in several campaigns, garrisoned distinct territories, drew their recruits from separate provinces, and were in fact distinct armies.

From 1824 to 1857.

11. After the year 1824 the army of Madras had comparatively little fighting, except in the Burmese wars. The Bombay army shared in the successes, and escaped the disasters of the first Afghan war; it subdued the province of Sind, took part in the Mooltan campaign, and sent a force to Persia. But the chief extensions of territory, and the campaigns of which these extensions were the result, occurred in the Bengal Presidency. On the Bengal army fell the brunt of the Cabul and Punjab wars, and on that army lay the duty of garrisoning the new provinces. The Madras army was found to be too large for the protection of the peaceful territories of the southern presidency; it took therefore the duty of garrisoning Burma, as well as the Hyderabad, and some of the Central India stations. The Bengal and Bombay regiments of the line, on the other hand, were found insufficient for the territory to be occupied, and for the duty to be done. Accordingly the strength of the Bengal regiments was raised, and irregular regiments of horse and foot were added to the strength of the Bengal and Bombay armies. These irregular corps differed from the regiments of the line, as will be more particularly explained hereafter, in that they possessed only one-sixth the full number of European officers, and were considerably cheaper than the line regiments. These irregular regiments consisted mainly of men belonging to the warlike races of the Delhi territory, of the Punjab, of the Afghan border, and of the Nepal hills; and to them was committed the duty of guarding the north-west frontier of the Company's dominions. The regular army of Bengal consisted mainly of Rajputs and Brahmans of Oudh and Hindustan, men of fine physique and soldierly bearing, who had fought bravely for the Company for 100 years, from Cuddalore, on the Coromandel coast, up to the city of Cabul. Besides the regular and irregular regiments of the Company's three armies, there were several contingents, maintained for the protection and at the expense of Native States. These contingents were commanded and disciplined by British officers, and they drew their recruits, for the most part, from the same classes and districts from which men were enlisted for the Bengal regiments of the line. At the end of 1856 the

the British forces in India consisted of 39,375 Europeans and 214,985 Natives, besides the soldiers of the contingents paid by, and serving in, Native States.

Mutiny of 1857.

12. In the year 1857, the great majority of the Bengal regiments of the line, and some of the irregular regiments and contingents, mutinied against the Government which they had served so long and faithfully. Into the causes and circumstances of the mutiny of the Bengal army we need not enter. The irregular regiments of the Punjab remained faithful, and these troops aided the slender European garrison of that province to wrest the fortress of Delhi from the mutineers. Fresh British regiments came from England, and the armies of Madras and Bombay assisted in stamping out rebellion and restoring order. Before the mutiny campaigns were over, the old Bengal army had practically ceased to exist; the British garrison of India had been raised to over 70,000 men; the government of India was transferred from the East India Company to Her Majesty the Queen; the European troops of the Company became part of Her Majesty's army; and the whole field artillery of India was manned by British, instead of by Native, soldiers. The British officers of the three armies were offered the choice, which most of them accepted, of joining three staff corps, which were to furnish officers for all Native regiments, for departments of the army, and for other duties outside the scope of ordinary military work. The Punjab regiments and levies not required for guarding the frontier, with the few Bengal corps which had remained faithful, and certain levies recently raised in Hindustan, became the new army of Bengal. The new regiments of the Bengal line were all organised on the so-called "irregular" footing; and the numbers of the Native troops in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, were kept very much below the totals that had existed before the mutiny.

Indian armies up to 1877.

13. During the 20 years following the mutiny, India was not the scene of any general war, though expeditions were sent to China, to Abyssinia, and to the Malay peninsula. On the north-western, and on the north-eastern frontier, little wars and expeditions constantly took place; and some of these affairs, such as the Ambeyla and Bhootan campaigns, occupied many troops and caused some difficulty. Since the reconstruction which followed the mutiny, the chief changes of organisation have been the extension of the "irregular" system to the armies of Madras and Bombay. Under the "irregular" system as finally settled in 1863, and applied to all three armies seven British officers were attached to each Native regiment, instead of 25 under the system of the line regiments, and instead of three as under the irregular system before the mutiny. European officers commanded squadrons and wings of regiments; while Native officers commanded troops and companies. In 1874–75 the strength of European officers with Native regiments was increased by the addition of one or two probationers to each corps, who were to take the place of officers absent on furlough or other duty.

Superior commands and system of administration unchanged.

14. The superior commands and the management of the Indian armies remain as they were before the mutiny. The supreme control of all the armies is vested by law in the Governor General in Council and the Commander in Chief in India; but the armies of Madras and Bombay are commanded by local Commanders in Chief, and are in some degree directed by the Local Governments of those presidencies; while the Punjab Frontier Force is under the immediate orders of the Local Government of the Punjab.

Review of the Native army system in 1872–76.

15. In the years 1872–76 especial consideration was given by Her Majesty's Government, and by the Government of India, to the questions whether the system of officering the Native army could not be improved, and whether the position of Native officers and sepoys was all that it should be. After much discussion it was finally decided that the "irregular" system had succeeded, and should be upheld; that seven British officers to a regiment, with one or two probationers in place of absentees, gave a sufficient strength of officers for field service; that the Native officers, when well selected, were quite competent to command troops and companies; and that the pay and pensions of Native officers and sepoys required some increase, on the ground that the cost of living had increased considerably during the previous 20 years. In consequence of these decisions, certain increases of pay and allowances were given to the Native officers and sepoys; the pension rules were revised; and the rates of pension were increased in the case of Native officers, the term within which a long

long service pension could be earned being also reduced from 40 to 32 years. The only decision of the Government of India passed on the subject of the Native army organisation in 1876, to which effect was not given, was the rule that an European officer, on the completion of 31 years' service, should not retain any regimental appointment which he had held for five years. The operation of this most salutary rule was postponed until the question of compulsory retirement among officers of Her Majesty's British army had been settled by the Home Government.

Strength and cost of Indian armies in 1878.

16. On the 1st July 1878, that is to say, before the recent complications with Cabul, the Indian armies consisted of 6,002 British officers, 60,341 British and 123,254 Native soldiers.* The cost of this army amounts, in round numbers, to about 17 millions sterling (or 17 crores of rupees), including charges on account of loss by exchange of military expenditure in England, as well as the outlay on military works. The total revenues of India from which these army charges have to be met are 63¼ millions sterling (63¼ crores of rupees). In considering how the great cost of the Indian army can best be reduced, and more funds set free for material improvement, we have borne in mind the words of Sir John Malcolm in 1832, which are as true now as when he wrote them—

"Our Eastern empire has been acquired, and must be maintained, by the sword. It has no foundation, and is not capable of having any made, that can divest it of that character; and if the local army of India, but above all the Native branch, is not preserved in a condition which, while it maintains its efficiency, preserves its attachment, no commercial, financial, fiscal, or judicial systems we may improve, or introduce, can be of permanent benefit. The success of these must depend upon the continuance of internal tranquillity and exemption from foreign war. . . . It is, therefore, to the army of India we must look for the means we possess, not only of maintaining our power, but of preserving the great benefits we have already conferred, or may hereafter confer, upon the millions subject to our authority. No considerations, therefore, should ever induce us to forget for one moment the paramount and vital importance of our military power."

CHAPTER III.

THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL ORDER.

Duties of the Indian army.

17. THE purposes for which the army of India must be maintained may be stated to be—

(*a.*) Preventing and repelling attacks, or threatened aggressions, from foreign enemies beyond our border;

(*b.*) Making successful armed disturbance, or rebellion, within British India, or its feudatory States, impossible;

(*c.*) Watching and overawing the armies of feudatory Native States.

Nearly two-thirds of the border of the Indian Empire is protected by the sea. So long as Great Britain is mistress of the seas, the sea-coast of India is protected by the fleet of England, and the Indian army need provide only for defences at four or five sea-ports. The external foes which the Indian army may have to meet on its land frontier are Russia and Afghanistan on the north-west; Nepal or Bhootan on the north-east; wild tribes of the Assam, Cachar, and Arracan border on the east; and Burma on the south-east. It is not probable that India will come in contact with China or Persia on the land frontier of British India for some time to come. For operations against Russia, or Afghanistan assisted by Russia, a force of two army corps, or 50,000 to 60,000 fighting-men, might possibly be necessary. No one has ever suggested that the army of India should be maintained at a strength necessary to put into the field a larger force than this. Two divisions of all arms would probably suffice for the requirements of a war with Nepal; while, against other external foes, a single division of all arms would, if communications were maintained, be enough.

18. In

* Estimates, 1878–79, exclusive of the Hyderabad Contingent.

18. In another part of this report, we show that besides the permanent obligatory garrisons, which ought not to be moved, our distribution of the Indian army will enable the Government to employ on distant operations two army-corps consisting of 58,000 men of all arms and 180 guns. When two field army-corps of the above-named strength take the field there will still remain, for the garrisons of the interior and frontier of British India, and for support of troops in the field, an approximate strength * of 39,600 British soldiers, and 75,800 Native soldiers, with 220 guns. When the organisation of reserves, as proposed by us, is completed, there will, in addition, be 19,200 available Native soldiers, of the first reserve, and nearly 40,000 of the second reserve of pensioners. There will also be available, for the internal defence of the country, over 7,000 enrolled volunteers, all drilled and armed, of whom about three-fourths may be reckoned as "efficient." Strength of obligatory garrisons.

19. We consider that this force, composed of the home garrisons, the reserves, and the volunteers, would suffice to maintain order in British and feudatory India, and on the frontier, in the event of the whole force available for field service being moved out of India for a few months. The home forces would be cantoned at different obligatory places on the railway lines; and at each large garrison sufficient means of transport would be constantly maintained to enable a moveable column of all arms to take the field for local service in the neighbourhood at twenty-four hours' notice, or to move with the troops by railway to any threatened point of the Empire. Their sufficiency.

20. It must be recollected that, though the maintenance of tranquillity, and the safety of the British Government in India, depend ultimately, on the existence of a military force, with a sufficient proportion of British troops and guns, yet the duty of preserving order, of protecting property, and of quelling disturbance, rests primarily on the civil police, who are employed by the Civil Governments. In the several provinces of British India, with their population of 192 millions of people, the strength of the regular police, rural and municipal, is 157,999, of whom 3,158 are mounted constables; 54,720 of the police are armed with muskets or rifles; the rest carry only swords or batons. All of these police are controlled by British officers; they are partially drilled to use arms, but they are for the most part scattered in small numbers over the country. On parts of the eastern and northern frontiers, the police are well drilled and organised, and some of them are armed with breech-loading rifles. The cost of this police force is 2,511,000 *l.*, of which 346,000 *l.* are contributed by municipal and local funds. The regular police are aided in the execution of their duties by the village police, of whom there are, approximately, 700,000 distributed over the 510,808 towns and villages of British India. These rural police are paid, partly by grants of land and partly by money and grain contributions from the villagers and townspeople whose houses and goods are protected. That the regular and village police, supported as they are by a strong military force in the background, are ordinarily sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace and order in British India, will be apparent from the subjoined statement showing the number of times troops have been called out † to repress or prevent internal Police force maintain civil order.

* In addition to the ordinary garrison of India there are the following local corps, all of which are efficient troops, organised on the irregular system, and commanded by European officers, namely :—

4 batteries of field artillery, with four guns each, 4 regiments of cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry,	of the Hyderabad Contingent.
2 regiments of Central India Horse, 4 regiments of local infantry, namely, the Malwa Bheel Corps, the Bhopal Battalion, the Meywar Bheel Corps, and the Mhairwarra Battalion, 2 regiments composed of cavalry and infantry, namely, the Deolee and the Erinpoorah Forces,	belonging to Rajputana and Central India.

† Even when troops are called out to suppress riots, a very small force often suffices. When acknowledging (on the 16th January 1879) a report from the Government of Bombay concerning certain riots in the city of Surat, the Viceroy in Council said—"As regards the conduct of the Native troops, his Excellency the Governor General in Council considers that the Subadar, Deojee Kuddum, and his men of the 17th Native Infantry, acted with forbearance and judgment in the presence of a great crowd of excited rioters; and that they were, under the circumstances, justified in firing on the mob when two shots had come from the crowd and several of the soldiers had been disabled by other missiles. The history of the Surat riots shows that an Indian popular outbreak, even in a city with traditions of disorder like Surat (paragraph 13 of your present letter) melts away instantaneously before a small party of Native soldiers immediately they fire a volley of ball cartridge. It would also seem, if we may form a judgment from the behaviour of this Subadar and his party of fifteen men, that Native soldiers, under a Native leader, act with moderation and coolness in the presence of an angry attacking mob one hundred times their own number, and that the Native soldiery are thoroughly on the side of law and order." It may be well to add that the volley which dispersed the rioters injured six men, of whom two died and three were only slightly hurt.

internal disturbance in the several provinces of the Empire. The statement does not include expeditions or affairs against tribes on or beyond the Beluchistan, Punjab, Bhootan, Assam, Chittagong, Arracan, or Burmese frontiers :—

See Appendix V.

PROVINCE.	Number of Times Troops have been called out to prevent or repress internal Disturbance in British India, or Feudatory States, during the Twenty Years from 1860 to 1879.
Madras	6
Bombay	7
Bengal and Assam	6
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	4
Punjab	Not received.
Central Provinces	ditto.
British Burmah	5 †
Mysore	1
Berar and Nizam's country	2
Rajputana States	5
Central India States	10

Enquiries regarding condition of Indian populations.

21. The Government of India, in a circular dated the 7th July 1879, called upon the several Local Governments to furnish the Commission with full particulars regarding—

(*a.*) Strength of Native population.

(*b.*) Strength of European and Eurasian population (exclusive of army).

(*c.*) State of popular feeling.

(*d.*) Elements of danger.

(*e.*) Strength of police.

(*f.*) Distribution of police.

(*g.*) Efficiency of police.

(*h.*) European and Eurasian population considered as—

(1.) Strength as regards their combatant power and capability to maintain order;

(2.) Weakness with regard to the necessity for providing for the safety of non-combatants, women and children;

(3.) Of possible greater utility than at present, if organised for the maintenance of order in case of disturbance.

(*i.*) Question of compulsory enrolment.

(*j.*) Development of volunteer system.

The replies to these questions will be found *in extenso* in Appendix II. to this Report. Some of the answers are too important and weighty to be abstracted here; at the same time it is desirable to furnish some review of the facts stated, and opinions expressed, in the answers to this Circular.

Population.

22. The population of British India is 192 millions, and the population of the feudatory Native States is 53 millions. In no part of British India do the people carry arms; a small proportion only possess arms; and, in most provinces, the mass of the population has, for one or more generations, been unaccustomed to their use. In Native States, on the other hand, most people, who can afford any luxury or show, possess arms of some kind.

23. The

† All jail outbreaks.

23. The state of popular feeling towards the British Government, and the elements of danger in the several provinces, are thus described. In Madras the population are passively loyal and contented; danger might arise from the kindling of Muhammadan feeling, in the event of our being at war with any Moslem power; but excessive taxation, arbitrary misuse of power by subordinate Government officers, and needless interference with established customs, rather than religious fanaticism, are more likely to cause active disaffection in Southern India. State of feeling in Madras.

24. In Bombay the peasantry are generally well-disposed and loyal; but a martial spirit still survives in them, and they have a sort of excitability which tends to violence. There are sundry hill-tribes always ready for mischief and capable of doing it. The hilly fastnesses of the country make operations against disturbers of the peace difficult. Among the educated classes there is a sprinkling of restless, intriguing plotters. The many Native States scattered all over the presidency may, in troublous times, be centres of political mischief, though the Chiefs themselves are loyal. His Excellency Sir Richard Temple sums up the elements of danger in the Bombay Presidency in these words:— In Bombay;

"Political ambition among certain classes which can hardly be satisfied under British rule.

"A certain degree of disaffection, which, though very partial, is not likely to be removed, or even mitigated, by any remedies which a foreign Government can adopt.

"A Native aristocracy which has unavoidably suffered in wealth and position by the introduction of foreign rule.

"Clusters of lesser Native States inside the presidency, which, despite the personal loyalty of the Chiefs, might, indeed probably would, become centres of political intrigue in event of general disturbance.

"Certain tribes, such as Bhils, Kolis, Ramoshis, Waghirs, and others, either inclined occasionally to lawlessness and violence, or else of a predatory disposition hardly corrigible."

25. In the territories under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, the people are peaceable and quiet. The influential landholding classes have prospered greatly for three generations of British rule. The educated classes, though they feel aspirations after national freedom, do not wish ill to the British Government; and they are really loyal to the British Queen and nation, notwithstanding the exaggerated and violent tone of criticism of the acts of Government and its officers to be found in the columns of some of the vernacular journals. Though there are 20 millions of Muhammadans in Bengal Proper, though the reforming sect of the Ferazis (or Wahabis) has many followers in Eastern Bengal, though there is ill-will between Moslem ryots and Hindu landlords, and though the populations of the Delta districts occasionally take the law into their own hands, yet the people of Eastern Bengal are a prosperous and quiet race, very unlikely to cause danger to the British Government, or employment to the Indian army. In the troubles of 1857-58, the district of Arrah (Shahabad) was, for several months, the scene of rebellion. But the woody fastnesses of Jugdispore are converted into a garden; and the people of South Behar are now as quiet as any in India. The Sonthals, and some of the aboriginal tribes of Chota, Nagpore, and Orissa, have given trouble in past times, and are not yet free from a tendency to become excited on very small provocation. But the exhibition of excitability of this kind is growing rarer; the tribes are settling down quietly; the Sonthal country is pierced by two railways and by many roads; and, unless a time of general anarchy came, no serious cause for anxiety is likely to arise in Bengal. If the British power were exposed to danger elsewhere, the provinces of Bengal Proper could be kept quiet with a smaller garrison than any other large province of the Empire. In Bengal;

26. In the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, British rule received, during the troubles of 1857-58, severer and more permanent shocks than in any other part of India. The Lieutenant Governor of these provinces reports that the general feeling on the part of the great landholders and of the trading classes toward the Government is loyal; self-interest, more or less enlightened, teaches them that the strong hand of British power secures to them their dignity, their position, and their property. Among the great mass of the rural population the general feeling is said to be one of contented indifference. The lower stratum of the Muhammadan urban population, the dispossessed landholders, the preda- In the North-Western Provinces and Oudh;

tory classes, and perhaps the cadets of old Muhammadan families, are the only sections of the people who really dislike British rule. The Lieutenant Governor adds an expression of his opinion that the recent increases of direct taxation, the decrease in the personal influence of district officers, and the complexity of our judicial and legislative systems are, or may become, distinct sources of danger to British rule.

In the Punjab;

27. The Punjab is the home of the most martial races of India, and is the nursery of our best soldiers. It is, therefore, peculiarly satisfactory that the Lieutenant Governor and his officers should be able to report that the state of feeling towards the Government is excellent in this province; and that among chiefs and people, traders and peasantry, Sikhs and Musalmans, there is much real, hearty, active loyalty and good-will towards the British Government. The Lieutenant Government considers that the people of the Punjab will remain well-disposed to individual Englishmen and loyal to the Government so long as they are ruled with justice and consideration. He believes that the elements of danger to British rule lie in the increase of taxation, burdening the people beyond its strength, and in unsympathetic legislation, subversive of native custom and undemanded by the voice of the people.

In British Burma;

28. The Chief Commissioner of Burma reports that the majority of the respectable classes are contented with our rule, and would be unwilling to see it disturbed. Though there is no enthusiasm on their part for British rule, yet the people feel that they have prospered marvellously since annexation; and, under ordinary circumstances there is no quieter or more peaceful quarter of Her Majesty's Eastern Dominions than the province of British Burma. At the same time, the Chief Commissioner says that there is an element of danger in the unsteady and excitable character of the people, among whom the prestige of the Court of Ava is very great, and on whom disturbances or troubles on the Mandalay border might re-act in an inconvenient and mischievous fashion.

In the Central Provinces.

29. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces reports that the towns and villages of the Nagpore and Nerbudda country are remarkably free from the restless, unemployed class who are ever ready to give trouble in some other parts of India; that among the agricultural population there is no section who are bound together against the Government by any fancied tie of common interest; and that the people are quiet and law-abiding. He says that, in guarding against future disorder, the large semi-aboriginal population, and the extensive chiefships (covering 30,000 square miles of country), with their half-educated chiefs and uncivilized people, cannot be left altogether out of account.

Efficiency of the Police Force.

30. The total strength of the regular police, rural and urban, has been stated to be 157,999 according to the latest returns for all the provinces of India; of these, 21,313 are engaged on the duty of guarding jails and treasuries, or of escorting prisoners and treasure; 32,055 constitute the police of municipal towns; and about 104,000 are employed in keeping the peace in the country at large. The police force is distributed over the country with reference to the density and character of the population, and to the physical features of the country and the lines of communication. The proportion of police to the population ranges from one constable to 2,315 people among the quiet inhabitants of Bengal, to 1,159 among the martial but orderly races of the Punjaub, to 950 among the Bombay population, and to 447 people among the excitable races of British Burma. In Madras the police force is said to be deficient in European officers, insufficient in strength, and without an adequate force of mounted men. It is efficient for ordinary constable's duty, but unfitted to cope with armed resistance. In Bombay the police, without the assistance of troops, are not able to repress armed resistance, and have been found unable to cope with the robbers of Western India on their own hilly ground. On the Bengal, Assam, and Cachar borders, the frontier police are an excellent body of men, fit for any duty; and the Chief Commissioner of Assam, very rightly, in our opinion, proposes, on financial grounds, to employ frontier police more largely on the border posts, and to leave the regular troops concentrated at stations, whence they can be directed upon any threatened point of the extensive eastern border. The mass of the Bengal police, among whom are a proportion of sturdy men of Northern

Northern India, are sufficient for all ordinary requirements. The police of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh are men of manly race; they cope efficiently with the predatory tribes and the organised robber bands which infest parts of those territories, and which abound in the borderland between British and Native districts west of the river Jumna. The Lieutenant-Governor considers the police of the Punjab to be, in physique and warlike spirit, equal to many Native regiments; on occasions they have done valuable service in frontier complications; and the Local Government considers that they would form a valuable reserve for the regular army. In Burma the police of the Arracan frontier are a well-drilled and efficient body of men, principally foreigners from the Nepal hills. The police of the Pegu frontier are able to repel robber bands; if massed together and commanded by Europeans, they would, the Chief Commissioner considers, be able to act successfully against considerably larger forces from the kingdom of Mandalay. On the whole, we gather that outside the Punjab, the North-Western Provinces, and Oudh, the frontier police are the only body which can, unaided, repress any considerable armed disturbance. It therefore follows that the military garrison of the country must be ever ready to aid the police when need arises. At the same time we are satisfied that a very small body of troops, if moved to any spot before trouble spreads, will suffice to repress local disturbances. And we consider that the home army, or obligatory garrisons, possessed as they will be of standing means of transport ready for instant use, will suffice to maintain peace in British India and in the great majority of feudatory States.

Civil population of Europeans and Eurasians.

31. The question of utilising the European and Eurasion population to help in guarding obligatory points, or large settlements of Europeans, in time of trouble, has been discussed in the reports received from the Local Governments. The total European and Eurasian civil population, exclusive of the Indo-Portuguese, of British India is—

PROVINCE.	Number of British Subjects, European and Eurasian, of all Ages and Sexes, exclusive of Officers and Soldiers of the Army.
Madras	41,021
Bombay	11,789
Bengal	30,839
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	16,794
Punjab	7,362
Central Provinces	5,767
British Burma	8,360
Mysore and Coorg	6,222
TOTAL	128,154
Add, Europeans or Americans not being British Subjects	6,189
GRAND TOTAL	134,343

Volunteer Corps.

32. From among the European and Eurasian population, 25 corps of volunteer infantry, one of volunteer artillery, and one of volunteer cavalry have been formed. The enrolled strength of these volunteer corps is over 7,000 men, of whom about three-fourths are efficient. Out of the enrolled strength, about 2,500 are servants of the several Railway Companies and State Railways. These railway employés would, in time of trouble, be wanted for professional duty on the railways; but they could nevertheless be of much service in defending fortified places at the principal railway junctions and termini. All the "efficient" volunteers have passed their drill, have qualified in rifle practice, and can act as light infantry. The only volunteer horse are the Behar Mounted Rifles. This corps consists chiefly of indigo planters, all of whom are well mounted and, as a rule, excellent riders. All the Local Governments advise that greater encouragement should be given to induce Europeans and Eurasians to join the nearest volunteer

volunteer corps. But we do not find any suggestions as to the manner in which such encouragement can best be given. The Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Provinces is the only chief of a Local Government who recommends any compulsory enrolment of civilian Europeans and Eurasians in a militia. He considers that such compulsion on persons not connected with Government would be impossible and undesirable. But he advises that all European and Eurasian clerks, and other subordinates in the civil employ of Government, should be bound, as a condition of their service, to enlist and qualify in the nearest volunteer corps. We are not prepared to support this proposal.

Further encouragement to volunteer movement.

33. We have considered what further encouragement the Government could usefully give to the volunteers. At present, arms and accoutrements are provided; headmoney at 20 rupees a year is allowed for each efficient volunteer, with an additional grant of 10 rupees for each extra efficient; and the Government sanctions a paid adjutant and drill sergeants when the number of efficient men in a corps is sufficient to warrant such appointments. We are not prepared to say that the grant should be increased; for, if the uniform is simple and cheap, the headmoney, with such contributions as the wealthier members are always glad to make, suffices for the absolute necessities of a volunteer corps. But we think that Government should be ready to make extra grants to really efficient corps towards any necessary expenditure for corps purposes. At the same time, the Government should insist on the uniform being simple and cheap, so that service with volunteers might in no case impose outlay on the less wealthy members of a corps. There is now much difficulty in getting good drill sergeants to leave their regiments for employment with volunteers. Proposals for making the duty more attractive have been laid before the Government, and we recommend them for favourable consideration. At small stations it will often be impossible to get up even a small squad of volunteers. But we consider that, wherever a Local Government is able to organise a sufficient number of small squads at a variety of small stations, a sergeant should be deputed to visit and drill such squads during a part of the year. Arms and the usual headmoney should be sanctioned for such squads, which would be affiliated to the nearest volunteer corps. Even if these squads acted together only once in five years, still they would have arms and know how to use them, and they would possess some sort of discipline; in time of general trouble, two or three such squads would suffice to defend a central rallying place, into which European families might be gathered together.

Places of refuge at civil stations in the interior.

34. The provision of rallying-places, or defensible places of refuge at outstations in the interior of the country, has frequently been under the consideration of the Government of India. We have no doubt that such defensible places could be held by a few volunteer rifles for days, provided neither food nor water failed the defenders. We do not however recommend that such posts be constructed all over the country. In times of such general danger as would make the use of these posts necessary, the civil officers would ordinarily be called in, and it would be difficult to detach troops to relieve a large number of isolated posts. We would apply to such cases the suggestion made by us in respect to important railways and junctions. Plans should be drawn up and approved by the Permanent Defence Committee, for constructing round the most defensible building in the station, a tracing such as could be made in a few hours with the materials on the spot, and which, while including a water-supply and a place for storing food, should not be too large for defence by the limited numbers, who would rally into it. Drawings and specifications of such works, with full directions for the measures to be taken for their construction, should be lodged in a head-quarter office, and in the chief civil office of the station, where it might be required to construct it, and each Local Government should hold some selected officer responsible for seeing that this is done. Beyond this, we do not think that anything is required.

Military force of Native States.

35. It has been stated above that one of the duties of the Imperial army of India is the watching and overawing the armies of feudatory Native States. It cannot be overlooked that these armies are, or may become, elements of danger to the British power. His Excellency Sir Richard Temple writes that the presence of armed bands on the Bombay border, under the chieftains of the Hyderabad

Hyderabad country, constitutes a source of danger, which must not be forgotten in troublous times. The Madras Government adverts to the armed forces of the Nizam of Hyderabad as a danger, to provide against which special garrisons must be maintained in British territory. In our proposals for the distribution of the Indian army, we have felt obliged to allot to Secunderabad, the British cantonment near Hyderabad, a force of 3,233 European troops, 3,560 Native troops, and 24 guns, in addition to a portion of the Hyderabad Contingent, because a smaller force would not suffice to overawe the city of Hyderabad and the large force which the Nizam of Hyderabad and his principal nobles constantly maintain. Treaty engagements with the Nizam compel the British Government to maintain a considerable force at Secunderabad. But the strength of the troops kept by the Nizam and his nobles compels us to propose a larger garrison than treaty engagements require, and prevents the British Government from seeking to revise the treaty, so as to permit of the Secunderabad force being reduced in numbers and cost. We have, under these circumstances, been constrained to review the condition of the armies maintained by Native States, and the relation of these armies to the British garrisons in India. In considering these matters, we have been greatly helped by a valuable report on the armament of Native States, furnished by a committee of military and political officers in 1877. We find that the Native States, with a population of 53 millions of people, and a total revenue of 18 millions sterling, maintain armed forces aggregating 381,000 men, of whom 69,000 are cavalry and 10,964 artillery. They possess 2,698 serviceable guns, very few of which, however, are manned, and horsed field guns. In these totals are reckoned the police of the States, and the armed rabble which compose the following of the petty chieftains among whom the territories of the Rajputana and some other Native States are parcelled out. The Rajputana Native armies are reckoned at 106,000 men with 1,466 serviceable guns. But only a very few thousands of these are regular troops, and none of the guns are equipped for the field. The Rajputana troops are, for the most part, a feudal militia who obey their own petty lairds rather than the Chief of the State; they could never act together; it is questionable if any large number of them would ever act against the British Government; and they can hardly be considered to be a source of danger to British rule. None of the Mahratta or Kattywar States, or of the minor Hindu and Moslem States, subject to the two exceptions noted below, south of the Sutlej, possess a military force capable, in its present condition, of causing uneasiness to the Empire. The troops of the Sikh States are composed of good material; they are well officered; and they have on occasions done excellent service for the British Crown. The soldiery of these States are devoted to their Chiefs, who are conspicuously loyal, and are bound to the British Government by mutual good-will and good offices, which have extended unbroken over many years. In Chapter VII. will be found an expression of our view that some of these Native armies can be usefully employed as contingents in war time; that they ought not to form part of the Imperial army, or of the reserves; and that they ought not to be brigaded with our troops, or cantoned in British territory during time of peace.

Forces of the Maharaja of Gwalior.

36. The only Native armies which, from their numbers, discipline, and organisation, require watching at the hands of the British Government, are the armies of Maharaja Scindia, the Gwalior Chief, and of the Nizam of Hyderabad in the Deccan. The Gwalior army consists of 48 guns, 480 artillerymen, 5,000 infantry, and 6,000 horse; it is composed chiefly of Hindustanis from British territory; it is well organised and drilled; it possesses several fully-equipped and horsed batteries of field artillery; and the whole force is kept in a high state of efficiency and organisation. This force the Maharaja is allowed to keep under the Treaty of 1860. Personally, the Chief of Gwalior is, and has been, loyal to the British Government. In weighing the possibilities of the future, it must be remembered that the Maharaja holds sway over powerful alien clans by virtue of the Mahratta conquests at the end of the last century. The local chieftains (Thakurs), though they owe him fealty, are not very loyal subjects; in time of trouble the Maharaja might have to employ his whole force in maintaining order in his own dominions; and his successor would have little power, even if he had the will, to cause embarrassment to the British Government. If the troops of Scindia were to be largely reduced, the British Government might have to undertake the task of keeping order in Gwalior territory, and

and repressing the Thakurs. We consider that, under all the circumstances, interference with the Maharaja Scindia's army is not necessary, so long as its strength is kept within the numerical limits imposed by treaty, and so long as its armament is not materially improved.

Army of the Nizam of Hyderabad.

37. With the army of the Hyderabad State the case is different. The total armed force maintained by this single State is returned at over 45,580 men.* Many of these troops are foreign mercenaries from remote parts of India, and from the Afghan highlands beyond our northern frontier, who take service under the Nizam and his chiefs, engage in faction fights and raids within his territory, and have recently shown themselves ready to join any discontented men who may be willing to pay them for raiding into British districts. This soldiery, for the most part ill-organised and riotous, could never stand against Imperial troops, and could hardly prove a source of danger to the British Government, though they constantly harass the Nizam's subjects, and occasionally annoy the peaceful peasantry of the British Deccan. But during the minority of the present Nizam, the Co-regent of Hyderabad has been re-organising and improving a part of the Nizam's forces. When this re-organisation was first proposed in 1862, the British Government agreed to the measure on the distinct understanding that the reformed troops should not exceed two batteries of artillery, two regiments of infantry, and two squadrons of cavalry, and on the further understanding that the irregular levies should be reduced. In 1876 this understanding had been so far transgressed, that the reformed and reorganised troops had reached a total of 7,443 men with three batteries of artillery. More recently the work of bringing all the irregular troops up to the standard of the reformed troops has been actively pushed on. These troops are, for the most part, kept near the capital. Save for the maintenance of the Nizam's dignity, there is no work for these troops that could not be adequately performed by the Hyderabad Contingent, which is maintained by the British Government for the use of the Nizam under treaty engagements. At the same time that these improvements in the organisation of the Nizam's troops were proceeding, the Co-regent established a factory whence breech-loading ordnance and rifles were turned out. We consider it to be absolutely clear that these large forces, these reformed troops, and these appliances for manufacturing improved weapons cannot possibly be needed for maintaining the peace of the Hyderabad territory, or for upholding the dignity of the Nizam. So long as the British power stands, no external foe can injure or threaten the Nizam or his people. If his chiefs rebel, or his people are riotous, the police of the country can be supported by the troops of the Hyderabad Contingent, and by the subsidiary force, a force of 3,233 Europeans and 10,641 Natives of all arms, with 40 guns, all of which are stationed in the Nizam's territory, and a portion of which are ready to move at twenty-four hours' notice to any part of the territory where disturbances may arise. We recommend that, in justice to the people of the southern districts of British India, who are threatened by the enormous mercenary levies of the Nizam's Government; in justice to the Indian treasury, which has to maintain large forces to overawe these troops; and in justice to the Nizam's own subjects, who have to support these large bodies of soldiers, the British Government should take measures to induce the Nizam's Government gradually to curtail the irregular levies maintained under various names all over the Hyderabad country, and to restrict the reformed troops to such moderate numbers as may be required† to support the dignity of the Nizam and to keep order among the population of the city of Hyderabad. We are assured that there are, in the settled population of the Nizam's territories, no elements of chronic disorder or possible resistance to the central authority; that there are no unruly classes or turbulent nobles, and no strongholds held by other than the Nizam's officers. If the loose bands of foreign mercenaries were reduced to the number and equipment needed for the effective police of the country, and for the dignity of the State, no pretext whatever would remain for maintaining a special army in addition to the British forces and the Contingent at the capital.

38. In

* This total does not include police or the armed retainers of nobles and chiefs.

† The present Resident of Hyderabad, Sir Richard Meade, who is much versed in the ways and requirements of Native Courts, and has served as Resident at Gwalior and Indore, recommends that the reformed troops be limited to 12 guns, 1,000 cavalry, and 2,000 infantry, *plus* 2,000 men for Hyderabad city, who would be organized as police and not as soldiers.

38. In regard to the troops of Native States generally, we would add that the absence of any cohesion or common feeling between these many armies, of which the total strength is twice as large as the whole of the British and Native Imperial forces, and the fact that they possess little organized artillery, no rifled ordnance, and no breech-loading rifles, are the chief reasons why these troops do not form potential elements of danger or cause of anxiety to the British Government. The chiefs are now all loyal; but their successors may not always remain so; and, even if they do, there is no certainty that their troops will always obey them. But, so long as these forces have little field artillery and no breech-loading arms of precision, they can never stand against even small bodies of British troops. At the same time, their armament and discipline are fully sufficient to keep the peace in the territory, and to maintain the dignity, of their sovereigns. We advise that on no account should arms of precision be given to the troops of Native States, that their field artillery should be kept within the smallest possible limits, and that the British Government should take no steps to employ or exercise the contingents of different States together. Seeing that the peace of their countries, with complete freedom from external dangers, is guaranteed to all Native States by the Imperial army, we think that they owe to the paramount power the duty of restricting the number and armament of their forces, within such limits as will cause the least possible risk and anxiety to the British Empire in India.

Armament of the forces of Native States should not be improved.

CHAPTER IV.

THE STRENGTH, DISTRIBUTION, AND GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY FOR PEACE AND WAR.

The Peace Formation of the Army of India.

39. One of the first and most important questions which came before us for consideration was the territorial formation of the army of India in time of peace, its distribution, and its command; these, indeed, form the base from which all our proposals in respect to the organization of the army proceed.

The territorial formation.

40. At present there are, as has been explained already, three distinct Native armies in India with three different systems of organization, viz., the army of Bengal, which garrisons the whole country extending from the Bay of Bengal to Afghanistan; the army of Madras, which garrisons Madras, Burma, Hyderabad, the Central Provinces, and certain stations in Bengal; and the Bombay army, which garrisons Bombay, Sind, Rajputana, and Aden. It has long been felt, by those who have given the subject of the general organization of the army of India attention and consideration, that there is something anomalous and unsatisfactory in the existence of three separate armies in the same country, all serving the same Central Government. The complete amalgamation of the three armies is a measure which has been discussed for many years past, but such a step was condemned, even before the mutiny took place, and the soundness of the objections raised have been still more fully recognised since. The advocates of unification undoubtedly had strong support, even in those days of difficult communication, in the evidence they could produce as to the disjointed and extravagant nature of the military administration, in the necessity for a central power, and in the impossibility of obtaining this indispensable principle of a war system under the arrangements then, and still, in force. But though these considerations had great weight, especially with those who had watched, and studied practically, the evil effects, of the existing system, it is evident that they ignored the political effects of a complete fusion, or amalgamation, of the troops of the three presidencies. It was to this thorough fusion of the armies that the Duke of Wellington objected, with that practical wisdom which so distinguished that great soldier and statesman. But it appears to us that, in the discussions of the past, the real point at issue has gradually been lost of: the question is no longer one of amalgamating the armies of India into one large unmanageable homogeneous body, in which all national and religious differences shall be obliterated and ignored, in supersession of a system under which three armies of different nationalities are maintained. No one would, we imagine, in the present day, advocate a change of such a nature, but the question as it presents itself to us now is this, is it really true that the great principle of segregation of national divisions is preserved under the existing system, and is it necessary for the maintenance of such a principle that we should have three distinct

Three distinct armies and systems.

See Appendix VI.

distinct armies, three separate systems of military government, three sets of staff, and army departments?

Principle of separation of nationalities at present disregarded.

41. The view which we find ourselves compelled to accept is, that the political separation of nationalities, which is so essential to the safety of the Empire, is disregarded and nullified in the present arrangement of the Presidential armies, and we believe that, by a stricter recognition of that great principle, India can have a simpler, cheaper, and more scientifically constructed military organization, with far greater security than the present system gives. Our desire is to maintain the great national divisions of the army, but to systematise and re-adjust them on an intelligible principle, and we, therefore, have determined to recommend that, instead of the three Presidential armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, the armies of India should be divided into four completely separate and distinct bodies, to be called army corps, so distributed that they shall be deprived, as far as possible, of community of national sentiment and interest, and so organised, recruited, and constituted, as to act in time of excitement and disturbance, as checks each upon the other. While bringing the whole of the army corps under the general central control of the Supreme Government, we would leave the detailed administration of each a great deal more than at present under the authority of the officer commanding it. We can see no connection whatever between such a measure as that which we here propose, and the suggestion for the fusion and amalgamation of the three armies into one, which naturally called forth such opposition in former days.

Mistaken adherence to Presidential system has prevented reform.

42. We cannot help seeing that the mistaken feeling that the segregation of the various divisions of the army is, and can only continue to be preserved, under a system of three distinctly organised Presidential armies, has already had a very baneful effect upon the country, in delaying the reconstruction of the Indian military system on a simpler basis, and we find that it has also stood in the way of every proposal hitherto made by the Government of India for re-adjusting the distribution of the army to the limits really required by the present condition of the country. We, therefore, think that we are called upon to state, at some length, the reasons which have guided us to the conclusion at which we have arrived.

Reasons which have guided Commission in proposing four distinct Army Corps.

43. We quite admit that too great importance cannot be attached to the immense advantage which it has been to the State, in days gone by, to have had at its command three armies entirely unconnected by sympathy or common interest, and ordinarily serving in entirely different parts of the Empire. It must be recollected, however, that the original growth of these three armies was at first accidental, and was the natural result of military operations being conducted by the East India Company from three different points on the seaboard of the continent of India, points entirely unconnected at that time, except by sea, and which afterwards developed into the three Governments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. At the time when these three armies were formed, no other organisation was possible; for the land communication was so difficult and tedious, that central administration was practically out of the question. No one, however, can suppose that, had the organisation of an army for India come to be undertaken for the first time in the present state of India, with all its facilities of communication by telegraph and by railway, it would have taken the shape of three distinct armies under three Governments and three Commanders in Chief, with a complete set of establishments in triplicate. Being now called upon to prepare a comprehensive scheme for the re-organisation of the Indian armies on a more efficient and economical footing, and on a system more suited to the requirements of the present day, we have felt it to be our duty to suggest their reconstruction by taking from the existing system all that experience has shown us to be good, and adding such modifications as the altered conditions of the country and the progress of military science naturally demand. We have endeavoured to adapt a state of things, which has been the gradual growth of the necessities of a bye-gone age, to the present conditions and requirements of the Empire, and to bring the administration of the army on to the same lines that have been so successfully followed in re-organising, from time to time, the civil government of the country.

Neglect of principle of separation of nationalities

44. We view with regret the tendency which there has been of late years to neglect, and indeed lose sight of, the theory on which the maintenance of three separate armies of India has been so long justified. Instead of periodically re-affirming the great and important principle of localising and segregating the main divisions of the army in the areas which they should naturally

naturally occupy, and of re-adjusting these, step by step, with the growth of our possessions in India and the acquisition of fresh territory, the divisions of the army, as they naturally, and of necessity, formed themselves in the days of the early conquests of India, have been rigidly adhered to; while to meet the growing requirements of the State, the several armies have been increased far beyond local requirements, and each in turn has been gradually pushed forward, till the troops comprising them have become intermingled in the duty of garrisoning the various provinces of India; and the soldiers of the Punjab, and of the most southerly districts of Madras, are to be found garrisoning neighbouring, and sometimes even the same, stations.

Growth of territories and extension of Presidential armies.

45. The growth of territory has been chiefly in the provinces occupied by the army of Bengal; and the area to be garrisoned having become too large for occupation by the old army of Bengal, there has, in consequence, grown up in the north of India a new army composed of the best fighting classes of the continent, who are willing enough to serve us in their own country and climate, and to go anywhere on foreign service, but who dislike the irksome duty of garrisoning, in times of peace, the districts of Lower Bengal, where they experience a climate which is entirely unsuited to them. At the same time the Madras army has been maintained on a footing, admittedly much in excess of what is necessary for garrisoning the territory under the Government of Madras, in order that it might assist in occupying the territory which has become too extensive for the Northern army. Madras regiments have, in consequence, been advanced into Bengal, and even Upper India, and in this way not only has the segregation of the several armies been departed from, but men have been employed in constantly garrisoning stations, the occupation of which they look upon as foreign service: this has led to discontent among the soldiers, and to an unpopularity of the service which has affected the powers of recruiting; while it has, at the same time, involved a very heavy expenditure of public money in the payment of extra allowances to troops serving beyond the limits of their own presidency, and it has also caused a great confusion of commands. The Bengal army, amalgamated as it is with that of the Punjab, has become unwieldy and unmanageable as a single command, while its strength has become so preponderating, when compared with the armies of the other presidencies, that they have ceased to occupy towards it the position of a potential check, and the advantage of the division of the army into separate bodies is thus neutralized and lost. We have all the disadvantages, inconveniences, and expenses of three separate armies, but none of the advantages which are popularly and justly assigned to such an arrangement.

Dangerous intermingling of troops of the different nationalities.

46. It may be said that the present time is an exceptional one, and that the distribution of the army is abnormal. We are content to take the army as it stood before the Afghan campaign of 1878–79, and will show how singularly the distribution was opposed to the principle we advocate of dividing India into what has been aptly termed "water-tight compartments." In the beginning of 1878, the Bengal Native army—one large force composed of many castes, creeds, and nationalities—was scattered over the country between Calcutta and Peshawar. Sikh soldiers were serving in Calcutta and in Central India side by side with Hindustanis; Punjabis garrisoned Rohilcund; while Hindustanis were manning forts in the Punjab. At Peshawar itself the Bengal sepoy was brigaded with the Sikh soldier; Madras sepoys were serving in Saugor and Jubbulpore in the Central Provinces, and in Nowgong. Madras detachments spread out from Nagpore to the banks of the Mahanuddy, and to Dorunda in Bengal, with the result that at certain times of the year, to reinforce the station of Raipore, Madras sepoys had to be sent from Madras by rail, through the Bombay Presidency, almost to Bombay itself up by rail to Nagpore, altogether 1,246 miles, and thence by route march to Raipore.

Importance of remedying the evil, and opinions of those supporting division of Bengal Army, and system of Army Corps.

47. It is needless for us to dwell on the great importance of remedying this state of things. A proposal to intermix soldiers of the Deccan, the Carnatic, Oudh, and the Punjab, throughout the length and breadth of the land would, we feel assured, receive now, as it has received before, just and emphatic condemnation from all sides; and yet this is precisely to what the existing arrangements are tending. At the present time, the Sikh and the Poorbia, the Musalman of the Punjab and of Oudh, serve side by side in all parts of the vast and ill-defined tract called the Bengal Presidency, a term which has not even the accuracy of a geographical definition. The natural consequences are

are that the distinctive characteristics of the soldiers, both in creed and nationality, tend to amalgamate, and thus a common feeling is stimulated which might dangerously unite them to a common end. This is an evil which is not now apparent for the first time; experienced statesmen and distinguished soldiers have pointed it out again and again. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge 20 years ago considered that the Bengal army should be divided into army corps, and that the Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay should be merely Commanders of Forces. The opinions of such men as General Jacob, Sir Sydney Cotton, General Hancock, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Sir Henry Durand, Sir Harry Tombs, and of the majority of general officers who have favoured us with their evidence,* in the same direction, should not fail to carry great weight; for they are the deliberate conclusions of those who, from different points of view, and with widely varying experiences of India, have arrived at a common agreement in those principles which we feel constitute the only basis upon which the true organisation of the armies of India can be founded.

See Appendix VII.

Opinions of the three Commanders in Chief.

48. We must admit, on the other hand, that, in opposition to these authorities, his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India prefers the retention of the three Presidential armies to the distribution of the army into four army corps; but the principles on which his Excellency advocates the retention of the present system are really those which we have had mainly in view in recommending the substitution of army corps. We find that we are in entire accord with his Excellency as to the necessity of avoiding any fusion of the armies into a homogeneous body. His Excellency considers that this is best done by maintaining the present Presidential armies; but we have given our reasons for believing that, in practice, the maintenance of the Presidential armies as they now are, is doing that which all in common admit should not be done. We gather that his Excellency the Commander in Chief of Bombay would view with favour the substitution of army corps for the three armies, if it could be shown that it would lead to an increase of efficiency and a decrease of expenditure. We think we shall show that both these objects will be met by the change. His Excellency the Commander in Chief of Madras states that he sees no real difference whether the Commanders of the Madras and Bombay armies be styled Commanders in Chief, or Commanders of Army Corps, and is of opinion that the Bengal army is too large, and should be divided into two distinct portions. He would place one army corps under the Commander in Chief in India, and would apparently place the other under a special Commander in Chief, or Commander of an Army Corps: but he would place these four armies under the four Local Governments of Madras, Bombay, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab, and would thus have, including the Government of India, five Military Governments instead of three, while he would place the army garrisoning the Lower Provinces of Bengal under the authority of a neighbouring local Government, that of the North-Western Provinces. Even if it were not for the mischief and expense which, in the opinion of the majority of the Commission, result from the maintenance of a number of separate military Governments, we are of opinion that his Excellency's scheme would be absolutely impracticable from an administrative point of view. It would, we think, be found quite impossible to place the military authority of one Lieutenant Governorship under the Lieutenant Governor of a neighbouring province.

Army territorial limits cannot be coincident with any particular civil jurisdiction.

49. When we came to consider what the territorial limits of the various army corps should be, we felt that we could not be restricted by the present territorial jurisdiction of the subordinate Civil Governments, for the military jurisdiction is now nowhere co-ordinate with the civil jurisdiction. In the Madras army, for instance, no less than 28† out of 40 regiments are serving beyond the limits of the Civil Government, and the same, though in a less degree, may be said of Bombay, so that the territorial limits of the minor Governments have already been completely obliterated in respect to the armies belonging to them, while the Bengal army is to be found serving in the territories subject to the Governments of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, the Punjab, Assam, and the Central Provinces. We are aware that our proposals may

* Ten out of 14 Generals Commanding Divisions and Brigades in India, who have given their opinion to the Commission, are in favour of army corps instead of Presidential armies. *See* Appendix IV.

† Six only of the 28 are on, or for, field service in Northern India.

may meet with opposition on the ground that they deprive the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay of the authority which they now exercise over the armies of their Presidencies. We have examined at some length, in Chapter V., what that control amounts to; how far it is real and absolute; and whether this local authority, in questions of military detail, is necessary for the efficiency of the army, or the proper civil administration of the areas over which the minor Governments preside. Our consideration of the present system, involving as it does a complicated and expensive military administration, has led the majority of the Commission to the conclusion that the military authority of the Local Governments, while needlessly intervening in, and hampering, military affairs, is at best a very nominal authority, neither conducing to the efficiency and economy of the army, nor to the true dignity of the civil power. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the final decision of all great military questions is, and must be, reserved to the Supreme Government of India, with which all real responsibility in the disposal of such questions must ultimately rest. This is a responsibility which cannot be evaded, and which should be made plain and manifest, and freed from the screen of the secondary and nominal responsibility of the subordinate Government. The growth of the Empire has, it must be remembered, necessitated the sub-division of the country into a number of Civil Governments, which had no existence when the army was divided territorially between the three presidencies. Long experience has shown that it is quite unnecessary that the Civil Government of a province should have any control over military administration beyond the right of calling upon the military commanders to move troops in case of internal disturbance or threatened aggression, and of being consulted in regard to the location of garrisons. If the Government of Bengal, with its enormous territory, long and exposed boundary, and a population of 62 millions of people, and the North-Western Provinces and Oudh with 42 millions, can carry on the Government without any separate military authority, there can be no reason whatever, in these days of telegraphs, quick posts, and railways, why Bombay, with its far smaller territory and population of 16 millions, or, excluding Sind, 13 millions, should not be placed in the same position. In fact, to push the argument of those who desire to retain the separate Military Governments to its logical conclusion, we ought to establish one for each of the Governments and Administrations of Bengal, North-Western Provinces, Punjab, Burma, the Central Provinces, and Assam. Madras, it must be recollected, is only maintained as a Military Government by giving it jurisdiction over troops serving in Burma, in the Central Provinces, and in Hyderabad,—places with the actual government of which it has absolutely nothing to do. Of the great practical disadvantages and inconvenience of this arrangement the majority of the Commission are fully convinced. Having regard also to the altered aspect of affairs on the North-West frontier, which necessitates the larger employment of British and Native troops in advanced positions, both beyond and intermingled with those hitherto held by the Punjab Frontier Force only, we are of opinion that the distinct administration of that force by the Civil Government of the Punjab cannot be continued without destroying that unity of command which is absolutely and indispensably necessary for the success of military operations. We recommend therefore that the Punjab Frontier Force should form part of the regular army and be under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the army. At the same time, having before us the very cogent reasons urged by Sir Neville Chamberlain in favour of retaining the Punjab Frontier Force as a distinct body, we see no reason why its title should be altered, or why it should not continue to be located, as heretofore, in the trans-Indus stations of the Punjab, though available for general service. We would alter its constitution in no way, but would bring it under the control of the executive head of the army. We are confident that, under the arrangement we propose, the discipline and soldierlike qualities of this magnificent body of troops will be as available and valuable for the future service of the State, as they have been for the last 30 years under the Government of the Punjab.

Administration of the Punjab Frontier Force by the Civil Government of the Punjab should be discontinued.

See Appendix III.

50. In working out the details of our proposed division of the army, our main object has been to define the territorial formation of the army of India with due regard to the great principle of *divide et impera*. No one can study the history of the three armies of India, their organisation, development, and distribution in times past, and at the present moment, without being struck with

Object of work of Commission to remedy evil of present arrangements, which tend to fusion of races.

with the fact that the present arrangements and distribution are based on an entire disregard of the above principle, and that an undue regard for the importance of preserving the dignity of some of the Local Governments has led to the maintenance of a complicated and expensive system, which has long since lost the principle and spirit of its original development, while it has preserved its empty form. At the same time the growth of the Empire has, as we have already shown, led to the intermingling of the two great warlike races belonging to Hindustan and to the Punjab, and their amalgamation into one military body. It will hardly be denied that this fusion must become a danger to the Empire, if steps be not promptly taken to alter the state of things which has been allowed to grow up. We are convinced, therefore, that we should re-adjust the divisions of the army, on military and political grounds alone, and should not be influenced by any other consideration. In determining how the safety of the Empire could best be secured by a sub-division of the army of India into territorial limits, we had to consider the races of which each sub-division should be composed, and their respective strength; we felt that we should at the same time make the greatest possible use of the existing system of sub-division, and that we should endeavour to give to each of the present forces its fair share of work, both in time of peace and war, and so localise them as to make their ordinary garrison work as popular and as little irksome as possible.

Four general national and geographical areas.

51. The great general divisions of the army, which naturally suggested themselves, were the Punjab, Hindustan with Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. These are, speaking broadly, the areas of distinct nationalities, and their sub-division into minor states, tribes, religions, and castes, does not nullify the advantages we may derive from this general division. The Sikh and Punjabi generally have not only no love for, but a profound dislike to, the Hindustani Brahman or Rajput; and this feeling was, it is needless to say, a powerful factor in the suppression of the mutiny. These latter, in turn, look on the Mahrattas of Western India, and the inhabitants of the Southern Peninsula, as foreigners dwelling far away from Hindustan, and with manners, customs, speech, and dress altogether different from their own.

The territories in each army corps area.

52. For these reasons, we came to the conclusion that military and political requirements could only be met by the division of the present Indian army into four territorial army corps, as distinct forces, independent in themselves, but under one supreme authority, garrisoning—

(1.) The territory within the Civil Governments of Bengal and Assam, the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.

(2.) The territory under the Punjab Government and the Frontier Administration.

(3.) The territory included in the Civil Governments of Bombay, the Central Provinces, Central India, Rajputana, and Sind.

(4.) The territory embraced by the Civil Governments of Madras, Hyderabad, and Burma, with the Belgaum district.

Principles on which these have been allotted.

53. In determining these areas of command, we have been guided by the principles which we have described above, and we have also considered the present and future state of road and railway communication, the necessity for dividing the armies with reasonable equality, and giving each certain frontiers to guard and foreign stations to occupy, by which means not only the military spirit of the troops is maintained, but any tendency to become "localised," as the word is generally understood and applied, is entirely prevented. We have examined the numbers which can be conveniently commanded; and have allotted a fair and reasonable force to each area, with reference to the military requirements of the countries to be garrisoned, and the demand for service beyond their limits.

Bengal Army Corps.

54. The *Bengal Army Corps* comprises Assam, Bengal Proper, Oudh, and the North Western Provinces. This area appears to us to be obviously the proper one to be garrisoned by the soldiers of Hindustan. Lower Bengal does not furnish any recruits to the army, and it would be impossible to give a smaller area with advantage.

Punjab Army Corps.

55. The *Punjab Army Corps* includes the Punjab Proper, the trans-Indus frontier, and advanced posts.

56. The

56. The *Bombay Army Corps* area naturally includes the Central Provinces (now garrisoned by Madras troops), both from its geographical and national connection. Sind and our advanced position beyond the Bolan, will form an outlet for the military instincts of the Bombay army, while Rajputana and a portion of Central India will, as at present, be garrisoned by Bombay troops. Bombay Army Corps.

57. We have allotted Burma to the *Madras Army Corps*, because it is necessary to provide some foreign service for that force, and to give it its proper share of frontier work. Burma and Secunderabad (Hyderabad) have long been occupied by the Madras army, and the service is not unpopular with its soldiers. Belgaum is, as the Commander in Chief of Madras states, near the home of the Madras sepoy. North Canara was formerly under the Madras Government, and we cannot think that the security of the adjoining districts will suffer by the transfer; nor can we in any way admit the argument, that the garrison of Belgaum must necessarily be under the immediate control of the Local Government. Madras Army Corps.

58. We believe that these four divisions are based on sound geographical, political, and military reasons, and that not only will the internal security of the country be enhanced, and our military power increased by this re-adjustment, but the popularity of the army will be greatly augmented, while, at the same time, localization, in a dangerous sense, will be prevented by the provision of a considerable share of frontier and foreign service for each army corps. These four divisions based on geographical, political, and military reasons.

59. Each army corps should be organised as a complete command. The Lieutenants General commanding should be assisted by a well-organized staff, which should include officers representing every branch of the staff, army and departmental. The Lieutenants General should be invested with the fullest control which it is possible to give, consistently with the reservation of supreme military authority to the Government of India, assisted by the Commander in Chief in India. The administration of military affairs should be so decentralised as to dispense with the present system of reference to the Commander in Chief and the Government of India on every matter of trivial importance: each Lieutenant General should be placed in a position to enforce his orders on every department of the army employed under him, and should have imposed upon him full responsibility for their prompt and efficient performance of duty. Each army-corps to be a complete command.

DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOTMENT OF GARRISONS.

60. We have carefully considered all that has been advanced by the Local Governments in reference to the military requirements of their respective provinces; but, before discussing these, we think we should state the principles by which we have been guided in preparing our scheme for the distribution of the troops in India, and show that we have endeavoured to obtain a comprehensive view of the military requirements of the whole Empire. Distribution and allotment of garrisons.

61. We felt that the first step to be taken, was to determine the strategical and obligatory points in India, upon the occupation of which the maintenance of our military supremacy depends. The first step was to determine the obligatory points

62. We consider that the first essential is to preserve the great lines of communication intact. Speaking broadly, so long as we hold our main trunk lines of railway communication, any successful insurrection, or any real display of military power by the Native States, is out of the question. We are entirely opposed to the principle of scattering troops in small isolated detachments over the country; it is a great waste of military power, contributes to inefficiency and demoralization in both officers and men, and has been constantly condemned by the highest military authorities. There must, in a large Empire like India, be places where garrisons, comparatively isolated, may have to be maintained, having regard to pressing political reasons, to the health of the troops, or to the existence of barrack accommodation. These exceptions do not, however, detract from the importance of the principle which should be strictly observed in the present, or any future distribution of the army. The concentration of troops on the main trunk lines of communication is, therefore, one chief point which we have had in view. It appears to us that the additional military power, given to us within the last 25 years by the construction and maintenance of over 8,000 miles of railway, has never been sufficiently realised. We are aware that this power will be denied by some who contend that, because a line can be interrupted by hostile action, we ought not to take it into consideration. The defence Essential to hold the main lines of communication, and concentrate the troops thereon.

and security of the whole of the railways of India have never, so far as we have been able to ascertain, received adequate attention; but we are convinced that their safety can be provided for by thorough preparation in time of peace.* It is unreasonable to contemplate the simultaneous destruction of all the railways in India; and, if we provide for their safety and the means for their quick repair, we consider that we are fully justified in relying on railways as a real addition to the military strength of the country, supplemented as they are by a great increase in road and water communication.

Obligatory strategical points.

63. We consider that, for strategical and political reasons, the following are the obligatory points, the possession of which will guarantee the complete military control of India, and that, with certain precautions, to which we shall allude, the supremacy of the British Government must be absolute so long as the power exists, not only to maintain ourselves at these centres, but to repress insurrectionary movements in outlying tracts. These points are Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, and Meerut, Lahore, Rawal Pindi. Moultan, Kurrachee; and, turning south-west from Delhi, Nusseerabad, Ahmedabad, Mhow, Jubbulpore, Nagpore, Poona, Bombay, Secunderabad, Bellary, Bangalore, Madras. To these may be added Shillong for Assam, and Rangoon for Burma. There are, of course, many other important places, but the above are, we consider, the strategical points to which we should assign chief prominence in arranging for the distribution of the army.

Secondary points.

64. The secondary strategical stations may be divided into two classes, those on the frontier and those intermediate to the above centres. There are points of another class, not up to the present time embraced in any project for the defence and security of the Empire, namely, railway junctions, which would have to be occupied in providing for the protection of the lines. It is not at all necessary that these should be occupied in time of peace, provided complete preparations are made for their military security in time of disturbance.

Convenient stations.

65. The remaining class of stations to which we have distributed troops, is that which embraces convenient, but not obligatory, places for the location of troops.

Garrisons allotted to each station separately.

66. Having reviewed the strategical requirements of the Empire, we next proceeded to consider each station separately, and allotted to each its normal garrison. We have detailed the obligatory garrisons which should, under all circumstances, be maintained for the preservation of order, the general defence of the country, and the supply of small field columns for prompt movement in the neighbourhood, and have shown the number of troops that may be regarded as available for service in any direction, or for employment with an army in the field. Our distribution and allotment are based on the principle of abolishing small single-battalion stations where possible, and the maintenance of compact bodies of troops at strategic centres; but our recommendations must also be criticised with due regard to the fact that we propose to raise British and Native cavalry and infantry regiments to a higher strength; that we advocate the formation of a limited reserve of Native troops; and that our propositions make no material reduction in the effective strength of the British and Native army; while, by a better and simpler system of administration, organisation, and distribution, we shall develope the military power to a large extent.

Tabular statements giving all details.

67. The accompanying tables show very clearly the stations we propose to retain in each army corps area, the normal garrisons to be maintained at the obligatory and subsidiary stations, the obligatory garrisons to be maintained, and the troops which can be withdrawn for war service.

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* A good deal has been done in drawing up reports and plans of the defence of railway stations, &c.; but we think that it will have to be considered hereafter what are the special means to be adopted throughout India on each line. For example, the maintenance of the security of the line by a system drawn up in peace, embracing such points as maintenance of safety of line to be confided to villages along the line in time of emergency; of payments for care, and heavy punishments for mishaps; patrolling engines; patrolling by railway servants and military; protection of important points and bridges, &c., that is to say, the security of those points at which, if injury be done, great delay, and perhaps complete obstruction to the traffic, would ensue; the aid to be expected from railway volunteers and the European civil population adjacent to the line; the maintenance of material for repair. All this is, of course, rather matter for local elaboration on the lines of certain general principles, but it is necessary to allude to it when we are considering the military power given to us by the use of railways. For recommendations, *see* Chapter XI.

BENGAL ARMY CORPS.—HEAD QUARTERS, ALLAHABAD.

Commands.						Stations.	Normal Garrison.										Obligatory Garrison.										Troops Available for Field Service Elsewhere.									
							Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.			Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.			Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		
1st Class District.	2nd Class District.	3rd Class District	Staff Colonel's Command.	1st Class Station.	2nd Class Station.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	Companies Sappers and Miners.	Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	Companies Sappers and Miners.	Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	Companies Sappers and Miners.
		1	–	–	–	SHILLONG	–	–	–	⅓*	–	–	–	–	1⅓	–	–	–	–	⅓*	–	–	–	–	1½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
						Sadya	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½																					
						Cachar	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
						Baxa	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½																					
					1	CALCUTTA, Barrackpore, and subsidiary stations.	–	1	–	–	1	–	¼	1½	4	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	⅛	½	2	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	⅛	1	2	–
	1	–	–	–	1	Darjeeling	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	½	–	–
					–	Dorunda and detachment	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–
					1	DINAPORE	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	½	1	–	–	⅓	–	–	–	–	–	½	½	–	–	⅔	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
					–	Benares	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
			1	–	–	ALLAHABAD	–	1	–	–	1	–	¾	1	1	–	–	⅔	–	–	1	–	½	½	1	–	–	⅓	–	–	–	–	¼	½	–	–
			–	–	1	CAWNPORE	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	½	⅞	–	–	½	–	–	–	–	–	½	⅜	–	–	⅓	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–
1	–	–	–	–	–	Futtehghur	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	⅛	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	⅛	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
			–	–	–	LUCKNOW	1	1	–	–	–	1	1	1¾	2	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	½	1	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	½	¾	1	–
			–	–	1	Fyzabad	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	¼	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	¼	1	–
						Bareilly	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	½	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	½	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	½	–
		1	–	–	–	Ranikhet and Nynee Tal	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1½	–	–
						Almorah	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
					–	MEERUT	1	2	1	–	–	1	1	½	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	½	1	–	1	1	1	–	–	1	1	–	–	–
					–	Roorkee	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6
1	–	–	–		–	Dehra	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
					–	Chakrata	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
					1	DELHI	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	½	½	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	½	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1	–	1	–	–	AGRA	–	1	–	–	½	–	–	1	1½	–	–	1	–	–	½	–	–	1	½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
		–	–	–	–	Morar and Gwalior	1	1	–	–	½	–	1	1⅜	2	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	·	⅞	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	1	½	2	–
		1	–	–	–	Nowgong	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	⅛	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	⅝	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–
2	2	3	2	–	6	TOTAL	3	12	1	1⅓	5	2	6	13	24	7	–	6⅓	–	⅓	4	–	1⅛	7	11	1	3	5⅔	1	1	1	2	4⅞	6	13	6

*** Main Obligatory stations in large capitals.

Total.		Obligatory.	Available.		
3	H. Artillery	—	3	=	3
12	F. Artillery	6⅓	5⅔	=	12
1	Heavy	—	1	=	1
1⅓	M. Battery	⅓	1	=	1⅓
5	Garrison	4	1	=	5

Total.		Obligatory.	Available.		
2	B. Cavalry	—	2	=	2
6	N. Cavalry	1⅛	4⅞	=	6
13	B. Infantry	7	6	=	13
24	N. Infantry	11	13	=	24
7	Sappers	1	6	=	7

PUNJAB ARMY CORPS.—HEAD QUARTERS, RAWAL PINDI.

Commands.						Stations.	Normal Garrison.										Obligatory Garrison.										Troops Available for Field Service Elsewhere.									
							Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		Companies Sappers and Miners.	Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		Companies Sappers and Miners.	Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		Companies Sappers and Miners.
1st Class District.	2nd Class District.	3rd Class District.	Staff Colonel's Command.	1st Class Station.	2nd Class Station.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	
						Umballa and subsidiary stations	1	1	–	–	–	1	1	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	1	1	1	1	–
		1	–	–	–	Dagshai	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
						Subathu	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
						Jutogh	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
					–	MEEAN MEER and FORT GOVINDGHUR.	–	1	–	–	1	–	1	1⅜	1	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	1⅜	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
					1	Ferozepore †	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	⅝	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	⅝	½	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–
1	–	–	–	–	–	Dharmsala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
					–	Bakloh	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
					–	Dalhousie (Depôt)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
					–	Sialkot	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	‡1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
				1	–	RAWAL PINDI and Hills	1	1	1	–	½	1	1	½	1	3	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	½	1	–	1	1	1	–	–	1	1	–	–	3
				–	–	Murree Hills	–	–		3	–	–	–	1½	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	1½	–	–
1	–	–	–	–	1	Abbottabad	–	–	–	*1	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	*1	–	–	–	–	1	–
				–	–	Attock	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	⅛	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	–	⅛	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
			–	1	–	Nowshera	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	⅞	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	⅞	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–
			–	–	–	Hoti Murdan	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	§1	–	1	–	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1	–	–	–	–	Peshawar and Cherat	1	1	–	–	–	–	⅞	1	2	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	⅞	1	2	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
			–	–	–	Ali Musjid	–	–	–	*1	–	–	⅛	–	3	1	–	–	–	*1	–	–	⅛	–	3	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
			1	–	–	Lundi Kotal																														
				1	–	Kohat	–	–	–	*1	*1	–	½	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	*1	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	*1	–	–	–	–	1	–
				–	1	Edwardesabad	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1	–	–	–	–	Thull	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
					–	Kuram Valley	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
				1	–	Kuram	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	1	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
						MOOLTAN	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	⅞	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	⅞	½	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	½	–
						Dera Ismail Khan	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	⅛	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	⅛	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		1	–	–	–	Tonk	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	*⅓	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
						Dera Ghazi Khan	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	½	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
						Rajanpore	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
2	2	2	1	4	3	TOTAL	3	9	1	9	4	2	*13	13	27	6	–	3	–	3	4	–	8	*7½	20	2	3	6	1	6	–	2	5	5¼	7	4

* There are three Guide Corps of the following strength :—Queen's Own Corps of Guides, 4 squadrons, 1 battalion, and two guns; the other two, each of 2 squadrons, 1 battalion, and 2 guns.
† 2 Companies at Govindghur.
‡ The British Regiment for Sialkot is now at Lundi Kotal, but should return to Sialkot when possible.
§ 1 Cavalry Regiment Guides at 4 squadrons.

Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		
3 H. Artillery	—	3	=	3
9 F. Artillery	3	6	=	9
1 Heavy	—	1	=	1
5 B. Mountain	1	4	=	5
4 N. Mountain	2	2	=	4
3 B. Garrison	3	—	=	3

Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		
1 N. Garrison	1	—	=	1
2 B. Cavalry	—	2	=	2
13 N. Cavalry	8	5	=	13
13 B. Infantry	7½	5½	=	13
27 N. Infantry	20	7	=	27
6 Sappers	2	4	=	6

BOMBAY ARMY CORPS.—HEAD QUARTERS, POONA.

Commands: 1st Class District	2nd Class District	3rd Class District	Staff Colonel's Command	1st Class Station	2nd Class Station	Stations	Normal Garrison: Batteries of Artillery (*) Native Artillery: Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	Regiments Cavalry: British	Native	Regiments Infantry: British	Native	Companies Sappers and Miners	Obligatory Garrison: Batteries of Artillery (*) Native Artillery: Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	Regiments Cavalry: British	Native	Regiments Infantry: British	Native	Companies Sappers and Miners	Troops Available for Field Service Elsewhere: Batteries of Artillery (*) Native Artillery: Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	Regiments Cavalry: British	Native	Regiments Infantry: British	Native	Companies Sappers and Miners
1	-	-	1	-	-	Above Dadur	-	1	-	*2⅓	1	-	1½	1	4	2	-	1	-	2⅓*	1	-	1½	1	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	1	Jacobabad	-	-		-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	¾	-
			-	1	-	KURRACHEE	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	¾	-	-
				-	-	POONA and Kirkee	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	1¾	2½	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	¾	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1½	3
				-	-	Satara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
				-	-	Serur	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
1	-	-	-	1	-	AHMEDABAD*	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	½	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	½	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-
				-	-	Baroda									½										½											
				-	-	Rajkot	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
				-	-	Surat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1	-	-	-	-	BOMBAY	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	½	2½	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	½	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1½	-
						Deolali																														
				-	-	MHOW	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	⅓	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	1	-	⅔	-	1	-	-	1	-	½	-	-
				-	1	Asseerghur (detachment)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
				-	-	Neemuch	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¾	-
	1	-	-	-	-	Mehidpur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
				-	-	Augur																														
				1	-	Saugor	-	1	-	-	-	-	½	½	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	½	½	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-
				-	1	JUBBULPORE	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-
		1	-	-	-	Nusseerabad and Aboo	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	⅛	-	-	-	-	¼	¼	½	-	-	⅔	-	-	-	-	¾	¾	½	-
						Deesa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¾	-
						NAGPORE																														
						Kamptee	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	½	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	½	1	-
		1	-	-	-	Seroncha																														
						Raipore																														
						Sumbulpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		1	-	-	-	Aden	-	-	-	-	2	-	⅛	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	⅛	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	2	3	1	3	3	TOTAL	2	9	1	2⅓	5	1	6⅝	9	25	6	⅓	4⅔	-	2⅓	4	-	2⅞	5½	15¾	3	1⅔	4⅔	1	-	1	1	3¾	3½	9¼	3

LOCAL CORPS IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE.

	Stations	Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	British	Native	British	Native	Companies	Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	British	Native	British	Native	Companies	Horse	Field	Heavy	Mountain	Garrison	British	Native	British	Native	Companies
† Central India Horse	Agar	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malwa Bheel Corps	Goona	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
† Bhopal Battalion	Sirdarpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
† Deolee Irregular Force	Sehore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Erinpoorah Irregular Force	Deolee	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Meywar Bheel Corps	Erinpoorah	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
† Mhairwarra Battalion	Kherwarah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Ajmere	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	2½	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2½	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
	GRAND TOTAL	2	9	1	2⅓	5	1	9⅛	9	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	5⅛	-	18¾	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6¾	-	-	-

* In the event of barrack accommodation not being eventually available, part of the regiment might be sent to Poona or distributed. ‖ † Could be made available for field service if circumstances of country permitted.

	Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		Total.	Obligatory.	Available.	
2 H. Artillery	⅓		1⅔	= 2	2⅓ N. Mountain	2⅓	—	= 2⅓	6⅝ N. Cavalry	2⅞	3¾	= 6⅝	25 N. Infantry	15¾	9¼	= 25
9 F. Artillery	4⅓		4⅔	= 9	5 Garrison	4	1	= 5	9 B. Infantry	5½	3½	= 9	6 Sappers	3	3	= 6
1 Heavy	—		1	= 1	1 B. Cavalry	—	1	= 1								

MADRAS ARMY CORPS.—Head Quarters, Bangalore.

Commands.						Stations.	Normal Garrison.										Obligatory Garrison.										Troops Available for Field Service Elsewhere.									
							Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		Companies Sappers and Miners.	Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry		Companies Sappers and Miners.	Batteries of Artillery. (*) Native Artillery.					Regiments Cavalry.		Regiments Infantry.		Companies Sappers and Miners.
1st Class District.	2nd Class District.	3rd Class District.	Staff Colonel's Command.	1st Class Station.	2nd Class Station.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.		Horse.	Field.	Heavy.	Mountain.	Garrison.	British	Native.	British.	Native.	
1	-	-	-	-	-	SECUNDERABAD	1	2	1	-	-	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	2
	-	-	1	-	-	BELLARY with Ramandroog Hill.	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	½	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	¼	1	-
1	-	-	-	-	-	BANGALORE	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	7	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	¼	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	¼	1	6
	-	-	-	-	-	French Rocks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	-	-	-	-	-	Wellington	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
	-	-	-	-	1	Trichinopoly	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	-	-	-	-	1	Cannanore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
		1	-	-	-	Belgaum	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	⅓	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	⅔	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
		-	-	-	-	MADRAS	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	½	4	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	½	2	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	½	2	-
		-	-	-	-	Poonamallee (Invalid Depôt for British Troops).	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1	-	-	-	-	Waltair	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-
		-	-	-	-	Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	Cuttack	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	RANGOON	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	¾	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	¾	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	1	-	Thayetmyo	-	-	-	1	½	-	-	½	1	-	-	-	-	1	½	-	-	½	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	1	-	Tonghoo	-	-	-	1	½	-	-	½	1	-	-	-	-	1	½	-	-	½	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1	-	-	-	-	Moulmein	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	Showaygheen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-	Port Blair	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	¼	¼	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	2	1	1	2	2	TOTAL	2	8	1	2	4	1	2	8	25	10	1	3⅓	1	2	3	1	-	5	14½	2	1	4⅔	-	-	1	-	2	3	10½	8
							LOCAL CORPS IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE.																													
†Hyderabad Contingent, 2nd Class District Command						Mominabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Bolarum	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Aurungabad	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Hingoli	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Ellichpur	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Lingsugur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Jalna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mysore Force						Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Mysore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						Shimoga	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nair Brigade						Trevandrum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						TOTAL	-	4	-	-	-	-	7	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
						GRAND TOTAL	2	12	1	2	4	1	9	8	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

† If the circumstances of the country permitted, a portion of the contingent might be employed on an emergency.

	Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		
2 H. Artillery		1	1	=	2
8 F. Artillery		3⅓	4⅔	=	8
1 Heavy		1	—	=	1
2 B. Mountain		2	—	=	2
4 Garrison		3	1	=	4

	Total.	Obligatory.	Available.		
1 B. Cavalry		1	—	=	1
2 N. Cavalry		—	2	=	2
8 B. Infantry		5	3	=	8
25 N. Infantry		14½	10½	=	25
10 Sappers		2	8	=	10

It will be seen that we recommend the abandonment of the following stations in the different areas:— Proposals for abolition of small stations.

Bengal Army Corps.

68. Julpigoree, Berhampore, Dacca, Hazaribagh (for British troops), Bhaugulpore, Segowlie, Gowhatty, Tezpore and Dibrooghur, Jowai, and various detachment posts in Assam. It is unnecesssary to detail the reasons which have induced us to recommend the withdrawal of troops from these places, and their concentration elsewhere. Our recommendations for the garrison of the Lower Provinces are in entire accordance with those of the Government of Bengal, though we have increased the garrison of Darjeeling, considering it to be a most convenient situation for another battery of artillery to be kept in reserve, for service anywhere in Bengal or across the sea, connected as it now is by railway with the port of Calcutta. The mere presence of a Native cavalry regiment at Segowlie is no protection to the frontier; and in case of serious complications with Nepal, a much larger cavalry force must be posted along the frontier to watch and reconnoitre. The Chief Commissioner of Assam points out the unsystematic way in which the military and police are mixed up at the frontier posts, and the evils of the present arrangements. A reserve at Shillong, with strong half-battalions garrisoning Sadya, Baxa, and Cachar, will, with the police force contemplated by the Chief Commissioner, provide for the defence of the frontier; while arrangements must be prepared to despatch a body of troops from the central reserve in Calcutta in case of extensive operations. We agree with the Chief Commissioner that the duties now imposed upon the troops are not consistent with the maintenance of efficiency and discipline, and are not the proper duties of the regular army; small isolated outposts should be made over to the police. We also advise the abandonment of the detachment or small stations of Chunar, Goruckpore, Seetapore, Moradabad, Shajehanpore, Muttra, Sipri, Lalitpur, Jhansi, and Banda. None of these are necessary to the military security of the country, while the waste of strength which they involve is very great. We cannot agree with the Government of the North-Western Provinces, that the presence of a wing of Native infantry at Goruckpore can command the Nepal frontier. Nepal is not a petty marauding state, but an organized and responsible government, with which we have diplomatic relations. If there is fear of a misunderstanding with Nepal, an army will be required to guard the frontier, not isolated detachments. Chunar is not a place which it is necessary to hold in ordinary times; if it is retained for the purpose of guarding State prisoners, a small detachment from any of the neighbouring garrisons, or a party of police, should suffice for all purposes. The maintenance of a wing at Moradabad is, in our opinion, quite unnecessary, if Bareilly be well garrisoned, and if a strong police force is stationed in the city. The abandonment of Jhansi has long ago been decided by the Government of India on political, military, and sanitary grounds. The subject has been frequently reconsidered, but with always the same result, and no sufficient reasons have been brought forward to disturb the conclusion arrived at; while Sipri and Lalitpur are, like other petty stations, a weakness rather than a strength. Bengal. *See* Appendix VIII.

Punjab Army Corps.

69. In the area of the Punjab Army Corps our recommendations are fully in accord with those of the Punjab Government, except that we propose to retain some stations which, as the Lieutenant Governor justly remarks, are not necessary for the internal security of the province, though desirable and convenient with reference to military demands elsewhere. In this area we have to provide for many new frontier stations, in consequence of the recent extension of territory in the Kuram and Khyber valleys. Punjab.

Bombay Army Corps.

70. In the area of the Bombay Army Corps we recommend the withdrawal of troops from Hyderabad (Sind), Bhooj, Mehidpur (when arrangements with the Maharaja Holkar permit), and Augur, Deesa, Malegaum, Hoshangabad, Chanda, Dharwar, and Kolhapore. Hyderabad is badly placed and unhealthy, Bombay.

and its abandonment has for some time past been contemplated. Troops at Bhooj are out of the way and unnecessary. Mehidpur is most unhealthy and inconvenient. Deesa is, in no sense, a place for the maintenance of British troops, who will be much better placed elsewhere; and the large expenditure proposed for barracks at Deesa can be far better applied at other stations. Malegaum, Dharwar, and Kolhapore, are neither required for the security of the country nor for the convenience of the army. Hoshangabad has been condemned by the military authorities; and Chanda, with its small detachment, is not required. Disturbances in the Upper Godavery district, or in the Hyderabad territory, must be suppressed by the despatch of organized and mobile bodies of troops from Nagpore or Secunderabad, as the case may be. The presence of small stationary detachments of Native troops rather invites than prevents attacks, while the disadvantages in a military and economical point of view are too patent to need repetition. We recommend that if Pachmarhi eventually proves healthy, the British troops from Kamptee and Jubbulpore should mainly be stationed there.

Madras Army Corps.

Madras.

71. The present system of scattering the troops at small stations throughout that peaceful part of India which is comprised in the presidency of Madras proper has long been condemned and deprecated. We consider that with strong bodies of troops posted at Secunderabad, Bellary, Bangalore, Belgaum, Trichinopoly, Madras, and in Burma, the further dispersion of troops over the country is altogether unnecessary. We recommend, therefore, the abolition of the small and unimportant stations of Mercara, French Rocks,* Palamcotta, Quilon, Trichore, Trevandrum, Vellore, Vizianagram; that the British regiment at Cannanore should be withdrawn from that place, which is unsuited both in position and climate, and should be posted at Wellington, in the Neilgherry Hills. There will be three Native infantry regiments at Trichinopoly, available in any direction; and we have ascertained that there are no treaty obligations with Travancore rendering it necessary to keep troops in that State, so long as we protect it and post troops in such a position as Trichinopoly, whence they can be sent by rail to Palamcotta. At Madras, and its outlying adjacent cantonments, we propose the concentration of a considerable force, a great part of which will always be available for service either inland or beyond sea. We have not thought it necessary to increase the garrison of Burma beyond the strength which has up to the present time been considered amply sufficient. The garrison of Burma is intentionally fixed as a peace garrison; it is an exceptionally expensive one to maintain, and, if necessity ever arises for the employment of a strong force in the field, reinforcements would of course be sent from India.

See Appendix IX.

Treaty engagement with Foreign States.

72. There are two considerations which we have kept prominently in mind in working out our proposed distribution of the army. The first is the location and strength of troops at certain stations with reference to treaty obligations with Native States. The second is the question of relief. As to the first, we find that in only two of our treaty engagements with Native States, for the maintenance of subsidiary or contingent forces, are the actual numbers of regiments or men laid down. The States in question are Hyderabad and Baroda; and it will be seen from Appendix X. that the Foreign Department of the Government of India anticipate that no objection will be made by the Nizam's Government so long as there is no material variation of the number of sabres and bayonets. In the engagement with Baroda the number of men only is laid down, so that the number of regiments can be lessened if the strength of each unit is increased. Then, as to reliefs, we believe that, with the system of limited reserves, fixed depôts, and reliefs in army corps areas, which we have recommended in Chapter VII., the military arrangements will be less complicated than at present, and regiments will ordinarily serve nearer their own homes. The Sikh, recruited at Amritsar, may have to serve at Umballa, at Peshawar, or at Mooltan, but he will not ordinarily garrison Calcutta and Lower Bengal—a service distasteful to him and injurious to his health. The Hindustani may have to serve anywhere from Calcutta to Meerut; but he will not usually be employed

Reliefs.

* When lines are available, the Native infantry regiment, now at French Rocks, should be placed at Bangalore.

employed to garrison trans-Indus stations; while the Madras sepoys, with their innumerable belongings, will not be compelled to undertake unpopular service in Central India, or Bengal, at great extra expense to the State. As a rule, we believe that the area of reliefs will be so contracted that they may be carried out by the Government cattle and the Transport Department.

73. In the *Bengal Army Corps* area, the only stations remote from the homes of the men are Calcutta, Dorunda, Gwalior, Nowgong. The south-east frontier stations will be usually taken by the Assam local corps. It is evident, therefore, that reliefs will be simplified, and that, if necessary, a Bengal regiment might be sent to the Punjab to garrison the arsenal of Ferozepore, and the fort of Govindghur.

Stations remote from homes of the native troops in the Bengal army corps;

74. With the *Punjab Army Corps* the frontier stations are numerous; but it must be remembered that most of these have always been occupied by the Punjab Frontier Force, which it is now proposed should form part of the army corps, and that none of them are really remote from the homes of the men. The new stations necessary with reference to the occupation of Cabul beyond the present frontier must, of course, be provided for by special arrangements. If, however, Cabul be permanently occupied, then many of the stations across the old frontier at which we have placed large garrisons may be, in time, considerably reduced; and it is presumed that the garrisons for stations in Cabul will be provided from a force specially raised. Our distribution and organization have been limited altogether to the country now in regular occupation of our troops. The regiments of the old Punjab Frontier Force will continue to be localized and to occupy the stations now held by them; but having regard to the reduced number of cadres, and the unpopularity which would be caused by giving too frequent turns of duty to the remaining troops of the Punjab Army Corps at such places as Peshawar, we think that one of the regiments of the Peshawar garrison should be furnished from that Force.

in the Punjab army corps;

75. In the *Bombay Army Corps* area there are seven stations remote from the homes of the men; but this number is only obtained by including Rajputana and Central India, whereas they have for many years served at such stations as Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad.

in the Bombay army corps;

76. The *Madras Army Corps* has only the Burma stations as foreign to the troops; Secunderabad is not considered foreign service.

in the Madras army corps;

77. We are of opinion that the retention of special convalescent depôts in the hills is, as a rule, undesirable on the score of expense and of injury to the discipline of the troops thus detached in small parties from various regiments, and we would recommend that, as far as possible, men sent up from the plains should be attached to regiments, wings, and detachments stationed in the hills.

Convalescent depôts and hill stations.

Commands.

78. We have described in detail the area we propose to allot to each territorial army corps; it remains for us to show how we propose to sub-divide this area into compact military commands.

Commands.

79. As there appears to be occasionally some misapprehension as to the real meaning of the expression "army corps," we may explain that it may mean either an organized body of troops complete in itself, or a command which is territorial, embracing not only such field force or troops as may be available for war, but the garrisons maintained within the territory, and the reserves, &c., which are necessary for sustaining the body of troops a nation may be able to put into the field. In Germany, for instance, the territory of the German Empire is divided into seventeen army corps districts. Each district contains not only the army corps proper which takes the field, but the troops which remain behind on the outbreak of war. The field troops in each corps command form the *field army corps*, the depôt and garrison troops being then called out and specially organized. In Austria, the Empire is divided into sixteen territorial districts, and army corps are formed only on mobilization. In France, the territory is divided into eighteen regions, in each of which an army corps is stationed. These regions have been established for purposes of the organization of

Meaning of term "army corps."

of the active army corps, of the reserve of the active army, of the territorial army, and of its reserve. In England, the country is divided into military territorial districts. Aldershot is exceptional; for there only, bodies of troops are concentrated and formed actually into brigades. In the plan of mobilisation of the regular and auxiliary forces in England, army corps are intended to be formed, their divisions and brigades, drawn from all parts of the country, being concentrated at certain named centres.

Circumstances of India forbid application of plan followed by continental armies.

80. We admit that if we could distribute our troops uniformly throughout India, and if we could sub-divide India into equal territorial areas, recruiting our Native troops in the same proportions from these areas, then the scientific way of organising the army would be to create divisional areas, from which we could draw organised field divisions, sub-dividing these areas again into sub-districts, from which we should draw our brigades, each with their generals and staffs and troops complete. But the circumstances of the military occupation of India forbid this uniform division. The existing state of things in India is as follows:—In the Bengal area there are three so-called "divisions," four "districts," and one brigade; that is to say, there is one division with one brigade subordinate to the command, the remaining two "divisions" and four districts having no brigades. In the Punjab area there are three territorial divisions, three brigades, and two districts (counting the Punjab Frontier Force as a district). Of these three "divisions," two have one brigade each, and the third has none. The Madras area is divided into three territorial divisions and five districts. There are no brigades, and all these divisions and districts are independent. The Bombay area has three "divisions," three "districts," and three "brigades." Two of the three divisions have one subordinate brigade a-piece, and the third division (Poona) has no brigade.

Present mode of dividing army unsatisfactory, and the only sound method by territorial districts.

81. This is, in our opinion, an unsatisfactory way of dividing the army and the country. An organised "division" is never taken from any of the present divisional areas, or a complete brigade from a so-called "brigade" area. The use of the words "division" and "brigade" is confusing, because they are made in India, at present, to apply both to a territorial command and a tactical unit. We propose to remedy this by calling the territorial command a "district." There are, in our opinion, only two ways in which a country can be divided into military areas. The *first* is the division of each army corps area into such districts and sub-districts, or divisions and brigades, that organised field divisions and brigades may be drawn from them. The *second* is the division of the territorial army corps into convenient districts, allotting general officers to the commands according to the importance of the command, plans for the mobilisation of *field* divisions and brigades from the *army-corps* areas being worked out in anticipation of their being required. It is certain that, having regard to the peculiar circumstances of our occupation of India, we cannot solve the problem by the first condition; and therefore it seems to us that there is no alternative but to accept the second.

Detail of the present and proposed system. Bengal Army Corps.

82. The troops in the Bengal Army Corps have hitherto been in the following commands:—

Allahabad - - - - - - - - - -	Divisions.
Oudh - - - - - - - - - -	
Meerut - - - - - - - - - -	
Agra - - - - - - - - - -	Brigade.
Eastern Frontier - - - - - - - - -	Districts.
Presidency - - - - - - - - -	
Rohilcund - - - - - - - - -	
Gwalior - - - - - - - - -	

giving eight commands in all; of which one only is subordinate to a division, namely, the Agra brigade. Our proposal is to divide these commands into seven districts, which we would classify into two first class, two second-class, and three third-class, in the following manner:—

Lucknow - - - - - - - - -	1st Class.
Meerut - - - - - - - - -	
Calcutta - - - - - - - - -	2nd Class.
Gwalior - - - - - - - - -	
Eastern Frontier - - - - - - - - -	3rd Class.
Barcilly - - - - - - - - -	
Nowgong - - - - - - - - -	

83. The

83. The troops of the Punjab Army Corps are now in the following commands :— Punjab Army Corps.

Umballa - - - - - - - - -	Divisions.
Lahore - - - - - - - - -	
Rawal Pindi - - - - - - - -	
Mooltan - - - - - - - - -	Brigades.
Sialkot - - - - - - - - -	
Rawal Pindi - - - - - - - -	
Peshawar - - - - - - - - -	District.
Punjab - - - - - - - - -	Frontier Force.

Eight commands in all, of which the three brigades are subordinate. The distribution we propose puts them into six districts. Subject to modification hereafter, according to the development of events beyond the frontier, the division might be—

Lahore - - - - - - - - - -	1st Class.
Rawal Pindi - - - - - - - - -	
Peshawar - - - - - - - - -	2nd Class.
Kuram - - - - - - - - -	
Umballa - - - - - - - - -	3rd Class.
Mooltan - - - - - - - - -	

This gives for both army corps what may be reckoned as the equivalent under the present system of nomenclature of four divisions, four first-class brigades, and five second-class brigades, or 13 commands, in place of (excluding the Saugor district, and including the Punjab Frontier Force) six divisions, six first-class brigades or districts, four second-class brigades or districts, or 16 commands.

84. The Madras Army being already distributed in separate commands, none of which are subordinate to the other, no change of system takes place. The present commands are— Madras Army Corps.

Mysore - - - - - - - - - -	Divisions.
Burma - - - - - - - - - -	
Hyderabad - - - - - - - - -	
Centre - - - - - - - - - -	Districts.
Nagpore Force - - - - - - - -	
Ceded Districts - - - - - - - -	
Malabar and Canara - - - - - - - -	
Southern - - - - - - - - -	
Northern - - - - - - - - -	

Of the latter, four were first-class and two second-class, but the Northern district has lately been abolished.

Our proposed distribution gives five commands, which may be distributed as follow :—

Hyderabad - - - - - - - - -	1st Class.
Bangalore - - - - - - - - -	
Madras - - - - - - - - - -	2nd Class.
Burma - - - - - - - - - -	
Belgaum - - - - - - - - -	3rd Class.

not including the Hyderabad Contingent, which will rank as a second-class district.

85. In Bombay there are now nine commands— Bombay Army Corps.

Poona - - - - - - - - - -	Divisions.
Northern - - - - - - - - -	
Mhow - - - - - - - - - -	
Belgaum - - - - - - - - -	Districts.
Bombay - - - - - - - - -	
Sind - - - - - - - - - -	
Deesa - - - - - - - - - -	Brigades.
Nusseerabad - - - - - - - - -	
Aden - - - - - - - - - -	

Of the brigades and districts, two are first-class and four second-class. The proposed

proposed distribution consists of seven districts, which might be classed as follows :—

Sind and Beluchistan - - - - - -	First Class.
Poona - - - - - - - - -	
Bombay - - - - - - - - -	Second Class.
Mhow - - - - - - - - -	
Nusseerabad - - - - - - -	Third Class.
Nagpore - - - - - - - - -	
Aden - - - - - - - - -	

Existing commands.

86. Taking the four corps together, there have been hitherto—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Divisions - - - -	6	3	3	12
Districts, first-class* - -	7	4	2	13
Districts, second-class - -	1	2	1	4
Brigades, first-class - -	–	–	–	–
Brigades, second-class - -	3	–	3	6
	17	9	9	35

Proposed commands.

87. There will now be—

	Bengal.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
First-class districts -	2	2	2	2	8
Second-class districts	2	2	2	2	8
Third-class districts	3	2	1	3	9
	7	6	5	7	25

Present cost.

88. The present cost is—

	Rs. a.	Rs. a.	Rs. a.
12 Divisions - - -	× 3,500 –	= 42,000 –	
13 First-class districts -	× 2,227 14	= 28,962 6	
10 Second-class brigades -	× 2,027 14	= 20,278 12	
			91,241 2

Pay of generals commanding districts.

89. We recommend that the pay of general officers commanding districts shall be at the following consolidated rates :—

	Rs.
First-class district - - - - - - - - -	3,500
Second-class district - - - - - - - - -	2,500
Third-class district - - - - - - - - -	2,000

Proposed cost.

90. The proposed cost at the above rates will be—

	Rs.	Rs.	Rs. a.
Eight first-class districts - -	× 3,500	= 28,000	
Eight second-class districts - -	× 2,500	= 20,000	
Nine third-class districts - -	× 2,000	= 18,000	
			66,000 –
Saving monthly - -			25,241 2
			× 12
TOTAL Annual Saving - -			3,02,893 8

Annual saving.

or 30,289 *l.*, besides a considerable saving in staff and other expenses.

91. In

* Including Punjab Frontier Force.

91. In addition to the above district commands we have provided for the command of garrisons. At important stations, garrisoned by troops of all arms, we have allotted colonels on the staff, with staff pay at 800 rupees per mensem, in addition to staff corps pay. These will be selected officers, and will hold their appointments for five years. At minor stations, we propose to retain the present system of leaving the commands to be exercised by the senior officer of the garrison, and have placed these stations in two classes, with a command pay of 300 rupees and 200 rupees respectively. At all other stations the senior officer will exercise command without any additional pay. The stations at which we recommend that colonels on the staff should be appointed are, Allahabad, Agra, Lundi Kotal,* Bellary, Pishin, or some other station above Dadur, total five. The first-class stations will be Rawal Pindi, Nowshera, Kohat, Kuram, Thayetmyo, Tonghoo, Kurrachee, Ahmedabad, Saugor, total nine. The second-class stations will be Barrackpore, Darjeeling, Dinapore, Cawnpore, Fyzabad, Delhi, Ferozepore, Abbottabad, Edwardesabad, Trichinopoly, Cannanore, Jacobabad, Asseerghur, Jubbulpore, total 14. Command of garrisons.

92. Although we have, in paragraph 77, stated our opinion that where possible it would, on grounds both of efficiency and economy, be more desirable that convalescents should be attched to corps stationed in the hills than formed into special depôts, we do not suggest any immediate abolition of these depôts, and consider that their commands and staff should remain as at present. We have therefore omitted them from our calculations. Convalescent depôts.

93. We have allotted the number of cavalry and infantry regiments to each army corps with reference to the requirements of the country and the demand for service external to its limits, on the principle that each of the four army corps should supply for any considerable war an organised body of troops, with its own commanders and staff, equipped, transported, and maintained by the military resources of the army corps to which it belongs. We have, in effect, only reiterated the principle so admirably enunciated by Lord Strathnairn, that it is better to have 10,000 men we can move than double that number of stationary soldiers. Summary of proposals.

94. In treating of the organization of the Native army, we have taken into account the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces, the Hyderabad Contingent, and the local forces in Central India and Rajputana. But, in order that our present distribution may be clearly understood, we should repeat here that under our proposals we contemplate the inclusion of the Punjab Frontier Force in the Punjab Army Corps, and the Sind force in the Bombay Army Corps, three more Guide corps being raised, on the model of the present one, for Kuram, Tonk, and Pishin, to be at the disposal of the Frontier authorities; for obvious reasons, the Hyderabad Contingent and local corps should remain much as at present, merely being brought under a general supervision by the Lieutenant Generals Commanding the Madras and Bombay Army Corps respectively. The Hyderabad Contingent should be officered, we think, from the Madras Army Corps, and recruited, as far as possible, from good classes in the Deccan and Southern Peninsula. Local forces.

95. The distribution of the army into districts follows, as we have shown, the system adopted in England. This arrangement will simplify work, and will remove unnecessary intervention between officers commanding garrisons and the general officer. In Chapter V. we have provided for the staff for districts and garrisons. On the frontier our distribution gives full power to general officers commanding the field forces in the Peshawar, Kuram, Mooltan, and Sind districts, while the four Guide corps, each consisting of cavalry, infantry, and guns, will be, as it were, the outer line to watch the frontier, and keep the peace of the border. Improvement by changes proposed.

96. The

* So long as the present force, including British troops, remains, this will be a brigade command in the field.

Formation of the Army in time of War.

Maintenance of internal security.

96. The peace of the country will, in ordinary times, be kept by the normal garrisons, by the police force numbering 157,999 men, and by the local bodies of volunteers, whose numbers might be largely increased in the case of any great emergency. In case of internal disturbance, moveable columns from all the main centres might be sent into the districts within 48 hours. We have shown in another part of the report that sufficient transport for the purpose, if our recommendations are adopted, will always be available.

Probable demands in various quarters.

97. It remains to consider our requirements in case of larger military operations. With regard to the two States in the interior of India, possessing any real military power, we presume that a well-equipped division of all arms against each would, with the defensive and offensive power we now possess at the strategical centres of the respective territories, be sufficient to overpower any resistance. For external requirements, we may be involved with the tribes of the Eastern Frontier, or with Burma; or we may have to render assistance to the Straits Settlements, or to China. War with Nepal is a contingency to be kept in view, while we must always be ready for service in Afghanistan and beyond. Again, Indian troops may be called upon to bear their share in any warlike operations in Africa, Egypt, or Asia Minor. Persia might also form the theatre of Indian military operations; and although the occupation of her seaports would bring great pressure to bear, a land force might have to be sent, as in 1856, either for operations near the coast, or still further inland.

Strength and composition of possible forces required.

98. In discussing the strength and composition of the forces which might be required in these various directions, we have been governed by past experience, modified by the present condition of things in respect to changes in armaments, equipment, and communications, all of which have tended to place our troops at an advantage relatively to the military strength with which the Government might have to deal. For operations on the Eastern Frontier, it might be necessary to employ a strong brigade of all arms to reinforce the troops in Assam, which will in themselves, if our proposals are carried out, represent over 2,700 men. For Burma, more than a division, in addition to the normal garrison we have allotted to that province, which exceeds 5,000 British and Native troops, would not be required. For operations in the Straits Settlements, India might probably send a brigade of all arms; for China, a strong division of all arms might be sent as the Indian contingent; for war in Nepal, as in days past, two or more divisions would probably be employed; while in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the force required would consist of one or two army corps, each of two or three divisions. In Persia, Africa, Egypt, or Asia Minor, the object of Government would be to embark organised and complete divisions of troops, to be followed, as the case may be, by other divisions, to be either united with similar bodies from England, or to act on separate lines. It appears, therefore, that the army of India may be called on to furnish, for various services in external warfare, organised bodies of from 5,000 up to about 60,000 men, this being the maximum which it would probably ever be necessary to put in the field.

Force available for active service; 12,674 cavalry, 55,272 infantry, 240 guns,

99. From the army corps tables we have prepared (*see* pages 37-40) it will be seen that there will be available for field service—

Artillery.—Thirty batteries of horse and field artillery, numbering 180 guns; three batteries of heavy artillery (or small siege trains); seven mountain batteries, or 42 guns; and three garrison batteries for siege trains.

Cavalry.—Five British cavalry regiments, or 2,930 sabres; 16 Native cavalry regiments, or 9,744 sabres; making a total of 12,674 sabres.

Infantry.—Eighteen regiments British infantry, or 18,792 bayonets; 40 regiments of Native infantry, or 36,480 bayonets.

Sappers.—Twenty-one companies of sappers.

So that, under our proposed distribution, it would be possible to put into the field 12,674 cavalry and 55,272 infantry, with 240 guns, besides heavy siege artillery

artillery and sappers, leaving, at the same time, for the preservation of internal order in India, a force of British and Native troops numbering over 96,000 men, and 160 guns. In addition to this force composing the home or obligatory garrisons of the different stations of India there would be the large body of local troops shown in our distribution tables, but not included in the above strength, the limited reserve we have proposed, and the volunteers and police, all of which must be taken into account in considering the precautions required for the maintenance of internal peace.

Over and above the garrison troops, of 96,000, 160 guns, and reserves, &c.

100. A force of the strength detailed above could, we consider, be put into the field with comparative ease without any demand for troops from England; but, in regard to our power to obtain such reinforcements, it is necessary also to bear in mind the great additional military advantage India has derived from the change in our relations with England, in the existence of telegraphic communication, in the rapid transit by steam between the two countries, and in the development of an enormous and increasing steam mercantile marine.

Could be put in the field without aid from England.

101. It must, of course, be understood that we consider it to be the duty of the head-quarters staff of the army to have clearly-defined plans of the mode in which the forces required in various directions could be moved and concentrated. In our opinion, it is not sound policy to leave these matters to be settled in a haphazard way when an emergency has actually arisen. Every ordinary and probable contingency should be foreseen and pre-arranged for, so that the moment an order is given to move a brigade or division the officer commanding the territorial army corps may know exactly what troops he is to detail, the stations from which they are to be drawn, the relative strength of each arm, and the nature of the transport required and available.

Duty of head-quarters staff to prepare plans of mobilization.

102. The first step, in our opinion, to be taken to this end is to determine the composition of brigades, divisions, and army corps. Certain modifications may be necessary with reference to the character of the countries in which the army of India may be required to serve; but these can easily be made if a standard is laid down, and if there is a general understanding throughout the army as to what is meant by the terms "brigade," "division," and "army corps." Her Majesty's Government, in a Despatch, No. 92 of the 1st April 1878, ordered that this should be done, but nothing appears as yet to have been effected to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State.

Formation and organization of tactical units.

See Appendix XI.

103. We have fully considered the home organisation, and the reasons which have guided the military authorities of British and Continental armies in the composition of brigades, divisions, and army corps. The requirements of Indian warfare will not, we trust, very frequently demand the employment of army corps in the field; but it is all the same necessary to define their constitution. We believe that the following composition of an infantry brigade, a combined brigade for detached service, a division, and an army corps of two or three divisions, will fully meet the necessities of our situation in India, whether for internal or external warfare.

Commission has considered British and Continental systems.

104. The composition of Indian brigades and divisions in past expeditions and wars is given in Appendix XI. Taking the experience of the past as a guide, we consider that the following organisation will be suitable to the requirements of Indian service:—The details are given in Appendix XII.

Proposed composition of brigades, divisions, and army-corps.

A Brigade of Infantry -	1 British infantry battalion. 2 Native infantry battalions.
A Brigade of Cavalry -	1 British cavalry regiment. 2 Native cavalry regiments. 1 Battery horse artillery.
A Brigade of all Arms -	1 Brigade infantry. 1 Regiment Native cavalry. 2 Field batteries. 1 Company sappers.
A Division of all Arms, 24 Guns	2 Brigades infantry. 1 Pioneer regiment. 2 Native cavalry regiments. 1 Horse artillery battery. 3 Field batteries. 2 Companies sappers.

An Army Corps of 2 Divisions, 60 Guns.	2 Divisions (as above, except that there will be only one Native cavalry regiment and only one company of sappers with each division). 1 Cavalry brigade. 3 Batteries corps artillery. 4 Companies corps sappers.
An Army Corps of 3 Divisions, 90 Guns.	3 Divisions (as above). 1 Cavalry division of 2 brigades. 4 Batteries corps artillery. 5 Companies corps sappers.

Commands and staff of administrative and tactical units.

105. In Chapter V. our proposals with regard to the staff are detailed. It is only necessary to mention here that we propose that a field army corps shall be commanded by a general officer, aided by four staff officers; that a division shall be commanded by a major general with two staff officers, and a brigade by a major general or brigadier general with one staff officer. These numbers are exclusive of artillery, engineer, departmental, and personal, staff. The details are given in Appendix XII.

CHAPTER V.

THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA.

The present system.

106. The superintendence, direction, and control of the whole civil and military government of India is vested by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 39, in the Governor General in Council. By the 45th section of the same Act, the Governor General in Council is invested with full authority to superintend and control the Governments of the minor presidencies in all points relating to the civil or military administration of the said presidencies respectively, and the said Governments are bound to obey such orders and instructions in all cases whatsoever.

The Governor General in Council the supreme head of the army.

107. The Governor General in Council, therefore, is the supreme head of the army.

108. The military administration of India is carried on by the following independent departments and offices with the Government of India, at Simla and Calcutta and with Army Head-Quarters in the Bengal Presidency; also by similar departments with the Governments of Madras and Bombay, and the Army Head-Quarters of those presidencies.

Departments under the Government of India.

The Military Department.

Government of India and Bengal army.

109. The business of the army in India is conducted, as all other business of Government is conducted, so far as the issue of the orders of the Governor General in Council is concerned, through the agency of the Secretary of the Department. The head of this Department, under the existing system, is the Military Member of Council, who is the adviser of the Governor General in the Military Department, and who is responsible to the head of the Government for the proper working of the Department. The Secretary takes his orders from the Military Member of Council, who acts under the general control of his Excellency the Viceroy, and the Secretary's position is that of a superior ministerial officer. He is assisted by a Deputy, and a staff of Assistant Secretaries.

Military Department; Functions of—

110. The Military Department of the Government of India corresponds with the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, and conveys the orders of Government to the Commander in Chief through those officers. It corresponds with the Madras and Bombay Governments in regard to those armies; with the Punjab Government for the Punjab Frontier Force; with the Resident at Hyderabad for the Hyderabad Contingent; with local corps under the Government

Government of India, through the Foreign Office; with Civil Governments and Departments; and with the Home Department on civil and ecclesiastical matters relating to the army. This office also comprises the Military Accountant General and the Consulting Naval Officer to Government. A large portion of it is in *Calcutta* throughout the year.

The heads of the Army Departments directly under the Military Department, Government of India, are as follow:— **Departments under Government of India.**

1. The Commissary General, Bengal Army.
2. The Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal Army, with a Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance in Calcutta.
3. The Surgeon General, British Medical Department, and Principal Medical Officer, British Forces in India.*
4. The Surgeon General, Indian Medical Department, Bengal Army (in *Calcutta*).
5. The Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal Army (in *Calcutta*), with subordinate Pay and Audit Officers.
6. The Superintendent of Army Clothing, Bengal Army (in *Calcutta*).
7. The Director of Army Remount Operations, Bengal Army.
8. The Superintendent of Horse Breeding Operations, Bengal.

The Inspector General of Military Works, Bengal Presidency, is practically under the Public Works Department, and only corresponds with the Military Department through the Public Works Secretariat.

These Departments correspond by letter with the Military Department of the Government of India, and with the departments under the Commander in Chief.

The Commander in Chief as Chief Executive Officer of the Army.

111. Under the administrative control of the Governor General in Council, the chief executive military authority is the Commander in Chief. He is in respect of his position as Commander in Chief the immediate subordinate of the Governor General in Council, and is bound to carry out all the orders he receives. He has special command of the Bengal army; but under the provisions of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 95, s. 30, the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India was made also, by virtue of such appointment, Commander in Chief of all the Company's Forces in India. **Commander in Chief.**

112. The Commander in Chief of the army is, however, placed in a very anomalous position; he is called upon to perform dual functions. He is the chief military executive subordinate of the Government of India; but by Sect. 3 of c. 67, 24 & 25 Vict., the Commander in Chief may also be appointed to be an Extraordinary Member of the Council of the Governor General, taking rank and precedence next after the Governor General, and therefore above the Military Member of Council. Further, the Commander in Chief, when he visits one of the minor presidencies, becomes a Member of the Council of that presidency, and supersedes the local Commander in Chief, who from that moment ceases to have a vote in Council; and we then have the anomaly of two Commanders in Chief in the same place, both exercising control over the same army. **His anomalous position.**

113. It is not obligatory by law that the Commander in Chief should be apppointed to the Council, but hitherto this has been done. We shall allude to this question in detail further on.

The officers of Army Head-Quarters under the Commander in Chief in India are— **Offices under the Commander in Chief.**

1. The Commander in Chief's office under the Military Secretary.
2. The Adjutant General in India.
3. The Quartermaster General in India.

4. The

* This officer is nominally under Government, but practically he is more directly connected with Army Head-quarters.

4. The Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India.
5. The Inspector General of Artillery in India.
6. The Judge Advocate General, Bengal Army.
7. The Principal Veterinary Surgeon, British Forces.
8. The Director of Garrison Instruction in India.
9. The Inspector of Gymnasia in India.
10. The Superintendent of British Army Schools, Bengal Army.
11. The Superintendent of Native Army Schools, Bengal Army.

All these offices and departments correspond with each other and with other departments, by letter or official memorandum. They are in separate buildings, and scattered about Simla in private houses and cottages, for which high rents are paid. Nos. 10 and 11 are not stationed at Simla, but at Kussowlie and Umballa respectively.

Madras army.

114. In the Madras Presidency the military administration consist of the following offices and departments:—

Military Department, Government of Madras.

The heads of departments directly under it are—

1. The Commissary General, Madras Army.
2. The Inspector General of Ordnance, Madras Army.
3. The Surgeon General, British Medical Department.
4. The Surgeon General, Indian Medical Department, Madras Army.
5. The Controller of Military Accounts, Madras Army.
6. The Remount Agent.
7. The Superintendent of Army Clothing.

The Army Head-Quarters offices under the Commander in Chief, Madras Army, are—

1. The Commander in Chief's office under a Military Secretary.
2. The Adjutant General, Madras Army.
3. The Quartermaster General, Madras Army.
4. The Assistant Adjutant General of Royal Artillery.
5. The Judge Advocate General, Madras Army.
6. The Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon.
7. The Superintendent of Army Schools.

Bombay army.

115. In the Bombay Presidency the military administration consists of—

Military Department, Government of Bombay.

The heads of departments directly under it are—

1. The Commissary General, Bombay Army.
2. The Inspector General of Ordnance, Bombay Army.
3. The Surgeon General, British Medical Department.
4. The Surgeon General, Indian Medical Department, Bombay Army.
5. The Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay Army.
6. The Superintendent of Army Clothing.

The Army Head-Quarters Offices under the Commander in Chief, Bombay Army, include—

1. The Commander in Chief's Office under a Military Secretary.
2. The Adjutant General, Bombay Army.
3. The Quartermaster General, Bombay Army.
4. The Assistant Adjutant General of Royal Artillery.
5. The Judge Advocate General, Bombay Army.
6. The Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon.
7. The Superintendent of Army Schools.

Military Secretariats, Punjab and Hyderabad; and Military Secretaries to Viceroy and Governors.

116. In addition to these offices connected with the Government of India, the Bengal army, and the Madras and Bombay armies, there are the offices of the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and of the Military Secretary to the Resident at Hyderabad. There are also three personal Military Secretaries

Secretaries with offices; one military Secretary to the Viceroy, one to the Governor of Madras, and one to the Governor of Bombay. It will be found, on reference to the Tables given in Appendix XIV., that the higher military administration of India, such as that which is included in the War Office in England, and in the War Ministries of foreign armies, employs about 145 officers and 1,500 clerks at a cost of about 494,498 *l.** per annum for an army of 180,000 men. The War Office in England administers a force of regulars, militia, yeomanry, and volunteers, amounting to 570,000 men, of whom 127,000 are regular troops with foreign stations all over the world. This strength is exclusive of the Indian Establishment of the British army, numbering 62,000, which, although not under the control of the War Office, necessarily adds to its labours. The number of superior officers, civil and military, is 62, and 461 clerks, at a cost of 136,110 *l.* per annum.† It seems clear, therefore, that even allowing for the greater efficiency of the home clerical establishment, there is a great waste of power in the present system in India.

Cost of military administration in India as compared with that in England.

117. The financial powers of the Military Department are governed by the general rule that, except in cases of great emergency, no order sanctioning any considerable expenditure of money, or alteration of salaries, or new appointments and establishments, shall be issued by any department of the Government of India without the consent of the Civil Financial Department previously recorded. Such orders are usually issued in the Financial Department, or after consideration in that Department, and no orders may be issued, even preliminarily or conditionally, from any other department which are calculated to commit Government to the approval or sanction of any expenditure.

Financial powers of Military Department.

118. All departments of the Government of India have, however, authority to sanction, without reference to the Financial Department, ordinary contingent expenditure for which there may be no precise precedent, provided the amount involved in any case does not exceed 1,000 rupees, and that there is nothing novel, doubtful, or irregular in the character of the expenditure. The Military Department has power to deal, within the limits of the annual grant, with financial matters requiring professional knowledge or a knowledge of military details, and to sanction minor charges or small alterations in, or additions to, establishments. Such cases are reported in quarterly statements for the information of the Financial Department. With this exception, there is no difference between the powers of the Military Department and those of other departments of the Government of India.

119. The Army Departments which are directly under the Military Department treat with the following subjects:—

Duties of Army Departments.

The Commissary General controls supply, transport, rations, forage, barrack supplies, medical and transport charges, &c.

The Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines deals with armaments, arsenals, equipments, factories, warlike stores, &c.

The Surgeon General, British Forces, is the responsible adviser on all medical matters connected with the British Service, over which he has supervision in all branches of its medical administration.

The Surgeon General, Indian Medical Department, performs the same duties in connection with the Native portion of the Bengal army.

The Controller of Military Accounts deals with all questions relating to pay, pensions, or the expenditure of cash or stores.

The Superintendent of Army Clothing watches over the indents, receipts, purchase, manufacture, and issue of all clothing or materials to the army in the Bengal Presidency.

The Director of Army Remount Operations superintends the purchase, care, and transfer of remounts.

The Superintendent, Horse Breeding Operations, is responsible for the general working of operations in the North-Western Provinces, Punjab, and Rajputana; also for mule-breeding, the inspection of stock at the horse-fairs in these provinces, and of that used for cattle-breeding.

* Exclusive of the large expenditure on printing.

† Exclusive of "Works Division," which has also not been included in the numbers and cost of the Indian War Administration.

Departments of the Army Head-Quarters under the Commander in Chief in India.

The Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief deals with personal matters and appointments.

The Adjutant General in India deals with the administration of the army in all its branches, but more directly with enlistment, service, discharge, interior economy, training, and discipline.

The Quartermaster General in India superintends the housing and sheltering of the army in cantonments and camps, sanitary questions, collection of intelligence, and transport or movement of troops.

The Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery in India is a branch of the office of the Adjutant General in India, and deals with all matters affecting the artillery in the whole of India.

The Inspector General of Artillery in India conducts the inspection of the whole of the artillery in India.

The Judge Advocate General supervises courts-martial generally, and is the Commander in Chief's adviser on all points of military law.

The Principal Veterinary Surgeon deals with all army veterinary questions, veterinary medicines and instruments, diseases, casualties, and castings of horses in British cavalry and artillery.

The duties of *Director of Garrison Instruction in India, Inspector of Gymnasia in India, Superintendent of British Army Schools, and Superintendent of Native Army Schools*, are explained by the titles of the appointments.

The duties of the corresponding officers of the military administration of Madras and Bombay are very similar to these.

Excessive routine and correspondence.

120. We have detailed as briefly as possible the heads of the chief army staff and departments scattered over India concerned in the higher administration of the army, and have indicated the subjects with which they deal. The official procedure followed in each office is given by the heads of departments in their written evidence, to which we request that a reference may be made, as it would be impossible to burden the body of the report with a detailed account of the innumerable processes of routine. A study of that evidence will, we think, show that great inconvenience to the public service undoubtedly arises from the circuitous course which is followed in dealing with the business of the army.

See Appendix XV.

Centralisation of details.

121. The Adjutant General in India, Sir P. S. Lumsden, now Chief of the Staff, has stated in his written evidence that the present system centralises everything at Army Head-Quarters. We believe that this refers only to the Bengal army, but other evidence points to the fact that General Officers of Divisions and Districts refer even the most minor matters to Army Head-Quarters. In fact, it is impossible not to see that the present system centralises everything, and disregards the fundamental principle on which all efficient army administrations are based, of centralising in important matters, and decentralising in minor questions of detail.

See Appendix IV.

Want of concentration of army offices.

122. One of the greatest obstacles to a prompt and efficient performance of business in the various offices connected with the military administration is the arrangement under which these departments are scattered about in separate houses, both in Simla and Calcutta. The necessity of concentrating the offices has been fully recognised for some time past, and several schemes for remedying this defect have been under consideration; but nothing has yet been done, except a very partial concentration of army staff offices at the head-quarters of some of the districts and divisions, the details of which will be found in the correspondence in Appendix XVI. The principle of concentrating army offices is undoubtedly sound, and should be followed throughout the whole military administration of India.

The chief officers overburdened with details.

123. Another of the defects of the present system is that the officers at head-quarters, being overburdened with details, have but little time to study carefully the progress of the armies of other nations, the changes in the circumstances of the country, or the defence and security of the Empire as a whole. Various projects and schemes come up from individual officers, which are reported

reported on separately by the army departments; but there is little or no direct consultation between these departments, and the original projects are buried under a mass of opinions from which it is hopeless to disinter a clear and practical proposal. Even if, after the lapse of time, a conclusion be arrived at, change of officers, the occurrence of other circumstances, or the pressure of current work, frequently prevent its being carried into effect.

Work of the Military Departments.

124. By way of testing the manner in which the military offices work, we have given in Appendix XVII. a statement of the matters dealt with in the month of January 1879 in each of the Military Departments, viz., the Military Department of the Government of India, the Military Department of the Government of Madras, the Military Department of the Government of Bombay, and in the Military Secretariat of the Government of the Punjab. We have taken the month of January 1879 at random, and any other month would have served the purpose equally well. The first list shows the work of each Military Department, and the second list shows the work which emanated from the Military Department of the Government of India, or was referred to it from the subordinate Governments.

125. A consideration of these lists will show, we think, better than any argument—

Minor Military Departments unnecessary.

1st.—That the minor "Military Departments" are in many cases mere transmitting offices, interposing a needless routine between the supreme military authority and local executive chiefs. The excessive routine of even communicating an order of the Government of India is admirably shown by the Commander in Chief in Bombay in Appendix III.

2nd.—That much of the matter now referred to the minor Military Departments could be confided to the chief local military authority, such as we propose in each of the four great areas, viz., Bengal, Punjab, Bombay, Madras.

3rd.—That much of the detail now undertaken by the Military Department of the Supreme Government could be distributed to the Commander in Chief in India under our proposed system, and to the Lieutenant Generals Commanding the four army corps, assisted as they would be by competent advisers and responsible chiefs for each army department.

Military Authority of Local Governments.

Military authority of Local Governments.

126. Though, as we have shown, the supreme control of the military administration of the armies of India is vested in the Governor General in Council, the military authority and control in Madras and Bombay is, to a certain extent, entrusted to the Government of those presidencies; but it is, at best, a nominal and unreal control. Control really hinges entirely on considerations of finance. It is a rule in the Military Department, as in all other departments, that no order sanctioning any permanent expenditure of money, or the employment of new establishments, shall be issued without the previous consent of the Government of India, though no interference is exercised on permanent authorised expenditure, except when a reduction of expenditure throughout India is called for. We find, on examining the records of the Military Department, that such matters as the substitution of a water carrier with his bullock on 10 rupees per mensem, for a hand water carrier on 7 rupees at Sattara, and the hire of a blacksmith to shoe mules at Belgaum, had to be submitted for the sanction of the Government of India, as indeed every question, however trivial, involving the slightest expenditure, must be.

This authority only nominal.

127. It cannot, therefore, be pretended that the military administration of the minor presidency Governments has ever been in late years anything but nominal. The power of the Local Governments is limited to making appointments to sanctioned offices, and granting leave under a strict limitation to the general rules of the service. The movement of Native troops is entrusted to them, subject to the control of the Government of India; the allotment of European troops to the minor presidencies, and their transfer from one presidency to another, are, however, entirely in the hands of the Commander in Chief in India, acting under the orders of the Supreme Government. The Governments of the

the presidencies further exercise, under the Army Discipline Act and the Indian Articles of War, certain unimportant functions co-ordinately with the Governor General of India. It seems, indeed, always to have been recognised as an essential principle that India, as respects its military force, must be viewed as a whole and worked as a whole. The extent of the power of the Local Governments in military matters has never been formally defined. It arose from the force of circumstances, as far as we can find, and has become more and more of a shadow as the armies of the two minor presidencies have gradually been employed in territory not subject to the Governments of those presidencies, and in which, therefore, their connection with the army has been limited to detailing regiments for relief on the report of the Commander in Chief, or on the requisition of the heads of the Governments and Administrations in whose provinces Madras and Bombay troops have been stationed; they have also exercised their authority in the appointment of officers, which must necessarily have been made on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.

Unreasonableness of maintaining this authority.

128. It appears to the majority of the Commission that there is no reason for maintaining this unsubstantial authority on the part of the Local Governments, while its retention is, on the other hand, most inconvenient, and of necessity involves great delay in the transaction of business, and a break in the chain of responsibility of the officers really commanding the troops. It further imposes great hardships and disabilities on the officers of the armies of the minor presidencies, who are kept out of the sight of the central authority, and do not in consequence obtain their fair share of recognition. Neither, indeed, do the armies themselves obtain their fair share of work and service; and it is mainly owing to this, no doubt, that these armies are said to have lost some of their warlike instincts. If it was really essential to the efficiency of the administration that each Local Government should control the army within its own jurisdiction, it would have long since been found necessary to have had 10 separate armies. When the three presidential armies were established, there were three civil administrations; Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. We now have Bombay, Madras, Bengal, North-Western Provinces, Punjab, Burma, Assam, Central Provinces, Rajputana, and Mysore. While the civil government has been decentralised, the army of Bengal has been retained under the immediate detailed control of the Central Government, the control of the Madras and Bombay armies being nominally left under the Local Governments. There is an entire want of principle or system in the present arrangement. Some of the Governments with the largest territory and the most burthensome administration have been left with no authority over the armies employed within their jurisdiction; while other Governments, which have far less responsibility and are less likely to be actively mixed up in military operations, consider it absolutely essential to the maintenance of their authority that they should retain their nominal connection with the army. It appears to the majority of the Commission obviously unreasonable to expect that we can have a separate army for each large Government, much less for each Administration; and the only remedy, therefore, is to adopt the system which should, we think, have been adopted long ago, of placing the higher administration of the army entirely and exclusively under the Supreme Government. There is no more real reason why the Bengal army should be under the Government of India than the armies of Madras and Bombay, except that the army has hitherto been considered a department which should not be decentralised as the civil departments have been. In civil matters the Supreme Government has no special territory under its direct and immediate control; and there is no reason, therefore, why it should retain direct control of only a portion of the army of India. The Local Governments, it should be added, are assisted by a Military Secretariat in the same way as the Central Government is, but they have no Military Member of Council; the Commander in Chief of the local army is also a Member of the Council of the Local Government, is its military adviser, sits in judgment on his own proposals and his own acts, and is expected to censure himself for his own shortcomings. The Commander in Chief of Bombay has laid stress on the absurdity and delay of the present of working.

Evils of present Presidential system.

129. The majority of the Commission are much impressed by the evils of the present "Presidential" system, the defects of a war administration worked by separate

separate and dispersed agencies, and by the three sets of separate staff and army departments. We cannot close our eyes to the grave embarrassment to military affairs caused by the numerous and circuitous channels through which the smallest detail has to filter; and we have endeavoured to show that, apart from all question of useless expense, the existence of such an arrangement as three separate military administrations, however necessary and desirable in days gone by, can no longer be defended. We may be told that it is not necessary to get rid of an anomaly merely because it is one; and we are prepared to admit that everything in our military administration should be practical, and that old customs and arrangements should not be sacrificed to a merely theoretical and symmetrical system. But when we discover that the anomaly is not merely useless, but hurtful to the efficiency of the army; that even in peace time it impedes the conduct of military affairs, hampers the energies of officers and men in war, and wastes the revenue of the country, we feel justified in condemning it. It has at times been urged that the military authority of the Local Governments, such as it is, has the effect of checking violent and ill-considered reforms calculated to disturb the mind of the Native soldiers. But the slightest consideration will show how unsubstantial this objection to centralisation of control really is, when it is remembered that, with very few exceptions, the Governors of the minor presidencies, and the Commanders in Chief of these presidencies, have been appointed from England, without any knowledge whatever of India, or the feelings of the soldiery and people of India. With this fact in view, we can imagine no greater protection to the Native soldiers than the control which is exercised by the Government of India in all military matters.

130. Two of our colleagues, Major General Sir Peter Lumsden and Brigadier General O'Connell, dissent from the opinion expressed by the majority of the Commission in respect to the withdrawal from the minor presidencies of their military authority, and would preserve to them authority over the army corps of their respective provinces. They have recorded their dissent in a separate Minute.

131. Having thus sketched the present system of military administration in India, and pointed out what appear to us to be its defects, we propose to examine, briefly, the system of military administration adopted in modern times in England, as the existence of the evils, which we believe to be the great encumbrance to efficient army administration, has made itself felt there in precisely the same manner as it has in this country, and has led to reforms which we think the Government of India should keep prominently in view.

132. The war administration of the British army has in late years passed through many changes, which we have not time or space to follow in detail; we will merely point out what appear to us to be the salient features of the various modifications which have from time to time taken place, and what is the organisation of the present day. War administration of the British army

133. In consequence of defects in the working of the War Department during the Crimean War, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the subject; and, in May 1855, as a result of their report, a Minister for War was appointed, the Commissariat was separated from the Treasury, and the Board of Ordnance was abolished. The civil departments of the army had already been consolidated in 1854 and 1855, and some other improvements were from time to time effected; but the Military Organisation Committee of 1860 showed that various matters still required reform. Among the defects on which stress was laid were the amount of correspondence between the different branches of the military administration, arising from the separation of the offices belonging purely to the War Department, and their non-concentration under one roof. The evidence of many experienced men examined before that Committee tended to show the necessity for the concentration of all offices of military administration, and for their due subordination under one head; it was also made clear that the establishment of a general registry, and the substitution of "minutes" for letter-writing, would save an immense amount of labour in correspondence, and that personal communication was essential to the efficient conduct of public affairs. These views, though enun- Reforms therein.

ciated 20 years ago, and fully recognised in England, were not acted up to until 1870–71.

Lord Northbrook's Committee.

134. The Franco-German war of these years gave an impetus to the development of what all had agreed was the proper form of administration, though it had been allowed to remain in abeyance until we became aware that a great military power, in whose perfection we had long believed, had failed in the organisation of its army and the concentration of its troops. The centralisation of details, the want of harmony in the administration, the numberless authorities all ordering and counter-ordering, the promotion of men of mediocrity to high places, and the excessive paper-work overshadowing the great principles and practical lines upon which the affairs of the army should have been carried on, were evils which were seen very clearly in another nation. The disastrous confusion which resulted, and which foiled the efforts of a brave army, stifling its struggles in the bonds of routine and official tradition, is notorious. The lesson did not pass unheeded in England. An effort had indeed already been made to place the military administration on a sounder footing. A Committee had assembled in 1869 and 1870, under the presidency of Lord Northbrook, then Under Secretary of State for War, to inquire into the arrangements in force for the conduct of business in the army departments. This Committee followed on the lines laid down by the Military Organisation Committee of 1860. Lord Northbrook's Committee reported, among other things, that a much larger administrative staff was employed in England, in comparison with the strength of the regular and reserve forces, than in any of the principal nations of Europe; and that the reason was to be found in the fact that the whole military administration of England had been organised upon a system of want of trust, which had created double establishments for the transaction of the same business; that although the different offices which once were concerned with the administration of the army were now placed under one responsible Minister, the tradition remained; and that, both within the walls of the War Office itself, and more especially between the War Office and the Horse Guards, the habit was to prefer a system of unnecessary check, double labour, and divided responsibility, to one of well-defined responsibility, simplicity, and reasonable confidence.

Their recommendations.

135. Lord Northbrook's Committee were of opinion that the effect of the system was unsatisfactory, both from an economical and administrative point of view, and that no sound system of administration could exist which was not established on the principles of having a responsible War Minister controlling all branches of army administration, and of placing confidence in selected chiefs, on whom should be imposed due responsibility for the efficient working of the departments entrusted to them.

Necessity for concentration of offices.

136. The Committee spoke strongly of the necessity for the whole administration of the army being conducted under one roof, and they pointed to the evidence given by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, and the Military Secretary, in support of this view. The Committee showed that a general registry was necessary, that correspondence between the different branches should cease, that too much detailed business came to the Horse Guards, that the distribution of business was not clearly defined, that too great centralisation of details existed in the War Office and Horse Guards, that unnecessary minuting of papers took place in the War Office, and that questions should be dealt with, in the first place, by heads of departments. In Appendix XVIII. will be found extracts from this clear and practical Report, and also from the evidence given before the Committee.

Organisation of the War Office.

137. The War Office is now broadly divided into three great divisions—Military, Ordnance, Finance. At the head of the *Military Department* or Horse Guards is the Officer Commanding in Chief; the head of the *Ordnance* Department* is a Parliamentary officer, the "Surveyor General of the Ordnance" (an old title of the third great functionary of the Board of Ordnance) the head of the *Finance Department* is the Financial Secretary, a Parliamentary

* A term used to express supply and transport, artillery and stores, and contracts.

tary officer. The *Central Department* is a bureau containing the general registry, and performing such special *general* work as the codification of regulations. *See* Appendix XXX.

138. Under the advice of Lord Northbrook's Committee of 1870 much greater simplicity was introduced into the system of correspondence and the internal organisation of the War Office. Correspondence between the various departments has been entirely discontinued, all communication being made by minutes, the passage of which through the various branches of the office is carefully registered and checked. This arrangement has led to great decrease of correspondence and clerical labour, while the diminution of friction between departments, and the greater facilities afforded to the transaction of military business, can scarcely be overrated. As a matter of fact we find that, whereas there were, according to the above Report of 1870, 82 superior officers and 673 clerks, or a total of 755, employed in the higher administration of the army, there are now only 62 superior military and civil officers, and 461 clerks.* Improvements in system.

139. The relative position of the civil and military government, which had been always recognised in theory, was definitely and legally laid down in 1870 by the War Office Act, and by the Orders of Council issued thereon, under which the Commander in Chief and every branch of the army administration were declared to be subordinate to the Minister of War. The whole army administration placed under the War Minister.

Position of the Commander in Chief as a Member of the Supreme Government.

140. We have indicated above the anomalous position of the Commander in Chief in India, and the majority of the Commission feel that it is their duty to point out the mischief which has, in their opinion, undeniably resulted from placing him in the false position of having a voice in the decision of questions affecting his own acts and his own administration. Two of our colleagues, Major General Sir Peter Lumsden and Brigadier General O'Connell, do not concur in the views of the majority, and have recorded their dissent in a separate Minute. They are of opinion that the Commander in Chief should continue to be a Member of the Supreme Government, as well as executive head of the army. Position of Commander in Chief anomalous,

141. The position of the Executive Commander in Chief as a Member of Council is, in the opinion of the majority, one without precedent in the organisation of any European government or army. It is contrary to one of the most essential and salutary principles of sound administration; and the common instinct and experience of all administrations, whether representative or despotic, has everywhere rejected it. *Primâ facie*, therefore, the retention of so anomalous an arrangement could only be justified, in any well-considered re-organisation of the Indian army, by strong evidence of special advantages derived from it in this particular case. But the evidence of all Indian experience is, from the positive point of view, opposed to this anomaly, even more strongly than the accepted principles and practice of all European countries are opposed to it from the negative point of view. It has been found to weaken simultaneously the executive initiative of the military, and the financial control of the civil authority, by constantly confounding and confusing their respective spheres of independent activity. It renders practically impossible that continuous personal contact, which in every well-organised system of military administration has been found so beneficial, between the supreme executive head of the whole army and the subordinate heads of its various branches and corps. Finally, between the Governor General, the Commander in Chief, and the Military Member, whom it places in fundamentally false relations towards each other, there has been, under each successive administration since the existence of this ill-advised arrangement, continual friction, or cause for friction. And without precedent in other armies.

142. The inconvenience of embarrassing the Commander in Chief by imposing on him dual functions, and rendering it difficult for him to see enough of the army, was noticed as far back as 1832, when it found place in the Report of Inconvenience and embarrassment consequent on this dual position.

* Army Estimates, 1879-80.

of a Parliamentary Committee on Military Affairs. Nearly every statesman who has given an opinion on the subject in late years has laid stress on the difficulty of a Commander in Chief properly performing the irreconcilable functions of the two offices. It is the constant duty of the Commander in Chief to be urging on the Government the expenditure of money for the improvement of the army, and it is to him that the officers and men of the army must look to press their claims and state their requirements. It is the constant duty of the Government of India, on the other hand, in the interests of the tax-payers of India, to refuse demands for expenditure which they consider unreasonable or unnecessary, or beyond the power of the country to bear. When the Commander in Chief has, as executive head of the army, and as a subordinate of the Government of India, said all that he can properly urge in support of his views, he has performed his duties as advocate; and it should then rest with those responsible for the government of the country to determine how far they can reconcile it to their sense of duty to accede to his requests. But this is not what happens; for the Commander in Chief having, as head of a great spending department, pressed as ably as he can his reasons in support of a grant of money, next proceeds to abandon his position of advocate, and takes his seat on the bench with the judges, to decide in his own cause. If the application he has made is not accepted, and it very often happens that it is not, an acrimonious and bitter discussion too often takes place; and the relations of the Government with the executive chief of the army are in consequence constantly strained, and a perpetual friction is maintained, which permeates through the army and its departments, and is most mischievous in its effects on the public interests. It is as unjustifiable to place the Commander in Chief in the position of having to urge his views and justify his conduct, when called in question at a Council of which he is a member, as it would be to place the head of a subordinate Local Government in the same position. He cannot be unbiassed as a judge, and it is unreasonable to expect that he will sit down patiently to hear his conduct as a subordinate of the Government discussed by his colleagues. The position was very plainly stated by the late Lord Sandhurst, in the following words, extracted from a Minute which will be found in Appendix XX.:—

Opinion of Lord Sandhurst.

"It may be assumed that the Commander in Chief of each presidency is sent out by Her Majesty's Government to be the principal military adviser of the Government to which he is attached. In the minor presidencies his position is so inferior, that a clash with the Local Government is not very likely; and if it should take place, the consequences are not very important. Far otherwise is it with the great functionary called 'Commander in Chief in India.' Whenever the latter is a man of quick and powerful mind he finds his position difficult; at times almost intolerable. He has a great responsibility, is much appealed to, as shown above; while he often feels and knows that around the head of the Government are irresponsible and secret military advisers who regard him with hostility. Hence it is that many Commanders in Chief in India have always been most anxious to live away from the Government as much as possible, while others have been engaged in conflict leading to resignation. I conceive that the evil of divesting the head of the Government of India of his chief and responsible military adviser can hardly be exaggerated; yet if that responsible military adviser is to be at the same time an executive Commander in Chief, who is ever engaged in traversing the country on tours of inspection in times of peace, or at the head of the active army in time of war, it is utterly impossible for him to be in his place at the side of the Governor General, except at rare intervals of time. Military feeling is so strong, and the prizes of war are so great, that no Commander in Chief in India can resist the temptation of putting himself at the head of an army in the field if he has an opportunity. In like manner, for the maintenance of discipline, to gain a knowledge of the army, of the manner in which it is housed, cared for, and handled, it is absolutely necessary that a Commander in Chief should be ever on the move in peaceful times. Therefore, as said before, the constant presence of the Commander in Chief in India in his place as a member of the Supreme Government, and the recognised responsible adviser of the Governor General in Council, is an impossibility under the present system."

Opinion of Sir Charles Trevelyan.

143. Sir Charles Trevelyan, in his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1873, laid great stress on the fact that the Commander in Chief is divided between two duties, both of which are equally necessary, but both of which it is impossible for him to perform. On the one hand, it was said, he ought to be always on the move, inspecting his force from Assam to Peshawar; on the other, he ought always to be at head-quarters, attending the Council of the Governor General. A full extract of Sir Charles Trevelyan's evidence will be found in Appendix XXI.

144. Sir

144. Sir Henry Durand in 1869, when his judgment had become matured by experience gained in every branch of the public service, including the Council of the Governor-General, wrote as follows:— Opinion of Sir Henry Durand.

"Supposing the time to have arrived for considering this question, both in connection with economy and efficiency, it involves in one respect a constitutional change. I would propose but one Commander in Chief, and that the commands of the Madras and Bombay armies be merged in that command. But, under such circumstances, I am of opinion that the Commander in Chief should not have a seat in the Council of the Governor General, but should be set free for an active, though not hurried, supervision of every part of his executive command. It is only by such devotion of time and attention to the duties of his charge that a Commander in Chief can acquire a practical and thorough knowledge of the state of the different parts of the army, and of the disposition and character of the men and officers who constitute the forces under him. To do full justice to so great a charge demands undivided attention and to be untrammelled by the sessions of a Council. Such a change would also remove the anomaly of the Commander in Chief, as Extraordinary Member of Council, taking part in a review of his own executive acts. As part of the salary of the Commander in Chief was originally due to the position generally given him in the Council of the Governor General, some reduction might be made, though moderate, as the control of the Madras and Bombay armies would be added. Still I think that the Commander in Chief would be well paid by being assigned a salary equal to that of the ordinary Members of the Council of the Governor General, viz., 8,000 *l.* per annum. This would effect a reduction of 2,000 *l.* per annum.

"The Madras and Bombay forces are in reality not more than each a weak *corps d'armée*, and in no other army in the world would separate Commanders in Chief be assigned to such forces. When the difficulties of communication rendered intercourse between the presidencies slow and tedious, and when the Native armies were much stronger than they are at present, there was a practical reason for these commands being separate from that of Bengal. Powerful Native States intervened, and there was not that unity of British dominion and coherence of its parts which now has taken place. All this has greatly changed; and even with the addition of the Madras and Bombay armies, the Commander-in-Chief at the head of 192,762, or 191,704 European and Native troops, could move about and inspect and control that whole force far easier than in 1857 he could the 160,133 which constituted the Bengal force alone. The difference of about 32,000 men, which would be in excess of the command in 1857, is more than compensated by the facilities which railways alone afford for the movements of a Commander in Chief; and steam communication has improved as well as railways. In 1857 the Madras command was over a force numbering 61,970; it is now reduced to 44,852, and admits avowedly of still further reduction. The Bombay command was in 1857 over a force of 55,643; it is now reduced to a force of 46,874, all told. Under these circumstances I cannot see the necessity for maintaining in 1869 the same amount of commands in chief for a total of 192,000 men as was kept up in 1857 for 276,000 men, when neither railways nor steam communication at all presented the facilities of locomotion they now offer. I am therefore of opinion that, without any detriment to the service, a saving of 23,000 *l.* can be effected by the reduction of the Madras and Bombay commands in chief.

"I do not think that this proposal involves, as supposed by my honourable colleague Sir Richard Temple, a fusion of the Native armies and a loss of their traditions. This result is not a necessary consequence; for there is nothing to prevent the department of the Adjutant General having, when amalgamated, distinct sections for the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Native armies, the recruiting of which should, in my opinion, be kept perfectly distinct, the reliefs of which also should be made to circulate within, so to speak, provincial limits. I have no doubt that the concentration of three commands under one Commander in Chief would result in a reduction of the departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, inasmuch as the substitution of one head-quarters for three head-quarters could not fail to effect some considerable reduction of these now distinct establishments. Manifestly, instead of three Adjutant Generals and three Quartermaster Generals, one Adjutant General and one Quartermaster General would suffice, though three Deputy Adjutant Generals and three Deputy Quartermaster Generals might still be required for these administrative departments at first. I say at first, because there is no reason why ultimately some further reduction should not be possible. The reduction of two Adjutant Generals and two Quartermaster Generals would yield about 10,000 *l.*; and the concentration of the establishments might give a further 4,000 *l.*

"Altogether, therefore, the reduction of the two minor commands in chief and of their appendant Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals would result in a saving of about 37,000 *l.* per annum."

145. As far back as 1853 Sir Charles Napier pointed out the inevitable disputes and misunderstandings which must arise from a divided civil and military command. He quoted the cases of three Governors General, whose relations with three different Commanders in Chief had, at that time, been of a very strained character; and the history of late years confirms his experience. Sir Charles Napier.

 Indeed,

Indeed, for the reasons which we have given above, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. Now, as the authority of the Civil Government must of necessity be supreme, and as by law it is supreme, the remedy for the present unsatisfactory state of things is clearly to remove all division of authority. When the Commander in Chief was first made a Member of the Council there was no other Military Member of Council. As time went on, and when, in 1833, a Military Member of Council was added to the army, the British territory in India had so grown, that the Commander in Chief was generally altogether away from the Government at army head-quarters in Northern India, and his attendance in the Council became nominal. Later on, however, when the seat of Government was removed for half the year to Simla, the head-quarters of the Government and the head-quarters of the Commander in Chief were brought into contact again, with the obvious result of frequent misunderstandings and difficulties. The subject has been constantly under the consideration of the Government, but there has, no doubt, been naturally considerable hesitation on the part of the Government in moving in such a delicate matter as the removal from the Council of one of the Members. We find that, in 1869, the Government of India wrote as follows to the Secretary of State:—

"In the Minutes of his Excellency the Commander in Chief and of Sir Henry Durand, certain possible changes in the command of the other presidencies and in the position and functions of the Commander in Chief in India, together with possible alterations in the mode of enlistment and period of service in the British army, as well as other organic changes, are referred to as practicable or expedient; but, however desirable some of these changes may be, we do not propose to consider them in this Despatch, though we may possibly hereafter address your Grace with respect to some of them."

Since then no move seems to have been made in the matter.

Abolition of office of Commander in Chief disapproved by the Commission.

146. One remedy which has occasionally been proposed for the inconveniences of the existing arrangement has been the division of the whole army into four such army corps as we have agreed to recommend, and the abolition of the appointment of Commander in Chief altogether, making the Military Member of the Council practically the Commander in Chief and the head of the War Department,—making him in fact the administrative and executive head of the army. We cannot bring ourselves to advocate such an arrangement. It seems to us absolutely impossible that the business of the army can be conducted without a Commander in Chief. It is essential that the army should have some recognised executive head, who shall constantly visit, first one army corps and then another, making himself acquainted with the best men of each army, learning the requirements, the defects, or the special merits of the army organisation throughout India, capable of gathering together into his hands the threads of the executive control and discipline of the whole army, and thus qualifying himself to nominate to the Government the proper officers for high commands or staff appointments, and to advise the Government in respect to changes in the organisation, or measures calculated to improve the condition, of the army. It should be his business to draw up for the Government plans of campaigns and expeditions, in which every division of the army should be duly represented, watching carefully and impartially over the interests of each army, and concentrating all the reports, statistics, and returns which are essential for the maintenance of a proper control over the subordinate commanders and departments. It is, in fact, the duty of the Commander in Chief, either of his own motion, or when set in motion by the Lieutenant Generals acting under him, to originate nearly every measure for the improvement of the efficiency of the army, at the same time duly considering the proposals with reference to their cost, relative importance, and influence on the general expenditure of the army. When measures are originated by him and supported by all the power derived from his experience and his position, it is for the Government, which is responsible for the financial administration of the country, to deal with them. In this there is full work for a Commander in Chief; and, unless he is relieved of all other work, it will give him more than he can do. We do not agree with the opinion of Sir Henry Durand, that the salary of the Commander in Chief should be reduced. He has to maintain a large staff and occupies a representative position, which is not imposed upon a Member of Council.

Relations between Commander in Chief and the Government should be similar to those existing in England.

147. The relative positions of the Government of India and the Commander in Chief should, in our opinion, be those of the Secretary of State for War and

and the Commander in Chief in England. In his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee, which sat in 1860, his Royal Highness most fully recognised and admitted the subordination of the Commander in Chief to the War Office; and, indeed, it was clearly shown that, as considerations of finance must always be supreme in the discussion of questions involving military expenditure, no other principle could possibly be carried into practical effect. The English Act of 1870, and the Orders of Council based thereon, confirmed and legalised the principle that the Secretary of State for War was to assume supreme control, direct and indirect, over every detail in the whole machinery of administration. This principle, which is entirely inconsistent with giving the chief executive officer of the army a vote in Council, has worked satisfactorily in England, and should, in our opinion, be extended to India whenever a vacancy in the office of Commander in Chief occurs.

Commander in Chief will, under proposals of Commission, have a higher military position.

148. There is, perhaps, an idea in some minds that to dissever the connection of the office of Commander in Chief in India from the Council may weaken the military position of this high officer. It may also be said that if we allot to four responsible officers, the Lieutenant Generals commanding Army Corps, all possible details for the forces under their control, we shall leave the Commander in Chief in India nothing to do. In regard to the first point, it appears to us that we actually strengthen his strictly military position, and make him a substantial and powerful Commander in Chief of the army in India, instead of being, as he now is, Commander in Chief of a section only of that army. It must be remembered that at present the Governor General in Council, the supreme authority, while controlling the whole army of India, exercises a somewhat detailed supervision over one particular portion of it, viz., the Bengal army; while he commands, it may be said, the Punjab Frontier Force, the Hyderabad Contingent, and the local corps in Central India and Rajputana, numbering some 26,000 officers and men, to all of which the Commander in Chief in India has hitherto had nothing to say. But, stranger still, the Commander in Chief in India has in practice, except as a Member of the Supreme Government, exercised little control over the Native armies of Madras and Bombay, although by law he is Commander in Chief of those armies as well as that of Bengal. His control in respect to the minor presidencies has been limited to a general supervision of the British troops stationed in the provinces garrisoned by the Madras and Bombay armies. It is true he may frequently be called upon by the Government of India to give his views on matters affecting both the British and Indian portions of the Madras and Bombay armies; but it may happen that the Commander in Chief in India has little experience of the other armies, or of the countries in which they are stationed, and possibly may not have a single member of his staff who is possessed of the requisite knowledge. The only remedy for such a state of things is to place the Commander in Chief in a position to visit all parts of the country, and to provide that his staff should be drawn, not from one section of the army, as at present, but from all four army corps. He would then be in a position to afford the Government of India the most valuable advice on all great questions affecting the various divisions of the army.

Extensive duties of Commander in Chief.

149. In regard to the second point, viz., that we shall leave the Commander in Chief nothing to do, we think that, on reflection, this can scarcely be maintained. The functions of a Commander in Chief in India we have already touched upon; but we imagine that they consist in watching generally over the organisation and working of the whole army, its equipment, training, both tactical and educational, discipline, supply and transport, its housing, its sanitary and medical state in time of peace, so that he may be able at the call of the Government to put into the field the largest number possible at the right points and in the highest state of efficiency. It is also his duty to make himself acquainted with the merits of the higher officers of the army, in order that he may be in a position to advise the Government of India in the selection of officers for high commands and important positions on the staff. We think that he should not be employed, as at present, on the annual inspection of regiments, but that he should confine his visits to the large military centres of India and to camps of exercise, leaving the inspection of regiments to the lieutenant generals commanding the army corps and their subordinate commanders. These, we conceive, are, broadly, his duties in peace; and to prepare for a state of war, he has to

to direct his staff and subordinate agents, so that he may acquire a knowledge of the general military resources, both of India and the countries where Indian troops may campaign, and be prepared with matured plans for many possibilities of internal and external warfare. All this, embracing the field equipment and organisation of bodies of troops, the embarkation and disembarkation in ships, the movement of troops by rail and road; in a word, the mobilisation of the army for various services, seems to us to involve deep study, watchfulness, and constant preparation. The security of the whole country when the forces are put into the field alone involves long and continuous application. An excessive attention to detail has, necessarily, under the present system often distracted the attention of the Commander in Chief from these great questions, and much, which should have been definitely decided in anticipation, has, in consequence, had to be settled when war has actually broken out. We cannot, therefore, think that a Commander in Chief will find his time unoccupied when he is relieved by the agency of four lieutenant generals, commanding four army corps, from much harassing detail which now comes before him.

Future Organisation of the War Department.

Proposed system of military administration in India.

150. On a full consideration therefore of the working of the present system, and on an examination of the system in England and other countries, we consider that the organisation of the War Department, working under the orders of the Governor General in Council, should be as follows.

The Governor General in Council the supreme head of the army.

151. As we have already shown, the Governor General in Council is by law the supreme head of the army. His position, thus legally defined, is in fact exactly that occupied by the head of the State in all countries, whether their Government be despotic or representative.

The Member of Council in charge of War Department.

152. The Member of Council in charge of the War Department should obviously be an officer of very great and tried administrative ability, and of large experience, capable of advising the Governor General on all points of military organisation and administration, and of exercising a real financial control over the army expenditure. It will be plainly seen that the Member of Council in charge of the War Department cannot command the army, and that the relations between the general administration and the Executive Commander in Chief should, therefore, be those of co-operation, and not of rivalry. In the organisation of the War Department we should endeavour to secure the most efficient control over expenditure, coupled with technical knowledge methodically employed in the analysis and criticism of all military questions submitted to the Government for decision. The Department, properly organised, should be fully qualified to judge of the efficiency of the army as compared with the expenditure upon it, and should be able to protect the Government from blind confidence in an inefficient commander, or a defective military organisation.

Secretariat.

153. The War Secretariat should correspond to the central offices of the War Ministries of all other armies, having no direct administrative functions, but should be merely the medium of communication between the army, the army departments, and the Government.

Tenure of office of Secretary.

154. The tenure of office of the Secretary should be, like that of all army staff appointments, for five years. The appointment should be open to officers of every branch of the service who shall have been, at the time of such appointment, in the service in India of the Crown, or of the Company and the Crown, for at least 10 years. The officer selected for this important post should not have been constantly absent from India during the course of his service for a longer period than 10 years. The Secretary should have the local rank of major general.

Staff of War Secretary.

155. The staff of the War Secretary should consist of four Under Secretaries, all of whom should have passed the tests for the staff, and one permanent Assistant Secretary to preserve the continuity of procedure, and dispose of matters of routine. Each army corps should have a representative in the Secretariat staff. These officers, with the exception of the Assistant Secretary, should be appointed for five years.

156. The

156. The administrative officers of the army departments* should be represented in the War Department in the following manner. **The administrative officers of—**

The Accountant General as head of the department dealing with the account and audit of army expenditure, and as financial adviser of the War Department. **Finance.**

The Commissary General in Chief for the general control of the commissariat of the four army corps employed on the supply of all the wants of an army (including clothing), except warlike and medical stores. **Commissariat.**

The Director General of Ordnance for the general control of the Ordnance Department of the four army corps, as technical and scientific adviser, and charged with supervising the military factories and the supply of warlike stores. **Ordnance.**

The Surgeon General, in charge of the Military Medical Department. **Medical Department.**

The Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works. **Military Works.**

The Director of the Remount Department. **Remount Department.**

157. The whole of the offices of the War Department should be concentrated in one building, or in one series of buildings, at some central spot in the business part of Simla. In this building there should be a board room for committees, rooms for the Commander in Chief and War Member of Council, and a central library and map-room under the charge of the Intelligence Department. The cost of such a building would, we understand, be more than covered by capitalizing the rents of the houses now hired for the various offices of the Head-quarters Staff and Army Departments. **Building for War Department.**

158. The system of minutes instead of official letters, one general registry, and one record room, should be gradually introduced. The head-quarters of the army administration should be permanently maintained at Simla, and when the Government moved to Calcutta, or into camp, small camp offices, selected and arranged so as to be compact and economical, should accompany it. The present system is that, while Army Head-quarters offices remain working at Simla throughout the year, the Army Departments under Government move up and down, dragging with them their records and establishments. This is productive of great waste of time and enormous expense. We believe that a large saving could be effected by the plan we propose. **Internal system of War Department.**

Commander in Chief.

159. The Commander in Chief would be the chief executive head of the entire army in India, and in working out the details of the administration we have proposed we consider that every effort should be made to enhance, rather than to lessen, the Commander in Chief's sense of personal responsibility within the limits to which it should be practically confined, and up to which it should be unreservedly recognised. The Commander in Chief should represent the executive, the War Department should represent the administrative, power of the State in reference to its army. The Commander in Chief should be assisted by a staff, which we recommend should consist of the following officers :— **The Commander in Chief.** **His staff proposed.**

1 Chief of the staff.
4 Officers of the general staff.
1 Officer of the general staff for musketry inspection.
3 Officers of the general staff for intelligence work (with attached officers, if necessary).
1 Officer of the general staff for Royal Artillery, to be Inspector General of Artillery, with 2 staff officers.†
1 Officer of the general staff for Royal Engineers.
1 Judge Advocate General, with an assistant.
1 Director of Gymnasia for India.
1 Director of Military Education { 1 Assistant Director for British Army Schools. 1 " " Native " "

160. We

* Details as to control and organization of departments are given under Chapters IX. and X.

† The Inspector General of Artillery would be the head of the artillery staff and the direct adviser of the Commander in Chief on artillery matters. In his absence on inspection duty, the ordinary work would be conducted by the next senior artillery staff officer at head-quarters.

Staff to be selected from all four army corps.

160. We desire to lay the greatest stress on the observance of the principle that the members of this staff should be chosen from all the army corps alike, and, as much as possible, equally from all branches of the service.

Reasons for recommending a Chief of the Staff, and functions of that officer.

161. We shall refer further on to the selection, training, and allotment of the staff in the four army corps, at their head-quarters, in the military districts, and in garrisons; but we think we are bound to state at some length our reasons for recommending the permanent adoption of the title of "Chief of the Staff." We have, on full consideration, determined to advocate the amalgamation of the departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General of the army, and the appointment of a Chief of the Staff, a single superior staff officer, who shall be the immediate lieutenant of the Commander in Chief, and shall be in rank above all other officers of the staff, in the room of the present Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. It will be his duty to take the orders of the Commander in Chief on all the large questions affecting the discipline of the army, the maintenance, the supply, and the movements of troops. He will be responsible to the Commander in Chief that all questions on these subjects are clearly and fully laid before him, and that the orders which his Excellency may see fit to issue are faithfully carried out. He will gather together the subjects on which the orders of the executive head of the army are necessary, and he will distribute these orders, when received, to the officers of the various branches of the staff concerned. There is, we are aware, naturally a strong prejudice to any sort of change in the name and title of officers of the staff, and for many years the change which has forced itself upon all other armies in the world has been steadily resisted in England; and it will be observed that it is opposed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, and his Excellency the Commander in Chief of Bombay. But it is a significant fact that, on two occasions lately, strong practical evidence has been given in favour of such a change as we suggest. During the Cabul war of the past year the Adjutant General was placed in the position of head of the staff, and we understand that, when hostilities broke out a short time ago, one of the first proposals which was made, was that the Adjutant General should be appointed Chief of the Staff, with the control of all members of the staff. This, it must be recollected, was not in the field, but at Army Head-quarters at Simla. With the utmost respect, therefore, for the opinion which has been expressed against a permanent change in the title of the senior officer of the staff, we may safely assume that, from a practical point of view, the determination at which we have arrived will be admitted to be sound.

Objections untenable.

162. It has been said that great inconvenience will arise from the adoption of one system of nomenclature here, while another system exists in England. This objection is, we consider, purely imaginary. Even if England is induced, by a love of what is old, to adhere to the division of the departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, no real difficulty will arise. All letters in these two departments will be addressed to the Chief of the Staff, and distributed by him to the proper branch of the army administration. The proposal we make is not a new one, and the change is entirely justified by the consolidation of the staff which was ordered by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge to be carried out, in Horse Guards General Order No. 25, dated 1st April 1871. There was a Chief of the Staff in the Persian Expedition, in the Mutiny Campaign, in Ashantee, and for Cyprus; and one was named when war was imminent between Russia and England. There is a Chief of the Staff at the Cape; and not only that, but the duties of the Assistant Adjutant General, and Assistant Quartermaster General, are amalgamated in an officer with the unmanageable official title of "Assistant Adjutant General and Assistant Quartermaster General of" the division. Certainly, if required for war, these high staff officers should be trained in peace time. It seems that there is something essentially unsound in the practice so often followed, both in England and in India, of leaving everything to be changed in its organisation the moment war breaks out. And it is consequently not to be wondered at that we are always at first unprepared and embarrassed. If the plan we propose is the correct one, as it clearly must be if it is always resorted to when real work has to be done, we do not think we should be prevented from urging it on the Government simply because there is a prejudice against change.

163. His

163. His Excellency the Commander in Chief of Bombay says that a Chief of the Staff is only justifiable when the Commander in Chief is worn out by age or infirmity; but this is, we think, a misunderstanding of the nature of the office. A Chief of the Staff is much in the position of a Chief Secretary to Government. He does not perform the work of an infirm superior, but acts as the lieutenant and chief officer of the Commander in Chief, seeing that his orders are really carried out, and saving him from much annoying detail. He is responsible to the Commander in Chief for the proper working of all the subordinate branches of the army staff. The Commander in Chief would look to him and hold him to blame for any miscarriage of his instructions, instead of having to hunt up for himself the subordinate members of the staff who have been the cause of a misunderstanding of his orders.

The Chief of the Staff the lieutenant and chief officer of the Commander in Chief.

The Staff.

164. The question of amalgamating the two departments of the staff was discussed very fully by Lord Northbrook's Committee of 1870, who strongly recommended it should be carried out. In General Orders by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, No. 25, dated 1st April 1871, it was announced that "the Queen has been pleased to approve of the consolidation of the general staff of the army under one designation." The separation of the staff into two distinct departments has long since been abandoned by all Continental armies, most of which have fully tested, in military operations of great magnitude, the single as compared with the dual system. The present system, as existing in India, is inconvenient, expensive, and creative of an artificial division in army business, which is entirely unnecessary, and it has been condemned by practical officers. With an amalgamated staff a general officer can allot officers to the duties best suited to them. We, therefore, recommend the union of the departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, under the title of "General Staff."

Consolidation of the staff.

See Appendix XVIII.

165. At the present moment there are adjutants general, quartermasters general, deputies, assistants, and deputy assistants, in the two departments; brigade majors, and no less than four classes of "station staff officers"; then there are the personal staff, military secretaries, and aides-de-camp, all with varying rates of pay; so that the classes and kinds of staff appointments are unnecessarily numerous.

Numerous classes of staff appointments unnecessary.

We consider that the staff should be divided as follows:—

Proposed classification of staff.

	Staff Pay per Mensem.*
GENERAL STAFF:	*Rs.*
Staff Officers, 1st Class	500
Ditto 2nd „	400
GARRISON STAFF:	
Staff Officers, 1st Class	200
Ditto 2nd „	100

166. By allotting the routine work of garrisons to a subordinate branch of the staff, we leave the staff officers of districts time for their general work, and allow them opportunity to acquire a complete military knowledge of their districts; but, for small or single-battalion stations, the duties should be done by regimental officers from the corps at the station, with an addition to pay of 25 rupees

Staff of War Department and of the army generally.

* In addition to Staff Corps pay and allowances.

25 rupees per mensem to include the cost of stationery. The staff which we would propose for India would, therefore, be as follows :—

War Department.

War Department.

		Per Mensem.
		Rs.
Secretariat, War Department.	1 War Secretary - - - - at	3,500 consolidated.
	1 Under Secretary - - - - "	1,000 staff pay.
	1 " " - - - - "	800 "
	1 " " - - - - "	700 "
	1 " " - - - - "	600 "
	1 Assistant Secretary - - - "	700 rising to 1,000 consolidated.
1 Accountant General - - - - - - "		2,000 " 2,500.
1 Commissary General in Chief - - - - - "		2,500 consolidated.
1 Assistant to ditto - - - - - - - "		600 staff pay.
1 Director General of Ordnance - - - - - "		2,500 consolidated.
1 Deputy ditto - - - - - - - - "		600 staff.*
1 Assistant to ditto - - - - - - - "		250 " *
1 Surgeon General - - - - - - - "		2,700 consolidated.
2 Secretaries to ditto - - - - - - - "		1,400 each, consolidated.
1 Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works "		—
1 Director of Remount Department - - - - "		1,000 or 500 staff pay.†

Head Quarters, Army of India.

	Staff Pay per Mensem.
	Rs.
1 Chief of the Staff - - - - - - - - at	3,000 consolidated.
1 Staff Officer - - - - - - - - "	1,000 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 " " - - - - - - - - "	1,000 "
1 " " - - - - - - - - "	600 "
1 " " - - - - - - - - "	500 "
1 " " for Musketry - - - - - "	600 "
1 " " for Intelligence Branch - - - - "	800 "
2 Staff Officers for " " - - - - "	500 each "
1 Inspector General of Royal Artillery - - - "	2,500 consolidated.
1 Royal Artillery Staff officer with Inspector General of Royal Artillery - - - - - - - "	800 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 Ditto ditto - - - - - - - - "	500 "
1 Staff Officer of Royal Engineers - - - - "	600 "
1 Judge Advocate General - - - - - - "	2,500 consolidated.
1 Assistant ditto - - - - - - - "	500 staff pay.
1 Director of Military Education in India, with 2 Assistants each on 250 rupees staff - - - - "	500 "
1 Director of Gymnasia in India - - - - "	500 "

* In addition to regimental pay and allowances.
† *See* Section 5, Chapter X.

Army Corps head-quarters.

HEAD QUARTERS of each ARMY CORPS.*

		Staff Pay per Mensem.
		Rs.
1 Lieutenant General	at	4,500 consolidated.
1 Chief of the Staff	„	2,500 „
1 Staff Officer	„	800 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 „ „	„	600 „
1 „ „	„	500 „
1 „ „ Royal Artillery	„	500 „
1 „ „ Royal Engineers	„	500 „
1 Deputy Judge Advocate General	„	500 „
2 Staff Officers for Musketry Inspection for six months in the year	„	300 staff pay.

1 Garrison Instructor on 400 rupees staff, and 1 Assistant on 250 rupees staff, for the inspection of Native Army Schools, and 2 Sub-Inspectors for British Army Schools.

* In addition to departmental officers shown under the various sections in Chapters IX. and X.

Bengal Army Corps.

BENGAL ARMY CORPS.

District Staff.

DISTRICTS.	GENERAL STAFF.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Eastern Frontier	0	1
Calcutta	1	1
Lucknow	1	1
Bareilly	1	0
Meerut	1	1
Gwalior	1	1
Nowgong	0	1
Total	5	6

Garrison Staff.

Officers of the 1st Class at the following stations:—Fort William, Dinapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Bareilly, Meerut, Delhi, Agra, Morar	10
Officers of the 2nd Class at Barrackpore, Fyzabad, Darjeeling	3
Garrison Staff for Bengal Army Corps, Total	13

Punjab Army Corps.

PUNJAB ARMY CORPS.

District Staff.

DISTRICTS.	GENERAL STAFF.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Umballa	1	0
Lahore	1	1
Rawal Pindi	1	1
Peshawar	1	1
Kuram	1	1
Mooltan	1	0
Total	6	4

Garrison Staff.

Officers of the 1st Class at the following stations:—Umballa, Meean Meer, Ferozepore, Rawal Pindi, Peshawar, Nowshera, Lundi Kotal, Kohat, Kuram, Mooltan -	10
Officers of the 2nd Class at Sialkot, Edwardesabad, Dera Ismail Khan, Abbottabad -	4
Garrison Staff for Punjab Army Corps, Total - - -	14

Bombay Army Corps.

BOMBAY ARMY CORPS.

District Staff.

DISTRICTS.	GENERAL STAFF.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Sind and Beluchistan - - - - - - - -	1	1
Bombay - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Poona - - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Mhow - - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Nusseerabad - - - - - - - -	1	0
Nagpore - - - - - - - - -	1	0
Aden - - - - - - - - - -	0	1
Total - - -	6	5

Garrison Staff.

Officers of the 1st Class at the following stations:—Peshin, Kurrachee, Bombay, Deolali, Poona, Mhow, Saugor, Jubbulpore, Nusseerabad, Kamptee, Ahmedabad -	11
Officers of the 2nd Class at Jacobabad, Nagpore, Asseerghur - - - - - -	3
Garrison Staff for Bombay Army Corps, Total - - -	14

Madras Army Corps.

MADRAS ARMY CORPS.

District Staff.

DISTRICTS.	GENERAL STAFF.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Hyderabad - - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Bangalore - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Belgaum - - - - - - - - -	0	1
Madras - - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Burma - - - - - - - - - -	1	1
Hyderabad Contingent - - - - - - -	1	0
Total - - -	5	5

Garrison Staff.

Officers of the 1st Class at Madras, Secunderabad, Bellary, Bangalore, Trichinopoly, Rangoon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	6
Officers of the 2nd Class at Cannanore, Thayetmyo, Tonghoo, Port Blair - - -	4
Garrison Staff for Madras Army Corps, Total - - -	10

167. This

167. This gives, for the head-quarters of the army of India and the four army corps, the following staff: * Total numbers of General Staff and Garrison Staff proposed.

	General Staff.	Garrison Staff.
Head-quarters, Army of India - - - - -	15 exclusive of Artillery and Engineers.	
" Four Army Corps - - - -	28 ditto - -	ditto.
Bengal Army Corps - - - - - - -	11	13
Punjab - - - - - - - - - -	10	14
Bombay - - - - - - - - - -	11	14
Madras - - - - - - - - - -	10	10
Total - - -	85	51

168. There would, therefore, be a total of 136 officers, instead of 209 as at present, while we have provided fully for garrisons; so that the general staff, being to a great extent freed from routine and local work, will be able to give their full attention to the efficiency and readiness for war of the whole of the troops in the commands, and to the military topography and resources of their districts. Full provision for all duties.

169. We attach great importance to the formation of an Intelligence Department. This has, we understand, been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, and it is therefore only necessary for us to recommend that an officer of each army corps head-quarter staff should be in charge of the intelligence work, in subordination to the Chief of the Staff. It should be that staff officer's duty to visit, in turn, every civil district in the territorial limits of the army corps. In that way he may, in the course of a short time spent at each civil district, in communication with the local officers, magistrate, and collector, road-cess engineer, railway authorities, and irrigation officers, obtain complete and correct information of the condition, resources, communications, military topography, population, and specialities of the district. Intelligence Department.

170. So long as the system in the British army is maintained in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 4, of the Queen's Regulations, it is necessary that the Commander in Chief in India should have a military secretary, and that an officer performing the same functions should be attached to generals commanding army corps; the former should receive a staff allowance of 500 rupees, and the latter 400 rupees. The Persian interpreter to the Commander in Chief should be a staff officer of the 2nd class. Personal Staff.

Aides-de-camp should be allowed on the following scale:—

Commander in Chief - - - - - - - -	3
Lieutenant Generals commanding army corps - - -	2 each.
General officers commanding 1st class districts - - -	1 "

The total of the personal staff would, therefore, be 25, viz., 5 Military Secretaries, 1 Persian Interpreter, and 19 Aides-de-camp.

171. In the Judge Advocate General's Department we propose considerable reductions. There should, we think, be one Judge Advocate General, with an assistant, at Army Head-quarters in India, and one deputy with each army corps. We are convinced that, with the greater knowledge of military law which officers now possess, the district staff should be able to perform much of the work now done by the Deputy Judge Advocates, while regimental and staff officers could be deputed to act at courts-martial with an allowance of 16 rupees per diem. The Judge Advocates at army corps head-quarters should merely be reviewing and advising officers, and the assistants of the General in difficult questions of military law. The department should, therefore, be reduced from fifteen officers to six. Judge Advocate General's Department.

172. We

* In these calculations we have not reckoned the 4th class of "station staff officers" on either side, because regimental officers would perform the trifling work required with an allowance of 25 rupees per mensem.

Military Education Department.

172. We propose that there should be one Director of Military Education in India, who, in addition to supervising the garrison instruction, should also superintend the British and Native army schools, with two assistants; one for British and one for Native army schools. This officer should be at army head-quarters, and there should be a Garrison Instructor, with an assistant, at each army corps head-quarters, viz., Allahabad, Rawal Pindi, Poona, and Bangalore.

Departmental staff at army corps head-quarters.

173. The departmental staff for army corps head-quarters is detailed in Chapters IX. and X., which treat of the organisation of the medical and other army departments. We are of opinion that the officers of these departments should be, both at army corps head-quarters and in districts, subordinate to the general officers in command of army corps and districts respectively.

Selection for army corps command.

174. Army corps commands should be equally divided between the home and Indian armies, and, as a rule, be held alternately by officers of each service. In like manner, as far as practicable, when the army corps commander belongs to one service, his chief of the staff should be selected from the other, and the several branches and services of the army should be represented in the subordinate staff. Nomination for army corps commands should, in the case of officers of the home service, be made by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief; in the case of Indian officers, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, with the approval of the Government of India; and, in both cases, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for India.

And for district and staff colonel's commands.

175. Selection for district and staff colonel's commands should, in the case of officers of the home service, be made from the British army at large, subject to the terms of Indian service already in force, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, with the approval of the Governor General in Council, and with the concurrence of the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, when the officer is serving out in India. And, in the case of Indian officers, by lieutenant-generals commanding army corps, subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Governor General in Council. Nominations to commands of Native regiments should be made by officers commanding army corps, but should be confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Vacation of staff appointments after 31 years' service.

Selection for general and garrison staff.

176. These commands and all staff appointments should be vacated when officers have attained 31 years' service, and have held their appointments for five years. The selection and appointment for the general and garrison staff of army corps districts should, we consider, be left to the lieutenant-general commanding. The selection for the head-quarters staff of army corps should be made by him, subject to the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the final approval of the Governor General in Council. The staff of the army of India at head-quarters should be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, and appointed by the Governor General in Council. All confidential reports on staff officers in India should, as a matter of course, be laid before the Governor General in Council by the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Selection and training of the staff generally.

See Appendix XXII.

British army.

Qualifying examination for staff employ.

177. We have considered carefully the views of many general and staff officers regarding the staff in India, and have also inquired into the method of selection for staff appointments adopted by the heads of the departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General in each of the three presidencies. The staff of the army in India is, it appears, drawn from two sources; the British army, and the Staff Corps, or Indian service. In the British service at home, officers must, as a rule, have passed the Staff College before they can obtain staff appointments. This rule has not yet been applied in India to British officers, although it is the case that, provided an officer has qualified by linguistic attainments, and is in every other respect fit for staff employment, the fact of his having passed the Staff College establishes a claim in his favour. There is, however, in India, a qualifying examination, which is held by the Garrison Instruction Department, and, with certain exceptions, officers are not appointed to the staff unless they have passed this test.

Officers of Staff Corps and Indian army.

G. G. O. No. 1044 of 1876. *See* Appendix XXIII.

178. Officers of the Staff Corps and Indian service have to undergo this qualifying examination for staff employ, unless they have passed the Staff College. In 1876 the Staff College, at Sandhurst, was thrown open to officers of the Staff Corps and Indian service, three officers annually being permitted to

to enter, provided they passed the competitive examination among the number allowed to join the College. The subjects taught at the Staff College are topography, military surveying and sketching, reconnaissance, fortification and field engineering, artillery, strategy, tactics, and military history generally, military administration and law, and languages. Great stress is now laid on practical instruction in these branches of military knowledge; and, in addition to the two years' course at the College, the officer must, before and after the course, be attached to the staff of a general officer, and also spend some time with those arms of the service to which he does not belong. There can, we imagine, be no doubt that to the good, or even average, regimental officer the Staff College course cannot fail to prove highly beneficial; and that an officer who has studied at the Staff College, endowed with mental and physical strength, courage, tact, and temper, must necessarily be more fitted for the staff than one who has not so studied, other things being equal.

Appointment of committee to report on the staff.

179. We therefore beg cordially to support the views of the Government of India in reference to the Staff College, published in G. G. O. No. 1044 of 1876, and consider that the encouragement of Indian officers to join that institution is likely to prove a more useful, and less expensive, plan than the establishment of a Staff College in India. We understand, however, that only one or two officers of the Indian army have, owing to the fact of so many having been for some time in the field, availed themselves of the permission to join the Staff College under the regulations in the General Order above quoted; and we recommend that the subject be inquired into by a committee of practical staff officers. This committee should consider what further encouragement, if any, should be given to Indian officers desirous of joining the Staff College.

Classification of army business, routine work and returns, military clerks, to be considered by a committee.

180. We recommend that the better classification of army business; the form of headings of subjects (which now vary considerably in different departments for the same subject); the system of routine and office work; the question of reducing the paper work and number of returns both in peace and war; the pay, position, and employment of military clerks, in conjunction with the division of clerical establishments into a higher and lower class; should all be considered by a competent committee.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN INDIA.

Strength of British troops.

181. It has already been shown, in Chapter II., that, before the mutiny of 1857, the European troops in India consisted of—

Cavalry - - - - -	2,754	officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.
Artillery - - - -	6,517	
Infantry - - - - -	30,104	
Total - - -	39,375	

The Native troops at that time comprised 214,985 Native officers and men, of whom 8,172 were artillerymen employed with field and other batteries of artillery. On the reorganization of the army, after the mutiny was quelled, it was decided that the proportion of Native to European troops in India should never greatly exceed 2 to 1, and that the field and other artillery should be exclusively, or almost exclusively, manned by Europeans. Eventually, after various fluctuations, during the years 1858 to 1869, the strength of the British garrison in India has, for the past 10 years, been maintained at from 61,000 to 63,000 officers and men, divided thus:—

Cavalry - - - - -	4,347	officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.
Artillery - - - -	12,232	
Infantry - - - - -	45,962	
Total - - -	62,541*	

All

* Estimates, 1879-80. These figures do not include the few officers and men of the invalid establishment, or the British non-commissioned officers and men with the sappers.

All the fortresses in the country are now served by British artillery. All the heavy batteries and all the batteries of horse and field artillery are manned by Europeans. Out of a total of 384 guns, no field-guns, and only 24 mountain-guns, are in the hands of Native artillerymen. The 16 smooth-bore field-guns of the Hyderabad Contingent are manned by Natives, and are not included in these figures. The lessons taught by the mutiny have thus led to the maintenance of the two great principles, of retaining in the country an irresistible force of British troops, and of keeping the artillery in the hands of Europeans.

Power of garrison increased of recent years.

182. Our position in this country has very materially changed during the last 22 years, and a force of 62,000 European soldiers represents a power far in excess of that which it represented in 1857. In those days the British troops were scattered in small forces throughout the country, and it was a matter of great difficulty, delay, and expense to concentrate even a small British force on any one spot in India. When the mutiny broke out we had hardly 400 miles of railway complete in the country, while, at the present moment, we have 8,312 miles of railway open and complete, and about 500 miles more will be opened next year. All our great cantonments, all our fortresses and arsenals, save one, are now connected with each other, and with the seaboard by railway. The strength of our European troops for action at any point within, or without, the borders of British India, has thus been enormously increased. For example, whereas in 1855 a regiment took three to four months to march from the seaboard to Lahore, it can now move from Calcutta to Lahore in a week. Reinforcements from England, which then occupied three months on a voyage round the Cape, now land in Bombay within 30 days of leaving England. Again, the power of British troops has been indefinitely increased by their armament with breech-loading rifles, and by the substitution of rifled field-pieces of higher power for the smooth-bore six-pounder, nine-pounder, and mountain guns of the mutiny era. In any contest within the borders, or on the frontiers of India, these improved armaments would tell heavily; for the troops of Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal, Gwalior, Hyderabad, and the cis-Sutlej States are, for the most part, still armed with smooth-bore muzzle-loading weapons.

Changes in organization involving extra cost.

183. At the same time there have also been considerable changes in the organization of British troops in India, some of which have very largely increased the cost of the Indian army. Until the mutiny, all the European artillery, and nearly one-third of the European infantry, consisted of local troops, who were raised by the East India Company for service in India, and who remained permanently in India. For these local troops, about 14,000 in number, regiments of the line and batteries of royal artillery, serving for a short time only in India, have been substituted. Very heavy home charges are incurred for the maintenance of these troops, and India is put to an enormous expense on account of the frequent relief of regiments, and the passage home and out of time-expired men, and the recruits who have to be sent out to take their places. The difference in cost between local European troops as maintained in 1857, and Her Majesty's troops now serving in India, is probably not far short of 8 *l.* per head per annum. Calculated on the strength of the old local army of 14,000 men, this would give an increase of expenditure from the employment of line regiments of 112,000 *l.* a year; while, if half the present army consisted of local troops, the difference of cost would be 240,000 *l.* a year. During the mutiny Her Majesty's cavalry regiments in India were over 600 strong, and Her Majesty's foot regiments were over 1,000 strong. Since that time the strength of British cavalry regiments has been brought down to 408 rank and file, and of infantry regiments to 820 rank and file. This reduction in the strength of regiments has involved the addition of from two to three cavalry cadres, and of seven infantry cadres, to the Indian garrison; and has thus caused a heavy additional expenditure of about a quarter of a million pounds sterling for the same number of effective sabres and rifles. The recent change in the system of recruitment for the British army, under which soldiers are engaged for short terms of six years, has caused great extra expense for recruits and for homeward passages of time-expired soldiers; while the short-service system, as now administered, has materially impaired the efficiency of British regiments in India by maintaining a constant stream of boy recruits who

who succumb to the Indian climate, and by substituting youthful non-commissioned officers for the seasoned and experienced sergeants and corporals of former days.

184. We consider that, notwithstanding the extension of railway communications and the improved armament of the troops, we cannot at the present time propose to reduce the total strength of the European force in India; and we attach vital importance to the maintenance of the decision that all fortresses and arsenals must be garrisoned, and all guns, except a few mountain batteries, manned by British soldiers. We believe that a reduction of the British infantry in India would be the worst form of economy which could be adopted.

British garrison not to be reduced.

185. High authorities have urged that, although troops of Her Majesty's British army must be superior in discipline and traditions to a merely local force, yet a local European army would be as good a force as India can afford, and would suffice for, at any rate, half or one-third of the European garrison. We cannot, of course, fail to see that the substitution of local troops for 20,000 or 30,000 of Her Majesty's British troops would cause a saving of from 160,000 *l.* to 240,000 *l.*; but we feel that any such change would seriously disturb the military system of the parent country, and would deprive a great part of the British army of the valuable training which Indian service now furnishes. Moreover, such a change in the European garrison of India would, no doubt, involve some deterioration of discipline and consequent loss of power, and would deprive both India and England of the undoubted advantages which they mutually derive from the employment of a large portion of the Imperial army in India. While, therefore, we concur in the conclusions which were arrived at by the Parliamentary Commission of 1859, that it is not desirable to maintain a local European army for India, we think that the portion of the army employed in this country should be organized and administered with due regard to the interests of the people of India, and not for the purpose of supplying defects in the system of home defence, and, above all, that it should not be made the means of obtaining, at the cost of India, advantages for the army at home which do not directly affect the interests of this country.

Local European forces not desirable on Imperial grounds.

186. In the matter of army organization, England and India should, we feel, act on strict terms of reciprocity; for there can be no doubt that, while India derives great advantages from being garrisoned by a portion of the army of England, and from the reserve which the English army represents, England also derives very considerable benefits from this arrangement, and has, in the Native army of India, a great reserve in the case of her being engaged in military operations in the East outside India proper. While, therefore, we fully recognise the fact that the establishment of Her Majesty's British troops serving in India must of necessity be dependent in a great degree on the home organization, we consider that all possible concessions, not directly and radically inconsistent with that organization, should be made to the special requirements and circumstances of India. If this principle be not recognised and enforced in a liberal and even generous spirit, it is possible that the advantages which India may hope to derive from the present system may be too dearly purchased, and may become a burthen which the country will be unable to bear. India may thus be driven by sheer necessity to re-establish a local army which, though less efficient than that now at her disposal, may be sufficient for her purposes and more within her means.

Necessity for strict reciprocity between England and India.

187. Having before us these considerations, we are gravely impressed with the duty of recommending that the British regiments serving in India should be made as cheap as it is possible to make them without loss of efficiency. It has been pointed out by nearly all the commanding officers of British regiments, who have favoured the Commission with their advice, that an important economy, and, at the same time, improved efficiency and enhanced fighting power, can be secured by raising the strength of British regiments of cavalry and infantry, and keeping the same total number of sabres and rifles as before; that is, by reducing the number of cadres of regiments employed in India and increasing their strength. In 1869 a similar measure was recommended by the Government of India and the Commander in Chief, which would have resulted in a saving of nearly 300,000 *l.* per annum; but, although the Secretary of State for India appeared to assent to the measure, it seems to have been lost sight

Great majority of opinions in favour of stronger regiments.

sight of in the consideration of the general organization of the British army. It has been already mentioned that, during the mutiny, a British cavalry regiment was about 600 strong, and a battalion of foot over 1,000 strong. Under the British system, a cavalry corps in England on war strength is about 600* strong, and an infantry battalion is about 1,000† strong. This, therefore, is accepted as the proper fighting strength of a unit of British cavalry or infantry. The best continental armies also have adopted about the same strength for their battalion. A British regiment in India must of necessity be kept at a war strength; for it is as far from its reserves as regiments employed in a European war would be; it is subject to casualties far in excess of those of the English garrison; and it may at any moment, and at very short notice, be called upon to take the field. The duties of a British regiment in India are not those of a garrison in times of peace; the mere garrison duties are performed by the Native regiments; our position in India is dependent on the readiness of our British regiments to strike at a moment's notice in any direction, and they must be maintained on a war footing, if they are to answer the purpose for which they are intended. It must be remembered, too, that an Indian campaign is necessarily commenced, whenever it is possible to choose our own time, early in the cold season—the time of year when British regiments are at their lowest strength. With their present numbers, the British regiments in India form inconveniently small, and extremely costly, tactical units. A British cavalry regiment in India at present strength can rarely take‡ into action more than 300 sabres, and an infantry regiment often puts less than 500 rifles into its fighting line.

188. All the officers commanding British cavalry regiments, who have advised the Commission, are in favour of raising the strength of a cavalry regiment from three squadrons with 455 non-commissioned officers and men, to four squadrons with 586 non-commissioned officers and men. Three-fourths of the officers, commanding or serving with British infantry regiments, who have furnished the Commission with reports, are clearly in favour of raising the strength of battalions from 820 to 1,000 rank and file; some of the officers who are against such an increase merely base their advice on the ground that, at many stations, the existing barrack accommodation of a regiment does not suffice for the increased strength. With this objection we will deal hereafter.

With stronger regiments fewer cadres would suffice.

189. We strongly recommend, not only on grounds of economy, which, however, are very cogent, but on the score of efficiency, that the strength of British regiments in India should as soon as possible be raised; that our cavalry regiments should consist of four squadrons with 586 non-commissioned officers and men, instead of, as at present, of three squadrons with 455 non-commissioned officers and men; and that infantry regiments should consist of eight companies of 1,044 non-commissioned officers and men, instead of 886, as at present.

Proposed number of regiments and battalions.

190. We consider that, with this strength, the European garrison of India, exclusive of artillery, may consist of six cavalry regiments instead of nine, and of 43 infantry battalions instead of 50. The reduced number of regiments will

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* 31 officers (including medical and veterinary officers),
600 non-commissioned officers and men (excluding transport drivers),

† 31 officers (including medical officers),
1,044 rank and file (excluding transport drivers).

are the precise numbers given in the Army Circular.

‡ The officer commanding the 10th Hussars reported to the Commission that, after the casualties of last campaign, he could, on the 10th October 1879, master for war only 200 sabres. At the present moment the 10th Hussars has only 40 men fit to turn out at mounted parade, while the pay and allowances of the officers alone amount to about 1,70,000 rupees a year: this throws a very heavy charge upon the revenues of India for a practically useless result. The officer commanding the 8th Hussars, which regiment was not employed in the recent campaign, reported that he could not then (October 1879) "turn out for service a greater number than 300 men;" and that even at the most favourable time of the year he could not turn out more than 360 men fit for service. The Despatches of the general officers commanding at the actions of Ali Musjid and the Peiwar Kotal showed that British regiments went into action on those days with the following strength:—

Ali Musjid, on the 21st November 1878.

17th Foot	652	of all ranks.
51st "	564	" "
81st "	574	" "
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	621	" "

Peiwar Kotal, on the 2nd December 1878.

72nd Highlanders	330	of all ranks.
2-8th Foot	366	" "

will give a strength of 3,516 sabres, as compared with 4,095, and of 44,892 rifles, as compared with 44,300 under the old system. We consider that this small reduction of three squadrons in British cavalry—the most costly arm of the service—can safely be made, and will be more than compensated by the increase in rifles.

Strength of horses with cavalry regiments.

191. The officers of cavalry, who have furnished us with their opinions, show that, under the present system, the strength of horses attached to cavalry regiments is too large. One commanding officer writes that he has 100 horses unmounted in the cold season, and 150 in the sickly season. Another commanding officer, whose regiment was not employed in the recent campaign, reports that he could only put into the field 250 men and 400 horses. By the present rule the full number of horses for the non-commissioned officers, and for 95 per cent. of the privates, is maintained; and the officer commanding the 10th Hussars reports that, in the recent campaign, the surplus horses were a great inconvenience and seriously impeded the regiment. Colonel Lord Ralph Kerr advises that the strength of a British regiment in India should be 600 men and 450 horses. Other officers recommend 80 per cent. of horses to men. Seeing that a reserve of horses is maintained by Government apart from regiments, we recommend that in future there should be kept with British cavalry regiments the full number of horses for the non-commissioned ranks, and horses for 85 per cent. of the rank and file.

Syces (Native grooms).

192. We recommend that the establishment of syces for cavalry be assimilated throughout India, and that the scale be that now existing in the Bombay Presidency, viz., one syce to every non-commissioned officer's horse, and one to every three troop horses.

Present strength of artillery.

193. When considering in detail the force of artillery which is required as the permanent garrison of each territorial district and garrison, and as part of the available force of two active army corps in the field, we found that certain alterations and reductions were desirable in the strength and arrangement of the Royal Artillery. The present sanctioned strength is—

Horse artillery - - - - - - - -	15 batteries.
Field artillery - - - - - - - -	43 „
Heavy artillery - - - - - - - -	4 „
Mountain guns - - - - - - - -	2 „
Garrison artillery - - - - - - -	22 „
Total - - -	86 „

A horse artillery battery costs, we find, 3,500 *l.* a year more, or 20 per cent., than a battery of field artillery. Now, though a certain force of horse artillery is absolutely required to act with cavalry in the field, yet, for general purposes, field artillery are quite as useful, while their fighting power is, in some respects, stronger than that of horse artillery. We find that for two field army corps, 58,000 strong, the complement of horse artillery would be 10 batteries. We consider that for the protection of the country, and for overawing the troops of Native States, field artillery will amply suffice, if a sufficient strength of horse artillery is maintained for service with the two field army corps. We, therefore, propose that, instead of 15, only 10 batteries of horse artillery be maintained in India.

More mountain guns required.

194. Experience of recent campaigns has given much support to the opinion, that for service beyond the frontiers of India, where there are often no roads and where the country is broken and hilly, mountain batteries are a most useful arm. The mountain gun of the present day, it must be remembered, is not a smooth-bore three-pounder, as it was in 1857, but a rifled seven-pounder, which is carried with its carriage and wheels on mules. It is in some respects a more powerful weapon than the horse artillery gun of the mutiny days. A mountain battery can practically go over any ground where armed men can climb. We are aware that the British horse and field artillery can go almost anywhere.

For instance, this autumn, batteries of horse and field artillery have driven over the Shutargardan Pass into Afghanistan, 10,900 feet high; and they did this in the day's march, without using elephants or any special traction power. But we are, nevertheless, convinced that the fighting power of the British artillery in India, and on the Indian frontiers, would be increased by the substitution of mountain batteries for a certain number of field batteries; and, looking to the needs of the several frontiers in detail, we recommend that the number of British mountain batteries be raised from two to eight. This change, while adding to the fighting power of the army, will secure a considerable saving; for a mountain battery costs 3,100 *l.* less, or 17 per cent., than a field battery.

Stronger garrison batteries of artillery.

195. We also consider that economy can be effected, without loss of power, by increasing the strength of garrison batteries of artillery. The present strength of a garrison battery in India is five officers, 15 non-commissioned officers and trumpeters, and 72 gunners, or 92 of all ranks. The home war establishment of a siege train battery is 120 gunners. In India, when siege trains are manned for field service, two garrison batteries have to be drawn upon. Details from the present garrison batteries suffice for the work of minor strong places; such, for instance, as the Fort of Lahore. We consider that the strength of each garrison battery should be raised to 120 of all ranks, and that half batteries should be stationed in places where a full battery is not required. Under this arrangement the requirements of the service would be met by 17 strong batteries in place of 22 weak batteries. The reduced number of batteries would be distributed as per Appendix XXIV. There would be an actual increase of the number of gunners, and, at the same time, a saving of 13,700 *l.* per annum. For siege trains, batteries would be drawn from the reserve at the hill station of Darjeeling and from double battery stations.

Proposed strength of artillery.

196. After a careful review of the needs of all the territories and cantonments of India, and after providing amply for the artillery of two field army corps, we recommend that the British artillery garrison of India be fixed, for the future, at—

	Present Garrison.	Proposed by the Commission.
Horse artillery - - - -	15 batteries.	10 batteries.
Field artillery - - - -	43 „	38 „
Heavy artillery - - - -	4 „	4 „
Mountain guns - - - -	2 „	8 „
Garrison artillery - - -	22 „	*17 „
Total - - -	86 or 384 guns.	77 or 360 guns.

Besides 336 field and mountain guns, and 24 heavy guns manned by Europeans, we propose to retain the following force of Native artillery, namely—

$6\frac{2}{3}$ † batteries of mountain artillery - -	40 guns.
4 „ the Hyderabad contingent -	16 smooth-bore guns.
Total - - -	56 guns.

Two mountain guns to be attached to the 44th Assam Regiment.

197. The Native mountain artillery will be employed chiefly on the north west border with the Sind and Punjab Frontier Forces. But we recommend that two mountain guns, with full mule equipment, commanded by an artillery officer, be attached to the Assam regiment, which has its head-quarters at Shillong. For frontier expeditions mountain guns are often required; and it is desirable that a division of a mountain battery should be permanently attached to

* The strength of a garrison battery according to the Commission's scheme is 120, against 92 of all ranks under the existing system.

† The total of Native artillery works out to two-thirds of a battery, on account of the divisions attached to the Guide Corps, and the regiment at Shillong.

to one of the regiments on the Assam frontier. We recommend that all mountain batteries should consist of six guns each, and that a committee of officers of mountain artillery be convened to consider the most economical and efficient organization, and in what way assimilation can best be effected.

Committee of mountain artillery officers to report on organization of mountain batteries.

198. The small reduction of 24 guns proposed in the strength of the British artillery we believe to be quite safe. We make this recommendation in full recollection of the facts that in India, and in Asia generally, the moral effect of well-served artillery is even greater than in Europe; and that in all Indian wars artillery fire has had immense effect. But we find that the strength we now propose provides fully for the fortresses and defences of the Empire, for holding the country and overawing disaffection, and for two army corps taking the field at the same time, with an aggregate strength of 58,000 men of all arms.

199. We have considered whether any economy can be effected in the cost of batteries of horse and field artillery in India, by a reduction of the waggons which are drawn by bullocks. There is an almost unanimous opinion among artillery officers, that it is not desirable to employ bullocks as draught animals in batteries of horse or field artillery in time of war. We recommend, therefore, that on a war establishment all the carriages of a battery should be horsed, and that the establishment of bullocks be abolished, with the exception of six bullocks which may be retained for work in the lines. The general opinion appears to be in favour of relieving the major commanding the battery in time of war of the charge of the second line of waggons now drawn by bullocks, and of introducing the home system of ammunition columns in a modified form. Several experienced officers, however, object to the limber waggon as a means of carrying reserve ammunition, and urge that this should be packed in boxes, so that, if thought desirable, it might be carried on mules or camels.

Second line of waggons with batteries of artillery.

200. On a review of the whole circumstances, we recommend that, at the stations marginally noted, every battery should be in possession of a first reserve of ammunition on the same scale as is adopted for divisional ammunition columns at home, viz., 76 rounds per gun, or 456 per battery. This ammunition should be so packed that it could be conveniently carried either on a mule, or a camel, or in an ordinary cart. We also recommend that the use of the limber waggon should be discontinued for the transport of reserve ammunition, and that in lieu each battery should be provided with six strong carts, to be horsed by two horses each. These carts should be capable of carrying a load weighing about 20 maunds, or 1,600 lbs., should be of a commodious nature, so that they could be used for ordinary purposes, and should be of such a pattern that the ammunition boxes could be covered and locked up. In time of peace batteries could use such carts for the carriage of forage or other purposes in the lines; and in time of war they could either accompany the battery, carrying its reserve ammunition, or the ammunition carts of several batteries might be brigaded together, so as to form a special ammunition column; or, in cases of emergency, they could be used for transport purposes, as was done with the siege train carts in the late campaign in Afghanistan.

Bengal Army Corps.	*Bombay Army Corps.*
Dinapore.	Above Dadur.
Nowgong.	Kurrachee.
Morar.	Nusseerabad.
Bareilly.	Kamptee.
Punjab Army Corps.	*Madras Army Corps.*
Rawal Pindi.	Secunderabad.
Mooltan.	
Sialkot.	
Peshawar.	

Ammunition columns.

See Appendix XXV.

201. The establishment of horses which we recommend to be maintained at the stations mentioned above, where batteries have their ammunition reserves in possession and carts horsed, is as follows:—

Strength of horses with batteries.

Establishments proposed.

	Per Battery.
Horse Artillery—	
Ordinary strength - - - - - -	168
Increased „ - - - - - - -	200
Field Artillery—	
Ordinary strength - - - - - -	124
Increased „ - - - - - - -	144

202. We have followed the principle that these batteries should be at war strength (according to the English scale), so that for internal disturbance they may always be ready to take the field. This will allow, as shown by the Table in Appendix XXVI., for the six carts being horsed in peace and war. When a campaign is anticipated, measures must be taken to purchase horses for the batteries liable to take part in it. If proper information be obtained beforehand, and a liberal price is offered at the time, we do not anticipate any difficulty in securing suitable horses in sufficient numbers to enable batteries to enter on a prolonged campaign at the increased strengths noted above, independent of the reserve of horses which we have elsewhere suggested should be maintained. At the remaining artillery stations, batteries should be in possession of the six reserve ammunition carts and the harness, but the 12 horses need not be kept up. At these stations the ordinary establishment of horses will be—

	Per Battery.
Horse Artillery - - - - - - - -	156
Field „ - - - - - - - -	112

It will be seen, therefore, that—

For horse artillery batteries we reduce 10 horses per battery at the stations where the reserve ammunition carts are kept horsed;

For horse artillery batteries we reduce 22 horses per battery at the stations where these are not kept horsed;

For field artillery batteries we add 12 horses per battery at stations where the reserve ammunition carts are kept horsed;

For field artillery batteries we add two horses per battery at stations where field batteries do not have their ammunition carts horsed.

203. We are of opinion that the drivers of all carriages of a battery, other than those required for the guns and limber ammunition wagons, should be Natives; and that the Native establishment of each battery should be organized accordingly. We do not propose to reduce the European establishment of batteries.

Important saving which India must justly claim.

204. We are aware that it may cause some temporary inconvenience to the army administration at home if the Indian garrison is thus reduced by three regiments of British cavalry, seven battalions of British infantry, and nine batteries of artillery. But the change can be made gradually, and can be spread over one or two years, and, at the worst, its injurious effects will be limited to the interests of a few officers, while the maintenance of the army on its present expensive organization affects the interests of millions. And it must be remembered also, that the reduction in the number of regiments serving in India will lessen the difficulties now experienced by the War Office in working the system of linked battalions, under which one battalion should always be on home service. The saving secured by the arrangement, including reduction of home effective and non-effective charges, amounts to about 364,000 *l.* a year; and this saving is made without any real loss of fighting strength, and with considerable increase of efficiency in the tactical unit. If India, in deference to the requirements of the richer mother country, foregoes the important saving that would accrue from converting a third or one-half of her European army into a local force, we feel strongly that justice to the Indian taxpayer demands that the proposal for raising the strength of British regiments in India, and reducing their number, should be sanctioned, and carried out without avoidable delay. We can conceive no possible objection which should, for one moment, be allowed weight in considering a measure which affords such a material relief to the finances of India, and at the same time increases so greatly the efficiency of the regiments in India, without interfering with the organization of regimental establishments in England.

Appendices XXVII and LXIV.

Barrack accommodation.

205. Turning now to the objection raised, that at many stations there is not sufficient accommodation for the increased strength of regiments which we propose, we have ascertained from the Inspector General of Military Works that, according to estimates lately prepared with much care, under the orders of the

the Government of India, a very large sum, viz., about 543 lakhs of rupees or 5,430,000 *l.*, is required to complete the barrack accommodation authorized by Government at all existing stations under the Military Works Branch, Public Works Department, which only comprises the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps.

Economy which will result if distribution proposed is carried out.

206. If our proposals for the distribution and strength of the army, and abolition of unnecessary stations, are carried into effect, the above sum will be very largely reduced. We are informed by the Inspector General of Military Works that for the four army corps, Bengal, Punjab, Bombay, and Madras, our proposals will only involve an outlay of about 23 lakhs in the hills, and 104 lakhs in the plains, or a total of 127 lakhs (1,270,000 *l.*). This sum will doubtless be increased by the inclusion of certain new works at stations we retain, and which are provided for in the 543 lakhs. On the other hand, the adoption of our distribution will render much of this large expenditure unnecessary, and will besides save over three lakhs annually for repairs alone, while if the distribution of the army remains as at present, the 543 lakhs must be increased by the amount required to complete the barrack accommodation in the Madras and Bombay presidencies. We have not data before us to show the exact saving in barrack building, which will follow on the adoption of our proposals, but there can be no doubt that it will be very large, and that a considerable amount may be realized from the sale of barracks and military lands at stations, where they will no longer be required.

See Appendix XXVIII.

Unnecessary to provide double accommodation.

207. We desire to invite attention to the unnecessary expenditure that is often incurred, in providing double accommodation for the same troops both in the plains and in the hills. For instance, a full regiment of British infantry is quartered at Umballa, which in the hot season sends many men to the neighbouring depôt at Kussowlie and Solon. We submit that it is quite unnecessary to provide accommodation on the hot season scale for a full regiment at Umballa. Again, we recommend that, when the composition of a garrison is changed, artillerymen should be housed in the empty infantry barracks, or infantry soldiers in the empty artillery barracks; there is no necessity, while there is great waste, in abandoning empty barracks of one arm and building new quarters for another arm of the service. In such cases, the well-considered adaptation of existing auxiliary buildings, for the wants of the new troops, would save large sums of money.

Concentration of more troops in the hills.

208. With the present railway system, we think that even more use than at present might be made of hill stations for European troops; but the stations to be selected should be in the neighbourhood of main lines of communication, and within reach of railways. It seems to us that a mistake has been made in selecting Ranikhet and Chakrata for military stations; the former is 107 miles, and the latter 81 miles, from a railway station; the troops located at these stations might with great advantage have been concentrated in the hills within easy reach of Umballa.

Mature recruits with some years' service before they are required for India.

209. It has been already mentioned that the short-service system recently introduced into the British Army has increased the cost, and has materially reduced the efficiency, of the British troops in India. We cannot resist the feeling that, in the introduction of this system, the interest of the Indian tax-payer were entirely left out of consideration. It is absolutely necessary, if Her Majesty's line regiments are to continue to be employed in India, that the injury done to this country by the change of system should be promptly remedied; and we, therefore, have no hesitation in recommending that, until the short-service system, as at present administered, be altered, no soldier under three years' standing be embarked for service in India; that no men be allowed to proceed to India who have not extended their service with the colours to a period of nine years; that any men, or non-commissioned officers, who may desire to remain in India may be allowed to volunteer, on a bounty, for a further period of six years' service with the colours in India, and may be permitted to join any battalion with not less than six years' service in India before it. The reasons which have guided us in the determination to make these recommendations are obvious enough. Very young soldiers coming to India before they are twenty years of age, suffer from the climate much more seriously and readily than men two or three years older. Unless young soldiers are sent to hill stations and are

treated with very special care, they frequently sicken, and have to be invalided during their first two years in India. Such soldiers are not fit for duty in the field, and are little addition to the fighting strength of the army. If men with less than three years' service before them come to India, they have to be sent home as time-expired men, at great expense, after two years' Indian service. In this way a battalion may, under the present system, lose two-thirds of its strength of disciplined soldiers, and have raw recruits in their place, two or three times over during its tour of Indian service. Our proposals are made in the desire of obviating these constant changes which are fatal to the efficiency of a regiment, and which render it impossible for commanding officers to retain with the colours tried non-commissioned officers of sufficient standing. The extra bounties for re-engagement and the additional good conduct pay will involve some additional expenditure; but efficiency will be greatly increased; and there will be considerable reduction in the cost of sending home time-expired men and bringing out recruits.

Sea transport service of troopships.

210. We recommend that the system, whereby all reliefs and drafts of British troops are sent by troopships to Bombay, should be revised The service now costs about 19 *l.* per man each way; and the troops have to perform long, costly journeys by railway from the port of Bombay to places in Southern, Eastern, and Northern India, or to stations in Burma. We advise that steps be taken to ascertain at what rates the great English steamship companies would convey troops regularly to the several ports of Calcutta, Madras, Kurrachee, and Rangoon. We believe that, if a contract were made for a considerable number of troops, and for a term of years, private companies would convey troops regularly and comfortably to and from the several ports nearest their stations, at rates considerably below the cost of transport by the troopships. If reliefs and drafts for Sind, Beluchistan, or the Punjab, were landed at Kurrachee, there would be a great reduction in the length and cost of the railway journey, which, moreover, would lie over lines with comparatively little traffic. There would be similar advantages if troops destined for the Madras army corps could be landed at Madras.

Interior barrack arrangements should be managed regimentally.

211. We strongly recommended that commanding officers of British regiments be allowed the option of undertaking regimentally the management and repair of barrack furniture and fixtures; the management of barrack lighting; the arrangements for punkah-pulling and tattie-watering; and such like minor matters of regimental convenience in garrison. Some colonels and company officers would gladly undertake this duty, and would make the money go much further,* and contribute more to the health and comfort of the men, than it now does. Other officers, however, may not feel competent to undertake the direction of these affairs in addition to their other duties, in which case they would be performed as they now are. When an officer undertakes all or any of these matters, he should receive a maximum monthly allowance for the purpose; the allowance would not be in the nature of a private contract, but would have to be accounted for in the regimental books, though its expenditure would not be subject to the audit of the Pay Department. We are of opinion that very considerable economy is feasible in punkah-pulling and tattie-watering establishments. We recommend that a large reward be offered by Government for the best and cheapest method of working punkahs, and that this question and that of the necessity for tatties at all the stations to which they are now supplied, be investigated by a committee. We consider that commanding officers should be encouraged to make their men cook their own rations at hill stations, and generally to perform barrack duties in the hills, much as they do in English quarters. A great deal more might be done in the hills, in the way of making the men build their own huts and maintain garrison roads.

Reward to be offered for punkah-pulling machinery.

Employment of troops in the hills.

Practical instruction in cooking.

212. At garrisons in the plains, during times of peace, every regiment and battery should be marched out a certain number of times in the cold season and made

* It seems quite certain that some of the money now spent on punkah-pulling is misapplied. In the papers before us are given cases where sums of 500 rupees and 400 rupees have been paid for the contract to supply punkah pullers to 200 or 300 European troops for a single season. Of course, these payments mean that the contractor makes those amounts and a great deal more for himself, besides paying the punkah pullers. If this money were spent by the commanding officers or company officers for the advantage of the soldiers, much additional comfort and convenience could be secured for the troops.

made to cook their dinners in the open, so that they may gain some readiness for work in the field. We notice that, according to the reports of commanding officers, the cooking-pots of British regiments are of extremely inconvenient shape for transport; and that the troops have no camp-kettles or other appliances by which they could cook for themselves, as their comrades do on service elsewhere.

Uniform and equipment of British troops.

213. We have considered the opinions of the many regimental officers, who have written very fully on the subject of the uniform and equipment of British soldiers in India. It is undeniable that during the recent campaigns officers and men, as far as they could, left off their uniform and took to improvised service clothing. The majority of officers are agreed that this system is bad, and that some part at any rate of Her Majesty's uniform ought to be fit for use as serviceable clothing in the field: we feel that this view is undoubtedly correct. It is very generally admitted that the present uniform of British soldiers of all arms is too tight for campaign work in India; that cloth coats and trousers are generally unsuited for use in India; that a loose serge Norfolk jacket, with a sleeved waistcoat for colder climates, and serge trousers, with gaiters or puttees (woollen bandages wound round the leg in place of gaiters), make the best possible working or marching dress for a British foot soldier in India in the cold weather; that for mounted soldiers a similar jacket, with cord trousers, gaiters and ankle-boots, are best; that for the hot season, *khaki* (*i.e.*, dust-coloured) drill clothes, loosely fitting, are best; and that buff leather equipments are absolutely unsuited for India, brown leather being in every respect superior. We think that the colour, scarlet for British infantry, or blue for Royal Artillery, to which so many associations are attached, should be retained for serge clothing in India; but that black is an unsuitable colour for the trousers of infantry soldiers in India. If these general views are accepted, we recommend that a committee of regimental officers be appointed to fix, on the general principles stated above, a suitable parade uniform, and a suitable service uniform, for British soldiers of each arm of the service. There will be some saving caused by the substitution of serge for cloth, so that a margin will be left to pay for certain requisite additions to the working uniform. The same committee should also settle the equipment of the soldier of all arms. It seems certain that the pouch and bag are unsuited for cartridges, and for the skirmishing drill of the present day; that the valise, the soldier's greatcoat, and the mode of distributing the weight of ammunition and arms over the soldier's back and shoulders, are susceptible of much improvement, and that the present glass water-bottle is unserviceable.

Committee on uniform and equipment to be appointed.

Armament of lancers and of drivers.

214. We do not feel able to recommend any change in the armament of the British soldier. We consider it to be true that the lancer of the present day is overarmed, and that lance, sword, and pistol for the front rank, with sword and carbine for the rear rank, of lancers, would amply suffice. We notice that the British cavalry regiments which served in the recent campaign, rejected their steel scabbards, almost as soon as they took the field. We think that an artillery driver ought to be armed with a revolver. But until these changes of armament are adopted in the British army, they cannot be usefully proposed for the British troops in India, which are merely a branch of the home army.

Musketry instruction.

215. We have no changes to propose in the establishments of officers of regiments serving in India, but would recommend that the musketry instruction in infantry regiments be more fully entrusted to company officers than it now is, and that the musketry instructor be appointed for six months only in the year, for the purpose mainly of preparing the returns and ensuring uniformity of system.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIVE ARMY.

Native armies before 1857.

216. The Native army of India, before the mutiny of 1857, consisted of 214,985 Natives of all ranks. The bulk of these troops belonged to the 21 cavalry, and 155 infantry, line regiments of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay armies. Besides the regiments of the line, there were a number of what were called irregular regiments, that is, regiments in which the establishment of officers was only three, as distinguished from the regular organization of regiments, the establishment of which comprised 25 officers. The irregular cavalry regiments and the Goorkha battalions were enlisted for general service. The "Guides" and the other irregular regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force were employed exclusively in guarding the north-west frontier of the Punjab. The regiments of the Sind local force guarded the Beluchistan border. In the line regiments there were two European officers at least, to each company or troop. In irregular regiments the troop and company officers were Natives of India; and the whole control and command of companies was left to the Native officers. The advantages of the irregular system were, that it was much the cheaper, and that it gave a career to deserving and loyal Native officers. Under the old system, Native officers were often worn-out men, whose hair had grown white in the ranks of the East India Company's regiments, and who were unfit either to lead their companies in the field or to control them in cantonments.

Native army of 1857.

217. In 1857 the bulk of the Bengal army mutinied. It cannot be said that the irregular regiments were altogether free from taint; for some of the irregular cavalry corps mutinied and killed their officers. Nor can it be said that the regular system broke down; for the Madras and Bombay regiments of the line were true to their colours, and did good service during the disturbances of 1858. The Bengal Native army, as reconstructed after the mutiny, consisted entirely of regiments organised and officered on a modification of the old irregular system, that is, the command of troops and companies was placed in the hands of Native officers, the staff of European officers being reduced to less than one-third of the old establishment for each regiment. That system has since been extended to the Madras and Bombay armies. And on the 1st July 1878, that is to say, before the outbreak of the recent Afghan campaign, the Native armies of India consisted of about 135,000 Native officers and men,* distributed thus—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
	Bengal Army:	
	19 Regiments of the line. 6 Regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force. 2 Local regiments.	45 Regiments of the line. 4 Goorkha regiments. 12 Regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, including the Guides. 6 Local regiments.
	Madras Army:	
	4 Regiments of the line. 4 Local (Hyderabad) regiments.	40 Regiments of the line. 6 Local (Hyderabad) regiments.
	Bombay Army:	
	4 Regiments of the line. 3 Regiments Sind Horse.	30 Regiments of the line.
Total	42 Cavalry regiments	143 Infantry regiments.

There

* This total includes the Hyderabad Contingent and other local corps.

There were also four batteries of Native artillery belonging to the Hyderabad Contingent, six Native mountain batteries with 24 guns,* and 25 companies of Sappers and Miners. All these regiments are organised and officered on the new system. The complement of British officers for each regiment of the line and of the Punjab Frontier Force is seven; while with the local corps a complement of three to five officers per regiment is held to suffice. The strength of an infantry regiment of the line is 712, and of a cavalry regiment 457 Natives of all ranks. Before the mutiny, the strength of a Native infantry regiment in Bengal had risen as high as 1,100 bayonets; while the strength of a cavalry regiment was 600 sabres. The armament of the Native infantry of 1857 consisted of smooth-bore muskets, whereas now all the regiments of the line, and most of the local regiments, are armed with breech-loading rifles.

Reduction of force not now possible.

218. We consider that, in the present state of affairs, no reduction can safely be made in the strength of the total effective Native forces of the Empire. We fully recognise that the great extension of communications, and the improved armament of the troops, make a Native regiment a far more powerful unit than it used to be. But, looking to the extent of the Empire; to the long land frontier of India, infested by wild or hostile tribes; to the military monarchies of Nepal, Cabul, Burma, aggression from which must be prevented; to the strength of the great feudatory chiefships, such as Hyderabad and Gwalior, whose troops must be overawed; to the existence of half-civilised tribes, who have hardly forgotten their habits of rapine, within our own borders; and to the other causes of disturbance which may arise among 250 million people of many nations, tribes, and languages, looking to all these considerations, we feel unable to recommend the reduction of the Native army below its present strength.

Strength of regiments should be increased and numbers decreased.

219. A considerable saving, as well as increased efficiency and fighting-power, can however, we are fully satisfied, be gained by raising the strength, and reducing the number of cadres of regiments. Almost all the regimental officers who have furnished the Commission with reports say that the present strength of our Native regiments is too small. The experience of the late campaign in Afghanistan shows that, with a sanctioned strength of 712 Natives of all ranks, an infantry battalion becomes very weak after a few weeks in the field. In the action of the Peiwar Kotal, out of five Native infantry regiments, only one took more than 500 men into action; while the rest were all below 408 strong. Yet this was at the beginning of the campaign, when the regiments had suffered no losses, and when only the depôt detachments and camp guards should have been absent from the colours. The weakness of the Native cavalry regiments has been even more marked, both at camps of exercise of late years and during the recent campaign. In accordance with the opinions of the great majority of regimental officers, we strongly recommend that the strength of a cavalry regiment be raised—

From 3 squadrons with 457 Natives of all ranks,
To 4 squadrons with 609 Natives of all ranks.

And the strength of an infantry regiment—

From 8 companies with 712 Natives of all ranks,
To 8 companies with 912 Natives of all ranks.

See Appendix XXXI.

220. With this strength 40 infantry regiments will have 880 more men, and greater fighting-power, and will cost very much less than 50 infantry regiments under the present system; while 15 cavalry regiments will have the same strength as 20 under the old organisation. It is of the greatest advantage in this country that a regiment should be sufficiently strong to take the field at once, and leave a sufficient number of men behind it for garrison and depôt purposes. With the present weak and expensive organisation this cannot be done.

Strength of European officers, and command of troops and companies by Native officers.

221. The sanctioned establishment of European officers at present attached to a Native regiment is seven, of whom one is considered to be in reserve. But for the last few years probationers have been attached to Native regiments, up to

* One mountain battery had been expanded to six guns, the others consisted of four guns each.

to a strength of two per regiment, in place of officers absent on furlough: thus the present strength of officers in the Bengal and Punjab armies averages 8·29 officers per cavalry, and 8·02 per infantry, regiment. The company and troop commanders are Native officers, who ought to be encouraged to take upon themselves full responsibility for their troops and companies in the field, in cantonment, or in detachments. In some regiments, notably in the Guide corps, and in the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, Native officers are trusted with, and perform, these duties. The greater the responsibility and power committed to them, the more efficiently they appear to perform their trust. Along the north-west frontier, where Native officers are often in command of frontier posts, the discipline maintained in such commands is excellent, and the sagacity and promptitude displayed by Native commandants of posts can hardly be surpassed. Some few of the regimental commanders who have reported to the Commission say that, for certain duties, they would rather employ Native officers than young and inexperienced British officers, and there is no doubt that the more these Native officers become used to command, the greater will be the success of the system. But from many regiments, especially from regiments of the Madras army, it is reported that the Native officers do not and cannot really command their troops and companies. And from such regiments come strong recommendations that the number of British officers with a Native corps should be largely increased. Some regimental officers who passed through the recent Afghan campaign say that the experience of those operations shows that more British officers are wanted. We are clearly of opinion that the system introduced after very mature deliberation in 1861, under which troop and company commanders are Native officers, should certainly be maintained. Under this system, a career is open for Native gentlemen of the military castes; and a good commanding officer has more hold on the men of his regiment, through selected Native company officers, under the present system, than he could have through British company officers. We advise that regimental and inspecting officers should be encouraged to raise the standard of efficiency and responsibility of Native officers everywhere to a higher level. But though we adhere to the system, whereby Native officers are company and troop commanders yet we cannot fail to attach weight to the opinions expressed by a majority of regimental commanders, that the present strength of British officers does not suffice for the casualties and requirements of a regiment in the field; and we recommend that the two extra officers hitherto attached in the room of officers absent on furlough or other duty, should form part of the sanctioned strength of each regiment.

Establishment of British officers proposed.

222. We recommend that the established strength of officers with each Native regiment should be as follows:—

Present Strength.	Proposed Strength.
Cavalry:	
1 Commandant.	1 Commandmant.
3 Squadron commanders.	4 Squadron commanders.
2 Squadron officers.	4 Squadron officers.
1 Adjutant.	1 Quartermaster.
	1 Adjutant.
Total - 7	11
Infantry:	
1 Commandant.	1 Commandant.
2 Wing commanders.	2 Wing commanders.
2 Wing officers.	4 Wing officers.
1 Adjutant.	1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.	1 Quartermaster.
Total - 7	9

The

The addition of a fourth squadron to every cavalry regiment renders it necessary that one squadron commander and one squadron officer should be added to the old strength. Our proposals, in effect, add two British officers to the sanctioned strength of each corps, of whom one will be available for the regimental depôt during a campaign, and another will be an addition to the reserve of officers present with regiments in the field. The cost of the additional two officers per regiment will probably not add more than about 2,00,000 rupees to the present cost of the army, because they take the place of the probationers who already exist under the orders of 1875.

Musketry instruction

223. We also recommend that one of the officers be appointed to the charge of the musketry instruction at 50 rupees per mensem for six months, so as to relieve wing officers of the preparation of returns, and to ensure uniformity of system.

Native officers, their selection and superannuation.

224. Native officers are at present selected, in the Madras and Bombay armies exclusively, and in the Bengal and Punjab armies mainly, from among the ranks of the non-commissioned officers and men. The regimental officers of the two southern armies report strongly, and almost unanimously, against the appointment of cadets of good family to be Native officers without passing through the ranks. They say that such appointments would take away from the rank and file, and from non-commissioned officers, a very strong incentive to faithful service; and they aver that in the territories from which their recruits are raised, suitable candidates of good family could not be found for the appointment of Native officers. In the Punjab and Bengal armies, on the other hand, a small proportion of the Native officers are now appointed direct from the loyal and martial families of Northern India; and regimental officers report that an admixture of such direct cadets among Native officers is desirable. Many officers report, and the records of the Army List bear* out this statement, that Native officers are often too old for their work. Younger men may indeed be selected as Native officers; but it is said that so much explanation is required for each old havildar that is passed over, that commanding officers are often driven to recommend promotions by pure seniority. We recommend that, in the Bengal and Punjab armies, a proportion of the vacancies in the ranks of the Native officers be held available for direct cadets of good family. We advise that such cadets should go to a military school, to be established at Roorkee or elsewhere, before they join their regiments; and that a limited number of selected non-commissioned officers, before promotion to be Native commissioned officers, should also be allowed to attend the military school. Non-commissioned officers sent to the military school should receive an allowance towards their expenses at the school, on the same principle as men of certain special regiments are, under present army regulations, granted allowances for attending classes in military surveying. In order to assist commanding officers in the difficult task of promoting to the rank of Native officers, by genuine selection, and to prevent native officers from staying too long in the service, we recommend that the promotion of very old soldiers to be jemadars and subadars should be discouraged, and that no Native officer should be retained on active duty after he has attained 32 years' service, unless he has gained one of the military orders, or unless his retention is sanctioned year by year by the lieutenant general of the army corps, on the commanding officer's report.

Non-commissioned ranks.

225. We do not propose to increase the staff of non-commissioned officers for a company of Native infantry, although the numerical strength of a company will be increased. Five havildars (serjeants) and five naiks (corporals) per company will amply suffice. We do not propose that the titles of these Native non-commissioned officers should be altered, as has been occasionally suggested, to their English equivalents. There is, however, a strong and general opinion among regimental officers, that the position of non-commissioned officers should be

* For instance, the Madras Army List of June 1879 shows the average length of service of 32 subadars (in four regiments, the 8th, 16th, 24th, and 32nd, taken at random) to be 32¾ years. With Natives, 32 years' service (or about 52 years of age) seems too old for the average age of company commanders. And it is hardly surprising that, with such old subadars, some of the regimental officers report that the Native officers either do not, or cannot, lead their companies.

be somewhat improved. This most useful class received no increase, when the rates of pay of all other classes in the Native Army were revised three years ago. At present the non-commissioned officers are not, save in respect of pension, much better off than the privates, and they get no progressive increase as the sepoys do. The present rates of pay are—

	Per Mensem.
CAVALRY—	*Rs.*
Duffadar (with horse allowance) - - -	38
Sowar (private) - ditto - - - - -	27 to 30
INFANTRY—	
Havildar - - - - - - -	14
Naik - - - - - - - -	12
Lance naik - - - - - - -	7 to 10
Sepoy (private) - - - - - -	7 to 10

We recommend that duffadars and havildars be allowed 1 rupee a month, for every two years of good service in that grade, up to a maximum of 4 rupees good conduct pay; and that naiks be allowed 1 rupee a month for every two years of good service in that grade, up to a maximum of 2 rupees good conduct pay. The duffadar's pay will thus, in line regiments, be 38 rupees, rising to 42 rupees a month; the havildar's pay will be 14 rupees, rising to 18 rupees a month; and the naik's pay will be 12 rupees, rising to 14 rupees a month.

Corps of Guides.

226. We have elsewhere recommended that the Punjab Frontier Force should henceforward serve under the Commander in Chief, instead of being under under the orders of the local civil Government. Our instructions particularly direct us to consider the question of frontier defence, and we therefore make the following proposals regarding the employment of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides. We consider that the peculiar circumstances of the north-wertern frontier require that the supreme civil authority on the spot should have at his absolute disposal, small military bodies for the prompt performance of those duties which have hitherto been performed by the Corps of Guides. We therefore recommend that, though this corps should be at all times available for "general service," its present constitution should remain unaltered, and that, ordinarily, it should be at the disposal of the civil administration without need of reference to the officer commanding the rest of the troops. We propose that the Queen's Own Corps of Guides should be retained in its present locality, Murdan, and that, in addition, the frontier line from Michni to the eastward should be entrusted to its charge, thus relieving the line regiment of this duty. Under this arrangement, the corps should be raised to a strength of 800 sepoys, and four sqadrons, and should have two mountain guns under an artillery officer attached to it.

At Hoti Murdan.

Selection of officers for Guide Corps.

227. The command of the Guide Corps should, as hitherto, be entrusted to a specially selected officer, who should also invariably be an assistant to the chief political authority, and act as his agent on that part of the frontier under his charge. One of the main objects which we have in view by this recommendation is, by means of such local forces, to train a body of officers for frontier service; we therefore consider that all the officers of such a corps should be carefully chosen, and that no one should be appointed to be either commandant or second in command, who has not passed an examination in Persian and Pushtoo.

228. We further recommend that three similar corps should be formed with the same strength of infantry and artillery as the Queen's Own Guides, but with two squadrons of cavalry each. These new guide corps should be posted, one in Kuram, another at Tonk, and a third in Pishin. Men of the surrounding tribes should be allowed to enlist in these corps; but the new corps could at once be created by the transfer to each of a regiment of Punjab infantry, with squadrons and divisions of artillery from the Punjab and Sind Frontier Forces. Under this scheme all corps of Guides would remain on precisely the same footing,

Guide Corps at Kuram, Tonk, and Pishin.

footing as that hitherto held by the troops of the Punjab Frontier Force. Returns would be sent in to the head-quarters of the military command to which the corps might be attached, the periodical inspections being taken by the chief military authority in the district, to whom cases of breaches of discipline and general courts-martial would be referred. Otherwise, these corps would be separate bodies officered by selection from any of the army corps, having distinct head-quarters stations of their own, and entirely under their own commandants, who should be responsible for their efficiency, but subordinate to the chief political authority.

229. The number of British officers with these corps should not exceed that originally attached to the Corps of Guides, viz. :— Officers of Guide Corps.

1 Commandant and assistant political officer with a staff pay of 1,000 rupees.
1 Second in command and commandant of cavalry.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.
1 Squadron officer.
1 Artillery officer.
1 Medical officer.

230. With regard to Native officers, we recommend that in order to secure a superior class of men for this grade in the guide corps, and as an incentive to the rest of the Native officers of the army corps, one Native officer should be appointed commandant of cavalry, and another commandant of infantry, with 200 rupees staff allowance, in addition to the pay of his rank.

231. With a view to further providing for the requirements of Pishin and Beluchistan, we recommend that Jacob's Rifles, and another corps of the Bombay army, should be gradually altered in composition and assimilated to the two present Beluch battalions (27th and 29th Native Infantry). These four Beluch battalions should then be accepted as local battalions for "general service," as in the case of the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force. But they would usually be employed in the Beluchistan and Sind Field Force, which, in addition to the stations beyond Dadur, would hold Jacobabad and Kurrachee. The advantage of such a change would be to secure to the Sind Field Force the services of men, to whom residence in a more rigorous climate than the rest of the Bombay Presidency would be acceptable, and also that the regiments of the regular army would only have to supply, in ordinary relief, two battalions for Beluchistan. No additional cost would be caused by this arrangement; on the contrary, there would be some saving in the cost of reliefs. Beluchistan Frontier Force.

232. We have considered the question of forming additional pioneer regiments, of having a pioneer company in each regiment, and a certain number of pioneers in each troop or company. The formation of pioneer companies in each regiment is generally deprecated by regimental officers of the Bengal and Punjab army corps. We recommend that two pioneer regiments be constituted in each army corps, and that two pioneers be maintained in each company and troop of every regiment of cavalry or infantry. These pioneers should, as far as possible, be trained artificers; and the equipment of cavalry pioneers should be arranged for purposes of destruction rather than construction. Each pioneer soldier should receive 1½ rupees a month extra pay; the cost of the extra pay being met by reducing the strength of regimental lascars from eight to four per regiment, as on the pioneer soldiers some of the duty now performed by regimental lascars will naturally devolve. We recommend that the labour of pioneer regiments, of pioneer soldiers in companies, and of Native troops generally, be more often utilised in time of peace on building or maintaining barracks, fortifications, railways, and other military works. The concentration of troops in stronger battalions and at fewer stations, and the reduction of guard duties, will make such utilisation more feasible than heretofore, and the working pay to be gained by such labour would be acceptable to the men. The experience of the last campaign shows that the 23rd Pioneers, who had been engaged continuously for three years on road making and other similar work, were more healthy and strong, and quite as efficient as the very best Native regiments that took part in the recent operations. There is, therefore, no reason for fearing that more frequent employment on works would impair Pioneer regiments and pioneer companies.

Committee of regimental officers to fix pioneer equipment.

the efficiency of Native regiments of the line. The proper equipment of pioneer soldiers in line regiments should be settled by a special committee of regimental officers. As far as possible, the tools should be such as Natives ordinarily use; the heavy spade of the British pioneer equipment now issued to Native pioneer regiments is not suitable for Natives, who ordinarily do earth-work with a phowrah and pick. Native pioneer regiments now receive an expensive equipment which is quite unsuitable to the purpose; but we understand that this subject is engaging the attention of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

Sappers and miners.

233. We recommend that there should be four instead of three corps of sappers and miners, and that the number of companies for each should be as shown in the army corps distribution tables, Chapter IV. The number of companies will thus be increased from 25 to 29. The head-quarters of the sappers of the Punjab army corps should be at Rawal Pindi. The training and organization of the four corps should be assimilated as far as possible, and every endeavour should be made to enlist artificers. We are of opinion that sappers should be employed to a large extent on military works. We recommend that a committee of officers of sappers should be assembled to report on the best and most economical organization for the four corps of sappers and miners. This committee should also report what improvements are necessary in the organization of pontoon, telegraph, and engineer trains, and should fix the proper number of British officers and non-commissioned officers for each company. We consider that three officers per company are required in time of war.

Committee of sapper officers to report on the organization of the four corps of sappers and miners.

Question of linking battalions.

234. Proposals have been frequently made, and a majority of regimental officers now recommend, that two or more battalions should be linked together. The advantages of such linking would be, that all three battalions would be homogeneous, consisting of men of the same class; that the European officers would be promoted on one list from one battalion to another, thereby maintaining regimental promotion, and at the same time affording a list large enough to ensure a fairly regular flow of promotion; that one battalion of the three could always be at, or near, the home station or depôt, where the reserves and recruits of all three linked battalions could be exercised together; and that there would be a distinct economy by having a depôt for three battalions, instead of a depôt for every battalion. The disadvantages of the linked battalion system are, that officers transferred from one battalion to another would never know the men, in the same way as officers who rise in a single battalion; that there may be risk in having larger units of the Native army sharing in the same impulses; and that the linked battalion system would be a decided change, such as it is not desirable to introduce among so conservative a body as the Native soldiery, unless it be for some very distinct benefit, such as at present cannot be expected to accrue. Some members of the Commission were in favour of linking three battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry together; they thought the advantages of such linking were clear; and they believed the arrangement could be carried out without disturbance to to the Native army or the soldiery. The majority of the Commission, including those members who possessed most experience of military affairs, were against the change. Accordingly, we recommend that the Native army should consist of single regiments and battalions, each with a fixed depôt at some cantonment, in or near its recruiting ground; that the cadre of British officers should be for single regiments and battalions; and that the regimental promotion of British officers, with the exception of the commandant, should go, as far as possible, exclusively within the regiment.

Regimental depôts.

235. Except in the case of the Goorkhas, the "Guides," and a very few corps with fixed head-quarters, no regiment has any fixed depôt where the baggage, sick, and families can be left when the regiment goes on foreign or other active service. When Madras regiments go to Burma, they leave their families behind in head-quarters fixed for the time being. On the outbreak of war in 1878, and again in 1879, discomfort and anxiety to the men, and some difficulty to the army staff, were occasioned by the absence of standing arrangements for regimental depôts, at which absentees, sick, and families could be assembled, and whence payments to the families of men

on

on service could be methodically made. We will now proceed to show how, in our opinion, depôts can best be established. When the regiments to be maintained in each army corps shall be finally accepted by Government and settled, a committee of regimental officers should be convened to decide at what cantonment the depôt of each regiment should be fixed. It would naturally happen that the depôts of two or more regiments would be at the same cantonment. For instance, the depôts of six or seven Hindustani regiments would be fixed between Lucknow and Bareilly, while the depôts of several Punjab regiments would be at Meean Meer, Umballa, and Rawal Pindi. Ordinarily a native officer, or a pensioned Native officer, would be placed in charge of the depôt on a small staff salary, and he would have under his orders four or five pensioned soldiers with small staff salaries, and a fixed monthly allowance to keep the place clean. If possible, disused Native lines, or disused barracks would be utilised as depôt buildings. When the regiment was ordered on service, or when the reserves are called out, a British officer would be told off for depôt duty; he would have charge of the regimental effects and families, of the sick, of recruits, and of the reserves. It would be for the decision of the commanding officer in each case, whether he would have his recruits in ordinary times drilled at the depôt, or with the regiment. If the corps was on service or distant duty, probably he would have the recruits subjected to their first drilling at the depôt; in such case a sufficient staff of Native and non-commissioned officers, with perhaps an European officer, would have to be deputed to the depôt for the drill season. If the regiment were quartered in cantonments at no very great distance from the recruiting ground, the commanding officer would probably prefer to have the recruits drilled in the regiment under his own eye. The total cost of a regimental depôt, where a sufficient nucleus of buildings was available, need not exceed 60 rupees a month for each regiment*. At this rate, the yearly cost for 122† regiments, or the whole army, would amount to 87,840 rupees. This outlay would secure the Government, and these soldiers, against difficulty and anxiety, such as was caused in 1878 and 1879, when the Native regiments had no recognised depôt at which they could leave their families, their sick, and their goods. The possession of a fixed head-quarters near their homes would contribute to give Native troops a feeling of comfort, and would meet, to some extent, the love of home and fatherland, which is so very strong in the Native soldier. For regiments like the Goorkha corps and the Guides, which already possess fixed head-quarters, no fresh expenditure would have to be incurred.

Committee of regimental officers to decide on depôts.

236. The questions of recruiting, and of reserves, for Native regiments, and of pensions to Native soldiers, are closely bound up and must be considered together. At the present time the systems of recruiting for the several armies are diverse. Regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies draw their recruits from many tribes and castes over the several recruiting grounds of those presidencies. The Bombay regiments, moreover, have an admixture of Sikhs and Hindustanis from Northern India in their ranks. These armies are thus composed of what are called "mixed regiments," that is to say, of corps in which men of different races, several religions, and many provinces are thrown together into the same company or troop. In the Bengal and Punjab armies the majority of corps are what are called "class-company regiments," that is to say, the regiments draw recruits from three or more different races and recruiting grounds, but the men of each class or race are kept apart in separate companies. Thus, an infantry regiment may have two companies of Sikhs, two companies of Hindustani Brahmans and Rajputs, two companies of Punjabi Muhammadans, one company of trans-Indus Pathans, and one company of Dogras from the Kangra or Jamú hills; such a regiment

Present systems of recruiting.

	Rs.
* Staff allowance to pensioned Native officer - - - - -	25
To the five pensioned non-commissioned officers and sepoys - -	25
Allowance for maintaining and keeping clean the depôt buildings	10
	60

† The total number of regiments of cavalry and infantry proposed for the four army corps is 128, exclusive of local corps, for the Guides and Goorkha regiments, depôts will not be needed: thus 122 regiments are left.

regiment would be a class-company regiment; the Native officers of each company would ordinarily belong to the race, tribe, or sect from which the company was recruited. In the Northern army are a limited number of "class regiments," which are composed exclusively of men belonging to one caste or tribe. Such, for instance, are the five Goorkha corps, recruited entirely from the hardy, short-statured highlanders of the Nepal hills; the two pioneer regiments, which consist exclusively of men of the Muzbi tribe, who in the early days of Sikh rule were despised outcasts, whose noblest calling was thieving, but who are now among the flower of the Northern army; the 14th and 15th Regiments, which have been almost pure Sikh corps from the time they were raised; and the 1st Cavalry, which has been recruited from Muhammadans of the Delhi territory, ever since the corps was raised by Colonel Skinner many years ago.

"Mixed regiments" in two Southern armies.

237. The opinions of regimental officers in the Madras and Bombay Army Corps are almost unanimous that the system of "mixed regiments," with no special recruiting ground, is best for their armies. We recommend that this system be left untouched, save in so far as each army corps will henceforward be restricted to raising recruits within its own territorial limits. This restriction will prevent the Bombay Army Corps from recruiting Sikhs and Hindustanis, and it will prevent the regiments of the Hyderabad Contingent, which will in future belong to the Madras Army Corps, from drawing, as they now do, a large proportion of their recruits from Northern India. The restriction, so far as it interferes with regimental traditions and customs, must be enforced gradually; but we feel convinced that, if the essential principle of maintaining four distinct armies without community of nationalities and sympathies is to be preserved, the regiments of the several army corps must be kept to separate and distinct recruiting grounds as far as possible. The Hyderabad Contingent is the force in Southern India most largely recruited from Hindustan; and the Foreign Department of the Government of India agrees, we find, in our view that it would be desirable to recruit this force more exclusively from the Deccan and the adjacent districts.

"Class regiments" and "class-company regiments" in Northern armies.

238. The great majority of regimental officers of the Bengal and Punjab armies consider that "class regiments" are preferable to "mixed regiments" or to "class-company regiments." They argue* that the men are more contented and happy serving with their own tribesmen; that under such a system there will always be strong rivalry, not to say antagonism, between regiments, which, though useful to the State as between regiments, might be hurtful to discipline as between companies of the same regiment. Other officers, however, point out that regiments of the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps could not be all converted into class regiments without a radical change throughout both armies, such as would dislocate the existing regimental organization and gravely unsettle the minds of the men. Seeing how strong a majority of regimental officers in the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps are in favour of "class regiments," we deem it right to fortify our position, in not recommending a general system of class

* It may be well to cite here the arguments in favour of class regiments, as put by the commandant of a regiment which is composed of class troops. In answer to the question put by the Commission—"Are you in favour of class company regiments, class regiments, or mixed regiments?" he says—

"Certainly in favour of class regiments. We are unfortunately a class troop regiment, and these are the disadvantages we find in it—

(*a*.) Unjust promotion, a vacancy falls due in one class, the best man in *that class* is promoted, while older and better soldiers of other classes are passed over, and become subordinate to a man they should command.

(*b*.) Clashing of interests of troops of different classes.

(*c*.) Backbiting and unfriendliness of occasional individuals.

These are regimental grievances only, but the State difficulties become State dangers—

(*a*.) Few corps can be employed on service against any enemy or rebel without having in their ranks some clansmen of the men they are engaged against.

(*b*.) The compulsory fraternity of a regiment composed of hitherto antagonistic elements practically binds the great majority of the whole Native army into one organised mass, and combinations not only become possible, but easy. The class regiments are naturally happier homes to the men, and it is, or should be, the chief endeavour of all commanding officers to make their men happy. The class corps are, and must be, more popular. You promote your best men, you hear of no quarrels, you fear no fraternization with an enemy, you know your men have no fellow-feeling with other corps, except of their own class, and in consequence of the general well-being of the corps, a most valuable *esprit de corps* is fostered, which a class troop regiment cannot possibly have."

class regiments, by quoting the opinion of the Punjab Committee of 1858 on the reorganization of the Native army. The Committee consisted of Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, Sir Neville Chamberlain, and Sir Herbert Edwardes. These men were the authors of the irregular system, as developed in the Punjab Frontier Force and in the new regiments that in 1857 went down from the Punjab to quell the mutiny. They wrote with the events and dangers of the great mutiny fresh before their eyes. At the time they wrote their report, they had the advantage of the presence of Sir Henry Lumsden, who had organized and commanded "The Guides," confessedly one of the finest irregular corps India has ever seen. On the question of class regiments, the Punjab Committee (pages 184-185 of the Appendix to the Blue Book of 1859) say—

Opinion of Punjab Committee of 1858.

"This (whether each corps should be recruited in a prescribed district only, or whether it should be recruited over a wide area) is a very important question, but after mature consideration, and with reference to the events of the past year, we come decidedly to the conclusion that regiments of Native infantry should be provincial in their composition and ordinary sphere of service. As we cannot do without a large Native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force, comes the counterpoise of Natives against Natives. At first sight it might be thought that the best way to secure this would be to mix up all the available military races of India in each and every regiment, and to make them all general service corps. But excellent as this theory seems, it does not bear the test of practice. It is found that different races mixed together do not long preserve their distinctiveness; their corners and angles, and feeling, and prejudice get rubbed off, till at last they assimilate, and the object of their association to a considerable extent is lost. To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and which, while it lasts, makes the Muhammadan of one country despise, fear, or dislike the Muhammadan of another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Muhammadan, of one province be enlisted in one regiment, and no others, and having thus created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so against the hour of need, by confining the circle of the ordinary service to the limits of their own province, and only marching them on emergency into other parts of the Empire, with which they will then be found to have little sympathy. By the system thus indicated, two great evils are avoided: firstly, that community of feeling throughout the Native army, and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces; and, secondly, that thorough discontent and alienation from the service which has undoubtedly sprung up since extended conquest has carried our Hindustani soldiers so far from their homes in India Proper. There can be no question that a contented servant is better than a discontented one. Unfortunately we have tried too much hitherto to purchase the contentment of our Native armies by increased pay, batta, &c.; this has not answered its purpose, and has produced many evils. It has enriched the sepoys, but not satisfied them. Nothing can reconcile Natives to long absence from their homes, where they leave their wives and lands. The sepoys felt they were being coaxed into foreign service; and got both angry and insolent with a sense of power. We believe that what is called 'general service' has been prominent among the causes which undermined our once faithful Native army. If, then, in future we keep our regiments moving ordinarily in a circle about their homes, we shall add greatly to their real happiness, and consequently their loyalty, and be able to get rid of all mischievous increases of pay. Fewer men will also suffice, for the furloughs will be shorter, and, in fact, we believe that the service will thus be rendered more safe, more economical, and more popular."

The abstract in the same Blue-book of 1859 goes on to say—

"The Punjab Committee are of opinion that some corps should be homogeneous, but that most corps should be mixed of the races prevailing in the respective provinces; and they refer to the condition of the Punjab force, in which there are already three homogeneous corps, viz., one regiment of Goorkhas and two corps of Muzbi pioneers; this is exclusive of the Nusseeree Goorkha battalion, which does not belong to the Punjab force. The Committee state that if more regiments of Goorkhas could be obtained they would be glad, but that it appears impracticable, and that more Muzbi corps are not required. Hence they do not recommend any more homogeneous regiments for the Punjab, but that all the other provincial corps should be mixed, some being in the proportion observed in the new Punjab corps, viz.:—

Muhammadan companies - - - - - - -	4
Sikh companies - - - - - - - -	4
Hill Rajput companies - - - - - - -	2
	10

 "Others

"Others having a predominant element thus—

Sikh companies	5
Muhammadan companies	3
Hill Rajputs	1
Hindustanis	1
	10

"Or,—

Muhammadan companies	5
Sikh companies	3
Hill-men company	1
Hindustani company	1
	10

"Again, in one corps the whole of the Muhammadans might be Pathans of the trans-Indus, though this should be quite exceptional. In another regiment they might be all Punjabi Muhammadans from the cis-Indus, and so on. The views of Lieutenant Colonel Macpherson coincide with those of the Punjab Committee."

Proposals of Commission.

239. The history of the Bengal army during the past 21 years has, on the whole, supported the conclusions of the Punjab Committee of 1858. We recommend that in the Punjab and Bengal Army Corps a certain limited number of class regiments, Goorkhas, Muzbis, Sikhs, and Hindustanis, be maintained, but that the bulk of these two armies should consist more or less of class company regiments, each of which should have its principal recruiting ground, and its fixed depôt, in a specified tract of country. Each ordinary regiment of the line would then mainly consist of class companies, drawn from a particular province, though special regiments, like the Guides and others of the permanent frontier corps, would be allowed to draw recruits from several provinces. By this plan, the distinction between the Bengal and Punjab corps would be sharply defined. Each regiment, excepting only the regiments of the Frontier Force, would have a tour of service at its fixed depôt near its home. At the same time, a portion of each of these two army corps might be temporarily cantoned beyond its own borders.

Application of the system of four localised armies.

240. The plan here recommended would take practical shape somewhat as follows:—

Bengal Army Corps.—We propose that the Native infantry of the Bengal army corps should consist of—

	19 battalions of the line	each of 912 Natives of all ranks.
	2 Goorkha battalions	
	3 Assam battalions	
Total	24	

There are now existing—

	* 25 Hindustani regiments	each of 712 Natives of all ranks.
	2 Goorkha regiments	
	3 Assam regiments, eac	of 912 Natives of all ranks.
Total	30	

If the Bengal Army Corps is to be maintained at the strength recommended by the Commission, six of these Hindustani regiments will have to be reduced.

Punjab

* The Hindustani regiments are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st, all of which are mainly or exclusively composed of Hindustanis.

Punjab Army Corps.—We recommend for the Punjab Army Corps 27 battalions of infantry in all, of the increased strength of 912 Natives of all ranks. There are now—

	* 17 Punjab battalions of the line.
	10 Battalions of the Punjab Frontier Force.
	3 Goorkha battalions.
	1 Battalion of Guides.
Total -	31

If it be decided that the strength recommended by the Commission will suffice for the Punjab Army Corps, then four regiments will have to be reduced. It would be for a committee of regimental officers to advise the Government which regiments could best be reduced in each of the four armies. As regards the cavalry, there will be 6 regiments in the Bengal and 13 in the Punjab Army Corps, all of 4 squadrons, to be formed out of the existing 26 regiments of Bengal and Punjab cavalry, including the Guides.

Madras Army Corps.—We recommend for the Madras Army Corps 25 regiments of Native infantry and 2 of Native cavalry of the increased strength, as compared with 40 infantry regiments and 4 regiments of cavalry. If this arrangement be accepted, 15 infantry and 2 cavalry cadres will have to be reduced.

Bombay Army Corps.—We propose 25 regiments of Native infantry and 6 regiments of cavalry for the Bombay Army Corps, as against 30 of infantry and 7 of cavalry now existing. Under this arrangement, 5 cadres of infantry and one of cavalry would be reduced.

Provision for officers and men of the reduced regiments.

241. We presume that in the case of each army corps the least efficient regiments would be reduced. The privates in the reduced regiments who may be fit for service would be absorbed into the strength of the remaining cadres. This might also be done in the case of a few of the non-commissioned officers, drummers, or farriers, who may wish to serve. But in the case of the Native officers, and of the majority of the non-commissioned officers, special terms of pension and retirement should be granted. To send these men to other regiments would retard promotion, and produce general discontent. Moreover, it would be costly to retain them on full pay. It would be better that they should retire at once, and as their retirement from active duty, after serving the State faithfully for many years, would be compulsory, something more than the ordinary pensions should be given them. We propose therefore that the present superior rate of pensions be given to all ranks above that of private who have served in the army for 25 years and upwards, and that those who have served from 15 to 25 years should receive ordinary pensions, and, in addition, a gratuity of one month's pay for every two years' service in the army. The result will be a considerable increase to the pension list, and an immediate outlay in gratuities; but this will be far less than retaining the men on full pay. For instance, in the Madras army, where reductions will be largest, 256 Native officers and 1,540 non-commissioned officers will have to retire, causing an immediate outlay of some 1,72,345 rupees in gratuities, besides additional pensions. The last two columns of the statement in the Appendix show that in the Madras army the cost of these extra pensions for one year, *plus* gratuities, will be less than full pay for the same period, whilst in the second and following years, the outlay will be diminished by the amount of the gratuities.

See Appendix XXXIII.

No just ground for discontent at the reductions proposed.

242. Much stress may, no doubt, be laid upon the discontent which these discharged Native officers may carry into their homes and villages; but to this we have to say that the discontent of these men is a trifling matter, compared with the discontent of the millions, who would feel the pressure of the increased taxation which would be necessary, if no reduction in military expenditure were made; and, further, we believe that, if our proposals regarding retirement are

* The 17 Punjab battalions of the line are the 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, and 45th, all of which are mainly or exclusively composed of Punjabis or frontier men.

are carried out, there will be no such discontent, and certainly no just ground for discontent. Sir C. Trevelyan, in his evidence before a Parliamentary Committee in 1873, when explaining the mode in which a large reduction of the Madras army was previously carried out, laid great stress upon the readiness with which the Madras soldier returned to his home and to an agricultural life, when discharged with a fair gratuity, and we can have no reason to doubt that the same feeling now exists, even if it is not stronger than it was before. Any way we are quite satisfied that the taxpayers of India should not be called upon to maintain a large number of cadres of regiments beyond the requirements of the State, simply because a few hundred Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers may feel slightly aggrieved at being paid off and retired.

See Appendix XXXIV.

Reductions in the Madras army.

243. We cannot help feeling that the reduction which we have made in the number of cadres, falls with extreme severity upon the Madras army. But this appears to us to be unavoidable. We would gladly, if it had been possible to do so, have suggested such a distribution of the force as should have caused a rateable reduction over the whole of the armies of India; but to have done this would have been to act in complete opposition to the principles which we have thought it absolutely essential to follow in arranging for a systematic distribution of the army of India. We had to provide for a proper separation of the army into great divisions, with such diversity of interest and natural sympathy, as should place them in a position to act as a counterpoise one on the other. We found ourselves called upon to distribute the troops in such a manner that, while all obligatory points and garrisons were maintained in strength, and while the troops were as far as possible concentrated at convenient centres, a certain force should be available for service in the field at any point; and we had to consider how this could be done so as to provide for the maintenance of the internal peace of the country, and at the same time to ensure the greatest possible economy, consistent with a due regard to these primary objects. We believe that we have assigned to the Madras presidency proper, a force very much in excess of what can ever be necessary in a country with such a peaceable and unwarlike population as that of Madras; we have certainly assigned to it a force which, when compared with that given to the various provinces of Bengal, is on a very liberal scale, due regard being had to the area of population and nature of the frontier of the two provinces; and, in the interests of the taxpayers of India, we do not feel that we should have the slightest justification for increasing the garrison beyond the number we have proposed.

Inexpediency of employing Madras troops largely in other provinces.

244. Next, we have considered most attentively how far it would be possible to increase the scope of the extra-provincial area in which Madras troops might be employed. We have given to Burma, Mysore, Hyderabad, and Belgaum, Port Blair, and Cuttack, the fullest garrisons which we consider that we are justified in assigning to them. We at one time considered whether it was possible to garrison Calcutta, and a portion of the presidency district of Bengal with Madras troops, but we were precluded from accepting this idea by several considerations. First, the very great expense of bringing up Madras regiments with all their families and following to Bengal, and of frequently relieving them. Secondly, the fact that the troops in and around Calcutta are concentrated in strength, in order that they may be employed in case of necessity on the eastern frontier of Bengal, employment which we find is considered by the Madras Government to be most distasteful to the Madras sepoy, and for which he is in no way fitted. Thirdly, that service beyond the limits of the presidency is extremely unpopular with the Madras regiments; so much so, that the great amount of such service which has been thrown upon the Madras army has tended to make it difficult to obtain recruits for the army. Sir Neville Chamberlain has observed:—

"The physique of the Native army is far from being what it ought to be. The difficulty of obtaining suitable recruits for the infantry has been forcibly brought to my notice by almost every commanding officer I have come into contact with; and I lately felt myself called upon to publish a general order prohibiting the enlistment of youths physically unfit to discharge the duties of a soldier. Such men are useless on field service; whilst with ordinary cantonment duties they in middle life become a burthen upon the pension establishment. One of the causes assigned for the difficulty in recruiting from

from amongst the rural population is the loss of popularity of army service. This is said to proceed partly because of the greatly increased proportion of foreign and Bengal to home service, and the long periods some regiments are kept out of their own presidency. The Native army can only be kept efficient by drawing to all ranks an unfailing supply of the pick of village lads; and whatever deters them from accepting military service is, to my mind, a subject worthy of the serious consideration of Government."

245. Much the same is said by other officers. These are very serious considerations, and the only ground upon which we should feel justified in recommending the employment of Madras troops in Bengal, in the face of the repeated declaration of the growing unpopularity of military service in consequence of the amount of Bengal, and other extra-provincial duty, the men have now to do, would be that these troops are more efficient or less costly than the Bengal troops. Now, as to the first, it is certain that for duty in the hills and forests of the north-east frontier in Bengal, which is the quarter in which the troops of the presidency district are most likely to be employed, the Madras troops would be altogether inefficient, and would probably succumb at once to the climate. The probable effect of duty in Bengal on the men of the Madras army is thus described by his Excellency the Commander in Chief of Madras. He points out that for active service the Madras sepoy is ready and willing to go anywhere.

Their unsuitability to foreign climates.

"But it is different, when merely to garrison a place out of their own presidency, men are sent to an unknown and remote corner in Bengal where the language, climate, and customs are strange, and where there is not the excitement of service to occupy their mind. They then brood over the discomforts around them, and are unable to comprehend why they are thus expatriated."

He observes:—

"As some persons measure the efficiency and utility of the Madras army by comparing it with that of Bengal, I here say most distinctly that, do what we may, the Madras sepoy can never attain to the Bengal standard; whilst I believe it to be equally certain that the men of Southern India fall far short, as a race, in possessing the courage and military instincts of the men of Northern India; but I do believe that now, as heretofore, the Madrasee, properly selected and commanded, can be made into a very serviceable soldier."

246. Lord Napier of Magdala also in 1871, on the occasion of the Lushai war, strongly protested against a proposal to employ the troops of Madras in the eastern frontier of Bengal. It seems plain, therefore, that there is no ground for bringing the Madras sepoy up to garrison Bengal on the score of superior efficiency.

247. Then as to cost, every Madras regiment employed in Bengal costs about one lakh of rupees a year more than a Bengal regiment employed on the same duty. On this point Sir Neville Chamberlain says:—

Their costliness when employed in other provinces.

"As regards the matter of cost of a Madras regiment when employed out of its own presidency, there seems to me room for doubt whether the financial result has ever been fully estimated. Government has to pay the fare of the wives and children, as well as of the men, when moved by rail; if the regiment marches, the difference between actual cost and the old rates of cart hire."

248. Further, they receive a higher scale of compensation for rations, and all their clothing and equipment have to be brought from Madras. All the objections which are urged against the employment of Madras troops in Bengal, apply equally to their employment in the Central Provinces. The only extra-provincial duty which they do not seem to dislike is the garrisoning of Burma, and this is considered pure foreign service, and carries with it all the extra pay and privileges of such service; they also seem to be contented at Secunderabad. We have accordingly left the present garrison of Burma untouched; we propose still to garrison Secunderabad with Madras troops, and we have also proposed to garrison Belgaum with Madras troops—an arrangement which seems in every way suitable and expedient, and to which we can see none of the objections which seem to present themselves to Sir Richard Temple. There appears to us no special reason why Belgaum should be garrisoned by the Bombay army, while it does afford a very suitable and convenient field for the employment of Madras regiments. In the case of local disturbances, the Civil Government of Bombay will find the officers of the Madras Army Corps just as ready to co-operate with them as those of Bombay; and we have, for reasons explained elsewhere, come

Belgaum command assigned to the Madras army.

to the conclusion that it is not only not necessary that the troops serving in a particular province should be under the military control of the Civil Government of that province, but that such an arrangement is absolutely impossible. The Belgaum district is one of the tracts of country which can, with the greatest convenience, be garrisoned by Madras troops, and we think that, having regard to the heavy reductions which are necessary in the strength of that army, it is only fair to give this duty to it rather than to the Bombay army, which has been very slightly reduced. We are also of opinion that the regiments of the Hyderabad Contingent should be mainly recruited from the Madras districts, and the districts round Hyderabad, and not from Hindustan. The Contingent should, we think, be officered from the Madras Army Corps.

No real public reason for maintaining an excessive Madras army.

249. It seems clear, from a consideration of these circumstances, that, so far from any claim being put forward by the people of Madras for a larger sphere of military employment, the demand already made upon the civil population for the purpose of recruiting the army is found to be too great a strain upon the province, since it is alleged on the best authority that it is now impossible to find sufficient good men to recruit the army, and mainly because they are now called upon too frequently to serve beyond the old limits of the Madras presidency. Neither do the Madras regiments put forward any claim to an extension of the territories which they are to garrison; on the contrary, they seem to demand a curtailment of existing limits. At the same time, it is not the interest of the Government to persuade them by the offer of special inducements to extend their ambition; for they are neither as efficient, nor as cheap, as the military material to be got in the countries in which it has been urged that they might be employed. There only remains one reason for maintaining a larger force than that we have suggested for employment, and it is the reason which has been so often urged, and so often allowed weight, to the great detriment of the country and the army alike, and that is, the interests of the officers who would be affected by the reduction. No doubt, the reduction in the number of officers involved in the decrease of the number of Native regiments of Madras by two regiments of cavalry and fifteen of infantry is very great, and it is a subject which deserves the most careful and serious attention. We would not recommend any measure which ignored the substantial rights of any officer, but we cannot conscientiously recommend that Madras should continue to be greatly over-garrisoned, and the people taxed simply for the convenience of a few officers. We believe, however, that the interests of these officers can be carefully guarded without recourse to any measure so unjustifiable as that, and we have, further on, made specific proposals for a special scheme of retirement, for all officers in excess of actual requirements.

Great surplus of senior officers in Madras.

250. There is another consideration which has led us to believe that no time is so favourable for making a change, and for introducing a scheme for reducing the number of field officers, in the Madras army as the present. An enumeration of the list of the officers of the Madras army will show a state of things, which must have immediately forced upon the Government of India the adoption of some decisive special measures for a re-adjustment of the ranks of the officers of the Madras army, wholly irrespective of any proposals which we have made. It will be seen that there are no less than 169 field officers employed on the regimental establishment of the Madras army, while there are only 118 captains and subalterns. The consequence is, that in every regiment in the Madras army, field officers are performing the duties of captains, and even of subalterns. It is certain that there is no measure so opposed to economy as the retention of officers in the higher ranks, to perform the work which might be better performed by officers of inferior rank. To take the 20th Regiment as an instance, we find two brevet-colonels, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, and one sub-lieutenant; in the 41st, two brevet colonels, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, two lieutenants; in the 38th, five field officers, and no subaltern; in the 33rd Native Infantry, five field officers, one captain, and no subaltern; in the 32nd, five field officers, one captain, and two sub-lieutenants; in the 28th, six field officers; in the 26th, five field officers; in the 25th, five field officers, of whom two are brevet colonels. In fact, there is hardly a regiment in the whole Madras army which has not four or five field officers, either on the cadre of the regiment, or attached, while some have more.

It

It seems to us that it is impossible to expect any army to be efficient in which there is such entire disorganization of rank as now exists in the Madras army; it must be demoralising to the officers and men. It is out of the question to suppose that old field officers will efficiently and zealously perform the duties of wing officers, adjutants, and quartermasters; and if it be the case that the Madras regiments are less efficient than they used to be, it is not necessary to look further than to this state of things for a reason. In a letter, dated 3rd April 1876, Sir Frederick Haines, then Commander in Chief of Madras, wrote:—

"The present great and ever-increasing proportion of senior to junior British officers is most injurious. Colonels and lieutenant colonels hold the wings. Three or four majors have officiating wings, and, with two or three exceptions, old captains are subalterns. There are no young officers coming on as candidates to fill the numbers, upwards of 30 of permanent and officiating appointments, now vacant. The well-being of an army depends much upon an assured source of supply of young officers. The army of Madras does not possess this; and it is a vital question how to provide it. The age of the seconds in command and wing officers is also becoming a serious matter, and cannot fail to be detrimental to efficiency."

Retirement of surplus field officers must be dealt with independently of any proposals now made.

251. We maintain therefore that, independently of any reductions which our proposed distribution of the army may involve, the time has come when it is the imperative duty of the Government to deal decisively with the question of retiring the surplus field officers of the Madras army, and of providing its complement of young officers. If this fact be recognised, then the question of adding a few more to the number of field officers to be retired cannot be a very important one; and it is difficult to believe that many of the field officers can desire to remain on, in the incongruous and humiliating position which it is now their fate to occupy. We find, however, that from the calculations we have made, the number of surplus field officers who will have to be retired, on account of the changes we have proposed in regimental organization and distribution, will not be very excessive, provided that for a few years to come two majors are attached, as a temporary arrangement to each regiment, instead of one. We have proposed measures with a view of inducing the surplus field officers to retire, which we believe will be acceptable to them, while they will add enormously to the efficiency of the army, and will cause a great annual saving of money from the employment of subalterns, instead of field officers.

Previous opinions of high authorities on subject of reducing the Madras army.

252. We must in justice to ourselves lay stress upon the fact that the reduction of the Madras Army to the real requirements of the province, has not been raised by us for the first time. As far back as 1868 the Madras Government pointed out that their army was in excess of all requirements, and proposed large reductions. Lord Napier and Ettrick said, with reference to the insufficiency of the revenue of India to meet the constantly increasing charges from the public service—

Lord Napier and Ettrick.

"If this be true, it behoves us, surely, to inquire most seriously whether a vigorous well-considered effort has been made to reduce expenditure in the Madras Presidency. It is my opinion that the cost of the army far transcends the wants of the country."

His Excellency was supported in this view by the members of his council, and, on a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, the Government of India, in 1869, strongly urged upon the Home Government the reduction of the Madras army by two regiments of cavalry and eight of infantry. "The Madras Native army is admittedly," it was observed, "largely in excess of any requirements of the presidency. To bring them to other presidencies, as we have already shown, is most inconvenient." And, in sending home their recommendations for the reduction, the Government of India said—

Government of India.

"With very ample information before us, we are convinced that, as far as the interests of India are concerned, every proposal we make can be carried out without danger to efficiency, or the diminution of necessary military strength."

253. The Home Government, however, declined to make any reduction of the army of Madras, which was acknowledged to be in excess of the requirements of the presidency, unless corresponding reductions were made in the other armies; and as the exigencies of the service made it impossible at that time to reduce the Bengal army, the reductions fell through. The Secretary of State's objections to the reduction were largely based upon the injury it would inflict upon the

the interests of the European officers, and, alluding to the change made in the position of European officers after the mutiny, he observed:—

"Time has not yet sufficed to allay the distracting effects of these various changes and reductions. The service seems to me to need that encouragement for the future, which can only be found in a relief from a depressing apprehension of continued unstability and sudden change. While prepared to receive at all times with unmixed satisfaction the assurance that the Native Army of India can, in the opinion of the local authorities, be still further reduced in number without danger to the peace of the country, I entertain a strong conviction of the impolicy of carrying out further measures of this nature otherwise than by a proportionate reduction in the Native army of each presidency. In considering the general question of the amount of Native forces required for India, I am of opinion that your Government should look at it as a whole, without reference to the wants of this or that presidency as if they were separate and independent States."

Lord Mayo.

The Viceroy, Lord Mayo, in a Minute* written on the receipt of the Secretary of State's Despatch, observed—

See Appendix XXXV.

"The statement that the Madras Army is larger than is necessary for the wants of the presidency is not a matter of argument; it is a matter of fact which has been asserted not only by the Government of India, but by the leading members of the Government of the presidency. If large reductions in the Native army are imposed on us as necessary and desirable, we are bound to consider what branch of the service can be weakened with the least possible risk."

Government of India.

254. In a Despatch, dated 23rd June 1871, the possibility of a large reduction of the Madras Native army was again pressed upon the Secretary of State. It was stated—

"We believe that a very large reduction in the number of regiments which form the Madras army is inevitable. On this very ground our colleague, Mr. Ellis, dissented from the second plan above, in so far as it did not reduce the Madras army sufficiently. It will be impossible to continue for any lengthened period to tax the people of India for the support of a force which has been declared by the highest authorities in the presidency to be far beyond the wants of this province, and which, from its expense, and from the nature of the races from which it is recruited, is known to this Government to be unsuitable as a reserve for the main army of India.

"We say nothing on the question as to the formation of a reserve for our Native army; but if the propriety of such a reserve were to be used as an argument against our view, then we would urge our belief, that the materials for that reserve are not to be found among the races which form the elements of the army of the Southern presidency."

Summary of conclusions.

255. We have gone at some length into this subject to show—1st, that the excess strength of the Madras Army has thrown upon the country a burthen against which the Government of India has repeatedly protested in the strongest language, and that it is not a question now raised for the first time; 2ndly, that the state of things in the Madras Staff Corps is such that, whether our scheme for reduction is accepted or not, Government will be compelled to adopt measures for largely decreasing the number of field officers, and for reconstructing the Madras army in such a way, that the higher ranks of officers shall bear a proper proportion to the lower; and that thus our proposals will not materially affect that question; 3rdly, that it is impossible to employ more Madras troops than we have proposed, without great disadvantage to that army, and to the Government.

Madras soldiers within proper limits make good troops.

256. We entirely believe with Sir Neville Chamberlain that, if Madras soldiers are properly selected and commanded, they can be made into serviceable troops, but to bring this about, the demand on the civil population for recruits must be limited, so as to give some power of selection to recruiting officers; the area of duty must be limited so as to make the service less unpopular than it now is, and the men must be better equipped and dressed, and thus be more assimilated to the soldiers of the other Native armies. The present uniform is inconvenient to the men, and certainly it does not enable them to show to advantage. The officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, European and Native, must be younger and better regulated as to standing and rank, and the different battalions must not be left too long at isolated single regiment stations.

Present system of augmentations of the army generally.

257. At present there are no reserves whatever for the Native army in any part of India. When a regiment is augmented for field service, it has sometimes

* Dated 30th October 1870.

times been the custom that battalions, not ordered on service, should contribute volunteers to bring the field regiments up to war strength. In this way during the Abyssinian campaign, for the Malta expedition, and for the recent Afghan war, regiments ordered on service received drafts of disciplined efficient soldiers, but the regiments remaining behind were proportionately weakened, and were less efficient as a reserve for ultimate employment in the campaign. For the Malta expedition, a Bengal cavalry corps received a squadron from another regiment. Ordinarily, however, and notably in the year 1878, a Bengal regiment, when augmentation is ordered, at once sends out recruiting parties; but the recruits so collected are unable to take their place in the ranks for some months after enlistment. Cases are, however, on record in which a reserve has been improvised to meet the exigencies of the moment; for instance, in 1878, the "Guides" regiment called in a number of pensioners to the colours; and the pensioners assisted to hold the frontier post of Hoti Murdan.

Question of reserves.

258. The want of some system of reserves for India has often been felt, and the subject has been brought forward from time to time. The success of the German system has shown that the existence of army reserves gives an immense, and at the same time an economical, increase to the military power of a nation. Lord Napier of Magdala recommended* the formation of reserves for the Indian army when he was Commander in Chief. His Excellency Sir Frederick Haines concurred† in Lord Napier's opinion as to the necessity for forming a reserve. The Bombay Government also accepted the views of his Excellency Sir Charles Staveley, then Commander in Chief of Bombay, that the State ought to retain a lien on the services of pensioned soldiers. Nearly all the regimental officers of the Bengal and Punjab armies, especially those who were engaged in the Afghan campaign of 1878, are convinced that some system of reserve is needed, by means of which regiments ordered into the field can obtain at once a supply of disciplined soldiers to fill vacancies caused by casualties, and to take the places of invalids, or others, sent to the depôt. As has been stated above, the officers of the Madras and Bombay Army Corps hold that drafts from linked, or other, battalions can best supply this need. Officers of the two Northern Army Corps, on the other hand, say that some system of regimental reserves ought to be established, under which disciplined and effective reservists could be recalled to the colours at a week's notice. They report, moreover, that such a system of reserves, if combined with localized recruiting grounds and fixed regimental depôts, would be most popular with the best fighting races, of which the Northern armies are composed.

See Appendix XXXVI.

Political aspect of reserves question.

259. There can be little doubt that the maintenance of army reserves in India would greatly increase the offensive and defensive power of the Indian army. At the same time, it must be remembered that our Native army is a mercenary force, serving an alien Government. Even if it were desirable, it would not be possible to impose compulsory service in the army of reserve on any large section of the population. And it would be politically inadvisable to adopt for India the short-service system of Europe, whereby the largest possible number of men are passed through the army, returned into the general population, and are kept by periodical training in a state of military efficiency. There can be no advantage, and there might be much risk, in scattering hundreds of thousands of trained reservists over the several provinces of India. The services of such large numbers would never be needed, and the cost of their maintenance would be very great. Under the present system, however, a considerable number of trained soldiers already pass from our army annually into the general population. According to the returns for five years, 7,778 Native soldiers leave the army annually, of whom 4,612 retire on pension. Thus, in ten years' time, nearly 80,000 trained Native soldiers return to their homes. Any plan which retained a proportion of these 80,000 men in army reserves, and bound them to the British Government by sufficient money payments, would meet the requirements of our military system, without increasing

* *See* letter No. 2837, dated 16th November 1874, from General Lumsden, the then Adjutant General.
† Madras, Adjutant General's letter of 27th July 1876.

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creasing the number of trained soldiers annually absorbed in the general population.

Creation of two lines of reserve.

260. We attach great importance to the opinions of so many distinguished soldiers, and of so many experienced regimental officers, in favour of a reserve system. At the same time we recognise a distinct political danger in any indefinite increase of the number of trained soldiers passed annually into the population of India. We consider, however, that the provision of efficient reserves can well be combined with some revision of the pension rules. We propose that a strictly limited reserve of 200 men to every infantry regiment be eventually maintained. The reserve would consist of privates, inhabitants either of British territory, or of States within the frontier of British India, who, after 12* years' service with the colours with good character, might choose to pass into the reserve. They would receive a reserve pay of 4 rupees a month, payable half-yearly; they would belong to the first reserve till they reached 21 years' service; during their service in the first reserve they would be liable to embodiment for two months in every two years, and to service with the colours whenever summoned; they would receive, during the period of their embodiment, in addition to reserve pay, the full pay and good-conduct pay, which they might have been drawing when they joined the reserve. At 21 years' service they would pass to the pension list, or second reserve, where they would continue to receive a pension of 4 rupees a month, and would be liable for service on garrison duty only when summoned. After 32 years' service they should be liable for no further service, but would enjoy their pension of 4 rupees a month for the remainder of their lives. It would rarely be necessary to exercise or embody the second reserve; but they could, in time of necessity, usefully take garrison duty in cantonments or fortresses. The first reserve would be embodied at the regimental depôts; and their two months' exercise would include rifle practice. A British officer, with sufficient strength of Native officers and non-commissioned officers, and a medical subordinate, would be deputed to the depôt from the regiment once in two years, to exercise the reserves. The second reserve, when called out, would be armed from the nearest depôt or arsenal. As the first reserves of different regiments would be called up for embodiment in alternate years at the time of year least inconvenient for agricultural operations, arms, uniform, and accoutrements, for 200 men, would suffice for the reserves of two regiments; and therefore one-half only of the reserve equipments need be kept at the depôts, in custody of the Native regiment cantoned at the depôt head-quarters, the remainder being kept at the nearest arsenal. Reservists on embodiment for exercise would be sheltered in standing camps, wherever the depôt buildings and huts did not furnish sufficient accommodation.

Cavalry reserves not proposed.

261. We do not propose to constitute any first reserves of cavalry, because we consider that the country cannot afford to maintain a large reserve of horses. Native cavalry reservists who had no exercise with their horses would soon become inefficient. We think, however, that the change in the pension rules, and the liability to garrison service in the second reserve, should for the future apply to cavalry, as well as to infantry.

Sappers and Miners.

262. We recommend that the reserve system be applied to the Sappers and Miners, but we are of opinion that sapper reservists should, when called up, be formed into reserve companies, which would be able to take the place, in garrison, of those proceeded on active service. Every effort should be made to employ reserve sappers in suitable positions in arsenals and railway workshops.

Present pension rules.

263. The present pension rules give to sepoys (privates) of the Native army—

(*a.*) An invalid pension of 4 rupees a month, or about half-pay after 15 years' service;

(*b.*) A full pension of 7 rupees a month, after 32 years' service.

In

* Twelve years is named as the period before which a soldier should not be passed into the reserve. But the Commission feel that this term should be open to re-consideration at special times, and for special reasons.

In the Bengal and Punjab armies very few soldiers, less than 100 a year, serve on for the full pension. About 4,600 soldiers in the four armies retire on invalid pensions every year. It is reported by many officers that soldiers who fail to earn promotion to the non-commissioned ranks, habitually malinger and qualify for invalid pension when they reach 15 years' service; whereas it is generally considered that a Native soldier is fit for active duty until he is 40 to 45 years of age, that is, until he has completed 20 to 25 years' service. There are wide differences in the tenacity with which soldiers of the four armies cling to the service. For instance, in the Bengal and Punjab armies, at the present time, only 11 per cent. of the men are over 15 years' service; whereas in the Bombay army, 23 per cent., and in the Madras army, 37 per cent are over 15 years' service. So again, in the Bengal army, only 21 men per mille retire on full pension annually, whereas in the Bombay army, 41 per mille, and in the Madras army, 67 per mille, retire every year on pension. Large numbers of sepoys in the Bengal and Punjab armies take their discharge before they have served five years; some of these men, however, re-enlist.

Pension rules modified to suit reserve system.

264. The pension rules of the Native army would necessarily remain as they now are for soldiers already in the service. But for soldiers enlisted on the new system there would be no invalid pensions, except for wounds and sickness on field service, or for sickness contracted on foreign service. Every private would be entitled, subject to his serving in the second reserve until he attained 32 years' service, to retire on a pension of 5 rupees a month after 21 years' service, unless he had previously joined the reserve. The full pension of 7 rupees for privates of 32 years' service, with the colours, would be maintained. The present rates of officers' and non-commissioned officers' invalid pensions, would be maintained for men now in the service. But for future recruits no pension, either for officers or men, would be allowed, save for wounds and sickness contracted on field or foreign service, until after 21 years' service with the colours, when the present invalid pension would be claimable without a medical certificate of unfitness, but subject to service in the second reserve. The full pension after 32 years' service would stand as at present. Men who retired without earning pension, and without joining the reserve, would receive gratuities as at present. We do not recommend the abolition of the present invalid pension after 15 years' service without full consideration. *We find that his Excellency Lord Napier of Magdala recommended (in 1874) that invalid pensions should cease, that no pensions should be given to Native soldiers who had done less than 20 years' service, and that to a man who broke down in the service from ordinary causes, before reaching 20 years' service, gratuities up to a maximum of one year's pay should be given.* We are convinced by the testimony of many regimental and staff officers that the invalid pension is an abuse under the present system; and we consider that a pension after 21 years' duty with the colours, combined with a system of reserves and reserve pay, will be more satisfactory to the soldiery, and more beneficial to the country.

Officers and non-commissioned officers not to be passed into the first reserve.

265. We do not propose that any officers or non-commissioned officers should be passed into the first reserve, because we consider that officers for the reserve can best be supplied by temporary promotions from the fighting ranks. It is not desirable that the company leaders or non-commissioned officers of the reserves, should be men of very mature age, or whose knowledge, drill, and company tactics were obsolete. In a separte section of this report we have shown how a reserve of British officers for field service would be supplied.

Strength and cost of reserves.

266. In applying this system of reserves to the Native army, some regiments will be found, such, for instance, as the Goorkhas, in which the formation of a "first reserve" will be almost impossible. But, apart from any such special exceptions, we recommend that the reserve system be made applicable to all infantry regiments of the four army corps. We advise that the abolition of invalid pensions after 15 years' service, and the obligation on all pensioners for duty in the second reserve up to 32 years' service, should be carried out at once, so far as future enlistments are concerned. We recommend also that men now with the colours should be permitted to elect, if they so desire, for the new pension rules; that is, for the pension of 5 rupees, after 21 years' service, with liability to duty in the second reserve, instead of invalid pension of 4 rupees after 15 years' service. In order that a part of the reserve strength should be established

established as soon as possible, we recommend that commanding officers of regiments to which the reserve system is applied, be allowed to arrange at once for raising half their reserves (*i.e.*, 100 men per infantry regiment) by passing into the reserve men now in the ranks of 12 to 18 years' service, or by inviting men who have already retired to join the reserve. Hereafter, a fixed proportion of men would be passed, at their option, into the reserve annually. For every 100 reservists required for a regiment, 14 men, who had served on the average 13 years with the colours, would be passed into the reserve. This number would allow for a due proportion of casualties in the reserve. Under the system proposed by us the country would have, when the first and second reserves were in full operation,—

(1.) 200 men per infantry regiment in the first reserve.

(2.) Approximately 320 pensioners per infantry regiment in the second reserve,

If first reserves were formed for 96 infantry regiments*, and if the second reserve system were carried out throughout the army, then the total eventual strength of the reserves might be—

(1.) First reserve, 19,200 infantry.

(2.) Second reserve, 33,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.

The proposed system could cause no political danger.

267. It will be seen that our proposed reserves (58,200 in all) will form a part of the total number of soldiers (80,000) that under the present system are absorbed every 10 years into the general population. We consider, therefore, that this restricted reserve system can cause no political danger to the country. Moreover, the reserve system, or some extension of it, might hereafter, in time of profound peace, enable the Government to reduce the peace strength of the Native army. We anticipate that the cost of reserves, and of pensions as above proposed, will not increase appreciably the cost of pensions to the Native army under existing rules.

Employment of reservists on civil duties.

268. A reduction in the cost of the reserves will be gained, if any large proportion of the first and second class reserves are employed near their homes by the Civil Governments as policemen, as jail guards, on railways, and in other capacities, where disciplined men of good character would be of great use. The several Local Governments who have favoured us with replies on this point, say that they would be ready to employ reservists in civil departments of the Government, thus—

The Bombay Government	would employ	1,500	Total, 7,200.
The Bengal Government	,, ,,	1,300	
The Punjab Government	,, ,,	1,500	
The British Burma Government	,, ,,	900	
The Central Provinces Government	,, ,,	1,500	
The Berar Government	,, ,,	500	

The Madras and the North Western Provinces Governments have stated that they cannot employ reservists in civil departments. We recommend that one-half reserve pay, and full pension, when earned, in addition to full pay during embodiment, be granted to reservists who may obtain active employment and pay in any civil department. The army must keep and must pay for its hold on the reserve. Reserve men would revert to their full reserve pay directly they lost their civil employment. We believe that if commanding officers would keep the local, civil, and police officers, fully informed of the number of reservists available for civil duty in each district, a large number of reserve soldiers would always find employment in the civil department; for the reservists will generally be more regular in their conduct, and more amenable to discipline than men taken from the ordinary civil population. We strongly recommend that the Local Governments be urged to employ reservists as much as possible; for such employment will tend greatly to increase the popularity of service in the Native army†.

Armies of Native States to be kept separate from reserves.

269. It has occasionally been proposed that the armies of feudatory and allied Native States in British India should be utilised as reserves for the British

* This is the number of the regiments of increased strength which the Commission propose to retain exclusive of the Goorkhas and local corps.

† For papers regarding reserves and pension system, *see* Appendix XXXVII.

British forces in India. In another part of this report* we have discussed the strength and condition of the armies of Native princes. In the recent Afghan campaign, and during the siege of Delhi in 1857, contingents from the armies of the loyal chiefs of the Punjab joined our armies, and were of great use in maintaining communications, and relieving British regiments sent to the front. We believe that such contingents can be again employed in this way, with advantage to the British power, and with satisfaction to the loyal chiefs who are glad to join their forces with those of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress. We think that such contingents would, on occasion, do good work in the field against the enemy as they did in 1857. But we are strongly of opinion that these contingents should be kept as distinct local forces, commanded by their own officers, drilled in their own fashion, and armed with comparatively inferior weapons. The soldiery of Native princes should not be incorporated with our regiments, as reserves or otherwise; they should not be stationed in our cantonments, or brigaded with our troops, save in war time. So long as these forces are kept separate, they will, it may be hoped, remain loyal to their chief, and through him to the paramount power; and they will have little sympathy with other Native troops. If they were drilled and led by British officers, armed with improved weapons, and brigaded with British troops, they might soon become estranged from their chief; they would become a part of the great mercenary forces of India, which cannot safely be increased beyond certain limits; they would cease to be a counterpoise to our own Native soldiers, or to the troops of other States; and they might become a source of danger both to their own chiefs and to the British Government. The only two Native armies within India, which at present require watching at the hands of the British Government, are the forces of the Nizam of Hyderabad and the troops of Scindia. Both these armies are composed mainly of foreigners, drilled and managed after British fashion, and always embodied. We are of opinion that every reasonable and possible pressure should be brought to bear on these Native Governments to induce them to reduce their armies. It is not only that the States themselves are involved in heavy expenditure, in maintaining armies which they may not always be able to control, and which are always a standing menace to the Government of those States, but the Government of India is compelled to maintain large garrisons to act as a check upon these men, and a burthen is thrown upon the country at large by the whims and fancies of Native chiefs for maintaining large armies quite unnecessary for the administration of their States. The local militia of the Sikh and Rajputana States, on the other hand, consist entirely of Natives of those States, and they are a source of strength alike to their own chiefs and to the British Government.

Powers of regimental commanders.

270. We have considered whether the power of discharging unfit or ill-conditioned sepoys, of compelling retirement on pension, and of reducing or suspending non-commissioned officers, should be restored to commanding officers of regiments. The possession of these powers, by commanding officers selected for efficiency, was regarded† by the Punjab Committee of 1858 as most important to the well-being of Native regiments organized on the irregular system, though they proposed certain reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such powers in the case of soldiers over five years' service. These powers were withdrawn from commanding officers in 1869; almost all regimental officers who have adverted to the matter in their reports to the Commission advise that these powers should be restored. A majority of the Commission, however, consider that no sufficient cause has been shown for rescinding the orders of 1869; and they apprehend that restoration of large summary powers to commanding officers might cause a feeling of insecurity among the Native soldiers, who are for the most part loyal, orderly, and well-intentioned.

Regimental followers.

271. We have inquired into the practicability of reducing the cost, or improving the efficiency, of regimental followers. Regarding the improvement of the dooly and ambulance service, and the creation of an army hospital service corps, recommendations are made in another part of this report. We have already

* Chapter III.

† *See* page 191 of the Appendix to the Report on the Organization of the Indian Army in the Blue-book of 1859.

already proposed, at paragraph 232, that the number of lascars or kalassis (tent-pitchers) should be reduced from eight to four per regiment, the savings from their pay being utilised to give extra pay to the company pioneers. For the rest, we do not propose any reduction among regimental followers. We recommend, however, that the regimental bazaar establishment, which at some stations or on some campaigns is partially or wholly useless, should not be always maintained. The commanding officer should be allowed to draw the sum at present sanctioned for the bazaar establishment, and to spend it for improving and organizing the supply of grain to the regiment. When he thought proper, the commanding officer would maintain the existing bazaar establishment. The expenditure of the bazaar establishment allowance would be duly shown in the regimental books, but need not be audited by the military account department.

Compensation for dearness of provisions.

272. We have considered the question of revising the existing rules, under which Native soldiers draw compensation-money, when the cost of their daily ration exceeds a certain moderate scale. Native soldiers ration themselves, and the payment of compensation-money is the only way of equalising, or nearly equalising, the earnings of soldiers of the same army, who serve, for instance, at Peshawar with wheat at 12 lbs. per rupee, and at Umballa with wheat at 40 lbs. per rupee, throughout the year. The scale on which the Madras soldier receives compensation is based on the price of rice, and is different from that laid down for Bengal and Bombay troops. The compensation to Madras soldiers serving in Northern India, where rice is not the staple food of the country, becomes extremely costly. Indeed, compensation to the Madras regiment at Saugor, or in the Punjab, sometimes doubles the sepoy's pay all round. Such liberal allowances are liable to cause discontent among troops of other army corps with which Madras troops may happen to be serving. We are very unwilling to recommend a change in the grain compensation system, a matter concerning which Native soldiers have, in past times, felt very strongly. We advise, however, that the scale of compensation-money to Madras troops serving with other army corps be revised; and that a Madras corps ordered on foreign service be allowed the alternative of the new scale of compensation, or of being rationed by Government, in the same way that Madras troops serving in Burma are already rationed.

Uniform and equipment of Native troops.

273. We draw special attention to the many useful and practical recommendations received from regimental officers regarding the uniform and equipment of Native soldiers. It would appear that the "Guides" and other frontier corps have, by experience gained during nearly 30 years of more or less constant warfare, brought their uniform and equipment to a pitch of practical efficiency, that has been recognised by officers of all arms of the service during the recent campaign. We notice that, in other army corps, there is much room for improvement in the uniform and equipment of Native regiments. We consider that cloth clothes for Native soldiers are a mistake; that the coats and trousers of most Native regiments are too tight; that helmets, shakos, and Scotch caps, do not suit Native soldiers; that white uniforms are too expensive for Native sepoys; that *khaki* (dust-coloured) drill is the best working material for Native soldiers' uniforms; that the Zouave jacket is too short in the skirt; and that the white or yellow facings, down the front of the jacket, make the soldier an easier mark for an enemy's fire. If these views be accepted, we recommend that the uniform of each army corps should be revised by a committee of regimental officers, who should be instructed to propose a standard uniform for infantry and cavalry, the materials being serge or other woollen stuff, such as *puttoo*, and *khaki* drill, the colour being red for one serge or woollen coat only, the rest being *khaki*, save for the Goorkha and Assam corps, which would retain their dark green uniforms, and for the Punjab frontier corps, which might retain their *khaki* uniform. Any change that might be sanctioned should be introduced gradually, so as to cause the least possible expense to the sepoys. Some of the regimental officers report that a good type of boot is one of the greatest needs of the Native infantry and cavalry soldier of the present day. Heretofore the Native army have always supplied their own shoes. During the recent campaign some regiments, notably the Goorkhas, eagerly bought English ammunition boots when they could.

Committee of regimental officers to report on uniform for Native troops.

We

We do not recommend that Government undertake the business of providing boots and shoes for Native soldiers. If, however, the business of shoeing the Native army for expeditions into cold, stony countries, like Cabul or Europe, be deemed necessary, care must be taken that boots for Natives are not made on European lasts, which rarely fit the shape of Native feet.

274. Among miscellaneous suggestions made by regimental officers which deserve special consideration we would mention,—

(*a.*) The need for grass preserves (*rukhs*) near every artillery or cavalry station. At present grass provided for cavalry horses is, for the most part, stolen, or taken without leave, by grass-cutters from the neighbouring lands. The supply of grass is becoming, year by year, a more frequent source of difficulty and dispute. In a country like India, where forage for cattle is not separately grown, and where no lands are habitually put down in grass, the plough and milch cattle have to pick up grazing wherever they can. And the landholders do not readily acquiesce in their grass being cut or plucked up by the roots for the food of cavalry chargers. Government carts belonging to the transport corps would be available in time of peace to bring in forage from grass preserves in the neighbourhood of cantonments. We consider that this question of providing forage preserves for mounted corps deserves the very early attention of the Government. Provision of forage reserves.

(*b.*) The desirability of reducing guard and escort duty, as far as possible, has always been recognised by his Excellency the Commander in Chief and the general officers of the army. Nevertheless, many regimental officers report that the guard or escort duty exacted from the men is so excessive as to impair regimental efficiency, and to prevent them from putting their corps through entrenching drill or from undertaking extended manœuvres. We have reason to believe that there are few stations in which it would not be possible to reduce guards or sentries, established in days gone by, when a different state of things existed to that with which we now have to deal, or which have been posted from an excess of caution on the part of commanding officers. It should, we think, be a standing instruction to all general and commanding officers to reduce guards and escorts wherever possible, to substitute locks or fastenings for sentries wherever advisable, and to bring together, as far as circumstances permit, all regimental, cantonment, or field institutions that must be guarded. No guard should be given for any civil purpose, or to any civil officer below the rank of Chief Commissioner, without the special sanction of the lieutenant-general commanding the army corps. Reduction of guard duties.

CHAPTER VIII.

Officering of the Native Army and Army Departments.

Section 1.

275. On the amalgamation of the Military and Naval Forces of the East India Company with the Military and Naval Forces of Her Majesty in 1861, an entire change was made in the system of officering the army in India. Under the system in force previous to the amalgamation, it had been the practice to detach from regiments many of the officers whose names were borne on regimental cadres, and to place them on what was called staff employ. Staff employ was held to include everything, from employment on the army staff, and in departments, to employment in the subordinate offices of the civil administration. The duties performed by many of the officers were of the most ordinary civil nature, and it often happened that an officer was taken away from his regiment to spend the whole of his service in duties not even indirectly connected with a military career. Such officers not only became strangers to their regiments, with which their only connection was a continuance of their subscription Change made in 1861 in officering the army.

scription to regimental funds, but they became perfectly separated from all military life, and ceased to be efficient even for the purposes of a reserve. This arrangement had long been the subject of great complaint, and on the amalgamation of the armies it was determined to get rid of the system; and it was accordingly resolved to establish in each presidency a staff corps, to which all officers of the army, except those who elected to remain on the cadres of their old regiments, should be transferred. To quote the report of a Parliamentary Committee on the staff corps system:

"All officers of the Royal, as well as of the Indian, armies who were at the date of the amalgamation on staff employment in India, and who were under the substantive rank of colonel, were declared to be eligible for admission to the staff corps; and officers of either service under the rank of field officer, who were not on the staff at the date of the amalgamation, were declared eligible to become candidates thereafter for similar admission. The selection of officers for the staff corps was to rest with the Governments of the several presidencies, subject to the approbation of the Secretary of State for India in Council.

"The promotion in the staff corps was to be thus regulated:—Ensigns, when transferred to that corps, were to become lieutenants; other officers were, except in the case which we will mention, to have the rank they had in the regiment from which they were transferred. Officers in the staff corps after 12 years' service, of which four must have been in the staff corps, were to become captains; after 20 years' service, of which six must have been in the staff corps, were to become majors; and after 26 years' service, of which eight must have been in the staff corps, were to become lieutenant-colonels. It was further provided that officers in staff employment at the date of the General Order should be allowed to count their past service on the staff as if it had been performed in the staff corps. One step of rank was to be given to every officer joining the staff corps whose period of service would qualify him for it; and a period of two years at least was to elapse between each succeeding step. Thus a captain of 24 years' standing who had served six years in a staff appointment would join the staff corps as a major, and at the end of two years would become a lieutenant-colonel. The names of officers transferred to the staff corps, as well as of those who had joined the new line regiments, were to be retained on the cadre of the regiment to which they had belonged, and to which they were to be considered as still belonging, for the purpose only of regulating the promotion of the officers who remained."

Privileges conceded in 1866.

276. But further privileges were subsequently, in 1866, conceded to the officers of the staff corps and the Indian army, which had the effect of entirely changing the condition of the corps as originally designed, have inflicted upon the country an enormous annual expenditure, and could never have been contemplated at the time. Previous to that year, a certain number of lieutenant-colonels succeeded, on vacancies occurring, to what were called off-reckonings or colonel's allowances. These carried with them, practically, an extra pension of 668 *l.* 12 *s.* 5 *d.* per annum. Succession depended on vacancies arising from casualties, and no officer could calculate, as a matter of certainty, on receiving them at any given date, or indeed on receiving them at all, and therefore the inducement to officers to hold on to the service, after they had ceased to be efficient, in the hope of attaining to this extra pension, was not very great. Unfortunately, under the impression that the position of lieutenant-colonels had been injuriously affected by the amalgamation of 1861, the Secretary of State published a Despatch in 1866, which contained a provision that—

"all officers now in the several staff corps, and all who may join them under the terms of this Despatch, will be entitled to the colonel's allowances after 12 years' service in the grade of substantive lieutenant-colonel, without reference to any fixed establishment of colonels with colonel's allowance."

These concessions contributed to fill upper ranks with officers in excess of requirements.

277. Thus every officer could, in future, rely upon obtaining the colonel's allowance, if he could live, and cling on to the service, till he had served 38 years. The result naturally was to fill the upper ranks of the service with old officers far in excess of requirements, many of whom had become incapable of rendering any valuable service to the State. No officer will now willingly retire, and surrender his chance of succeeding to the colonel's allowance, and the result is that the army is weighed down by an excess of field officers, and the finances are not only materially affected by the necessity of paying officers of the higher ranks for whom there is no suitable employ, but an enormously increased liability is incurred, by the right of all officers to succeed to the higher pension in the course of time. Simultaneously, another change was made which has had the effect of completely breaking down the staff corps. It had, up to 1866, been limited to officers of the Royal and Indian armies under the rank of colonel, who

who were at the time of the amalgamation actually on staff employ in India, and no officer above the rank of captain could thereafter enter the corps.* But under the orders of 1866 the privilege of entering the staff corps was thrown open to every officer in the Indian army, without any regard to standing or qualification, and the result was that in one year the number of officers in the staff corps rose suddenly from 1,485 to 2,197, while the number of field officers increased from 585 to 921. Though this enormous increase occurred in the number of field officers in the staff corps, the change was made with so little calculation of its practical working, that it was accompanied by a reduction of only 50 in the ranks of cavalry and infantry field officers. In fact, this one order added 286 field officers to the Indian army, and offered special inducements, which had the effect of ensuring a constant further increase of field officers.

Trial of staff corps system for 18 years.

278. The staff corps system has now had a trial of 18 years, and its merits and defects have been brought to light by the test of actual experience. There seems to be an almost unanimous feeling that it has not worked well, while there can be no doubt that it has been the cause of very serious financial embarrassment. The few defenders of the system plead that its failure has been due, not to the want of a clear conception of its probable working on the part of its authors, but to the entire change of its organization hastily introduced by the ill-considered orders of 1866, which completely altered the whole principle of the scheme. Any way there seems to be no doubt that the staff corps, as it now stands, and with which we have to deal, is an institution which has exercised a very unbeneficial influence on the army. An attempt has been made to apply a partial remedy to the existing state of things, by offering to officers, from time to time, special inducements to retire on receipt of the present calculated value of their claim to colonel's allowances. The measure has, however, given only partial relief.

Staff corps system unsound.

279. We believe that the whole system of the staff corps is radically unsound. At the present moment there are, in the three staff corps, 1,961 officers, while there are in all the armies in India only 245 army staff appointments which can be held by officers below the rank of colonel. At the time when the staff corps was constituted the inequality was very much more marked. It appears to us that, instead of placing all the officers of the different armies in a staff corps, and officering regiments from the staff, the proper course would have been to attach all the officers of the army to the various regiments, and to take away the officers required for the real army staff from the regiments, letting them remain on the cadres while so employed, and returning to them on the expiry of their tour on the staff. In this way Government would have secured for itself a practical application of the well-recognised principle, that staff appointments should be tenable only for a limited number of years, in order to keep the staff always *en rapport* with the army, and thus, while the general staff would be a permanent institution, the members of it would be placed in a position to gain regimental experience; regimental officers in the same way would, as far as possible, be placed in a position to acquire a staff training which should make them more efficient on service, both with their regiments and in higher commands. All officers not really employed on military duty, should have been placed at the same time on a separate list.

Equality of promotion might have been attained by a general list.

See Appendix XXXIX

280. Equality of promotion might have been secured by grading all the officers of each army in a general list, by which the army rank of all, whether employed regimentally, or on the staff, would have been regulated, their staff and regimental pay being regulated by the regimental and departmental promotion. His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, in his evidence in the Appendix to the Report of the Committee of 1859 on Indian Army Organization, foreseeing the evils of the staff corps system, strongly urged the establishment of a general list for the promotion of officers. We are of opinion that if his Royal Highness's views had then been accepted, the difficulties which now have to be dealt with would never have arisen. The Parliamentary Committee, however, did not feel that they were in a position to decide then on the relative merits of the two schemes.

Working of staff corps system demoralising and extravagant.

281. It is alleged against the staff corps system, and we fear with truth, that its practical working has had a demoralising effect upon the army, while it

it has been ruinous to the State. On its first introduction it scattered throughout the country a number of officers with no fixed duties, whom the Government would not employ, either because they were inefficient, or because there was no suitable employment for them; and though there has been a gradual diminution of them, there is still a large number of such officers in the country. Their presence cannot have an elevating or beneficial effect upon the public service, while it involves a considerable expenditure of public money, for which there is little or no return. Then, again, the staff corps contains in its ranks a very large number of officers who are employed in civil duties of various kinds, entirely unconnected with the military profession, who combine all the advantages of military rank and military pension with the higher pay of the civil administration. Before the staff corps was formed, officers in civil employ were liable to be called upon, in the case of war or other exigency, to return to military duty, and they formed a reserve, though a very inefficient reserve, of officers for the army. This system was no doubt a bad one, for it often involved the return of officers to military duty in the higher ranks of the service who were entirely disqualified by want of experience and practice for military command. But the evils of the old system were light when compared with those of the present system, under which a young officer of two years' service leaves his military life, and spends his whole career in civil employment as a magistrate, a judge, or as an officer of the Educational or Forest Departments, rising under the staff corps rules at certain fixed periods of service to be captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, eventually to retire with the rank of major general on his colonel's allowances, which represent a pension very much in excess of that given to any civil servant. At the same time, it must be remembered, he has really throughout his service received a higher salary than the civil servant for performing the same duties. For the civil servant's salary is liable to a deduction of 4 per cent. for his annuity, while the military officer in civil employ, if he chooses to remain on as long as he can, receives a higher maximum pension, with no deduction from his salary as a contribution towards it.

Employment of military men in civil service not now necessary.

282. The employment of military men in civil service has already fallen into disuse, very few appointments having been made of late years, and though we recognise the fact that it has given to the civil administration very many admirable administrators, we cannot help seeing that it is a system inconsistent with the recruiting of the civil service by open competition; that it is, in point of fact, an agency quite as expensive as the covenanted civil service; that it involves duties and a line of life entirely unconnected with a military career; and that it gives the highest military rank to men of absolutely no military knowledge or experience. We can understand that for exceptional positions and exceptional duties, such as the administration of newly-acquired countries under semi-military occupation, or for special political offices, the employment of military officers in civil duties may occasionally be necessary and convenient, but for such a purpose a staff corps is not necessary. Military men can always be vested at the will of Government with any civil duties, and in the same way it is open to Government to select any military man of special qualifications for high political duties. All that is necessary in either case is to second such officer in his regiment.

Employment of military men in civil service should cease.

283. We are of opinion that the present system of employing military men in ordinary civil administration should cease, and that, when a military man chooses permanently to give up a military for a civil career, his connection with the army should terminate. We would, however, recognise the fact that, for political appointments, a certain number of officers may very properly be withdrawn from military duty; for such appointments we propose that officers should be seconded in their regiments for two years, and if remaining in the Political Department after that period, should be borne only on the general list for army promotion.

Staff corps system of promotion by length of service causes unnecessary number of senior officers.

284. Promotions being now made under the staff corps rules on length of service in a particular grade, and not on the occurrence of vacancies, the upper ranks of the service are filled with officers for whom there is no room in such rank. And the country is, in consequence, compelled to pay for the services of field officers, who perform duties which would be better performed by officers of the

the junior ranks of the army. A reference to the tables contained in Appendix XL. will show the actual working of the staff corps system even now, when it is supposed to have outgrown many of the evils which not unnaturally sprung up on the first introduction of the experiment. In the Bengal staff corps there are, excluding 74 general officers and lieutenant-colonels in receipt of colonel's allowances, 996 officers. Of these, 610 are employed in officering Native regiments, and are not, therefore, performing any staff duties; 34 are employed in the army staff, and 59 in the departmental staff of the army; 37 are doing general duty, or are otherwise employed in purely nominal duties, because they are either in excess of army requirements or are inefficient; 14 are unemployed altogether; while no less than 242 are employed in duties entirely unconnected with any military duty; and of these latter as many as 167 are field officers drawing high salaries in excess of the civil standard, doing nothing whatever for the army, disqualified by long absence from military duty from acting as an efficient reserve, and yet realising by length of service all the privileges and advantages of military rank and promotion, and qualifying eventually for the highest pension given to any class of public servants in India. State of Bengal staff corps.

285. The Madras staff corps consists of 526 officers, of whom 302 are doing regimental, and not staff duty. No less than than 148 are doing work absolutely unconnected with the army; and of these, 130 are field officers, whose pension will shortly become a charge on the military grant, though probably many of them have performed only a few months' military duty in the course of a long service. Out of the whole of the 526 officers of the Madras staff corps, only 56 were employed on the military staff. State of Madras staff corps.

286. Again, in Bombay out of 439 officers in the staff corps only 52 are on the staff of the army; 275 are regimental officers, and 104 are engaged on duties altogether unconnected with the army. State of Bombay staff corps.

287. In short, out of the three staff corps, comprising altogether 1,961 officers, only 201 are employed on the military or army departmental staff. The rest are employed either on regimental duties, or on duties absolutely foreign to military service, and for which they have no special training or qualifications, or else they are unemployed or nominally employed. It is, we think, quite clear from the above facts that the staff corps has not answered the expectations of its authors, and that its name, at all events, is misleading. State of the three staff corps.

288. There are, we find, many who recognise the defects of the staff corps, but consider that any attempt to alter the system would lead to confusion, and an unsettling of the minds of officers, which is not warranted by the circumstances of the case. We admit that there might be force in this plea if the evil were less than it is, and we also see that there are many difficulties in the way of an entire change of system; but the question is one of vast importance, and the evils of the system will, if left alone, perpetuate themselves so seriously to the injury of the army and the country at large, that we have felt it our duty to consider the question entirely on its own merits, and with exclusive reference to what is best for the public interests. It has been said, with some truth, that hitherto the subject of army reform in India has been dealt with on the principle that "India was made for the army, and not the army for India," and we feel that the mistakes of the staff corps have arisen from perhaps an unconscious concession to this principle. We think, however, that the system may be amended, while at the same time all real, tangible, and reasonable expectation which any officer may have formed on joining the staff corps, may be duly regarded. It appears to us impossible that the country can go on paying for officers it does not want, and we consider that when there is shown to be a surplus of officers, especially of the higher ranks, they should be induced to retire from the service with an equitable recognition of their claims. Objection to altering system discussed.

289. Two modes of overcoming the defects of the present system have been suggested. The first is, that three or four battalions of Native infantry should be united into a regiment, and that the promotion of officers should take effect by seniority in the regiment. There would be no difficulty in initiating such a system in the Madras and Bombay armies, where there are no class companies Suggested modes of overcoming defects of present system.

Proposal to unite three or four battalions into one regiment.

or class battalions; and we also think that with care, patience, and tact, it would be possible to classify the regiments of Bengal and the Punjab in such a way as to avoid any great practical inconvenience from such an arrangement. But, on a full consideration of the subject, we have come to the conclusion that the difficulties arising from the constitution of the regiments, and the various classes and tribes of which the different regiments are formed, are so great, that we should not be justified in recommending the system, so long as the object can be gained in any other way.

Proposal to form a general list for each army corps.

290. The other system which has been proposed is that the officers of each army corps, who may in future join the Indian army, should be formed into a general list; that the number of each rank should be strictly limited; and that promotion in army rank should only take place as vacancies occur in the rank above. And this is the system which we desire to recommend for adoption.

Method of giving practical effect to second plan.

291. The way in which we would give practical effect to this scheme is as follows: We have elsewhere recommended that, for the future, the complement of officers for a cadre of Native infantry should be 9 officers, and for the cadre of a cavalry regiment, 11 officers. We propose that the army ranks for the officers of infantry should be 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 3 captains, 4 lieutenants; and for cavalry, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 4 captains, 5 lieutenants. To find the number of regimental officers required for each army corps, the establishment has to be multiplied by the number of Native battalions attached to each army corps. Then, to these must be added the officers whom we consider sufficient for the army staff of the territorial army corps, the officers for the army departments, commissariat, pay, &c., and a margin, representing the possible number of officers from each army corps employed on the head-quarters staff, with a due allowance for casualties and exigencies of the service. Worked out upon the scale which we have adopted for the staff and army departments, the result will show, approximately, the following to be the strength of officers required for each army corps, and the relative proportion for each rank:—

See Appendix XLI.

RANK.	For Regimental Duty.				For Army Staff.				For Army Departments.			
	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.
Lieutenant-colonels - -	31	38	38	40	5	5	5	5	8	6	6	6
Majors - - - -	32	43	43	37	6	6	5	6	8	7	7	7
Captains - - - -	102	128	101	91	5	6	5	5	15	13	13	13
Lieutenants - - -	127	158	143	128	5	2	4	3	15	13	13	13

Strength of the four general lists.

292. The general lists of each army corps would, under our scheme, therefore stand as follows:—

	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Total.
Generals - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—
Colonels with allowances - -	—	—	—	—	—
Lieutenant-colonels - - -	44	49	49	51	193
Majors - - - - -	46	56	55	50	207
Captains - - - - -	122	147	118	109	496
Lieutenants - - - -	147	173	160	144	624
Total - - -	359	425	382	354	1,520

293. All

293. All officers joining the army for the future, whatever their employment may be, should be borne, and obtain their promotion in army rank on, the list of the army corps to which they belong. Regimental officers, though borne on the general list and promoted in army rank by the vacancies in that list, should obtain their regimental promotion by their position in the regimental list; for instance, a squadron officer would rise from captain to major by the general army list, but would obtain his promotion from squadron officer to squadron commander by regimental vacancies. With a fixed establishment of captains for the future, we do not consider that it is necessary at once to promote lieutenants to fill up the complement of that rank. Lieutenants now in the staff corps should not be promoted to be captain till they have served for 12 years. Mode of promotion.

294. Officers of the commissariat and pay departments, should be borne on the strength of their regiments for a period of two years, and if they are, on the expiry of their period of probation, permanently appointed to the department, they should be struck off the regimental cadre, and in future take their army rank by their position on the general list. Officers of departments.

295. As regards the future, this system would, no doubt, work easily and effectively if combined with a proper system of enforced retirement and a proper scale of pensions, such as we have recommended elsewhere; but in the meantime the existence of the present staff corps forms a serious disturbing element. All officers who have, up to the present time, entered the staff corps, especially those who entered previous to 1866, have certain privileges which it is impossible to disturb, and their case must be dealt with exceptionally. The course which we would recommend in respect to such officers, is that all those in civil employ should be placed on a separate non-effective list, quite distinct from the army list; they must continue to receive their promotion under the rules of the staff corps system until they disappear by the lapse of time. For the future, as we have said above, all officers electing a purely civil career should give up all connection with the army. It had occurred to us that officers in civil employ might at once be given the option of returning to military duty, or of remaining in civil employ on condition of surrendering all claim to military rank, pension, and privileges, and accepting in lieu of all other claims a pension calculated on the civil pension, exclusive of the civil annuity. But, on the whole, we are disposed to think that it might lead to much confusion and inconvenience, if many of these officers were to elect for military service after such a long absence from military duty, and therefore we have come to the conclusion that the alternative we have proposed above is the lesser evil, though it, no doubt, has the disadvantage of leaving open to such officers the inducement of remaining on in the hope of attaining to colonel's allowances. We have not classed political appointments under purely civil employ. We quite see the advantage of having a certain number of military men employed in the political service. We would, as we have already stated, second them in their regiments, keeping them on the regimental establishment for two years, and, on the expiry of that period, would place them on the general list, letting them get their promotion in army rank by that list. Difficulties to be overcome, officers now in the service.

296. All officers now detailed for the army departments, such as the commissariat and pay departments, should be placed on the general list, those already in the staff corps obtaining their promotion as at present by length of service. All officers hereafter joining the army, and being placed on the army departmental staff, should take their army rank by promotion on the general list, and their departmental rank by the departmental list. Officers of departments.

297. All officers of the general staff, and all regimental officers, should be placed on the cadre of regiments to which they should henceforth belong. Officers now on the staff, and those hereafter placed on the staff, would then have a fixed position to which they could return on the expiry of their tour of staff employment. In respect to such officers now in the staff corps, it will be necessary to preserve to them their right to promotion by length of service, and this will no doubt result, for some years to come, in an excess of officers in certain grades. All existing excess, and all officers heaeafter promoted under the staff corps rules in excess, will have to be entered in the general list in italics, as supernumeraries of their rank. Staff and regimental officers to be placed on cadres of regiments.

Not more than two officers to be drawn from each regiment for the staff.

298. To prevent an excessive number of seconded officers being borne on the cadre of any one regiment, it should be a rule that not more than two officers should be withdrawn for the staff from any one regiment.

Absorption of staff corps officers a work of time.

299. The absorption of officers of the staff corps will be the work of many years, but by a proper system of retirements, and a strict limitation of admissions to the army, to the number actually required for the sanctioned establishment, and to fill vacancies in that establishment, there is every reason to hope that in the course of time the ranks will become evenly distributed, and that the flow of promotion will go on undisturbed. If it is found that in consequence of the existing excess in the higher ranks of the army promotion is at present retarded, it will be necesary to sanction a certain number of extra promotions until the supernumeraries are gradually absorbed.

Opinion of some that the existing staff corps rules will eventually ensure a proper proportion of ranks.

300. It has, however, on the other hand, been represented to us that, beyond some limited measures to relieve the present surplus of officers in the higher ranks, no further action is necessary, and that in the course of years the proportion of ranks which we desire to recommend will be attained by the operation of present and proposed rules. Under the orders of 1866 the number of colonels' allowances will be limited to one in thirty officers, so that officers will no longer have the inducement to remain on in the service which they now have, and we have elsewhere proposed that, with some exceptions, officers be required after 31 years' service to vacate any appointments which they may have held for five years. We have also fully concurred in the proposals already made by the Government of India for an increase to the pension allowed after 32 years. It has been urged that, if these proposals are carried out, the ordinary rules which regulate promotion in the staff corps will ensure a proportion of ranks very similar to that in the scheme which we have suggested. That, or nearly that, proportion will, it is alleged, be the normal distribution of the staff corps, as deduced from the rules for promotion, the average mortality, and ordinary retirements. We have not at our disposal the time, statistics, or actuarial skill, necessary to determine whether this view is sound or not, but we would urge that the question be submitted, without delay, for the opinion of professional actuaries. Should their report be favourable, it would no doubt be satisfactory to find that the distribution of ranks, which is in our opinion essential, both for the efficiency of the army and for the finances of the country, can be attained without the many difficulties which must necessarily attend any proposals for radical changes in army organization. But we are quite satisfied that no system should be maintained which throws upon the State the faintest liability at any time to have an excess of officers in the higher ranks, and a deficiency in the lower ranks: it is difficult to overestimate the enormous loss which the country has already suffered in the increase of non-effective charges from neglect of this principle in carrying out the organization of the staff corps, and therefore, unless an actuarial investigation establishes beyond all doubt the certain and positive results indicated above, we are of opinion that the experiment of the staff corps should be tried no longer.

The question to be investigated by actuaries.

Disposal of officers unfit for commands or staff.

301. We are strongly of opinion that all officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel, who are declared by the Commander in Chief to be unfit for the command of a regiment, or who have no staff employment, should be compulsorily retired, and we think that for the future, whenever an officer is shown, on the report of the Commander in Chief, to be unfit for military employment suited to his rank, he should be at once placed on the retired list, or on half pay.

Disposal of inefficient officers of army departments, and power of Government to place excess officers on half-pay.

302. In the same way, any officer on the departmental staff of the army who is declared to be inefficient should, on the report of the Commander in Chief of the army, be compulsorily retired. When at any time the number of officers, on the regimental or departmental establishment, is in excess of requirements, the Government of India should have the power of placing officers on half pay until they can be absorbed.

Present system of obtaining officers not successful.

303. We are compelled to come to the conclusion that the existing system of obtaining officers for the Indian army is not successful. There are at the present time great deficiencies in the lower of the sanctioned establishment, especially

especially in the Madras and Bombay armies. Service with native troops is not attractive to young officers who have once joined a British regiment with the intention of remaining with it throughout their career, and probably the only officers who join the staff corps from British regiments are young men who enter the service and join regiments in India, with the original intention of entering the staff corps so soon as they become qualified. While we do not wish to debar young officers of the British army serving in this country from joining the Indian service, under existing rules, we think that a more certain, and in every way more satisfactory, way of recruiting officers for the Indian army, would be by ascertaining, on careful calculation, the number of young officers required every year, and sending out to India, by direct commission from Sandhurst, the number necessary to supply the requirements of the year. The officers might be selected by competition, supplemented by a larger number of Queen's and Indian cadets.

Officers to be appointed direct from Sandhurst.

304. We believe that a youug officer will acquire much more useful military training if, instead of being at first attached to a British regiment in this country, he is attached for a year, or even two years, to a British regiment serving at one of the large military camps in the United Kingdom. On arriving in India he should be attached to a native regiment, where he will pick up a knowledge of the language, and of the customs, of the people much more quickly than with a British regiment, and there will not be the same fear of his aquiring tastes and habits calculated to make service with a native regiment distasteful to him. If, however, a young officer, who has not done duty with cavalry at home be appointed, on arrival in India, to the native cavalry, we consider that he should be attached for a time to a British cavalry regiment in this country.

And to be trained at a military camp.

Section 2.—Pensions and Retirements.

305. The question of a revised scale of pensions has been so fully discussed in a recent despatch from the Government of India, that we need make but few remarks on this head. Such observations and recommendations as we propose to offer may be divided into two parts—the first relating to the present, and the second to the future.

Revision of pensions recently discussed by Government.

306. We have, in the first part of this chapter, explained fully our views on the unsatisfactory manner in which the establishment of the staff corps, with the subsequent changes made in the year 1866, has effected the efficiency of the army and thrown an excessive burden on the finances of India. Of those changes, the one as we have already said which has operated most disastrously for efficiency and economy has undoubtedly been that which gave as a matter of right to all officers then in the Indian army or staff corps, colonel's allowances after they had held the rank of lieutenant-colonel for twelve years. Under this order a direct inducement was held out to officers not to retire, when they knew that by merely living on for a certain period they would come into the enjoyment of what was practically a retiring pension of 1,124 *l.* a year. The result has been a constant increase in the higher ranks of the army, causing not only a heavy charge on the finances, for the pay of senior officers performing duties which might and ought properly to be in the hands of younger and less highly paid men, but also a large and for many years continued increase in the non-effective charges. The number in the higher ranks would have been larger still but for the special retiring schemes which have been thrown open annually since 1874, and which have cost a considerable sum of money, though no doubt less than would have been payable had no such special retirements taken place.

The grant in 1866 of colonel's allowances to all officers, the cause of excessive expenditure.

307. Unsatisfactory and expensive as the present condition of affairs is, we cannot see that the future gives any hope of amendment except after very many years. Indeed, for some years to come, the inconvenience and expense of the present organisation will continue to increase. All that can be done is to palliate, as far as possible, the evils of the existing system, which are twofold—the tendency to create more field officers than are required for the army, and to maintain an inordinate number of officers in the receipt of colonel's allowances. The only way of effecting improvement is by devising some means of inducing

Palliation of evil possible only.

inducing officers to leave the service at an earlier date than that at which they now retire, impelled as they are to hold on by the certainty of colonel's allowances after a fixed period.

Rule regarding non-retention of appointments after 31 years' service.

308. We have, in Chapter V., recommended the adoption of a rule that an officer on the completion of 31 years' service shall not retain any appointment which he may have held for five years, unless specially appointed thereto for a further term. When this rule was first proposed by the Government of India, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, for application only to regimental appointments, it was suggested; with a view to mitigating any hardship which might fall on officers who had served in the army for lengthened periods, that three courses might be thrown open to them:—

"I. That they may reside where they please in India on the pay of their rank, namely, 827 rupees a month. until they succeed to colonel's allowance or become general officers, whichever may first occur.

"II. That they may reside in England on the pay of their rank (1 *l.* a day) until they succeed to colonel's allowance or become general officers.

"III. That they may retire on the pension to which they are entitled, availing themselves of the benefit of the existing scheme for commuting colonel's allowance, which should be kept specially open to these officers.

"This latter privilege would only apply to officers who succeed to colonel's allowance after a fixed period, that is, to those who were in the staff corps or Indian army before 1866; and it will be some years before any others can have served long enough to come under the operation of the system of retirement which we here advocate. As officers who entered after 1866 should, in course of time, relinquish regimental appointments under the same principle, we propose, when any system of pension for officers of Her Majesty's British army is adopted in connection with the compulsory retirement recently introduced in that army, to again address your Lordship, because the system of pension adopted at home may affect our recommendations. But we think it will be necessary to give the highest rate of pension at an earlier period than at present, and thus do away altogether with the inducement on the part of these officers to serve on for the 38 years, which is now required to enable them to claim the most advantageous retirement, as well as to lessen the desire to remain on for colonel's allowance, succession to which will in these cases be after an uncertain period, but probably much later than at present."

The proposed new rate of pension after 32 years' service may induce officers to retire.

309. We are, however, of opinion that if the new rate of pension after 32 years' service, which has already been recommended to Her Majesty's Government, be sanctioned, it will in all probability suffice to induce many officers to retire rather than to remain on in India or in England, unemployed and on comparatively small pay. We are inclined to believe that the proposed compulsory removal from staff employ, coupled with a liberal pension, will relieve very materially, if not altogether effectually, the stagnation in the higher ranks and the increasing burden of the colonel's allowances.

Inability to suggest further proposals for retirement, except for—

310. As under existing rules officers are guaranteed from compulsory retirement, except for inefficiency or misconduct, and as no retiring scheme which did not closely approximate to the value of their expectations, and which would therefore be of little or no financial benefit to Government, would tempt them to retire, we are unable to suggest any further proposals in this direction, except as regards those officers who may become supernumerary, consequent on the proposed reduction of regiments and staff appointments. For these officers we consider that some special relief should be afforded beyond what is provided by the above proposals, or by existing regulations.

Officers who may become supernumerary by reason of changes proposed by Commission.

Conditions to be offered.

311. To all who may thus be deprived of their appointments, and for whom there may be no prospect of early and suitable employment, we would suggest that the following conditions be offered:—

I.—To officers of 28 years' service and upwards, the pension rate next above that to which they may be entitled by length of service, including service at Addiscombe, no deduction being made for furlough taken in excess of the periods counting for pension, with the additional annuity or bonus allowed under G. G. O., No. 1 of 1879.

II.—To officers of between 20 and 28 years' service, pensions as above, with the additional annuity or bonus under the above order, calculated for their age and service, such as was recently sanctioned for officers of the Public Works Department.

Both

Both classes should receive, in addition, a bonus of six months' staff pay of their appointment, and also be allowed to capitalize, if they wish it, a portion only of the extra annuity. Those who are unwilling to retire on these conditions must necessarily be permitted to continue in the service, and should be provided with such suitable employment as can be found for them according to their rank and capacity.

Support of proposals for revised scale of pensions, made by Government of India.

312. As regards the future, we entirely concur with, and desire fully to support, with one exception to be noted hereafter, the proposals already made by the Government of India. We are strongly of opinion that the pension of officers should be fixed for the future on a scale, the object of which should be to secure their services during the prime of their life, and not to offer them inducements to prolong their service in the hope of an increased pension after they have ceased to be efficient. At the same time, the rates of pension must not be fixed so as to hold out any special inducements to officers to retire before the State has had the full benefit of their services.

Principles explained by Secretary of State.

313. The principles on which any scheme of pensions should be based are so fully explained in a despatch by the Secretary of State for India, No. 73 of 1869, that we cannot do better than extract them here in support of our views:—

"37. I cannot concur with your Government in the necessity or expediency of thus holding out special inducements to officers of the staff corps to retire before the Government have had the full benefit of their services. It appears scarcely consistent with sound policy to create a body of officers, and to hold out inducements to them to enter and qualify for a special service, and then to frame subsidiary regulations, with the avowed object of inducing them to retire at a time when their services are most valuable.

"38. There appears to be in the minds of many an entire misapprehension of the object with which a scale of pensions is laid down for any department of the public service; and this or that rate of pension is not unfrequently alluded to as insufficient to meet the requirements of an officer and the support of his family.

"39. The fact is that pensions are intended, not as inducements to officers to retire while still capable of work, but as a recognition of former services, in the event of their retiring to suit their own convenience, or from failure of health before they have reached a disqualifying age.

"40. To tempt men to retire at ages between 40 and 50, by the offer of enhanced pensions, framed with a view of rendering them independent of further employment, would be extremely impolitic. Men are then usually in the vigour of life, and have reaped something of that experience which is of special value in India,—knowledge of the languages, right understanding of native character, softened prejudices; all the fruits of matured intellect and experience have then been attained. To encourage early retirement is not only to sacrifice wantonly the interests of the service by depriving it of the best men, but tends also to bring up a class of officers whose thoughts are bent from the first upon early retirement—an object incompatible with an earnest and contented public spirit. The pension is intended generally for the worn-out servant, not offered for the purpose of inducing an efficient public servant to retire."

But system of colonel's allowances should be re-cast.

314. The scale lately proposed by the Government of India appears to fulfil all the conditions required by these principles, and has our cordial support, with the exception that we hold that, with the adoption of the above principles, the system of colonel's allowances, which really amounts to giving a very high and special pension not for merit or distinguished service, but solely as a consequence of having lived a certain number of years, should be entirely re-cast.

The amount to be 1,000 *l.* per annum for future entrants to the service.

315. It has, already been suggested by the Government of India that, in notifying to the army any revised scale of pension, the opportunity should be taken to reduce prospectively, for those who may enter the service hereafter, the colonel's pay and allowance to a consolidated sum of 1,000 *l.*, as fixed for the cavalry and infantry of Her Majesty's British forces out of India.

The colonel's allowance should be a pension given by selection for meritorious and distinguished service.

316. We propose, however, that for the future the colonel's allowance should be considered strictly in the light of a pension; that it should be given by selection for meritorious and distinguished service, and not by mere seniority; and that officers should not be considered eligible to receive it till after they have retired. The establishment of colonels, with allowances, is practically a non-effective list, and in our opinion should become wholly so. There will in the future be a fixed number of these allowances, and to this establishment officers should succeed after retirement, their claims to succession being determined

mined on the principle now adopted in Her Majesty's British regiments. This extra or distinguished service pension should be open to officers above the rank of major, and be calculated at a fixed rate of 300 *l.* a year, to be drawn in addition to any pension which an officer may be otherwise entitled to draw.

Pension of 700 *l.* a year after 32 years' service not unduly liberal.

317. In the other proposals of the Government of India we desire to express our unqualified concurrence. The rate of pension proposed after thirty-two years' service, 700 *l.* a year, is liberal, but not in our opinion unduly so, when compared with the scale fixed for officers of Her Majesty's British troops, due allowance being made for the fact that the service of officers of the Indian army is wholly foreign service and in a tropical climate.

Future entrants retiring before 32 years' service to be liable to re-call to duty.

318. We consider that, for future entrants, officers retiring before thirty-two years' service should be liable to re-call on serious emergency, as provided by the Royal Warrant of 1877, and thus be available as a reserve of officers for the army.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE IN INDIA.

Present inefficiency and extravagance.

319. THE extravagance of the present double system of medical administration in India, under which two distinct bodies, the British Medical and the Indian Medical Services, are working together in the same field, is very generally admitted, and has for some time past been under the consideration of the Government of India and the Secretary of State; and it is, therefore, quite unnecessary to dwell at any length on its numerous and very grave defects. The problem to be solved is to provide at a reasonable expense medical aid sufficient for the army of India, and also for the civil wants of the different provinces. As will appear hereafter, these two great branches of the service, the military and the civil, must be considered together. It is only in this way that an army medical service can be provided which shall be at once efficient, economical, and elastic; that is to say, which shall provide sufficient medical and surgical aid for the army in time of peace, and at the same time provide a reserve of capable officers who may be called on, when emergency arises, to afford that additional medical and surgical aid which is absolutely indispensable in the field.

Division of the subject.

320. The subject may be conveniently considered under the following heads:—

I.—Administration.

II.—Executive.

III.—Hospital Establishments.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

V.—The formation of one Medical Corps for India to take the place of the two Medical Services.

I.—ADMINISTRATION.

Proposals of despatch of November 1877 taken as the basis of further recommendations.

321. After many years of discussion, and after many projects had been considered, the Government of India in November 1877,* submitted definite proposals in respect to the re-organisation and reduction of the administrative branch of the two services. These proposals are summarised in the following tabular statement. No definite orders have yet been received directing that they shall be carried into force, but we understand that they have practically been

* Military Despatch, No. 295, dated 5th November 1877.

been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and they may therefore be taken as a convenient basis for further examination of the subject :—

SCALE of Administrative Medical Officers existing at present, as compared with Scale recommended in Military Despatch, No. 295, dated 5th November 1877.

Presidency.	Department.	Military. Present Scale. Surgeons-General.	Military. Present Scale. Deputy Surgeons-General.	Military. Present Scale. Superintending Surgeons-Major.	Military. Proposed in Despatch. Surgeons-General.	Military. Proposed in Despatch. Deputy Surgeons-General.	Military. Proposed in Despatch. Superintending Surgeons-Major.	Military. Reduction. Surgeons-General.	Military. Reduction. Deputy Surgeons-General.	Military. Reduction. Superintending Surgeons-Major.	Civil. To be Created.* Surgeons-General.	Civil. To be Created.* Deputy Surgeons-General.	Civil. To be Created.* Superintending Surgeons-Major.	Net Reduction. Surgeons-General.	Net Reduction. Deputy Surgeons-General.	Net Reduction. Superintending Surgeons-Major.
Bengal	British	1	6	2	1	6	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	2
	Indian	1	11	–	–	5†	–	1	6	–	1	4	–	–	2	–
Madras	British	1	3	1	1	2	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	1	1
	Indian	1	6	–	–	4‡	–	1	2		1	–	–	–	2	–
Bombay	British	1	3	–	1	2	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
	Indian	1	4	–	–	2§	–	1	2	–	1	–	–	–	2	–
		6	33	3	3	21	–	3	12	3	3	4	–	–	8	3
	Totals	42			24			18			7			11		

* Two Civil Deputy Surgeons-General with the local rank of Surgeon-General, one for Bengal Proper, and one for the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, have already been appointed in anticipation of the sanction of the Secretary of State.

† Of these Indian Deputy Surgeons-General in Bengal, the one with the Eastern Frontier Field Force was to do civil medical duties, and also to be Sanitary Commissioner of Assam. His military work would consist of the supervision of only 4,364 Native soldiers. The one with the Punjab Frontier Field Force was also to do the civil work.

‡ The British Burma Deputy Surgeon-General was to do civil medical duties, and also be Sanitary Commissioner.

§ The Deputy Surgeon-General of the Sind District was also to do civil work.

In addition, the Sanitary Commissionership with the Government of India was to be held by a Surgeon-General, and the Sanitary Commissionerships in provinces by Deputy Surgeons-General. No change was to be made in the Sanitary Commissionership of Berar, and it was not, therefore, entered in the comparative statements.

This statement does not take into account the Secretaries to the Surgeons-General, or the independent sanitary appointments, to which reference will be made in a subsequent paragraph.

Administration in peace must be the same as that required in the field.

322. The principles on which the despatch is based appear to us to be very sound. A military medical administration, which is unsuited to field service, ought not any longer to be kept up in time of peace. The double system now in force is expensive, inefficient, and breaks down the moment a force is ordered on service. Experience has shown that, in time of war, there must be one adviser to the military authorities at Army Head-Quarters, and one adviser and administrator for each body of men concerned. In India this body of men will generally be more or less mixed, some Europeans and some Natives. In every important operation it must always be a mixed force. Therefore, in ordinary times, it is essential that administrative medical officers should be learning those double duties connected with European and Native soldiers which they will inevitably be called on to perform as soon as they go into the field. The despatch in making this recommendation merely extends to the medical circles of superintendence the same system which has always existed in the military commands. An officer has a certain force to attend to, and so far as this force is concerned, he must attend to everything that is required, both for Europeans and Natives. It has been objected that officers of the Indian service, having now no means of learning the wants of British troops, can never efficiently fill the position of Deputy Surgeon-General, or Surgeon-General, with a force of which British troops form part. It might be argued with equal force that British medical officers can never be fit to superintend the medical control of a force of which Native soldiers form part. But, as a matter of fact, one medical officer, either of the British or Indian Medical Department, must be the administrative medical officer of the mixed force when

when it takes the field; and it is quite unnecessary to prove that, if this officer has opportunities of learning the double work in days of peace, he will be able to perform it much more satisfactorily when the emergency of war necessitates its performance. The single medical administration for military purposes, which has been adopted in the despatch of the Government of India, will no doubt commend itself to all who study the subject. Instead of the present costly and cumbrous dual system which entirely separates the medical administration of European and Native troops, there must, we are satisfied, be one head, one Surgeon-General over all. His subordinate administrators must, until an amalgamated medical department for India is adopted, be partly British and partly Indian, and each must have the medical management of both European and Native troops in his own circle.

Officers required for military medical administration.

323. The Despatch of the Government of India provided for the wants of the army according to presidencies. There were to be three Military Surgeons-General, one for Bengal, one for Madras, and one for Bombay, and 21 Deputy Surgeons-General. Altogether there were to be 24 administrative medical officers for military work in place of the existing staff of 42, thus giving a reduction of 18. The Surgeon-General of Bengal was to have two secretaries, one British and the other Indian, and the Surgeons-General of Madras and Bombay were each to have a secretary from the Indian service. The proposals which we have made for substituting four nearly equal army corps for the three presidency armies, and for the concentration as far as possible of troops at convenient centres, will, combined with a modified system of garrison or station hospitals, lead to such a simplification of work and such diminution of small hospitals, of medical officers, and of returns and other clerical work, that we have no hesitation in proposing a reduction of the medical staff considerably in excess of that already proposed in the Despatch in question. For each army corps three administrative medical officers of the rank of Deputy Surgeon-General would suffice. The senior of the three would be the chief adviser to the General Commanding the army corps, and would be stationed at the head-quarters of the Lieutenant-General Commanding. He would communicate with the Surgeon-General presiding over the whole military Medical Department of India. The other two Deputy Surgeons-General belonging to the army corps would be under his orders.

Position of the military surgeon-general.

324. There would be one military Surgeon-General who would ordinarily be an officer of the British medical service. He would be attached to the War Department and would be the authority from whom all orders to the four senior Deputy Surgeons-General at the head-quarters of each army corps would issue. He should have two secretaries, one of the British, and the other of the Indian service. Considering the importance of the duties he will have to perform in advising the Surgeon-General on all matters affecting the Indian army, the Secretary of the Indian service should be an officer of experience, and of over 20 years' service.

Necessity for keeping up prizes in the medical services.

325. If the question could be narrowed within these limits, it would be very simple; but it is made very complex by the claims and expectations of officers now in the service. Were the prizes in the medical services, and especially in the Indian medical service, to be reduced to the extent which the above sketch of the requirements of military medical administration involves, there can be no doubt there would be great discontent in the medical service. Officers who were near their promotion would think, rightly or wrongly, that the Government had not kept faith with them. This belief would extend to the schools, and very probably the Government of India might find itself in the embarrassing position which has been occupied for years by the Home Government, in great want of medical officers, raising its terms, and yet finding that candidates will not come forward. Such a state of things ought to be avoided, not only because it will cause inefficiency, but also because it will, in the end, lead to increased expense. In order to secure good men, a public service must offer a certain number of prizes, and, therefore, such a reduction as is involved in the scheme we have sketched above, would be impolitic unless some compensation be given to the service in other directions.

326. The

326. The reduction of two Deputy Surgeons General in each presidency, which is recommended in the Despatch of the Government of India, is a very heavy loss to the Indian medical department. In Madras it takes away one-third, and in Bombay one-half, of these appointments, while promotion is even now deferred to such an extent that most of those who may now hope to rise to be Deputy Surgeon General will have to retire under the 55-year superannuation rule before they can hope to reach that rank. The British medical department is in much the same state

Present slow rate of promotion to administrative grade.

327. It must be borne in mind that medical officers value promotion to the grade of Deputy Surgeon General, not only on account of the increased pay and higher position, but also for the extra pension of 250 *l.* per annum, which service in this grade brings with it. To deprive the medical services of a large proportion of appointments which carry with them both increased pay and increased pension would naturally inflict a very serious loss on the service, which would tend to make it less popular. At the same time, we are quite satisfied that it cannot reasonably be expected that administrative appointments which are not really essential for the efficient control of the department should be kept up, and, therefore, some scheme must be devised by which, while the useless excess of highly paid appointments is abolished, a sufficient number of prizes to render the service attractive to the class of men who are required for service in India should be provided. The creation of a new grade of medical officers between the Surgeon Major and the Deputy Surgeon General, to be called Brigade-Surgeon, has been recommended by the special committee appointed a few months ago by the Secretary of State for War to inquire into the causes which tend to prevent a sufficient number of eligible candidates from coming forward for the Army Medical Department; and this seems to be the best solution of the difficulty. We recommend that 24 such appointments should be made for India: 12 of the first class, with a staff salary of 450 rupees, and 12 of the second class, with a staff salary of 250 rupees, and that Brigade Surgeons of the Indian service, after five years' service in that grade, should be allowed an extra pension of 150 *l.* if in the first class, and 100 *l.* if in the second. Such an arrangement would do much to prevent discontent, by providing some higher office than that of an executive medical officer to many who are now looking forward to promotion to the rank of Deputy Surgeon General. The aggregate value of the prizes proposed in the Despatch of the Government of India will not be diminished by the change we propose, but somewhat increased. That Despatch, as already shown, recommended 24 administrative appointments for the military branch of the service; we recommend only 13; but the 11 so reduced will be more than made good to the service, both in pay and pension, by the new appointment of 24 Brigade Surgeons.

Appointment of brigade surgeons proposed.

328. The principle of giving extra pensions for service in the higher ranks of the service is a sound principle, if promotions are made on careful selection, because it offers additional attractions to good men to enter the service. It is a principle which has long been followed in the British and Indian Medical Services. If, however, promotions are made according to seniority alone, and not according to qualifications, these extra pensions cannot fulfil the purpose for which they were intended. In order to make the extra pensions a real, and not a mere nominal boon, the present order, which requires that an Indian medical officer shall serve for five consecutive years in the administrative rank, with only six months' leave during that period, ought in our opinion to be altered. This rule presses most unfairly on officers, especially on those who are not strong, or who have not been able to take much leave in their earlier years of service. The State can gain nothing from the present system, except that the extra pension may be saved altogether in an officer's vain and injudicious efforts to earn it. So long as an officer is entitled to furlough counting as service, such furlough ought to count as part of his five years' tenure of office, and carry with it no such punishment as fine of 250 *l.* per annum.

Rules regulating extra pensions for administrative service require modification.

329. The military medical administration we desire to propose would, it will thus be seen, consist of one Surgeon General with the War Department having two secretaries, one British and the other Indian, 12 Deputy Surgeons General,

Military administrative staff recommended.

of whom four would be on higher pay than the others, and 24 Brigade Surgeons, who, though in executive charge of hospitals, would also have considerable administrative duties to perform in superintending the whole of the hospitals and medical arrangements of large stations. The proportion of the military administrative appointments to be held by British and Indian officers must depend, in some measure, on the proportion of executive officers of each service required for India; and this point will, therefore, be taken up in a subsequent paragraph.

Proposed distribution of the staff.

330. It remains for us to show how the military administrative medical staff would be distributed. The following statement will, we think, make our proposals clear:—

One Surgeon General in the War Department, assisted by two secretaries, one of the British, and the other of the Indian, medical service.

I.—*Bengal Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General on 2,250 rupees, adviser to the General Commanding the Bengal Army Corps, issuing orders to, and receiving reports, &c. from, the two other Deputy Surgeons General of this corps, and himself directly superintending the medical arrangements in the Lucknow and Bareilly districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General on 1,800 rupees, superintending the medical arrangements of the Calcutta and Eastern Frontier districts, and under the orders of the Deputy Surgeon General with the General Commanding the Bengal Army Corps.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, superintending the Meerut, Gwalior, and Nowgong districts, and under the orders of the Deputy Surgeon General with the General Commanding the Bengal Army Corps.

Six Brigade Surgeons, one in each military district (except the Eastern Frontier), each of whom, in addition to ordinary work as an executive medical officer, would also assist in the work of administration in any manner in which his Deputy Surgeon General might direct, either by remaining in charge of his office while the Deputy Surgeon General was on tour, or by carrying out inspections at remote stations which it may not be convenient for the Deputy Surgeon General himself to visit at the time. In the cold season, when the work of executive medical officers is at a minimum, there would generally be no difficulty in detaching a Brigade Surgeon temporarily for this duty.

II.—*Punjab Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with the General Commanding at Rawal Pindi, directly superintending the Rawal Pindi and Peshawar districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Umballa and Lahore districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Kuram and Mooltan districts.

Six Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.

III.—*Madras Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with General Commanding at Bangalore, and directly superintending Bangalore and Madras districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for Hyderabad and Belgaum districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for British Burma and Port Blair.

Five Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.

IV.—*Bombay Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with General Commanding at Poona, and directly superintending the Poona and Bombay districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Mhow, Nagpore, and Nusseerabad districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Sind and Aden districts.

Seven Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.

As a rule, no Deputy Surgeon General would have more than eight or nine stations under his charge.

Distinct civil medical administration.

331. We are decidedly of opinion that the civil medical administration should be, as far as possible, completely distinct from the military medical administration. It is, no doubt, beyond the scope of our inquiry to discuss the civil branch of the medical administration, but it is so intimately connected with the question of military medical administration, both branches being fed from the same source, that we feel that we shall be excused for suggesting how the two can, in our opinion, be most efficiently organized with the view of carrying out the practical separation of the two departments so far as administration is considered. The Government of India have already recommended that an administrative medical officer should be appointed as adviser in medical matters to each Local Government, and that such supervision is required is, we believe, a question admittedly beyond dispute. The Local Governments, with large medical establishments and expensive hospitals, have hitherto practically been without any adviser, or any qualified administrator, able to check expenditure and correct abuses; and a radical reform in this matter is urgently called for. Already, in anticipation of the sanction of the Secretary of State, a local Surgeon General has been appointed to Bengal, and another to the North Western Provinces. The only exception suggested by the Government of India to this principle of the entire separation of the military and civil medical administration was made in the case of remote parts of the country,—Assam, the Punjab frontier, British Burma, and Sind—where the military work is light, and where, therefore, it was proposed that the military Deputy Surgeon General should, in addition, perform the civil duties. In British Burma and Assam it was proposed that he should also be Sanitary Commissioner of the province. With the much reduced staff for military medical administration, we would recommend some modification in these arrangements. It is, no doubt, very desirable that the military should be kept as distinct as possible from the civil medical administration. But the Chief Commissioner of British Burma ought, we think, to be provided with a civil administrative medical officer entirely under his own orders, and not subject in any way to the control of the military authorities. The Sanitary Commissioner and Inspector General of Gaols might, we believe, undertake this duty in addition to the other work he has now to perform; his duties at present take him to every station at which there is a civil surgeon or hospital, and the addition of the superindendence and inspection of the department would not therefore add very materially to his labours. In the same way, a Sanitary Commissioner is required for Assam, and he might also superintend the civil medical department. The only part of the country where, for the present, military and civil medical administration may with advantage be combined, seems to be the Sind district of the Bombay Army Corps. Here, owing to his isolated position, the Deputy Surgeon General will have comparatively little military work, and may give valuable assistance to the civil department in the ordinary course of his tours without interfering with his military duties. It seems desirable that the civil Deputy Surgeon General in the Punjab, as head of an important department, should have the local rank of Surgeon General, as in Bengal and the North Western Provinces.

Amalgamation of civil Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India recommended.

332. We at first had some doubts, from the perusal of such papers as have come before us, whether there would be sufficient work for a Surgeon General as head of the administration of the civil medical department with the Government of India, if he had no other duties to perform. We think, however, that this difficulty might be met by uniting the offices of civil Surgeon General with the Government of India and Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of

of India. We are aware that, when the subject was on a former occasion discussed, it was objected that it would always be necessary in practice to appoint a senior officer to be Surgeon General, and that this officer might not be fitted to be Sanitary Commissioner. There is, no doubt, a certain amount of force in this argument; but we have no doubt that, as a matter of fact, an officer could always be found capable of being both civil Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India. He should be assisted, however, by a secretary. It is very desirable that this arrangement should, at all events, be tried as an experimental measure.

Local Sanitary Commissioners not to be Deputy Surgeons General.

333. We are not concerned with the civil and sanitary administrative appointments, except in so far as they affect the proportion of administrative appointments available for the several medical services. In this point of view, and for other reasons which need not be detailed, the proposal made in the Despatch of the Government of India, that the Sanitary Commissionerships should be filled by Deputy Surgeons General, does not commend itself to us. The Sanitary Commissioners should be much younger men, but to any who prove really efficient, inducements should be held out to remain in these appointments. We would, therefore, recommend that, instead of a fixed salary of 1,200 rupees and 1,500 rupees, the pay should be graded, rising, say, from 1,000 rupees to 1,400 rupees, and from 1,200 rupees to 1,750 rupees. This has been recommended for Bengal, and it will involve no extra cost.

Staff proposed for both Military and Civil Administration.

334. The administrative medical staff, which we here propose for both military and civil work, will therefore stand as follows:—

	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
MILITARY.			
1 Surgeon General with Army Head Quarters, at 2,700 rupees	32,400		
1 Secretary to ditto, British Service at 1,400 „	16,800		
1 Ditto ditto, Indian ditto at 1,400 „	16,800		
4 Deputy Surgeons General with Army Corps, at 2,250 „	1,08,000		
8 Ditto ditto ditto, at 1,800 „	1,72,800		
12 Brigade Surgeons' Staff pay, at 450 rupees	64,800		
12 Ditto ditto, at 250 „	36,000		
		4,47,600	
Deduct half-pay of 1 Deputy Surgeon General, who is to do civil as well as military work in Sind.		10,800	
			4,36,800
CIVIL.			
WITH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:			
1 Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner, at 2,700 rupees	32,400		
1 Secretary to ditto at 1,400 „	16,800		
1 Statistical Officer to ditto at 1,500 „	18,000		
* BENGAL PRESIDENCY:			
1 Deputy Surgeon General, Bengal, at 2,250 rupees	27,000		
1 Ditto North West Provinces, at 2,250 rupees	27,000		
1 Ditto Punjab, at 1,800 rupees	21,600		
1 Ditto Central Provinces, at 1,800 rupees	21,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, Bengal, at 1,500 rupees (1,200 rupees rising to 1,750 rupees).	18,000		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, Assam, at 1,200 rupees (1,000 rupees rising to 1,400 rupees).	14,400		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, North West Provinces, at 1,500 rupees	18,000		
1 Ditto Punjab, at 1,500 rupees	18,000		
1 Superintendent, Vaccination, North-West Provinces, at 950 rupees	11,400		
1 Ditto Punjab at 950 „	11,400		
1 Deputy Native Assistant Surgeon, Oudh at 300 „	3,600		
MADRAS:			
1 Surgeon General, Madras, at 2,500 rupees	30,000		
1 Secretary to ditto at 800 „	9,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, at 2,000 „	24,000		
1 Superintendent, Vaccination, at 950 „	11,400		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, British Burma, at 1,200 rupees (1,000 rupees rising to 1,400 rupees).	14,400		
BOMBAY:			
1 Surgeon General, Bombay, at 2,500 rupees	30,000		
1 Secretary to ditto at 800 „	9,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner at 2,000 „	24,000		
		4,12,200	
Add half-pay of 1 Deputy Surgeon General deducted from Military above.		10,800	
			4,23,000
GRAND TOTAL Rs.			8,59,800

335. According

335. According to this statement, the cost of military medical supervision will be 4,36,800 rupees for all India: the present military charges on this account are 10,49,400 rupees. The saving, therefore, is 6,12,600 rupees. The cost of civil medical supervision will be 4,23,000 rupees: the present cost is 2,40,600 rupees, so that on this item there will be an increase of 1,82,400 rupees; but it must be remembered that the nominal supervision of civil hospitals has really hitherto been a charge on the military accounts. It will be fair, therefore, to compare the total present cost under both heads with that proposed:— Cost of proposals.

	Rs.
Present Military Charges - - - - -	10,49,400
Present Civil Charges - - - - - -	2,40,600
Present Total - - -	12,90,000
Proposed Total - - -	8,59,800
Saving - - - Rs.	4,30,200

336. The Deputy Surgeons General, it will be seen, are divided under the scheme we recommend into two classes, which gives some continuity of promotion. The four of the first class should, as proposed, receive 2,250 rupees, and the remaining eight should receive 1,800 rupees, the pay which officers of this rank receive now. As the Brigade Surgeons are intended to be primarily superior executive officers, their pay proper will be debited in the executive part of the scheme. Their staff salary alone is entered here. The pay of all the secretaries and of the vaccination appointments is entered at the rate adopted by the Government of India in the Despatch to the Secretary of State, so that comparison of the two schemes may be more readily made. Deputy Surgeons General to be of two grades.

337. We are of opinion that a great diminution and simplification of returns may be effected, both in respect of those required from regimental officers and also of those which are required by the military authorities. Much time and labour might be saved both to medical officers who have to forward these returns, and to administrative and other authorities, who have to deal with them afterwards. Simplification of statistical returns required.

It does not seem necessary to provide special medical supervision for the irregular regiments under political administration, as shown in the margin. The Hyderabad Contingent may be administered medically by the Deputy Surgeon General at Secunderabad, as proposed in the Despatch. The regiments in Rajputana may be similarly administered by the Inspector General of Dispensaries under the orders of the Agent Governor General. The regiments of Central India may be arranged for hereafter, as found most convenient. Supervision of regiments under Political Administrations.

Hyderabad Contingent.
4 Batteries Artillery.
4 Regiments Cavalry.
6 Regiments Infantry.

Central India.
2 Regiments Central India Horse.
Malwa Bheel Corps.
Bhopal Battalion.

Rajputana.
Deolee Irregular Force.
Erinpoorah Irregular Force.
Meywar Bheel Corps.
Mhairwarra Battalion.

II.—Executive.

338. Before considering what number of medical officers is required for executive work, it is essential to determine what relation medical officers in civil employ should occupy with regard to the service generally. The Government of India in dealing with the subject has laid down the principle that, "although the administration is to be divided into two distinct parts, civil and military, the officers would all remain, as now, military officers; those in civil employ being only lent to the civil department, and liable to be called on for military duty in the event of their services being required;" * that in this matter there should be no change in existing arrangements; that medical officers in both civil and military employ should continue, as now, to form one service; and that they should rise, as now, through civil or military employment, or both, to the grade of Deputy Surgeon General, either military or civil, as the exigencies of the service at the time may require. Relation of medical officers in civil employ.

339. After

* Paragraph 39 of Despatch No. 295, dated 5th November 1877.

Great advantages of the present system to the Military Department.

339. After a careful consideration of all that is to be said on both sides of this question, we have come to the conclusion that the advantages of the present system greatly outweigh any disadvantage that may arise from it. Without the medical officers in civil employ the medical service has no reserve on which to fall back in time of war. The medical officers in civil employ are the men best qualified to undertake the duties of field service, because they are always operating, and always watching surgical cases. They are learning every day to do, and to do well, that which they would be required to do for the wounded. A system which deprives the State of their services at a time when they may be specially useful must be a mistaken system. Moreover, if the civil medical charges were to be made over to special local medical services, the great prizes of the Indian Military Medical Department would, to a large extent, disappear. The civil appointments are the main attractions which induce medical men to come to India. If they are taken away, few, if any, good men will care to enter the military branch, and the quality of the military medical officers who seek admittance will surely and rapidly degenerate.

And also to the Civil Department.

340. On the civil side also the disadvantages would be equally great. The Local Governments now, practically, have the pick of the services. Without a military commission, civil employment would lose much of its attractions. Medical officers value their commission, and their rank, which is purely military; if these are taken away, they occupy a lower status; the service will deteriorate, and in time will be composed of doctors locally recruited, such as are now employed in some of the smaller civil stations, and there are many obvious reasons why this class of medical officers should not be increased. The Local Governments also would lose the benefit of the military discipline to which the officers in civil employ have for a time been subjected; this discipline is wholesome, and it is very much to be regretted that of late years it has not in all cases been insisted on. In future, every medical officer should be obliged to serve at least two years with the army, and half of that time with British troops, before he is appointed to civil work.

Any disadvantages of present system comparatively slight.

341. It has been urged that officers employed on civil duties will not be capable, later on in their service, of performing the duties of the higher administrative offices of the Medical Department; but the special duties which devolve on a military medical officer, or even on a military Deputy Surgeon General, are not so intricate that they cannot be easily learned by any man of ordinary common sense in a short time; and the fact that a medical officer comes to them from active employment as a civil surgeon, untrammelled by the monotonous routine in which military medical officers are brought up, and accustomed to employ his mind on varied matters, seems to promise that he will really exercise a more watchful and intelligent supervision than if he had never to use his judgment, except on such matters as come within the daily work of a military hospital. Some of the best military Deputy Surgeons General of the Indian service have, we understand, been men who served nearly all their time in civil employ, both because they were originally better men, and were therefore selected for posts of responsibility and trust, and also because they had led a busy professional life, and had been accustomed to think and act on their own responsibility. No doubt it, is inconvenient for a Local Government to be called on to send away a number of its civil surgeons for military work; but the inconvenience very rarely occurs to any serious extent. During the last 28 years it has occurred twice; once in the mutiny, and once in the recent Afghan campaign. The disadvantage is common to all wars, and is not peculiar to India. The inconvenience to Local Governments would not only be rare, but the demands would never be so great as to nesessitate the withdrawal of civil medical officers, except from small stations; and, during their temporary absence, their places might be well filled by selected Native assistant surgeons.

Comparative advantages of station and regimental hospitals.

342. Having decided that the military medical officers temporily lent to the civil authorities shall form the proper reserve to be drawn on in the event of war, the next point to be determined is what number of medical officers is required with the army in time of peace. But, before any answer can be given to this question, it is necessary to come to some definite conclusion as to the principle which should govern the distribution of medical officers. The main point for consideration is whether the present regimental system should be continued,

continued, or a system of station hospitals be adopted in its stead, or some other system devised which shall be more or less a modification of both. We have carefully considered the many opinions which we have received on the comparative merits of regimental and station hospitals. Speaking generally, it may be said, as regards British troops, that the medical authorities are in favour of station hospitals, and that commanding officers, and other military authorities, are strongly in favour of regimental hospitals. In the case of Native troops, the weight of opinion, both of the medical and military authorities, is decidedly in favour of adhering to the regimental hospital system.

Objections to adoption of station hospitals.

343. It is not necessary that we should enter into any lengthened discussion of the comparative merits of the two systems claimed by the supporters of each. In a practical point of view it will suffice to notice the main disadvantages under which both seem to labour. As regards station hospitals, there are, it is said, few cantonments in which buildings suitable for such a purpose, either in construction or position, are available. Calcutta and Dinapore may be cited as exceptions. In both these places, and in a few others that might be named, the sick of different corps are already treated under the same roof, but, as a rule, the regimental hospitals are far apart. To build new hospitals in convenient situations would involve very large expenditure and must be the work of time. The large areas covered by most cantonments, and the distances between the lines occupied by different corps, are another serious obstacle to the adoption of station hospitals. The sick could not in many stations walk from their barracks to a central hospital without fatigue and exposure, at most times of the year, to heat or rain, which would be very hurtful to them; to provide carriage sufficient to take them all to hospital would be a large undertaking. The station hospital system, although the reason for this is not apparent, seems to entail continual changes in medical officers, and these perpetual moves, especially during the hot weather, are a source of great discomfort to them, depriving them to a great extent of a home, and of all sense of security that they will be allowed to remain in any one place for more than a few months at a time. Not only are the medical officers thus prevented from having that personal acquaintance with their men which is so important, but commanding officers are also prevented from knowing their medical officers, and from acquiring that confidence in their advice by which they should be so largely guided in this country in all their regimental arrangements. Under the present system, which is in force in the British Medical Department, we have been informed that it is by no means uncommon for a regiment or battery to be placed under the medical charge of five or six different officers in the course of 12 months. We have no hesitation in saying that such frequent changes must be detrimental to a regiment, and altogether inconsistent with the proper medical and sanitary care of any body of men.

Especially for Native troops.

344. In addition to all these objections, which apply both to European and Native troops, there are other and special objections which apply to Native troops. A native has a natural aversion to a hospital. After some years of service and experience of the benefits he has derived from it, this aversion, no doubt, disappears; but it would certainly be revived and intensified if, when ill, he were obliged to go to a place where he might have none of his friends or comrades about him. Depressed with sickness his heart would sink within him, and he would be in a condition very unfavourable to recovery from a severe illness. Native soldiers look on their own regimental medical officer as a friend whom they have learned by experience to trust. To take him away would be subversive of that intimate relation between officers and men which it is so desirable to encourage. Moreover, although there would be a saving in medical officers by adopting the station hospital system for Native troops, there would be little or no saving in hospital establishments which are on a very economical scale.

Objections to regimental hospitals.

345. But the objections to the purely regimental system of hospitals are also very great. It is urged that the number of medical officers, who have to be kept up under this system at nearly every station, is much greater than necessary. As a rule they have very little to do, and, as a natural consequence of this,

this, two great evils result. First, the State is put to great and unnecessary expense; and, secondly, medical officers, through the defects of the system, and no fault of their own, are placed in the very circumstances which are best calculated to render them inefficient, and to unfit them for work when necessity arises. The work is not evenly distributed; medical officers, whose corps happen to be unhealthy may for a time be overworked, while others with healthy regiments are comparatively idle; there is no proper division of labour, and in particular the duties of the officers of the British and Indian services are kept so entirely distinct that the one derives no assistance from the other. An officer in medical charge of a battery of artillery, or of a native regiment has, as a rule, very light work, for it must be remembered that during the unhealthy season many of the Europeans are in the hills, and many of the natives absent either on sick leave or furlough at their homes. The regimental system entails the multiplication of hospital buildings, of medical officers, of hospital establishments, of medicines, instruments, and other articles of hospital equipment. All this favours waste, and the carriage of most of the requirements of every regimental hospital from station to station in the course of relief, it may be from the one end of India to the other, involves a great deal of unnecessary expense. Moreover, experience has shown that regimental hospitals are altogether unsuited to the field, and it is most objectionable, on the breaking out of war, that the whole organisation of the medical service should be disturbed.

Number of executive medical officers required under the modified regimental system recommended.

346. Taking the objections to both systems into consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion that neither the one nor the other is suited to India, and that a modified system, embracing as far as possible the advantages of both, ought to be adopted. The modification we propose is to take the regimental system as the basis of our scheme; to provide regimental medical officers, but to arrange their number and regulate their duties so that there may not be more in each station than are required for the medical duties of the station as a whole. These officers would have their regimental duties as their primary charge; they would invariably attend on the sick of their own corps, but, in addition, they would be available for other duties under the general direction of the senior medical officer, and where the buildings and the distance of the troops from the hospital would permit of such an arrangement, they might work together in a general European hospital. Under this scheme, the number of medical officers we propose to allow is two for each British regiment of cavalry and infantry, one for each battery of Royal Artillery, and one for each Native regiment. With the increased strength proposed for regiments this arrangement will prove less costly than may be supposed. For garrison batteries separate medical officers would not be necessary, were it not that these batteries are usually supported by detachments of British infantry. One medical officer can attend to both the battery and the detachment. The details of the scheme we propose are shown in the following statement:—

SCHEME OF DISTRIBUTION OF EXECUTIVE MEDICAL OFFICERS.

I.—BENGAL ARMY CORPS.

BRITISH SERVICE.		INDIAN SERVICE.	
22 Batteries R. A., at 1 = - -	22	6 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = - -	6
2 Regiments Cavalry, at 2 = -	4	24 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	24
13 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	26	Sappers and Miners = - -	1

Scheme of Distribution of Executive Medical Officers—*continued.*

II.—Punjab Army Corps.

British Service.		Indian Service.	
21 Batteries R. A., at 1 = - -	21	12 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = - -	12
2 Regiments Cavalry, at 2 = -	4	27 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	27
13 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	26		
	103		70
Miscellaneous appointments - -	3	Miscellaneous appointments, including 7 Irregular Civil Regiments -	10*
Depôts - - - - - -	7		
	113		80
Add,—20 per cent. for reserve, &c. -	23	Add,—25 per cent. for reserve, &c. -	20
Total Bengal and Punjab Army Corps † - - - -	136		100
Present Establishment - -	230	Present Establishment - -	123
Now proposed - - - -	136	Now proposed - - - -	100
Reduction - - -	94	Reduction - - -	23

III.—Madras Army Corps.

17 Batteries R. A., at 1 = - -	17	2 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	2
1 Regiment Cavalry, at 2 = - -	2	25 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	25
8 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	16		
	35		27
2 Depôts - - - - - -	2	Miscellaneous appointments - -	3 ‡
		Hyderabad Contingent - - -	10
	37		40
Add,—20 per cent. for reserve, &c.	8	Add,—25 per cent. - - -	10
Total Madras Army Corps -	45		50
Present Establishment - -	74	Present Establishment - -	76
Now proposed - - -	45	Now proposed - - -	50
Reduction - -	29	Reduction -	26

* *Viz.*—Secretary to Surgeon General - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeepers - - - - - - - - 2
Seven Irregular Regiments (*a*) - - - - - - - 7
10

† To be provided from the Bengal Medical Service.

‡ Surgeon to Governor - - - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeeper - - - - - - - - - 1
Palaveram Depôt - - - - - - - - - 1
3

(*a*) As shown in margin of paragraph 337. The medical charge of Mhairwarra Battalion mentioned there is held by the Civil Surgeon of Ajmere.

Scheme of Distribution of Executive Medical Officers—*continued.*

IV.—Bombay Army Corps.

British Service.		Indian Service.	
17 Batteries R. A., at 1 = - -	17	6 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	6
1 Regiment Cavalry, at 2 = -	2	25 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	25
9 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	18		
	37		31
Miscellaneous appointments—		Miscellaneous appointments - -	2*
5 Depôts - - - - - -	5		
	42		33
Add, - 20 per cent. for reserve -	9	Add,—25 per cent. for reserve -	8
Total Bombay Army Corps -	51		41
Present Establishment - -	69	Present Establishment - -	56
Now proposed - - -	51	Now proposed - - -	41
Reduction - -	18	Reduction - -	15

SUMMARY.

British Medical Service.

	Present Establishment.	Now Proposed.	Reduction.
Bengal and Punjab - - -	230	136	94
Madras - - - - - -	74	45	29
Bombay - - - - - -	69	51	18
Total - - -	373	232	141

Indian Medical Service.

Bengal and Punjab - - -	123	100	23
Madras - - - - - -	76	50	26
Bombay - - - - - -	56	41	15
Total - - -	255	191	64

Large reduction to be made under these proposals.*

347. It will be seen from this statement that the number of executive medical officers of the British service may, in our opinion, be reduced by 141, and that of the Indian services employed on military work in the three presidencies by 64, or a total of 205 for both. Owing to the large proportion of Surgeons Major of the British Medical service now in India, the average pay of these 205 medical officers cannot be less than 700 rupees a month; we believe it to be nearer 800 rupees. Their reduction will thus save 17,22,000 rupees per annum.

348. We

* Surgeon to Governor - - - - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeeper - - - - - - - - - - 1
2

348. We have already said that we attach great importance to medical officers having immediate care of particular regiments. We regard this as of special importance when a regiment first arrives in India, and would strongly recommend that a medical officer of Indian experience should be placed in charge of each regiment and battery as soon as it lands in the country.

A medical officer of Indian experience required for each corps immediately on landing in India

349. Such wholesale reductions as we have proposed may at first sight seem impracticable, but as regards British troops we have the valuable opinion of the Director General of the Army Medical Department. In his memorandum on the scheme of medical re-organization proposed by the Government of India in Despatch of November 1877, already several times referred to, Sir William Muir states that if the station hospital system were introduced he could dispense with 150 executive medical officers of his department out of the total of 373 now in India, or nine more than we propose to reduce. Sir William Muir's statement is all the more corroborative of these recommendations, because he proposes, according to his scheme, to take away all the Indian medical officers from military employ, and to make over charge of Native regiments to Native assistant surgeons. This would entail a certain degree of supervision from the British medical officers, and throw on them all the labour of extra duties, such as lock hospitals and the medical charge of the staff. Moreover, it was made apart from any proposals such as we have recommended for reducing the strength of European troops in India and concentrating them in a smaller number of stations. We believe that the number of medical officers provided under our scheme will be ample, and in fact so far in excess of requirements that there will be no difficulty as respects their obtaining leave in turn. A reserve of 20 per cent. for British, and 25 per cent. for Indian, officers has, it will be observed, been provided. The former are relieved every five years; the latter remain in the country for life; hence the difference in the margin allowed. If 150 British officers can be spared according to Sir William Muir's plan, more could be spared under that which we recommend. The Director General's statement ought materially to assist in carrying out those reductions which are so urgently called for in the executive medical staff

Opinion of the Director General, Army Medical Department, in favour of reduction.

350. As regards buildings, we recommend that in new cantonments, or where new hospitals may be required, they should be provided on the general principle that one hospital will suffice for all the European sick, and another for all the Native sick, but that a separate ward or wards according to probable requirements should be assigned to each corps. Where a general hospital already exists, such as Calcutta, Dinapore, and other stations, we would recommend that this arrangement of separate wards should be observed, though, as will be seen presently, we do not propose that under such circumstances there should be separate hospital establishments. In the meantime the various existing hospitals should be looked upon rather as separate detached wards of a garrison hospital; the entire medical staff being placed under the orders of the senior medical officer of the garrison, who should be responsible for the efficient medical administration of the whole garrison staff, should check expenditure, examine indents, have control of reserve stores, and through whom all communications connected with the medical administration of the garrison should pass.

Arrangements for new hospitals that may be built.

351. It is essential that a certain establishment of medical officers be fixed either for India as a whole, or for each presidency, if the Presidential services are to be kept distinct. For years now there has been no fixed establishment for the Bengal service, it having been altered annually. The sanctioned strength of the Bengal medical establishment at present is 353, including all ranks. The military medical officers set free under the scheme we have proposed may be absorbed, by filling the civil appointments now held by uncovenanted medical officers with military medical officers, which would increase the military reserve. There are 67 of these appointments now held in the Bengal presidency by uncovenanted medical officers and apothecaries. The strength of the Bengal medical establishment might, therefore, remain 353, as at present.

Sanctioned establishment to be fixed for each presidency.

Bengal.

352. The Madras lists give no information as to the number of civil charges held by uncovenanted medical men. The present strength of the Indian medical service in Madras is 187. This will probably admit of reduction to 160.

Madras.

353. In the Bombay presidency the strength of the Indian medical service is

Bombay.

is 143. There are only eight appointments not held by military medical officers. The strength required may be set down as 135, but here, and in the other presidencies, the exact strength of the Indian service cannot be precisely fixed until the civil requirements of each have been carefully revised.

Number of executive medical officers, British and Indian.

354. The number of medical officers, both British and Indian, will thus stand as follows:—

———	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total for India.
British Medical Department -	-	-	-	*239
Indian " " - -	353	160	135	†648
			TOTAL - - -	887

On these figures the administrative appointments should be assigned in the proportion of somewhat over one-fourth to the British, and of somewhat under three-fourths to the Indian, service.

Proposed allotment of administrative appointments to each service.

355. There would be in all 20 administrative appointments, as follows:—

———		Military.	Civil.	Total.	Remarks.
Surgeons General -	1st class -	1 (*a.*)	1 (*b.*)	2	(*a.*) With the War Department. (*b.*) With Government of India.
	2nd " -	–	2 (*c.*)	2	(*c.*) Madras and Bombay.
Deputy Surgeons General.	1st class -	4 (*d.*)	2 (*e.*)	6	(*d.*) One with each army corps. (*e.*) Bengal Proper and North Western Provinces.
	2nd " -	8	2 (*f.*)	10	(*f.*) Punjab and Central Provinces.
	TOTAL - - -	13	7	20	
Brigade Surgeons -	1st class -	12	–	12	
	2nd " -	12	–	12	

A fair distribution might be made thus:—

———	Indian Service.	British Service.	Total.
Military Administrative Appointments - -	6	7	13
Civil " " - - -	7	- -	7
TOTAL - - -	13	7	20

Of the 24 Brigade Surgeonships, eight may be assigned to the British, and 16 to the Indian, service, according to the following distribution:—

———	British.	Indian.	Total.
Bengal Army Corps - - - - - -	2	4	6
Punjab " - - - - - -	2	4	6
Madras " - - - - - -	1	4	5
Bombay " - - - - - -	3	4	7
TOTAL - - -	8	16	24

* *i.e.*, 232 executive *plus* 7 administrative.

† Including administrative.

356. The

356. The seven military administrative appointments for the British service would be one Surgeon General, one Deputy Surgeon General of the first class, and five Deputy Surgeons General of the second class. The appointments for the Indian service would fall thus:— And to the local service in each presidency.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Deputy Surgeons General { 1st class -	1	1	1
Deputy Surgeons General { 2nd „ -	1	1	1
Brigade Surgeons - { 1st class -	4	2	2
Brigade Surgeons - { 2nd „ -	4	2	2
Add civil administrative appointments -	5	1	1
TOTAL - - -	15	7	7

If the Brigade Surgeonships be included, the percentage of administrative appointments, both military and civil, to the strength of each service stands thus:—

British medical service in India - - - - - - -	6·4
Bengal medical service - - - - - - - -	4·2
Madras medical service - - - - - - - -	4·3
Bombay medical service - - - - - - - -	5·1

If the brigade surgeons be excluded, the ratios are, for British three, Bengal 1·9, Madras 1·87, Bombay 2·2.

357. According to both calculations the British Service has the largest proportion of prizes. But as the prizes vary in value it may also be well to show how the aggregate monthly emoluments of those assigned to each service average on the total strengths. Fairness of the division tested.

358. The aggregate value of the seven administrative appointments of the British Service in India, with the staff salaries of their eight Brigade Surgeons, will amount to 16,750 rupees per mensem, which, divided among 239 medical officers, gives an average of 70 rupees a head. In the same way, the five Civil and two Military Administrative appointments with eight Brigade Surgeonships, in Bengal aggregate 17,650 rupees per mensem, or only 50 rupees a head of the Bengal Medical Service. One Civil and two Military Administrative appointments in Madras with four Brigade Surgeons, gives 7,950 rupees per mensem, or 49 rupees a head, and the same number in Bombay gives 59 rupees a head. It appears, therefore, that, tested according to the value of the prizes, the British Medical Service has been more liberally dealt with than any one of the Local Services, for its average is 70 rupees compared with 50 rupees in Bengal, 49 rupees in Madras, and 59 rupees in Bombay. Bombay has more than its fair share of the prizes, but they cannot be divided more equally with a due regard to all considerations. It may be thought that the proportion of Military Deputy Surgeons General and Brigade Surgeonships should be fixed entirely with reference to the number of medical officers in military employ in times of peace, but such an arrangement would greatly tend to destroy the military character of the Indian services, which it is most desirable to preserve. A constant interchange between those in civil and those in military employ ought to be encouraged at all times, so as to maintain the fullest efficiency of both.

359. The British service have now in India— Reduction in British service in proportion to strength.

3 Surgeons General.
12 Deputy Surgeons General, and
3 Superintending Surgeons-Major.

Total - - - 18

Under the new scheme they would have—

1 Surgeon General.
6 Deputy Surgeons General { 1 of 1st class. 5 of 2nd „
8 Brigade Surgeons - { 4 of 1st class. 4 of 2nd „

Total - - - 15

 The

The prizes will be greatly reduced under this scheme, but it must be remembered that the number of their executive officers will be reduced by 141, or by more than one-third of its present strength, and that, therefore, the number of prizes to lower appointments is not disproportionate.

Alteration in scale of pay required.

360. If our proposals be approved, some change will be required in the pay of medical officers. The existing arrangements are full of anomalies. Indian medical officers, unless they are in charge of a regiment, receive only unemployed pay. They may have to perform most arduous duties, but if not in charge of a regiment, they are considered to be unemployed, and draw considerably less than a British medical officer of the same standing. What the exact scale of pay for different periods of service should be we do not attempt at present to say; but in fixing it we would recommend that the following principles be adhered to. First, that the pay of both services should be the same, as they will have the same kind of work to perform; and, secondly, that the pay be divided into two parts, pay proper to be drawn, no matter whether on leave or on duty, and staff pay to be drawn on duty.

Abolition of Netley as a school for Indian candidates recommended.

361. In connection with the position of executive medical officers, the subject of medical education deserves some notice. At present, all candidates for the Indian service spend a certain time at Netley with the candidates for the British Medical Department. Beyond the microscope and water analysis, there is very little practical instruction to be had at Netley, and these are matters which may be arranged for equally well at the schools or after they arrive in India. There is no practice to be seen at Netley except such as is afforded by a few chronic cases among invalids; and the consequence is, that candidates going there leave it no better able to treat Indian diseases, so far as actual experience of them goes, than they were when they entered it. Netley should be abolished as a place of instruction for Indian medical officers. It costs 6,082 *l.* per annum, or say 70,000 rupees, not to speak of the pay which the candidates receive while there. All this might be saved. Instead of going to Netley, all young medical officers should, on arrival in India, be sent to do duty for a few months at one of the large hospitals at the presidency towns, where they will learn more of the proper treatment of Indian diseases than they could acquire for themselves in as many years The increased efficiency thus attained would be a distinct gain to the State and a decided advantage to the sick whom young medical officers may be called on to treat. The abolition of Netley would also tend to make the service more popular, for the continual examinations in details, which are of no practical importance, help to deter good men from entering it.

Rules regarding admission of Natives of India and Eurasians into the medical services require amendment.

362. There is also another point connected with medical education which deserves very serious consideration. Under the orders which are now in force, a considerable number of Natives and Eurasians are being admitted into the Indian medical services, and we are informed that in Bombay this number is likely to increase. It is almost impossible to find suitable employment for those already borne on the lists. We understand that even with Native regiments, for which charges they might be considered specially suited, they are not popular, and have not the same influence with the men as European surgeons; at the same time they are, many of them, ill-calculated for a life of rough field service; the presence of men of this class in the services must therefore soon become a very serious embarrassment. Apparently one principal cause of their entering the service is the facility which is afforded them by the course of study provided in the medical colleges at the presidencies. The curriculum at these colleges has been so arranged, that men desirous of competing for medical appointments in the regular services have little more to do than present themselves for examination in London, and if they are successful, return to India as commissioned medical officers. We have every desire that the utmost facilities should be afforded to Natives of India and others residing in this country to acquire a thorough medical education, and much benefit has, we believe, already resulted from the excellent medical education which is given at the various medical colleges; there is a great demand in the country for competent Native medical practitioners, and they can be made available to a considerable extent for civil appointments; but for this purpose it is not necessary that they should join the regular military medical service. Obviously a medical officer who is not fit for every duty which he may be called upon to perform is not as efficient as one

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who is, however good he may be in a particular branch of his profession. In order to qualify a candidate for the Covenanted Medical Services, it is not sufficient that he should have medical knowledge. To enable him to take his place in a regiment, or a European civil station, as one of the community, it is essential that he should have acquaintance with the usages of English society, and with the manners and customs of those with whom he will be called on to associate. We would, therefore, very strongly recommend that in future no Native of India or Eurasian should be admitted as a candidate for the Indian Medical Services who has not passed in the United Kingdom the full time required for medical education.

III.—Hospital Establishments.

Present large establishments.

363. The number of separate hospitals in our military stations is very large. Each regiment, both British and Native, and every battery of royal artillery is provided with a separate hospital establishment. In each battery of royal horse artillery, each light field battery, and each mountain battery this establishment consists of 25 persons, costing 2,940 rupees per annum. In the heavy, field, and garrison batteries the number and expenditure are somewhat less. In each cavalry hospital there are 62 persons on the establishment, costing 8,016 rupees per annum, and in each infantry regiment there are 75, costing 8,328 rupees. These figures do not include the hospital sergeant, who is omitted, as he is entered separately in the military statements for the year. How very large the hospital establishments are will appear by taking the strength of the garrison at a few stations. At Cawnpore, with one battery, royal artillery, and a regiment of foot, the hospital establishments, for British troops alone, together number 100 persons; at Ferozepore, with two batteries and a regiment of foot, they number 125; at Meean Meer, with three batteries, royal artillery, and a regiment of foot, they number 150; at Meerut, with three batteries, one regiment of cavalry, and one of infantry, they number 212. The hospital establishments for European troops at this station cost per annum 25,164 rupees. In addition, there is a separate establishment for each Native regiment, besides in many cantonments a staff or station hospital, as it is called, for the treatment of casual persons and residents who do not belong to any particular regiment. At many large stations there are 10 or 12 distinct hospital establishments. These remarks apply specially to Bengal. In both Madras and Bombay a system of station hospitals is partially in force.

Reductions proposed.

364. There can be little doubt that under even a modified station hospital system much economy might be effected in these arrangements. Speaking generally, we believe that two-thirds of the separate hospital establishments for the royal artillery may be abolished, and their sick treated in the British cavalry or infantry hospitals at the same station. The hospital establishments of 55 batteries would in this way be saved. Taking them on an average at 2,600 rupees, the total saving would be 1,43,000 rupees per annum. By the abolition of staff hospitals in Bengal, there would be a saving of 4,836 rupees per annum. This does not include the hospital assistants. The expense of the station hospitals in Bombay corresponding to those in Bengal cannot be accurately stated. In Madras the garrison hospitals have an establishment of highly-paid members of the subordinate medical department. Considerable saving may also be effected in the convalescent depôts, as the expenditure at some of them is far in excess of what is necessary.

Hospital equipment to be stationary.

365. If the modified hospital system which we have recommended be adopted, the hospital equipment at each place ought to be regarded, as far as possible, as stationary: much expense may thus be avoided in the removal of hospital stores from place to place, as is now done when regiments march. All that will be necessary will be to carry sufficient for the march.

Modifications in hospital establishments proposed by special committee.

366. A special committee, which sat at Simla in 1876, recommended material changes in European hospital establishments, and these have been approved by the Secretary of State, but have not yet been carried out. We concur in the desirability of making the proposed changes, but would suggest that the hospital corps be more local in their character than the scheme recommends. It leaves the financial part of the question very much as it is, and it may therefore be more conveniently considered when the hospital establishments required for each particular

cular station have to be determined. We would only remark at present that these establishments should be fixed, not only with reference to the strength of the garrison, but also the general character of the place for healthiness or the reverse.

No reduction proposed in hospital establishments of Native regiments.

367. The Native regimental hospitals are, no doubt, capable of some reduction under the station hospital system, but their establishments are on an economical scale, and no very material saving can be made in them. We propose, therefore, to leave them as they are.

The subordinate medical department.

368. As regards the subordinate medical department, the establishments for regiments of cavalry and infantry would represent the establishments required for each modified station hospital. For such a hospital the three medical subordinates (one apothecary, one assistant apothecary, and one passed apprentice) are ample. The work of medical subordinates is light; their main duty is to go round with the surgeon, take his orders, and see that patients get their diet and medicine. If the proposals we have made be carried out, there is room for some reduction in the subordinate medical department of each presidency; but instead of recommending any direct reduction, we would propose that the subordinates not actually required for military duty should be lent to the civil department, and be looked on as a reserve for war. The number now in civil employ, especially in Madras, is very large. The training and pensions of all persons so employed ought not to be a military charge, as it is now, but should be apportioned to the military and civil estimates according to the length of time which has been spent in military and civil employ. The military estimates will thus be freed from a heavy charge which now unjustly falls on them. Some such adjustment should also, we think, be made in respect to the pensions of a certain number of surgeons and surgeon majors who have spent the greater part of their service in civil employ. The proper amount to be debited against civil administration might be calculated on the average of past years.

Hospital assistants.

369. Great variations also exist as regards another subordinate class known as hospital assistants in the three presidencies. In Bengal the military hospital assistants have been entirely separated from the civil assistants and placed on a distinct list. The strength fixed as sufficient for military work is 314, with a reserve of 25 per cent., giving a total of 392; this may be reduced by the number now attached to horse artillery and field batteries, for which credit has already been taken. In Madras, there are 395 hospital assistants borne on the list, of whom only 109 are in military employ, so that the large number of 286 hospital assistants in the Madras Presidency are qualifying by purely civil service for pensions which will eventually fall as a charge on the military department. The details for Bombay are not accurately known, either as to the number of hospital assistants employed, or the number of those who are doing duty in the Civil Department.

Greater responsibility of administrative medical officers.

370. For choléra camps, movement is to be depended on rather than medical assistance. It is unreasonable to expect that each station shall be provided with sufficient medical and subordinate medical staff for such emergencies. On these occasions the ample margin allowed of 20 per cent. on both must be brought into use, and stations which are not suffering must, if need be, aid for the time. For detachments and moves in course of relief there is not the same difficulty. These moves almost always take place in the cold weather, when sickness is at a minimum. Under the new system, which will place all medical officers in military employ, both with European and Native troops, under one authority, there will be greatly increased power to provide for these and any other emergencies that may arise; but it is essential for the proper success of the scheme that there shall be much more decentralisation than there is at present. Deputy Surgeons General must not be obliged to apply to head-quarters before they can change a single medical officer or a single subordinate from one duty to another. They must keep the Surgeon General fully informed of all they do, but they must be invested with greater authority, and must feel that they have greater responsibility; they ought not to be mere forwarding officers as they now are to a great extent.

IV.—Miscellaneous.

371. Under the above proposals considerable economy ought to be effected in medicines and other hospital equipments. There will also be much saving of labour in the medical depôts, consequent on the number of hospitals, and with them the number of indents, being reduced. But radical changes seem to be required in the management of the depôts themselves. The chief depôt in Calcutta is, practically, the largest wholesale druggist's shop in the world; but there is not a single individual on the whole establishment who has been brought up to the business, and the manufacturing processes carried on there are, we understand, of the most antiquated and imperfect description. The Principal Medical Storekeeper, or the officer at the head of the principal Medical Store Departments, by whatever name he is called, ought to be a thoroughly trained manufacturing druggist, capable of turning local resources to the best account. At Calcutta there is not room for a sufficient laboratory in the present premises; but the stores might be removed to Chinsurah, where, we understand, there is ample accommodation available in the old barracks both for them and a proper manufacturing department. If the Government could secure the services of a chemist like Mr. Wood, who has just resigned his post as quinologist, he could perform the work both of quinologist and head of the Medical Store Department in India; superintending his own factory and stores, and also seeing that a proper system of business is carried on in the other and minor depôts. It may be possible to find suitable men for such an appointment in the medical services, but it is quite an accident if any of them have had the special training that is needed for such a position; it is certain, however, that the duty cannot be properly performed by an officer selected by chance from the medical service with no special knowledge whatever. The system, in our opinion, requires a thorough change. The importance of the matter may be judged from the fact that the medical stores, medicines, instruments, &c., received from England cost India 64,000 *l.* in 1877-78, 73,000 *l.* in 1876-77, and 88,000 *l.* in 1875-76. But, in addition, there is considerable expenditure on this account in the local market. In 1877-78 this local expenditure amounted to 41,500 *l.*,* so that in that year the grand total, including the purchases in both English and Indian markets, was 105,500 *l.* By far the largest proportion was for the civil branch, viz., 68,000 *l.*† out of 105,500 *l.*, leaving only 37,500 *l.* as a charge against military accounts; but the depôts are primarily military, and their proper management, must, therefore, be considered a military question.

Re-organization of the medical depôts required.

372. It would seem sufficient to provide one medical depôt for each army corps. At present there are three in Bengal, one at Calcutta, one at Allahabad, and one at Meean Meer. There is one at Madras and one at Bombay, besides a second-class depôt at Rangoon. This last may, perhaps, be dispensed with. It would save fresh packing if hospitals in British Burma were supplied direct from Calcutta or Madras.

Number required.

373. The work of the depôts might also be much reduced if the present long list of medicines were largely curtailed. No medical officer uses so many medicines in practice; and the printed names of many drugs and instruments which are rarely, if ever, required, seem to be regarded as an invitation to apply for them. The list might remain, but each medical officer should be obliged to restrict his indents to a certain number of drugs. Every indent complied with should also be accompanied with a list showing the cost of the articles supplied. Indenting officers have no idea of the relative prices of what they ask for, or of

Checks on needless expenditure.

	£.
*Bengal	32,000
Madras	3,500
Bombay	6,000
Total	£. 41,500

†Bengal	34,000
Madras	20,000
Bombay	14,000
Total	£. 68,000

of the total cost of what they get. On this point the measures lately adopted by the Bengal Government are worthy of general imitation. The depôt should be a shop to all intents and purposes. Instruments, again, are supplied in far larger numbers than is necessary. Of the most expensive kinds, one set for each station will amply suffice; and this economy can easily be carried out under the hospital system which we recommend. At present all classes of hospitals are furnished with instruments of all sorts, which cost much, are rarely, if ever, used, and rapidly get spoilt. The senior medical officer of a garrison should be responsible for all instruments and stores issued to his station. It should be the duty of inspecting officers to inquire more thoroughly into hospital management than they do now. At present they look at the sick; they inspect the books; they see if the medicines and instruments are neatly arranged and well kept, and if the poisons are locked away in a safe place. But they rarely inquire, and still less report on, the expenditure in diet, extras, medicines, and clothing, in proportion to the number of sick. We have been much struck by the extraordinary variations year by year in the expenditure on stimulants; this expenditure, especially on port wine, in some years has been enormous, and is altogether unexplained.

V.—A Medical Corps for India.

Advantages of one Medical Corps for all duties in India.

374. We have made the recommendations contained in the preceding portion of this chapter on the supposition that two medical services, one British and the other Indian, will continue to exist in this country as they do now. But we are satisfied that the medical administration of India will never be really satisfactory until a much more radical change is made, and the whole of the medical service of the country amalgamated into one Medical Corps, which should provide officers for all duties, military and civil Among the advantages of such a change which at once occur to us are the following:—

(1.) At present three public services* are competing against each other in the medical schools. No sooner is any concession made to the one, than it must be extended, or even a greater concession made, to the other. This is an evil which ought, as far as possible, to be avoided; and there seems no difficulty in avoiding it in so far as the maintenance of two distinct army services is concerned.

(2.) By having an Indian Medical Corps, men of Indian experience would be secured for British troops. A medical man, it must be remembered, is required for something more than merely administering physic. His first, and far the most important of all his aims, should be to take such judicious care of the men that disease may, as far as possible, be prevented. For regiments just arrived in India such care is indispensable. Their greater liability to sickness, and the high mortality among them, have been proved by statistics beyond all doubt. Every new regiment should, therefore, have attached to it immediately on landing the most experienced medical officer that can be provided, and his experience must be Indian experience, or it will be of little or no use.

(3.) The treatment of the sick, as has been already said, is a very subordinate matter to the prevention of disease; but even in the treatment of the sick Indian experience is of the greatest value. Medical men who make particular diseases, or a particular class of diseases, their special study, attain an accuracy in diagnosis, and an experience in treatment, which make their advice in all such cases greatly sought after. Any one suffering from his eyes, for example, who can afford to pay for advice, does not consult the first medical man he may chance to meet, but goes to an oculist; if he has anything the matter with his ears, he goes to an aurist;

* The British Medical Department.
The Navy.
The Indian Medical Service.

aurist; and so on with other ailments. He, in fact, consults the man who has made the particular class of ailment with which he is concerned the study of his life. Indian diseases form a large enough field for such study; and the man who devotes himself to it is more likely to be a successful practitioner than if he took it up for a year or two now and again, as his tour of Indian service came round.

(4.) If one service could provide for all wants, it would probably attract good men; for the civil prizes already referred to are numerous. The British Medical Department offers no such prizes, and, as is well known, all competition for entering this service has ceased.

(5.) A medical establishment entirely under the orders of the Government of India, and looking to no superior in England, would be more easily managed; for it would feel more loyalty to the Government it serves, and would be more careful in regulating expenditure. At present there is a very general feeling that the British medical officers have but small consideration for the economical management of their hospitals, and care little what expenditure is incurred, as it falls upon a Government to which they owe no allegiance, and which cannot reward or punish them.

(6.) The jealousies which now exist between the two services would disappear; and this would be no small gain.

375. This scheme for amalgamating completely the medical services in India has been frequently proposed, but it has apparently always been thought that the difficulties in the way of such a scheme were very great. Some have held that it should be effected by making Indian service of all kinds part of the duty of the British Medical Department, abolishing the local services altogether. No doubt this would make the British Medical Department more popular than it now is; but it would be an advantage to the British service purchased at the expense of the people of India, for it would certainly intensify nearly all the evils of the present system, and its only advantage would be unification.

376. We would, therefore, propose that there should be one Medical Corps for all India. Direct admission into the Indian Medical Service would cease. All army medical officers would first enter the British service. They would serve in it, say, for two years, and then, as required, might be annually drafted into the Indian Medical Corps after passing an examination in the languages. In order that they might, before applying for admission into this Indian Corps, be the better able to form an opinion as to how Indian climate and Indian work would suit them, a certain number of young British medical officers, say 50, might always be kept in the country; and from among them the annual addition to the Indian Corps should be made. Exchanges might also be allowed between the British Medical Department and the Indian Medical Corps. By this arrangement the British service would itself, in all probability, become more popular. The change would be gradual; but ultimately the British Medical Department, excepting the 50 young officers above mentioned, would altogether disappear from India. Or the change might be carried out at once, by simply calling for volunteers from the Army Medical Department, to fill up the administrative appointments, and the 232 vacancies in executive appointments for British troops in India. If this were done, it would be necessary to have volunteers of all periods of service, so that they might take their place in the amalgamated list without injury to themselves, the Indian medical officers, or the public service. There would, no doubt, be immediate advantage in this arrangement. The single military administration, which the Government of India and the Secretary of State approve, has been so strongly opposed by the Army Medical Department, that we fear they will not materially aid in endeavouring to carry it out with success. If the change were immediate, however, they would altogether cease to have anything to do with the arrangements; for the annual transfer of officers from their ranks to the Indian Medical Corps would be a mere matter of routine.

377. It may be objected that, if England were to be engaged in a great European or other war out of India, little or no assistance would be derived from

Objections answered.

from this Indian Medical Corps. But, not to speak of the 50 young medical officers of the British Medical Department who could be spared at once, because their places could be taken by members of the Indian Medical Corps in civil employ, there would be no want of volunteers, as the experience of the Malta Expedition amply proves. Fifty medical officers are probably a larger reserve of the Army Medical Department than exists under the present system, and it could be made available at once. No doubt they would be young, but under the guidance of the more experienced officers who would volunteer they would do excellent service.

Economy to be effected under proposals made.

378. We now proceed to sum up the reductions which may be effected if our recommendations are carried out. We believe that these reductions will be accompanied by a very great increase of efficiency, but if even it were otherwise, and some little loss of power were the result, it is such a considerable saving that we think the interests of the people of this country require that some slight sacrifice should be made. The proposed reduction will stand thus—

	Rs.
I.—Administration - - - - - -	4,30,200
II.—Executive medical officers - - - -	17,22,000
III.—Hospital establishments - - - -	1,43,000
IV.—Abolition of Netley - - - - -	70,000
GRAND TOTAL - - - Rs.	23,65,200

This does not include saving in pensions to a large number of medical officers and subordinates, who would either not be required at all, or whose pensions would fall as a charge on the Civil Department, and also a saving in many other items, such as passage out and home of the present large number of British medical officers, saving in carriage of hospital stores from station to station, &c., the amount of which cannot be estimated with sufficient accuracy to admit of its being entered here. But if the military estimates alone be considered, the saving in Section I., instead of 4,30,200 rupees will be 6,12,600 rupees, as the cost of the proposed military medical administration will be 4,36,800 rupees instead of 10,49,400 rupees, which it costs now. The total will then stand thus—

	Rs.
I.—Administration - - - - - -	6,12,600
II.—Executive medical officers - - - -	17,22,000
III.—Hospital establishments - - - -	1,43,000
IV.—Abolition of Netley - - - - -	70,000
TOTAL - - - Rs.	25,47,600

379. The extra pensions to Brigade Surgeons are more than compensated for by the reduction of pensions to Deputy Surgeons General. The saving in pensions to 141 British and 64 Indian medical officers, or a total of 205 officers, who would either be dispensed with altogether, or who, as has been proposed for Bengal and Bombay, would take the place of uncovenanted doctors in civil appointments, is a very large item, which we have no means of calculating correctly. On a moderate computation, this and other minor savings may be reckoned at five lakhs of rupees. So that the grand total of the reductions which we have recommended in the medical services cannot fall short of 31 lakhs of rupees.

CHAPTER X.

THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

SECTION 1.—Commissariat and Clothing.
" 2.—Transport.
" 3.—Ordnance Department.
" 4.—Military Works and Barrack Departments.
" 5.—Remount and Veterinary Departments.
" 6.—Military Account Department.

SECTION 1.—COMMISSARIAT and CLOTHING.

380. Before the year 1809 the victualling of British troops, and the supply of army transport, were carried on entirely by contract. In that year a Commissariat Department was formed to supply everything required by the army, including horses and warlike stores. At first great power was left to the Commissary General, who controlled the entire expenditure of his department. This system was afterwards frequently modified. In 1815, a separate branch of accounts under the Commissary General was established. In 1821 the department was re-organised, and the Commissary General was relieved from the charge of accounts, which were submitted by executive officers to the Military Board. In 1830, the Commissariat Department was placed entirely under the control of the Military Board, so much so that even appointments to the department could not be made without the concurrence of the Board. In 1837-38 this rule was somewhat modified; but not being found to work well, another change was made in 1843. The Military Board was again invested with all authority and responsibility connected with the department; and the Commissary General was made a stipendiary member of the Board, and two Deputy Commissaries General were directed to superintend the executive details of the department.

Formation of Commissariat Department in 1809.

Placed under Military Board in 1830.

381. This system remained in force for about nine years, or from 1843 to 1852, during which time the accounts of the first Cabul war had been closed, and three other campaigns had taken place; the Gwalior, Sutlej, and Punjab. These campaigns brought to light certain shortcomings in the working of the Commissariat, more especially as regards the accounts, during operations in the field; and a Commission was assembled to investigate and report on the subject.

System in force for nine years.

382. This Commission, which assembled in 1851, found that there was a variety of systems in the three presidencies. After a careful inquiry it recommended uniformity of system; that the Commissary General should be separated from the Military Board, and be placed in direct communication with Government as head of his department; that he should be invested with the most ample control over its interior economy and arrangements generally; and that the examination and check of accounts should be entrusted to a separate department. These recommendations were accepted, but can hardly be said to have been carried out in their entirety even up to the present day.

Commissariat Commission of 1851.

383. We are of opinion that the three Commissariat Departments of the armies of India should be amalgamated and placed under one officer, who should be attached to the War Department of the Government of India, and should be

The three Commissariat Departments to be amalgamated under a Commissary General in Chief.

be Commissary General in Chief of the Army in India. We are satisfied that the present arrangement under which there are three distinct Commissariat establishments, with different organisation and rules, is thoroughly unsound. If, as we hope may be the case in future, each army corps will send a contingent to every army formed for service in the field, it becomes absolutely essential that the whole system shall be unified, and all the officers of the department placed under the orders of the head of the department, who will detail them and their establishment for any work for which they may be required.

Establishment and organization of the Commissariat Department.

384. For the working of the Commissariat Department under the Commissary General in Chief, we would propose the following establishment and organization, which, in our opinion, will suffice to meet the wants of the army both in peace and in war.

One Commissary General for each army corps.

385. We would give one Commissary General for each army corps, with a personal assistant, who should ordinarily be one of the senior officers, qualified by his standing and experience either to take charge of the office during the Commissary General's absence on inspection, or occasionally himself to conduct inspections under superior authority.

Proposal to have three account offices in each army corps. Advantages to be gained.

386. We would also strongly recommend that there should be three account offices in each army corps, which would deal with all accounts of Commissariat expenditure within a certain circle. The advantages of this system would be (1), that Commissariat officers would have more leisure to thoroughly supervise their out-door executive arrangements; (2), that the system of accounting both for cash and stores would be more complete and uniform than can be the case when the accounts are dealt with by numerous small offices, each with its peculiarities and imperfections of procedure, involving more or less unnecessary work; (3), that the clerks would be more thoroughly trained, being kept to one kind of work, and free from the constant change of duties now often necessary in Commissariat offices; (4), that the accounts would be dealt with more quickly than is possible at present, when, on any extra work caused by the movements of troops, the accounts are at once set aside for the more pressing demands of executive work. These are only some of the general advantages which would attend the formation of central accounts offices; and no doubt, under the new system, many means would be found of simplifying and reducing work, as details now gone through in each separate office would, in a central office, be reduced to the necessary work of one office only. The work of an Executive Commissariat Office would then be of a very simple character, requiring writers of ordinary capacity and training; and, these offices would not be thrown into a state of utter disorganization, as they now are, by the withdrawal in time of war of their trained writers, whose places cannot, under the present system be adequately filled by untrained men. Lastly, there would not be, as there has been during the late campaign, a sudden change in the mode of rendering and adjusting accounts, as the system in war would be that to which officers and their establishments had been trained and accustomed in times of peace.

Relief of Account Department.

387. Besides the relief which the change would afford to the Commissariat Department, the work of the Commissariat Examiners and of the Accounts Branch of the Controller's office would be much reduced and simplified. There are now in the three presidencies 49 separate offices, each rendering separate cash and store accounts and other periodical statements and returns. There would in future be only 12 such offices. This would, no doubt, effect a very considerable saving in office establishments, rent, and contingencies in all these offices.

388. The

388. The following Table gives the establishment which we consider sufficient, divided into ranks and rates of pay :— Establishment of officers proposed.

Pay and Ranks.

Bengal.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.		Rate.	Total.
						Rs.	Per Mensem. *Rs.*
1	1	1	1	4	Commissary General, consolidated - -	2,000	8,000
2	2	2	2	8	Assistant Commissary General, 1st class, staff pay	800	6,400
3	3	3	3	12	" " 2nd " "	600	7,200
6	5	5	5	21	Deputy Assistant " 1st " "	400	8,400
7	6	6	6	25	" " 2nd " "	300	7,500
8	7	7	7	29	Sub-Assistant Commissary General "	200	5,800
27	24	24	24	99	Monthly - - -		43,300
							12
					Annual - - -		5,19,600
					Present cost for 100 officers - - -		5,56,800
					Saving - - -		37,200
					Add pay of one officer less—Captain - -		4,489
					TOTAL Saving - - - *Rs.*		41,689

389. The establishment detailed above would ordinarily be distributed as follows :— Distribution of establishment.

BENGAL ARMY CORPS.	PUNJAB ARMY CORPS.	MADRAS ARMY CORPS.	BOMBAY ARMY CORPS.
Commissary-General 1	Commissary-General 1	Commissary-General 1	Commissary-General 1
Calcutta - - 2	* Umballa - - 1	* (1) Secunderabad - 2	Above Dadur - 2
* Darjeeling - - 1	* (1) Kussowlie - - 2	Bellary - - - 1	* (1) Kurrachee - - 2
* Dinapore - - 1	* (1) Lahore - - - 2	* (1) Bangalore - - 2	Baroda - - - 1
Allahabad - - 1	Ferozepore - - 1	Wellington - - 1	* (1) Bombay - - 3
Cawnpore - - 1	* Sialkot - - - 1	Belgaum - - 1	* (1) Poona - - - 2
* (1) Lucknow - - 2	Rawalpindi - - 2	* (1) Madras - - - 3	Mhow - - - 1
* Fyzabad - - 1	* Nowshera - - 1	* (1) Rangoon - - 2	* Nusseerabad - - 1
Bareilly - - 1	* (1) Peshawar - - 2	Thyetmyo - - 1	Saugor - - - 1
* Ranikhet - - 1	Kuram - - - 2	* Tanghoo - - 1	* Kamptee - - 1
* (1) Meerut - - - 2	Mooltan - - 1	Port Blair - - 1	Aden - - - 1
* Chakrata - - 1			
* Delhi - - - 1			
Agra - - - 1			
Gwalior - - 1			
Nowgong - - 1			
Assistant to Commissary-General 1	- - - - - 1	- - - - - 1	- - - - - 1
Account officers - 3	- - - - - 3	- - - - - 3	- - - - - 3
23	20	20	20
Percentage for furlough - - 4	- - - - - 4	- - - - - 4	- - - - - 4
27	24	24	24

Forty officers available for field service.

390. In time of war the garrisons of many stations would be so reduced that there would be no difficulty in withdrawing officers from the stations marked with an asterisk, their places being taken by acting or warrant officers. And, even without any such reduction of garrisons, it will be found far easier than it is at present to spare Commissariat officers from these stations, as under the proposed system of separate account offices their duties, freed from all complications of accounts and correspondence, could in case of necessity be readily undertaken by an officer of one of the regiments at the station. The total reserve, therefore, that would be available in time of war could be—

From stations marked (*) - - - - - -	24
Officers recalled from furlough - - - - -	16
TOTAL - - -	40 officers.

Warrant and non-commissioned officers.

391. We have not before us the information necessary to enable us to fix an establishment of warrant and non-commissioned officers; but, looking to the reduction in the number of British regiments and of stations occupied by them, it should certainly be below the present scale.

No officer of less than five years' service should be permitted to enter the Department.

392. We recommend that no officers of less than five years' army service should be permitted to enter the Commissariat Department, and that after two years' probation they should, if permanently posted to the department, be removed from the regimental list and thenceforward be borne on the general list for promotion. In other respects we propose no change in their position or duties, except as regards a stricter definition of their relations to the officer commanding the station or district.

Military position of Commissariat officers.

*Military Department, No. 941, dated 19th February 1877

393. It has already been laid down by the Government of India that, "though departmentally Commissariat officers are under the Government of India in the Military Department,* they are in all other respects staff officers of the general or other officer to whose command they are attached, and should be recognised accordingly." This condition, we are of opinion, should be fully and unreservedly recognised; under it the status of the department and the military spirit of the officers will be maintained. A Commissariat officer must necessarily refer matters of departmental detail to the Commissary General; but this should not, and need not, in any way interfere with his duty and relations to the officer commanding, from whom he should receive his orders direct, and not through the medium of another staff officer.

Course to be pursued when orders are received inconsistent with departmental rules.

394. Should he receive orders which he considers to be inconsistent with the rules of his department, "it will be his duty," as laid down in revised Army Regulations, Volume IV., section 1, paragraph 17, "to point out this inconsistency to the officer commanding, and to solicit a special authority in writing for the deviation, which, being granted, must be implicitly obeyed." The Commissariat officer, however, should (section 1, paragraph 16) "be held responsible for any measure which may be adopted on his recommendation."

395. The position of the Commissary-General, whose place would be at the head-quarters of the army corps, should be in relation to the War Department and to the general commanding, respectively, precisely the same as that held by an executive officer to the Commissary-General and to the officer commanding the station or district. The Chief of the Staff of each army corps would, however, naturally convey the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding to the heads of departments.

Roster for each army corps to be distinct.

396. Though the officers of the Commissariat would be available for service anywhere in time of war, or even occasionally on special occasions in time of peace, the roster for each army corps should be kept distinct; and officers should, as a rule, serve with their own corps, and thus acquire a complete knowledge of the local resources of their districts, which in time of war would be invaluable. But the whole should be viewed as one department for all India, though permanently subdivided between four army corps, and should be administered directly by the War Department of the Government of India, through the Commissary General in Chief, whom we propose to appoint as an administrative

administrative officer of that department. Without interfering in the ordinary administrative or executive details, it would be his duty to enforce economy in all branches of this service, whether *personnel* or *matériel*, to introduce an uniform system of supply and procedure, and to revise and re-organise all establishments on one common scale, with rates of pay only varying according to local circumstances. He would direct or sanction all important contracts, check the demands on England for stores, regulate the reserves with reference to the wants of the whole army, and thus render the resources of the country available to meet the wants of the army, in peace or war, in the most efficient and economical manner.

General duties of Commissary General in Chief.

397. He should have a personal assistant drawn from, but extra to, the establishment of the department, on a staff salary of 600 rupees per mensem. The pay of the Commissary General in Chief should, we think, be the same as that of the Director General of Ordnance, 2,500 rupees a month.

Personal Assistant to Commissary General in chief.

398. The total annual cost of the department would then be as follows :—

Annual cost of proposed department.

	Rs.
One Commissary General in Chief - - - - - -	30,000
One Assistant to ditto (staff) - - - - - -	7,200
Establishment for four army-corps - - - - -	5,19,600
Total - - - - Rs.	5,56,800

This is, as shown in paragraph 388, the present cost for 100 officers, the number now required, inclusive of the personal assistant to the Commissary General in Chief.

399. Beyond relieving the department of petty supplies to the Barrack Department, of supplies to civil departments, of the supply of hospital clothing, and of cavalry and artillery line-gear, all of which proposals we desire to recommend, we do not consider that much change can be made in its duties in time of peace. The line-gear, with the exception of those articles now furnished by the Ordnance Department, should, we consider, be supplied by commanding officers, the cost being charged in contingent bills. The barrack supplies would be undertaken by the barrack masters, and the hospital clothing be made up by the Superintendent and Agent for Army Clothing.

Petty barrack supplies to be made by Barrack Department.

Hospital clothing by Clothing Department.

Line-gear by officer commanding.

400. The Commissariat has no doubt many apparently extraneous duties thrown on it, but they are really duties which properly appertain to it as the general department of local supply for other departments. It is for the advantage of the public service that there should be as few disbursing and accounting departments as possible; and there are obvious reasons why the Commissariat should be the one selected for these miscellaneous duties. We have elsewhere recommended that the transport of the army should continue under the Commissariat Department in time of peace, and also in war up to the base of operations, but for this service there will be separate transport officers working, in subordination to the department, under the orders of the Lieutenant-General commanding the army corps. This arrangement will relieve commissariat officers to a great extent of the strain caused by the transport, as well as the supply, operations of the army being thrown on their hands without any additional trained assistance.

Commissariat must necessarily be the department of local supply.

Proposals regarding transport will relieve Commissariat.

Clothing.

401. The clothing of the army is at present supplied from three depôts, one for each presidency, under a separate superintendent. The material is imported from England through the Store Department of the India Office, that for British troops being drawn from the War Office, while the cloth for the Native army is supplied by contractors. With some few exceptions to be noted hereafter, it is for the most part made up at the depôts, and issued ready-made to regiments and batteries.

System of supply.

402. The service appears to us to be conducted on the whole with efficiency and economy; and we have no desire to propose any radical changes in the organization of the department, or in the mode of supply and manufacture.

No radical changes recommended.

Economy of concentration of the three depôts doubtful.

403. It would no doubt be possible to concentrate the whole supply of clothing for the British and Native troops in two clothing depôts, or even eventually in one; but the economy of the change is doubtful, while there are no reasons connected with the organization of the army corps as proposed by us why any change in the present arrangement need be made. The only saving would be in the pay of the superintendent, and in the reduction of a portion of his establishment and contingencies. The actual cost of manufacture and packing would remain much the same as it is now.

Reasons for this opinion.

404. On the other hand, if the Bengal Clothing Depôt were retained for the supply of the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps, and a second one maintained at Bombay for the supply of Madras and Bombay, it would be necessary to enlarge and add to the present buildings at Bombay. The price of labour is very high in that town, and would probably rise still higher with the additional demand; while the charges for the transport of clothing to the Madras presidency and to the troops in Burma would be considerable. It may be said that these would be incurred mostly on guaranteed lines of railway; but, even so, the charge would be shown against the War Department; and in any case, whether the clothing be conveyed by a guaranteed or a State line, the transport would cost something in haulage, and wear and tear of rolling-stock. The risk of loss or damage in transit would also be increased. If the joint agency were established at Madras, there would also be some expenditure on new buildings: the cost of freight from England would be higher, and the transport charges, as shown above, would be very considerable, greater in fact than from Bombay. There would also be some immediate expenditure in the transfer of stock from Madras to Bombay, or *vice versâ*.

Reduction in staff salaries proposed.

405. We are, therefore, of opinion that no change in the present arrangement is necessary, either as regards efficiency or economy. The staff salaries of the superintendents however (1,000 rupees in Bengal and 700 rupees in Madras and Bombay) appear to us to be unnecessarily high in comparison with those allotted to other staff appointments; and we recommend that in future they should be fixed at 800 rupees for Bengal and 600 rupees for the other depôts.

Hospital clothing to be made up in the Clothing Department, and distributed to Commissariat depôts.

406. It would, we consider, be a great advantage to extend to the Madras and Bombay Army Corps the practice by which all "over-clothing" for hospitals is made up in the Clothing Department, and even to go still further and have all hospital clothing made up by that agency and consigned in bulk to commissariat depôts, whence it could be distributed as required.

Committee of 1875.

407. As pointed out by a Committee which reported on this subject in 1875—

> "such an arrangement would have a double advantage. It would secure a superior make and workmanship, instead of leaving the work to executive commissariat officers, who are dependent on the labour they can procure in the bazaar; and it would fix the responsibility of passing the articles on the Clothing Department, instead of, as now, on committees, who often have no special knowledge on the question."

Relief to Commissariat Department.

It would also relieve the Commissariat Department of a portion of those multifarious duties which now interfere with its more legitimate work of supply and transport.

Making up clothing by regiments.

Advantages.

408. We have also had under our consideration the question of how far it might be desirable to adopt the system of making up the whole of the clothing for the army under regimental arrangements. It is urged in favour of this plan that it would tend to make corps more self-reliant and independent, that the clothing would be better fitted and give more satisfaction to commanding officers, and that it would afford a wider range of industrial pursuits to the army, and a profitable employment for the wives and families of soldiers.

Disadvantages.

409. On the other hand, it is objected that unless the change were universal, and all corps without exception directed to make their own clothing, the full saving comtemplated by the abolition of the Clothing Department could not be realised. If the depôts were thus abolished or reduced, it would be very difficult to restore them to a state of efficiency, when, owing to a protracted war, regiments, unable to make up their own clothing, would be compelled to look to this department for their supplies. The cost of making up uniforms regimentally,

ally, and the waste of cloth from want of skill in cutting out, must necessarily be greater than in a regular factory, where by the use of machines, trained workmen, and skilled supervision, to prevent waste of material, the cost of the clothing can be reduced to a minimum. The amount now realised by the sale of cuttings would be much diminished. It has also been represented that in those corps where the clothing has been made up regimentally, the quality of the work is inferior to that turned out at the clothing depôts, while the necessary attention is not always paid to the uniformity prescribed by regulations.

Present practice of supplying materials in bulk to the mounted branches, and, when desirable, to infantry, should continue.

410. We find that, under present regulations, the clothing for the mounted branches may be supplied either made up or in materials, as may be required, and that for the rest of the army a certain percentage may be issued unmade; also that, whenever any regiment for special reasons desires to make up its own clothing, the application, if their is no objection on public grounds, is generally sanctioned. In view of the objections to the entire abolition of the present system, we do not think it necessary to extend any further the present practice of making up clothing regimentally.

Saving of 4,800 rupees per annum.

411. There will be a small saving in this department from the reduction of staff salaries, amounting to 4,800 rupees per annum.

SECTION 2.—TRANSPORT.

Need for efficient transport in Indian warfare.

412. We feel that there can be no doubt in the mind of any one who has studied the history of Indian wars that an efficient transport service is the first requirement of an army on a campaign.* Unless supplies of food for men and horses, reserves of ammunition for rifles and guns, and sufficient hospital appliances, are always present with an army in the field, the men can neither march nor fight. A part, at any rate, of the Indian army must always be equipped as if it were in the presence of the enemy in the field. In India, and in Asia generally, even more than in Europe, the rule holds good that a small fully equipped force, which can act at once and strike sharp, prompt blows, is more efficient, and far more economical than a large army that can only take the field after months of preparation. As one of the officers,† whose report will be found in Appendix LVI., says, "even if it be necessary to retrench in other points to meet the necessary expenditure, it would be a thousand times better to do so and give the army an efficient transport service; for such a service would give power of movement to the army, and is worth more to it than a couple of extra divisions."

Moveable column carriage.

413. In former years, no standing carriage, except elephants, no transport establishments, and no ambulance arrangements were maintained in India during times of peace. In the mutiny campaigns, and in previous Indian wars, the local carriage of the country, consisting of elephants, camels, bullock-carts, and pack-bullocks, answered tolerably well for the requirements of armies operating in the plains of India. Ordinarily, regiments had to march hundreds of miles before they reached the scene of action, and during the march the vehicles, the animals, and their drivers, became more or less disciplined and organized. But when a sharp and sudden blow had to be struck, the army was at times paralyzed for want of available carriage—as, for instance, when the field column was kept waiting at Umballa before it could march upon Delhi, in May 1857. The lessons of the mutiny taught the Government that, for the maintenance of internal order, and for the repression or prevention of disturbance, it was necessary that small bodies of troops should be able to take the field at a few hours' notice in different parts of the country. Accordingly, the Government has, since 1861, established and maintained, at 43 different stations, a small supply of carriage, sufficient to place in the field an effective "moveable column" of all arms. The constitution of the "moveable column" carriage varied according to the nature of the country. For instance, in Lower Bengal, Assam,

* Lord Strathnairn says it is "better to have 10,000 men with perfect transport, which ensures their efficiency, than double that number with imperfect transport and all the evils which follow in its train—an embarrassed strategy, neglected sick, and an ill-supplied soldiery."

† Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Low of the 13th Bengal Lancers.

Assam, and Burma, where the country is destitute of metalled roads and is intersected by rivers and rice-swamps, the moveable column carriage consists mainly of elephants and boats. In the Punjab, in Western and Northern India, the standing transport consists mainly of camels and elephants. In Madras, where camels do not thrive, the carriage consists of elephants, pack-oxen, mules, and a few camels. To each moveable column are attached a small number of dooly-bearers for carrying the sick and wounded, of water-carriers, and of other camp-followers. The elephants attached to moveable columns are all Government property; but the camels, carts, and pack-cattle are mostly hired. The orders of 1861 directed that moveable columns should be regularly mobilized and marched out of cantonments for a certain number of days in the year. But during the last ten years the moveable columns have very rarely, and at many cantonments have never, been moved out. No share of the standing carriage has been allotted to the several arms composing the moveable columns; but few officers or detachments have known their place in these columns; and the only action on the mobilization rules of 1861 has been the occasional publication, in station and regimental order-books, of the detachments told off periodically to the moveable columns.

Other carriage besides moveable column carriage.

414. Besides the "moveable column" carriage, a certain limited quantity of carriage is maintained at stations where there is no moveable column. This extra carriage consists of elephants, camels, and pack-bullocks, all of which, save the elephants, are hired. In addition to the provision of moveable column and station carriage, there are certain corps and arms of the service which are always kept provided with carriage. For instance, bullocks are kept to draw the second line of waggons attached to horse and field batteries of artillery, while elephants and bullocks are maintained for siege trains. Mountain batteries of artillery are provided with 66 baggage mules each, the presence of which enables half the battery to take the field fully equipped, or the whole battery to start in the lightest marching order, at a few hours' notice. Every corps of the Punjab Frontier Force is allowed to maintain sufficient camels and mules to enable half the regiment to take the field equipped and supplied for 15 days' service, or to enable the whole regiment to start in the lightest marching order ready for three days' field service. Then, again, all the (*sillidar*) cavalry of the Punjab, Bengal, and Bombay armies maintain* as part of

* The practice of Native cavalry regiments is not quite uniform in this respect. For instance, the Sind Horse keep, at the cost of the regiment, sufficient camels to enable the men to take the field. The Central India Horse require only 80 additional ponies per regiment, with 12 cacolet mules and 95 dooly-bearers, to enable them to take the field equipped for a long campaign, with reserve ammunition, hospital tents, and officers' baggage. The Poona Horse are always ready to march anywhere with their regimental baggage ponies; and the following extract from the commanding officer, Colonel La Touche's report, shows how this is arranged; he writes:—

"I think all Native cavalry regiments should keep up their own baggage animals, such animals serving in garrison as grass-cutters' ponies, and being equally useful therefore both in peace and war. As the baggage arrangements in my own regiment have always been most successful, I append a few notes on the system. In my own regiment the regimental carriage consists of a pony for every two horses for the non-commissioned officer, rank and file; and each Native officer has a pony for himself. This number is kept up most strictly; and the ponies are inspected every month on muster day by the squadron commanders. When the regiment is in camp, they are employed by the men in bringing in forage from the surrounding villages, making trips of from 10 to 20 miles, probably three times a week. They are thus in constant training for the work that is required of them on field service, and the syces in charge of them gain daily experience in the proper method of loading them. By this arrangement, I am at any time able to start at a moment's notice with my regiment and nearly two hundred and fifty baggage ponies, and have never yet, on the numerous occasions the regiment has been ordered out on various duties, had to apply for outside assistance. The loads carried by these ponies are extraordinary, and they will march 20 and 30 miles a day for weeks, arriving always at the encamping-ground within half an hour of the regiment. The latest occasion on which the services of my regiment have been required was the suppression of the dacoities in the Deccan. One detachment marched at an hour's notice, and covered 100 miles the first forty hours. I append a few extracts from long reports I have just received from Majors Daniell and Westmacott, Superintendents of Police, in command of various parties: 'The Poona Horse possesses a very great advantage over other regiments I have seen here in being supplied with pony carriage. The result is, that they can move literally as soon as the horses can be saddled and the baggage packed on the ponies, and they can travel over any country. On one occasion I marched with a detachment over 100 miles in less than forty hours; but whenever we halted for a few hours, the men's baggage was up, and they were able to get food for themselves and to make their horses and themselves as comfortable as they would be in their own lines within an hour of dismounting. Without this pony carriage, our movements would have been completely hampered in this country, where cavalry may at any moment be called on to travel long distances.' The above is from a report by Major Daniell.

"Major Westmacott, commanding a flying column, writes as follows: 'I applied for Government mule carriage for the infantry, and when it was really tested against the baggage ponies, the latter had the best of it by hours.' In describing some very hard work the men had in the pouring rain from 24th June to 3rd July 1879 over the Western Ghâts, he says: 'Six horses of the Poona Horse slipped off the path and rolled down distances, varying from 18 to 50 feet; the rain was incessant, and six nullahs were crossed in heavy flood. The ponies were again up within a few hours of the men; the mule carriage broke down altogether;

of their equipment, camels, or ponies, or mules, sufficient or nearly sufficient, to take the field in light marching order. Further, of late years, a reserve of 500 pack-mules has been maintained at the station of Rawal Pindi, and a similar number at Peshawar. These animals have been found of the greatest use in frontier expeditions, and also in carrying supplies to the regiments cantoned in the Murree hills.

415. The total cost of the means of transport now maintained for the Indian army in time of peace is, yearly,—

	Rs.
Bengal and Punjab armies, moveable column and station carriage	23,06,175
Madras army " " " " -	7,15,052
Bombay " " " " " -	5,41,609
Punjab Frontier Force regimental carriage - - - -	85,000
Total - - - *Rs.*	36,47,836
Besides this outlay on Government carriage, the army is charged with the following expenses, namely,—	
Cost of keeping up the khedda or elephant-catching establishments	1,50,000
Cost of hired carriage for reliefs, and for moving commissariat and ordnance stores, over and above railway and steamer expenses (about) - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,00,000
Grand Total - - - *Rs.*	39,97,836
From this must be deducted the cost of bullocks for the second line of waggons, in place of which other carriage has been (paragraph 200 of this Report) proposed - - - - - - -	2,33,905
Net Total of Transport Expenditure (exclusive of railway and steamer charges) in peace time - - - - *Rs.*	37,63,931

This does not show the cost of maintaining partial, or complete, carriage for *sillidar* cavalry regiments, which keep up pony, or other means of transport, out of their pay.

416. For this outlay of nearly 38 lakhs of rupees, the sanctioned strength is— Total cost of peace transport.

	No.
Elephants - - - - - - - - - -	1,307
Camels (mostly hired) - - - - - - - -	9,048
Mules (chiefly Government property) - - - -	4,412
Draught bullocks, with carts - - - - - - -	1,584
Siege-train bullocks* - - - - - - - -	1,760
Dooly-bearers - - - - - - - - - -	6,199
Other followers (exclusively of attendants on animals) -	628

This strength of carts and animals represents (exclusive of the siege-train bullocks) power to carry 74,000 maunds,† that is to say, it would suffice‡ to put into the field 15,000 British and 30,000 Native troops, complete with reserve ammunition, tents and baggage, according to the scale laid down for warfare in Afghanistan, hospitals, and four days' food for men and animals. The whole of these means of transport are under the charge of commissariat officers, with the exception of the transport animals belonging to the Punjab Frontier Force, which are in the charge of regimental officers. It must not be supposed that all this carriage is kept idle in time of peace. In the cold season it is employed in

altogether; three died from exhaustion and want of forage, and eighteen out of thirty-five went sick.' Further on, describing the end of this severe week's marching, he states: 'The whole of the mules did not rejoin me for a week, and then had left their tents behind; three mules died, and thirteen were sent sick to Poona. Out of thirty-five of the ponies, some (I cannot give the exact number) were laid up with sore backs; but all, with one exception, were fit to march again on the 7th.' Again: 'We have marched over some 600 miles in wet and dry, over hills and through deep mud; and pony carriage has never failed.'"

* Artillery bullocks numbering 1,987 are not included.

† 1 maund = 80 lbs.

‡ The carriage of the moveable column could do this duty, if it could be all employed. But it must be remembered that the elephants (of which there are 1,307) can hardly work at all in a country where there is no forage, and can never be concentrated. The heavy bullock-carts again, which are very useful in cantonments on good roads, are of little use on stony tracks through mountainous countries.

n transporting the baggage and stores of regiments moved from one station o another; and the dooly-bearers pull barrack punkahs in the hot weather. The draught bullocks are more or less engaged throughout the year in carrying supplies and doing cantonment work. The camels, for a part of the year, are kept at graze at half rates of hire, on condition that full rates are paid directly they are wanted for duty.

Present transport arrangements in time of war.

417. The large stock of carriage, thus kept up (at a cost of 376,000 *l.*) in time of peace, is not all available for use in war. It is distributed among some scores of cantonments from Kurrachee on the west to Tonghoo on the east, from Peshawar in the north to Trichinopoly in the south. The railway extension has made it easier to send carriage from one part of India to another; but it is costly and inconvenient to send camels or elephants by railway. Moreover, it is not considered desirable to withdraw entirely the moveable column carriage from the interior of the country. Therefore, when war threatens or breaks out in any part of India, only the moveable column carriage, and the station carriage of the cantonments close to the theatre of war, can at once be sent into the field. For the rest, the commissariat officers hire through contractors, buy in the market, or impress through the civil authorities, such additional carriage as is required for the advanced columns. As far as possible, the carriage with the field columns is composed of camels and pack-animals; bullock-carts usually suffice for the trains connecting the base of operations with the nearest railway terminus. The whole means of transport thus collected are worked under the commissariat officers, who are burdened with this charge in addition to their own primary duty of providing and distributing supplies. In the recent campaign the field transport has been placed under transport officers, who have so far relieved the extreme pressure on the commissariat staff. But the arrangement has been subject to the very serious drawbacks that the owners of, or attendants on, the hired or impressed transport tried to get away whenever they could, and that the attendants on Government animals were untrained and undisciplined, while neither attendants nor animals were accustomed to, or furnished with, protection against the inhospitable climate of Afghanistan. The result has been that, according to a report issued by the Quartermaster General, 60,000 of the camels supplied to the troops in Afghanistan last campaign have died or disappeared, and the force was stopped after four months in the field for lack of transport. Large reinforcements of transport were sent up, and the transport service was re-organized, so that the army stood ready to march on Cabul. But after the signature of the treaty of peace, and the lapse of a comparatively short interval, there was again a want of carriage notwithstanding that the animals sent to the front during the preceding five months, were sufficient, if properly treated and managed, to have mobilized a considerably larger force than that which crossed the frontier during the whole war. The cost to the country of the carriage supplied to the Kandahar, Khyber, and Kuram columns during the six months November 1878 to May 1879, is estimated to have been 183 lakhs of rupees (1,830,000 *l.*), inclusive of the value of the animals which have perished. Notwithstanding all this outlay, when a fresh campaign began in September 1879, there was again the greatest difficulty, and enormous outlay, in mobilizing the comparatively small columns that marched into Afghanistan by the Kuram and Khyber routes..

See Appendix XLIV.

See Appendix XLV.

Cause of the apparent failure of the old system.

418. It seems to us that the old system, under which Indian armies were put into the field in past years, has broken down in the Afghan campaigns of 1878 and 1879. It may appear strange that a system, which answered sufficiently well in the Cabul expeditions of 1839—41, in the Sind expedition of 1843, in the Sutlej and Punjab wars of 1846 and 1849, and in the long mutiny campaigns of 1857—59, should be condemned at the present time; for without doubt some of the armies operated at a longer distance from their effective base during the old wars than they did in the campaigns of the past two years. But it must be remembered that, during the last twenty years, the extensions of railways and metalled roads have wrought a great change in the course of traffic in India. Formerly the salt, the grain, the piece-goods, and the cotton traffic of the country moved across India by means of caravans of camels, and endless strings of pack-bullocks. Now all this trade is carried by railways along the main lines, and is distributed from the railways by carts moving on bridged roads,

roads, which are for the most part fairly level. One result of this change has been that camels are hardly used at all save in the sandy plains of Rajputana, and in the districts of the Punjab, while pack-oxen are seen only in small droves among the hills and wastes of Central and Southern India. The carts of Northern India which have taken the place of pack-animals, and ply in vast numbers on the roads and cross-roads of the country, would be serviceable enough for the heavy baggage of an army operating in Oudh, the North-Western Provinces, or the Punjab. The much lighter carts of the Bombay and Madras country would do good work for the stony and more hilly cross-roads of the south. But none of these bullock-carts are light enough and quick enough for duty with field columns of the present day, operating in countries like Afghanistan, or employed beyond sea. Ordinary country bullocks and carts, however, suffice for working a staged-train from the nearest Indian railway terminus to the field base.

Object of any new transport service.

419. We consider that any new transport service should maintain carriage enough to place a few moveable columns in the field at very short notice; should establish a reserve of carriage at a few selected centres, sufficient to mobilize within ten* to fourteen days a force of 6,000 British and 11,000 Native soldiers of all arms; and a system should be organised under which European officers and Native subordinates may receive constant training in transport duties, and the small reserve of carriage may in time of war be made capable of expansion on a pre-arranged plan. If all this can be done, at a somewhat smaller outlay than is now caused by the peace transport establishment, we may be quite sure that, under an organized and pre-arranged system, there will be very great saving in the cost of transport for future wars.

Reduction in the number of elephants.

420. Before showing how we propose to effect this object, we would describe some changes in the animals and *matériel*, which economy and the progress of circumstances appear to dictate. In the first place, we consider it to be quite unnecessary to maintain so large a number of elephants. These animals are very suitable for moveable column carriage in Burma, Assam, and Bengal, where fodder is plentiful, and where much of the country is covered with rice swamps. A small number of elephants, with appropriate harness, must be kept to drag siege-train guns. Elephants have been used on an emergency to carry field-guns in countries impassable for wheeled vehicles, as in Abyssinia. But the keep and purchase of elephants is very costly; the animals themselves are delicate, liable to get foot-sore on stony roads, and they suffer much from the cold. For ordinary operations, they form a very expensive and inconvenient means of transport. Moreover, it is practically impossible to move elephants by railway, and it is difficult to move them by water from one part of India to another. They cannot march more than 300 miles a month; and so the elephant carriage of one part of India is not promptly available for operations in another part of India. We propose to reduce the number of Government elephants constantly maintained, from 1,307 to about 400,† and we believe that this number may hereafter be further very much reduced. The average cost of keeping and replacing an elephant is 1,200 rupees a year; therefore the reduction of 900 elephants will make 10,80,000 rupees a year available for other means of transport. When a much smaller number of elephants is maintained, it will not be necessary to keep up the khedda (elephant-catching) establishment, which costs 1,50,000 rupees a year. The ordinary cost of a trained elephant has of late years been 1,200 rupees to 1,500 rupees. If a large number of Government elephants are thrown upon the market, they may be expected to fetch somewhat less all round. Still the sale of 900 elephants ought to yield ot least 9,00,000 rupees, which will be available for the purchase of other means of transport.

See Appendix XLVI.

Need for light mule and pony carts.

421. It has been said that the whole of the moveable column carriage at present consists of pack-animals; and the only description of wheeled transport hitherto

* Under our scheme, mobilization could be effected within ten to fourteen days, if the point of concentration were near the northern frontier. But our next point of concentration may have to be on the sea-board, or on the borders of Nepal or Burma.

† Two hundred and thirty-eight elephants are to be maintained for moveable column and reserve carriage. The remainder, 162, *may* be required for regimental carriage at frontier stations in Assam and Burma, where camels and wheeled carriage cannot be used, and where the keep of elephants is much cheaper than in the plains of India.

hitherto used by Indian armies are the heavy bullock-carts of the Indian plains, which are quite unsuitable for rapid marches or for hilly roads. Yet it stands to reason that wheeled transport, where roads exist, must be cheaper and more economical of animal power than pack transport. A mule or a strong pony can drag in a light cart at least twice the load which it can carry on its back. And light well-designed carts, drawn by mules or ponies, can travel and keep up with advanced columns on any track passable for field artillery. The baggage of all civilized armies is carried, more or less, in wheeled carts. We consider that for the transport service of the Indian army a supply of strong single and double mule (or pony) carts should be provided. A committee of practical officers should, we think, be appointed to consider the subject and construct and test various descriptions of carts. They should communicate with the many officers throughout the country who have given attention to this subject. It would not be necessary that the pattern of carts should be everywhere uniform. But the carts should be strong as well as light; the several parts of carts of any one pattern should be interchangeable; spare pieces as well as spare-wheels would be carried with the reserve supplies on service; and the harness should be devised so that the animals may, when necessary, be used for pack transport. If the wheels and axles of the service carts are really strong, the rest of the cart can be as cheap and simple as possible. For quick light carriage accompaning regiments on rapid marches, we believe that nothing could be more effective than a cart constructed after the fashion of the ordinary "ekka" of Hindustan, a light strong vehicle in which the common ponies of the country perform long journeys, and which could be adapted, by a slight change in construction, to the carriage of a light load, or of two foot-sore men.

Committee to be appointed.

Wheeled and other carriage for sick and wounded.

422. We consider that a change is also required in the arrangements for carrying the sick and wounded. At present, European troops in the field are accompanied by doolies and dooly-bearers for ten per cent. of their strength. The allowance of sick carriage for Native troops is one dooly per company, with as many ordinary bullock-carts as may be required; for work on the Punjab frontier, regiments have dandis in place of doolies, and five camels equipped with (kazawars) panniers for carrying sick men. Doolies for the sick and wounded were an excellent and most comfortable means of transport for the plains of India, so long as a supply of trained dooly-bearers was always available, but with the changes in the mode of travelling, caused by the construction of railways and roads during the past twenty years, the demand for dooly-bearers has almost ceased; and, as a consequence, very few trained men can now be hired for a campaign. Last year, common labourers, of all ages and of indifferent physical power, were hired for the Afghan expedition, many of whom were found quite unable to carry doolies; they fell sick, and filled the hospitals, and if the forces had been engaged in many hard, fought actions, there would have been the greatest difficulty in carrying away the wounded. It must not be forgotten that in Asiatic warfare, every wounded man must at once be carried off the field to the rear. Humanity to the wounded cannot be expected from semi-civilized races, and wounded men found by the enemy are liable, if not certain, to be ill-treated. The difficulty of obtaining competent dooly-bearers on hire at short notice will increase as years go on. We therefore think that the number of doolies allotted to regiments on service must be reduced; that mule ambulances, or wheeled carts, for the carriage of the sick should be substituted for a proportion of doolies; and that for Native troops camel-panniers (kazawars) and mule-panniers (cacolets) should be allowed in sufficient number.

Scale suggested.

423. The scale we suggest is—

For British Troops—

Doolies or dandies for 3 per cent. of the troops in the field.

Spring ambulances drawn by two mules for 3 per cent. of the troops in the field.

Camel-panniers (kazawars) for 1 per cent. of the troops in the field.

For Native Troops—

Doolies or dandies for $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops in the field.

Ambulances, camel-panniers (kazawars), and mule-panniers (cacolets) for $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops in the field.

Dooly-bearer

Dooly-bearers sufficient to supply a whole army corps in the field should be kept up, as an ambulance corps, in time of peace; the men should be regularly enlisted, disciplined, and clothed, with a sufficient proportion of sirdars (gang-leaders); and they might be employed in pulling punkahs, or other station and relief duty in time of peace. We are aware that there is much difficulty in devising a type of ambulance cart which shall be at once light, strong, and comfortable for wounded men, and shall carry a small stock of medicines and instruments. The best pattern of mule ambulance, of camel-pannier, and of mule-pannier would have to be settled by a committee of officers who have seen recent service. The camels and mules told off for hospital duty would have to be specially selected for strength and docility; and each animal would require a driver, instead of one driver to two or more animals, as is usual with baggage cattle. Not only is it necessary to substitute wheeled ambulances and pannier animals for a proportion of doolies, by reason of the scarcity of dooly-bearers, but ambulances will also be much cheaper. Every dooly, with six bearers, costs about 540 rupees a year in peace; it can carry only one wounded soldier, and it adds six men to the number of camp-followers to be fed, clothed, and protected. Two ambulances would cost about 800 rupees a year in peace, and they would carry, besides the drivers, eight men. A camel with panniers and a driver would cost about 180 rupees in peace, and 300 rupees in war time, and a cacolet mule would cost about 50 per cent. more. The cost of the different classes of sick carriage would thus be—

Committee to be appointed to decide on ambulances, &c.

	In Peace.	
	Rs.	
Doolies	540	Cost per annum of carriage for each sick man.
Wheeled ambulances	100	
Camel-panniers	90	
Mule-panniers	135	

In operations among the hills of the eastern frontier, camel-panniers and wheeled ambulances could not work. But the forces employed on such expeditions are small, and the supply of doolies and cacolets, constantly maintained, would suffice for such occasions. As in the case of mule and pony carts, so with ambulances and cacolets, they can move easily by railway from one end of India to the other, and so can thus be available for a campaign anywhere. Camels with panniers are not equally available beyond marching distance.

Question of keeping standing transport in regimental charge.

424. In the reports received by us, the question whether regimental transport in time both of peace and of war, should be managed and controlled by regimental officers, or by the officers of the Commissariat or the Transport Department, is much discussed. Experience in the Abyssinian and Afghan campaigns has abundantly shown that the corps and batteries, which have maintained regimental transport, were much more mobile, managed their transport better, and lost fewer animals, than those which employed carriage made over to them by the commissariat. At the same time it is also clear that standing regimental carriage is costly to maintain, and can be kept permanently only with regiments, such as the Punjab Frontier Force, which are constantly employed in the same neighbourhood. Obviously, a regiment of British infantry stationed one year in Calcutta, next year at a Himalayan station, and two years afterwards at Peshawar, cannot maintain and carry about with it regimental carriage that shall be useful at all these stations. Again, mounted branches of the service, such as artillery and cavalry, must keep a large number of animals near their barracks, and constantly employ ponies. Units belonging to these arms could easily accommodate and supervise a moderate additional strength of ponies or mules. A regiment of European infantry, on the other hand, has not space near its barracks for keeping carriage animals; its staff is not conversant with the duty; and it would not be possible to keep the transport of such a corps in regimental charge in peace time. We consider, on the whole, that such transport as the Government can maintain in peace time should be, so far as may be practicable, in regimental charge, subject to the

See Appendix XLVII.

the supervision and control of the transport branch of the Commissariat Department. Elephants and camels at large stations, or for the use of European troops, would ordinarily remain in departmental charge, but would be allotted, as far as possible, to regiments. Transport for Native regiments, and mule or pony carriage for mounted European troops, would ordinarily remain in charge of, and be attached to, regiments. We think that measures might be devised for making these cattle useful for bringing in forage for the troops, and that also, by helping the cavalry grass-cutters by a small grant, their ponies might be made available for drawing light carts or "ekkas" on the march.

Transport organization in peace time.

425. After much consideration we have come to the conclusion that the transport service should be a branch of the Commissariat Department, the staff of which would have to be strengthened, so as to provide for its new duties. Much has been said in favour of making the transport service a separate department both in peace and war. But we are satisfied that the transport organization can best be managed as a branch of the great Department of Supply. The commissariat officers and staff have the necessary knowledge of the requirements of animals and vehicles; their organization already extends to every garrison and cantonment; if the transport work be recognised as a separate and important branch of commissariat work, and if additional and special officers and subordinates are allowed for the duty, there can be no advantage, while there would be much expense and some inconvenience, in creating a new and separate department. Attached to the Commissary General of each army corps there would, under the scheme we propose, be a chief transport officer, who would, under the direction of the Commissary General, and under the orders of the Lieutenant General, be answerable for, and control, all the transport arrangements of the army corps. The commissariat officer of each station would be in direct charge of the Government departmental transport at the station; and he would, under the orders of the officer commanding the station, inspect periodically all Government transport in regimental charge. At stations where there was a moveable column of the three arms, a young officer from one of the British regiments in the garrison, who was qualified for staff employ, should, we think, be attached to the Commissariat Department as assistant transport officer; he would draw for the duty the staff salary attached to the second grade of garrison staff officer. If an officer from a British regiment could not be spared for the duty, a Native officer might be appointed transport officer on a staff salary of 50 rupees a month. The transport officer's duty would be to assist the commissariat officer in the management and control of the Government carriage; he would remain a combatant officer, and would not be seconded in his regiment. At stations where reserve carriage is placed, the transport officer would be a staff officer seconded from his regiment, and would receive a staff salary of 200 rupees a month. Reserve transport officers of all grades would work under the commissariat officer. Government carriage in regimental charge would be placed by the regimental or battery commander under a European officer in the case of British troops, to whom would be attached a selected non-commissioned officer, who would be inspector of regimental transport. The regimental transport of a Native regiment would be placed under a Native officer. Transport officers of British regiments would receive horse allowance of 30 rupees a month; while an allowance of 15 rupees a month would suffice for Native officers, and for British and Native non-commissioned officers respectively, and they would work either under the regimental quartermaster, or directly under the commanding officer, according as the latter might direct. The duty of the regimental transport officer would be to see that the Government carriage was kept in good order, that it was employed on Government work, and that available spare carriage was let on hire, or otherwise employed in such way as the commissariat officer, with the sanction of the commanding officer, might direct. All drivers, syces, dooly-bearers, and other followers, belonging to Government carriage would be regularly enlisted, and would receive a cheap uniform* at the public expense. The petty officers of the camel-men, muleteers, and cart-drivers,

* A khaki cotton jumper and a red turban once a year, and a woollen jumper once in two years, with the letters "T. S." on the shoulder have been suggested as suitable uniform for the Indian transport service.

drivers, should be as far as possible pensioned soldiers, or reservists, who might have capabilities for such duty. They would receive the pay of their appointment in addition to their pension or reserve pay. Extra hands required for transport work at camps of exercise, or on reliefs, or for detachments or command, should be taken as far as possible from the ranks of the Native regiments in the garrison; the men getting working pay for the days of such employment. When any considerable quantity of Government carriage is hired out to private persons, a Native officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier should be sent in charge. In order to accustom the troops to the methodical* loading and unloading of tents and baggage, every regiment, or part of a regiment, which possessed or could obtain Government carriage, should be frequently exercised, and a report of the manner in which the troops have acquitted themselves should be furnished to the Lieutenant General Commanding.

Theory of transport should be taught.

426. Under such an arrangement there would always be with the army a considerable number of officers and men who would have had some practical experience of transport work. But it would be necessary that the theory of transport work should also be taught. To this end a handbook for transport officers should be prepared, giving an account of transport by railway, by ship, and by road; explaining the duties of transport officers in the field and in garrison; and describing the different kinds of transport, the *matériel* used, the precautions to be taken, and the risks to be guarded against, in the field or on the line of communications. Lectures on transport should be made a part of the course in garrison instruction and in Native military schools. The subject should rank higher in the garrison course than military law, or even than surveying. When the transport course has been established, no officer who has not qualified in the subject should be eligible for a transport appointment or for the Commissariat Department.

Moveable columns to be maintained for the future.

427. The Government transport to be maintained during time of peace should, we think, consist of—

(*a*) moveable column transport,

(*b*) regimental transport,

(*c*) reserve transport at depôts.

We think that the great changes which have taken place in the means of communication, since moveable columns were first organized in 1861, make it possible for the Government to be satisfied with a smaller number of moveable columns than were then considered necessary. Omitting the frontier garrisons, which will be noticed hereafter, we advise that moveable columns be maintained only at—

Bengal Army Corps—		
Barrackpore.	Gwalior.	*Allahabad.
Dorunda.	*Lucknow.	*Bareilly.
Nowgong.		
Punjab Army Corps—		
*Umballa.	*Rawal Pindi.	Meean Meer.
Madras Army Corps—		
Madras.	*Secunderabad.	Cuttack.
*Bangalore.	Waltair.	Rangoon.
Berhampore.		
Bombay Army Corps—		
*Poona.	Ahmedabad.	Saugor.
*Mhow.	Nussecrabad.	Kamptee.

Excluding the columns at places marked with an asterisk, at which we propose to keep depôts of reserve carriage, the cost of the moveable columns at other places will be about 6,63,000 rupees a year, as shown in Appendix XLVIII.

428. The

* Reports from officers who served in the recent campaign teem with accounts of the way in which delay, loss of power, expense, and waste of animal life were caused by the ignorance of all ranks regarding the proper and economical employment, and custody, of the transport animals made over for regimental use.

Charge of moveable column transport.

428. The moveable column carriage allotted to mounted branches of the service should be in battery or regimental charge. The transport allotted to infantry should be in charge of the Commissariat Department; but the animals and vehicles belonging to each arm would be distinct, and the commanding officer of that arm would be entitled to order out his share of the transport for exercise or practice, at such notice as the circumstances might require. Each moveable column would be complete with ambulances, and carriage for light tents, hospitals, &c. In time of war, the mules, ponies, and carts belonging to every moveable column, ambulances, dooly-bearers, and pannier-mules, could be transferred by railway wherever they might be required; their places being supplied temporarily, wherever necessary, by hired carriage of the district. Such hired carriage could be cheaply obtained for work near the homes of the owners. It would ordinarily be inadvisable or impossible to transfer elephants and camels from moveable columns to any great distance; and therefore the general mobility of the army will be increased by making the moveable column carriage consist, as far as possible, of mules, ponies, and light carts of uniform pattern. In our scheme for moveable columns we would leave the kind of carriage to be maintained at each station to be settled by a committee under the orders of the Lieutenant General commanding the army corps. Mules, ambulances, carts, harness, and pack-saddles would have to be Government property. Camels and ponies might generally be the property of private persons; but the attendants on such animals would have to be enlisted and disciplined just as in the case of animals belonging to Government.

Regimental transport to be maintained on frontiers.

429. We consider that the plan by which regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force and mountain batteries always maintain sufficient transport for the whole corps to take the field at a few hours' notice in the lightest marching order, or for half the corps to march out fully equipped, ought to be extended to all troops guarding any external frontier exposed to attack. Under this arrangement, half carriage would have to be constantly maintained for—

	Artillery Batteries.		Cavalry Regiments.		Infantry Regiments.		Sapper Companies.
	Horse and Field.	Mountain.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	
Beluchistan Frontier - -	1	2⅓	- -	2½	1	4	2
Punjab " - - -	5	5	- -	9½	5	21	3
Assam " - - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3	—
Burma " - - -	- -	2	- -	- -	2	4	1
TOTAL - - -	6	9⅓	- -	12	8	32	6

Out of these frontier troops 12 infantry regiments of the Punjab Force and all the mountain batteries already maintain half carriage; while the Native cavalry regiments are always ready to take the field, provided that extra means of carriage are furnished for their reserve ammunition, their sick, and their hospital equipment. The addition of 35 Government mules or ponies to the establishment of Native cavalry regiments on the frontier would cost, inclusive of attendants, 5,600 rupees a year per regiment, or 67,200 rupees a year in all; and we think this addition should be made to the establishment of the Native cavalry regiments on the frontier.

430. There would remain to be provided with standing carriage six batteries of horse and field artillery, eight regiments of British infantry, 20 regiments of Native infantry, and six companies of sappers. Half carriage for this force, with a due proportion of sick carriage, would cost about 11,88,000 rupees a year. The particular type of carriage to be maintained at each station would have to be decided by special committees convened for each army corps. There would be great differences in this respect according to local circumstances. As in the case of the moveable columns, this carriage would be, as far as possible, in regimental charge. All mounted corps, and probably all Native troops, would be able to keep their carriage under regimental officers. But

See Appendix XLIX.

But the carriage for British infantry regiments would have to be kept in charge of the commissariat officers, subject to the orders of the regimental commander. The officers of the Commissariat and Transport Department would be responsible for inspecting and paying, through the regimental transport officer, the Government carriage with regiments, for supplying casualties, and for reporting to the regimental commanders any shortcomings in the management and custody of the *matériel* or animals. Frontier corps transport could be employed for Government or regimental purposes in or near the station; but this transport would not be available for hire to private persons, or for duty other than regimental reliefs and carriage of military stores and supplies. It would be understood that all Government carriage in regimental charge was available for Government purposes under the control of the commissariat officer, subject to the orders of the officer commanding the station. All followers belonging to regimental Government carriage would be enlisted and clothed as in the case of followers belonging to moveable column carriage. Non-commissioned officers or soldiers sent with detachments of regimental carriage on other than regimental duty would receive "working pay" for the period of such duty.

Reserve transport centres.

431. The moveable columns and the carriage of one-half of all the frontier forces having thus been arranged for, it remains for us to state what reserves of Government transport we propose to keep at selected centres. Those centres should be on the main railway lines, so that the reserve transport could, with the exception of elephants and camels, be easily transported to any point where concentration is ordered. The proposed centres have been selected, and allotments of reserve carriage have been made, with reference to the needs of possible future campaigns, to the requirements of large cantonments for station work, to facilities for hiring out and utilising reserve carriage, and to the need for carriage reserves near hill sanataria, whence troops have to be moved to the railway before they can be placed in the field. We propose to keep, at 11 centres, reserve carriage equal to a carrying power of 20,960 maunds, with hospital bearers and ambulances, distributed as per details given in Appendix L. We have allotted to the reserve centres a large proportion of dooly-bearers, ambulances, and other sick carriage, because the *matériel* and *personnel* of an effective ambulance corps must be organised beforehand. The total cost of this reserve carriage will be 14,45,400 rupees a year. It must be left to committees to settle, under the orders of the Lieutenant-General commanding the army corps, what description of carriage should be maintained at each reserve centre. It will be recollected, however, that camels cannot easily be transported to remote points of concentration, and that as every part of India abounds with bullock carts, which can be either hired or bought when war breaks out, there is no necessity for maintaining Government bullock carts in time of peace. There seems to be no doubt that the best form of reserve transport are light mule or pony carts. We propose, having regard to the cost and unsuitability of elephants, that not more than 80* elephants should be maintained at reserve centres. A part of the reserve carriage at each centre would be kept available for the moveable column, and would, as far as possible, be placed in regimental charge, subject to the supervision of the local commissariat officer and his transport assistant. The rest would be sent on detachment, under Native officers or non-commissioned officers, for Government work at neighbouring stations; would be used for plying on hill or other roads; or would be let on hire

* This makes the total number of elephants maintained for the Indian army, exclusive of elephant carriage which may be kept for frontier regiments in Assam and Burma, to be 238 in all, thus—

Elephants for moveable columns, as per Appendix XLVIII. - - - - - -	88
Elephants for frontier stations, as per Appendix XLIX. - - - - - -	70
Elephants for reserve centres, as per Appendix L. - - - - - - - -	80
	238
To these may be added the elephants kept for regimental carriage on the Burma and Assam frontier, which will probably amount to about - - - - -	162
Giving a GRAND TOTAL of - - -	400

It will be easy to maintain this reduced strength of elephants by purchases in the market, and by arrangements with private persons to whom licenses to catch elephants in Government forests may be given. Already such licenses contain conditions binding the hunters to give a proportion of their captures to Government at a fixed price. It will, therefore, be unnecessary to maintain costly Government kheddas or elephant-catching establishments.

hire to the postal or other departments. For instance, mules from the nearest reserve centres would be detached to the hill station of Ranikhet, Chakrata, the Simla and Murree hills, for the work of carrying water to barracks. Mule-carts from the reserve would undertake the postal parcel* service on all the hill-roads, and would be let out to municipal and local bodies, and to the Public Works Department at such rates as the commissariat officers might settle. All Government stores should, when possible, be carried by the reserve transport. Ambulances would be detached to stations where carts for carrying invalids to the hospitals are required; while ambulance mules could work in cart trains, the ambulances being kept in store at the reserve centre. Reserve camels would be let out to carry grain or other merchandise on neighbouring traffic routes. Dooly-bearers would be all employed in pulling punkahs, as hospital attendants, or on other station work at reserve centres, or at neighbouring garrison towns.

Cost of transport officers.

432. The cost of the Government carriage, as estimated in Appendices, provides for a due proportion of headmen and gangmen among the drivers and attendants, who will be enlisted for the animals and vehicles maintained by the Government. But the charge on account of transport officers, European and Native, is not included in those estimates. We propose that the transport officers with moveable columns, as well as all officers and non-commissioned officers employed with regimental carriage, should remain on the combatant lists of their regiments, that they should not be *seconded*, and that each officer should stay for a short time only on transport work. We quite see that it might in some respects be better for regimental discipline if transport officers were *seconded* and belonged to a separate department; but we do not think that such *seconding* is absolutely necessary; we are sure it would be costly; and we anticipate much good from a large number of European and Native officers gaining experience in transport work. The only officers to be seconded would be those at the reserve centres, and the chief transport officers at army corps headquarters. The commissariat officers will be permanent departmental officers, and they will be able to maintain the due continuity of the system, even though their transport assistants may change every two or three years. We estimate the cost of staff pay to transport officers at about 86,400 rupees a year in peace time, thus:—

	Rs.
Ten Transport officers at reserve centres at an average of 6,000 rupees pay, *plus* staff pay of 2,400 rupees a year -	84,000
Ten Transport officers at larger moveable column stations at 1,200 rupees a year - - - - - - - -	12,000
Horse allowance at 360 rupees a year to 40 battery and regimental British officers - - - - - - - -	14,400
Horse allowance at 180 rupees a year to 200 Native officers, and to British and Native non-commissioned officers - -	36,000
Rs.	1,46,400

Native veterinary practitioners.

It would, no doubt, be desirable that a staff of Native veterinary practitioners (*salutris*) should be told off to the moveable columns, reserve centres, and chief frontier stations. But at present there is no supply of these men available. In another part of the report we have advocated the establishment of one or more veterinary schools for Natives. When the passed students of such schools, or other Native veterinary practitioners, are available, not less than 50 (at an average cost of 150 rupees a year each) should be attached to the transport service and ambulance corps. The cost of these *salutris* would bring the special staff of the transport and ambulance service up to 1,53,900 rupees a year.

433. The

*The Director General of Post Offices anticipates that he can employ from 400 to 900 carts on this duty. *See* Appendices LI. and LII. in regard to employment of transport by Post Office and Municipalities.

433. The total cost of the transport service and ambulance in time of peace would, according to our scheme, be— Total cost of standing transport.

	Rs.
Moveable columns, as per Appendix XLVIII. - - - -	6,63,720
Frontier corps transport and ambulance, as per Appendix XLIX.	11,88,260
Reserve transport centres, as per Appendix L. - - - -	13,57,400
Four chief transport officers with four army corps, 600 rupees staff, in addition to staff corps pay of about 800 rupees - -	67,200
Transport staff, as per preceding paragraph - - - -	1,53,900
	34,30,480
From this may be deducted the estimated saving caused by employing the Assam coolie corps on public works, dooly-bearers in punkar-pulling and other station work, and by the hire of reserve transport let out to private persons, or to Government departments - - - - - - - - - - - -	5,00,000
Net cost - - - - - - - - - - - -	29,30,480
Which shows a saving of - - - - - - - - -	8,33,451
On the total present expenditure of - - - - - - Rs.	37,63,931

As stated in paragraph 415.

Commission's proposal intended only as an outline.

Our estimate of the cost of carriage per maund is intended to provide for a due proportion of smiths, carpenters, and leather-workers (mochis), who would be attached to the several moveable columns, frontier carriage establishments, and reserve centres. A part only of these absolutely necessary artisans would be kept on duty during peace time; the remainder being kept on reserve pay and allowed to earn their living at their homes. All such artisans, whether in active employment or in reserve, should be regularly enlisted and provided with a uniform, and should be told off to distinct sections of the Government standing carriage.

434. We would explain that we by no means advise that the tables of carriage given in Appendices XLVIII. to L. be accepted as the final allotment and distribution of Government standing transport. We consider that the details of such distribution should be considered by a competent committee for each army corps, and that the precise nature of the *matériel* and *personnel* to be kept at each station or reserve centre should be carefully arranged in detail. We merely present these statements to show how the general scheme of standing carriage which we advocate could be worked out in detail, and how much it ought to cost. We have shown only the annual cost of the carriage. There will be some outlay on providing new *matériel*, such as ambulances and light carts. Towards meeting a part of this charge, which will be spread over two years, the yield by sale of surplus elephants, estimated at 9,00,000 rupees will be available. But the initial outlay for improved *matériel* or animals will, we anticipate, considerably exceed this sum. However, some expenditure of the kind is unavoidable; and we believe that the saving and advantage to be gained on future outbreaks of war, will more than compensate for such outlay.

Mobilization of Government transport.

435. Such being the transport establishment which we propose to maintain in time of peace, it remains to recommend a system on which this establishment and organization can be expanded in time of war. We have provided, on the whole, permanent Government transport for 49,030 maunds of baggage, &c., with ambulance arrangements* for 2,866 sick and wounded. We consider that two-thirds of the moveable column carriage, one-third† of the frontier forces carriage, three-quarters of the reserve centre carriage, and four-fifths of the ambulance arrangements, ought to be available for dispatch to any theatre of war or any point of concentration. The officer charged with the custody or inspection of Government transport should always have ready a detailed scheme for putting the transferable portion of this transport on a war footing, and for dispatching it by rail to previously appointed places of concentration. The steps

* We provide altogether for 1,054 doolies, 273 ambulances, and 360 camel and mule panniers.

Probably Burma and Assam frontier carriage could not ordinarily be made available for concentration in India. Nevertheless it seems safe to reckon that, on the whole, one-third of the frontier carriage might be temporarily withdrawn.

steps necessary for putting Government carriage on a war footing, would be to raise the number of attendants on pack animals by 50 per cent.; to allot 10 per cent. of spare drivers and animals to the ambulances and carts; to place selected Native non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the regiments in garrison in charge of sections * of the carriage; and to make over to the European or Native officer in charge of the transport contingent a sufficient staff of salutris (Native veterinary practitioners), smiths, carpenters, and leather-workers (mochis), with a due proportion of spare wheels and other spare pieces. Each transport contingent should leave its station fully equipped, and should not depend on finding any part of its equipment at the place of concentration. When full concentration from all parts of India was ordered, there would be assembled (at any selected base) carriage for 29,566 maunds and ambulance appliances for 2,293 men. This would suffice to furnish† regimental transport for 19,000 men of all arms, and would leave trained transport equal to 6,566 maunds as a nucleus for departmental requirements.

Raising of special transport for a campaign.

436. The Government transport would, however, have to be largely supported and supplemented by special means in time of war; this would of necessity have to be done by hiring carriage in the districts nearest to the seat of war. We do not advocate the expenditure of money on retaining fees to carriage in time of peace. If mules, camels, and carts exist at all in a district, they will be forthcoming on payment of sufficient hire or price in time of war. Peace will, henceforward as heretofore, be the rule, and war the exception, in India. We believe it will be cheaper, and as efficient, to register carefully all means of carriage (including dooly bearers) in time of peace, and then to offer liberal rates of hire in time of war; or, if this is impossible, it will even be cheaper to purchase transport on an emergency. The transport officers of every district, and of every army corps, should, in concert with the civil officers, maintain registers, to be corrected every 10 years at the census time, of the quantity and type of carriage available in every district, and of the time it would take to collect. The proportion of carriage which each district, or other territorial section, should furnish, ought to be settled beforehand, so as to leave little opening for misconduct on the part of the petty officials charged with the duty of collecting transport when the time came. Schemes for raising transport trains from local carriage, with details of the number of transport officers (European and Native) to be drawn from the garrison regiments of each district command, would, under this system, be kept ready for all the probable theatres of war; would be in the hands of the local military and civil authorities; and would be corrected from time to time.‡

Organization of units of transport in war time.

437. In time of war all transport from the districts to the base of operations should be organized and maintained by the Commissariat Department, and should, as far as possible, be formed upon the system of stages. The regimental and departmental carriage beyond the base, however, should be on a military organization, and should be under the control of the Director of Field Transport. The Director would be immediately under the orders of the General Commanding in the field; he would have under him, for departmental carriage, one transport officer for every 1,000 animals; a staff § of Native officers and soldiers, of gangmen

* The extra attendants and spare animals would be made up partly from the carriage not mobilized, and partly by men specially hired for the purpose. This mobilization of a part of the standing carriage on a war footing could be done at two or three days' notice, provided that the scheme for so doing had been previously, in time of peace, worked out and settled down to the smallest details.

† The 19,000 men would be composed thus: 6,000 Europeans at two maunds a-piece, 10,000 Native infantry at one maund a-piece, and 3,000 Native cavalry, who would require only 1,000 maunds of Government carriage in addition to their own regimental means of transport.

‡ *See* Appendix LIII. for return of transport available in districts within 48 hours and within a fortnight.

§ It is of the utmost importance to the successful working of any transport system in the field that its organization should be strong and should be military. For a command of 1,000 transport animals in the field, the proportion of European superintendence and of Native soldiers to the trained and untrained followers, for the pack transport of advanced columns would be as follows:—

1 European officer.	25 Privates.
1 Sergeant (1st class inspector).	4 Muccadums.
1 Writer.	100 Trained and enlisted followers of peace establishment.
1 Native officer.	400 Untrained followers.
2 Havildars.	1,000 Mules or camels.
2 Naiks.	

Artificers according to regulation.

The result of such an organization would be an incalculable saving of animals and stores. Moreover, a general manœuvring within striking distance of an enemy would be enabled to effect his movements promptly and precisely, without that confusion which always exists amongst unorganized masses of followers, and acts prejudicially upon the military objects of the moment. For lines of communication, the proportion of drivers to pack animals would be 1 to 3.

men and drivers for every 100 animals; and a due proportion of *salutris* and transport artisans. The regimental and battery carriage would be, as far as possible, in regimental charge, but would still remain subject to the general control of the Director and his officers, and it would have its complement of Native inspectors brought up to the war strength of one non-commissioned officer and one sepoy for every 100 animals. The Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sepoys detailed for transport duty in the field would be drawn from regiments left in garrison; they would, as far as possible, be men who had graduated as transport inspectors in time of peace; and they would receive a pony allowance and staff pay, besides rations. We attach the greatest importance to having a sufficient staff of trustworthy Native non-commissioned officers and soldiers told off to, and responsible for, regimental and departmental transport in the field. Experience in large transport operations in time of war, and in time of famine, has abundantly shown that a strong supervising establishment conduces to economy, as well as to efficiency, in all undertakings of the kind. In an enemy's country the Native transport inspectors would be armed with breech-loading pistols and swords. All the attendants on the hired carriage should be enlisted and clothed as regular followers, for the time being. And a percentage of all transport followers in the field, according to the character of the country, should be armed with spears or short swords, as the men preferred one weapon or the other. Bamboos with spearheads can easily be improvised, and a sufficient proportion of spearheads should be kept in store. It appears to us to be useless to arm all followers; for instance, there can be no object in arming all dooly-bearers with swords, which merely impede their movements, and which they do not know how to use.

Hired and Government transport to be worked together.

438. Transport allotted to regiments and batteries on service and field hospitals would, as far as possible, consist of regularly organised Government carriage. But if the field army was very large, then a proportion of the regimental carriage would be hired, but would be organised precisely as the Government transport. Wherever possible, a section of each transport officer's party of departmental transport would consist of Government carts and animals, so that the discipline and organisation of the Government transport might permeate and be felt throughout all the field transport. When hired transport was taken across the sea, or to foreign countries, the owners should be offered the alternative of selling their carriage at a fair price, to be paid at their homes, in the event of its crossing the border.

Details for improving transport service must be worked up hereafter.

439. It is not intended that the Commission should trouble the Government of India with recommendations on points of minute detail: and it will be the duty of the chief transport officer of each army-corps gradually to work up the details of the transport organisation and *matériel* to the highest perfection compatible with strict economy. The reports furnished to the Commission, especially a pamphlet by Colonel Mignon, Commissary General, Bombay, are replete with suggestions on points of detail connected with transport work. We may draw attention to the following recommendations, among others, namely,—

See Appendix LIV.

(*a.*) That artillery ammunition should be packed so that it could, on necessity, be transferred to pack-animals;

(*b.*) That an improved, and more durable, pattern of bag be devised for carrying gram, other supplies, and small articles, on camels and mules; so that four of such bags would, when filled, form a load for a camel, and two would form a load for a mule;

(*c.*) That bags with compartments be used for carrying entrenching tools, instead of the small wrought-iron panniers recently introduced;

(*d.*) That a lighter class of tents be devised, which, when complete, would suffice for hot weather in the plains of India, and which, by rejection of the double-roof and accessories, could be made available for service in Cabul or other cold-weather campaigns;

(*e.*) That definite authority be given to certain officers of the transport service to weigh loads, reject excess, and report the person responsible for such excess to his immediate superior;

(*f.*) That

(*f.*) That experiments be made with compressed provisions for man and beast, with a view to determining, beforehand and in peace time, how far, and for what campaigns, such provisions could be economically used, and by what procedure supplies could be promptly obtained when need arose.

SECTION 3.—ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

The Indian Ordnance Department; its duties and organisation.

440. The Ordnance Department in India is charged with the duty of providing, holding, issuing, and accounting for, all munitions of war required for the use of the several branches of the army in India, as well as the volunteer forces, and all military stores except clothing and necessaries, food, bedding, and furniture. This duty, as the Ordnance Department is at present constituted, devolves on three separate establishments, known as the Bengal, the Madras, and the Bombay Ordnance Departments. The former is under the immediate control of the Government of India; the two latter, under the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay respectively. The formation of these three distinct departments dates back to a period when great difficulties existed in intercommunication throughout India.

Triple division once necessary.

441. It was then a matter of necessity that each Government should be in a position to provide the ordnance stores required for the efficient equipment of the army under its control, without the delay which, by reason of the then imperfect communications, would have resulted by references being continually made to a central authority, and it was essential that a responsible personal head of each Ordnance Department should be attached to the several Governments as their adviser on all matters pertaining to the supply and supervision of warlike stores. The circumstances which rendered necessary this triple division of the Ordnance Department have now changed. The centralization of control over the expenditure of the Ordnance, as of all other departments of the State, which the Government of India has found it expedient to institute, the opening of railways, the establishment of telegraphic communication throughout the length and breadth of the land, and the present very serious financial embarrassment under which the Government labours, calling for the exercise of the most rigid economy in army expenditure, have resulted in producing a condition of things which points to the absolute necessity for re-organizing the Ordnance Departments in India.

Change in circumstances calls for re-organisation.

Though Government of India decides all important ordnance questions, no supreme departmental head.

442. As it is, numberless questions affecting the Ordnance Departments of Madras and Bombay which in former days would have been decided by the Local Governments are now referred to the Government of India, and are not permitted to be decided without its approval and sanction. No supreme departmental authority on ordnance subjects in India has, however, yet been officially nominated, though, practically, the Government of India look for advice and counsel, in pronouncing and deciding on all such subjects, to the Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal. That officer, meanwhile, occupies, in the Bengal Presidency, exactly the same position that the Inspectors General of Ordnance of the minor presidencies hold in Madras and Bombay, and the former is thus placed in the invidious position of a judge on the official actions and professional opinions of officers theoretically occupying positions of a standing equal to his own.

Invidious position of Inspector General in Bengal.

Anomalies of present organisation should be corrected by amalgamation of the three existing departments.

443. The time has, in our opinion, arrived when, in the interests of the State, the anomalies which the existence of three separate ordnance establishments in India involves, should be corrected by the amalgamation of the three Presidential departments under one responsible head. A department thus amalgamated would necessarily be divided into two branches, the administrative and the executive. On the administrative branch would devolve the duties of general supervision and control of expenditure; on the executive, the manufacture, receipt, storage, and supply of ordnance stores.

Proposed administration of an amalgamated Ordnance Department.

444. The formation, strength, duties, and cost of the administrative department is the first point that calls for consideration. An officer of high rank and departmental experience should, it appears to us, be appointed to be the head of an amalgamated Ordnance Department, an officer whom the Government of India

India would hold responsible for the efficiency, and, especially, for the economical working of the department under his control.

445. This officer should be styled the Director General of Ordnance, and considering the responsibilities devolving on him, he should not be of lower rank than a colonel in the army, and during his tour of duty in the Ordnance Department should, if he has not the substantive, have the local, rank of major-general. As the Director General would be responsible for the efficiency, as well as the expenditure, of the Ordnance Department, the *personnel* of the department should be under his immediate orders. He should, therefore, dispose of all questions regarding promotion, transfer, exchange, and leave of all commissioned officers in the department. All appointments of warrant and non-commissioned officers should be made, and their promotion regulated, by him. Further, as the Director General would be responsible for the economical working of the Ordnance Department, the manufacturing establishments should be under his exclusive, immediate, and direct control, and all orders for work to be undertaken in the factories should emanate from him. The preparation and submission of the annual estimates, as well as of the annual and supplementary indents on England, should devolve upon him, and all questions involving expenditure of money be referred to him. For the efficient performance of the duties of his special office the Director General would, we consider, require the assistance of two officers. The senior of these to be styled the Deputy Director General of Ordnance, and the junior the Assistant to the Director General of Ordnance.

Director General: his rank and duties.

His assistants.

446. The Deputy Director General should be an officer of considerable departmental experience, possessing a thorough and practical knowledge of ordnance matters. The Assistant should be a young officer of known scientific attainments, and conversant with the latest improvements in artillery *matériel*.

Deputy Director General.

Assistant Director General.

447. The monthly pay of the officers thus employed in the administrative office of an amalgamated Ordnance Department should, we are of opinion, be fixed at the following rates:—

Proposed salary of the Director General and Assistants.

Director General of Ordnance - - - -	*Rs.* 2,500	consolidated.
Deputy Director General of Ordnance - - -	„ 600	with regimental pay and allowances.
Assistant to the Director General of Ordnance -	„ 250	

448. Under the immediate orders of the Director General, and to assist him in carrying out the administrative work of arsenals and depôts, he would require a certain number of officers who should be called Inspectors General of Ordnance. These officers would supervise certain circles of supply. An Inspector General of Ordnance would be responsible that the several arsenals and depôts in his circle of supply were in an efficient state, and that the officers under his command performed their duties correctly. He would arrange for the carrying out of the orders of the Director General as to the transfer of stores from one arsenal or depôt to another, and for the disposal of unserviceable stores. He would deal with all committee reports on regimental equipments, and indents for unauthorised stores, as well as those on payment. He would be responsible for the economical disbursement of all sums placed at his disposal for the purchase of local stores and camp equipage.

Inspectors General; their duties.

449. Having thus broadly stated the duties appertaining to the Inspectors General of Ordnance, the next question is what should be the number and extent of the several circles of supply over which it is proposed to place these officers. To decide this point it is necessary to have regard to the existing arsenals and depôts from which the troops forming the several army corps would draw their supplies of ordnance stores. These are as follow:—

Classification of arsenals and depôts for supplies of stores to—

Bengal Army Corps.

1st class arsenal, Fort William -	Shillong, Sadya, Cachar, Baxa, Calcutta, and subsidiary stations, Darjeeling, Dinapore, Dorunda, and detachment, Benares.
1st class arsenal, Allahabad - - Ammunition depôt, Agra* - -	Allahabad, Cawnpore, Futtehghur, Lucknow, Fyzabad, Bareilly,* Ranikhet,* Nynee Tal,* Almorah,* Meerut,* Roorkee,* Dehra,* Chakrata,* Delhi,* Agra,* Morar,* Gwalior,* Nowgong.

Bengal Army Corps.

	Punjab Army Corps.	
Punjab Army Corps.	1st class arsenal, Ferozepore - -	Umballa and subsidiary stations, Dugshai, Subathu, Jutogh, Lahore, Amritsar, Ferozepore, Dharmsala, Bakloh, Dalhousie, Sialkot, Mooltan,* Dera Ismail Khan,† Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajaupore.
	Ammunition depôts. Mooltan* - - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Dera Ismail Khan† -	
	2nd class arsenal, Rawal Pindi -	Rawal Pindi and Hills, Abbottabad, Attock, Nowshera,* Hoti Murdan,* Peshawar,* Cherat,* Ali Musjid,* Kohat,* Lundi Kotal,* Thull,* Kuram,* Edwardesabad,† Kuram Valley,* Tonk.*
	Ammunition depôts. Peshawar* - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Dera Ismail Khan† -	
	Madras Army Corps.	
Madras Army Corps.	2nd class arsenal, Secunderabad -	Secunderabad and the stations occupied by the Hyderabad Contingent.
	1st class arsenal, Madras - -	Bangalore,* French Rocks,* Bellary,† Belgaum,‡ Wellington, Trichinopoly, Quilon, Cannanore, Madras, Vellore, Poonamalee, Waltair, Berhampore, Cuttack.
	Ammunition depôts. Bellary† - - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Belgaum‡ - - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Bangalore* - -	
	2nd class arsenal, Rangoon - -	Rangoon, Thayetmyo, Tonghoo,* Moulmein, Showaygheen, Port Blair.
	Ammunition depôt, Tonghoo* -	
	Bombay Army Corps.	
Bombay Army Corps.	2nd class arsenal, Quetta - -	Dadur and stations above.
	2nd class arsenal, Kurrachee - -	Jacobabad, Kurrachee.
	1st class arsenal, Bombay - -	Rajkot,* Dwarka,* Deesa,* Ahmedabad,* Baroda, Surat, Bombay, Poona,† Kirkee,† Satara,† Seroor,† Asseerghur, Kamptee,‡ Nagpore,‡ Seroncha, Raipore,‡ Sumbulpore.
	Ammunition depôts. Ahmedabad* - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Poona† - - -	
	Ammunition depôts. Nagpore‡ - - -	
	2nd class arsenal, Aden - - -	Aden.
	2nd class arsenal, Mhow - - -	Mhow, Mehidpur, Agar, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Saugor, Jubbulpore.

Arsenals and depôts it is proposed to maintain.

We recommend, however, that, in the place of those mentioned above, the following arsenals and depôts should in future be maintained in India for the supply of ordnance stores:—

1st Class Arsenals - - 5—Fort William, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, Bombay;

2nd Class Arsenals - - 6—Mhow, Rawal Pindi, Kurrachee, Rangoon, Aden, Bellary;

Ammunition Depôts - - 10—Peshawar, Agra, Mooltan, Dera Ismail Khan, Secunderabad, Tonghoo, Poona, Ahmedabad, Quetta, Belgaum;

the depôts at Nagpore, Bangalore, and St. Thomas' Mount being abolished.

Resulting modification in the circles of supply.

450. If, therefore, our suggestions are carried out, the present circles of supply, as noted in the previous paragraph, will be slightly modified, and will be as follow:—

Bengal Army Corps.	
As at present.	
Punjab Army Corps.	
As at present.	
Madras Army Corps.	
2nd class arsenal, Bellary - -	Secunderabad,* stations occupied by the Hyderabad Contingent,* Bellary, Belgaum.†
Ammunition depots, Secunderabad,* Belgaum† - - - - -	
1st class arsenal, Madras - -	Bangalore, French Rocks, Wellington, Trichinopoly, Cannanore, Madras, Vellore, Poonamallee, Waltair, Berhampore, Cuttack.
2nd class arsenal, Rangoon - -	As at present.
Ammunition depôt, Tonghoo - -	
Bombay Army Corps.	
2nd class arsenal, Kurrachee - -	Dadur and stations above,* Jacobabad, Kurrachee.
Ammunition depôt, Quetta* - -	
1st class arsenal, Bombay - -	Rajkot,* Dwarka,* Deesa,* Ahmedabad,* Baroda, Surat, Bombay, Poona,† Kirkee,† Satara,† Seroor,† Asseerghur, Kamptee, Nagpore, Seroncha, Raipore, Sumbulpore.
Ammunition depôts. Ahmedabad* - -	
Ammunition depôts. Poona† - - -	
2nd class arsenal, Aden - - -	Aden.
2nd class arsenal, Mhow - -	As at present.

451. It

451. It will thus be seen that, if our recommendations are adopted, the Bengal Army Corps will draw its ordnance supplies from two arsenals (first class) and one ammunition depôt; the Punjab Army Corps from two arsenals (one first and one second class) and three ammunition depôts; the Madras Army Corps from three arsenals (one first class and two second) and three ammunition depôts; the Bombay Army Corps from four arsenals (one first and three second class) and three ammunition depôts.

452. At present the following establishments are comprised in the several Ordnance Departments:— Number of ordnance establishments at present maintained.

	Factories.	Arsenals.	Depôts.
Bengal - - - - - - - -	5	4	4
Madras - - - - - - - -	2	3	5*
Bombay - - - - - - - -	3	4	4

* Including the depôt at St. Thomas' Mount, which is really a manufacturing establishment.

453. Orders for work to be executed, the preparation of indents on England, as well as of the budget estimate, inspection, control of expenditure, in fact the entire supervision and administration of the department under his charge, now devolve on an Inspector General of Ordnance. According to the proposed reorganization of the Ordnance Department, the Inspector General of Ordnance will be relieved of many of these duties, and he would only have to carry out in detail the instructions he would receive from time to time from the Director General. Under these altered circumstances, it would prove no excessive charge for two Inspectors General of Ordnance to supervise the arsenals and depôts throughout India, and, looking at the disposition of troops in the four army corps, the most equal sub-division of the duties of providing the ordnance stores required for these troops would be to place the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps in one circle of supply, and the Madras and Bombay in another. The former might be called the Northern, the latter the Southern, circle of supply. Under the proposed re-organization, Inspectors General relieved of certain duties. Two therefore will suffice.

454. It would be inexpedient to leave an office such as that of an Inspector General of Ordnance dependent on one man. Sickness, absence on duty, and other causes would bring his office work in great measure to a standstill till his return to duty. But, besides this, there would be more work in the office of the Inspector General of Ordnance than one officer could efficiently and promptly carry out. Each Inspector General should, therefore, have an assistant. But would each need an assistant.

455. The monthly salary of these officers, we would suggest, might be fixed at the following rates:— Salary of Inspectors General and their assistants.

Inspector General of Ordnance - - -	*Rs.* 2,000 consolidated.
Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance - -	400 in addition to regimental pay and allowances.

456. The total monthly cost on account of officers of the administrative staff of an amalgamated Ordnance Department would, therefore, be— Total monthly cost of administrative staff.

		Rs.	*Rs.*	
1 Director General of Ordnance - - -	at	2,500	2,500	
2 Inspectors General of Ordnance - - -	„	2,000	4,000	
1 Deputy Director General of Ordnance - - -			600	in addition to regimental pay and allowances.
2 Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance -	at	400	800	
1 Assistant to Director General of Ordnance - - -			250	
TOTAL - - -		*Rs.*	8,150	

457. Having thus described the duties of the supervising staff of an amalgamated Ordnance Department, and the number of administrative officers which, in our opinion, is requisite for carrying out the duties of supervision efficiently and economically, it is necessary to determine the strength of, and the duties appertaining to, the officers forming the executive branch. Executive officers;

 458. The

their duties.

458. The duties devolving on the executive officers of the Ordnance Department are manifold, including the manufacture, purchase, storage, receipt, and issue of munitions of war, and the various articles provided through the agency of the Ordnance Department for the use of the army in India. A large portion of the munitions of war for India are manufactured in the country, and factories have been established and are maintained at certain stations. While the duties of storing, receiving, and issuing the special stores manufactured at factories have, of course, to a very great extent to be carried on in such establishments, the principal duty in a factory, to which all others are secondary, is the correct and economical manufacture of certain definite munitions of war. On the other hand, while large workshops have necessarily to be maintained in an arsenal, the prompt and sufficient supply of all stores required for the troops dependent on it is the first and most important duty of an executive officer. It follows that, as the duties devolving on the officers in charge of factories differ from those of officers in charge of arsenals and depôts, and as the nature of the work carried on in factories is special, rendering it necessary to adopt a system of accounts which would not be suitable in arsenals, the executive branch of the Ordnance Department is sub-divided into what may be termed the manufacturing and supply departments.

Existing factories.

459. There are at present 10 factories in India and one manufacturing depôt—

3 Gunpowder Factories	1 Foundry and Shell Factory.
3 Gun Carriage Factories.	1 Harness and Saddlery Factory.
2 Small Arm Ammunition Factories.	1 Small Manufacturing Depôt at St. Thomas' Mount.

Under control of Presidential Inspectors General.

Of the 10 factories, five are located in the Bengal presidency, two in Madras, and three in Bombay They are entirely under the control of the Inspectors General of Ordnance of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay respectively. One Superintendent is in charge of each factory, who is responsible to his Inspector General for the efficiency of his establishment, the correctness of the work executed, and the economy exercised in manufacture. Three Assistant Superintendents are allowed for the five factories in Bengal, one for the two factories in Madrás, and one for the three in Bombay. These officers are moved from one factory to another as the Inspectors General of Ordnance consider desirable.

Should be under that of a Director General of an amalgamated department.

460. To enable the Director General of an amalgamated department to exercise an efficient control over expenditure, it would be necessary to place under his immediate supervision all the manufacturing establishments in India. All estimates, returns, &c., which hitherto have been furnished by the Superintendents of factories to the Inspectors General of Ordnance, would be forwarded to the Director General, and the work to be carried on in each factory would be determined by that officer.

Number of superintendents of factories not to be altered; but their staff pay to be assimilated.

461. As regards the number of officers employed in the manufacturing establishments, no change appears necessary, but the anomaly which exists with regard to the pay of the three senior superintendents of factories in Bengal might, the Commission consider, with advantage be corrected. One uniform rate of staff pay for Superintendents, viz., 600 rupees per mensem, should, we think, be fixed.

Numbers of arsenals and depôts at present existing.

462. The following arsenals and depôts are at present maintained in India:—

	Arsenals.		Depôts.
	1st Class.	2nd Class.	
Bengal	3	1	4
Madras	1	2	5
Bombay	1	3	4

463. The

463. The present sanctioned establishments of Commissaries of Ordnance in the three presidencies are as follows:— Present establishment of Commissaries of Ordnance;

	Commissaries of Ordnance.		
	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Bengal - - - - - - -	3	2	3
Madras - - - - - - -	2	1	2
Bombay - - - - - - -	2	3	1
Total - - -	7	6	6

464. These officers are under the control of the Inspectors General of Ordnance of their respective presidencies, and their names are borne on separate rolls. This limited number of executive officers for the supply department has been found utterly inadequate for carrying on the duties efficiently, even in times of peace, and the war in Afghanistan has proved how insufficient this number of officers is for the exigencies of field service. The Bengal Ordnance Department, at the breaking out of hostilities in Afghanistan, could not be strengthened by the transfer of a single ordnance officer from Madras or Bombay, and officers had to be obtained as best they could from the artillery. Responsible duties both in the field, in the arsenals, and in the depôts, had to be entrusted to officers totally unacquainted with the work of the department. found inadequate.

465. Government have, in several instances, suffered loss from this lack of supervision in the ordnance establishments, and we are satisfied that, having regard to the value of the stores and the political mischief which may result from the theft of ammunition and arms, it is a very false economy to underman the Ordnance Department. It is, therefore, in our opinion an absolute necessity that the number of commissioned officers of the department should be very largely increased. Loss caused by lack of supervision. Increase of executive officers necessary, and—

466. The Special Committee on Ordnance, in paragraph 171 of their Report, bring the paucity of commissioned ordnance officers to the special notice of Government, and recommend that "there should be at least three commissioned ordnance officers in the arsenals at the presidency towns, two commissioned ordnance officers in other arsenals, one commissioned ordnance officer in charge of each 1st class depôt." Such an increase of officers, under the present organisation of the Ordnance Department, would involve a very considerable additional cost to Government, but, under the revised organisation proposed by us, this additional cost need not be so great. There are at present three grades of Commissaries of Ordnance. The first class receive 500 rupees monthly staff pay; the second, 400 rupees; and the third, 250 rupees. recommended by Special Committee. Would be costly under present organisation; less so under that proposed.

467. We suggest the formation of four grades of Commissaries of Ordnance on the following monthly salaries:— Proposed grades of commissaries and their distribution to—

	Rs.
1st class - - - - - - -	500
2nd „ - - - - - - -	400
3rd „ - - - - - - -	300
4th „ - - - - - - -	200

468. The work in a first class arsenal is exceedingly heavy, and we think it is necessary to allow three commissioned officers for its efficient working:— 1st class arsenals.

One 1st class Commissary of Ordnance.
One 3rd „ „ „
One 4th „ „ „

469. A second class arsenal not being such a responsible charge as a first class, might be left to two officers:— 2nd class arsenals.

One 2nd class Commissary of Ordnance.
One 4th „ „ „

 470. Ammunition

Depôts.

470. Ammunition depôts might, as at present, be left in charge of senior warrant officers, so long as the circle of supply is limited to one or two stations. But when an ammunition depôt has to provide ammunition for three or more stations, it should be under the charge of a third class Commissary of Ordnance.

Resulting modification in the number of arsenals and depôts to be maintained, and

471. It will be seen that, when our suggestions have been carried out, ordnance stores will be supplied from the following arsenals and depôts :—

1st class arsenals, 5.—Fort William, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, Bombay.

2nd class arsenals, 6.—Rawal Pindi, Bellary, Rangoon, Kurrachee, Aden, Mhow.

Ammunition depôts providing for three or more stations, 6.—Agra, Peshawar, Secunderabad, Quetta, Ahmedabad, Poona.

Ammunition depôts supplying two or fewer stations, 4.—Mooltan, Dera Ismail Khan, Belgaum, Tonghoo.

the executive officers required for their supervision

472. To carry out the views which we have expressed above, the following number of commissioned officers would be required for employment in the several arsenals and depôts :—

	Commissaries of Ordnance.			
	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.	4th Class.
1st class arsenals - - - -	5	–	5	5
2nd „ „ - - - -	–	6	–	6
1st „ depôts - - - -	–	–	6	–
Total - - -	5	6	11	11

available for duty in any part of India.

The names of all these officers should be borne on one list, and their promotion regulated by the Director General. They should be available for duty in any part of India.

Increase of staff pay under proposed organisation 1,300 rupees monthly, in addition to which increase on account of regimental pay must be considered.

473. The monthly staff or consolidated pay of ordnance officers increased to the strength proposed will be, as shown in the margin, 1,300 rupees more than the staff pay of the number now borne on the establishment. But to arrive at a correct estimate of the total additional cost which will be incurred if our proposals are accepted, it is necessary to take into account the regimental as well as the staff pay which officers of the Ordnance Department receive. This involves a difficult question, as the several grades of the Ordnance Department are not always filled by officers of the same rank. The total increased cost can only be arrived at approximately by working out averages based on the cost of existing establishments, and comparing them with the probable averages of cost of establishment under the proposed scheme.

As at present Organised.	Monthly Staff Pay.	Total.	As Proposed.	Monthly Staff Pay.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.		Rs.	Rs.
3 Inspectors General of Ordnance - - - -	6,900		1 Director General - -	2,500	
			1 Deputy Director General	600	
			1 Assistant Director General	250	3,350
3 Deputy Inspectors General of Ordnance - - -	2,000		2 Inspectors General of Ordnance at 2,000 rupees each - - - -	4,000	
1 Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance - - -	500		2 Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance at 400 rupees each - - -	800	
		9,400			4,800
10 Superintendents of Factories - - - -	6,450		10 Superintendents of Factories at 600 rupees each	6,000	
5 Assistant Superintendents of Factories - - -	1,000		5 Assistant Superintendents of Factories at 200 rupees each - - - -	1,000	
		7,450			7,000
Commissaries of Ordnance :			Commissaries of Ordnance:		
7 1st class - - -	3,500		5 1st class at 500 rupees each - - - -	2,500	
6 2nd „ - - -	2,400		6 2nd class at 400 rupees each - - - -	2,400	
6 3rd „ - - -	1,500		11 3rd class at 300 rupees each - - - -	3,300	
		7,400	11 4th class at 200 rupees each - - - -	2,200	10,400
Grand Total Monthly - Rs.	- -	24,250	Grand Total Monthly - Rs.	- -	25,550

This can only be arrived at approximately.

474. As

474. As the Inspectors General of Ordnance at present draw consolidated pay, and the Director General and Inspectors General of Ordnance would do so in future, their salaries may be left out of consideration. Further, the superintendents and assistant superintendents will probably hold the same ranks in future as they do at present, and their regimental pay need not be taken into account in preparing a comparative statement of cost of regimental pay and allowances.

Data on which such approximate estimate is calculated.

475. The average monthly regimental pay of an officer in any particular grade of the Ordnance Department must be calculated on the average pay of the officers who have been, or will probably hereafter be, employed in that grade. To take the present organization first. The Deputy Inspectors General of Ordnance of the several presidencies have been colonels, lieutenant colonels, or majors. The average regimental pay of these three ranks, including presidency house rent, is *Rs.* 1,012. 13.* The Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance has always been a major or captain. The average regimental pay of these two ranks, with presidency house rent, is *Rs.* 609. 2. 10.† Commissaries of Ordnance, of the 1st class, lieutenant colonel, major, or captain, the regimental pay averaging *Rs.* 686. 13. 11.‡ Commissaries of Ordnance, of the 2nd class, major or captain, average pay *Rs.* 529. 2. 10.§ Commissaries of Ordnance, of the 3rd class, captain or lieutenant; the average regimental pay of these ranks is *Rs.* 341. 9. 10.‖

Average estimated salaries of Ordnance officers under existing organization.

	Rs.	a.	p.		Rs.	a.	p.
* Colonel - -	1,265	5	–				
Lieutenant Colonel	1,032	4	–				
Major - - -	740	14	–				
	3,038	7	–	÷3=	1,012	13	–
† Major - - -	740	14	–				
Captain - -	477	7	8				
	1,218	5	8	÷2=	609	2	10
‡ Lieutenant Colonel	1,002	4	–				
Major - - -	640	14	–				
Captain - -	417	7	8				
	2,060	9	8	÷3=	686	13	11
§ Major - - -	640	14	–				
Captain - -	417	7	8				
	1,058	5	8	÷2=	529	2	10
‖ Captain - -	417	7	8				
Lieutenant - -	265	12	–				
	683	3	8	÷2=	341	9	10

476. The total monthly cost on account of regimental pay of Ordnance officers under the existing organization is, according to the above averages,—

	Rate of Pay.			Total.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
3 Deputy Inspectors General of Ordnance - - -	1,012	13	–	3,038	7	–
1 Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance - - -	609	2	10	609	2	10
7 Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class - - -	686	13	11	4,808	1	5
6 " " 2nd " - - -	529	2	10	3,175	1	–
6 " " 3rd " - - -	341	9	10	2,049	11	–
Total - - - Rs.				13,680	7	3

According to the proposed scheme, the Deputy Director General will hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or major, the average regimental pay being *Rs.* 880. 11. 6.¶ The Assistant Director General will be a lieutenant with regimental pay, *Rs.* 265. 12. The Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance will have the rank of major, captain, or lieutenant. The average regimental pay, including presidency house rent, will be *Rs.* 524. 2. 3.** Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st and 2nd classes, will be major or captain, with an average pay of *Rs.* 588. 5. 4.†† Commissaries of Ordnance, 3rd class, will be captain or lieutenant, average regimental pay *Rs.* 341. 9. 10.‡‡ Commissaries of Ordnance, 4th class, as lieutenant, regimental pay, *Rs.* 265. 12.

Under proposed organization.

	Rs.	a.	p.		Rs.	a.	p.
¶ Lieutenant Colonel	1,002	4	–				
Major - - -	759	3	–				
	1,761	7	–	÷2=	880	11	6
** Major - - -	789	3	–				
Captain - -	477	7	8				
Lieutenant - -	305	12	–				
	1,572	6	8	÷3=	524	2	3
†† Major - -	759	3	–				
Captain - -	417	7	8				
	1,176	10	8	÷2=	588	5	4
‡‡ Captain - -	417	7	8				
Lieutenant - -	265	12	–				
	683	3	8	÷2=	341	9	10

477. The

477. The total monthly cost on account of regimental pay for the officers of the Ordnance Department under the proposed scheme may, therefore, be estimated as follows:—

	Rate of Pay.	Total.
	Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Deputy Director General - - - - - - -	880 11 6	880 11 6
1 Assistant - - - - - - - - - -	265 12 –	265 12 –
2 Assistant Inspectors Generals of Ordnance - - -	524 2 3	1,048 4 6
Commissaries of Ordnance:		
5 1st class - - - - - - - -	588 5 4	6,471 10 8
6 2nd „ - - - - - - - -		
11 3rd „ - - - - - - - -	341 9 10	3,757 12 2
11 4th „ - - - - - - - -	265 12 –	2,923 4 –
Total - - - *Rs.*		15,347 6 10

Total additional cost under proposed organization annually, *Rs.* 35,603. 11.

478. The total additional monthly cost on account of the pay of officers of the amalgamated Ordnance Department, as suggested by us, would be—

	Rs. a. p.
For regimental pay - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,666 15 7
„ staff pay - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,300 – –
Total - - - *Rs.*	2,966 15 7

or, annually, *Rs.* 35,603. 11.

Per contra savings

479. Against this increased expense, on account of the *personnel* of the amalgamated Ordnance Department, we have considered the large saving (about 400,000 *l.*) which will result from the carrying out of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Ordnance, under which the reserves of ordnance, ordnance carriages, and ammunition, hereafter to be maintained in India, have been very largely reduced. The abolition of the depôts at Bangalore, Nagpore, and St. Thomas' Mount, as proposed by us, will effect a further and considerable saving, for the actual expense on account of the *personnel* and office establishment of the depôt at St. Thomas' Mount alone amounted in 1877-78 to 29,937 rupees. And, lastly, it must be remembered that an ammunition depôt has been provided at Quetta, for which no Ordnance establishment had previously been sanctioned.

will result in economy, while efficiency will be secured.

480. Taking all these facts into consideration, we believe that the actual cost of the amalgamated Ordnance Department will be less than that of the Ordnance Department under the present organization, while the acknowledged defect as regards the paucity of officers in the department will have been remedied, and the executive branch of the Ordnance Department strengthened by the addition of 14 commissioned officers.

Supply of Warlike stores.

481. The question of the supply of warlike stores to India from England, and of reducing and systematizing requisitions on England, has recently been considered by a special committee.* The recommendations of this committee have been approved by Government, and we anticipate that their labours will lead to economy and increased efficiency. There is, however, one point connected with the question, on which the report of the committee above quoted does not touch, namely, the existing arrangements at the India Office in London under which military stores are procured in England, and dispatched to India. We have reason to believe that these arrangements are open to much improvement, and that considerable economies might be effected as regards the supply of stores, as well as a greater regularity and promptitude in their dispatch to India.

Arrangements under which they are procured in England capable of improvement.

* Special Ordnance Committee, 1877–78.

India. We are strongly of opinion that the Secretary of State for India should be assisted at the India Office by an artillery officer of first-rate professional ability, specially selected for his knowledge and experience of warlike stores at home, and, if possible, in India. All requisitions from this country should go to this officer, who would check and submit them for approval, with an estimate of the cost, and a recommendation as to the source of supply. This officer should also be in direct communication with the Director of Artillery at the War Office, and with the Director General of Ordnance in this country, and it should be part of his duty to supply India with all the latest information on ordnance and artillery matters. Under existing arrangements, information in these matters is meagre in character, and frequently reaches India at a date which renders it practically valueless.

A specially qualified officer should be appointed to assist Secretary of State and be in direct communication with heads of the Ordnance Departments in England and in India.

482. In regard to the supply of stores from Indian sources, or through agents in India, we recommend that the greatest attention be paid to the development of local supply, and that every effort be made towards the reduction and utililization of obsolete stores. We consider, also, that greater strictness should be exercised by the military authorities, and especially by commanding officers, to prevent the hasty condemnation of stores and equipments. It should be the duty of officers commanding to assist the officers of the Ordnance Department in their efforts to prevent the waste of public money.

Development of the system of local supply.

Hasty condemnation of stores, &c., deprecated.

483. We are of opinion that some modification in the arrangement under which the survey of stores is conducted when regiments arrive in England from India, and leave England for India, would lead to mutual economy. There appears to be too great an eagerness on the part of the respective officers appointed on behalf of the India Office and War Office, to depreciate the equipment of regiments and batteries, and this leads to the hasty condemnation of articles which are really perfectly serviceable, and would last longer.

Survey of stores and equipments in England.

484. We consider these questions worthy of attention, and recommend that they should be considered by a committee of practical officers.

A committee to consider these questions.

Section 4.—Military Works and Barrack Departments.

485. Prior to 1872 military public works were designed and executed by the Civil Public Works Department of the provincial Administrations. In that year Lord Mayo placed the military works of the Bengal Presidency in a distinct military branch under an Inspector General of Military Works. This change of system was made in consequence of certain failures of construction which had taken place, and was only adopted after long and careful consideration. The change was not applied to the Madras and Bombay presidencies, although it was intended that eventually there should be only one system throughout India.

Creation of a Military Works Branch in 1872.

486. The Inspector General of Military Works holds, directly under the Government of India, the charge of the military works in the provinces of Bengal, the North West and Oudh, the Punjab, and a portion of the Central Provinces, and also administers the Barrack Department. In the remaining provinces of India the military works are under the Local Governments. The area under the Inspector General is divided into six commands, at the head of each of which is a Superintending Engineer. These commands embrace 27 divisions, each of which has its fixed staff of executive and assistant engineers, with subordinate establishments.

Functions of the Inspector General.

487. The estimates for 1879–80 give the following figures:—

Cost of Military Works Branch.

	£.
Charge for *personnel** of Military Works Branch	165,000
For new works and those in progress	254,000
For repairs	237,469
Barrack Department	63,000

488. The

* Including travelling allowances and contingencies.

Intention of Lord Mayo in the creation of this branch.

488. The intention of Lord Mayo had been, as he pointed out in 1871, to create a small and highly-qualified constructive staff, to whose care was to be entrusted the construction of everything in the shape of first-class buildings or fortifications; a secondary staff, composed of younger men, and men of minor attainments, being employed on works of petty construction.

Recent proposals in respect to military works.

489. It has lately been proposed to transfer to the Local Governments the maintenance of completed military works, and the construction of works of minor importance, and to absorb the greater part of the Military Works Branch in the Civil Public Works Departments of local administrations. It has been strongly urged that such a measure would be in the interests of economy, while the efficiency of the service would not be lessened. On the other hand, it has been represented to us that the step would be a retrograde one, that the Local Governments would not have any direct interest in military works, that the change would entail a complicated procedure, and would injuriously affect the corps of Royal Engineers in India. We have considered all that has been said on both sides of the question, and have had laid before us the various papers, in which the whole subject of military works in India has been discussed by eminent civil and military authorities for several years past, and we have consulted the head of the Military Works Branch.

Essential to maintain Royal Engineers in India.

490. Looking to the fact that it is essential to the efficiency of the army in war that a considerable number of officers of Royal Engineers should be maintained in India, and that in peace time they may be profitably employed on military works, we recommend that the design, construction, and maintenance of all military works in India should be entrusted to a separate Department of Military Works. We have not the data to enable us to propose exactly the establishment required for the Madras and Bombay Army Corps, but this can be framed on the basis of the numbers we now recommend in the Table subjoined.

Proposed establishment of the Department of Military Works.

STATEMENT of Proposed Establishment for Department of Military Works at Head Quarters of the Army of India, and for the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps.

Inspector General's Establishment.

1 Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works.
1 Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.
1 Assistant Director of Works for Fortifications.
1 Deputy Director of Works for Barracks.
1 Assistant Director of Works for Barracks.
1 Aide-de-Camp to Inspector General.

Commanding Royal Engineers.

4 Commanding Royal Engineers (one 1st grade, two 2nd grade, one 3rd grade)

Engineer Establishment.

21 Garrison Engineers } Distributed in grades according to Public
40 Assistant Garrison Engineers } Works Department rules.

Upper Subordinate Establishment.

63 Upper Subordinates (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Lower Subordinate Establishment.

120 Sub-overseers (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Accounts.

1 Examiner (II. class, 1st grade).
35 Accountants (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Inspector General of Fortifications to be an officer of the War Department.

We consider that the Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works should be an administrative officer of the War Department.

491. We

491. We have recommended a strong head-quarters staff, as we recognize the expediency of all large questions being treated as parts of complete schemes, centrally considered and controlled; all defence questions, all type plans of barracks and fortifications, being prepared and passed at head-quarters, under the direction of the Inspector General in concert with the Permanent Defence Committee. This Committee should, we consider, be composed as follows:—

All large questions to be dealt with at head-quarters.

Proposed composition of Permanent Defence Committee.

President.

The Commander in Chief in India.

Members.

The Chief of the Staff.
The Inspector General of Artillery.
The Director General of Ordnance.
The Inspector General of Fortifications.
The Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.
The Officer of Royal Engineers in charge of Torpedo Defences.

Secretary.

The Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.

492. We are strongly of opinion that the strictest watch should be kept to prevent the overgrowth of the establishment, or the employment of officers of Royal Engineers in petty works. The greatest portion of the accounts should be done at head-quarters, and executive officers should be relieved as far as possible of account work.

Establishment to be restricted.

Accounts to be done at head-quarters.

493. We are of opinion that contracts for building should be employed to the greatest practicable extent, and that both English and Native contractors should be encouraged to undertake such work.

Contracts.

494. We consider that the instruction of the army in field engineering should be undertaken by the garrison and assistant garrison engineers, and that every effort should be made to secure a simple and uniform system of instruction both for British and Native troops.

Instructions to the army in field engineering.

495. There are at present nine battalions (of officers) of Royal Engineers in India, each battalion consisting of 48 officers. We are of opinion that five battalions will be sufficient for officering the Sappers and Miners and the Department of Military Works, and these may be allotted as follows:—

Present strength of Royal Engineers in India.

Proposed strength.

For Sappers and Miners - - - - - -	1 battalion.
„ Military Works - - - - - - -	3½ „
„ furlough, &c. - - - - - - - -	½ „
TOTAL - - -	5

For civil works, Survey Department, &c., two battalions will suffice, and we therefore recommend that the total strength of Royal Engineers in India should stand at seven, instead of nine, battalions.

496. We have ascertained that the cost of the establishment we have proposed at paragraph 490, will be 122,040 *l.** per annum, instead of, as at present, 165,000 *l.* This provides for a strong engineer staff in the War Department, and for the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps. In regard to actual works and repairs, we believe much economy can be effected by rigid supervision on the part of the military and engineer authorities; that much will be saved by our re-distribution of the army, and the diminution in the number of stations at which buildings have to be maintained and repaired; by the employment of contractors under skilled inspection, and by the introduction of the military labour of the troops. We are of opinion that the annual allotment of funds for new military works should be of uniform amounts, as far as possible, so as to distribute the cost over a considerable period, and at the same time secure greater uniformity in the military grants of the year.

Cost of proposed establishment.

Economy possible in several ways.

Annual allotment of funds to be as uniform as possible.

497. For

* *See* Appendix LVII.

Barrack Department.

Creation of a Barrack sub-department proposed.

497. For the Bengal presidency, the Barrack Department is under the Military Works Branch, Public Works Department. In the Madras and Bombay presidencies it is still in charge of the Quartermasters General. We consider that, in the true interests of economy and efficiency, all barrack supplies should be managed by one class of officers, and that commanding officers should not, as at present in the Bengal presidency, have to deal with as many as four different Departments for these supplies. We therefore recommend that a barrack sub-department of the Department of Military Works be constituted for the whole of India; that the general control of this be in the hands of the Department of Military Works, and that at each station for British troops a barrack master, or barrack sergeant, be in charge of all business connected with barrack furniture, barrack supplies, and the care of the barracks.

SECTION 5.—REMOUNT AND VETERINARY DEPARTMENTS.

Present establishment.

498. The present establishment of the Army Remount Department is as follows:—

Bengal.

1 Director of Remount Operations, with a staff salary of 1,000 rupees per mensem.
1 Remount Agent at Calcutta, with 700 rupees staff.
1 Veterinary Surgeon at Calcutta on pay of rank.
2 Superintendents of Reserve Depôts, Hapur and Saharunpur; one on 700 rupees, the other on 600 rupees staff.
2 Assistant Superintendents, one on 350 rupees, the other on 250 rupees staff.
2 Veterinary Surgeons for the Reserve Depôts, one on 300 rupees, the other on 250 rupees staff.

Madras.

1 Remount Agent, also in charge of the Oosoor Depôt, on 700 rupees staff.
1 Veterinary Surgeon, on 200 rupees staff.

Bombay.

No special establishment.

In all the above appointments the staff pay is in addition to staff corps pay or pay of rank as veterinary surgeon.

Reserve of horses in Bengal and Madras.

No reserve in Bombay.

499. In the Bengal presidency a reserve of 1,000 horses is maintained at the above depôts. In Madras the horses are bought from November to February and kept at the Oosoor Depôt till about September, when they are drafted off to corps and batteries, leaving a reserve of 150 horses at the depôt. In both the above presidencies a considerable number of Australian horses are bought, which are considered to require handling and acclimatization before being sent into the service. In Bombay the remounts are mostly Arabs, Persians, and northern horses, with a smaller proportion of Australians; all are bought by a special committee in Bombay, and sent at once direct to corps and batteries.

Economy of Bombay system.

Cost of remounts.

See Appendix LVIII.

500. Of the economy of the Bombay system there can, we think, be no question, while there is no reason to suppose that the cavalry and artillery in that army are horsed less efficiently than those of the Bengal and Madras armies. We find that the remount, which in the Bengal presidency is bought at an average of 550 rupees, costs about double that sum before he is passed from the reserve depôt into the ranks. In Madras the original cost, which is much the same as in Bengal, is increased by 300 rupees, owing to the retention of the remounts at the depôt.

Depôts necessary for Australian horses.

501. It is, however, represented that, owing to the larger proportion of Australian horses purchased for the Bengal and Madras armies, it is very necessary that there should be a depôt at which this class of horses can be broken in and acclimatized before being sent into the service, and that, apart from the military advantages of a reserve, horses thus treated last longer and render better service than they would if sent direct from the dealer's hands to a regiment. This view is, we believe, correct as far as Australians are concerned, but there is no reason why all other remounts should not go direct, as purchased, to

to their final destination, where they should be gradually broken in and gently exercised till quite fit for work.

502. After careful consideration of the previous papers on this subject which have been laid before us, and of the reports with which we have been furnished in reply to our questions, we desire to recommend the following establishment and mode of supply.

Establishment and system recommended.

503. There should be one Director of the Remount Department for all India, as recommended in Chapter V., who should not only be an administrative officer of the War Department of the Government of India, but also fully available for consultation by his Excellency the Commander in Chief. If he should be a selected officer of the Army Veterinary Department, his staff salary should be 500 rupees per mensem in addition to the pay and allowances fixed for the principal veterinary surgeon in India. If he should be a regimental or staff corps officer, his staff salary might be 1,000 rupees, in addition to staff corps pay.

504. We recommend that there should be one reserve depôt at Saharunpur, with a superintendent on 600 rupees staff, and a veterinary surgeon on 250 rupees staff. The superintendent should, during the winter, be deputed to Calcutta as purchasing agent for the Australians brought to that market, being assisted by a veterinary surgeon detached temporarily for this purpose.

Reserve depôt at Saharunpur.

505. There should be one reserve depôt at Oosoor, with a similar staff. The superintendent would purchase at Madras and Bombay, the Australians being bought chiefly or wholly at Madras and sent to the depôt, while the Arab, Persian, and Northern horses would go direct to corps under the orders of the Director.

Reserve depôt at Oosoor.

506. The Director would determine beforehand the total number of remounts required annually for all four army corps. After dividing this number into those required for British and Native cavalry (the latter in Madras only and the Viceroy's bodyguard), horse and field artillery, he would then classify them so as to ascertain how many Australians would be required for horse artillery and as wheelers in field artillery, &c., and how many Northern, Arab, and other horses of a less powerful stamp, would be required for light, medium, and Native cavalry, riding, and off horses of artillery, &c. Purchases would then be made under his directions according to this classification.

Total annual requirements to be determined beforehand by Director.

Classification.

507. The Australians for the Bengal and Punjab army corps would mostly be bought in Calcutta, for Madras and Bombay at Madras, while all other classes would be bought for all four army corps at Bombay, at fairs and up-country stations by officers specially deputed in the cold season, and also occasionally by commanding officers direct where suitable remounts were presented for the Government service.

Specially deputed officers to purchase horses.

508. Under this arrangement, and keeping in view the reduced number of horses that will be required annually under the proposed re-organization of the cavalry and artillery, it will be found sufficient to keep a reserve of about 400 to 500 Australians at Saharunpur, and 250 to 300 at Oosoor. These horses would be gradually acclimatized at these depôts, as at present, and they would form a reserve, the possession of which would not only be of use in case of sudden war, but also serve as a check on any combination on the part of the dealers. In addition to this reserve there would, we are confidently assured, be no difficulty, in any emergency, in buying from 1,000 to 2,000 horses fit for the service, most of which would already have been partially trained to saddle or harness. The supply of Australians, also, could at very short notice be doubled, either by direct encouragement to a few well-known dealers to bring over larger shipments, or by deputing one or two officers to buy in the colonies, as was done in the year 1857–58. It is, we consider, better to pay liberal, or even extravagant, prices to meet exceptional demands, than to maintain at great expense for a series of years a large reserve which may never be required.

Reserve of 400 to 500 horses at Saharunpur.

Reserve of 250 to 300 horses at Oosoor.

509. The saving in staff salaries by the adoption of the proposed establishment would be (excluding the veterinary surgeon in Calcutta, who is not in excess of the establishment), 34,200 rupees per annum, while there would be five officers less than at present. Taking these at one lieutenant colonel, two majors, and

Saving by proposed scheme

and two captains, there would be a further saving of 34,300 rupees a year, exclusive of the reduction in the charge for pensions. The saving from the reduction of one depôt in Bengal, and of the reserves in Bengal and Madras, can hardly be estimated with accuracy; but, judging from the statement of present charges, the total saving would not be less than 2,00,000 rupees annually. The total reduction, therefore, would be 2,68,500 rupees, exclusive of pension charges.

Veterinary Department.

Present establishment of Veterinary Department.

510. The present veterinary establishment is as follows:—

Administrative.	Rs.
1 Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Bengal, who is also Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India, staff pay.	400
1 Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Bengal, staff pay -	300
1 ditto - - ditto - - Madras ditto -	400
1 ditto - - ditto - - Bombay ditto -	400

Executive.	Officers.
9 Regiments of British cavalry - - - - -	9
4 ditto Native ditto (Madras) - - -	4
Madras Bodyguard - - - - - - - -	1
15 Batteries, Horse Artillery - - - - - -	15
43 ditto Field ditto - - - - - -	25
Bengal Stud Department - - - - - -	5
Oosoor Depôt, Madras - - - - - -	1
Reserve - - - - - - - - -	9
TOTAL - - -	69

Veterinary requirements to be considered by stations.

Opinion of Principal Veterinary Surgeon at the War Office.

511. We are of opinion that, if the veterinary requirements of the army were considered by stations, instead of by corps and batteries, a very considerable reduction in the above numbers might be effected. In this view we are supported by the opinion of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon at the War Office, an officer of 12 years' experience in India, six of which were in the office of Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon. He writes as follows:—

"The peace establishment of veterinary surgeons for India is, all told, 72. I have no hesitation in saying that this number is excessive, and that, by a judicious re-organization, a considerable reduction might be made without in any way impairing the efficiency of the department.

See Appendix LX.

"In many stations in India, where there are only one or two batteries of artillery, a resident veterinary surgeon is unnecessary. If a veterinary surgeon visited these stations once a month to make a sanitary inspection, perform operations, give advice as to the treatment of sick and lame horses, &c., it would amply suffice. With railways available, one veterinary officer could embrace within his district several stations, each of which now possesses a resident veterinary surgeon."

This reduction, however, refers only to the peace establishment. For war, Mr. Collins considers that extra veterinary aid would be needed for the increased number of transport animals.

Proposed establishment.

512. In this view, we recommend the following establishment:—

Administrative.

1 Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon for each army corps, on staff, of 400 rupees; four in all.

Director of Remount Department would advise the Commander in Chief.

No principal officer appears necessary for the head-quarters of the army, as his Excellency the Commander in Chief would have at his disposal the advice and assistance of the Director of the Remount Department.

Executive.

Military requirements, distributed by stations - -	32
Two depôts - - - - - - - - - -	2
Horse-breeding operations - - - - - -	3
Percentage for leave, &c. - - - - - -	9
TOTAL - - -	46

513. We

513. We would also strongly recommend the early establishment of two or three veterinary colleges, at which Native farriers could be trained and educated. In times of peace there are many duties on which they could, apart from the private demand for their services, be most usefully employed under the Civil Governments, while in time of war a considerable number would, no doubt, be available, on liberal rates of pay, for service with the transport department. Veterinary colleges.

514. The saving by the reduction of 23 veterinary surgeons is estimated at 1,15,000 rupees a year, exclusive of the reduction in the charge for pensions. The eventual saving in the army remount and veterinary departments would be, approximately, 3,83,500 rupees per annum. Saving under proposed distribution. Total saving in the Remount and Veterinary Departments.

Section 6.—Military Account Department.

515. The present establishment of the Military Account Department is as follows: staff salaries only are included, except in the case of the controllers, whose pay is consolidated:— Present establishment of Military Account Department.

	Rs.
3 Controllers - - - - - - -	6,900 per mensem.
3 Military accountants, 1st class, 1st grade -	3,000 „
5 „ „ 1st „ 2nd „ -	4,000 „
5 „ „ 2nd „ 1st „ -	3,000 „
5 „ „ 2nd „ 2nd „ -	2,500 „
4 „ „ 3rd „ - - -	1,200 „
7 Assistant military accountants, average pay	1,050 „
32 Officers.	
3 Medical Examiners - - - - - -	1,200 „
Rs.	22,850 per mensem.

516. There are also the following special appointments connected with, but not forming part of, the Military Account Department:— Special appointments.

	Rs.
1 Superintendent of family pensions and payments, Madras -	600
2 Pension Paymasters, Bombay - 1 on - - - -	350
2 Pension Paymasters, Bombay - 1 on - - - -	250

517. The distribution of these officers according to duties is as follows:— Present distribution of officers.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Controller - - - - - - - - -	1	1	1	3
Examiner of Commissariat and Stud Accounts -	1	1	1	3
Pay Examiner - - - - - - - -	2	1	1	4
Officer in charge of Accounts Branch, Controller's Office.	1	1	1	3
Examiner of Ordnance and Clothing Accounts -	1	1	1	3
Paymasters - - - - - - - -	3	1	1	5
Pension Paymasters - - - - - - -	4	–	–	4
Assistant Military Accountants, probationers learning their work or acting for officers on furlough. One is permanent assistant to the Paymaster, Bombay, and also pays the pensioners of that circle.	–	–	–	7
Medical Examiner - - - - - - -	1	1	1	3
Total - - -	14	7	7	35

518. The medical examiners have charge of the military, medical, and orphan funds, for which they receive an extra allowance of 300 rupees in Bengal, and 150 rupees in Madras and Bombay. Unlike the other officers in the department, their tenure of office is limited to five years. Medical examiners.

519. In the Madras Presidency there are also special local allowances for the payment of pensioners, varying with the number of men at each paying station. Payment of pensioners.

520. In Bombay the system of paying pensioners is the same as in Bengal, though the pension paymasters are not officers of the Military Account Department.

Position of officers of the department.

521. The officers of this department are taken from all three presidencies, are borne on one roster for promotion, are in direct subordination to the Government of India, and are moved from one presidency to another as may be required in the interests of the public service. The pay is, speaking generally, personal to the officer, that is, departmental promotion carries with it higher grade pay without necessarily involving any immediate change of duties, though, as a rule, the more important posts are held by officers in the higher classes.

Mode of dealing with estimates.

522. The budget estimate of military expenditure for each presidency is submitted by the Controller of Military Accounts, and all three estimates are subsequently reviewed and consolidated in the Accounts Branch, Military Department, of the Government of India, before submission to the Financial Department. Classified statements of actual receipts and charges, and accounts current with the Secretary of State for India, including adjustments on account of the War Office, are submitted by each presidency, and consolidated in the same way.

Duties of officers.

523. The duties of the paymasters and examiners require no detailed explanation. Those of the controllers are defined as follows:—

"I.—To examine into all sources of military expenditure, and control all permanent and contingent expenses, whether relating to monies or material, throughout India, including all territories under the direct control of the Government of India, but without interfering with the functions of the administrative heads of departments.

"II.—To check and examine the several annual estimates of military expenditure, propose modifications therein, and to submit the same in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

"III.—To represent to the proper authority, and report to the Governments under which they are immediately serving, every instance in which reduction of expenditure, whether in money or stores, by any means of economy, may be practicable consistently with efficiency.

"IV.—To provide for the effectual supervision over all accounts of military expenditure, the verification of all balances of cash and stores, and, with the view of restricting the amount of cash in hand or of reserve stock, to make such inquiries as may be necessary; also enforcing the due and timely adjustment of all advances and inefficient balances."

Proposed organization of the department.

524. To provide for the requirements of the army corps organization it is necessary to sub-divide the Bengal portion of the Military Account Department into two distinct branches, for the Bengal and Punjab corps respectively, and we recommend the following establishment:—

	Rate.	Amount.
	Rs.	*Rs.*
4 Controllers (consolidated) - - - -	2,000	8,000
5 Military Accountants, 1st class, staff - -	800	4,000
5 " " 2nd " " - -	600	3,000
5 " " 3rd " " - -	500	2,500
5 " " 4th " " - -	400	2,000
7 Assistant Military Accountants on 150 rupees during the year of probation, and 200 rupees subsequently, average - - - - -	175	1,225
31 Officers.		
4 Medical Examiners - - - - -	400	1,600
		22,325
Present cost - - -		22,850
Monthly Saving - - - *Rs.*		525

525. These

525. These officers would be employed in the following duties:— Duties of the officers according to proposed organization.

4 Controllers, one for each army corps.
4 Examiners of Commissariat Accounts.
4 Pay Examiners.
4 Examiners of Ordnance and Clothing Accounts.
4 Paymasters at Calcutta or Allahabad, Rawal Pindi, Madras, and Bombay.
4 Pension Paymasters, Bengal and Punjab Army Corps.
7 Assistant Military Accountants employed as already explained.
4 Medical Examiners.

526. The Accounts Branch of the Controller's office should be superintended by uncovenanted officers, on a somewhat higher salary than that of the present head assistants. There is nothing in the duties of this office which requires the services of an officer from the army. Accounts Branch of Controller's office.

527. It is desirable that the whole system of paying pensioners in the three presidencies should be assimilated as soon as the information necessary to carry out the arrangement can be obtained. System of paying pensioners to be assimilated.

528. We recommend that no officers of less than five years' army service should be permitted to enter the department, and that after two years' probation they should, if permanently posted to the department, be removed from the regimental list, and thenceforward be borne on the general list for promotion. Appointment of officers.

529. As regards the duties of the department, and more especially the relation of the controllers to Government and to the generals commanding army corps, whose financial advisers they should, in our opinion, be, we would make the following proposals. All four controllers should hold the same position relatively to the Government of India that the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, now holds. But in order to diminish, as far as possible, the numerous references on comparatively unimportant points of detail which are now made to the Government of India and to the Local Governments, it will be necessary that the powers of the controller should be so far enlarged that he may be able to dispose, on his own authority, of all cases in which the sum involved does not exceed 1,000 rupees, provided always that no alteration of existing rules is involved, no precedent established, and there is nothing novel, doubtful, or irregular in the character of the expenditure. Relations of the controllers to the Government and to the generals commanding army corps.

530. He should afford to the general commanding the army corps any advice or information that may be required relating generally to all questions of military finance, and to any doubt or difficulty in the interpretation of pay or departmental regulations. Should that officer authorise any expense not provided for by existing rules, or on which the controller may record an adverse opinion, it should be the duty of the general commanding to report the same to the Government of India; but the controller should also be required to report the circumstance to the Accountant General of the War Department. All orders by general officers commanding districts issued as at present, "subject to confirmation," should, in the first instance, come under the cognizance of the controller, who, exercising a liberal discretion, would dispose of all cases in which the issue of the order appeared to have been necessary, though not provided by regulation, sending on to the general commanding for orders, or for submission to Government, only such cases as might be exceptional and seem to require special sanction, or in which large expenditure was incurred. He would not have authority to disallow finally charges incurred on the authority of such orders, without a previous reference to the general commanding or to Government. Financial powers of the generals commanding and controllers.

531. The financial powers of the general would, in times of peace, be limited to the sanction of expenditure not exceeding 1,000 rupees in each instance, and subject to the conditions already provided for the guidance of the controller in similar cases. Except in special circumstances, he would not dispose of references of a financial nature without calling on the controller for his advice or report. A schedule of all cases thus disposed of, either by the general commanding or by the controller, in which a limit of 500 rupees was exceeded, should be submitted monthly for the information of Government. Ordinary limit of such powers.

532. Estimates, statements of receipts and charges, and London accounts current Accounts.

current would be submitted separately for each army corps, and consolidated in the Office of the Accountant General, War Department.

Military, medical, and orphan funds of the Bengal presidency.

533. The accounts of the military, medical, and orphan funds in Bengal cannot be divided, and must remain under charge of the Medical Examiner, Bengal Army Corps.

Offices of controllers and examiners to be at the head-quarters of army corps.

534. Though not absolutely necessary, it would be very desirable that the offices of the controllers and the examiners should be at the head-quarters station of each corps. In Bombay this is already the case, and in the Punjab Army Corps the controller and his staff can of course be located at Rawal Pindi.

CHAPTER XI.

THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN INDIA.

Chief points on which troops may have to concentrate.

535. Military lines of communication in India must necessarily be considered under two great divisions, namely,—

I. Lines across our frontiers.

II. Lines to bases near our frontiers, or to other obligatory points within India.

Two-thirds of the external frontier of India are girt by the sea and are guarded by the British Navy. It is unnecessary to look forward to the time when British troops may have to meet Chinese or Thibetan armies beyond the frontiers of Burma or Bengal. And the only external foes against whom the Indian Government need provide are the Afghans, supported possibly by Russia, on the north-west, Nepal on the north, Bhootan, the Nagas and Lushais and other wild tribes of the Assam and Arracan borders on the north-east, and Burma on the east. Except in the case of frontier garrisons and of British regiments at hill stations, all the forces disposable for a campaign will be quartered on one or other of the railway lines. We may reckon that the Government must be prepared to concentrate and supply at one time or another—

A large force of 30,000 *men or upwards*—

(1) at Rawal Pindi for operations across on on the north-west border;
(2) at Shikarpur or at Mooltan for - ditto - ditto;
(3) at Bombay or Calcutta for dispatch across the sea.

A moderate force of 5,000 *to* 10,000 *men*—

(4) on the Nepal border;
(5) on the British Burma border.

A small force of about 5,000 *men*—

(6) at or near Hyderabad (Deccan);
(7) at or near Gwalior;
(8) on any point of the Bhootan border;
(9) on the Naga border of Assam;
(10) on the Lushai border either from Cachar or Chittagong.

We need not consider the question of communications for petty parties of a few hundred troops, who may be sent into the field to put down petty local disturbances, and to perforn *quasi*-police duties.

Lines to the north-west frontier.

536. Recent campaigns have brought prominently forward the extreme importance of good lines of communication to and across the north-west frontier into Afghanistan. While the Commission was sitting, we submitted, at the request of the Government of India, our opinion respecting the need for military railways through the Bolan pass to Quetta on the Kandahar route; also to Lundi Kotal, and perhaps Kohat, on the Khyber and Kuram routes respectively. The Government of India are already constructing, as rapidly as circumstances permit, the railways from the Indus towards Quetta; and from Jhelum through Rawal Pindi to the Indus, with an extension in the direction of Peshawar. We will only add that we believe the construction of these lines to be absolutely necessary

necessary for the safe and economical retention of our present, or of any more advanced frontier. We are confident that the existence of these railways will cause large savings of expenditure in time both of peace and of war. Not only will troops and supplies be expeditiously and cheaply conveyed, but a strong position, resting on good and secure communications, will be much safer from attack or from menace; whereas, with inferior lines of communication liable to interruption, even a threatening of danger compels the Government to spend vast sums on suddenly improvising costly means of transport. For narrow passes and steep ascents with difficult gradients we would recommend, when the commercial traffic is not likely to be heavy, that narrow lines be laid with rolling-stock capable of passing sharp curves.

Khyber route more important than the Kuram.

537. Notwithstanding the fact that a force on the Peiwar, with command of the Shutargardan pass, is within easy striking distance of Cabul and the Logar valley, we consider the Khyber route to be more important and obligatory than the Kuram. The latter route is closed by snow from three to five months of the year; and it can be turned by the Gumal pass, or by the Khyber. The Khyber route, on the other hand, has always been the road by which armies and caravans have passed from Central Asia into Northern India; and now that we know this route better, it has lost some of the terrors, physical and tribal, with which it was formerly surrounded. We advise that the railway from Rawal Pindi to the Indus be so laid out as to suit branch railways or roads both to Peshawar and Kohat, that is to say, to both the Khyber and the Kuram routes, and good roads suitable for wheeled traffic should be made through both these passes.

Lateral communications along the north-west frontier.

538. We do not consider that there is any need whatever for a railway along the Indus valley from Peshawar through Kohat and the Derajat. The existing frontier road from post to post along the base of the hills should be gradually improved, and will answer all requirements for many years to come.

Lines for concentration—At Rawal Pindi.

539. For concentration at Rawal Pindi, the important lines of communication are the East Indian Railway, the Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway, the Punjab Northern Railway, and the Oudh and Rohilcund Railway. The most important piece of railway on this line of concentration, which is still unmade (south of Jhelum), is the link between Moradabad and Saharunpur. This link will join the Oudh and Rohilcund garrisons directly with the Punjab line; and it will give, when the Benares bridge is finished, two broad-gauge lines between Behar and the Punjab. Not only will this line relieve pressure on the East Indian Railway through the Gangetic Doab, but it will furnish an alternative through route if the Jumna bridge at Allahabad, or any other of the great bridges on the East Indian Railway north of Mogul Serai, were destroyed.

On Mooltan or Shikarpur.

540. If concentration of troops from the southern armies were required at Shikarpur or at Mooltan, then the Indus valley is the next most important railway. The southern armies would go to Bombay by the Great Indian Peninsula and Madras lines. From Bombay two to three days' steaming would carry them to Kurrachee, whence a broad-gauge line could carry them to Sukkur in 16 hours, and to Lahore in 48 hours. The Kurrachee and Indus valley route would be much shorter, for the journey from Bombay to Sukkur, than the land route by Jubbulpore, Allahabad, and Ghaziabad. Moreover, it would be an alternative route, which would relieve pressure on the East Indian, and Punjab lines south of Lahore. The link most required in this route is the bridge over the Indus at Sukkur. The Indus crossing means a delay of three hours even for ordinary mail trains. It would probably add at least a day, and great expense to the transport of troops, horses, and guns by the Indus Valley Line. Apart from the question of the lines from Rawal Pindi and Sukkur to the border, the completion of the Rohilcund line to Saharunpur, and of the Indus bridge at Sukkur, will render the railway communication to our frontier bases as complete as the country can afford, or as they can well be made without doubling existing lines. We do not reckon the Rajputana line, even when it is completed from Beawar to Ahmedabad, an important link between the north-west frontier and the sea-base, for it is a narrow-gauge line, and it would only suffice to carry spare troops from the Central India garrisons to the main arterial lines of the East Indian and Punjab railways. The southern

southern armies could best be carried to the front by the Indus Valley route; and the eastern army would travel by the East Indian and Rohilcund lines.

On Calcutta or Bombay.

541. For concentration of troops at Calcutta and Bombay, the East Indian Railway, the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Madras Railway, and the Indus Valley Railway must be the principal routes.

On the Nepal border.

542. For the Nepal border, the East Indian Railway and the metre-gauge railways of North Behar would be the main lines of communication, if entrance into the hills were to be made by the ordinary route near Segowlie, or by the less known, but perhaps easier, route north of Mozufferpore. If entrance into Nepal were made by the Kosi valley, then troops would have to be concentrated by the Northern Bengal Bailway and by the Purneah road. For entrance into Nepal on the Goruckpore side, there would be only district roads. We think that the proposed extensions of the Tirhoot Railway to Bettiah in the north, and to the east of Durbungha, are of great importance in the view of possible military operations on the northern frontier of Bengal.

On the Burma border.

543. For concentration on the Burma frontier, the routes are the Irrawaddy river and the railway to Prome. There are no country roads, or next to none, by which troops could be concentrated on the frontier. There is, however, a partially completed military road between Thayetmyo and Tonghoo. To Tonghoo there is a road, and a railway has been aligned on this route. Until this railway is made the Burma frontier can hardly be safe; for troops concentrated at Prome, or on the river border at Allanmyo, could not operate towards Tonghoo without great difficulty and delay.

On Hyderabad.

On Gwalior.

544. Concentration on Hyderabad would be comparatively easy by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway and the Madras Railway upon Shahabad, whence the Nizam's railway runs into Hyderabad. So with Gwalior, the railway from Agra on the East Indian line will soon be finished, and then troops could rapidly concentrate in sufficient numbers on the Gwalior fortress.

On the Bhootan border.

545. On the Bhootan border any concentration of troops east and north-east of Julpigoree would be difficult at certain times of the year. There is, in truth, little danger to be feared from Bhootan. But if, or when, we have a war with Nepal, Bhootan may attempt inroads. A good road from Julpigoree to Baxa, and thence eastwards through the Duars to Burpetta, is wanted for the complete safety of that border.

On the Assam border.

546. The only route by which troops could approach the Assam border is the Brahmaputra. The banks of this river are 20 to 70 miles from the many possible points of hostile contact with border tribes. In a very few places navigable affluents of the Brahmaputra would help to transport troops and supplies to the border. Beyond Dibrooghur, the railway to Sadya, with a branch to Makum, will be a valuable means of communication with the border. But for the rest, the approaches to the border outposts are jungle tracts, accessible only by elephant carriage; while from one post to another there is sometimes no road or path at all. Considerable improvement in the Brahmaputra steamer service; some extension of the Northern Bengal Railway towards the Assam valley; and patrol roads or paths from post to post all along the border, with occasional roads from the posts to the stations and the river landing-places in the rear, are needed before the Assam frontier can be said to be secure.

On the Lushai border.

547. So again, with the Lushai frontier: from Silchar on the Barak river, from Hylacanda, and from Rangamutty on the Kurnafuli river, there are no regular roads to the frontier outposts. A military road by which the Barak valley outposts may join hands with the Kurnafuli valley posts is, perhaps, beyond the needs of this generation; but patrol paths from post to post, and from the posts to the base at Silchar and Rangamutty, are needed. On the Arracan hill tracts, the frontier posts are connected fairly well with the Koladyne river and with each other. But they are still very far indeed from joining hands with the outposts on the frontier of the Chittagong hill-tracts.

Military roads still required.

548. Except the roads from Goruckpore and Mozufferpore to the Nepal frontier, the road from Julpigoree along the Bhootan border, and the patrol roads (or paths) along the eastern frontier, it can hardly be said that any very important lines of military road remain to be made this side of the north-west frontier

frontier bases. In Burma it is doubtful whether railway extension to Tonghoo will not in the end be the cheapest improvement to communications there; and if Tonghoo could be joined by an improved military road with Prome (or Allanmyo) on the Irrawaddy, our communications from the sea to the Burma frontier would be as good as we are likely to get them within the present generation.

549. Though the great bulk of the troops are quartered on one or other of the broad-guage railways, a considerable force is kept in the Himalayan stations, which are from 40 to 120 miles distant from the railways. These regiments are not wanted* for the safety or protection of the districts where they are quartered; they are generally in good fighting order, and they are certain to be wanted, either in the field or to replace regiments ordered to the front, directly any army corps is ordered on field service. Therefore, the routes by which these troops can be carried to the railway are among our important military lines. The troops kept in the hills in ordinary times have hitherto been— Communications to military stations in the hills.

	Mountain Artillery Batteries.	Battalions.	
		British Infantry.	Native Infantry, Goorkhas.
Kumaon Hills	-	2	1
Chakrata and Dehra	-	1	1
Simla Hills	1	2	—
Kangra and Dalhousie Hills	-	-	2
Murree and Hazara Hills	1	2	1
Total	2	7	5

From the Kumaon hills, the descent of troops to the railway would occupy about three weeks. The Commissioner, Sir Henry Ramsay, says that the collection of sufficient carriage would be difficult; and he adds that, owing to the unhealthiness of the Terai, it would be unsafe for the troops to march down at all for three or four months of the year. The Chakrata garrison could reach the railway in about sixteen days' time. The troops in the Simla hills could reach the railway in eight days. To bring the Kumaon garrison within easy reach of the railway, a line from Moradabad station on the Oudh and Rohilcund Railway to Ramnagar has been proposed; this would be about 48 miles long, and could hardly pay. A line has also been proposed from Umballa to Kalka (40 miles), which would practically bring the Simla hills garrisons within two days of the railway. This line would probably obtain a large traffic. The Goorkha corps in the Kangra and Dalhousie hills could reach the railway in ten days. The garrisons in the Murree hills could concentrate on Rawal Pindi at four to six days' notice. We think the lines from Umballa to Kalka, and from Ramnagar to Moradabad, must be regarded as important military lines of communication. Looking to the comparative immobility of these hill garrisons, we urge the economy and convenience of cantoning regiments near together in the Himalayas, so that they may be served by the same railway. Even if water-supply is a difficulty, it is cheaper and more convenient to create a water-supply on some convenient site near other hill cantonments, than to take up fresh ground in the hills. For instance, the road to Chakrata cost 25 lakhs to make, and will perhaps cost one lakh yearly to keep up; yet the Chakrata regiment is still 16 days off the railway. The Ranikhet road also cost a very large sum. If these two and a-half battalions had been cantoned somewhere in the Simla hills, the large sums spent on new hill-roads would have been available to make a railway to Kalka, and to provide reservoirs and pumping machinery sufficient to yield an ample supply of water. It is not only in time of war, but for camps of exercise, for ordinary reliefs, and for supply purposes, that hill cantonments close to a railway

* Perhaps the 5th Goorkhas at Abbottabad may be an exception to this statement.

railway must always be cheaper and more convenient than stations 15 or 20 days' march from the nearest railway station.

Abstract of important lines existing and required.

550. To sum up, we may say that on this side of our bases at Rawal Pindi and the line of the Indus the most important lines of military communication to be maintained are—

The East Indian Railway, and Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway up to Lahore.
The Punjab Northern State Railway.
The Indus Valley Railway.
The Lahore and Rawal Pindi Railway.
The Oudh and Rohilcund Railway.
The Irrawaddy Valley Railway.
The Great Indian Peninsula Railway.
The Tirhoot Railway.

551. The lines of railway and roads which ought to be made, to complete our lines of communication, are—

The lines now under construction towards the Bolan and Khyber passes.
The Moradabad and Saharunpur link with the Benares bridge.
The Sukkur bridge on the Indus Valley Railway.
The Umballa and Kalka line.
The Rangoon and Tonghoo line.
The Ramnagar and Moradabad line.
The Tirhoot Northern and Eastern Extension.

Arrangements required to turn railways to the best advantage for military purposes.

552. Within the meaning of the words "maintaining our chief military lines of communication," as those words occur in our instructions, come also the arrangements required to turn the railway lines to the best and promptest advantage for military purposes. These arrangements seem to come under the heads of—

(1.) Employing the railway lines to the highest military advantage with as little inconvenience as possible to ordinary traffic;

(2). Maintaining and adapting rolling-stock and appliances, with due reference to military requirements;

(3). Arranging for the protection of lines in time of disturbance or danger;

(4). Providing for the rapid reconstruction of broken lines.

553. With reference to the first point, it must be remembered that a great deal of experience, method, and skill is required to get full duty out of a railway line, and especially out of a single line, of which the rolling-stock is limited and cannot be indefinitely increased. If the English standard, namely, 200 vehicles for every 1,000 men of all arms, with their *matériel*, be adopted as about the requirement of troops, then (with 25 vehicles to a train) it would take 240 trains to move an army corps of 30,000 men of all arms. Twelve trains each way, or, with great care and method, 15 full trains one way, and 10 trains of empties the other way, is about as much as can be got out of a single line for any considerable time together. On the East Indian Railway, at any rate, half of the power of the line would have, if possible, to be left for ordinary traffic. In order that the power of the military railways may be fully utilized in time of war or need, it will be necessary that in peace time tables and schemes for working military trains should, in concert* with the railway traffic authorities, be prepared to fit in with the ordinary time-tables, and should from time to time be altered as the railways alter their own working plans. When large movements of troops took place, the officers of the head-quarters staff charged with railway transport affairs would, in concert with responsible representatives of the traffic department of each line, regulate the working of the troop and supply trains, so as to fulfil whatever might be the requirements of the army in the front. They would be responsible for carrying out the troop-train movements, and the Chief of the Staff would only issue orders saying what troops and material

* In England all the chief officers of most railway lines belong to an engineer and railway transport volunteer corps; and they would arrange with each other for carrying out all large movements of troops which might be ordered by the Committee of Inspectors of Railways from the War Office.

material were to be moved, whence and whither. If in time of war troops had to be moved on several lines, an officer of the head-quarters or army corps staff would have to be deputed to each line, as a railway staff officer, to act in concert with the railway traffic officers. For it is not possible that a central authority, without staff officers who have made the transport of troops by railway their study, can regulate the movement of troop-trains on a large scale over several lines of railway.

554. For facilitating the protection of railway lines in times of peace and disturbance, some preparations have been made in the Punjab by making the Lahore station defensible, and by erecting small guard-houses on some of the important bridges. It might be difficult to make the large junctions situated in towns like Allahabad, Jubbulpore, and Cawnpore thoroughly defensible. But in time of disturbance such places would certainly have to be securely guarded. And designs ought to be prepared and made available both in the staff office on the spot, and in the head-quarter office, for converting some of the more convenient buildings into a place of arms, from which a moderate guard could dominate the station, and make attack by rioters or ill-organized rebels impossible.

Designs for making important stations defensible should be kept ready,

555. Unless such schemes are prepared and understood, there will be panic and confusion at some of the large stations, whose safety might be endangered by a few hundred bad characters from the neighbouring city. Not only will it be necessary to guard large stations in time of disturbance, but the main bridges will have to be watched. Now-a-days, when a few dynamite cartridges can blow a two hundred feet girder to pieces, it may be difficult to prevent all attempt to demolish a railway passing through hostile or disaffected populations. But unless the bridges are guarded and patrolled in such case, any single bad character (especially any one who has been a railway operative) could destroy any one of them without much fear of detection or interruption. A guard-house with patrols on the bridge would make such demolitions much more dangerous and difficult. And the presence of such a guard would, in most cases, deter ordinary local bad characters from making the attempt. A defensible guard-house would enable a small guard to protect themselves from a sudden attack. It would not be necessary to make such guard-houses everywhere; but designs and plans should be ready and accessible in the proper place, for erecting them with the material available on the spot. It is not only on the great lines to the frontier that such arrangements might be necessary. If ever we had a difficulty with the people of Hyderabad, they would assuredly attempt to demolish the Shahabad and Raichore junctions, and to cut the Kistna and Tangabhadra bridges.

and for guard posts on the big bridges.

556. In order to maintain military lines of railway in time of disturbance, it will be necessary that type-drawings and plans should be prepared and kept available, in the proper places, for hastily constructing bridges over small and large openings. The designs should show how to use profitably and rapidly rails, sleepers, timber baulks of the sizes always in stock, and sandbags, for the purpose of temporary trellis or other bridges. In order that rails and sleepers may be profitably used for such work, iron clamps, screws, and nuts of certain sizes not ordinarily in stock, will be required. As soon as the designs are ready, steps should be taken to have a sufficient stock of these clamps and screws present in store on the chief military railways.

Designs required for re-constructing bridges.

557. We have considered whether we could advocate the constitution of a railway service corps, such as was recommended by the Committee of 1878. We think that the Government need not provide for working railways in an enemy's country. The Indian army, under our proposals, will not be too large for the work it has to perform; and it can hardly spare a regiment for permanent railway duty. It may be questioned whether a regiment, which is obliged to give a certain part of its time to military duties, could manage a railway as economically, or as well, as a staff of regular railway employés. We do not advise the creation of a separate railway service corps. We recommend that a committee should consider the whole subject of working the entire railway system of India for large movements of troops, and the defence of railways, upon which we have touched in the foregoing paragraphs.

Railway service corps.

Committee to be appointed.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY FOR WAR.

Mobilization in India defined.

558. MOBILIZATION is the transition from peace to a war footing. In India the mobilization of troops may mean, either placing in the field moveable columns to maintain order in districts, or preparing and concentrating large bodies of troops for various services. The strength and position of the "moveable columns" we recommend, are detailed in Chapter X, Section 2, and Appendix XLVIII, and it is unnecessary for us to do more than advise that they should be frequently practised in moving out of their stations in the shortest possible time. We have based our recommendations on the principle of maintaining the strength of corps and batteries, in regard to men, at a war establishment, and it therefore only remains for us to show how the higher tactical and administrative units can be drawn from the territorial army corps.

559. The tables at pages 24 to 27 give the troops available to be mobilized, and at paragraph 104 we have detailed the composition of army corps, divisions, and brigades. In paragragh 97, Chapter IV, we have pointed out the various directions in which large bodies of troops may be required to operate, and we have elsewhere dwelt upon the necessity for the staff having matured plans for the organization, concentration, and forward movement of the several forces we may require to put into the field in India.

Requirements.

560. It would be impossible for us in the very limited time at our disposal to enter into all the details of mobilization, but it is advisable to show the requirements of a force to be mobilized, and the steps which must be taken to place it in the field. The requirements would be—(1) Officers; (2) Men; (3) Horses; (4) Equipment and Clothing; (5) Commissariat, Ordnance, Medical; (6) Transport.

Supply of officers.

561. (1) *Officers.*—In placing in the field two army corps of three divisions each of the composition given in Table 14, Appendix XII, we should have a strength of about 58,000 of all ranks with 180 guns—a force which we may fairly take as a maximum to be provided from the normal establishment of the army. The wants of one field army corps in officers may be classified under the heads, Staff, Commissariat, Transport, Pay. We think that it will be necessary to provide for the following staff for each army corps:—

i. *Staff (including General Officers)*—

Army Corps staff *	8
Divisional staff for three divisions	15
Brigade staff for six brigades	18
Cavalry division staff	10
Total	51

See Table 10, Appendix XII.
See Table 11, Appendix XII.

ii. *Commissariat.*—For this service we should be able to give, if required, 20 officers to each corps, under the organization already proposed in Chapter X, Section 1, page 128, and their distribution would be as follows:—

Army Corps head-quarters	2
Divisional head-quarters (three divisions)	6
9 † Brigades at 1 per brigade	9
	17
Spare	3
	20

iii. *Transport.*

* Excluding Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, &c.
† Counting corps artillery as a brigade.

iii. *Transport.*—We should, we think, allow 30 officers per army corps, which is however an excessive estimate if regiments manage their own transport.

iv. *Pay.*—This department would require two or three officers who might be drawn from the Military Account Department, and their places filled by officers brought in from regiments.

The total for one army corps of three divisions would be—

Staff	51
Transport	30
Pay	2
	83

562. For two army corps 166 officers would be required. The commissariat officers may be excluded because they are drawn from the department itself. Their places would be filled by warrant officers, or regimental officers could do the work at those stations whose garrisons were much reduced.

Number of officers available.

563. In the two army corps there would be four British cavalry regiments, 12 British infantry regiments, 14 Native cavalry regiments, 30 Native infantry regiments. This would leave in garrison two British cavalry regiments, 31 British infantry regiments, 13 Native cavalry regiments, and 71 Native infantry regiments, in addition to local corps. If two officers are taken from each British regiment, this would give 66 officers; and two from each Native regiment would give 168, or a total of 234 officers, without drawing on the local corps, whereas only 166 officers are required.

Steps to be taken before entering on a campaign.

564. The steps to be taken before entering on a campaign, with the view of providing officers for field service, would be to recall from leave or furlough all officers who are fit for duty, to request the Horse Guards to fill up all vacancies in British regiments and batteries, and to draw on the proposed reserve of young officers in England, whose places would be filled up by additional commissions from Sandhurst.

Reserve in England to be called on.

565. The new reserve of officers in England might also be asked for volunteers, and in the case of future entrants, Indian officers retiring before 32 years' service should be liable to recall in case of serious emergency, in assimilation with the rule laid down in the Royal Warrant of 1877. It is unnecessary to say that, for additional aid in the *personnel* of the Transport Department beyond the 60 officers detailed, we should requisition freely the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks of the Native army, and the European subordinates of the police, who, from their knowledge of the people and the country, &c., would give very efficient assistance. Ordnance, medical, and veterinary officers can be drawn from the stations from which their services can best be spared. These matters should be settled beforehand by the chiefs of the departments, and should be included in the scheme of mobilization.

Supply of men.

566. (2.) *Men.*—British and Native regiments will, if our recommendations are carried out, be maintained at a war strength, while for Native corps the reserve of 200 men per battalion would be called out; the second reserves for garrison service being embodied in the event of a prolonged campaign. The regimental depôts would be expanded, and the reserves would be formed there, men being drafted to head-quarters to fill up vacancies as required.

Supply of horses.

567. (3.) *Horses.*—The British and Native cavalry would be at a war strength, but batteries of artillery would have to be augmented as shown at paragraph 201. This would be done either by drafting from other batteries in the army corps command, or, if time admitted, by drawing from the reserves maintained at Saharunpur and Oosoor, and also by purchase in the market in anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities.

Supply of equipment and clothing.

568. (4.) *Equipment and Clothing.*—The extra equipment and clothing must depend upon the nature of the service. For service in the plains, corps may be said to be complete in equipment, and for service elsewhere scales should be laid down which should include every detail. Efforts have already been made to draw up such scales, but their completion has from one cause or other been delayed. We recommend that the subject should be thoroughly considered by a committee,

See Appendix LXII.

a committee, and that certain reserves of equipment should be fixed and maintained for each army corps. These reserves of equipment, clothing, and military stores need not generally be large, but should be calculated on first requirements, and on the quantities which must be consumed annually by the army in time of peace. In preparing a scheme of mobilization, the heads of departments must know exactly what to supply and how to supply it. If the requirements for each service are accurately known, there should be no difficulty in prompt and ready supply from the various arsenals and from the open market.

Other supplies.

569. (5.) *Commissariat, Ordnance, and Medical.*—The above remarks apply equally to the supply departments, the requirements of which can be settled in detail when the basis which we recommend is accepted.

Transport.

570. (6.) *Transport.*—In Section 2, Chapter X, we have entered at length into the transport establishments which we recommend should be maintained at centres, in addition to regimental and moveable column carriage to be kept up in certain parts of India, to form the nucleus upon which must be grafted the transport to be obtained from the district. A statement of the amount obtainable within forty-eight hours, and also within a fortnight, is given in Appendix LIII. The chief transport officer of the territorial army corps would be answerable that all arrangements were ready, in anticipation, for the prompt performance of this service, and for the expansion of the sections of transport, to meet the requirements of the force detailed.

Example of mobilization of a field division from the Bengal Army Corps.

571. To show how, in our opinion, it would be possible, under the system we have proposed, to mobilize a division, we may suppose that a division of all arms of the composition we have suggested is to be placed in the field from the Bengal Army Corps. Such a division would consist of—

2 Regiments British Infantry.	2 Native cavalry regiments.
4 „ Native „	1 Horse artillery battery.
1 Pioneer regiment.	3 Field batteries.
2 Companies sappers.	

The tables at page 24, Chapter IV., show that there are available, for field service, from the garrisons in the Bengal Army Corps—*

6 Regiments British Infantry.	3 Horse artillery batteries.
13 „ Native „ including 2 corps of Pioneers.	6 Field batteries.
5 Regiments Native Cavalry.	6 Companies sappers.

Steps to be taken in mobilizing this field division.

572. The steps that would have to be taken in the mobilization of this division would be—

(*a*) To issue the detail of the generals, staff, and the stations from which the troops are to be drawn.

(*b*) To call up the reserves.

(*c*) To arrange for the railway transport through the staff at army corps head-quarters, Allahabad.

(*d*) To expand the transport sections at Lucknow, Allahabad, and Bareilly to the required strength.

(*e*) To draw extra horses from the batteries remaining in garrison from Saharunpur, or to purchase them in the Calcutta and other markets.

(*f*) To despatch extra equipments, clothing, and other supplies from the Allahabad Arsenal, the Fort William Arsenal, the Calcutta Clothing Depôt, or other centres where they have to be purchased in the open market.

Necessity for all details being settled beforehand.

573. If these matters are thoroughly studied beforehand, and the points of concentration for brigades and divisions fixed for the various campaigns in which India is likely to be engaged, and if practical projects are drawn up, there will be comparatively little difficulty in providing for the rapid mobilization of brigades and divisions from any or all of the four army corps.

Camps of exercise recommended for practice in mobilization.

574. We recommend that camps of exercise be frequently formed, not only for the manœuvres of troops in large bodies, but for the practice of mobilization of such portions of each army corps as may be periodically selected to form field divisions and brigades.

* This is exclusive of British cavalry, and mountain, garrison, and heavy artillery.

CHAPTER XIII.

GENERAL MILITARY AND FINANCIAL RESULTS OF THE PROPOSALS.

575. In the previous chapters of this Report we have, under the various headings of the subjects which we were instructed to consider, investigated in detail the conditions with which we had to deal, and have proposed various changes and modifications of the existing system. These changes will, we trust, tend to increase the efficiency of the army in peace and war, while they are also calculated to give immediate and practical effect to the principles so strongly enunciated by Lord Mayo, and reiterated by his successors, that the people of India ought not to be called upon to support or pay for one single unnecessary soldier.

Changes will increase efficiency and decrease cost.

576. We have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to solve the problem set before us, how to increase the efficiency, without increasing the cost, of our military establishments, and we venture to think that those who review our proposals, in the light of the instructions under which the Commission was appointed, will admit that those proposals, while they undoubtedly effect a very material saving, will also render more efficient in time of war the armies of India, and the great departments of military administration on which they depend for much of their efficiency. We have shown that we increase the fighting power of the units of military force, without any radical change in the total number of sabres and bayonets. Bearing in mind the advantages afforded by the progress of communications and great development of the railway system, we have concentrated the troops in positions by which the security of the country is guaranteed more effectually, while their services are made more readily available. In the general organization and administration of the army, we have proposed changes which substitute a simpler and more powerful system for one which in the growth of years has become somewhat antiquated and cumbrous.

Higher efficiency secured by the changes proposed in the administration, organization, and distribution of the army.

577. Our recommendations in regard to the British army in India, if carried out effectively, cannot, we believe, fail to lead to the development of the military strength of this essential part of the Imperial army of India, for we propose to substitute strong for weak cadres, and to effect other improvements which must conduce to higher efficiency. In the Native army we propose to raise corps, from expensive and dangerously weak numbers, to such a strength, as will, at a less cost, give effective and powerful fighting bodies, and to establish, as a tentative measure, and with the caution demanded by our position in India, a limited reserve of soldiers whose services will be available in extensive or protracted campaigns; we also suggest various measures which will, we hope, tend to the contentment, popularity, and efficiency of the Native army. We have investigated the difficult subject of officering the Native army, and, while pointing out the defects of the present arrangements, have proposed remedial measures, by which we hope to secure a system more in harmony with the true principles of army organization, at a less cost to the State. In the medical services of India we recommend considerable changes and reductions, and the abolition of the present extravagant and inconvenient dual system of administration, but we provide fully for the wants of the army, and render the services of all medical officers in this country more readily available wherever they may be required. In the departments of the army we have maintained and developed the principles of uniformity of administration, and rendering available for the whole of India, the *personnel* and *matériel* of all services, while we have steadily kept in view the absolute necessity of upholding, and indeed more effectually carrying out than at present, the principle of separating and defining

Improvements proposed in various ways.

defining those great divisions in which our Native army should be maintained. We have laid stress on the necessity for securing, and improving by every means in our power, the main lines of communication, and we have indicated the measures necessary for carrying out the principles upon which we insist. We have shown how, under a more scientific system, the troops can be more rapidly and easily mobilized; and how, with improved transport arrangements, with a more thorough knowledge of the vast resources of the country in supply and transport, and with a decentralized military system, the Government of India will be able, provided the details are thoroughly worked out beforehand, to place in the field a force which will be a powerful weapon of offence or defence, while the troops remaining in garrison will be ample to supply a reserve if needed, and to maintain the peace of the country undisturbed.

Impossible to touch on every point.

578. It need hardly be said that there are many points on which we have found it, in the very limited time at our disposal, impossible to touch. We have confined ourselves to asserting the great principles, as applied to India, upon which, in our opinion, the superstructure of real army organization must be founded, and we have only permitted ourselves to enter into details where these were necessary for the due appreciation of the reforms proposed.

Financial result.

579. In Appendix LXIV. will be found an estimate of the cost or saving of our several proposals. It has been prepared very hurriedly, and under considerable difficulties, and can be considered as approximate only. It may, however, we think, be accepted as fair and moderate, and it will be seen from it that the effect of our proposals will be to relieve the finances of India to the extent of 1,03,25,000 rupees, or, including certain savings which cannot at present be accurately estimated, about 1,25,00,000 rupees per annum.

Aid received from the various Governments and officers.

580. In conclusion, we desire to acknowledge, most cordially, the valuable aid which we have received from the various Local Governments, and from officers of all branches of the service, civil and military, who have favoured us with their opinions on the subjects with which we had to deal, or have furnished us with the valuable and important information on which many of our proposals are founded. We are much indebted to the Military Secretariat of the Government of India, and to the offices of the army head-quarters in India, for the ready aid which they have in every way afforded us in the prosecution of our labours, and in supplying us from the archives of their offices with papers relating to the subjects with which we have had to deal.

Services of Secretary.

581. We desire also to acknowledge the excellent services of our Secretary, Captain Collen, whose exertions have been unwearied, and from whose great ability and varied military knowledge, we have derived the utmost assistance.

(signed) *Ashley Eden*, President.
Fred. Roberts, Lieutenant General.
C. Bernard.
Napier Campbell, Major General.
R. Phayre, Brigadier General.
H. O'Connell, Brigadier General.
H. T. Macpherson, Brigadier General.
T. D. Baker, Brigadier General.
P. S. Lumsden, Colonel.
C. M. MacGregor, Colonel.
O. R. Newmarch, Major.

E. H. H. Collen, Captain, Secretary.

Simla, 15 November 1879.

I have signed this report, as I accept the recommendations to apply to the military requirements of India before the Government entered on the present Afghan occupation.

I can conceive no act more politically unadvisable, or more detrimental to the interests of Government at a time like the present, when it is impossible to forecast future events for even the most limited period, than to break up a single

single corps, or by radical changes in organization and composition of regiments to disturb and perplex, not only the Native soldiers themselves, but all the populations directly or indirectly connected with them.

The Native army, by its loyal conduct in Afghanistan, has confirmed the confidence reposed in it by those who know it best, and by its discipline and gallantry has testified to the soundness of the judgment which has for so long so carefully administered it.

The feeling that the recommendations of this Commission tend to sever the ties which have heretofore so intimately bound up the interests of the army with those of the Government and people of India, induces me to entirely dissent from the position proposed to be assigned to the Commander in Chief in India, and the recommendation to alienate the local armies from Local Governments.

The Commission state that the Commander in Chief in India is placed in a very anomalous position owing to the dual functions required of him as Commander in Chief and as an Extraordinary Member of Council.

However anomalous that position may be, it is but a sequent to the greatest of all anomalies, the connection between Great Britain and India. It is the growth of experience which has grafted on to an European stem a shoot of Asiatic origin, necessary for the maintenance of an empire founded and retained by the sword.

It is by curious reasoning that the Commission, whilst refraining from recommending the nomination of a War Minister, who should be the administrative and executive head of the army, urge the application of the home system as to the relative positions and functions of the Secretary of State for War and of the Commander in Chief. The tendency of such recommendation is to constitute, as at home, a civilian instead of a soldier controller and administrator of the army; and as the functions of such control at home do not apparently demand military qualifications, there would in the opinion of the Commission appear to be no need for any essentially military element in the Council of the Government of India.

It is this exclusion of the executive military element from the Supreme Council, together with the proposed abolition of all connection between the army and Local Governments, initiating a system which must loosen the bond between the Government of the country and its Native army, that appears to me so full of danger to the future well-being of India.

This ignoring of all sympathy between the army and the civil Governments, and doing away with the speciality which has connected the local forces with the Viceroy; the Commander in Chief of the army with the Governor General in Council; the Commanders in Chief of minor presidencies with their armies and councils; and the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab with the Punjab force; can but result in one issue, the fusion of the armies of India into one mass, with a common interest, but with little sympathy with their rulers.

Whatever may have been the difficulties alluded to by the Commission on the part of the several great soldiers who for years past have been Commanders in Chief in India, in performing the dual functions accorded to them, I can state that during the experience of 15 years, in which I have been intimately associated with the Commanders in Chief, I never remember such having been referred to, except in the case of Sir William Mansfield, whose minute is dwelt on by the Commission.

To the extracts from that minute, as quoted by the Commission, I would draw attention:—

"It may be assumed that the Commander in Chief of each presidency is sent out by Her Majesty's Government to be the principal military adviser of the Government to which he is attached. In the minor presidencies his position is so inferior, that a clash with the Local Government is not very likely, and if it should take place, the consequences are not very important. Far otherwise is it with the great functionary, called Commander in Chief in India. Whenever the latter is a man of quick and powerful mind, he finds his position difficult; at times almost intolerable. He has a great responsibity; is much appealed to, as shown above, while he often feels and knows that around the head of the Government are irresponsible and secret military advisers, who

regard him with hostility; hence it is that many Commanders in Chief in India have always been most anxious to live away from the Government as much as possible, while others have been engaged in conflict leading to resignation. I conceive that the evil of divesting the head of the Government of India of his chief and *responsible* military adviser can hardly be exaggerated; yet, if that responsible military adviser is to be at the same time an executive Commander in Chief, who is ever engaged in traversing the country on tours of inspection in times of peace, or at the head of the active army in time of war, it is utterly impossible for him to be in his place at the side of the Governor General, except at rare intervals of time. Military feeling is so strong, and the prizes of war are so great, that no Commander in Chief in India can resist the temptation of putting himself at the head of an army in the field, if he has an opportunity. In like manner, for the maintenance of discipline, to gain a knowledge of the army, of the manner in which it is housed, cared for, and handled, it is absolutely necessary that a Commander in Chief should be ever on the move in peaceful times. Therefore, as said before, the constant presence of the Commander in Chief in India in his place as a member of the Supreme Government, and the recognised responsible adviser of the Governor General in Council, is an impossibility under the present system."

Sir William Mansfield points out what I believe to have been the source of many of the misunderstandings between the Government and the Commanders in Chief, viz., the undue influence brought to bear by irresponsible advisers on the deliberations of Government.

The pages of history, Kaye's Afghanistan, record that such influences, in direct opposition to the counsels of men of the greatest Indian experience, launched the Government into the first Afghan war.

Matters have not improved since, as shown by Sir William Mansfield; and so long as the head of the Government is surrounded by civil and military officers of high rank and position, an irresponsible element, generally inexperienced in Indian military affairs, continues to maintain a disturbing and irritating influence, antagonistic to the harmonious working of responsible authority.

With regard to the value to the State of the special knowledge of Commanders in Chief in its councils, I would but refer to the proceedings of Government since the mutiny, and to the records of the opinions of the successive illustrious Commanders in Chief with their results, to testify to the safeguard their presence in council has been to India, in so frequently assisting to prevent the introduction of measures inapplicable to the country, and in opposing what is regarded by the local Lieutenant Governors of the North West and Punjab as so great an element of danger, unsympathetic legislation, subversive of Native customs, and not suitable to the wants of the people.

Practically, no inconvenience has, I believe, been experienced by the brief absence of a Commander in Chief from the Council Chamber in some of the winter months, when it was necessary for him to inspect troops, or become acquainted with outlying provinces and commanders.

When required by Government he has at all times immediately proceeded to its head-quarters. If such has been the case in the past, the increased facility of communication by railways, which now cover the country, has done away with objections which might previously have been raised on such a score.

The Commission have recorded their opinion that the "lieutenant-generals commanding army corps should be invested with the fullest control which it is possible to give consistently with the reservation of supreme military authority to the Government of India, assisted by the Commander in Chief in India;" and as such control must embrace the functions now discharged by the Commanders in Chief in Madras and Bombay, it is difficult to realise the scope to be allotted to the Commander in Chief in India, without directly interfering in the executive command already entrusted to army corps commanders.

Relieved by army corps commanders of the executive command of the troops to compose the Bengal and Punjab Army corps, the Commander in Chief in India, as the principal military adviser of Government, would have afforded to him more time to devote to general administrative questions, and to master the progress of current political events within and in countries adjacent to India, without a knowledge of which, only to be obtained by intimate associa-

tion

tion with the Government in its councils, it is impossible for him satisfactorily to offer opinions on military policy.

Being relieved of executive control of any of the local armies, he would by constant inspection and intimate association with army corps and district commanders, be kept in full possession of all details of army *personnel* and requirements, without interfering with the functions of army corps commanders, as assuredly would be the case should the peripatetic Commander in Chief conceived by the Commission be created.

I cannot accept the statement that principles applicable to the Governments of Madras, Bombay, the Punjab, and North-Western Provinces, as regards the Local Governments towards the territorial armies, are equally applicable to Bengal, Burma, the Central or other Provinces forming Chief Commissionerships, and that beyond the right of calling upon military commanders to move troops in case of internal disturbance, or threatened aggression, there is no advantage in the civil Government of the various provinces having any control over military matters.

There is no analogy between the Governments of Bombay, Madras, the Punjab, and North-Western Provinces, and those of the other administrations, as in the former alone are found populations suitable for military purposes, and which provide recruits for the army.

The experience of a century has shown that in the well-being of the Native army the civil Government can exercise a legitimate authority with regard to the social and home interests of the classes in our service of almost greater importance, as regards its contentment, than that of the military authorities.

The lesson of 1857 should not be forgotten. It was the armies of the presidencies and of the Local Government of the Punjab, in contradistinction to the Bengal army under the Supreme Government and the direct control of the Commander in Chief in India, that were steadfast to their colours in that crisis; and during the past 22 years those armies have maintained their loyalty and efficiency.

There would therefore seem to be no reasonable justification for severing the connection which has bound them to their Local Governments, and applying to the Native armies of India a centralized control, which in the past proved so unsuccessful.

Such, however, is the proposition to which I am asked to consent, when called upon to abolish presidential distinctions, and to accept army corps, simply under military commanders subordinate only to the Commander in Chief in India and the Supreme Government.

In the councils of the Local Governments, or in the person of a Lieutenant Governor with his military staff, it appears to me the State possesses the only safeguard against administrative military action tending to engender discontent in the Native ranks, by the application of measures which, although advisable and appropriate to homogeneous masses, such as compose European continental armies, might at any time kindle revolt amongst any of the many races in the ranks of our Native army.

In the proposed method of administration, owing to the quinquennial system of vacating commands and appointments, there is no permanent provision for securing Indian experience, and I fail to see how that can be obtained except we look to the presidential control of Governors and their Councils, or of Lieutenant Governors and their military staff, who must have spent their lives amongst the people of India, or, more probably, in the special province controlled by them.

Opinion at home will assuredly determine that, *as a rule*, the Commander in Chief in India shall be an officer of the home service, and in like manner that, as the discipline of the British army in India is so materially in question, the appointment of Chief of the Staff in India shall, as is the case at present with regard to the appointment of Adjutant General in India, be *generally* held by an officer of the same service. Whilst to the British home army must be apportioned two of the four commands of army corps, together with a like proportion of their chiefs of the staff.

The alterations in the *personnel* of the commanders and staff created by the five years' tenure rule, has introduced an element which, however much required

in the general interests, has an unsettling influence not heretofore existing in the Native army, and which cannot but have some effect on classes by nature most conservative.

The more this matter is understood the greater is our appreciation of the political value placed by the ablest of our military and political administrators on the maintenance of presidential or local armies.

I think there is some misapprehension in classifying the administration of the Punjab as one of those which carries on government without any military authority.

The body of some 14,000 men which constitutes the Punjab Frontier Force, under the direct control of the Local Government, presents in itself, perhaps, the strongest illustration of the calamity—for I can apply no milder term—which will assuredly result from severing the ties which knit the local armies to provincial Governments.

It was the intimate bond between the Local Government of the Punjab and its local army that secured its loyalty in 1857.

It was the association of the army with its local rulers that enabled the Punjab Government, in direct communication with their local commander, Sir Neville Chamberlain, to send such material assistance to the force before Delhi.

It was the same bond between the civil Government and its army that enabled, at the same time, the same commander to break up a portion of the local force to form the nucleus of those Punjabi regiments now enrolled under the Commander in Chief in the regular army. To these corps the population of the Punjab, responding to the call of the Local Government, resorted for service, and enabled the authorities to overawe, in conjunction with the few British troops available, such remnants of the original regular army as remained in garrison in the Punjab.

I allow that, in theoretically reviewing army administration, there is a certain incongruity in maintaining these forces under Local Governments, and that in other countries, under different circumstances and within a more contracted space, the natural tendency would be to amalgamate the army as suggested by the Commission.

With reference, however, to the unique problem peculiar to India, of having to deal with many peoples and races, as distinct from each other as they are alien in creed and feeling from the dominant Power, recourse must be had to what has proved practically wholesome, in preference to theoretical speculations founded on systems which have nothing in common with the requirements of this Eastern Empire.

The history of the Punjab Force for a period of some 30 years has affirmed its special applicability for the requirements of our frontier province. Its character is so excellent, and its regiments are of such good quality, that, when choice can be made, it is done on equal terms with the best corps of the regular army.

Under such circumstances why uproot its foundations, why sever its connection with the administration which created and nourished it? Why not rather add to its strength, and constitute a Punjab Army Corps with a similar relation to the Punjab Government as that now held by the Presidential armies towards the Governments of Madras and Bombay?

I would here set forth Sir Robert Montgomery's Minute of the 3rd December 1862:

"Let us suppose that the arrangements now advocated by Sir Hugh Rose had been introduced before the mutinies, and instead of a local force, distinct from the regular army in organization and sympathies, it had been placed under the Commander in Chief, and incorporated and intermixed with the sepoy regiments; then, in all probability, instead of remaining loyal and contributing essentially, as it did, to the restoration of order, it would have taken part in the insurrection, and greatly added to the difficulties of the time. The same circumstances may not recur; but I cannot but think that one great lesson of the mutinies was, not to trust to one uniform system; not to break down the distinctions of race and character, which preclude the combinations of Native troops; not again to stake all upon one cast, but to build our ship in compartments, and, by some varieties of constitution, prevent the circulation of any secret poison throughout the body. It would be assuming too much to predicate that

that no sudden emotion can again simultaneously convulse the whole army of India, and, in my opinion, it will be well not to dispense with one of the checks which has already in practice retained a section of it in allegiance."

Such a system having proved so suitable to the Punjab, it should be introduced into the army for Bengal, but associated with the Government of the North-Western Provinces, in whose jurisdiction are the homes of the races from which it is proposed to recruit.

A difficulty has been brought forward that Native troops, because subordinate to one Lieutenant Governor, could not serve in the province of another; but as the latter, in provinces possessing no military element amongst the people, will have nothing to do with the armies, except to call for military aid in support of civil power, the objection has no weight.

I cannot conceive the grounds on which it is alleged that the control of the army by the Civil Governments of Bombay and Madras is absolutely nominal. I have been assured that in every respect it is the reverse, and that the m st intimate relations exist between the Government and the Commanders in Chief of those presidencies as to all matters connected with those armies. I would but draw immediate attention to the result of the despatch lately to the Mediterranean of a force from Bombay, in the preparation of which, had it not been for the intimate connection between the ruler and the army, and the personal exertions of the Governor, bringing the whole weight of the influence of Government to support military action, it would have been impossible for the commander to have so rapidly given effect to the orders of the Supreme Government.

Again, I would point to the like action on the part of the same Government, in support of the military power, which during the spring of this year concentrated in the shortest period so much carriage on the Sukkur-Quetta line as enabled our army at Kandahar to be fully maintained, and relieved the Government of India of the anxiety of a threatened collapse of commissariat supply.

I confess that I do not apprehend the statement that the control of the Presidential armies is founded on no legal sanction, unless Act 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, and the other portions of that Act, together with Acts 24 & 25 Vict. c. 67, 53, together with Clause 1 of the Mutiny Act and the Indian Articles of War, are illegal.

I am aware that it may be alleged that the Commission especially recommend that their four army corps be kept distinct, but when it is considered that it is the difference of race, country, creed, and home associations, and not the official appellation of different corps under a central control, that constitutes distinction, I feel that I am in accord with the most experienced and far-seeing of our Indian statesmen in deprecating the general fusion contemplated of the Native armies of India.

The three Commanders in Chief who, after holding the commands of subordinate presidencies eventually succeeded to the command of the army of India, have, on the subject of presidential armies, recorded unmistakeable opinions.

As the authority of Sir Henry Durand is cited as being in accord with the Commission, I here quote his evidence from the Report of the Commissioners assembled to inquire into the organization of the Indian army in 1859:—

"I do not think you can strip the Government of India and the Local Governments of their position, without great detriment and danger to our rule in India.

"There is also another thing which I have omitted mentioning, which I intended to mention before, which is, that I think that it is of immense importance to India to keep the Presidential armies separate, and that this amalgamation would inevitably lead to fuse these three armies together, which ought to be avoided as much as possible.

"It is rather a delicate point, but in future we cannot be too careful in keeping the three armies separate; and in fact it would be better if we divided the Native portion of the Bengal army into two armies; but, merely looking to the three presidencies, I look upon it as exceedingly important not to take any measures which shall fuse these three armies.

"It would come under that system which would be in no respect under the Local Government at all; it would be no longer what it is now, viz., that the whole of the promotion and everything else passes necessarily through the Local Governments."

Sir W. Mansfield's opinion is set forth in the same papers in the *précis* of replies submitted by Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Durand, on special duty, to the Right Honourable the Governor General in India, dated Allahabad, 16th August 1858:—

"Sir William Mansfield, without attempting to indicate the original causes of the mutiny of the Bengal army, is of opinion that the loyalty of the corps which remained true to their colours is an affair of circumstances, and that the same may be said of the Native troops of Madras and Bombay, in which mutiny did at times make its appearance, though it did not spread; the two armies having passed through a very terrible ordeal in a manner almost incredible.

"This result Sir W. Mansfield considers to be attributable only to a limited extent to their better system of discipline as compared with the Bengal army; but he assigns it rather to the entire separation of the Native armies of Madras and Bombay from that of Bengal, which, with different interests and systems, and different services, are animated by an *esprit de corps* of their own."

The Commission has before it the views of the Commander in Chief in India, Sir Frederick Haines, who lately also held command of the Madras army, and who impressively supports the necessity of maintaining distinct local armies.

If to such testimony be added the opinions of Sir Neville Chamberlain and Sir R. Temple, I am at a loss to understand on what ground the President and Members of this Commission can take upon themselves the responsibility of disassociating the Native armies from their provinces; and would, finally, direct attention to the warning of Lord Napier of Magdala, as addressed to the Government of India, in Adjutant General's Letter, No. 1932B, of 14th August 1875, paragraph 101:—

"In conclusion, Lord Napier of Magdala invites attention to the opinion of the late Duke of Wellington on the danger to the British Empire in India that would result from an amalgamation of the Native armies of the three presidencies, a danger which his Excellency believes would be as great, were such an amalgamation attempted in the present day, as it would have been when the opinion of the highest military authority on Indian affairs was pronounced."

(signed) *P. S. Lumsden*, Colonel,
Chief of the Staff.

Simla,
15th November 1879.

I entirely concur in the above dissent.

(signed) *H. O'Connell*,
Brigadier General.

15th November 1879.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS OF THE ARMY ORGANISATION COMMISSION.

CHAPTER I.

THE APPOINTMENT AND WORK OF THE COMMISSION.

Para. 6. The reduction of Native regiments proposed not to be carried out till the future occupation of Afghanistan is settled.

Regiments which have done good service in late war not to be selected for reduction.

CHAPTER III.

The Maintenance of Internal Order.

Volunteers.

Para. 32. The compulsory enlistment of European and Eurasian clerks in volunteer corps not recommended.

Para. 33. The capitation grant to volunteer corps not to be increased.
But extra grants to efficient volunteer corps to be made by Government, if necessary.
The uniform for volunteer corps to be simple and cheap.
The proposals before Government for making the appointments of drill sergeants to volunteer corps more attractive to be favourably considered.
Drill sergeants to visit annually squads of volunteers to be organised at small stations.
The usual head-money to be allowed to such squads, which should be affiliated to the nearest volunteer corps.

Defensible Posts.

Para. 34. Plans of places of refuge at out-stations to be drawn up and approved by the Defence Committee.
Drawings of such works, with directions for their construction, to be lodged in a head-quarters office and in the chief civil office of station.

Armies of Native States.

Para. 36. Interference with the Maharaja Scindia's army considered unnecessary.

Para. 37. But the Nizam of Hyderabad should be induced to curtail, gradually, the military forces maintained in his country.

Para. 38. Arms of precision not to be allowed to the troops of Native States; their field artillery to be kept within the smallest limits, and the contingents of different States not to be employed or exercised together.

CHAPTER IV.

The Strength, Distribution, and General Organisation of the Army for Peace and War.

The Peace Formation of the Army of India.

Para. 41. The armies of India to be divided into four distinct bodies, to be called army corps.

Para. 49. The Punjab Frontier Force to form part of the regular army, and be under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army.
The constitution of the Punjab Frontier Force not to be altered.

Para. 52. Military and political requirements can only be met by the division of the Indian army into four distinct territorial army corps, but under one supreme authority.

These four army corps to garrison—

(1.) Bengal, Assam, and the North-Western Provinces and Oudh.
(2.) The Punjab and frontier.
(3.) Bombay, the Central Provinces, Central India, Rajputana, and Sind.
(4.) Madras, Hyderabad, Burma, and the Belgaum district.

Para. 54. The Bengal Army Corps to comprise Assam, Bengal Proper, Oudh, and the North-Western Provinces.

Para. 55. The Punjab Army Corps to include the Punjab Proper, the trans-Indus frontier, and advanced posts.

Para. 56. The Bombay Army Corps to include the Central Provinces, Sind, and our advanced position beyond the Bolan, Rajputana, and a portion of Central India.

Para. 57. The Madras Army Corps to have allotted to it Burma, Secunderabad, and Belgaum.

Para. 59. Each army corps to be organised as a complete command.

The lieutenant generals commanding army corps to be assisted by a well-organised staff, which should include officers representing every branch of the staff, army and departmental.

The lieutenant generals commanding to be invested with the fullest control.

The administration of military affairs to be decentralised.

Distribution and Allotment of Garrisons.

Para. 62. Essential to preserve the great lines of communication intact; and concentration of troops on the main trunk lines of communication to be effected.

Para. 63. For strategical and political reasons, the following considered the main obligatory points to be held:—

Calcutta.	Agra.	Mooltan.	Jubbulpore.	Bellary.
Dinapore.	Delhi.	Kurrachee.	Nagpore.	Bangalore.
Allahabad.	Meerut.	Nusseerabad.	Poona.	Madras.
Cawnpore.	Lahore.	Ahmedabad.	Bombay.	Shillong.
Lucknow.	Rawal Pindi.	Mhow.	Secunderabad.	Rangoon.

Para. 64. The secondary strategical stations divided into two classes; those on the frontier, and those intermediate to the above centres.

Para. 65. The remaining military stations, those convenient for the location of troops.

Para. 66. The distribution and allotment of troops to be based on the principle of abolishing single battalion stations, and the maintenance of compact bodies of troops at strategical centres.

Para. 67. The total forces of the several army corps to be as follows, distributed in garrisons, according to the tables at pages 37 to 40, Chapter IV.:—

Bengal Army Corps.

	Normal.	Obligatory.	Available for Field Service.
H. Artillery - - -	3	- -	3
F. Artillery - - - -	12	$6\frac{1}{3}$	$5\frac{2}{3}$
Heavy Artillery - - -	1	- -	1
Mountain Battery - -	$1\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	1
Garrison Artillery - -	5	4	1
B. Cavalry - - - -	2	- -	2
N. Cavalry - - - -	6	$1\frac{1}{8}$	$4\frac{7}{8}$
B. Infantry - - - -	13	7	6
N. Infantry - - - -	24	11	13
Sappers - - - -	7	1	6

Punjab Army Corps.

H. Artillery - - -	3	- -	3
F. Artillery - - - -	9	3	6
Heavy Artillery - - -	1	- -	1
B. Mountain - - -	5	1	4
N. Mountain - - -	4	2	2
B. Garrison - - -	3	3	—
N. Garrison - - -	1	1	—
B. Cavalry - - - -	2	- -	2
N. Cavalry - - - -	13	8	5
B. Infantry - - - -	13	$7\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$
N. Infantry - - - -	27	20	7
Sappers - - - -	6	2	4

Bombay Army Corps.

	Normal.	Obligatory.	Available for Field Service.
H. Artillery - - -	2	$\frac{1}{3}$	$1\frac{2}{3}$
F. Artillery - - - -	9	$4\frac{1}{3}$	$4\frac{2}{3}$
Heavy Artillery - - -	1	- -	1
N. Mountain - - -	$2\frac{1}{3}$	$2\frac{1}{3}$	—
Garrison - - - -	5	4	1
B. Cavalry - - - -	1	- -	1
N. Cavalry - - - -	$6\frac{5}{8}$	$2\frac{7}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
B. Infantry - - - -	9	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
N. Infantry - - - -	25	$15\frac{3}{4}$	$9\frac{1}{4}$
Sappers - - - -	6	3	3

Local Corps.

Native Cavalry - - -	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	—
Native Infantry - - -	6	3	3

Madras Army Corps.

H. Artillery - - -	2	1	1
F. Artillery - - - -	8	$3\frac{1}{3}$	$4\frac{2}{3}$
Heavy Artillery - - -	1	1	—
B. Mountain - - -	2	2	—
Garrison - - - -	4	3	1
B. Cavalry - - - -	1	1	—
N. Cavalry - - - -	2	- -	2
B. Infantry - - - -	8	5	3
N. Infantry - - - -	25	$14\frac{1}{2}$	$10\frac{1}{2}$
Sappers - - - -	10	2	8

Local Corps.

F. Artillery - - - -	- -	- -	4
N. Cavalry - - - -	- -	- -	7
N. Infantry - - - -	- -	- -	11

Para. 68. Stations to be abandoned, viz.:—

Bengal Army Corps.

Julpigoree, Berhampore, Dacca, Hazaribagh (for British troops).

Bhaugulpore, Segowlie, Gowhatty, Tezpore, Dibrooghur, Jowai, and various detachment posts in Assam, Chunar, Goruckpore, Sitapore, Moradabad, Shajehanpore, Muttra, Sipri, Lalitpur, Jhansi, and Banda.

Punjab Army Corps.

Para. 69. Retention of certain stations desirable with reference to military demands out of the Punjab.

Provision for many new frontier stations necessary in this area.

Bombay Army Corps.

Para. 70. Withdrawal of troops recommended from—

Hyderabad (Sind).	Malegaum.
Bhooj.	Hoshangabad.
Mehidpur.	Chanda.
Augur.	Dharwar.
Deesa.	Kolhapore.

If Pachmarhi eventually proves healthy, the British troops from Kamptee and Jubbulpore to be stationed there.

Madras Army Corps.

Para. 71. Abolition of stations of Mercara, French Rocks, Palamcotta, Quilon, Trichore, Trevandrum, Vellore, Vizianagram.
Withdrawal of British regiment from Cannanore, and location at Wellington.
Concentration of a considerable force at Madras.

Convalescent Depôt.

Para. 77. Retention undesirable.
Men sent up from the plains to be attached to regiments and detachments in the hills.

Commands.

Para. 81. Division of the territorial army corps into convenient districts.

Classification of Commands.

Para. 82.

Bengal Army Corps.

1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Lucknow.	Calcutta.	Eastern Frontier.
Meerut.	Gwalior.	Bareilly.
		Nowgong.

Para. 83.

Punjab Army Corps.

1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Lahore.	Peshawur.	Umballa.
Rawal Pindi.	Kuram.	Mooltan.

Para. 84.

Madras Army Corps.

1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Hyderabad.	Madras.	Belgaum.
Bangalore.	Burma.	

Para. 85.

Bombay Army Corps.

1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.
Sind and Beluchistan.	Bombay.	Nusseerabad.
Poona.	Mhow.	Nagpore.
		Aden.

Para. 87.

Para. 87. Proposed district commands:—

———	Bengal.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
1st class - - -	2	2	2	2	8
2nd „ - - -	2	2	2	2	8
3rd „ - - -	3	2	1	3	9
	7	6	5	7	25

Para. 90. Proposed pay of general officers commanding districts:—

		Rs.	Rs.
8 1st class districts	- -	× 3,500	= 28,000
8 2nd „ „	- -	× 2,500	= 20,000
9 3rd „ „	- -	× 2,000	= 18,000
		Total - -	66,000 rupees monthly,
			or, 25,241 rupees less than present cost.

Para. 91. Important stations to be allotted to colonels on the staff, with pay at 800 rupees a month, who should hold their appointments for five years. Minor stations to be divided into two classes, with command pay of 300 rupees and 200 rupees respectively.

At other stations senior officer to command, without additional pay.

Stations at which colonels on staff should be appointed:—Allahabad, Agra, Lundi Kotal, Bellary, Pishin, or some other station above Dadur; total 5.

First class stations proposed:—

Rawal Pindi.	Kuram.	Kurrachee.
Nowshera.	Thâyetmyo.	Ahmedabad.
Kohat.	Tonghoo.	Saugor.

Second class stations proposed:—

Barrackpore.	Delhi.	Cannanore.
Darjeeling.	Ferozepore.	Jacobabad.
Dinapore.	Abbottabad.	Asseerghur.
Cawnpore.	Edwardesabad.	Jubbulpore.
Fyzabad.	Trichinopoly.	

Para. 92. Command and staff of convalescent depôts to remain as at present.

Formation of the Army in time of War.

Para. 99. Troops available for field service:—

H. and F. Artillery - - -	30 batteries,	180 guns.	
Heavy Artillery - - - -	3 „	18 guns.	
Mountain Artillery - - -	7 „	42 guns.	
Garrison Artillery - - - -	3 „	for siege trains.	
B. Cavalry - - - - -	5 regiments,	or 2,930 sabres.	
N. Cavalry - - - - -	16 „	or 9,744 sabres.	
B. Infantry - - - - -	18 „	or 18,792 bayonets.	
N. Infantry - - - - -	40 „	or 36,480 bayonets.	
Sappers - - - - - -	21 companies.		

Or,

Cavalry - - - - - - - - - -	12,674
Infantry - - - - - - - - - -	55,272
Guns - - - - - - - - - -	240

Besides heavy siege artillery and sappers.

Para. 101. Head-quarters staff of the army to have clearly-defined plans for moving and concentrating forces.

Paras. 103 and 104. Proposed composition of Indian brigades and divisions:—

Brigade of infantry - - - - - - { 1 British infantry battalion. 2 Native infantry battalions.

Brigade of cavalry - - - - - - { 1 British cavalry regiment. 2 Native cavalry regiments. 1 Battery horse artillery.

Brigade of all arms - - - - -	1 Brigade infantry. 1 Regiment Native cavalry. 2 Field batteries. 1 Company sappers.
A division of all arms, 24 guns - - -	2 Brigades infantry. 1 Pioneer regiment. 2 Native cavalry regiments. 1 Horse artillery battery. 3 Field batteries. 2 Companies sappers.
An army corps of 2 divisions, 60 guns -	2 divisions (as above, but with only 1 Native cavalry regiment and 1 company sappers). 1 Cavalry brigade. 3 Batteries artillery. 4 Companies sappers.
An army corps of 3 divisions, 90 guns -	3 Divisions as above. 1 Cavalry division of 2 brigades. 4 Batteries artillery. 5 Companies sappers.

Para. 105. A field army corps to be commanded by a general officer, aided by four staff officers; a division by a major general, with two staff officers; a brigade by a major general or brigadier general, with one staff officer.

CHAPTER V.

The Military Administration of India.

Para. 147. Relative positions of Government of India and Commander in Chief to be those of the Secretary of State for War and Commander in Chief in England.

Para. 149. Commander in Chief in India not to be employed on the annual inspection of regiments.

Future Organization of War Department.

Para. 151. Governor General in Council the supreme head of the army.

Para. 152. Member of Council in charge, War Department, to be an officer of very great and tried administrative ability and experience.

Para. 153. War Secretariat to have no direct administrative functions.

Para. 154. Tenure of office of Secretary to be for five years. He must not have been absent from India during his service for more than 10 years. He should have local rank of major general.

Para. 155. Staff of War Secretary to be:—

4 Under Secretaries: all must pass tests for the staff, and be appointed for five years.

1 Assistant Secretary.

Each army corps to be represented in Secretariat staff.

Administrative Officers.

Para. 156.

Accountant General.
Commissary General in Chief.
Director General of Ordnance.
Surgeon General.
Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works.
Director of Remount Department.

Para. 157. All offices of War Department to be concentrated in one central building at Simla.

Para. 158. System of minutes instead of official letters, one general registry, and one record room, to be gradually introduced.

Head-quarters of the army administration to be permanently at Simla.

Commander in Chief.

Para. 159. Every effort to be made to enhance his personal responsibility. His staff to be—

1 Chief of the Staff.
4 Officers of the General Staff.
1 Officer of the General Staff for Musketry Inspection.
3 Officers for Intelligence work.
1 Inspector General of Artillery, with two staff officers.
1 Officer of the General Staff for Royal Engineers.
1 Judge Advocate General, with Assistant.
1 Director of Gymnasia in India.
1 Director of Military Education { 1 Assistant Director for British Schools. 1 Assistant Director for Native Schools.

Para. 160. Members of Commander in Chief's Staff to be chosen from all army corps, and equally from all branches of the service.

Para. 161. Permanent adoption of appointment of "Chief of Staff," recommended.

The Staff.

Para. 164. Union of departments of Adjutant General and Quartermaster General recommended under title "General Staff."

Para. 165. Proposed division of staff:—

	Staff Pay.
General Staff.	*Rs.*
Staff Officers, first class - - - - - -	500
,, second class - - - - - -	400
Garrison Staff.	
Staff Officers, first class - - - - - -	200
,, second class - - - - - -	100

Para. 166. The staff proposed for India to be as follows:—

War Department.

		Per Mensem.
		Rs.
Secretariat, War Department.	1 War Secretary - - - at	3,500 consolidated.
	1 Under Secretary - - ,,	1,000 staff pay.
	1 ,, ,, - - - ,,	800 ,,
	1 ,, ,, - - - ,,	700 ,,
	1 ,, ,, - - - ,,	600 ,,
	1 Assistant Secretary - - ,,	700 rising to 1,000 consolidated.
	1 Accountant General - - ,,	2,000 rising to 2,500.
	1 Commissary General in Chief ,,	2,500 consolidated.
	1 Assistant to ditto - - ,,	600 staff pay.
	1 Director General of Ordnance ,,	2,500 consolidated.
	1 Deputy ditto - - - ,,	600 staff pay.*
	1 Assistant to ditto - - ,,	250 staff pay.*
	1 Surgeon General - - ,,	2,700 consolidated.
	2 Secretaries to ditto - - ,,	1,400 each consolidated.
	1 Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works.	
	1 Director of Remount Department - - - - ,,	1,000 or 500 staff pay.†

* In addition to regimental pay and allowances.
† *See* under Chapter X., Section 5.

Head-quarters, Army of India.

		Staff Pay per Mensem.
		Rs.
1 Chief of the Staff	at	3,000 consolidated.
1 Staff officer	"	1,000 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 "	"	1,000 " "
1 "	"	600 " "
1 "	"	500 " "
1 " for Musketry	"	600 " "
1 " for Intelligence Branch	"	800 " "
2 Staff officers for ditto	"	500 each " "
1 Inspector General of Royal Artillery	"	2,500 consolidated.
1 Royal Artillery staff officer with Inspector General of Royal Artillery	"	800 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 Ditto ditto	"	500 " "
1 Staff officer of Royal Engineers	"	600 " "
1 Judge Advocate General	"	2,500 consolidated.
1 Assistant ditto	"	500 staff pay.
1 Director of Military Education in India, with 2 Assistants, each on 250 rupees staff	"	500 "
1 Director of Gymnasia in India	"	500 "
*Head-quarters of each Army Corps.**		
1 Lieutenant General	"	4,500 consolidated.
1 Chief of the Staff	"	2,500 "
1 Staff officer	"	800 in addition to staff corps rate of pay.
1 "	"	600 " "
1 "	"	500 " "
1 " Royal Artillery	"	500 " "
1 " Royal Engineers	"	500 " "
1 Deputy Judge Advocate General	"	500 " "
2 Staff officers for Musketry Inspection for six months in the year	"	300 staff pay.

1 Garrison Instructor on 400 rupees staff, and 1 Assistant on 250 rupees staff, for the inspection of Native army schools, and 2 Sub-Inspectors for British army schools.

Bengal Army Corps.

DISTRICT STAFF.

District.	General Staff. First Class.	General Staff. Second Class.
Eastern Frontier	0	1
Calcutta	1	1
Lucknow	1	1
Bareilly	1	0
Meerut	1	1
Gwalior	1	1
Nowgong	0	1
TOTAL	5	6

GARRISON STAFF.	
Officers of the 1st class at the following stations:—Fort William, Dinapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Bareilly, Meerut, Delhi, Agra, Morar	10
Officers of the 2nd class at Barrackpore, Fyzabad, Darjeeling	3
Garrison Staff for Bengal Army Corps (Total)	13

* In addition to departmental officers shown under the various sections in Summary of Chapters IX. and X.

Punjab Army Corps.

DISTRICT STAFF.

District.	General Staff.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Umballa	1	0
Lahore	1	1
Rawal Pindi	1	1
Peshawar	1	1
Kuram	1	1
Mooltan	1	0
TOTAL	6	4

GARRISON STAFF.

Officers of the 1st class at the following stations:—Umballa, Meean Meer, Ferozepore, Rawal Pindi, Peshawar, Nowshera, Lundi Kotal, Kohat, Kuram, Mooltan	10
Officers of the 2nd class at Sialkot, Edwardesabad, Dera Ismail Khan, Abbottabad	4
Garrison Staff for Punjab Army Corps (Total)	14

Bombay Army Corps.

DISTRICT STAFF.

District.	General Staff.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Sind and Beluchistan	1	1
Bombay	1	1
Poona	1	1
Mhow	1	1
Nusseerabad	1	0
Nagpore	1	0
Aden	0	1
TOTAL	6	5

GARRISON STAFF.

Officers of the 1st class at the following stations:—Peshin, Kurrachee, Bombay, Deolali, Poona, Mhow, Saugor, Jubbulpore, Nusseerabad, Kamptee, Ahmedabad	11
Officers of the 2nd class at Jacobabad, Nagpore, Asseerghur	3
Garrison Staff for Bombay Army Corps (Total)	14

Madras Army Corps.

DISTRICT STAFF.

District.	General Staff.	
	1st Class.	2nd Class.
Hyderabad	1	1
Bangalore	1	1
Belgaum	0	1
Madras	1	1
Burma	1	1
Hyderabad Contingent	1	0
TOTAL	5	5

GARRISON STAFF.

Officers of the 1st class at Madras, Secunderabad, Bellary, Bangalore, Trichinopoly, Rangoon	6
Officers of the 2nd class at Cannanore, Thayetmyo, Tonghoo, Port Blair	4
Garrison Staff for Madras Army Corps (Total)	10

Para. 167. Total for the head-quarters of the army of India and the four army corps:—

	General Staff.	Garrison Staff.
Headquarters, army of India	15*	0
Headquarters, four army corps	28*	0
Bengal Army Corps	11	13
Punjab Army Corps	10	14
Bombay Army Corps	11	14
Madras Army Corps	10	10
TOTAL	85	51

Para. 168. 136 officers, instead of 209 as at present, proposed.

Intelligence Department.

Para. 169. Formation of, recommended. An officer of each army corps head-quarters staff to be in charge of the intelligence work, under chief of the staff.

Personal Staff.

Para. 170. Military secretary necessary for the Commander in Chief in India.

Military secretary to be allowed also to generals commanding army corps, with staff allowance of 400 rupees.

Persian interpreter to Commander in Chief to be a staff officer of 2nd class.

Aides-

* Exclusive of Artillery and Engineers.

Aides-de-camp to be allowed as follows:—

Commander in Chief - - - - - - -	3
Lieutenant generals commanding army corps - -	2 each.
General officers commanding 1st class districts - -	1 each.

The total personal staff to be—

5 Military secretaries.
1 Persian interpreter.
19 Aides-de-camp.
25

Judge Advocate General's Department.

Para. 171. At head-quarters one judge advocate general, with an assistant, and with each army corps, one deputy.

District staff to perform work now done by deputy judge advocates.

Regimental and staff officers to be deputed to act at courts martial.

Department to be reduced from 15 officers to 6.

Military Education Department.

Para. 172. Appointment of a Director proposed, to supervise garrison instruction and also British and Native army schools, with two assistants, one for each.

To be at army head-quarters.

One garrison instructor recommended to each army corps head-quarters, with an assistant.

Departmental Staff.

Para. 173. Officers of, to be subordinate to the general officers in command of army corps and districts.

Army Corps Commands.

Para. 174. To be equally divided between the home and Indian armies, and held alternately by officers of each service.

When an army corps commander belongs to one service, his Chief of the Staff to belong to the other. Nomination for army corps commands, in the case of officers of the home service, to be made by Field Marshal Commanding in Chief; in the case of Indian officers, by Commander in Chief in India, with approval of Government of India; in both cases subject to Secretary of State's approval.

District of Staff Colonel's Commands.

Para. 175. Selection for—to be made from the British army at large, subject to terms of Indian service, by Commander in Chief in India; and, in the case of Indian officers, by lieutenant generals commanding army corps.

Para. 176. Vacation of all commands and staff appointments by officers after 31 years' service, and after they have held their appointments five years.

Lieutenant generals commanding army corps to make selections for general and garrison staff; but, in the case of selection for head-quarters staff of army corps subject to concurrence of Commander in Chief in India.

Staff of the army of India at head-quarters to be nominated by the Commander in Chief, and finally approved by the Governor General in Council. All confidential reports on staff officers to be laid before Governor General in Council by Commander in Chief.

Para. 179. Indian officers to be encouraged to join the staff college.

Para. 180. Better classification of army business, office systems, returns, and military clerks, to be considered by a Committee.

CHAPTER VI.

The Organization of the British Army in India.

Para. 185. Undesirable to maintain a local European army in India.

Para. 186. England and India should, in the matter of army organization, act reciprocally.

Para. 187. British regiments serving in India to be made as cheap as possible, without loss of efficiency.

Para. 189. Cavalry regiments to consist of four squadrons and 586 non-commissioned officers and men.

Infantry regiments to consist of eight companies and of 1,044 non-commissioned officers and men.

Para. 190. European garrison of India, exclusive of artillery, to consist of six cavalry regiments, and 43 infantry battalions.

Horses.

Para. 191. British cavalry regiments to have the full number for non-commissioned officers, and for 85 per cent. of rank and file.

Para. 192. Establishment of syces for cavalry to be assimilated throughout India to that in the Bombay presidency, viz., one syce to every non-commissioned officer's horse, and one to every three troop horses.

Artillery.

Para. 193. Instead of 15 horse artillery batteries, only 10 to be maintained in India.

Para. 194. The number of British mountain batteries to be raised from two to eight.

Para. 195. The strength of each garrison battery to be raised to 120 of all ranks, and a half battery stationed where a full one is not required.

This arrangement gives 17 strong batteries instead of 22 weak ones.

Para. 196. Establishment of artillery for India to be—

British.

H. Artillery - - - - - - -	10 batteries.
F. Artillery - - - - - - -	38 "
Heavy Artillery - - - - - - -	4 "
Mountain Artillery - - - - - -	8 "
Garrison Artillery - - - - - -	17 "
	77 or 360 guns.

Natives.

	Batteries.
Mountain Artillery - - - - - -	$6\frac{2}{3}$ = 40 guns.
Hyderabad Contingent - - - - - -	4 = 16 smoothbore guns.
	56 guns.

Para. 197. Two mountain guns, with mule equipment and an artillery officer, to be attached to the Assam regiment at Shillong.

Para. 199. On a war establishment all the carriages of a battery to be horsed, and the establishment of bullocks abolished except six, to be retained for work in the lines.

Para. 200. First reserves of ammunition at 76 rounds per gun, or 456 per battery, to be kept with the batteries at the following stations:—

Bengal Army Corps.	*Punjab Army Corps.*	*Bombay Army Corps.*	*Madras Army Corps.*
Dinapore.	Rawal Pindi.	Above Dadur.	Secunderabad.
Nowgong.	Mooltan.	Kurrachee.	
Morar.	Sialkot.	Nusseerabad.	
Bareilly.	Peshawar.	Kamptee.	

Limber waggons to be discontinued for transport of reserve ammunition, and in lieu, six strong carts, with two horses each, to be given to each battery.

Para. 201. The establishment of horses at above reserve ammunition stations to be—

	Per battery.
Horse Artillery—	
Ordinary strength - - - - - - -	168
Increased strength - - - - - - -	200
Field Artillery—	
Ordinary strength - - - - - - -	124
Increased strength - - - - - - -	144

Para. 202.

Para. 202. At other stations, batteries to have the six reserve ammunition carts and harness, but the 12 horses need not be kept up.

For horse artillery batteries, 10 horses are reduced at stations where reserve ammunition carts are kept horsed, and 22 where they are not kept horsed.

For field artillery batteries, 12 horses are added at stations where reserve ammunition carts are kept horsed, and two where they are not kept horsed.

Para. 203. All drivers, except those for the guns and limber ammunition waggons, to be Natives. The Native establishment to be organised accordingly. The European establishment not to be reduced.

Barrack Accommodation.

Para. 207. On hot season scale unnecessary at stations where troops are always reduced in numbers during summer.

Hill Stations.

Para. 208. More use to be made of, for European troops, but stations selected should be near main lines of communication.

Recruits.

Para. 209. Injury done to the service by the short-service system to be promptly remedied.

Soldiers of less than three years' service not to be embarked for India, and none who have not extended their service to a period of nine years.

Men and non-commissioned officers to be allowed to volunteer to remain in India on a bounty.

Reliefs.

Para. 210. Troopship system to be revised.

Enquiry to be made as to the rates English steamship companies would charge for conveying troops.

Arrangements in Barracks.

Para. 211. Commanding officers to be allowed to arrange for repairs to barrack furniture and fixtures, and the management of barrack lighting, punkah pulling, and tattie watering.

Considerable economy in the two latter establishments possible.

A large reward to be offered for punkah pulling machinery.

Soldiers to be encouraged to cook their own rations at hill stations, to build their own huts, and maintain garrison roads.

Para. 212. In the plains regiments and batteries to be marched out during the cold season, and made to cook their dinners in the open.

Attention called to the fact that cooking pots of British regiments are of very inconvenient shape for transport.

Uniform and Equipment.

Para. 213. A loose serge Norfolk jacket (with sleeved waistcoat for colder climates) and serge trousers with gaiters, the best dress for foot soldiers in India in the cold weather; and for mounted soldiers a similar jacket, with cord trousers, gaiters, and ankle boots.

For the hot season *khaki* uniform best.

Brown leather equipments better suited to India than buff.

Scarlet for infantry, and blue for royal artillery, to be retained as colours for serge clothing in India, but black unsuited for trousers for infantry in India.

A committee of officers to be appointed to fix a suitable uniform for parade and service for each arm of the service, and also the equipment of each.

Pouch and bag unsuited for cartridges.

The valise, the soldier's greatcoat, and manner of distributing the weight on his back might be improved.

The present glass water-bottle considered unserviceable.

Para. 214. Artillery drivers to be armed with revolvers, and opinion given that lancers are over-armed.

Para. 215. No change proposed in the establishment of officers of regiments serving in India.

Musketry instruction in infantry regiments to be entrusted more fully to company officers.

CHAPTER VII.

The Organisation of the Native Army.

Para. 218. No reduction recommended.
Strength of cavalry regiments to be raised to four squadrons, with 609 Natives of all ranks; and that of infantry regiments to eight companies, with 912 Natives of all ranks.

Para. 221. Native troop and company commanders recommended.
Standard of efficiency and responsibility of Native officers to be raised.
Two extra British officers to be added to each regiment.

Para. 222. The following to be the establishment of officers for Native regiments:—

Cavalry.	*Infantry.*
1 Commandant.	1 Commandant.
4 Squadron Commanders.	2 Wing Commanders.
4 Squadron Officers.	4 Wing Officers.
1 Quartermaster.	1 Adjutant.
1 Adjutant.	1 Quartermaster.
11	9

Or two officers, in addition to the sanctioned strength of each corps.
One of these two officers to be appointed to the charge of musketry instruction at 50 rupees a month for six months.

Para. 224. In the Bengal and Punjab armies, a proportion of vacancies in the ranks of Native officers to be filled by direct cadets of good family, who should undergo training in a military school before joining a regiment.
Promotion of very old soldiers to be jemadars and subadars to be discouraged.

Para. 225. Non-commissioned officers for a company of Native infantry not to be increased, on account of increase recommended in numerical strength of company; five havildars and five naiks considered sufficient.

Good Conduct Pay.

Duffadars and havildars to be allowed one rupee a month for every two years' good service, up to a maximum of four rupees; and naiks one rupee a month for every two years' good service, up to a maximum of two rupees.

Corps of Guides.

Para. 226. Though available for "general service," its constitution not to be altered.
To be ordinarily at the disposal of Civil Government. To retain its present locality at Murdan; and the frontier line from Michni east to be entrusted to its charge. The corps to be raised to 800 privates, and four squadrons, and to have two mountain guns.

Para. 227. Its command to be entrusted to a specially selected officer, and all its officers to be carefully chosen.

Para. 228. Three similar corps to be formed and posted at Kuram, Tonk, and Pishin. Men of the surrounding tribes to be enlisted in them. All corps of guides to remain on same footing as troops of Punjab Frontier Force.

Para. 228. Returns to be sent into the head-quarters of the military command to which the corps are attached, and the inspections, &c., to be conducted by the general officer commanding the district.
These corps to be separate bodies, officered by selection from any of the army corps.

Para. 229. The establishment of British officers to be:—

1 commandant and assistant political officer, with staff pay of 1,000 rupees.
1 second in command and commandant of cavalry.
1 adjutant.
1 quartermaster.
1 squadron officer.
1 artillery officer.
1 medical officer.

Para. 230. One Native officer to be appointed commandant of the cavalry, and one of the infantry, with 200 rupees staff allowance, as an incentive to secure superior men.

Requirements of Pishin and Beluchistan.

Para. 231. Jacob's Rifles and another regiment of the Bombay army to be assimilated to present two Beluch battalions. The four battalions to be accepted as local battalions for "general service," like the Punjab Frontier Force.

Pioneers.

Para. 232. Two pioneer regiments to be constituted in each army corps.
Pioneer soldiers at two per troop and company in all corps, and to get 1½ rupees a month extra pay.
Labour of pioneers and Native soldiers generally to be more utilized in peace time on military works.
Equipment of pioneer soldiers to be settled by a special committee.

Sappers and Miners.

Para. 233. Four instead of three corps recommended.
Head-quarters to be at Rawal Pindi for Punjab army corps sappers.
Training and organization of the four corps to be assimilated, and artificers to be enlisted.
Sappers to be employed on military works.
Organization of sapper corps to be reported on by a committee.
This committee also to report on organization of pontoon telegraph and engineer trains, and on the number of officers required per company. Three officers are required on a war footing.

Depôts.

Para. 234. Native army to consist of single regiments and battalions, each with a fixed depôt near its recruiting ground.

Para. 235. Committee of regimental officers to decide on depôts to be maintained.
Ordinarily a Native officer or pensioned Native officer to have charge of a depôt on a small staff salary.
Total cost of a regimental depôt not to exceed 60 rupees a month.

Recruiting.

Para. 237. Army corps to raise recruits within its own territorial limits.
If four distinct armies be maintained, the regiments of the several army corps must be kept to separate recruiting grounds.
Hyderabad Contingent to be recruited from the Deccan and adjacent districts.

Para. 239. Class regiments composed of Goorkhas, Muzbis, Sikhs, and Hindustanis to be maintained in Bengal and Punjab Army Corps.

Native Infantry.

Para. 240. Numbers proposed—

Bengal Army Corps.

19 battalions of the line - - -	each of 912 Natives of all ranks.
2 Goorkha battalions - - -	
3 Assam battalions - - -	
24, or 6 less than present number.	

Punjab Army Corps.

27 battalions of increased strength, or 4 less than present number.

Madras Army Corps.

25 regiments of increased strength, or 15 less than present strength.

Bombay Army Corps.

25 regiments of increased strength, or 5 less than present number.

Native Cavalry.

Numbers proposed—

Bengal Army Corps.

6 regiments.

Punjab Army Corps.

13 regiments.

These to be formed of 4 squadrons each, out of existing 26 regiments.

Madras Army Corps.

2 regiments of increased strength, or 2 less than present number.

Bombay Army Corps.

6 regiments, or 1 less than present number.

Para. 248. Belgaum district to be assigned to the Madras Army Corps.

Regiments of Hyderabad Contingent to be recruited from the Madras districts and districts round Hyderabad, and to be officered from the Madras Army Corps.

Madras Army.

Para. 256. Proposals for improving efficiency are—

Demand on civil population for recruits to be limited.

The area of duty to be limited.

The men to be better equipped and dressed, and assimilated in these respects to the soldiers of the other Native armies.

The officers to be younger, and better regulated as to standing and rank.

The battalions not to be left too long at isolated stations.

Reserves.

Para. 260. A limited reserve of 200 men to every infantry regiment to be maintained.

To consist of privates, who, after 12 years' service with the colours, might pass into the reserve on a reserve pay of 4 rupees a month.

They would belong to the first reserve till they reached 21 years' service, during which time they would be liable to embodiment for two months in every two years, and to serve with the colours when summoned.

They would then receive, in addition to their reserve pay, the full pay and good conduct pay they were drawing when they joined the reserve.

At 21 years' service they would pass to the pension list, or second reserve, continuing to receive 4 rupees a month and liable to serve on garrison duty only on emergency.

After 32 years' service, to be liable for no more duty and get their pension to the end of their lives.

The second reserve would be rarely exercised.

The first reserve to be embodied in regimental depôts.

A British officer, with Native officers and non-commissioned officers and a medical subordinate, to be deputed to the depôt once in two years to exercise reserves.

The second reserve, when called out, to be armed from the nearest depôt or arsenal.

Arms, &c., for 200 men to suffice for the reserves of two regiments.

Half of the reserve equipment only, therefore, need be kept at depôts, the remainder at nearest arsenal.

Reservists on embodiment to be sheltered in standing camps.

Para. 261. First reserve for cavalry not proposed.

A change in pension rules for cavalry recommended, so that pensioners would be liable for garrison duty in second reserve.

Para. 262. Reserve system to be applied to sappers and miners.

Reserve sappers to be employed in arsenals and railway workshops.

Pensions.

Para. 264. Pension rules to remain as they now are for Native officers and soldiers already in the service.

For soldiers or officers enlisted under new system there would be no invalid pension, except for wounds or sickness.

Privates to be entitled to retire, subject to serving in second reserve up to 32 years' service, on a pension of 5 rupees a month after 21 years' service.

Privates with 32 years' service to get full pension of 7 rupees a month.

Men who retire without earning pensions or joining reserve to get gratuities.

Abolition of present invalid pension after 15 years' service recommended.

Reserves and Pensions.

Para. 265. Officers and non-commissioned officers not to be passed into the first reserve.

Para. 266. Reserve system to be made applicable to all infantry regiments.

Abolition of invalid pension after 15 years' service for future recruits, and obligation of pensioners for duty in second reserve to be carried out at once.

Men now with colours to be permitted to elect for the new pension rules.

Establishment of reserve strength as soon as possible recommended.

Under the proposed system there would be—

200 men in infantry regiments in 1st reserve;
300 men in infantry regiments in 2nd reserve;

or a total of

1st reserve, 19,200 infantry.
2nd reserve, 33,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.

Para. 268. Half reserve pay, and full pension (when earned) in addition to full pay during embodiment, to be granted to reservists employed in civil department.

Reserve men to revert to full reserve pay on losing employment in civil department.

Local civil and police officers to be informed of numbers of reservists available for employment.

Local Governments to be urged to employ reservists as much as possible.

Armies of Native States.

Para. 269. Native contingents to be kept as distinct local forces.

Native States to be induced to reduce their armies.

Powers of Commanding Officers.

Para. 270. Majority of Commission do not think that commanding officers should have the power of discharging unfit sepoys, &c.

Regimental Followers.

Para. 271. Number of lascars to be reduced from eight to four per regiment.

No reduction proposed among other regimental followers.

Regimental bazar establishment not to be always maintained.

Commanding officers to be allowed to draw the sum sanctioned for bazar establishment, and to spend it in improving the supply of grain to the regiment.

Compensation Money to Madras Sepoys.

Para. 272. Scale of compensation money to Madras sepoys serving with other army corps to be revised.

Madras corps ordered on foreign service to be allowed new scale of compensation, or rations from Government.

Defects in Clothing.

Para. 273. Cloth clothing for Native soldiers a mistake; coats and trousers too tight.

Helmets, shakos, and Scotch caps, do not suit Native soldiers.

White uniforms too expensive for them; *khaki* drill best for working uniform.

White and yellow facings down the front of the jacket make the soldier an easier mark for the enemy.

Uniform of each army corps to be revised by a committee of regimental officers.

Materials to be serge, or other woollen stuff, as *puttoo*, and *khaki* drill, the colour being red for one coat only, the rest being *khaki*, save for Goorkha and Assam corps, which should have dark green.

Any change to be introduced gradually, so as to cause little expense to the men.

Government not to undertake provision of boots and shoes for Native soldiers.

Para. 274 (*a*). Grass preserves to be maintained near every artillery and cavalry station.

(*b*.) Guard and escort duties to be reduced.

Locks and fastenings to be substituted for sentries where possible.

All institutions that must be guarded to be brought together.

No guards to be given to civil officers below the rank of Chief Commissioner.

CHAPTER VIII.

Officering of the Native Army and Army Departments.

Civil and Political Appointments.

Para. 283. Employment of military officers in civil service to cease.
Officers choosing a civil career to leave the army.
For political appointments, officers to be seconded for two years and then borne on the general list of the army for promotion.

Staff Corps System.

Para. 289. Present defects may be overcome in two ways—
1st, by uniting three or four battalions of Native infantry into a regiment, and promoting officers by seniority in the regiment.
No difficulty anticipated in Madras and Bombay armies in doing this, nor in Bengal or the Punjab, if care and tact in classifying regiments be observed.

Para. 290. 2nd, by forming a general list of officers of each army corps, to limit the number of each rank, and only make promotions as vacancies occur.
This plan recommended.

Para. 291. Army ranks for officers of infantry to be—
One lieutenant colonel, one major, three captains, four lieutenants.
For cavalry—
One lieutenant colonel, one major, four captains, five lieutenants.
The following is approximately the strength of officers required for each army corps, and the relative proportion for each rank:—

Rank.	For Regimental Duty.				For Army Staff.				For Army Department.			
	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.
Lieutenant colonels -	31	38	38	40	5	5	5	5	8	6	6	6
Majors - - -	32	43	43	37	6	6	5	6	8	7	7	7
Captains - - -	102	128	101	91	5	6	5	5	15	13	13	13
Lieutenants - -	127	158	143	128	5	2	4	3	15	13	13	13

Para. 292. The general lists of each army corps would stand as follows:—

	Bengal.	Punjab.	Bombay.	Madras.	Total.
Generals - - - - - - - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—
Colonels with allowances - - - - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—
Lieutenant colonels - - - - - - - - -	44	49	49	51	193
Majors - - - - - - - - - - -	46	56	55	50	207
Captains - - - - - - - - - - -	122	147	118	109	496
Lieutenants - - - - - - - - - -	147	173	160	144	624
Total - - -	359	425	382	354	1,520

Para. 293. All officers joining the army in future to be promoted in army rank on the list of the army corps to which they belong.
Regimental promotion to be made according to regimental list.
Unnecessary to promote lieutenants at once to make up complement of captains.
Lieutenants now in staff corps not to be promoted till after 12 years' service.

Para. 294. Officers of commissariat and pay departments to be borne on strength of regiments for two years, and after that on the general lists.

Para. 295. Officers who joined staff corps before 1866 to be dealt with exceptionally.
All in civil employ to be placed on a separate non-effective list, distinct from army list. They must continue to receive promotion till they disappear by lapse of time.
Political appointments not classed under purely civil employ.

Para. 296.

Para. 296. Officers now detailed for army departments to be placed on general list, those already in staff corps obtaining promotion as now.

Officers joining hereafter to take their army rank by promotion on general list, and their departmental rank by the departmental list.

Para. 297. Officers of the general staff, and all regimental officers, to be placed on the cadre of regiments to which they should henceforth belong.

Officers now in staff corps must be promoted by length of service.

All excess officers to be entered in the general list in italics as supernumeraries.

Para. 298. No more than two officers to be withdrawn for the staff from any one regiment.

Para. 300. Question of regulating promotion in the staff corps to be submitted for opinion of actuaries, but no system should be maintained which gives an excess of officers of higher rank and a deficiency in lower ranks.

Experiment of staff corps to be tried no longer, unless actuarial investigation proves that rules of staff corps will in time regulate promotion.

Para. 301. Officers unfit for military duty to be retired.

Para. 302. Officers unfit for departmental duty to be retired.

When officers, regimental or departmental, are in excess of requirements, they should be placed on half pay till absorbed.

Para. 303. Young officers of British regiments not to be debarred from joining Indian service.

But better plan of recruiting officers for Indian army would be to get them by direct commission from Sandhurst, supplemented by a larger number of Queen's and Indian cadets.

Para. 304. Young officers to be trained first at military camps in the United Kingdom.

On arriving in India to be attached to a Native regiment.

Officers who have not served with cavalry at home should, on arrival in India, join a British cavalry regiment for a time.

Pensions and Retirements.

Para. 311. To all who may be deprived of their appointments by reason of Commission's proposals, and for whom there may be no prospect of early and suitable employment, the following conditions to be offered:—

I. To officers of 28 years' service and upwards, the pension rate next above that to which they may be entitled by length of service, including service at Addiscombe, no deduction being made for furlough taken in excess of the periods counting for pension, with the additional annuity or bonus allowed under G. G. O. No. 1 of 1879.

II. To officers of between 20 and 28 years' service, pensions as above, with the additional annuity or bonus under the above Order, calculated for their age and service, such as was recently sanctioned for officers of the Public Works Department.

Both classes to receive in addition a bonus of six months' staff pay of their appointment, and also be allowed to capitalize, if they wish it, a portion only of the extra annuity. Those who are unwilling to retire on these conditions must necessarily be permitted to continue in the service, and should be provided with such suitable employment as can be found for them according to their rank and capacity.

Para. 312. For the future, revised scale of pensions proposed by Government concurred in.

Object of scales of pension to be to secure services of officers during prime of life.

Rates should not be fixed so as to induce officers to retire before the State has had the full benefit of their services.

Para. 314. System of colonel's allowances to be entirely re-cast.

Para. 315. Reduction prospectively of the colonel's pay and allowances to 1,000 *l.* consolidated.

Para. 316. For the future, colonel's allowance to be considered as a pension.

Establishment of colonels wholly a non-effective list.

Fixed number of colonels' allowances for officers to succeed to on retirement.

This extra or distinguished service pension to be open to officers above rank of major.

Rate to be 300 *l.* a year, in addition to any pension.

Para. 317. In all the other proposals of Government, the Commission concur.

Para. 318. For future entrants, officers retiring before 32 years' service liable to be recalled on serious emergency.

CHAPTER IX.

The Organization of the Medical Service in India.

Military Medical Administration.

Para. 323. Three Deputy Surgeons General for each army corps sufficient.

The senior to be chief adviser to general commanding; he should remain at head-quarters.

He would communicate with the Surgeon General of the Medical Department of India.

The other two to be under his orders.

Para. 324. There should be one military Surgeon General who would ordinarily belong to the British medical service.

He should be attached to the War Department, and have two Secretaries, one of the British and the other of the Indian service.

Para. 327. Appointment of 24 brigade-surgeons.

		Rs.	
12 of 1st class on		450	staff salary.
12 of 2nd	,,	250	,,

Brigade-surgeons of the Indian service after five years' service to be allowed an extra pension of 150 *l.* if in 1st class, and 100 *l.* if in 2nd.

Instead of the 24 administrative appointments recommended to Secretary of State by Government of India, Commission only propose 13.

The appointment of brigade-surgeons will make good to the service the loss of prizes by this reduction.

Para. 328. Officers entitled to furlough, to count such furlough as part of their five years' tenure of office.

Military Medical Staff.

One Surgeon General with War Department, with
Two Secretaries, one British and the other Indian.
Twelve Deputy Surgeons General, four on higher pay than the others.
Twenty-four Brigade Surgeons.

Para. 330. The military administrative medical staff to be distributed as follows:—

One Surgeon General in the War Department, assisted by two Secretaries, one of the British, and the other of the Indian, medical service.

I. *Bengal Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General on 2,250 rupees, adviser to the General commanding the Bengal army corps, issuing orders to, and receiving reports, &c., from the two other Deputy Surgeons General of this corps, and himself directly superintending the medical arrangements in the Lucknow and Bareilly districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General on 1,800 rupees, superintending the medical arrangements of the Calcutta and Eastern Frontier districts, and under the orders of the Deputy Surgeon General with the General commanding the Bengal army corps.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, superintending the Meerut, Gwalior, and Nowgong districts, and under the orders of the Deputy Surgeon General with the General commanding the Bengal army corps.

Six Brigade Surgeons, one in each military district (except the Eastern Frontier), each of whom, in addition to ordinary work as an executive medical officer, would also assist in the work of administration in any manner in which his Deputy Surgeon General might direct, either by remaining in charge of his office while the Deputy Surgeon General was on tour, or by carrying out inspections at remote stations which it may not be convenient for the Deputy Surgeon General himself to visit at the time. In the cold season, when the work of executive medical officers is at a minimum, there would generally be no difficulty in detaching a brigade surgeon temporarily for this duty.

II. *Punjab Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with the General commanding at Rawal Pindi, directly superintending the Rawal Pindi and Peshawar districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Umballa and Lahore districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Kuram and Mooltan districts.

Six Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.

III. *Madras Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with General commanding at Bangalore, and directly superintending Bangalore and Madras districts.

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for Hyderabad and Belgaum districts.

One

One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for British Burma and Port Blair.
Five Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.

IV. *Bombay Army Corps.*

One Deputy Surgeon General, first class, with General commanding at Poona, and directly superintending the Poona and Bombay districts.
One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Mhow, Nagpore, and Nusseerabad districts.
One Deputy Surgeon General, second class, for the Sind and Aden districts.
Seven Brigade Surgeons, one to each district.
As a rule, no Deputy Surgeon General would have more than eight or nine stations under his charge.

Para. 331. Civil medical administration to be distinct from military.
Civil administrative medical officers to be appointed to Burma.
Sanitary Commissioner and Inspector General of Gaols to undertake their duties in addition to other work.
Civil and military medical administration to be combined in Sind district.
Civil Deputy Surgeon General, Punjab, to have local rank of Surgeon General as in Bengal and the North-Western Provinces.
Sanitary Commissioner required for Assam, who might also do civil duties.

Para. 332. Offices of Civil Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India to be united.

Para. 333. Sanitary Commissioners to be much younger men, but any who prove efficient to be induced to remain.
Pay to be graded, 1,000 rupees to 1,400 rupees, and 1,200 rupees to 1,750 rupees.

Para. 334. The administrative medical staff, for both military and civil work, to be as follows:—

MILITARY.	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
1 Surgeon General with Army Head Quarters, at 2,700 rupees - - - -	32,400		
1 Secretary to ditto, British Service - at 1,400 „ - - - -	16,800		
1 Ditto - ditto, Indian ditto - - at 1,400 „ - - - -	16,800		
4 Deputy Surgeons General with Army Corps, at 2,250 „ - - - -	1,08,000		
8 Ditto - ditto - ditto, at 1,800 „ - - - -	1,72,800		
12 Brigade Surgeons' Staff pay, at 450 rupees - - - - - - -	64,800		
12 Ditto - ditto, at 250 „ - - - - - - -	36,000		
		4,47,600	
Deduct half-pay of 1 Deputy Surgeon General, who is to do civil as well as military work in Sind.	- -	10,800	
			4,36,800
CIVIL.			
WITH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:			
1 Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner, at 2,700 rupees - - -	32,400		
1 Secretary to - - - ditto - - at 1,400 „ - - -	16,800		
1 Statistical Officer to - ditto - - at 1,500 „ - - -	18,000		
BENGAL PRESIDENCY:			
1 Deputy Surgeon General, Bengal, at 2,250 rupees - - - - -	27,000		
1 - Ditto - North-West Provinces, at 2,250 rupees - - -	27,000		
1 - Ditto - Punjab, at 1,800 rupees - - - - -	21,600		
1 - Ditto - Central Provinces, at 1,800 rupees - - - -	21,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, Bengal, at 1,500 rupees (1,200 rupees rising to 1,750 rupees).	18,000		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, Assam, at 1,200 rupees (1,000 rupees rising to 1,400 rupees).	14,400		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, North-West Provinces, at 1,500 rupees - - -	18,000		
1 - Ditto - Punjab, at 1,500 rupees - - - - - -	18,000		
1 Superintendent, Vaccination, North-West Provinces, at 950 rupees - -	11,400		
1 - - Ditto - Punjab - at 950 „	11,400		
1 Deputy Native Assistant Surgeon, Oudh - - at 300 „	3,600		
MADRAS:			
1 Surgeon General, Madras, at 2,500 rupees - - - - - - -	30,000		
1 Secretary to - ditto - at 800 „ - - - - - - -	9,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, at 2,000 „ - - - - - - -	24,000		
1 Superintendent, Vaccination, at 950 „ - - - - - - -	11,400		
1 Sanitary Commissioner, British Burma, at 1,200 rupees (1,000 rupees rising to 1,400 rupees).	14,400		
BOMBAY:			
1 Surgeon General, Bombay, at 2,500 rupees - - - - - - -	30,000		
1 Secretary to ditto - at 800 „ - - - - - - -	9,600		
1 Sanitary Commissioner at 2,000 „ - - - - - - -	24,000		
		4,12,200	
Add half-pay of 1 Deputy Surgeon General deducted from Military above.	- -	10,800	
			4,23,000
GRAND TOTAL - - - *Rs.*			8,59,800

Para. 335. According to this statement the cost of military medical supervision will be 4,36,800 rupees for all India: the present military charges on this account are 10,49,400 rupees. The saving, therefore, is 6,12,600 rupees. The cost of civil medical supervision will be 4,23,000 rupees: the present cost is 2,40,600 rupees, so that on this item there will be an increase of 1,82,400 rupees; but the nominal supervision of civil hospitals has hitherto been a charge on the military accounts. It will be fair, therefore, to compare the total present cost under both heads with that proposed:—

	Rs.
Present military charges - - - -	10,49,400
Present civil charges - - - -	2,40,600
Present Total - - -	12,90,000
Proposed Total - -	8,59,800
Saving - - - Rs.	4,30,200

Para. 337. Diminution and simplification of returns to be effected.

Special medical supervision for irregular regiments unnecessary.

The Hyderabad Contingent to be administered by Deputy Surgeon General at Secunderabad.

Regiments in Rajputana to be administered by the Inspector General of Dispensaries.

Regiments of Central India to be arranged for as found convenient.

Executive Officers.

Para. 340. Medical officers to serve at least two years with the army, half the time with British troops before appointment to civil work.

Hospital System.

Para. 346. Both station and regimental hospital system objectionable, a modified system, embracing advantages of both, to be adopted.

Regimental system to be taken as basis of scheme.

Regimental medical officers to be provided, but numbers properly regulated.

Regimental duties to be primary charge.

Numbers of medical officers proposed:

2 to each British cavalry and infantry regiment.
1 „ battery of royal artillery.
1 „ Native regiment.

Scheme of Distribution of Executive Medical Officers.

I.—Bengal Army Corps.

British Service.		Indian Service.	
22 Batteries R.A., at 1 = - -	22	6 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	6
2 Regiments Cavalry, at 2 = -	4	24 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	24
13 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	26	Sappers and Miners = - -	1

SCHEME of Distribution of Executive Medical Officers—*continued.*

II.—PUNJAB ARMY CORPS.

BRITISH SERVICE.		INDIAN SERVICE.	
21 Batteries R.A., at 1 = - -	21	12 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	12
2 Regiments Cavalry, at 2 = -	4	27 Regiments N. I., at 1 = - -	27
13 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	26		
	103		70
Miscellaneous appointments - -	3	Miscellaneous appointments, including 7 Irregular Civil Regiments -	*10
Depôts - - - - - - -	7		
	113		80
Add,—20 per cent. for reserve, &c. -	23	Add,—25 per cent. for reserve, &c. -	20
TOTAL Bengal and Punjab Army Corps † - - - -	136		100
Present Establishment - -	230	Present Establishment - -	123
Now proposed - - - -	136	Now proposed - - -	100
Reduction - - -	94	Reduction - - -	23

III.—MADRAS ARMY CORPS.

17 Batteries R.A., at 1 = - -	17	2 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	2
1 Regiment Cavalry, at 2 = -	2	25 Regiments N.I., at 1 = - -	25
8 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	16		
	35		27
2 Depôts - - - - - -	2	Miscellaneous appointments - -	‡3
		Hyderabad Contingent - - -	10
	37		40
Add,—20 per cent. for reserve, &c. -	8	Add,—25 per cent. - - -	10
TOTAL Madras Army Corps -	45		50
Present Establishment - -	74	Present Establishment - -	76
Now proposed - - -	45	Now proposed - - -	50
Reduction - -	29	Reduction - -	26

* *Viz.*—Secretary to Surgeon General - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeepers - - - - - - - - 2
Seven Irregular Regiments (*a*) - - - - - - - 7
10

† To be provided from the Bengal Medical Service.

‡ Surgeon to Governor - - - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeeper - - - - - - - - - 1
Palaveram Depôt - - - - - - - - - 1
3

(*a*) As shown in margin of paragraph 337 of Report. The medical charge of Mhairwarra Battalion mentioned there is held by the Civil Surgeon of Ajmere.

SCHEME of Distribution of Executive Medical Officers—*continued.*

IV.—BOMBAY ARMY CORPS.

BRITISH SERVICE.		INDIAN SERVICE.	
17 Ratteries R.A., at 1 = - -	17	6 Regiments Cavalry, at 1 = -	6
1 Regiment Cavalry, at 2 = -	2	25 Regiments N.I., at 1 = - -	25
9 Regiments Infantry, at 2 = -	18		
	37		31
Miscellaneous appointments—		Miscellaneous appointments - -	*2
5 Depôts - - - - - -	5		
	42		33
Add,—20 per cent. for reserve -	9	Add,—25 per cent. for reserve -	8
TOTAL Bombay Army Corps -	51		41
Present Establishment - -	69	Present Establishment - -	56
Now proposed - - -	51	Now proposed - - -	41
Reduction - -	18	Reduction - -	15

SUMMARY.

BRITISH MEDICAL SERVICE.

	Present Establishment.	Now Proposed.	Reduction.
Bengal and Punjab - - -	230	136	94
Madras - - - - - -	74	45	29
Bombay - - - - - -	69	51	18
TOTAL - - -	373	232	141

INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE.

Bengal and Punjab - - -	123	100	23
Madras - - - - - -	76	50	26
Bombay - - - - - -	56	41	15
TOTAL - - -	255	191	64

Executive Medical Officers.

Para. 347.— Of the British service 141 may be reduced.
" Indian " 64 " "
Total - - - 205

Saving per annum 17,22,000 rupees.

Para. 348.

* Surgeon to Governor - - - - - - - - - - 1
Medical Storekeeper - - - - - - - - - - 1
2

Para. 348. Medical officers of Indian experience to be attached to regiments and batteries on arrival in India.

Hospital Buildings.

Para. 350. In new cantonments, or where required to be constructed, to be provided on the general principle of one hospital for all Europeans and one for all Natives.

Separate wards to be given to each corps.

In the meantime, various existing hospitals to be looked on as separate wards of a garrison hospital.

Para. 351. Military medical officers not required under proposed scheme, to be given civil appointments now held by uncovenanted men.

Para. 352. In Madras, 160 officers to be reduced.

Para. 353. In Bombay, 135 officers required, not 143 as at present, but exact strength cannot be fixed precisely.

Para. 354. Number of medical officers, British and Indian, to be,—

———	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
British Medical Department -	- -	- -	- -	239
Indian " " - -	353	160	135	648
			TOTAL - - -	887

Administrative appointments to be assigned in the proportion of a little more than one-fourth to the British and a little under three-fourths to the Indian service.

Para. 355. There would be in all 20 administrative appointments, as follows:—

———		Military.	Civil.	Total.	Remarks.
Surgeons General -	1st class -	1 (*a.*)	1 (*b.*)	2	(*a.*) With the War Department. (*b.*) With Government of India.
	2nd " -	–	2 (*c.*)	2	(*c.*) Madras and Bombay.
Deputy Surgeons General.	1st class -	4 (*d.*)	2 (*e.*)	6	(*d.*) One with each army corps. (*e.*) Bengal Proper and North Western Provinces.
	2nd class -	8	2 (*f.*)	10	(*f.*) Punjab and Central Provinces.
TOTAL - - -		13	7	20	
Brigade Surgeons -	1st class -	12	–	12	
	2nd " -	12	–	12	

Distribution to be as follows:—

———	Indian Service.	British Service.	Total.
Military Administrative Appointments - -	6	7	13
Civil " " - -	7	- -	7
TOTAL - - -	13	7	20

Of the 24 brigade-surgeonships, eight may be assigned to the British and 16 to the Indian service, according to the following distribution :—

	British.	India.	Total.
Bengal Army Corps - - - - - -	2	4	6
Punjab " - - - - - -	2	4	6
Madras " - - - - - -	1	4	5
Bombay " - - - - - -	3	4	7
TOTAL - - -	8	16	24

Para. 356. The seven military administrative appointments for the British service would be one Surgeon General, one Deputy Surgeon General of the first class, and five Deputy Surgeons General of the second class. The appointments for the Indian service would fall thus :—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Deputy Surgeons General { 1st class -	1	1	1
Deputy Surgeons General { 2nd " -	1	1	1
Brigade Surgeons - - { 1st class -	4	2	2
Brigade Surgeons - - { 2nd " -	4	2	2
Add civil administrative appointments -	5	1	1
TOTAL - - - -	15	7	7

If the brigade-surgeonships be included, the percentage of administrative appointments, both military and civil, to the strength of each service stands thus :—

British medical service in India - - - - - -	6·4
Bengal medical service - - - - - - - -	4·2
Madras medical service - - - - - - - -	4·3
Bombay medical service - - - - - - - -	5·1

If the brigade-surgeons be excluded, the ratios are, for British 3, Bengal 1·9, Madras 1·87, Bombay 2·2.

Para. 358. Interchange between medical officers in civil and military employ to be encouraged.

Para. 359. Under new scheme British service would have,—

1 Surgeon General.	
6 Deputy Surgeons General - - - - -	{ 1 of 1st class. 5 of 2nd class.
8 Brigade Surgeons - - - - - -	{ 4 of 1st class. 4 of 2nd class.
15	

Pay.

Para. 360. Change necessary in pay of medical officers.
Pay of both services to be the same.

Para. 361. Netley to be abolished as a place for instruction of Indian medical officers. Saving thereby effected 70,000 rupees per annum.
Young medical officers on arrival in India to be sent to large hospitals at presidency towns.

Para. 362. Eurasians and natives of India not to be admitted as candidates for Indian medical service, who have not passed in England full time for medical education.

Hospital Establishments.

Para. 364. Economy to be effected under modified station hospital system.
Two-thirds of hospital establishments for Royal Artillery to be abolished, and sick treated in British Cavalry or Infantry hospitals.
Abolition of staff hospitals in Bengal will effect a saving of 4,836 rupees per annum.
Savings also to be effected in the convalescent depôts.

Hospital Equipment.

Para. 365. To be stationary.

Hospital Establishments.

Para. 366. Recommendations of Simla Committee, 1876, approved by Secretary of State, concurred in, except that the hospital corps should be more local.
Establishments to be fixed according to general character of stations for healthiness.

Para. 367. Establishments of Native regimental hospitals to remain as they now are.

Subordinate Medical Department.

Para. 368. Reductions in — possible.
Those not required for military duty to be lent to civil Government.
Cost of training and pensions of subordinates in civil employ not to be a military charge, but to be apportioned between civil and military estimates, according to time spent in civil and military employ.
Similar arrangement to be made in respect to pensions of surgeons and surgeons major, who have been in civil employ.
Proper amount to be debited against civil Government to be calculated on average of past years.

Hospital Assistants.

Para. 369. Three hundred and fourteen, with a reserve of 25 per cent., or 392 in all, considered sufficient.

Para. 370. Greater responsibility to be placed on administrative medical officers.
More decentralization than there is at present required.
Deputy Surgeons General not to make references to head-quarters on small matters.

Medical Stores.

Para. 371. Economy to be effected in medicines and hospital equipment.
Radical changes required in management of medical depôts.
Head of medical store department to be a thoroughly trained druggist.
Calcutta medical store depôt might be removed to Chinsurah.
Government should secure the services of a good chemist to perform work of both quinologist and head of medical store department, and superintend, in addition to his own stores and factory, the minor depôts.

Para. 372. One medical depôt enough for each army corps.
Rangoon medical depôt to be dispensed with.

Para. 373. Work of depôts to be reduced if present list of medicines is curtailed.
Medical officers to restrict indents to a certain number of drugs.
Indents complied with to be accompanied by a list of cost.
Only one set of expensive instruments to be provided for each station.
Senior medical officers to be responsible for all medicines and instruments at their stations.
Inspecting officers to inquire more thoroughly into hospital management.

Medical Corps for India.

Para. 374. Recommendations of Commission made on supposition that the British and Indian medical services continue to exist, but they consider medical administration in India should be amalgamated into one medical corps.
At present three public services are competing against each other.
An Indian medical corps would secure for British troops men of Indian experience.
Indian experience of greatest value in treatment of sick.
If one service could provide for all wants, it would probably attract good men.
A medical establishment under Government of India alone more easily managed.
Jealousies existing between the two services would disappear.

Para. 376. One medical corps for all India proposed.
Direct admission into the Indian medical service to cease.
All army medical officers to first enter British service, and serve in it two years.
Fifty young British medical officers to be kept in the country, to see how the climate and work suit them.

Recruitment to be made from these.

Exchanges to be allowed between the British Medical Department and the Indian medical corps.

Change to be carried out at once by calling for volunteers from Army Medical Department to fill administrative appointments and the 232 executive appointments.

Volunteers of all periods of service would then be necessary.

Summary of Reductions.

Para. 378. The proposed reduction will stand thus—

	Rs.
I. Administration	4,30,200
II. Executive medical officers	17,22,000
III. Hospital establishments	1,43,000
IV. Abolition of Netley	70,000
GRAND TOTAL - - - Rs.	23,65,200

There would be besides savings in pensions of men employed by civil Government, savings in passages out and home of present large number of British medical officers, savings in carriage of hospital stores from station to station, &c. But if the military estimates alone be considered, the saving in Section I., instead of 4,30,200 rupees, will be 6,12,600 rupees, as the cost of the proposed military medical administration would be 4,36,800 rupees instead of 10,49,400 rupees, which it costs now.

The total would then stand thus—

	Rs.
I. Administration	6,12,600
II. Executive medical officers	17,22,000
III. Hospital establishments	1,43,000
IV. Abolition of Netley	70,000
TOTAL - - - Rs.	25,47,600

Para. 379. The extra pensions to Brigade Surgeons are compensated by reduction of pensions of Deputy Surgeons General.

The savings of pensions of the 205 officers to be reduced would also be a large item.

The grand total of reductions would not fall short of *thirty-one lakhs of rupees.*

CHAPTER X.

THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

SECTION 1.—*Commissariat and Clothing.*

Para. 383. Amalgamation of existing three commissariat departments under one head, the Commissary General in Chief of the Army in India to be attached to the War Department.

Unification of the whole Commissariat system necessary.

Para. 385. One Commissary General for each army corps proposed, with a personal assistant.

Para. 386. There should be three account offices in each army corps to deal with all accounts of commissariat expenditure within a certain circle.

Para. 387. Under proposed system, instead of 49 account offices as at present, there would only be 12 such offices, effecting saving in office rent, establishments, and contingencies.

Para. 388. The following table gives the establishment considered sufficient, divided into ranks and rates of pay:—

Pay and Ranks.

Bengal.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.		Rate.	Total.
						Rs.	Per Mensem. *Rs.*
1	1	1	1	4	Commissary General, consolidated - -	2,000	8,000
2	2	2	2	8	Assistant Commissary General, 1st class, staff pay	800	6,400
3	3	3	3	12	" " 2nd " "	600	7,200
6	5	5	5	21	Deputy Assistant " 1st " "	400	8,400
7	6	6	6	25	" " 2nd " "	300	7,500
8	7	7	7	29	Sub-Assistant Commissary General "	200	5,800
27	24	24	24	99	Monthly - - -		43,300
							12
					Annual - - -		5,19,600
					Present cost for 100 officers - - -		5,56,800
					Saving - - -		37,200
					Add pay of one officer less—Captain - -		4,489
					TOTAL Saving - - - *Rs.*		41,689

Para. 389. The establishment detailed above to be distributed as follows:—

BENGAL ARMY CORPS.		PUNJAB ARMY CORPS.		MADRAS ARMY CORPS.		BOMBAY ARMY CORPS.	
Commissary General	1	Commissary General	1	Commissary General	1	Commissary General	1
Calcutta	2	Umballa	1	Secunderabad	2	Above Dadur	2
Darjeeling	1	Kussowlie	2	Bellary	1	Kurrachee	2
Dinapore	1	Lahore	2	Bangalore	2	Baroda	1
Allahabad	1	Ferozepore	1	Wellington	1	Bombay	3
Cawnpore	1	Sialkot	1	Belgaum	1	Poona	2
Lucknow	2	Rawal Pindi	2	Madras	3	Mhow	1
Fyzabad	1	Nowshera	1	Rangoon	2	Nusseerabad	1
Bareilly	1	Peshawar	2	Thayetmyo	1	Saugor	1
Ranikhet	1	Kuram	2	Tonghoo	1	Kamptee	1
Meerut	2	Mooltan	1	Port Blair	1	Aden	1
Chakrata	1						
Delhi	1						
Agra	1						
Gwalior	1						
Nowgong	1						
Assistant to Commissary General	1		1		1		1
Account officers	3		3		3		3
	23		20		20		20
Percentage for furlough	4		4		4		4
	27		24		24		24

Para. 393. Though departmentally commissariat officers are under Government of India, they are in all respects staff officers of the General to whose command they are attached.

Para. 395. Position of Commissary General in relation to War Department and General commanding to be the same as that of executive officer to Commissary General and officer commanding station or district.

Commissary General to be at army corps head-quarters.

Orders from Lieutenant General commanding to be conveyed to heads of departments by Chief of the Staff.

Para. 396. Commissariat roster for each army corps to be distinct.

Officers to serve with their own army corps, as a rule, so as to acquire knowledge of local resources.

But the whole to be viewed as one department for all India.

The department to be administered directly by the War Department of the Government of India through Commissary General in Chief.

Duties of Commissary General in Chief to be—

To enforce economy in all branches;
To introduce uniformity of systems of supply and procedure;
To re-organise establishments to a common scale, with rates of pay only varying according to local circumstances;
To direct and sanction all important contracts;
To check demands on England for stores; and
To regulate the reserves.

Para. 397. Personal Assistant to be allowed to Commissary General in Chief, on 600 rupees a month staff salary.

Pay of Commissary General in Chief to be 2,500 rupees a month.

Para. 398. The total annual cost would be—

	Rs.
One Commissary General in Chief - - - -	30,000
One Assistant to - ditto - staff - - - -	7,200
Establishment for four army corps - - - -	5,19,600
TOTAL - - - Rs.	5,56,800

Para. 399. The department to be relieved of petty supplies to barrack department, of supplies to civil department, of supply of hospital clothing, and of cavalry and artillery line gear.

Line gear to be supplied by commanding officers, except the article furnished by ordnance department.

Barrack supplies to be undertaken by barrackmasters.

Hospital clothing by the Superintendent and Agent, Army Clothing.

Para. 400. Advantageous to have as few disbursing and accounting departments as possible.

Clothing.

Para. 402. No radical changes in department proposed.

Para. 405. No change in present arrangement needed.

But staff salaries of Superintendents should be 800 rupees for Bengal and 600 rupees for other depôts, instead of 1,000 rupees and 700 rupees respectively, as at present.

Para. 406. All hospital clothing to be made up by the clothing department.

Para. 410. Supply of material in bulk to the army, when desired, to be continued.

Unnecessary to extend any further the practice of making up clothing regimentally.

Para. 411. Savings from reduction of staff salaries would be 44,800 rupees per annum.

SECTION 2.—*Transport.*

Para. 419. New transport service to maintain carriage enough for placing a few moveable columns in the field at short notice. European officers and Native subordinates to be constantly trained in transport duties.

Para. 420. Maintenance of large number of elephants unnecessary.

Government elephants to be reduced from 1,307 to 400.

Para. 421. Committee to test and construct various descriptions of carts.

Carts to be strong and light, and parts of carts of one pattern, and interchangeable.

Para. 422. Change necessary in arrangements for carrying the sick and wounded.

Para. 423. The scale to be,—

For British Troops.

Doolies or dandies for three per cent. of troops in the field.

Spring ambulances drawn by mules, three per cent. of ditto.

Camel-panniers (kazawars) for one per cent. of ditto.

For Native Troops.

Doolies or dandies for 1½ per cent. of the troops in the field.

Ambulances, camel-panniers (kazawars), and mule-panniers (cacolets) for 3½ per cent. of ditto.

Dooly-bearers to be kept up as an ambulance corps in time of peace.

The men to be regularly enlisted, disciplined, and clothed.

But patterns of mule ambulance, camel pannier, and mule-pannier, to be settled by a committee of officers who have seen recent service.

Para. 424. Transport maintained in peace to be in regimental charge, as far as possible.

Elephants and camels at large stations to be in departmental charge.

Transport for Native regiments, and mule and pony carriage for mounted European troops, to be ordinarily in regimental charge.

These cattle to be used in bringing in forage.

Para. 425. Transport service to be a branch of the commissariat department.

Chief

Chief transport officer to be attached to the Commissary General of each army-corps.

Commissariat officers of stations to be in charge of Government departmental transport.

Where there are moveable columns, a young officer from one of the British regiments to be appointed assistant transport officer.

If an officer from a British regiment cannot be spared, a Native officer to be appointed.

The transport officer's duty to be to assist the commissariat officer in the management of the Government carriage.

At stations where reserve carriage is placed, the transport officer to be a staff officer seconded from his regiment, with a salary of 200 rupees.

Reserve transport officers to work under the commissariat officer.

Regimental transport to be, in the case of British troops, under an European officer assisted by a non-commissioned officer, and in the case of Native troops, under a Native officer.

Transport officers of British regiments to receive 30 rupees a month as horse allowance, and Native officers and British and Native non-commissioned officers, 15 rupees a month.

All followers to be enlisted.

Petty officers of camelmen, muleteers, and cart-drivers to be pensioned soldiers or reservists.

They would receive the pay of their appointment in addition to their pension or reserve pay.

Extra hands to be taken from the ranks of Native regiments.

When Government carriage is hired out in large numbers, a Native officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier should be sent in charge.

Regiments to be exercised in loading and unloading tents and baggage.

Para. 426. Theory of transport work to be taught, and a handbook to be prepared.

Transport course to be established.

Para. 427. Government transport during peace to consist of,—

(*a.*) Moveable column transport.

(*b.*) Regimental transport.

(*c.*) Reserve transport at depôts.

Smaller number of moveable columns now required than in 1861, when they were first organized.

Moveable columns to be maintained only at,—

Bengal Army Corps.

Barrackpore.	Gwalior.
Dorunda.	*Lucknow.
Nowgong.	*Allahabad.

*Bareilly.

Punjab Army Corps.

*Umballa. | *Rawal Pindi.

Meean Meer.

Madras Army Corps.

Madras.	*Secunderabad.
*Bangalore.	Waltair.
Berhampore.	Cuttack.

Rangoon.

Bombay Army Corps.

*Poona.	Nusseerabad.
*Mhow.	Saugor.
Ahmedabad.	Kamptee.

Places marked with an asterisk to be reserve transport centres.

Para. 428. Moveable column carriage allotted to mounted branches to be in regimental or battery charge.

The transport allotted to infantry to be in commissariat charge.

Each moveable column to have ambulances, and carriage for light tents, hospitals, &c.

Moveable column carriage to consist of mules, ponies, and light carts.
Committee to settle kind of carriage to be maintained at each station.
Mules, ambulances, carts, harness, and pack-saddles to be Government property.

Para. 429. Regimental transport to be maintained by all corps serving on frontiers.
Under this arrangement, half carriage would have to be constantly maintained for—

	Artillery Batteries.		Cavalry Regiments.		Infantry Regiments.		Sapper Companies.
	Horse and Field.	Mountain.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	
Beluchistan Frontier - -	1	2⅓	- -	2½	1	4	2
Punjab " - -	5	5	- -	9½	5	21	3
Assam " - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3	—
Burma " - -	- -	2	- -	- -	2	4	1
Total - - -	6	9⅓	- -	12	8	32	6

Addition of 35 Government mules or ponies to the establishment of Native cavalry regiments on the frontier recommended.

Para. 430. Standing carriage to be provided for,—

6 Batteries horse and field artillery.
8 Regiments British infantry.
20 Regiments Native infantry.
6 Companies sappers.

Particular type of carriage for each station, to be decided by special committees.
This carriage to be in regimental charge.
All mounted corps and Native troops could keep their carriage under regimental officers.
But carriage of British infantry to be in commissariat charge, subject to the orders of the regimental commander.
Officers of the commissariat and transport department to inspect and pay the Government carriage with regiments, to supply casualties, and report shortcomings.
Frontier corps transport to be employed on Government or regimental purposes in or near the station.
All Government carriage in regimental charge available for Government purposes.
All followers belonging to Government carriage to be enlisted and clothed.
Non-commissioned officers or soldiers sent with regimental carriage on other than regimental duty to receive working pay.

Para. 431. Reserve transport centres to be on main railway lines.
Eleven such centres proposed.
Allotment to these centres of a large proportion of dooly-bearers, ambulances, and other sick carriage.
Description of carriage to be maintained at each reserve centre to be settled by committees.
Light mule or pony carts the best form of reserve transport.
Not more than 80 elephants to be maintained at reserve centres.
A part of reserve carriage at centres to be available for moveable columns, and to be as far as possible in regimental charge.
The rest to be used,—

on Government work at neighbouring stations,
for plying on hill or other roads,
in the postal or other departments on hire,
at hill stations in carying water to barracks.

Mule-carts to undertake the postal parcel service on all hill roads, and to be let out to municipalities and the Public Works Department.
All Goverment stores to be carried by reserve transport.
Ambulances to be detached to stations where invalid carts are required.
Ambulance mules to work in cart trains, the ambulances being kept in store.
Reserve camels to be let out on hire.
Dooly-bearers to be employed in punkah-pulling or other station work.

Para. 432. Transport officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, with moveable columns and regimental transport, to remain on the combatant list and not be seconded.
The only officers to be seconded to be those at transport centres and the chief transport officers at army corps head-quarters.

The

The estimated cost of staff pay to transport officers would be about 86,400 rupees a year in peace time, thus :—

	Rs.
10 transport officers at reserve centres, at an average of 6,000 rupees pay, *plus* staff pay of 2,400 rupees a year -	84,000
10 transport officers at larger moveable column stations, at 1,200 rupees a year - - - - - - - -	12,000
Horse allowance at 360 rupees a year to 40 battery and regimental British officers - - - - - - -	14,400
Horse allowance at 180 rupees a year to 200 Native officers, and to British and Native non-commissioned officers -	36,000
Rs.	1,46,400

Native veterinary practitioners to be attached to the transport service and ambulance corps.

Para. 433. The total cost of the transport service and ambulance in time of peace would be,—

	Rs.
Moveable columns, as per Appendix XLVIII. - -	6,63,720
Frontier corps transport and ambulance, as per Appendix XLIX. - - - - - - - - -	11,88,360
Reserve transport centres, as per Appendix L. - - -	13,57,400
Four chief transport officers with four army corps, 600 rupees staff, in addition to staff corps pay of about 800 rupees - - - - - - - - - -	67,200
Transport staff - - - - - - - - -	1,53,900
Rs.	34,30,480
From this may be deducted the estimated saving caused by employing the Assam coolie corps on public works, dooly-bearers in punkah-pulling and other station work, and by the hire of reserve transport let out to private persons, or to Government Departments - - -	5,00,000
Net cost - - - - - - - - - -	29,30,480
Which shows a saving of - - - - - - -	8,33,451
On the total present expenditure of - - - - *Rs.*	37,63,931

Smiths, carpenters, and mochis, to be attached to the several moveable columns, frontier carriage establishment, and reserve centres.

A part only of these artizans to be kept on duty during peace, the rest on reserve pay.

They are to be entitled to, and provided with, uniform.

Para. 434. Allotment of transport to be considered by a competent committee and the *matériel* and *personnel* for each station arranged for.

Para. 435. Transport provision made for 49,030 maunds of baggage, &c., and ambulance arrangements for 2,866 sick and wounded, or for the latter—

1,054 doolies, 273 ambulances, and 360 camel and mule panniers.

Two-thirds of moveable column carriage, one-third frontier force carriage, three-fourths reserve centre carriage, and four-fifths ambulances, to be ready for dispatch to any point.

Detailed scheme for putting the transferable portion of transport on war footing, and dispatching it by rail to be kept ready.

The steps necessary for this would be—

To raise number of attendants by 50 per cent. ;

To allot 10 per cent. of spare animals and drivers ;

To place selected Native non-commissioned officers and soldiers in charge of sections of carriage ;

To provide artizans, spare wheels, and other pieces.

Transport contingents to leave stations fully equipped.

The carriage available on full concentration would be for 29,566 maunds and ambulances for 2,293 men, or for a force of 19,000 men, leaving transport available for 6,566 maunds for departmental requirements.

Para. 436. In time of war Government transport to be supplemented by hiring carriage. Retaining fees for carriage not recommended in time of peace.

Registry of carriage available in districts to be kept.

This is to be done in concert with civil officers.

Time for collection to be ascertained.

The proportion of carriage to be furnished by each district to be settled beforehand.

Schemes for raising transport trains from local carriage to be kept ready for all probable theatres of war.

Para. 437. In time of war all transport from districts to base of operations to be organised and maintained by commissariat department on the system of stages.

Regimental and departmental carriage beyond the base, to be on military organization under director of field transport, who would have, for departmental carriage, one transport officer for every 1,000 animals, a staff of Native officers and soldiers, of gang-men and drivers for every 100 animals, salutris, and artizans.

Regimental and battery carriage to be in regimental charge, but under control of director.

Native officers and sepoys detailed for transport work to be drawn from regiments left in garrisons, men who have graduated as transport inspectors in times of peace; they should get pony allowance, staff pay, and rations.

A sufficient staff of Native non-commissioned officers and soldiers to be told off for regimental and departmental transport in the field.

Native transport inspectors to be armed with breech-loading pistols and swords.

All attendants on hired carriage to be enlisted and clothed.

A percentage of all transport followers in the field to be armed with spears and short swords.

Spear-heads to be kept in store.

Useless to arm all followers.

Transport system in the field organization to be military. For a command of 1,000 transport animals in the field, the proportion of European superintendence and of Native soldiers to the trained and untrained followers for the pack transport of advanced columns would be as follows:—

1 European officer.	4 Muccadums.
1 Sergeant (1st class inspector).	100 Trained and enlisted followers of peace establishment.
1 Writer.	400 Untrained followers.
1 Native officer.	1,000 Mules or camels.
2 Havildars.	Artificers according to regulation.
2 Naiks.	
25 Privates.	

Para. 439. Duty of transport officers of each army-corps to work up details of transport organization and *matériel*:—

(*a.*) Artillery ammunition to be packed so that it could be transferred to pack animals;

(*b.*) An improved, and more durable, pattern of bag be devised for carrying gram, other supplies, and small articles on camels and mules; so that four of such bags would, when filled, form a load for a camel, and two would form a load for a mule;

(*c.*) Bags with compartments be used for carrying entrenching tools, instead of the small wrought-iron panniers recently introduced;

(*d.*) A lighter class of tents be devised, which, when complete, would suffice for hot weather in the plains of India, and which, by rejection of the double-roof and accessories, could be made available for service in Cabul, or other cold-weather campaigns;

(*e.*) Definite authority be given to certain officers of the transport service to weigh loads, reject excess, and report the person responsible for such excess to his immediate superior;

(*f.*) Experiments be made with compressed provisions for man and beast, with a view to determining, beforehand and in peace time, how far, and for what campaigns, such provisions could be economically used, and by what procedure supplies could be promptly obtained when need arose.

SECTION 3.—*Ordnance Department.*

Para. 443. Amalgamation of the three presidential departments under one head; to be divided into two branches, administrative and executive.

Head to be an officer of high rank and departmental experience.

Para. 445. To have local rank of major-general, if he has not this substantive rank.

Personnel to be under his direct control.

He should dispose of all questions regarding promotion, transfer, exchange, and leave.

All appointments of warrant and non-commissioned officers, and their promotion, to be regulated by him.

Manufacturing establishments to be under his exclusive control.

The preparation and submission of annual estimates and indents to devolve on him.

He should have a deputy and assistant.

Para. 447. Pay to be—

	Rs.	
Director General of Ordnance - -	2,500	consolidated.
Deputy - ditto - -	600	with regimental pay and allowances.
Assistant - ditto - -	250	

Para. 448. Inspectors General of Ordnance required.

They should supervise circles of supply, be responsible that arsenals and depôts are in an efficient state, and see that officers under them performed their work correctly.

They should arrange for transfers of stores from one arsenal or depôt to another, and for the disposal of unserviceable stores.

They would deal with all committee reports on regimental equipment and indents.

They would be responsible for economical disbursements.

Para. 449. Existing arsenals and depôts from which the troops forming the several army corps would draw their supplies of ordnance stores. These are as follow:—

Bengal Army Corps.

1st class arsenal, Fort William - - -	Shillong, Sadya, Cachar, Baxa, Calcutta, and subsidiary stations, Darjeeling, Dinapore, Dorunda, and detachment, Benares.
1st class arsenal, Allahabad - - - Ammunition depôt, Agra* - - -	Allahabad, Cawnpore, Futtehghur, Lucknow, Fyzabad, Bareilly,* Ranikhet,* Nynee Tal,* Almorah,* Meerut,* Roorkee,* Dehra,* Chakrata,* Delhi,* Agra,* Morar,* Gwalior,* Nowgong.

Punjab Army Corps.

1st class arsenal, Ferozepore - - - Ammunition depôts: Mooltan* - - - - Dera Ismail Khan† - -	Umballa and subsidiary stations, Dugshai, Subathu, Jutogh, Lahore, Amritsar, Ferozepore, Dharmsala, Bakloh, Dalhousie, Sialkot, Mooltan,* Dera Ismail Khan,† Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpore.
2nd class arsenal, Rawal Pindi - - - Ammunition depôts: Peshawar* - - - - Dera Ismail Khan† - -	Rawal Pindi and Hills, Abbottabad, Attock, Nowshera,* Hoti Murdan,* Peshawar,* Cherat,* Ali Musjid,* Kohat,* Lundi Kotal,* Thull,* Kuram,* Edwardesabad,† Kuram Valley,* Tonk.*

Madras Army Corps.

2nd class arsenal, Secunderabad - - -	Secunderabad and the stations occupied by the Hyderabad Contingent.
1st class arsenal, Madras - - - - Ammunition depôts: Bellary† - - - - Belgaum‡ - - - - Bangalore* - - - -	Bangalore,* French Rocks,* Bellary,† Belgaum,‡ Wellington, Trichinopoly, Quilon, Cannanore, Madras, Vellore, Poonamallee, Waltair, Berhampore, Cuttack.
2nd class arsenal, Rangoon - - - Ammunition depôt, Tonghoo* - - -	Rangoon, Thayetmyo, Tonghoo,* Moulmein, Showaygheen, Port Blair.

Bombay Army Corps.

2nd class arsenal, Quetta - - - -	Dadur and stations above.
2nd class arsenal, Kurrachee - - -	Jacobabad, Kurrachee.
1st class arsenal, Bombay - - - - Ammunition depôts: Ahmedabad* - - - - Poona † - - - - Nagpore ‡ - - - -	Rajkot,* Dwarka,* Deesa,* Ahmedabad,* Baroda, Surat, Bombay, Poona,† Kirkee,† Satara,† Seroor,† Asseerghur, Kamptee,‡ Nagpore,‡ Seroncha, Raipore,‡ Sumbulpore.
2nd class arsenal, Aden - - - -	Aden.
2nd class arsenal, Mhow - - - -	Mhow, Mehidpore, Augur, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Saugor, Jubbulpore.

In the place of those mentioned above, the following arsenals and depôts should in future be maintained in India for the supply of ordnance stores:—

1st class arsenals - 5. Fort William, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, Bombay;

2nd class arsenals - 6. Mhow, Rawal Pindi, Kurrachee, Rangoon, Aden, Bellary;

Ammunition depôts - 10. Peshawar, Agra, Mooltan, Dera Ismail Khan, Secunderabad, Tonghoo, Poona, Ahmedabad, Quetta, Belgaum;

the depôts at Nagpore, Bangalore, and St. Thomas' Mount being abolished.

Para. 450. The circles of supply to be as follows:—

Bengal Army Corps.	*Punjab Army Corps.*
As at present.	As at present.

Madras Army Corps.

2nd class arsenal, Bellary - - - - Ammunition depôts, Secunderabad,* Belgaum† - - - - - - -	Secunderabad,* stations occupied by the Hyderabad Contingent,* Bellary, Belgaum.†
1st class arsenal, Madras - - - -	Bangalore, French Rocks, Wellington, Trichinopoly, Cannanore, Madras, Vellore, Poonamallee, Waltair, Berhampore, Cuttack.
2nd class arsenal, Rangoon - - - Ammunition depôt, Tonghoo - - -	As at present.

Bombay Army Corps.

2nd class arsenal, Kurrachee - - - Ammunition depôt, Quetta* - - -	Dadur and stations above,* Jacobabad, Kurrachee.
1st class arsenal, Bombay - - - - Ammunition depôts { Ahmedabad* - - - Poona† - - - -	Rajkot,* Dwarka,* Deesa,* Ahmedabad,* Baroda, Surat, Bombay, Poona,† Kirkee,† Satara,† Seroor,† Asseerghur, Kamptee, Nagpore, Seroncha, Raipore, Sumbulpore.
2nd class arsenal, Aden - - - -	Aden.
2nd class arsenal, Mhow - - - -	As at present.

Para. 451. Bengal Army Corps to draw its ordnance supply from two arsenals (1st class) and one ammunition depôt.

The Punjab Army Corps from two arsenals (1st and 2nd class) and three ammunition depôts.

The Madras Army Corps from the arsenals (one 1st class and two 2nd) and three ammunition depôts.

The Bombay Army Corps from four arsenals (one 1st and three 2nd) and three ammunition depôts.

Para. 452. Present establishments in several ordnance departments:—

	Factories.	Arsenals.	Depôts.
Bengal - - - - - - -	5	4	4
Madras - - - - - - -	2	3	5
Bombay - - - - - - -	3	4	4

Para. 453. Bengal and Punjab Army Corps to be in one circle of supply.

Madras and Bombay in another.

The former to be called the northern, and the latter the southern, circle, of supply.

Para. 455. Salaries to be:—

	Rs.
Inspector General of Ordnance - -	2,000 consolidated.
Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance -	400 regimental pay and allowances.

Para. 456. Total cost of officers of the administrative staff:—

	Rs.
1 Director General of Ordnance - - - - - - -	2,500
2 Inspectors General of Ordnance at 2,000 rupees - -	4,000
1 Deputy Director General of Ordnance - - - -	600
2 Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance at 400 rupees -	800
1 Assistant to Director General of Ordnance - - -	250
TOTAL - - Rs.	8,150

Para. 460. All manufacturing establishments to be under Director General.

All estimates and returns, &c., to be sent to him.

Para. 461. One uniform rate of staff pay for superintendents, viz., 600 rupees per mensem.

Para. 467. The formation of four grades of Commissaries of Ordnance on the following monthly salaries suggested:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
1st class - - - - - - - - - -	500	–	–
2nd „ - - - - - - - - - -	400	–	–
3rd „ - - - - - - - - - -	300	–	–
4th „ - - - - - - - - - -	200	–	–

Para. 468. For a first class arsenal to be allowed three commissioned officers:—
One 1st class Commissary of Ordnance.
One 3rd „ „ „
One 4th „ „ „

Para. 469. For a second class arsenal two officers:—
One 2nd class Commissary of Ordnance.
One 4th „ „ „

Para. 470. Ammunition depôts might, as at present, be left in charge of senior warrant officers, so long as the circle of supply is limited to one or two stations. But when an ammunition depôt has to provide ammunition for three or more stations it should be under the charge of a third class commissary of ordnance.

Para. 471. Ordnance stores to be supplied from the following arsenals:—

1st class Arsenals, 5. Fort William, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, Bombay.

2nd class Arsenals, 6. Rawal Pindi, Bellary, Rangoon, Kurrachee, Aden, Mhow.

Ammunition Depôts providing for Three or more Stations, 6. Agra, Peshawar, Secunderabad, Quetta, Ahmedabad, Poona.

Ammunition Depôts supplying Two or fewer Stations, 4. Mooltan, Dera Ismail Khan, Belgaum, Tonghoo.

The following commissioned officers would be required for employment in the several arsenals and depôts:—

	Commissaries of Ordnance.			
	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.	4th Class.
1st class Arsenals - - - -	5	- -	5	5
2nd class Arsenals - - - -	- -	6	- -	6
1st class Depôts - - - -	- -	- -	6	—
TOTAL - -	5	6	11	11

The names of all these officers to be borne on one list, and their promotion regulated by the Director General. They should be available for duty in any part of India.

Para. 476. The total monthly cost of regimental pay of ordnance officers under the existing organisation is:—

	Rate of Pay.			Total.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
3 Deputy Inspectors General of Ordnance - - -	1,012	13	–	3,038	7	–
1 Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance - - -	609	2	10	609	2	10
7 Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class - - - -	686	13	11	4,808	1	5
6 Commissaries of Ordnance, 2nd class - - - -	529	2	10	3,175	1	–
6 Commissaries of Ordnance, 3rd class - - - -	341	9	10	2,049	11	–
TOTAL - - *Rs.*	-	-	-	13,680	7	3

Para. 477. The total monthly cost of regimental pay for the officers of the ordnance department would be:—

	Rate of Pay.			Total.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
1 Deputy Director General - - - - - - -	880	11	6	880	11	6
1 Assistant Director General - - - - - -	265	12	–	265	12	–
2 Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance - - -	524	2	3	1,048	4	6
Commissaries of Ordnance:						
5 1st class - - - - - - - - - - } 6 2nd „ - - - - - - - - - - }	588	5	4	6,471	10	8
11 3rd „ - - - - - - - - - - -	341	9	10	3,757	12	2
11 4th „ - - - - - - - - - - -	265	12	–	2,923	4	–
TOTAL - - *Rs.*	-	-	-	15,347	6	10

Para. 478. The total additional monthly cost of the pay of officers of the amalgamated ordnance department would be:—

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
For regimental pay - - - - - - - -	1,666	15	7
For staff pay - - - - - - - - -	1,300	–	–
TOTAL - - *Rs.*	2,966	15	7

Or, annually, *Rs.* 35,603. 11.

Para. 479. Against the above expense, there will be the saving resulting from the recommendation of the special Committee on Ordnance, to reduce the reserve ordnance, ordnance carriages, and ammunition.

Abolition of depôts at Bangalore, Nagpore, and St. Thomas' Mount will also effect a large saving.

Ammunition depôt provided for Quetta, which was not previously sanctioned.

Para. 480. Actual cost of amalgamated ordnance department will be less than that of the present department.

Executive branch to be strengthened by the addition of 14 commissioned officers.

Para. 481. Secretary of State to be assisted by an artillery officer of first rate ability.

All requisitions from India to go to him for check.

This officer to be in direct communication with the Director of Artillery at the War Office, and with the Director General of Ordnance in India, whom he should keep supplied with latest information on ordnance and artillery matters.

Para. 482. Attention to be paid to development of local supply, and to reduce and utilise obsolete stores.

Hasty condemnation of stores to be prevented.

Para. 483.

Para. 483. Modification necessary in the arrangement for the survey of stores when regiments arrive in England from India, or *vice versâ*.

Para. 484. Committee to be appointed to consider these questions.

SECTION 4.—*Military Works and Barrack Departments.*

Para. 490. Design, construction, and maintenance of all military works to be entrusted to a separate department of military works.

Statement of Proposed Establishment for Department of Military Works at Head Quarters of the Army of India, and for the Bengal and Punjab Army Corps.

Inspector General's Establishment.

1 Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works.
1 Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.
1 Assistant Director of Works for Fortifications.
1 Deputy Director of Works for Barracks.
1 Assistant Director of Works for Barracks.
1 Aide-de-Camp to Inspector General.

Commanding Royal Engineers.

4 Commading Royal Engineers (1 1st grade, 2 2nd grade, 1 3rd grade).

Engineer Establishment.

21 Garrison Engineers - -
40 Assistant Garrison Engineers } Distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules.

Upper Subordinate Establishment.

63 Upper Subordinates (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Lower Subordinate Establishment.

120 Sub-overseers (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Accounts.

1 Examiner (II. class, 1st grade).
35 Accountants (distributed in grades according to Public Works Department rules).

Inspector General of Fortifications and Director of Works to be an administrative officer of the War Department.

Para. 491. All large questions to be treated as parts of complete schemes.

All defence questions, plans of barracks and fortifications to be prepared under the direction of the Inspector General in concert with the Defence Committee.

This Committee to be composed as follows:—

President.

Commander in Chief in India.

Members.

Chief of the Staff.
Inspector General of Artillery.
Director General of Ordnance.
Inspector General of Fortifications.
Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.
Officer of Royal Engineers in charge of Torpedo Defences.

Secretary.

Deputy Director of Works for Fortifications.

Para 492. Overgrowth of establishment to be restricted, and the employment of Royal Engineer officers on petty works not to be allowed. Greatest portion of accounts to be done at headquarters.

Para. 493. Contracts for building to be employed as much as possible.

Para. 494. Instruction of the army in field engineering to be undertaken by the garrison and assistant garrison engineers. System to be uniform and simple.

Para. 495. Five battalions of Royal Engineer officers sufficient for the Sappers and Miners, and Military Works Department. For civil work, survey department, &c., two battalions enough, or seven in all, instead of nine, the present number.

Para. 496. Economy to be effected by rigid supervision on the part of military and engineer authorities, and by the diminution in the number of stations where buildings have to be maintained. Also by the employment of contractors and military labour.

Annual allotment of funds to be as uniform as possible.

Barrack Department.

Para. 497. Constitution of a barrack sub-department of the Department of Military Works.

Control to be in the hands of the Military Works Department.

SECTION 5.—*Remount and Veterinary Departments.*

Para. 503. One Director of the Remount Department for all India.

Available for consultation by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

If of the army veterinary department, his staff salary to be 500 rupees a month + pay and allowances.

If a regimental or staff corps officer, his staff salary to be 1,000 rupees + staff corps pay.

Para. 504. One reserve depôt to be at Saharunpur, with a superintendent on 600 rupees, with a veterinary surgeon on 250 rupees.

Para. 505. Another at Oosoor with same staff.

Para. 506. Director to determine remounts annually required to classify the different kinds of horses required, and direct the purchases.

Para. 507. Australians to be bought at Calcutta and Madras, and other classes of horses at Bombay, at fairs and up-country stations, and by commanding officers, when suitable remounts were presented.

Para. 508. A reserve of 400 to 500 Australians to be kept at Saharunpur, and 250 to 300 at Oosoor.

Para. 509. Total reduction would amount to 2,68,500 rupees, exclusive of pensions.

Veterinary Department.

Para. 511. Veterinary requirements to be considered by stations instead of by corps and batteries.

Para. 512. One inspecting veterinary surgeon proposed for each army corps on staff of 400 rupees.

Executive.

Military requirements (by stations)	32
Two depôts	2
Horse-breeding operations	3
Percentage for leave, &c.	9
	46

Para. 513. Two or three veterinary colleges for training Native farriers to be established.

Para. 514. Savings—

Twenty-three veterinary surgeons reduced—1,15,000 rupees a year exclusive of pensions.

Eventual saving in remount and veterinary departments—3,83,500 rupees per annum.

SECTION 6.—*Military Account Department.*

Para. 524. Establishment proposed as follows:—

	Rate.	Amount.
	Rs.	*Rs.*
4 Controllers (consolidated) - - - - - - - -	2,000	8,000
5 Military Accountants, 1st class, staff - - - - - -	800	4,000
5 " " 2nd " " - - - - - -	600	3,000
5 " " 3rd " " - - - - - -	500	2,500
5 " " 4th " " - - - - - -	400	2,000
7 Assistant Military Accountants on 150 rupees during the year of probation, and 200 rupees subsequently, average - - -	175	1,225
31 Officers.		
4 Medical Examiners - - - - - - - - - -	400	1,600
		22,325
Present Cost - - - -		22,850
Monthly Saving - - *Rs.*		525

Para. 525. These officers to be employed in the following duties:—

4 Controllers, one for each army corps.
4 Examiners of Commissariat Accounts.
4 Pay examiners.
4 Examiners of Ordnance and Clothing Accounts.
4 Paymasters at Calcutta or Allahabad, Rawal Pindi, Madras, and Bombay.
4 Pension paymasters, Bengal and Punjab army corps.
7 Assistant Military Accountants employed as already explained.
4 Medical Examiners.

Para. 526. Accounts branch of controller's office to be supervised by uncovenanted officers on higher salaries than at present allowed.

Para. 527. Systems of paying pensioners in the three presidencies to be assimilated.

Para. 528. No officer of less than five years' service to be allowed to enter the department.

On being permanently posted to the department, they should be borne on a general list for promotion.

Para. 529. Controllers to be financial advisers to generals commanding army corps.

All controllers to hold the same position relatively to the Government of India that the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal, now holds.

References to Governments on unimportant points to be diminished, and controllers allowed to dispose of cases in which the sum involved does not exceed 1,000 rupees.

Para. 530. Controllers to afford generals commanding army corps advice on questions of military finance, and meaning of regulations.

Cases in which controllers and generals commanding do not agree to be reported to Government of India and Accountant General, War Department.

All orders of general officers commanding districts to come under the cognizance of the controller.

Controllers not to have authority to disallow, finally, charges incurred on the authority of orders by generals commanding, without previous reference to the generals commanding or Government.

Para. 531. The financial powers of generals commanding army corps to be limited in times of peace to sums not exceeding 1,000 rupees.

Controller's advice to be taken by him on all financial references.

A schedule of all cases thus disposed of exceeding 500 rupees to be submitted monthly to Government.

Para. 532. Separate estimates, statements of receipts and charges, and London accounts current, to be submitted separately by each army corps and consolidated by the Accountant General, War Department.

Para. 533. Accounts of military, medical, and orphan funds in Bengal to remain under medical examiner, Bengal Army Corps.

Para. 534. Offices of the controllers and examiners might be at headquarters of each corps.

In the Punjab army corps, the controller and his staff can be located at Rawal Pindi.

CHAPTER XI.

The Lines of Communication in India.

Para. 536. Need for military railways through the Bolan Pass to Quetta on the Kandahar route, also to Lundi Kotal and Kohat on the Khyber and Kuram routes.

These lines necessary for the safe and economical retention of our present or any advanced frontier.

Large savings of expenditure will be caused thereby.

For narrow passes and steep ascents, narrow lines to be laid with rolling stock capable of passing sharp curves.

Para. 537. Khyber route more important than the Kuram.

Railway from Rawal Pindi to the Indus to be laid to suit branch railways or roads to Peshawar and Kohat, *i.e.*, to both the Khyber and Kuram routes.

Para. 538. Railway not needed along the Indus Valley from Peshawar through Kohat and the Derajat.

Para. 545. A good road from Julpigoree to Baxa necessary.

Para. 546. Brahmaputra steamer service to be improved, and Northern Bengal Railway to be extended towards Assam Valley.

Patrol roads or paths from post to post required along the Assam frontier.

Para. 547. Patrol roads from post to post and to the base at Silchar and Rangamutty needed.

Para. 548. Railway extension to Tonghoo necessary.

Improved military road from Prome or Allanmyo to Tonghoo would improve communications from the sea to the Burma frontier.

Para. 549. Railway lines from Umballa to Kalka, and from Ramnuggur to Moradabad, important.

Cantoning of regiments near together in the Himalayas economical and convenient, so that they may be served by the same railway.

Hill cantonments near railways cheaper and convenient in time of war, for camps of exercise, reliefs, and supply purposes.

Para. 550. On this side of our bases at Rawal Pindi and the line of the Indus, the most important lines of military communication to be maintained are—

The East Indian Railway, and Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway up to Lahore.
The Punjab Northern State Railway.
The Indus Valley Railway.
The Oudh and Rohilcund Railway.
The Irrawaddy Valley Railway.
The Great Indian Peninsula Railway.
The Tirhoot Railway.

Para. 551. The lines of railway and roads which ought to be made to complete our lines of communication are—

The lines now under construction towards the Bolan and Khyber passes.
The Moradabad and Saharunpur link with the Benares bridge.
The Sukkur bridge on the Indus Valley Railway.
The Umballa and Kalka line.
The Rangoon and Tonghoo line.
The Ramnuggur and Moradabad line.
The Tirhoot Northern and Eastern Extension.

Para. 552. The arrangements required to turn railway lines to the best advantage are—

(1.) Employing the railway lines to the highest military advantage with as little inconvenience as possible to ordinary traffic;

(2.) Maintaining and adapting rolling stock and appliances, with due reference to military requirements;

(3.) Arranging for the protection of lines in time of disturbance or danger;

(4.) Providing for the rapid reconstruction of broken lines.

Para. 553. Tables and schemes for working military trains in time of war, to be kept ready in times of peace.

When large movements of troops take place, the officers at headquarters charged with transport affairs should regulate the working of troops and supply trains. They would be responsible for troop train movements.

In time of war, officers of the headquarters or army corps staff should be deputed to each line.

Para. 554. Large junctions to be guarded in times of disturbance.

Designs for defence always to be kept ready on the spot and at headquarters.

Para. 555. Designs should be kept ready for guard-houses on the big bridges.

Para. 556. In order to maintain military lines of railway in time of disturbance, designs for bridges over large and small openings should be kept ready.

Para. 557. Creation of a separate railway service corps not recommended.

A committee to consider the question of working the railway system of India for large movement of troops, and the defence of railways.

CHAPTER XII.

The Mobilization of the Army for War.

Para. 564. Steps necessary, on entering a campaign, for providing officers, would be—

To recall from leave all officers fit for duty;

To request Horse Guards to fill up vacancies in British regiments and batteries; and

To draw on the proposed reserve of young officers in England.

Para. 572. The steps to be taken in the mobilization of a field division from the Bengal Army Corps would be—

(*a.*) To issue the detail of the generals, staff, and the stations from which the troops are to drawn.

(*b.*) To call up the Reserves.

(*c.*) To arrange for the railway transport through the staff at army corps headquarters, Allahabad.

(*d.*) To expand the transport sections at Lucknow, Allahabad, and Bareilly to the required strength.

(*e.*) To draw extra horses from the batteries remaining in garrison from Saharunpur, or to purchase them in the Calcutta and other markets.

(*f.*) To dispatch extra equipments, clothing, and other supplies from Allahabad arsenal, Fort William arsenal, the Calcutta clothing depôt, or other centres where they have to be purchased in the open market.

Para. 574. Camps of exercise to be frequently formed for manœuvres of troops and practice of mobilization.

CHAPTER XIII.

General Military and Financial Results of the Proposals.

Para. 579. Total savings by proposals of Commission 1,25,00,000 rupees per annum approximately.

(signed) *Edwin H. H. Collen*, Captain,
Secretary.

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DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 204 of 1880—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis, Simla, 1 June 1880.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 48, dated the 4th February 1880, forwarding early copies of the Report of the Army Organisation Commission which was formed under Lord Cranbrook's sanction, communicated in his Lordship's Military Despatch of the 17th July 1879, we have now the honour to formally submit, for the consideration of your Lordship in Council and Her Majesty's Government, the signed Report, with the opinions recorded thereon in Minutes by the Members of our Government named in the margin.* A further Minute by our colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, will follow by a later mail.

* His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 16th May 1880.
His Excellency the Commander in Chief, dated 20th March 1880.
General the Hon. Sir E. B. Johnson, dated 4th March 1880.
The Hon. Sir A. J. Arbuthnot, dated 12th April 1880.
Major General the Hon. A. Fraser, dated 27th May 1880.

2. In accordance with the instructions conveyed in the 3rd paragraph of Lord Cranbrook's Despatch of the 17th July 1879, No. 198, we have taken no action on any of the recommendations made by the Commission, though some of them have our unanimous approval.

3. We desire, however, to observe that we believe, on reviewing this Report, your Lordship in Council will find some suggestions to which immediate effect might be given, and we would suggest that, when this appears to be the case, it will be to the advantage of the service if authority be given us for their introduction without waiting till orders are passed on the whole Report, the review and discussion of which must, we are aware, be a work of time.

4. We are satisfied your Lordship in Council will concur with us in the opinion we entertain of the great care and conspicuous ability with which this Report has been prepared, and will appreciate the valuable aid rendered by the Honourable Sir Ashley Eden and his colleagues on the Commission to the Government of India, in its desire to place the Army on a footing of assured efficiency.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Lytton.*
F. P. Haines.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
A. Fraser.

(Enclosures referred to.)

— 1. —

MINUTE on the Army Organisation Commission Report, by General Sir *E. B. Johnson*, K.C.B.

I HAVE examined this Report with much interest, and must congratulate the Commission on having, in the short space of time allowed them, been able to make this valuable compilation representing in a tangible, though necessarily crude, shape many of the views advocated for a reform in the military administration of the country that have from time to time come under my notice during the many years of my connection with Government and the Army.

It is particularly valuable to us, as it throws out the defects of the existing military system in the strongest light; and, as no fault or error seems to have escaped criticism, the Report may be held to contain the worst that can be said of that system.

In the full spirit of the instructions contained in the letter (No. 202 S., of 17th July 1879), which practically placed no limits on the scope of their inquiries, the Commission claim to have arrived at a happy solution of the great problem of applying to India an organisation based on the lines of the "improvements

"provements in administrations which have recently been introduced in Euro-"pean armies."

To attain this object they have been compelled to represent the existing state of affairs in India in the worst light, and have naturally felt that it was necessary to justify their convictions and their recommendations by a show of evidence in the shape of concurrent opinions of notable men. They have attained their object, were the Report intended only for the casual reader unacquainted with the history of India's military administration, for to such the statements made are plausible enough. But it is possible to show that many of their assumptions are as erroneous as the evidence of their witnesses appears to me to have been misread and misapprehended.

Being so entirely opposed to the ground and position taken up by the Commission, it is needless for me, had I even the time for it, to remark specifically on each of the various measures recommended in the Report, especially as many of these suggested changes have been and are still before Government. I shall, therefore, confine myself at present to the larger questions and principles of "reconstruction," on which hang the bulk of the changes advocated.

I agree with the Commission in what I believe to be their meaning, that were we now engaged in the construction and organisation of an army in India for the first time; if, in fact, we were working on a "*tabula rasa,*" unfettered by considerations of prudence and policy, we should not now construct or organise that army in its present identical form.

But such acquiescence does not blind me to the fact that, whilst making proposals for the better administration of the country, the existing conditions must have primary consideration, and as facts are stubborn, so will it be useless to ignore them or to shape them for the purpose of carrying out the idea of transplanting root and branch to the East what is an outgrowth of the requirements of the West.

The Commission premise their argument with the assumption which may be pithily stated as "what is, is all wrong, and what is not, is right." It ridicules the existing state of affairs, attributing, in but thinly-veiled terms, to maladministration that which I confess will admit of much improvement, but which in principle is, nevertheless, what experience has proved desirable.

I entirely object to the assumption that our administration is behind the civil and political requirements of the day.

I protest against the assumption that we have not remedied, and are not continually correcting, many of the evils evidenced against us, and I protest against the assumption implied that the necessary improvements lie in ruthless iconoclastic measures demanded by the adoption of a European model.

I know that there are many military authorities who consider that the proposals here brought before us are demanded by the spirit of the age, and who, no doubt, consider these views not only correct, but also that their acceptance must be a foregone conclusion. To the more comprehensive observer, however, that is, to the professional observer, who looks beyond the mere internal requirements of an ideal military hierarchy, and recognises certain distinct external influences as necessarily placing restrictions or conditions on the perfecting the military machine "*pur et simple,*" it must be apparent that but few of these proposals could be adopted without deliberately reversing nearly all the fundamental principles of that military administration in India so rightly upheld against repeated attacks made by irresponsible reformers.

These fundamental principles are as much an outgrowth of the progressive experience of years as are those principles which govern the military administrations in Europe; both are outgrowths meant to meet the demands made by conditions which, it must be acknowledged, still *are* different, however the difference may diminish in time, but which even time itself cannot entirely remove.

I cannot lose sight of the great difference that exists in many important respects, but apparently lost sight of by the Commission when advocating, for instance, the introduction into India of the dogma underlying the theory of "peace and war establishments."

These, with the necessary machinery requisite to cause the transformation of one to the other on the eve of a war, are essentially peculiar to civilised Europe.

Civilised nations, with civilised neighbours on flank and rear, must be capable of

of arming themselves to the uttermost for the purpose of retaining their nationality, and that as rapidly as possible. The demand *there* is for a system which will enable them to place a vigorous and exacting hand on all and every part of their resources in the shortest space of time, and the least costly solution of this problem has been found in the system of peace and war establishments.

Here in India there is no such demand. Our first consideration is to guard against the latent dangers connected with the forcible retention of an uncongenial soil, and the repression of an unsympathetic population.

We can have no peace establishment in the European sense. The armed strength at our disposal must be regulated by the inimical forces opposed to us, no doubt often dormant, but daily increasing in vigour and health, as the civilisation we are imparting is raising the population above its former low level of depression and ignorance.

In civilised Europe, when a country considers it necessary to appropriate part of its neighbour's domain, it does so with the conviction that, by means harsh or tender, the "attached" people will in time blend with the race of the conquerors, thus making a return to a peace establishment certain, or at least to be hoped for; but here, with us in the East, it is different. Firmly must a new province be held, no fusion of blood being possible, and never can we harbour the hope that in our time the day may come when Kuram and Pishin, like its synonyms of Alsace and Lorraine, can be garrisoned by a "peace "establishment."

Many junior and regimental officers support and favour the views of the Commission, but they naturally only speak from their own limited point of view, disregarding the larger political and other considerations. It is but natural for a regimental officer to jump at any proposal that will, on an emergency, enable him to march into the field with an augmented body of men, irrespective of the general bearings of the case. His view is restricted, and his opinion need not be considered as having weight affecting the discussion of the main principle at stake.

The system of reserves as proposed by the Commission is, no doubt, apart from other considerations, excellent in principle; but, even with the results contemplated, it is practically but a plaything which, by their own admission, must never be allowed to grow beyond that stage which, even under the happiest circumstances, make it absolutely insignificant when compared with the full-grown, powerful, but dangerous machine which it would become were the restrictions placed by the "Military Administrator" on the "soldier" not maintained.

In European countries the object is to have as many people trained to arms as possible. In India the object should be exactly the reverse. We should have as few natives of the country trained to arms as possible.

The reserve is to be limited to 58,000 "reservists" of the 1st and 2nd line, spread all over India. It is sanguine to expect that even one-half of these men would turn up at the right moment.

I am afraid that the many plausible excuses in the mouths of men not animated by a national sense of duty will have to be accepted, and will tend to largely diminish the power of the reserves; and, if it is considered necessary to enforce penalties for such non-appearance, penalties which can only take the shape of loss of pensions, it cannot be doubted but that such treatment will be misunderstood, and that to breach of faith will be assigned this "advanced" method of furnishing, in opposition to the tradition of the army, a force of "reservists" to meet the demands for employing the army of India as an offensive weapon on the approved European system.

As proposed, the system of reserves is the thin end of a wedge, the thick end or base of which is an acknowledged source of danger to the Empire. Why, therefore, run the risk of sowing a seed which, if not carefully and constantly mutilated, must bloom into a deadly parasite? It is the first step that indicates the direction, and if the direction is admittedly wrong, why be induced, for a love of shaping on a European pattern, to take that step, and make a change which, if perfect, is dangerous, and if imperfect, useless, disappointing, and, under any circumstances, costly?

Changing army systems is always a delicate matter, but tampering with the

the system of the Native Army of India is not only delicate but peculiarly dangerous.

Apart from the contemplation of political dangers, I feel convinced that the bulk of the sepoys would not appreciate such a change in the traditions of their service. Any system of reserves would be most unacceptable to the Native soldiers, effective or non effective, and the proposed introduction of such a system, so foreign to their ideas and experiences, would have a very disturbing effect on the army, already in a state of doubt and confusion owing to rumours of the various changes which have been disseminated, and which are producing a visible and marked effect on the recruiting of the army.

To the rough and ready but impulsive Pathan and Afridi, and to the more docile but still warlike Punjabi, the periodical outing connected with an annual training would, perhaps, be welcome; but it would be madness to connive at strengthening the resource of a country at heart inimical to our existence, and where the least spark of patriotism would at once obliterate the most perfected system for a prolific or limited production of "reservists."

To the less inflammable Madras, Bombay, and North-West soldiers, bound as they are by home ties to a more peaceful state of affairs, the having to break the monotony of a happy repose earned after a burdensome and harassing service, by a periodical interruption of their habits and pursuits, would be most distasteful, and the application of such a system would be only opening a wide door to an easier and less easily detected system of shirking by malingering than is now affirmed to exist.

For similar reasons, and on the same grounds, do I strongly deprecate the proposed changes in the pension rules, as being fraught with the most serious consequences.

Only three years ago these rules were, after long and mature consideration, revised in favour of the soldier and on the same lines as then existed, and any change curtailing or abolishing them would have a very injurious effect on the minds of the Native Army

The Commission, in their recommendations for creating their reserve, propose to draft soldiers after certain periods of service from the army into the police.

This appears to me to be a measure of more than questionable policy. I consider it extremely objectionable, as giving the two bodies, the army and the civil police, interests in common.

In times of internal disorder or excitement, or of discontent among our soldiers, the military element in the ranks of the police would, I believe, gain an ascendancy, and exercise an influence over the civil protectors of order, which might be dangerous, in leading to common cause against us.

Further, in time of war, the police, at the very moment when most required for the maintenance of peace and order within our own provinces, and at a time when our military garrisons are reduced to a merely obligatory pitch, would be seriously weakened by the withdrawal for active service of the "army reserve" policeman.

I would observe, moreover, that the only two Governments of our provinces from which the vast majority of the recruits of this Presidency are raised, the Punjab and the North-West Provinces, both strongly object to making use of the police force as an instrument whereby a reserve for the army can be formed.

The Commission have assumed the necessity for a war establishment, to meet requirements, "offensive and defensive."

It is not my wish here to enter upon the demands that can be rightfully made on India's resources to make her a power for "offensive" purposes, but I may say that, up to the present day, and even under existing difficulties, the system of moderately strong cadres on a war footing, admitting of expansion by recruitment in case of need, has answered the purpose fairly well, and I fail to see how heavy cadres, not capable of augmentation without making our regiments unwieldy and inconvenient, can be made a better substitute.

Moreover, heavy battalions are particularly unsuited to our system of reliefs, a system which is and must be based on the military, political, and sanitary necessities of our occupation of the country.

India can, admittedly, only be held by *force;* to count on the love and loyalty

loyalty of the masses would be fanciful, and fatal to the continuance of our existence here.

Such force is best and most cheaply applied when placed palpably *en evidence*, and as the temptation of the Natives to disaffection and resistance would be concurrent with the display of our weakness (in their minds meaning absence of force), it is but reasonable to suppose that Sir Charles Wood's conclusions, made at the head of his Council in 1864, after mature consideration of the argument in favour of reduction and concentration of troops, still hold good.

He said: "It is impossible to deny . . . . . that there are constant "elements of danger in the ambition or the fanaticism of portions of the popu-"lation in various parts of India; and that the presence of a body of European "troops may prevent disturbances, which, if they broke out from the absence of "any such repressing force, might cause far more expense than would be "incurred by the maintenance of a permanent effective force on the spot."

Diminution of British cadres, concentration of troops, and reduction of single battalion stations, mean widening the meshes of our military network to such an extent as to vivify the dangerous element it is intended to keep suppressed. On this account, if on no other, I strongly deprecate the proposed reduction in number of so many British cadres.

It appears to me of great importance that the presence of our British troops in India should be widely seen, and felt to be a reality.

With the Native troops different reasons apply, but with the same results, and necessitate the retention of single battalion stations.

I do not much care to dwell on the reasons for such an opinion, but feel compelled to mention some of them, as they seem to have been ignored by the Commission.

Garrison duties at large stations are at all times arduous and harassing, and when combined with the bad climate often reduce our Native regiments, after a tour of duty, to a point almost of disorganisation.

Take, for instance, the two ends of our trunk line, Peshawar and Calcutta (Fort William and environs).

The duties are excessively heavy, and the climate, distasteful to at least one of the regiments at each, is injurious to all, affecting health and discipline to such an extent as to place these corps, at the end of a tour of duty, often in the category of "inefficient" for serviceable purposes.

To such corps stations like Jhelum, Tallogong, Gorruckpore, Moradabad, &c., are nursing places from which, after a short residence, they would march out, well set up, well clothed, well drilled, and ready by an entire renovation to take their place again as efficient corps.

These periodical rests are of the utmost importance to the well-being of the army at large, and though opposed to the theory that promises a "greater development of the military power," should be accepted as essential.

But a still more important consideration is that dictated by political requirements. I will only say on this point that I concur in the opinion given in the following extract from a Minute by the late Sir W. R. Mansfield, dated 13th July 1858:—

"The old mutinies of India, and the terrible one of last year, demonstrate the inexpediency of such concentrations of Native troops at immense stations, except where they may be wanted for garrisons, as at Peshawar. The necessity of advocating a principle of dispersion to preserve the peace of the country, after the fashion of military police, rather than that of assembly for the purpose of imposing military display, therefore becomes obvious.

"I believe the true principle to be adopted may be stated in a very few words.

"As centralization is necessary to meet a foreign enemy, so dispersion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied. It sounds almost like a truism, but the repetition of it cannot be avoided, and it must be pressed home, owing to the great and venerated authority * under which an opposite view has been advocated."

* Sir Charles Napier.

I cannot bring myself to believe that the day has come when the lessons of the past can be forgotten.

In para. 79 of their Report the Commission describe the term "Army Corps" in the sense as understood in Europe, and recommend its application to the advocated

advocated divisions of the army. I consider the application of this term to the divisions proposed a distinct *mis*application. The term implies the separate members of one body, that is to say, divisions of the same body, composed of the same material and deriving their munitions and supplies originally from the same factories and main arsenals. This is the reverse of what we have and must have in India.

The Armies of Madras and Bombay are, practically and inevitably, self-contained and isolated, and my contention is that such independence, whatever the numerical strength, gives them the character of an army and not that of an army corps. The Commission object to these commands being those of a Commander in Chief under a Local Government, as being an anomaly, and yet recommend this, to me, greater anomaly of giving the proposed Commanders the same or increased powers of command, with additional responsibility (with almost the same numerical strength), but less rank, and with none of the moral, if not effective, check and support derived from the presence of a superior local authority.

They further propose the retention of the present isolated state of the Corps of Officers. In continental armies an "army corps" has absolutely nothing to say to regulating the promotion of officers. Yet the Commission would recommend the application to a, numerically, far inferior body of troops of the more dignified sytem of promotion obtaining in an army, and to call it by the less significant term, seemingly for no other reason than the desire to mould it symmetrically on the "European model."

Another consideration which would preclude the acceptation of the "real" meaning of this term, is the size territorially and the difficulties of communication and inspection.

The largest army corps in Germany is, territorially, 100 miles long, that of Madras as proposed, over 1,000 miles. A European army corps commander can receive a reply by post from an out-station in 48 hours. In the Madras Army Corps, to receive a reply at Bangalore from Thayetmyo would take the better part of a month. The Commission ignore these differences, and speak of Madras, Bombay, Burma, Assam in the same strain in which we could imagine the military home districts are spoken of at the War Office, instead of bearing in mind that, as regards distances, our commands in India are better compared with Austria, France, Sweden, and Denmark. It is fanciful to asssume that India is now sufficiently advanced in civilisation as to admit of a comparison with these countries for the purpose of assimilating the military administration.

The real meaning of the term "army corps" *cannot* be applied, and, call them what we will, these divisions of our forces in India will virtually remain territorially and politically "armies," and no misapplication of terms can make them dwindle into the less significant military body known by the name of "army corps."

The *name* may be of little importance, if it were distinctly understood that with its misleading application a false impression had not been present in the minds of some of the Commission when they make their further proposals in connection with this idea.

Stress is laid in defence of that view upon the "progress of railways, &c.," but reference to essential facts shows that the progress made is, for our military purposes, comparatively but insignificant. In England the ratio of miles of railways to area of country is as 1 to 11; in France, 1 to 22; in Germany, 1 to 17; but in India only as 1 to 250. A marked difference, which, to my mind, is of the utmost importance, but which I confess would be materially lessened if I could bring myself to believe that we could insure the potential volcanic dangers previously referred to, which are the primary cause of the existence of our troops, being confined to the neighbourhood of our trunk lines.

It appears to me that the Commission have altogether exaggerated the benefit to us, in a military point of view. of this railway system, and I cannot but consider that the advantages that railways afford have already been largely discounted by the very considerable reductions which have been made in the numerical strength of our army during the last 20 years.

On this point I will quote Sir Hugh Rose's opinion, which I fully endorse:—

"No one will urge that a long line of rail from Calcutta, even if it reached the

the Sutlej and Peshawar, would be a sufficient and reliable transport for British troops operating in the field.

"In the first place, the scenes of the most important operations may lie at a long distance from the line of railroad, and, in the next place, railroads, as the most obvious of tactics, would be the point of attack of districts in revolt. I myself witnessed the whole line of electric telegraph from Mhow to Gwalior destroyed by the rebels. The disaffected have gained much experience from the mutinies, and, as said before, the first effort of insurrection against British power would be to attack its best ally, the railroads. The destruction of railroads is easy. A few barrels of gunpowder placed here and there on the line would effectually obstruct its communication.

"When on the subject of railroads, I should observe that this important element of British power, but unfortunately so easy of destruction, entails another charge for British troops.

"It is true that it carries troops along its long line, but, on the other hand, that long and expensive line requires protection, and none would be efficient in time of trouble but that given by British troops. General officers in command would not have any more important, but difficult, duty than to put down rebellion in distant provinces, and at the same time preserve intact the line of rail."

Chapter IV. contains the grounds for the opinions held that violent changes of principle are necessary, but I shall endeavour to show that some of these are but assumptions, giving a distorted view of supposed facts.

The opening sentence, for instance, runs as follows: "At present there are, "as has been explained already, three distinct Native armies in India, with "three different systems of organisation," and ends by saying that the question for solution is, "whether it is necessary to have three military Governments, "three sets of Staff and Army Departments." I maintain that this is a biassed and partial description of the actual state of affairs. I maintain that the "intelligible principle" aimed at by the Commission in their proposals, viz., to have a general central control by the Supreme Government, leaving the detailed administration of each body (army corps) a great deal more under the officer commanding is (but for the proposed severance from local Governments) precisely what is at present in existence.

Time and space would not admit of my attempting here to bring up the proofs of a fact patent to those who have held office in the administrative Departments of Government. I will only say that in corps or armies where officers and men are enlisted, armed, trained, equipped, paid, promoted, employed, and retired on the same broad principles, jealously watched over by a central Government, it must at least be considered a mistake to assume that there exist "three distinctly organised Presidential Armies." The differences in detail, the natural result of local conditions, are in themselves constantly being checked and under revision, but some difference will and should and always must exist. These very differences help to keep up the distinctions so essential to our political welfare, distinctions of customs and race, abhorrent to the theoretical staff officer, but no stumbling-block to practical men.

It is true that at one time distinct *organisations* did exist. But that is a matter of history, and the extract from Malcolm's plaints and sighs over the "distinct organisations" are matters half a century old. The "unification" advocated in 1832 by the witnesses "shown in Appendix VI." is now an accomplished fact.

* Not printed.

The one supreme authority, so that "no obstacle or counteracting authority "may impede or militate such orders as he may find it necessary to give with "a view to military economy," is fully recognised.

The remedies suggested for allaying the officers' grievances have been met, the British officer in Madras and Bombay serving under the same rules as those in Bengal.

The suggestion that "pay and allowances of the Native soldiery and public "followers should be fixed with reference to certain general principles" (page 1364 of Appendix VI.*), the idea that "the military equipment and departments of the forces of "the different Presidencies should be as little different in practice "as local circumstances will permit," are all now accomplished facts, showing that the necessary changes required to keep up with the general advance of India's economy

* Not printed.

economy have been recognised, accepted, and carried out. To assume the converse is a vital error on which to base any proposals for a "reconstruction."

I fully admit that there is room for improvement in many ways, but these improvements do not require the ruthless uprooting of stable and solid principles shaped by circumstances peculiar to India; on the contrary, they can best be carried out in harmony with a less radical and less expensive progression by leaps and bounds in the dark.*

* *Sic* in original.

The Commission frequently speak with an implied sense of ridicule about "a "complete set of establishments in triplicate." This expression is only another instance of the exaggerated style indulged in by the Commission, for, if taken literally, it would mean that the Government of India are now applying a staff identical in number to bodies of troops unequal in size. This, I need hardly point out, is not in accordance with fact.

I will here notice the very partial way in which the Commission deal with the recorded opinions of the witnesses they bring up to strengthen their cause; evidence, as cited, misleading and liable to be taken as giving support where none was intended.

The Commission claim the opinions of the Duke of Cambridge, General Jacob, Sir Sidney Cotton, General Handcock, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Sir Henry Durand, and Sir Henry Tombs as being commonly agreed "in those principles* which we feel "constitute the only basis upon which the "true organisation of the Armies of India "can be founded." The principles forming this "only basis" are modifications in many cases amounting to a complete reversal of the existing principles. From an analysation of the recorded opinions, I find this to be a biassed representation, fairly open to the charge of grave carelessness, militating to a large extent against the value of the Report.

* 1. Separation of commands from Local Governments.
2. Further subdivision territorially of the Bengal Army.
3. Complete assimilation of the Army Corps under one Chief.

Take, for instance, the separation of military commands of armies from Local Governments. This is a corner-stone of the "only basis," on which is to take place the organisation of what the Commission themselves term the "Armies of India."

It is remarkable to find how conspicuous is the absence of any of their opinions on this point. To claim them as "supporters" of the view of the Commission, then, is hardly fair.

The fact is, that the existing principle was looked upon as so stable and sound that general reference to it was not considered necessary, and in the isolated instances (notably that of Sir Henry Durand) where it is mooted the perusal of the opinions of the supposed supporters will clearly show that the Commission on this point have the weight of their own cited evidence against them.

But chiefly on the points of further subdividing the Bengal Armies and of solidifying the Presidential bodies into *one* Army of India, under one chief, do we find their evidence of such a nature as ought to have precluded many of these names from being claimed as supporting the adoption of new and "only basis," of which this point is an important part. It can be seen, on a careful perusal of the whole evidence and purport thereof, chiefly extracts from the Commission Report of 1859, that the opinions then given related to a very different kind of subdivision and separation to that under discussion now. This assumption of similarity places words that were spoken some 20 years ago into the mouths of witnesses to-day (mostly dead men), who, had they lived, would have been in the position to correct any misconstruction which may have been placed on their evidence.

The Presidential Commanders in Chief in those days were, under the Local Governments, entirely independent in all matters relating to the Native armies, and the purport of the evidence of these authorities was to establish the amount of subordination to one Imperial authority, which has been accomplished and now exists; but, from the general tone of their evidence, it will be seen that most of them would certainly have repudiated the accusation of having given any support to proposals resulting in an "incorporation" such as that implied in the term "army corps." As, however, the balancing of opinions numerically may have some weight in matters where divergence of opinion is said to exist in an equal degree, I will refer to a few of the leading authorities whose opinions

opinions may safely be said to be, on the larger question, adverse to a change of principles.

Commencing with men now holding office, I would point out that, to the introduction of the four large changes proposed, the Commander in Chief in India and the Commander in Chief in Madras, the Governor of Bombay, and the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, are distinctly and commonly opposed. The Commander in Chief of Bombay is in accord with the Commission only on the purely military question of subdivision.

Their reasons are given at length in the Appendices. If to these are added the recorded opinions of men whose names are best known, as Lawrence, Mansfield, Montgomery, Hugh Rose, Northbrook, Charles Wood, Chamberlain, Temple, Napier, and Norman, I think the preponderance in figures alone would remain with those who oppose the fatal error of making changes claimed to be uncalled for and unwise.

Also on the point of the contemplated application of the term "army corps" to the subdivision as proposed by the Commission, we find these witnesses by no means commonly agreed.

In paragraph 47 the Commission would have us understand that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief supports their proposals to divide the Bengal Army into two perfectly distinct armies under the title of "Army Corps."

His Royal Highness speaks of the division in a purely military sense, and says: "As regards the command of troops, I would leave that much as it is at present; "I would not add a fourth army to those of the three existing Presidencies." Again, "I would divide Bengal into *corps d'armée*, probably three in number, "the officer commanding these corps to have considerable powers, but still all "directly under the authority of the Commander in Chief in Bengal." Also, "I think the Bengal Army should remain as at present, and not be further "divided."

From the foregoing it seems to me that His Royal Highness would leave the army exactly as it is, with this difference, that the large body of troops now called the Bengal Army should be divided into two or three army corps *of* the Bengal Army. The other witnesses are dealt with very much in the same spirit. They almost all speak of the proposed divisions as "armies."

And this brings me on to another proposal also antagonistic to the existing principles of our military administration, viz., the severance of the bond that now exists between the Local Governments and the Native armies.

I have already stated that uniformity and central control in principal matters *do* exist in India consistent with the principle (on which all are agreed, and in which the Commission concur *in words*) that the Native armies must be kept segregated.

This principle of separation of interest, though opposed to the idealistic axioms of European military administration, must be accepted, for it is as essential to the welfare of the Indian Empire as the *reverse* is the admitted principle of successful policy in Europe, where the acme of political success lies in a perfect fusion of the national elements, and yet the Commission advocate the abolition of what is, has been, and will be the great means of preventing the fusion of interest, and which disastrous fusion the separation contemplated would facilitate and in time evolve.

The sympathy which is now felt by Local Governments with the territorial armies under them would no longer exist if the connection between them were broken, and the beneficial effects of that good feeling between the army and its civil rulers would disappear.

I cannot but think also that the disconnection of the territorial armies from their Government would be altogether misunderstood by the Natives, and more especially if such a severance should be associated with the blotting out of the Commander in Chief.

I also strongly object to the manner in which the "reconstruction" contemplated is to be made at the expense of the Madras Army. The tone in which such a result is spoken of is another instance indicative of the "foreign" spirit in which the Report has been written, a spirit engendered by an exaggerated feeling of confidence in the future, and an ignoring of the lessons taught by the past. Discontent of "even a few hundred retired sepoys," who, however, if the Report be accepted, would be numbered by thousands instead of hundreds, when imported

imported into the widespread area of our recruiting grounds, breeds feelings which alienate the good will of the population.

Further, it seems to have been forgotten, in proposing their wholesale reduction, that, under the peculiar organization of the Madras Army, the disbandment of a regiment is not the mere sending men away to their homes, but the disruption and ruin of a community.

It appears to me a very great mistake indeed to suppose that the feeling of discontent which would be engendered, were the Madras Army subjected to the treatment proposed by the Army Commission, would be limited to "a few hundred retired sepoys." It would permeate through the whole Presidency, not only by reason of the reductions proposed, but by the breaking up of regimental ties and associations, which would be a consequence of the drastric measures it is proposed to apply to that army. The Madras Army has ever been treated as a *corpus vile* on which to test the extent to which mutilation and dismemberment can be carried out without extinguishing life and loyalty.

The late Viceroy was sensible of the impolicy of carrying out any large reductions in the Madras Presidency, and, in one of his last notes before leaving India, Lord Northbrook said that, though the Madras Army was susceptible of reduction and still be left in sufficient strength to perform the duties now allotted it.* "It must not be forgotten that this army forms "a reserve which has proved, and may again prove, of service in "time of difficulty."

* *Sic* in original.

"Bearing this in mind, as well as the hardship to the British and Native Officers and to the men, and the unpopularity and disturbance of the minds of the people which reductions always occasion, I am of opinion that the Madras Army should be retained at its present strength, unless some serious financial difficulty should arise."

Recent events have proved how useful a reserve this army is, and justify the opinions of those who have urged its retention on its present footing.

The Commission indicate how small the control of the Local Government is over their Native armies, and further endeavour to show how practically the fusion and intercourse dreaded is actually taking place by a neglect of the principle still recognised in theory.

As to the former, I will only say that the Commission has clearly proved how the control of Local Governments exists really only in small current matters, and that their powers over expenditure are only within budget limits, and have also shown how real and efficacious is the control by the Central Government in matters of principle. Now that the amalgamation of the Military Accounts Department and the compilation of one pay code is effected, the Supreme Government has the means of exercising a still more rigid and strict scrutiny over the expenditure of the Local Governments, and for the present this is sufficient.

Moreover, I have only again to point to recent events to show how useful it has been to have some of the responsibility of military operations shared by Local Governments, in whose hands are necessarily centred the wires communicating with the different sources of supply so essential to the successful termination of any military operation.

I entirely dispute the assumption that the existing principle of segregation is recognised in theory and ignored in practice, and "that the present system is doing that which all in common admit should not be done." The fact that the artificial Presidential boundary is overstepped for valid reasons, based on the principle that Madras is our "reserve" of the "first line," does *not* cause the fusion attributed to it. On the contrary, it may often be the means of showing up the differences that exist between the several armies, and helps to bring this home to each respectively. However disadvantageous on other grounds, chiefly that of costliness, it is justified by the existing principle. The safeguard does not lie in the modern "scientifically constructed organization," in other words a theoretical organization at variance with the dictates of experience, such as that it is proposed to introduce, but in the strict retention of the small points of dissimilitude born of local requirements and individual interests. Strict retention of artificial boundaries will not, by itself, afford the segregation claimed by the Commission's proposals. Traditional and national differences not affecting efficiency, concentration of interests on different points, with a certain amount of "historical sentiment," alone can secure that segregation of the mind required

for our political welfare, but which cannot possibly be obtained by a mere segregation of the bodies.

I have already pointed out that the distinctions between the armies are not in "organization," but in smaller matters of detail, and that I consider these details an effective means of fostering in these several armies a feeling of segregation, hateful it may be to the "military reformer," but essential to the statesman.

The only disadvantage I can find in this difference of details is, that the employment of the Madras troops beyond the limits of an artificially constructed frontier is at times expensive. This by itself is liable to remedy, and is one of the many questions still before Government.

The anomaly said to exist by the appointment of the Commanders in Chief as Members of Council and the supposed difficulties in the way of loyally discharging a dual function, so redundantly described in para. 142, are mostly the creations of imaginative minds.

Where "angry discussion" takes place, or the "grievous mental conflict" which makes "the position of a Commander in Chief intolerable," whether the cause lies in the possession of a "powerful mind," or whether it is due to a want of tact or common sense, it certainly is not due solely to the "dual position," but generally to the existence of a divergence of opinion which, if arrived at on mature consideration, no mere change of official seats can possibly affect. My experience would lead me to the conviction that the duty of a Member of Council, can be, and, as a general rule, is exercised in entire harmony with that of the Commander in Chief.

Innumerable instances are on record where the Commander in Chief has pointed out the urgent necessity for certain matters with regard to military requirements, but, at the same time, knowing the policy of Government, has refrained from pressing these matters to a point necessitating a refusal. It seems to me more dignified to have the requirements of the army represented to Government in this way than to have an official of one-sided opinions continually clamouring for what he ought to know he often cannot obtain owing to the many other claims on Government, but, were it not for his "dual" position he would be officially relieved from knowing. Such an additional responsibility as that of a seat in Council, instead of impairing the value of a Commander in Chief's opinion, to my mind enhances it, and leads to economical results.

Further, I would ask the members of the existing Government whether the presence in Council of the Commander in Chief during the last two anxious years has not been of the greatest advantage, and whether it would not have been a serious loss to the Government had the Commander in Chief been absent from their deliberations.

As for the dual position entailing a "seat in judgment" on his own acts, I know nothing, and the instances can at all events be so rare that they need not be considered as forming that insuperable bar it is represented to be. The difficulties, if any are experienced, are not more than those to be overcome by most public men holding offices of importance, from the Secretary of State and Governor General in Council downwards.

The evidence on behalf of this advocated change of principle given in Sir W. Mansfield's letters and claimed in support is not only beside the point, but may be taken as evidence in direct opposition to the Commission's views, for the Commander in Chief of Sir W. Mansfield's creation would have been but a functionary performing the duties of a Chief of the Staff under a War Minister, who, by virtue of his office, would practically hold the dual position of Commander in Chief and a Member of Council, being a proposal almost identical with that referred to, but discarded as impracticable and opposed to their unanimous opinion.

It is certainly noteworthy that on this point the Commission have the late Sir Henry Durand's opinion in their favour, but this even at the time was not shared by any (with one or two exceptions at most) of the public men of the day whose opinions are as much entitled to weighty consideration.

The last points I shall remark on as affecting principle are the recommendations connected with a War Secretariat, the heads of Departments, and the amalgamation of the general staff.

I fully concur in almost every point of detail having as its aim the expedition

of

of public business and the increase of the powers of control. Most of the recommendations made by the Commission with this object would have been carried into practice years ago had the funds been available. I would also raise no objection to the proposals for the extension to the heads of Departments some direct administrative functions, in so far as they can be carried out in harmony with the retention of the existing principles of administration.

I have always advocated the amalgamation under one central control of the Ordnance Departments of India. I have also advocated the placing of the Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department in the hands of the Military Department, so also do I entirely concur in the proposals for the organization of a Transport Department, subject to such modifications in matters of detail as on mature examination may appear necessary or advisable.

The complete fusion of the staff into one body has been assumed as an accepted fact in England, though the double and distinct titles are in some instances still retained.

My experience has been adverse to this fusion of duties which for a century have been recognised as requiring different knowledge and different training.

As Adjutant General and Quartermaster General I have had exceptionally large and varied experience in these Departments, and, backed by this experience, I can explicitly avow as my firm opinion that it is most unadvisable to combine these two Departments, the special qualifications required in a Quartermaster General widely differing from those of an Adjutant General, and *vice versâ*.

The advantages are purely theoretical, and the demand for this fusion is but a swing of the pendulum of change, which will some day swing back to an "intelligible subdivision of duties" as a remedy against the evils which the advocated system will surely generate. A few years hence, when the amalgamation of the staff at home will have been completed (if a return to the old system has not by that time been made) it will be time enough to consider any such change in India.

A Chief of the Staff was, for the first time in India, and for special reasons, made during the mutiny, when Sir William Mansfield accompanied his old commander, Lord Clyde, in that capacity.

In time of war, and during the conduct of great military operations, such an official is, I think, most desirable. He has, under the General Commanding the Forces, the general control over the departments of the army in the field, the heads of departments receiving their orders from him, and communicating with the Commander in Chief only on such occasions as might be considered necessary. In minor matters, therefore, the Chief of the Staff is the *alter ego* of the Commander in Chief, who, delegating to him his authority, is relieved of an infinity of details, and thus has leisure to deal with important matters.

On this ground, therefore, I entirely advocate the appointment of a Chief of the Staff in the field or in time of war.

In time of peace, however, such an appointment appears to me quite unnecessary. I am fortified in my own conviction by Sir William Mansfield's opinion, given me himself when relinquishing the post of Chief of the Staff to take up the command of the Bombay Army. He then told me that it was considered unadvisable to renew the appointment, that he himself had for some time past felt it to be absolutely unnecessary, as being nothing more than a fifth wheel to the coach.

I can only say, for my own part, that, were I in time of peace in command of an army, I should infinitely prefer dealing direct with the heads of the several departments of the staff to receiving their opinions through the medium of a Chief of the Staff. In fact, in the conduct of business he would be an incumbrance to me and a very inconvenient one, for my inclinations would lead me to pass him by and consult personally with the officers in charge of the several branches of the Service.

The greater portion of the foregoing remarks were written and in type before I received in official course the departmental notes on the report of the Army Organization Commission. When writing this paper, therefore, I was not aware of the shape and form in which the secretary would submit his views.

It may, perhaps, be thought that I should have adopted a similar procedure,

and noted paragraph by paragraph on the arguments and recommendations of the Commission. But to adopt such a procedure now appears to me inexpedient; it would involve very considerable delay in the submission of these papers to the Viceroy, which his Excellency was extremely anxious to avoid.

Further, as I am opposed to the main principles on which the recommendations of the Commission have been based, it would be almost impossible for me to dwell item by item on the several paragraphs of their report. I trust, therefore, that the Viceroy will not object to the form in which I have submitted my opinions.

I have endeavoured in the above remarks to be as concise as possible, but it appears to me difficult to determine how much or how little I ought to say when so many paragraphs of the report, involving very important changes of principle, afford so much matter for comment; matter for comment, indeed, sufficient to constitute a voluminous report in itself.

There are, however, some very important questions dwelt on by the secretary to which I invite special attention, as I have not noticed them in the body of my observations.

I refer more immediately to Colonel Allen Johnson's remarks on those parts of the report of the Commission having reference to the Staff Corps.

I also would draw attention to his remarks on the question of reserves. I have already expressed myself on this subject in reference to the impolicy of the proposed system. Colonel Johnson's note treats not only directly of this point, but also of the inadequacy of the measures proposed in a numerical point of view.

I do not propose to enter on the question of medical administration or medical requirements, which, as noted by the secretary, has been and is still being considered separately under distinct instructions from the Secretary of State.

For the reasons adduced by the secretary, I am not able to enter into a consideration of the financial results of the recommendations of the Commission. It is impossible for me, with the means and the time at my disposal, to examine the calculations on which their estimated reductions of expenditure are based.

I must, however, observe that a considerable portion of the saving due to reorganization of the Medical Department has been anticipated by the measures already carried out independently of the Report of this Commission, and should be excluded therefore from their estimates.

Further, in regard to the anticipated savings connected with the measures proposed with reference to the British army, admitting and endorsing the principle that India should not be burthened with a larger military expenditure than is absolutely necessary, I do not think we are justified, under the circumstances, in asking the War Office to accept proposals so largely affecting the British army generally, which, if not resulting in a complete reorganization of its existing system, would certainly interfere to a very inconvenient degree with the system obtaining in that army, and which has been so lately adopted at home.

Moreover, I have already expressed, in the body of this Minute, the strong objections which I entertain to the diminution in the number of cadres, the saving effected by which form so large a part of the reduction in expenditure anticipated by the Commission.

I would now briefly recapitulate the substance of my remarks.

I object to the "foreign" spirit in which the investigations have been made.

I protest against the many erroneous assumptions on which have been built a modern reconstruction.

I protest against the dogmatic manner in which most important fundamental principles of military administration have been reversed.

I object to changes in pension regulations only recently established.

I dissent from the view that the improvements, many of which are now before Government in one shape or another, require the "scientific reconstruction" of our armies contemplated by this Commission.

I may lay myself open to the charge of being old fashioned and conservative in my ideas, and obstructive in the way of reform, but change is not synony-

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mous with reform, and if obstruction means a genuine opposition to what appear to me to be mischievous and dangerous innovations, and conservatism the maintenance of what has proved good in the past, and what I believe to be equally good in the present, then I am content to lie under such imputations.

4 March 1880. (signed) *E. B. Johnson.*

MEMORANDUM by His Excellency General Sir *Frederick P. Haines*, Commander in Chief in India, on the Report of the Special Army Commission, 1879.

Introduction.

I. In connection with the few remarks I have to offer on the Report of the Military Commission which is now before us for review, I should wish to place on record here the fact that I opposed the assembly of this body on grounds which subsequent events have, in my opinion, fully justified. I shall ever regret that its sittings were continued after the virtual break up of its component parts on the 6th September, for so greatly was the constitution of the Commission then altered, that it cannot be said to have retained in any way the elements designed for it by the Government of India. Generals Roberts and Macpherson, Colonels Baker and MacGregor, were at once removed from the sphere of their labours with the Commission; General Lumsden was virtually withdrawn at the same period, for his duties as Chief of the Staff most fully occupied his time, and it was not until the arrival of Major General Greaves that he was able to give any continuous service to the Commission. A great portion of this time must have been taken up in the penning of the Minute of Dissent which he has recorded against one of the vital principles adopted by the Commission.

II. Brigadier General Phayre arrived late, Brigadier General O'Connell still later; not more than a week before the great exodus of the military members took place. It may be noted that Brigadier General O'Connell joins Major General Lumsden in his dissent.

III. It is, therefore, certain that but very few meetings of the whole body, as constituted by the Government of India, could have been held.

IV. It is much to be regretted that this strong body of military opinion should not have been available, or only available in a fitful manner, for the purpose of influencing throughout the matter and tone of the Report, for I feel sure that much now stands on the record which could not have been allowed to stand had the Report been subject to the careful revision of its various chapters in detail by the full Commission.

V. Perhaps it was necessary to depreciate the value of the past and present military administration, in order that a case might be made out for that which is now sought to be introduced. It is nowhere admitted that competent officers, capable of understanding and appreciating our position in India and its military requirements, have been at the head of our armies in this country, or that they have had competent staff officers to assist them. The reverse, if not broadly stated, is manifestly implied; an assertion of thorough competence is reserved for the Army Corps commanders of the future, and the excellent staff officers to be provided for them. The services of Major General Lumsden as Adjutant General and of Major General Roberts as Quartermaster General are standing protests against such an imputation.

VI. I am no believer in the class of perfection which is claimed for all appointments to be made under the new system, but anticipate as many failures under it as under the present, for human nature will continue to err whether in the person of the selector or of those selected.

Remarks on Report of Commission.

The Commander in Chief in India.

1. It is difficult for me to write upon the future position and functions of the Commander in Chief in India without appearing to be influenced by personal considerations. So great a portion of my tour of command has, however, passed away that it is more than likely that the recommendations contained in these proceedings will not be given effect to or rejected within the time which may be left to me. I have no hesitation in saying that, if the recommendations of the Commission be carried out, the Commander in Chief in India in reality ceases to exist. In the first place, he becomes a Commander in Chief without an army, and in the next, his severance from the Supreme Council cuts him off from all share in the government of the country, and from the sources of knowledge regarding its internal administration and its foreign relations, which the Commander in Chief in India ought to possess if he is to perform the most important functions of his office with the greatest advantage to the interests of the State. The very essence of the proposal that the armies in India should be organized on the basis of four army corps, commanded by four lieutenant generals, consists in the delegation to these commanders of full power to dispose of all possible details connected with the forces under their command. The name of Commander in Chief is indeed reserved to him, but he is stripped of everything like real command over troops. The Commander in Chief is, in fact, entirely withdrawn from the field and relegated to the bureau. He is not "to be employed as at present on the annual inspection of regiments, but is to confine his visits to the large military centres of India and to camps of exercise."

2. Camps of exercise are but of infrequent occurrence. In the course of a five years' tenure of command at Madras I saw but one. Since 1876 there has been no such thing in Bengal. The official inspection of regiments and batteries is an important part of the duty of officers commanding divisions and districts, and the Inspector General of Artillery, and it is a misuse of terms to say that the Commander in Chief is so employed at present. True, when in the course of his cold-weather tours he visits military stations, be they large or small military centres, he orders a parade of all the troops, or sees them in detail, as circumstances may demand. He observes personally the state of the troops, their efficiency in the field, as well as the measure of comfort they enjoy in barracks. Such visits and inspections, moreover, enable him to judge more accurately as to the value of the reports rendered by inspecting officers. These are not of uniform value, and never will be. The opportunity of thus being brought into personal contact with the troops, either massed or in fractions, as he may consider most desirable, is a privilege no Commander in Chief would forego.

3. I affirm that the disclaimer to diminish the substantial power and authority of the Commander in Chief in India, contained in paragraph 148, is wholly contradicted by the statement of duties said in the following paragraphs to be reserved to him, but which are in reality delegated to the Lieutenant Generals, who, in accordance with the scheme of the Commission, are invested with the fullest control, embracing the functions now discharged by the Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay. In fact, the only duties left to the Commander in Chief in India are in their nature essentially bureaucratic, and it is difficult to realize the limits to which the scope of his control would extend without trenching on the executive command entrusted to the Army Corps commanders. Now the duties which are here so fully detailed as pertaining to the Commander in Chief in time of peace and war are stated in such a manner as to lead the casual reader to suppose that they are matters which hitherto had received no attention whatever. On the contrary, they, one and all, have received the very closest attention. The conduct of the troops now in the field does not lead one to suppose that, however much the Commander in Chief and the able officers of his staff may have been otherwise employed, that they have systematically neglected the equipment, training, whether tactical or educational, or the discipline of the army in time of peace. The question of supply and transport in time of peace, and up to a well-defined point

point in time of war, is not in any sense under the Commander in Chief. I believe no army staff in the world is better supplied with information under all these heads, or more constantly under the necessity of applying such knowledge than the army in India.

4. Then again, in time of war, the Commission report that all questions connected with the field equipment, organization of bodies of troops, their embarkation and disembarkation when proceeding by sea or river, and their movement by rail or road, in a word the mobilization of the army for various services, seem to them to be subjects involving deep study, watchfulness, and constant preparation. This is true, tritely true, but is it supposed that hitherto these subjects have not been carefully studied, duly watched over and prepared for? So much has this been the case, that every demand made upon the military authorities to furnish a scheme of military operations to accomplish specified objects has been complied with within 48 hours of the time of its receipt. Delay has frequently occurred in coming to a decision on the Commander in Chief's plans, the supply of transport has not been forthcoming, or the tactical unit has not been completed by a prompt sanction to the appointment of brigade staff as recommended. These matters are all beyond the Commander in Chief's control, but they throw a bad complexion over our military organization, which is discredited in the eyes of the public. The military organization is called effete, and the distribution of the army unscientific. I affirm that the military organization is as full of vitality and power at the present moment as it can possibly become under the changes proposed to be introduced. Had the Commission well considered the events which have occurred in the immediate past, they must have been well aware that the responsible military advisers of Government are not deficient in a knowledge of the means and appliances for the mobilization of troops, or of the best mode of using them. Witness the arrangements for the transport of 7,000 men to the Mediterranean. These were all thought out at head-quarters, and most admirably carried into effect at Bombay. Then our heavy concentration of troops at Quetta, Thull, and Peshawar, from which points our forces were launched into Afghanistan on the same day.

5. I maintain that so far as could be done by those having no control over outlay, all was as well and promptly done under the present unregenerate system of army administration as could have been done under the system now proposed.

6. The Commission strongly affirm that the Commander in Chief, as a Member of Council, holds a most anomalous position towards the Government he serves as Commander in Chief of the Army. There is, I think, some grave misconception here. It is well understood, and the dictum has never been cavilled at, either by my illustrious predecessors or by me, that in military as well as in other matters the Governor General in Council is supreme, and that orders issued under such authority must be obeyed: but I distinctly affirm that the discussion which should precede the issue of orders regarding important military measures, whether bearing on the preparation and dispatch of troops on field service, or affecting the improvement of the army, cannot be prejudiced by the active participation in it of the Commander in Chief as a Member of Council. Be it remembered that he is also the Viceroy's intimate and chief responsible adviser in all military matters. If on such points disagreements occur, they are, I maintain, wholesome differences of opinion which sometimes disappear under the influence of ventilation. They are at all events settled authoritatively, and orders at this point are absolutely accepted and carried out to the best of his ability by the Commander in Chief. I can assist the Commission to no instance of bitter and acrimonious discussion which has arisen out of a matter which has been constitutionally discussed in Council, though perhaps some such may have occurred between this and 1832.

7. The Commission rightly report that it is the Commander in Chief's constant duty to be urging on Government the expenditure of money for the improvement of the army, and that officers and men look to him to press their claims and provide for their requirements. The claims and requirements of officers and men are mostly personal, which, being governed by the Pay Code or other regulation, are seldom the subjects of a second reference, and, as a rule,

rule, give rise to no after discussion at all. Those affecting the improvement of the army, or changes in its constitution, are matters of large import, and may well receive the closest attention both from the Executive Council and from the Commander in Chief.

8. As a matter of fact, questions of the highest importance only come before the Commander in Chief as Member of Council after he has once considered them through the Adjutant General or Quartermaster General, and it has often occurred to me that if the Commander in Chief, as Member of Council, were in closer contact with the Viceroy than he is at present, during the passage of military questions through the departments, up to the point at which they are decided, things would work more satisfactorily than they now do. The following statements regarding the course of military business will illustrate my views. All matters requiring the sanction of Government are submitted by the Adjutant General or Quartermaster General. They are addressed to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, and are minuted on in that Department and submitted to the Military Member, who, in his turn, minutes and submits to the Viceroy. If the Viceroy is in accord with the Military Member and the Commander in Chief the affair is settled and orders are issued, or, if the Military Member and the Viceroy are in accord, the thing is equally settled and orders issued. The Commander in Chief, although a Member of Council, has not, except under very special circumstances, the privilege of seeing the notes or the information on which the adverse decision has been passed on his reference. He has no opportunity of being instructed by the fresh light which may have been thrown upon the matter either by the Military Department or by the Military Accountant General. In many cases this would be such as to induce him cordially to concur in the final action of Government, but, on the other hand, he might at times be able to combat such decision, and justify his original reference even in the face of objections.

9. The above being the course which references between the Government of India and the Commander in Chief ordinarily take, it will be seen that there is but little room for the exercise of acrimonious and bitter discussion. I can never admit these terms as applicable to a free statement of views or full discussion.

10. I greatly prefer the method of transacting business which obtains in Madras, and I suppose Bombay. There the subjects are treated exactly as in Bengal up to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, and, there being no Military Member of Council, all papers go with the Secretary's Minute to the Governor. If the Governor is in accord with the Commander in Chief the matter is settled; if not, all papers are referred back to the Commander in Chief as Member of Council, with all the light the Department has been able to throw upon it. The Commander in Chief is either convinced, or he has an opportunity of writing a minute of dissent, when the affair becomes one for the Council to decide. I rack my memory in vain for any recollections of acrimonious correspondence or discussion arising out of this more open method of transacting business.

11. The Madras method is more in accord with a Commander in Chief's membership of Council, and with the theory of his having as such a potential influence on decisions affecting military administration up to the last phase of each question, whereas the Commander in Chief in India has not that firm continuous hold on the transaction of military business which I believe it was the intention of Parliament to entrust him with when, in addition to that office, power was retained to confer upon him the position of an Extraordinary Member of the Supreme Council. The anomalous position of the Commander in Chief in India is further illustrated by the fact that, when he visits a minor Presidency, he supersedes the local Commander in Chief, who from that moment ceases to have a vote in Council, "and we have the anomaly of two Commanders in Chief in the same place, both exercising control over the same army."

12. These visits of the Commander in Chief in India to the minor Presidencies are of rare occurrence, but, when they have taken place, I doubt if the Commander in Chief in India has ever taken his seat in the Local Council, or in any way performed an executive act in supersession of the Presidential Commander

Commander in Chief. Lord Napier of Magdala visited Madras when I was in command, but in no sense did he supersede me in any one of my functions. I have visited Bombay, and have never exercised control in any shape or form over the Bombay Army in supersession of its Chief, neither have I ever sat in Council there. No doubt the power to do all this exists, but there is that degree of courtesy and good feeling prevailing among the officers of the British and Indian Armies which would prevent the actual occurrence of the anomaly on which much stress is laid in paragraph 112. Some palpable cause must have arisen before a Commander in Chief in India would exercise this prerogative.

13. I am entirely opposed to the abolition of the Presidential system of army administration and command. In preference to the scheme of army corps under Lieutenant-Generals, and under the general supervision of the Commander in Chief in India, as propounded by the Commission, I would maintain the system as it exists to-day. These armies are available at any moment for whatever duty the Government of India may demand from them. They are complete in every branch of military organization, arms, equipment, the supply of all military stores and munitions of war. All these are provided under local arrangements, but also under the supervision of the Government of India; a supervision which ought to be a sufficient safeguard against undue accumulations on the one hand, or of the existence of deficiencies on the other. Let this supervision, however, be as light and as free from exacting and minute interference as that which the Commission propose should be applied to their Lieutenant-Generals.

14. The existence of three separate Governments, and of three separate armies under them, is a distinct source of safety and of power to the State, which a mere army corps lightly connected with the local power, and reporting to a distinct, unseen, and somewhat mythical superior could give.

15. It is surely a mistake to assert, as the Commission have asserted, that the Local Government have no real power and control over their own armies; on the contrary, is not the reverse the fact, and is it not the case that in all matters within their budget estimates, subject also to pay and army regulations, that they have control over every matter concerning their respective armies? True it is, that when these points have to be overstepped, if a bheestie's pay has to be increased or a sweeper extra to the establishment entertained, then a reference to the Government of India has to be made, and sanction obtained—a sanction which is sometimes withheld to the creation of friction, and that class of impatience which is sure to be generated by minute, perhaps unnecessary, control. The Commission have thought it worth while to put forward incidents of this class as instances of maladministration and impuissance on the part of Local Governments. They must surely have been aware that it is within the power of the Government of India to do away with all such absurdities, by delegating to Local Governments power to deal with such minutiæ, and by imposing upon themselves due restraint, when tempted to exercise interference which can be only irritating, because uncalled for, in matters unconnected with important general questions, or which, being of minor or local interest only, can be best settled by the local authorities. Further, it is apparent that unless such power be delegated to the Lieutenant-Generals of Army Corps, like references and friction will arise with them as is now the case between Commander-in-Chief, Local Governments, and the Government of India. If the necessity for such references is to be done away with, I should prefer seeing the spending power delegated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Local Army, subject to the Local Government, instead of to the Commanders of Army Corps.

16. The Bengal Army and the Punjab Frontier Force have always existed under the immediate supervision and direct administration of the Government of India, a supervision much more intimate than that which could possibly be afforded to the more distant armies of Madras and Bombay. These, on the contrary, have, on account of their remoteness from the seat of the Supreme Government, been more intimately affiliated with and administered by the Local Governments. These Governments and these armies are, in my opinion, separate and distinct

sources of power and safety, which have been most judiciously contrived to act powerfully on any class of danger that can befall us in the very strange and anomalous position in which we find ourselves, as rulers of this great country. I am firmly of opinion that the lines laid down by our forefathers for us are the safest, and that on these we should be contented to move.

Staff.

17. I see no possible advantage to be derived from an amalgamated staff. The officers now appointed to serve in each branch are selected for their special aptitude for the work pertaining to it. There would be no difficulty in the transfer of an officer of the Adjutant General's Department to that of the Quartermaster General (or *vice versâ*), should he have developed special talent indicating the desirability of such a change.

18. The appellation of a Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General is in the highest degree vague and cumbrous. I would retain the grades and designations now appertaining to the separate departments of the army staff, as conveying a clear and well-defined indication of the nature of the duties entrusted to each.

19. As regards the Chief of the Staff, I retain the same opinion that I held when answering Question 15, which I would repeat here were it not superfluous, adding, however, to it, that if the Commander in Chief himself should take the field, or should be impressed with the necessity for such an appointment, that he should be at liberty to nominate an officer for such a post. For the ordinary administration of the army, I consider such an officer unnecessary.

20. With reference to the illogical position in which the Commission seek to place me, regarding my action with reference to this appointment at the commencement of the two phases of the Afghan campaign, I would say, with regard to the first, that it never occurred to me that the operations would be brought to a close without the Commander in Chief taking the field. To provide for this contingency, I recommended the appointment of General Lumsden as Chief of the Staff. This Government refused to accept. With regard to the second series of operations, it will be remembered that we received news of the Kabul outbreak on the 5th September. On the 1st of that month Major General Lumsden ceased to be Adjutant General; thus he had no substantive appointment, his successor had been appointed and might arrive at any moment. I considered it to be desirable that he should hold an office absolutely unaffected by the arrival of the new Adjutant General. There was an immense amount of work on hand, the transaction of which was, no doubt, vastly facilitated by his retention in office; for General Lumsden had, I believe, acquired the confidence of the Viceroy, of the heads of the Military Departments, and of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, all of whom were mainly concerned in our preparations. He had notoriously possessed mine from the moment we came into contact. In the first instance, he was in the position of my Chief Staff Officer and most intimate and confidential adviser, by virtue of his superior knowledge of the subject in hand and from force of character, but never Chief of the Staff properly so called. In the second, he was named Chief of the Staff because another had become Adjutant General; but as Chief of the Staff, beyond giving occasional assistance to the Deputy Adjutant General, nothing was touched by him pertaining to the general administration of the army, but only such things as belonged to the war. I regret to have to make what is really a personal explanation in such a paper as this, but paragraph 161 demands it.

21. The general, divisional, and brigade staff as it now stands is suitable to the work which falls to it, and I cannot say I consider it to be in excess as regards strength.

22. The Commission recommend (page 52 of Report) that the Royal Artillery Staff in India should consist of one officer of the General Staff, with two

Staff

Staff Officers, the Inspector General of Artillery to be the head of the Artillery Staff, and the direct adviser of the Commander in Chief on artillery matters. During his absence on inspection duties, the ordinary work would be conducted by the next senior Artillery Staff Officer at head-quarters. I fail to see how the blending of the two posts now known as Inspector General, Royal Artillery, and Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, can be productive of any advantage over the existing system. The Commander in Chief in India always has the means of consulting the Inspector General of Artillery, and his advice and opinion on artillery subjects are sought whenever considered desirable, and always freely given, and with advantage. It is scarcely necessary to observe that his advice derives its chief value from that personal acquaintance with the existing condition and requirements of the Artillery in all parts of India which he acquires in the performance of his inspection duties. The performance of these most important duties over such an extensive area, and the preparation of the reports relating thereto, take up about two-thirds of the year. The proposal to place him for the remaining four months in charge of an important branch of the Adjutant General's office, the working of which must be conducted during the greater portion of the year by another officer, carries with it no conceivable advantage, and cannot produce greater efficiency in the conduct of administrative business than exists under the present organization. Holding these views, I am of opinion that the Inspector General should continue precisely in his present position, and that the remainder of the Artillery Staff should be maintained on its present footing.

Army Corps.

23. I am so averse to the introduction of the Army Corps, the command proposed for it, and the system by which it is to be worked, that I shall say but little on the subject, trusting that eventually the organization now in force will be maintained. But for the moment we are asked to accept a system which, under totally different circumstances, has been found to answer elsewhere. The territorial system which suits Germany, with its more or less homogeneous population, the vigorous manhood of which passes through the ranks of the army, and retains a place in them under some head or other throughout a long portion of existence, may be, and in my opinion is, singularly inappropriate here. For it must be allowed that our Indian armies, our Indian populations, and our English rule in India, have not one single feature in common with the army of Germany and its population (which in effect are one and the same thing) or its Government.

24. The local association here is one of race only, engendering and maintaining community of feeling between the inhabitant of the country and the sepoy placed near him, nominally for his control. The soldier, the cultivator, and the ryot have a certain amount of homogeneity, the ruling race alone being alien. This is not a wholesome state of things, and is totally unlike the military situation of any European nation.

25. The Commission, in proposing to localize its Hindustani regiments in Oudh, Rohilcund, and Bengal, and the Sikh and Punjabi regiments in the Punjab itself, have been careful to declare that this localization avoids the evils generally associated with that form of service. This I cannot admit, and I am of opinion that it would be highly objectionable to leave Oudh, Rohilcund, and the North-Western Provinces in the hands of Native troops which have been drawn only from the population of those territories. I hesitate not to affirm this to be a cardinal error, fraught with dangers, against which the experience of the past conveys an impressive warning. But when we come to apply this system to the Punjab, I cannot but think that we are on the point of committing a blunder of the first magnitude, and one that could hardly fail to carry with it most baneful results.

26. If the territorial division of the Army of Bengal is to effect the separation of the races serving in its ranks, and their localization, with a view of bringing the sepoy of each district within easy reach of his own home, and to keep him under home influences, I maintain that every point that was held to be important, every safeguard sought to be attained, when the Bengal Army was reconstituted after the frightful convulsions of 1857-58, is disregarded and abrogated,

abrogated by the proposals set forth in paragraph 47, and those dealing with this question which follow it.

27. The very essence of our policy then was truly to divide and command. A proposal to bring together in Oudh, Rohilcund, and the North Western Provinces, all the Hindustani elements of the army, would never have been tolerated for one moment; far less the more dangerous aggregation of Sikhs and Punjabi Mahomedans in the Punjab. That dispersion of race, and that mixture of peoples, which so greatly offends the sense of scientific distribution entertained by the Commission, is in reality the sheet anchor of our security in India. Bring such classes together and locate them permanently within the range of family, of home, and of race influences, and who will answer for the result? The Punjab is the newest of our provinces. The Hindustani element has failed us once. Madras and Bombay on their present footing have well stood the test of time and trial. The partial mutinies which have occurred in these armies have always been connected with a wrangle about pay, or some interference with their head-dress.

28. It is well known that what may be called Punjabi opinion was always in favour of the system of localization, as quoted by the Commission; but, on due consideration, those responsible for the re-organization of the army preferred an opposite course, and in doing so, I cannot, for one moment, doubt the correctness of their judgment.

29. The Commission write of the dangerous intermingling of the different nationalities which arises from our present distribution of the army and the system on which reliefs are carried out. This system was introduced many years ago, has been carried out under at least five Viceroys, and with the approval of Lord Clyde, Lord Strathnairn, Lord Sandhurst, and Lord Napier of Magdala, all of whom accepted it without protest. The late Sir H. Tombs is quoted in favour of army corps, but this is what he wrote to the Governor General's agent, when he was commanding at Gwalior: "In conclusion, I would most strongly urge that there should be as little of the Poorbea element in the Native portion of the British force at Morar as possible. . . . So long as the troops of the Gwalior State continue to be recruited from Oudh and the North-Western Provinces, it would seem a proper precaution to employ Punjabi regiments in garrisoning Morar." The organization of the army corps which Sir H. Tombs had in his mind did not, therefore, involve a separation of races, as in the scheme of the Commission. It may be as well to explain here what is the principle on which reliefs of Native corps are made. The system in force is to let Punjabi troops serve two tours of relief (about five years) down country, and 10 years in the Punjab. In the same way Hindustanis serve five years, or two reliefs in the Punjab, and 10 years in the North-West and Bengal. It is, therefore, clear that the sepoy is not disassociated from his home to the extent suggested by the Commission. It is true that this system cannot always be carried out, but the programme of relief submitted to Government has always been based upon it as far as practicable. I trust the mixture of races in the military occupation of the country will be maintained.

30. In discussing the scheme for the redistribution of the army, I have followed the example of the Commission in calling it a territorial system, but how, apart from the separation of races, it is more so than the system now in force, I am at a loss to imagine. Surely our divisions and districts as at present constituted are territorial expressions, having well-defined limits, while brigade commands such as Agra and Mooltan denote a more circumscribed locality. The idea that the use of the term "brigade" embodies an element of doubt and confusion, because it applies equally to a tactical unit and to a local command, presents a difficulty hardly worth considering. The proposals of the Commission do not bring us one iota nearer to the possession of a tactical unit in connection with the distribution of the army into districts of classes and stations than does our present occupation by divisions, districts, and stations. We have long since been in possession of tables showing what troops are available for service in each division, and what will remain in garrison after their withdrawal. These have been used in our recent concentrations.

31. It is always in our power to draw for active service complete brigades, under brigadiers and staff belonging to their respective divisions. But it has been

been held to be more convenient not to tie down the Commander in Chief by any hard-and-fast rule regarding the selection of either troops or commanders, leaving him perfect freedom to select commanders, staff, and troops as the occasion might seem to demand. Cases do arise which demand the employment of certain classes of troops rather than others. This freedom of selection suits the actual circumstances of our military occupation of India far better than a pedantic striving after the attainment of a local tactical unit. The areas of command allotted to our divisional officers are already sufficiently extended. The proposed reduction in their number is most unadvisable, especially after the reduction which has taken place in those commands in the course of the last 20 years. In the year 1860 the Bengal Army consisted of nine divisional commands, six first and six second class brigade commands.* Now there are left six divisions, six districts, and three subordinate brigades. The armies of Madras and Bombay have suffered like, if not greater, proportionate reductions. These commands the Commission would still further reduce, although they have to provide for the area which the Afghan War has added to our military occupation, viz., the Khyber and Landi Kotal, the Kuram Valley and Quetta, Pishin. I take here the limits considered by the Commission. Such reductions have, in my opinion, been already carried too far to be consistent with due military supervision and command, considering the vast extent of country occupied by our Indian Army. I cannot think it right to accept the reduction to the extremely low scale advocated by the Commission. To do so would be, not only to impoverish the service and to render the prospects of officers miserably poor, but would diminish the field for training officers for the exercise of higher and more important commands. This Government, though subject to temporary financial embarrassment, is still an Imperial Government, to which the spirit and well-being of its officers and soldiers must ever be a matter of great concern, and whose interest it is to have always at its disposal a sufficient number of officers whose qualifications for superior command have been ascertained by the fact of actual experience.

Vide Army List, dated 3rd January 1860.

32. It is unnecessary to deal with the redistribution of the army, as set forth by the Commission, in anything like detail, for confessedly it provides for a situation which no longer exists, and which in all probability will never exist again. The Commission had not before it, we have not before us now, data upon which the requirements of the future can in any way be fixed, either in men or cadres. We well know that in these respects we want more than we have, and from this cause the relief of weak and sickly battalions at the front has become impossible. Had the situation as contemplated by the Commission held good, I should have objected to the diminution of cadres, whether British or Native, on general principles. The Commission recommend that the number of British cavalry regiments should be reduced from nine to six, and the British infantry from 50 to 43 battalions, and the grounds given for the reduction are,—

1. Saving of cost.
2. Increase of fighting power of regiments.

Both these are true, and it was not necessary to ask the opinion of commanding officers as to the second. Commanding officers are naturally in favour of strong regiments. I would advocate the same were there not strong reasons for rejecting that which, though good in itself, is likely to produce evils which more than counterbalance the advantages which it offers. The best continental armies are quoted in support of the contention. I quite admit that the numbers given are the best for a fighting unit. But continental armies are massed by brigades, divisions, and army corps, very different from the position of British regiments in India, where they are of necessity scattered all over an enormous territory. If the proposal to have large units for this scattered service were accepted, the result, sooner or later, would be a division of these units, quartering regiments by wings, which is most destructive to efficiency, followed most probably by a reduction in the number of men. Having the increased number of cadres is the most ready means of effecting reinforcements. At least under a proper battalion system this should certainly be the case. Instead of getting out fresh battalions on an emergency, we should get reinforcements to battalions already broken

broken in to service in India. These observations apply also to garrison batteries.

33. With reference to the remarks of the Commission in paragraph 191, I would recommend that in future there should be kept with British cavalry regiments the full number of horses for each non-commissioned officer, farrier, and trumpeter, and for 85 per cent. of privates. I have no objection to offer to the recommendation regarding the number of syces, which are nearly the same as those made by me last year for British cavalry in Bengal, and which the Government have already sanctioned as a tentative measure.

34. It is proposed by the Commission to reduce the horse artillery in India from 15 to 10 batteries. In this sweeping reduction I cannot concur. The Commission consider that, after providing this arm for two army corps, no more is required. In paragraph 98 they state: "In discussing the strength and composition of the forces which might be required in these various directions, we have been governed by past experience, modified by the present condition of things in respect to changes in armaments, equipments, and communications;" while in the following paragraph the following also appears: "While in Afghanistan and Central Asia the force required would consist of one or two army corps of two or three divisions each." This is actually the case at present, and, on the foregoing valuation, no reserve, and no means of keeping complete or efficient the 10 batteries of horse artillery in the two army corps has been provided, nor is any provision whatever made to meet the contingency of more of this arm being required elsewhere, while our troops are employed as above indicated. It suffices to say, that in Bengal, with six horse artillery batteries in the field and four in the rear, these latter have been so denuded of men to replace the casualties in the former, that it has been found absolutely inexpedient to further denude them of the few effectives still left; and we have been obliged to telegraph home for 110 men of this branch to meet requirements during the coming season, and which will cause an increase in the present fixed establishment of this arm in Bengal of 70 men. Such facts speak for themselves.

35. Looking at the detail of troops belonging to Native States, it is remarked that Gwalior has 6,000 cavalry, and yet the Commission propose to take away the only battery of horse artillery now stationed near that place. This has been carefully avoided during the present operations, and I think the strength, constitution, and condition of Scindiah's army afford strong reasons for retaining a battery of horse artillery at Morar. If this is necessary in time of peace, it is certainly more so when the normal garrisons are weakened in time of war.

36. Again, as before stated, no horse artillery would be available for external uses in the event of any considerable force being dispatched beyond sea. In fact, this branch, which perhaps requires the longest training of all, is entirely overlooked, not only as regards reserves for that portion employed in the field, but also with reference to any internal or external contingencies which might arise during another war, such as that in which we are now engaged. Experience of past years has proved, moreover, that men of this branch, on arrival from England, are not, as a rule, sufficiently well drilled to take the field at once.

37. It appears to me that the number of batteries of horse artillery proposed to be maintained has been arrived at without considering two important points, viz., that casualties due to all causes are perhaps greater in this country than in any other, and that epidemics such as cholera have at times cost some batteries over 15 per cent. of their strength. These casualties have to be considered and provided for, if efficiency in the field is to be maintained. At present, Bombay, with its two batteries of horse artillery in and about to take the field, has no reserve; and if the casualties from invaliding, &c., in these batteries approach those of the horse artillery batteries which took the field from Bengal in 1878–79, the result will be that, after completing the foremost battery from the one in rear, the latter will be unable to turn out more than two guns, if it be not rendered entirely unfit for service.

38. I cannot

38. I cannot at all admit, as stated in paragraph 193, that "though a certain "force of horse artillery is absolutely required to act with cavalry in the field, "yet for general purposes field artillery are quite as useful, while their fighting "power is in some respects stronger than that of horse artillery." The advantages of horse artillery consist in its mobility, which enables it to act with cavalry. Field artillery is less mobile, and to substitute it for horse artillery would be either to deprive the cavalry of its guns, or to reduce its mobility to that of a field battery, the *rôle* of which is to work with infantry. Thus, under any circumstances, the power of the cavalry would be crippled, even if its action, which to ensure success must be rapid, be not altogether paralysed. From the last clause of paragraph 194 it appears to me that by looking too much to the saving that might be effected in time of peace, the necessity of being prepared for war has, as regards this branch, been lost sight of. I strongly deprecate such a large and dangerous decrease of an arm which cannot be readily replaced, and which, though costly, repays itself in time of urgency, when properly handled in conjunction with cavalry.

39. In the increase of the number of European mountain batteries I cordially concur.

40. I cannot approve the proposed reduction in the number of field batteries. Calculating the proposed number of guns of horse and field artillery on the proposed strength of cavalry and infantry, European and Native, but excluding local corps, we get only 2·94 horse artillery guns per 1,000 of cavalry, and of field artillery guns, including mountain and heavy batteries, and the 16 smoothbore guns of the Hyderabad Contingent, 2·59 guns per 1,000 infantry, or horse and field artillery guns combined 2·64 per 1,000 of cavalry and infantry. Next, deducting the two army corps for the field strength, as proposed at paragraph 99, there would be left no horse artillery for 7,666 cavalry, and only 176 or 1·96 guns per 1,000 men of the whole remaining force. But to these may be added about 16,000 local troops, for whom there is no artillery whatever. This, it cannot be denied, is out of all recognised proportions for the present day, and I consider that both horse and field batteries require increasing, the former to 14 and the latter to at least 40 batteries, on the numbers recommended by the Commission. The reduction of the number of garrison batteries from 22 to 17, and their division as proposed by the Commission, is a most serious question. Commanding officers are at all times averse to the division of their corps, and the first necessity which presents itself on the return of wings and detachments to head-quarters, is to raise them again to the standard of efficiency from which, it is admitted on all sides, prolonged detached duty always reduces them. In many cases it will be utterly impossible to provide a sufficient number of officers for the proper performance of duties, both at head-quarters and with the detached half-batteries, for it is with the greatest difficulty that more than two officers per battery can be found under the present organisation, and that this difficulty will be increased with the removal of 25 officers consequent on the proposed reduction of five batteries is obvious. Take, for instance, fortress Gwalior, Delhi, and other forts, with their large armaments, &c., to many of which it is proposed to allot half a garrison battery of 60 men, a number which after deducting sick, &c., will surely be found totally inadequate for the duties required of them, and for these, as well as for the remaining half batteries, a due proportion of officers and staff non-commissioned officers must always be found. But, setting aside this, I am averse to the measure on the more important ground that the division of so many batteries cannot fail to prove detrimental to efficiency and discipline.

41. The measure of reduction applied to the Madras Army is simply destructive. There is assuredly no evidence to warrant the conclusion come to by the Commission. The framing of the questions certainly leads one to imagine that, in this as in some other points, a foregone conclusion existed as to the doom of the Madras Army. But the evidence of the responsible military advisers of Government certainly does not warrant the proposals of the Commission; neither do the circumstances in which we stand, nor do our prospects for the future, warrant them. A careful perusal of Sir R. Temple's well-considered minutes and evidence places before us with remarkable clearness sound views regarding the organisation, distribution, and equipment of the Bombay Army,

as well as of the relations generally of the Presidential Armies with the Government of India and the Commander in Chief. The manner in which these papers are drawn up, in my opinion, show that the questions put to him evinced not only a request for information, but indicated also formed opinions to be combated.

42. I am not in favour of forming in India a reserve properly so called. But from one cause or another difficulties have arisen in the way of recruiting, and to counteract the deficiency of men procurable from this source to fill the ranks, I am not certain but that the limited and purely regimental system advocated by the Commission might not be found useful. No immediate relief from reserves can of course be expected or taken into account.

Distribution and Allotment of Garrisons.

43. It will, I think, be found that all our principal military stations are on or close to the trunk lines of railways. From the first these were looked upon as strategical works, and so aligned throughout India as to bring all our chief military stations into communication one with the other, and with the arsenals, depôts, and manufacturing centres on which they depend for warlike stores.

44. The concentration of troops, as far as circumstances would permit, has always been the object sought by military commanders, and much has been done to this end. That here and there more may be done I do not deny. But I wish to bring prominently to the notice of Government the opinion under this head recorded by his Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain in his answer to Question No. 1 of Series III., Madras, which is as follows:—

"I submit that concurrent authority was unanimously opposed to the sweeping reduction of stations and regiments of Native infantry, as recommended by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lord Napier and Ettrick,* and in my opinion it is most unadvisable now to adopt such a course. Although I most heartily accept the principle of concentrating the troops as far as possible at obligatory and strategical positions, and of reducing the number of single or out-stations to the uttermost, still I am deeply impressed with the circumstance that the number of our Native troops is small as compared with the area to be occupied, and to the duties they may any day be called upon to discharge; and that consequently, do what we may, after having met all local requirements only a small force remains at our disposal for concentration. The utility, or the absolute necessity, for the presence of troops may not be recognised so long as they are present, but I venture to affirm that, if this necessity be neglected or ignored, local disturbance will soon arise to prove that large areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held save by the presence of troops, ready if need be to act in support of order."

* *See* Minute by my predecessor in this command, Sir F. Haines, dated Madras, 16 March 1872, and by other Members of Council; also their previous Minutes, dated December 1871 and January 1872.

45. In every word of this I most cordially concur, and on similar grounds I cannot recommend that such stations as Segowlie, Goruckpore, or Moradabad should be done away with. I cannot admit the force of the arguments that because, in the event of war with Nepâul, the troops now stationed at Segowlie and Goruckpore would not be capable of dealing with that event, all semblance of military power should be withdrawn from that long and exposed frontier. His Honour Sir George Couper, primarily responsible for the peace of this district, urges the continued occupation of the posts named, viz., Moradabad and Goruckpore, and when he can quote in support of his views the words of Sir Neville Chamberlain, to the effect that large areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held save by the presence of troops, ready if need be to act in support of order, I think his views are entitled to more consideration than has been accorded to them. Bearing in mind that Sitapur is to be abandoned, a glance at a map will show how large a tract of frontier territory is to be exposed without the visible presence of a soldier.

46. Jhansi is a station from which I have the greatest desire to withdraw the troops;

troops; being off the rail it is highly inconvenient, and the climate is not good. As soon as this can be done with safety, I trust it will be done. However, even in this case, I would recommend caution in carrying it out.

47. Sir Neville Chamberlain combats the abandonment of stations in Madras, which the Commission determine shall be evacuated nevertheless. There again caution should be exercised, for the views of Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lord Napier and Ettrick, on which the Commission seem to rely, have not been accepted either by the members of Government or by the military authorities of their day. Between the years 1856 and 1860, which covers all Sir Charles Trevelyan's period of government, some 20 small stations were abandoned at Sir Patrick Grant's advice. This was a most salutary measure, but has it not been carried far enough? I would recommend a careful study of the views that Sir Neville Chamberlain has recorded under this head; for I feel that a dangerous course is here recommended, sacrificing real and efficient control over the country, with a view to obtaining a more compact and symmetrical distribution of troops.

48. As an instance of the proposals of the Commission, the redistribution in Bengal can hardly be said to carry out in full the principle they lay down. Before the war broke out, there were the following troops at Calcutta, Dum-Dum, Barrackpore, and Alipore:—

2 Field Batteries,
1 Garrison Battery,
2 British Infantry,
4 Native Infantry,
¼ Native Cavalry.

The Commission propose as the normal garrison of the same stations—

1 Field Battery,
1 Garrison Battery,
1½ British Infantry,
4 Native Infantry,
¼ Native Cavalry,

which they state can be reduced to provide for field service by—

1 Field Battery,
1 British Infantry,
2 Native Infantry,
⅛ Native Cavalry,

thus leaving the arsenal, the small arm ammunition factory, gunpowder factory, mint, &c., with only half a regiment of British infantry (552), and two regiments of Native infantry (1,824), for their protection, to say nothing of Calcutta itself. With the armies in the field which the Commission contemplate, no assistance could be hoped for from Dinapore, Cawnpore, Lucknow, and Allahabad, as their garrisons would also have been reduced to what the Commission consider obligatory.

49. On this point Sir H. Norman wrote in 1870:—

"The Commander in Chief (Lord Napier of Magdala) proposes to leave the "two regiments at the Presidency as at present, and in this I entirely concur. "With the vast wealth and importance of Calcutta, the great arsenal of Fort "William, with the powder and cartridge factories in the neighbourhood, the "presence of two regiments is, as a rule, most desirable, but I think, apart "from all this, we should have two regiments, so as to be able to send off a "regiment by sea at a day's notice, if a disturbance occurred in Burmah, "where our force is weak in the extreme." In 1878 it became necessary to send away a wing of British infantry, and a wing of Native, at 24 hours' notice to Burmah.

50. As regards the Eastern Frontier district and Assam, it is proposed to re-arrange the military posts throughout Assam, and to make over all outposts and frontier stations to armed police, keeping the military as a reserve. This view is entirely concurred in and has been acted on by the military authorities, but the armed police has hitherto been too weak for the work. If the police is increased as recommended, the distribution of the troops as proposed will be

 unobjectionable,

unobjectionable, except in one essential point, viz., that out of four regiments only one would be left intact, the others being divided into wings, stationed at considerable distances apart. The Commission state that one regiment could be withdrawn for field service elsewhere. This has recently been tried, the result being that the regiment removed had to be suddenly recalled. More than two regiments have lately been in the field, and one and a half additional regiments have had to be sent up on account of disturbances occasioned by the Nagas.

51. The Commission lay great stress on the importance of concentrating troops on the main trunk lines. To effect this it reduces the British garrison at Calcutta and vicinity by 206 infantry—

	Infantry.
Dinapore by	138
Meerut by	138
Cawnpore by	364
Benares by	443

while it increases—

Allahabad by	158
Delhi by	79
Agra by	158

52. It certainly may be said that one main line of communications through the Bengal Army Corps provinces is through Oudh and Rohilcund to Saharunpore; but what do the Commission provide for this?—

	Men.
Benares altogether reduced	443
Fyzabad reduced by	625
Lucknow increased by	55
Sitapur reduced altogether	443
Shahjehanpore reduced altogether	443
*Fatteghur reduced altogether	220
Bareilly reduced by	144
Roorkee reduced by	443
Moradabad reduced altogether	220

But the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, North Western Provinces, is that the normal strength of the garrisons of—

Lucknow,	Benares,
Fyzabad,	Bareilly,

should be maintained, and the garrison of Shahjehanpore and Sitapur might then, he thinks, be withdrawn. It is unnecessary, I think, to enter here into further details regarding the proposed distribution of troops, but I would desire to bring prominently to notice that not a single European cavalry soldier is left in the obligatory garrisons throughout the whole of India, except at one station (Hyderabad), and that no cavalry whatever is left on the main trunk line between Allahabad and Peshawar, while off the line there are only 304 Native cavalry at Lucknow, and 609 at Hoti Murdan. Holding the views I have already expressed regarding the number of horse and field batteries to be maintained, I cannot but consider that such a great reduction in the number of British cavalry regiments as is proposed is entirely out of the question.

Staff Corps.

53. I freely concur in all that has been said regarding the evils of the Staff Corps system. To this form of organization I attribute the greater part of the inordinate cost of the army in recent years, a cost which needs must go on increasing under this head, whatever may be done. To provide for the future, I would adopt the measures proposed by the Commission in para. 290 and subsequent ones, applying them, however, to the three Presidential Armies, instead of four army corps.

54. I am

* The gun carriage factory being located at this station, it specially requires military protection.

Pension and Retirement.

54. I am in entire accord with all the views of the Commission under this head, with the exception of the provisions of para. 316. I would prefer that the succession to Colonel's allowances should depend upon seniority, rather than selection. The whole basis of the army system proposed to be carried out in Chapter VIII., Section I., is seniority, tempered by the selection of the fittest, or at all events the rejection of the unfit. Throughout the whole course of an officer's career, I think that all those who have survived the perils of rejection up to so late a period may be held to be worthy of the crowning reward of the service, by the mere fact of having honourably maintained their position, instead of at that period being subjected to the danger of being deprived of it, through the caprice, the want of judgment, or the defective information of those on whom the burden of selection may from time to time fall. It will, perhaps, be admitted that this period of an officer's life ought not to be clouded with the thought that, even up to the very last, an element of doubt and uncertainty hangs about his future. If the principle of rejection be admitted, it should be exercised only in such cases as may admit of a distinct specification of the reasons for it. The system under which appointments of General Officers to Colonelcies of regiments are made in England has become almost one of seniority.

Commissariat.

55. I agree with the Commission in thinking that one uniform system of account and administration should be introduced throughout India, wherever this is not the case at present, and that wherever differences in organization and rules may be found to exist, they should be revised in favour of that which shall be determined to be the best. But it will probably be found that no very material difference in this respect exists, beyond such as special local circumstances may have imposed. An uniform system of account is essential, and the proposals in para. 386 seem well adapted to secure this. The general principles enunciated under this head are highly practical, and may, with advantage, be applied to the Presidential Armies. But in this, as in all other matters pertaining to supply, I would leave the executive controlling authority with the Local Government, steps being taken to ensure absolute uniformity of system throughout India.

Clothing.

56. The recommendations on this head I accept absolutely.

Transport.

57. The chapter on transport is a valuable paper. The only point on which I shall comment here is the method proposed for officering the Transport Branch. I should prefer a permanent establishment of officers to the temporary method recommended by the Commission. It must be remembered, when considering this and similar questions, that the tendency of the recommendations of the Commission is to reduce the number of officers compared with that of men, serving with both British and Native troops, and that it has been found that our comparatively larger establishments hardly enable us to find officers for the extra staff and transport work arising out of the present campaign. There are certain points in these proposals at which the responsibility of the Commissariat and Regimental Officers appears to be somewhat vague and ill-defined, and calculated to cause friction. I shall attach a paper drawn up under my instructions in the Quartermaster General's Department, commenting on the subject generally, and specially regarding the relations of the commissariat and regimental authorities. The remark of the Commission (para. 413), that moveable columns have very rarely, and at many stations have never, been moved out during the past 10 years, is scarcely borne out by the reports received from the several commands during the last four years, in the course of which period, at several stations they have moved out pretty regularly, and when they have not done so the cause has generally been that the carriage was otherwise employed, such as in carrying out the annual reliefs, at the Delhi Assemblage, &c.

 58. There

Ordnance.

58. There are many valuable suggestions under this head, and none more so than that which recognises and deals with the paucity of commissioned officers serving in the Ordnance establishments of the three Presidencies

59. It appears that the Commission recommend Bellary as a second-class arsenal in preference to Secunderabad. This is in accord with the recommendation of the Special Ordnance Commission, but which the Government of India, after full and minute consideration of their report, rejected. I consider Bellary to be in every way unsuited for a second-class arsenal, and that the decision of the Government of India should be upheld.

60. The only point at which there is any necessity for general supervision appears to me to be the annual estimates and indents for stores required from England. It is absolutely necessary that these should be reviewed by one competent and controlling authority, for it is at this point adjustments between the surplus at one place and deficiencies at another ought to take place. In time of war the trained officers of each army should be available for duty in any part of India at which they may be required, temporary appointments being made in lieu of the absentees. The establishments proposed are for peace only.

Military Works and Barrack Department.

61. I accept generally the scheme put forward by the Commission, provided it be made applicable to the three Presidential Armies.

62. The Barrack Department should be under that of Military Works. All barrack supplies should be managed by one class of officers, viz., Barrack-masters, who should be well-paid officials. This supposes that the military works are under the military administration as proposed. Bombay has just changed its system. The Bengal system is very faulty, commanding officers having to indent on four separate departments.

Remount Departments.

63. I do not consider that the proposals of the Commission relative to the administration of remount operations throughout India by one central authority would be productive of either greater efficiency or economy, and am of opinion that the present system of supply of horses, as of other material and munitions of war, by the independent action of the Local Governments should be maintained.

64. I would remark that the fact of the Director General of Remounts being available for consultation by the Commander in Chief by no means ensures the presence of a competent veterinary adviser, and I consider it would be unadvisable to place a Veterinary Surgeon in the position of Remount Agent.

Communications.

65. The urgency of the necessity for the construction of a railway between India and Kandahar has been recognised, and in this I fully concur. But I would point out that if a break of gauge is to be admitted upon it, a very serious lessening of the value of this route as a means of military communication will be the result. If the spot at which this break is to occur be fixed at Sibi, the original error will be intensified. Sibi is extremely hot; it is stated to be unhealthy. Surely to fix upon such a spot in which to locate the terminal establishments of the gauges is hardly wise. Consequent on the necessity of unloading and reloading all trains wherever the break of gauge may be, an unobjectionable site as regards climate and sanitary considerations generally should be selected. In the trooping season troops will be delayed, as will every load of munitions of war, and for both of these eventualities barracks and store rooms will have to be provided. It has been strongly recommended that the broad gauge should be taken up to the plateau, probably to Dargai, which has an elevation of some 3,000 feet, and certainly a more salubrious climate than Sibi. If the cardinal error of a break of gauge is to be permitted to occur on this line, the greatest care should be exercised in selecting a good site for large establishments

establishments which will certainly be collected there, and for the troops which will for a time be delayed there.

66. My opinion regarding the inherent defects of this line has frequently been recorded, and I would here merely remark that I consider it still liable to failure from the great heat of the Cutchi at certain seasons, from defective water supply at one time, and at others from floods.

67. I would also point out the necessity of connecting by a good cart road this line of rail with our Punjab stations of Dera Ghazi and Dera Ismail Khan. Thull being the place selected for the defence of the line, the communications with this place should be completed both ways, a good cart-road for the present being sufficient.

68. I agree with the Commission as to the relative value of the Khyber and Kurum routes.

69. I do not think a railway through the Derajât along the frontier at all necessary, but I attribute great importance to the early completion of abridged cart-road along that line.

70. I can imagine no stronger condemnation of the narrow-gauge system of railway than the remark on the Rajputana line contained in para. 540 of this Report. It must be remembered that the saving in mileage by this line between Bombay and Delhi would be considerable,* yet it is put aside as having trifling significance as compared with the Great Indian Peninsula and East Indian on the one hand, and Sind, Punjab, and Delhi on the other. Nor would it be of material assistance in the transport of cavalry and artillery equipped for service, but for the movement of all arms in the ordinary course of relief it would be made use of. The Indian transports cannot apparently use the Kurrachi harbour. This diminishes the value of that port as a base, and leads to further regret that the Rajputana line is not on the broad gauge.

* Distance from Bombay to Delhi *viâ* Jubbulpore, 1,234 miles. Distance *viâ* Ahmedabad and Ajmere, about 893 miles.

71. Recent events point out how necessary it is that the completion of the communications stated to be necessary in Assam should be effected at once, *vide* para. 546. Defective means of carriage hamper us greatly in our operations against the Nagas. With the above remarks I would accept the views of the Commission generally as stated in this chapter.

72. I would, however, observe that a project once decided, all our great concentrations of troops for carrying it out have been effected with remarkable rapidity and precision; that the Quartermaster General, in communication with the railway authorities, carried out all our movements without a hitch, and that I cannot see the slightest necessity for the intervention at this point between either the Quartermaster General and the Commander in Chief on the one hand, or between the Quartermaster General and the railway officials on the other, of a Chief of the Staff. The system could only be worked out by the Quartermaster General. The execution of the project should be left in his hands.

73. From the foregoing it will be seen that I am opposed to most of the general principles advocated in the Report.

74. I am most thoroughly opposed to the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the Madras Army. I would most earnestly suggest that those who have to decide upon its future will well consider the position now held by that Army, and how admirably it fills the part assigned to it, viz., that of being the great reserve for India. By its means the garrisons of Burmah have been increased beyond their normal strength, and are held, so far as Native troops are concerned, by Madras alone. Madras regiments garrison Calcutta, Dorundah, and the Saugor District. They assist in holding Gwalior and Mooltan, whilst in the field we have three companies of Sappers and three regiments of Madras Native Infantry on the Khyber line, where the Madras men are reported to be healthier than any other class of Native troops. Reduce the Madras Army in its cadres to the extent suggested by the Commission, and I maintain it can never again render to Government the efficient aid and support it now gives.

 75. To

75. To Bombay must be confided the task of garrisoning Kandahar and Pishin, as well as Sind. With this task to perform, is it reasonable to expect that she will be able to take up the garrisons assigned to her in Saugor and the Central Provinces?

76. I would affirm that if every cadre now existing in the three armies were completed to the war strength suggested by the Commission, we should not have a man too many for our present needs. The diminution of the number of regiments proposed by the Commission would intensify the difficulties in which we now stand. The chief of these is the difficulty of affording relief to the regiments now in the field, which have become deteriorated in health in the course of active or previous service in unhealthy stations. Some we have relieved, but they stand in obligatory garrisons totally unfit for further use.

77. Our superior armament is much trusted to as justifying reduction; and no doubt our arms of precision give us vast advantages over any foe we may expect to meet in Asia just yet; but I would observe that this advantage cannot be counted upon as a constant element, for as time goes on arms of precision will be found in the hands of the tribes or nations that bound our Indian possessions. Nipal may be supplied through China, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Russia will gladly accommodate Afghanistan in that respect. The individual tribesman is quite ready to lay out considerable sums on his arms, and is keen to acquire the best procurable. All who have traversed the Kohat Pass, and seen its inhabitants under arms, must be well aware of this. Admitting its present value, I am unable to build with any confidence on a confidence on a continuance of the vast discrepancy in the relative merits and power of our arms and those which may be found in the hands of our neighbours in future. Further, given all these advantages, recent experience at Kabul goes to prove that there is a point at which numbers will prevail against the finest troops, well led and well armed, when the latter are but few in number.

78. Objecting to the appointment of a Chief of the Staff, as previously noted, I am greatly in favour of the various departments being brought together under one roof. This would facilitate business immensely, and it is a measure which has been warmly advocated by my predecessors as well as by me. I imagine that a project for this will be found amongst those buried ones which are stated by the Commission to exist in the archives of the Military Department.

79. The Commission was assembled under a sense of grave financial peril. If such peril ever existed, it was of such a trifling and temporary nature as to have been dispelled by a few months of agricultural prosperity and of slowly reviving trade; and that too after three seasons of drought and wide-spread famine, to which may be added an unexampled depression in the value of the rupee.

80. A paper on the proposals of the Commission regarding Musketry Staff and Instruction, drawn up under my instructions in the Adjutant General's Department, as well as one on Transport referred to in para. 62, are attached as Appendices to this Memorandum.

(signed) *F. P. Haines.*

Calcutta, 20th March 1880.

Appendix, No. 1.

MEMORANDUM on Transport referred to in Para. 57 of Commander in Chief's Memorandum.

1. The fundamental principles of the Memorandum on Army Transport, prepared in the office of the Quartermaster General, and printed as *Appendix XLV. of the Report* of the Special Commission, were the urgent necessity for remodelling the carriage now maintained in India under the name of moveable column carriage, so as to form a nucleus of transport, thoroughly well organised, and susceptible of ready expansion by a well-considered plan into one sufficient for all probable requirements of war, and, by means of special instruction and practice in peace duties, to provide a well-trained and military organisation competent to perform the duties required of a Transport Department

ment in the field, under the authority and control of the General Officer commanding; these principles appearing to be in accordance with the views of Government, as expressed in M.D. 2012 K., dated 24th April 1879, paras. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7. The views of the Commission agree with those of the Commander in Chief in regard to these principles. They state (para. 4) "that at no former period in the history of India has there "arisen greater necessity for the consideration of questions of this kind than exists at "present, when all the energies of Government are directed to meet the severe strain "which, by force of circumstances, has been imposed upon the resources of the country." They adopt existing moveable column carriage as the nucleus, they propose measures for its reorganisation, training, peace employment, and power of expansion. They declare (para. 437) that "in time of war, regimental and departmental carriage should be under "military organisation," and "under the orders of the General commanding in the "field." And they lay down as a general principle (para. 162)—"It seems that there "is something essentially unsound in the practice so often followed, both in England and "in India, of leaving everything to be changed in its organisation the moment war "breaks out; and it is consequently not to be wondered at that we are always at first "unprepared and embarrassed."

2. The necessity for such a military organisation in peace, as should be immediately available for war without the sudden chage of system so strongly adverted to by the Commission, led to the opinion recorded in Appendix XLV., page 1649, paras. 2 and 3.

3. But the Commission deliberately determines (para. 425) to constitute the Transport service in peace a branch of the Commissariat Department, and, as shown above, to divorce this union and make over Transport to the orders of the General Officer commanding in the field on the outbreak of war.

4. The Commission state very briefly (para. 425) the reasons why they are "satisfied "that the Transport organisation can best be managed as a branch of the Great Depart-"ment of Supply." These are as follows: "The Commissariat Officers and Staff have "the necessary knowledge of the requirements of animals and vehicles; their organisa-"tion already extends to every garrison and cantonment." The Commander in Chief cannot reconcile this opinion with those recorded in pages 1634, 1646, of Appendix XLV.

5. Moreover, in his Excellency's opinion, the methods by which "additional special "officers and subordinates are allowed for the duty" of enabling the Commissariat "to "provide for its new duties," are in the highest degree objectionable. Practically, the whole of the detail duties are to be confided to 60 British and 200 Native Officers, and to British and Native Non-Commissioned Officers and men, of whom 10 British Officers only, namely, those at reserve centres, are to be seconded (para. 432). Amongst the duties thus devolving upon combatant officers maintained upon the strength of their regiments are (para. 425) "to see that the Government carriage is "kept in good "order, *that it is employed in Government work*," *and that it* "*is let on hire, or otherwise* "*employed as the Commissariat Officer, with the sanction of the Commanding Officer,* "*may direct.*" The regimental Transport Officer is (para. 430) to be the medium of *paying* the Government carriage. The Commissariat Officer holds over him the power of "*reporting to the regimental Commanders any shortcomings in the management and cus-* "*tody of the materials or animals.*" "All Government carriage in regimental charge is "to be available for Government purposes *under the control of the Commissariat Officer,* "*subject to the orders of the Officer commanding the station.*"

6. Omitting the fact that regimental Officers have already as much as they can do to attend to their proper duties, and that these duties would be enhanced by the increased strength of units proposed by the Commission, and setting aside the improbability that young regimental Officers would be competent to such duties as letting out carriage for hire, and employing it on Government works, it appears to the Commander in Chief that such an employment of regimental Officers, not seconded in their regiments, on departmental duties, is opposed to the spirit of existing regulations, and that the interpolation of the Commissariat Officer between the regimental Transport Officer and his own commanding Officer, and the peculiar intermixture of the functions of these three and of the Officer commanding the station, could only lead to discordance, squabbling, and failure.

7. The employment of Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men in charge of carriage let out on hire, probably to native contractors or agents, is considered by his Excellency as likely to derogate from that self-respect and proper pride which should be fostered in the Native Army, as well as to lead to abuses detrimentral to discipline and to the efficiency of the training of the men so engaged. To pay "working pay" for such employment would vitiate the principles of this allowance and pave the way to highly undesirable claims hereafter.

8. The Commission give (para. 418) certain reasons why the old system of Indian transport has broken down in the current Afghan campaigns. But they omit from this detail what appears to be the principal reason of all, namely, the vast change which has taken place in the duties of Commissariat Officers, and in the system of that department during the period referred to (1838-80). Formerly the officers of this department were

 experienced

experienced out-of-door working men, not too much fettered by heavy office duties and a multiplicity of forms and accounts. Now-a-days their office is the scene of their labours. Here they preside over large establishments, and are fully occupied with returns and correspondence in minute detail, required by Government for financial reasons. And the out-door duties, the personal superintendence of establishments, the investigation of local sources of supply, and arrangements for contracts depending thereon, upon all of which duties the Army depends for efficiency, are relegated very largely to subordinates, to gomashtas, chowdries, and such like. Para. 180 of the Report proposes to reduce paper-work and returns. Para. 386 specially refers to the Commissariat in these matters, and shows that the Commission thoroughly realises the unsoundness of the present Commissariat system, and yet the Commission would give to this Department the charge and training, during peace, of the new Transport Service.

9. The Government of India must have had some doubts of the qualifications of the Commissariat in this respect, or the special appointment of distinguished officers previously unconnected with the department to control these matters would not have been made. Nor can it be held, in Sir Frederick Haines' opinion, that the addition of a Transport branch to the department, even under a much more perfect method than that already adverted to, would imbue the Commissariat with desirable knowledge, or aid in introducing practical improvement. On the contrary, the Transport branch will certainly adopt the vicious system of the present department by little and little, and on the outbreak of war similar changes of system, perhaps on a larger scale, will be again as necessary as they have been during the present operations. One object of the Memorandum forming Appendix XLV. was to create a department which should be free from Commissariat traditions and practices, and unless this end is secured no Transport Department will succeed.

10. His Excellency fully appreciates the advantages of maintaining carriage in regimental charge, at least of frontier troops, if a practicable method of doing so can be devised; but considers that British infantry should not be excluded from this system. One serious objection to the scheme is, however, the evil of crowding the lines of troop horses by the addition of transport cattle, and the presence of increased Native establishments in immediate contact with the troops. These evils would outweigh any advantages of the plan in all purely Indian stations.

11. One short sentence at the end of paragraph 425 conveys the opinion of the Commission, that troops should be frequently exercised in the methodical duties of transporting baggage. Drill and practice in these duties appear to Sir Frederick Haines to be vitally important. But, knowing the difficulties already existing in this respect, owing to the various employment of the present moveable column carriage, it is evident that no greater facilities would be afforded if the system of hiring carriage out to private individuals were in force. The theoretical instruction proposed, and the handbook suggested in the following paragraph, are no doubt highly desirable, but it is difficult to imagine that Commissariat Officers who are apparently to be charged with such training and instruction will find leisure for this additional work. And no handbook, or course of lectures, will compensate for insufficient practical teaching.

12. Economy has at all times the Commander in Chief's fullest approval, provided there be no sacrifice of efficiency. Appendix XLV., p. 1648, estimates the cost of existing moveable column establishments, omitting the kahars maintained for sick carriage, at 1,33,338 rupees per mensem, with a carrying power (when calculated at the rates given by the Commission in footnotes to Appendix XLIX., &c.) of 64,482 maunds; and proposes to substitute (Scale A) a carrying power (at the Commission's rates) of 75,700 maunds for the monthly cost of 1,33,017 rupees, or the annual rate of 15,96,204 rupees, exclusive of sick carriage. The Commission's proposals in Appendices XLVIII., XLIX., and L., are to provide for the carriage of only 50,030 maunds, at an annual cost of 22,95,060 rupees, and for sick carriage to cost 9,14,320 rupees per annum in addition. As regards establishments, that proposed in Appendix XLV., p. 1,650, is 1,57,236 rupees per annum, and that proposed by the Commission, paragraph 433, is 2,21,100 rupees per annum. Economy is, therefore, in favour of such a scheme as that prepared under the orders of his Excellency. But it is further evident that the total cost tabulated by the Commission in paragraph 433 is incomplete. Not only is the assumed lump sum saving of 5,00,000 rupees problematical, but the item of 1,53,900 rupees for Transport Staff, manifestly omits the indirect cost of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men employed on transport duty, and still retained on the combatant strength of regiments, which would be borne by the grant for *military* pay; and the extra item of "working pay" is also overlooked. As it is further proposed to enlist all the artisans "whether in active employment or in reserve," additional charges will certainly be entailed on the State for good conduct pay, batta, compensation, hutting money and gratuity or pension on discharge.

13. Finally, his Excellency desires to acknowledge his concurrence with the opinions of the Commission in many minor points referred to in their Report, and he joins in the aspiration, although he cannot endorse the dictum (paragraph 436) that "peace will "henceforward, as heretofore, be the rule, and war the exception, in India." Nor can he, in the face of all experience, acknowledge its soundness as the basis of a scheme for the transport of the Armies of India. It is necessary that sound military preparation be

be constantly maintained for war at whatever time it may arise. It is important that all possible economy shall pervade such preparation. It is desirable that the transport maintained for war shall be utilised as far as military efficiency may allow, in the general service of the State during peace.

Appendix, No. 2, referred to in Paragraph 81 of Commander in Chief's Memorandum.

MUSKETRY SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTION.

Alterations proposed by the Special Commission.

Page 69, para. 215, proposes that in British regiments company Officers should be more fully entrusted with the training of their companies, and that the instructors should be paid for six months only in the year.

Page 72, para. 223, proposes that in Native regiments an officer be appointed to the charge of musketry instruction, at 50 rupees per mensem, for six months in the year.

Page 54, "Staff," proposes one permanent Staff Officer for musketry with Army head-quarters, on 600 rupees, and for each army corps two Staff Officers, on 300 rupees per mensem, for six months in the year.

Remarks on the above.

1. The Commander in Chief concurs with the Commission in thinking that company Officers in British regiments should be more fully entrusted with the training of their men; such a measure would, in time, substitute for a single officer a whole body of officers practically acquainted with the subject, and remove a chief cause for the small interest taken by many good officers in duties that are properly their own; it would also, by the healthy emulation it would cause, lead to better general instruction and efficiency. As remarked, however, by his Excellency (Appendix, page 125, para. 29), any change, so far as the British Army is concerned, should be initiated by the Horse Guards.

2. The above principle is right, but the Commission recommends, on what grounds it is not clear, a precisely opposite system for the Native Army.

3. General Gordon, when Chief Inspector of Musketry, at the very commencement of musketry in the Native Army, wisely and determinedly insisted on the men being instructed by those officers who would have to lead and command them on service. The proficiency that has resulted in so short a time is surprising. There has been, and possibly is, passive resistance on the part of a few senior officers who think musketry instruction unsuited to their rank, and would prefer the duties of a field officer in a British regiment to those of the appointments they hold in Native regiments, and such men will generally be found in regiments which have made least progress. In Bengal, at any rate, the success of the system is indisputable, and it may be confidently said that the majority of officers in this Presidency would deprecate this change. To introduce musketry instructors in Native regiments would be retrogressive, and would involve an unnecessary cost of 38,700 rupees annually, at the very lowest computation. The systematic way in which musketry is now conducted, has, it is reported, more than anything else, brought officers and men together, since officers are obliged to look after the instruction of each man individually, an advantage that can hardly be overrated. It has also been the means of improving the capabilities of all ranks; of developing the abilities of many who would otherwise have remained unnoticed; of detecting the idle and stupid, and bringing forward the active and intelligent; musketry has, in fact, indirectly, by its example of methodical instruction, beneficially influenced other branches of training.

4. The Commission's recommendations to limit the pay of instructors and inspectors to six months in the year must be made on a misconception of the system of instruction as approved by the Horse Guards and the Government of India. It does not, as the Commission apparently think, cease for six months in the year; on the contrary, we attach great importance to the training between courses, on the principle that soldiers should always be in training, as they are liable to be called upon for service at any time of the year, and this is especially the case in the Native Army, in which we have no set preliminary drills immediately preceding, as in the British Army, the annual target practice. General Gordon instituted the principle of making the shooting dependent on the quality of the weekly drills throughout the year, and General Officers are at liberty to order a troop or company to fire its annual course at any time of the year they consider advisable. But for technical difficulties, which so far appear to be insuperable, distributing the target practice through the year, and not allowing all the rounds to be fired in one week, would be preferable. Besides drill, there are in both armies many practices to be carried out between the annual courses, training of recruits and casuals, instruction of indifferent shots, practice at a moving target, judging distance drill and practice, &c., &c.

5. As, then, musketry instruction is continuous, so should its supervision be.

6. The six months' pay proposed would, it is presumed, be from 1st October to 31st March, but the shooting frequently extends beyonds this; and, again, after the annual course is closed, the annual return has to be compiled in the regiment, and, together with the claims of prize men, carefully checked by the musketry staff officer. This necessary work, requiring in nearly every case assistance and reference, is seldom completely got over till June, and is far more satisfactorily done in circles where access to regiments is convenient than it could be at head-quarters, even with a large increase in the number of clerks; in fact, the requisite check could hardly be carried out unless locally. The Commission, it will be seen, proposes to transfer this work to the one officer at head quarters.

7. In the hot season the musketry staff have to visit regularly the drill, on which so much depends, of all regiments within a certain distance of their head-quarters, and to check and forward for Hythe and head-quarters, and to their generals, the periodical returns required of work done.

8. It is true that the work is lighter in the hot season than in the cold, during which experience goes to show no other Staff Officer is worked harder, but the relaxation is not unreasonable, it is general. An appointment demanding such constant parade and office work for six months, with the remaining part of the year taken up with regimental duty, would not be of an attractive nature, and it is matter for doubt whether really efficient officers, such as the subject requires, would accept it, even supposing the system were so altered as to confine it to a part of the year, and thus render the recommendation possible.

9. With regard to the number of Musketry Staff Officers, the supervision required by the Horse Guards, and by the Government of India, could not be efficiently carried out by the considerably reduced numbers proposed by the Commission; though in any re-arrangement of the musketry staff, consequent on a reconstruction and redistribution of commands, some modifications would doubtless be possible, as has been pointed by the Commander in Chief.

10. It may be gathered, from the recorded opinions of the Commanders in Chief in the three Presidencies, that the establishment of musketry staff ought to be governed by the number of regiments and stations to be visited, the facilities or otherwise of travelling, on which would depend the possibility of inspection duties being efficiently performed, and by various other conditions, rather than on an arbitrary, if symmetrical, allotment, irrespective of circumstances and requirements.

11. The Commission would leave for six months in the year, presumably from 1st April to 30th September, only one Musketry Staff Officer for the whole of India; they would indefinitely increase his work and responsibilities, and at the same time reduce his position and pay; they do not descend to the particulars of such alterations in the system as would render the efficient performance of this Officer's duties possible.

12. This one Staff Officer would then have to deal unassisted with every regiment in India, including local corps, volunteers, &c., scattered throughout the length and breadth of the land, from Kabul to Burma, from Quetta to Dibrogurh, in all matters connected with their returns, prizes, instruction, care of arms, arms boards, accoutrements, magazines, ammunition, armourers, appointments, &c.

13. Instruction in the use of the rifle must not be classed with other and more mechanical parts of a soldier's training; proficiency depends almost entirely on the personal influence of the Officers entrusted with instruction and supervision; the drills alone, however exactly carried out, will not make men shoot well; that hearty co-operation of both Officers and men is necessary which can result only from personal interest in the subject, and this feeling is to a great extent originated and actuated by the estimate which the army forms of the degree of importance which our commanders attach to the subject. That it exists, was well proved by the admirable way in which the Indian Army, which contributes nothing towards the expenses of the School of Musketry, was, as an extra duty, instructed by the British.

14. The Musketry Staff in England is occupied, it may be said, solely with the instruction of the regular army in England; but in India the duties are far heavier, for not only are the numbers of regiments greatly in excess, but every case at all connected with the subject "arms" is worked, and rightly so, by the Musketry Branch, and Native corps having no specially trained Officers expect and receive far more assistance than is required by British regiments; in fact the duties of Musketry Staff Officers with regard to Native regiments are more those of an Instructor than of an Inspector.

15. In England the work of Musketry Officers is allowed to be important, and to the head of the Musketry Staff a high position is assigned; the influence of this consideration is felt throughout the Army.

16. It

16. It would be a grave error to adopt any measure which might tend to lessen personal influence, and to lead the army to think, however really unfounded the idea might be, that in India rifle instruction is deemed of minor importance, and specially at a time when the use of the rifle is being still further developed.

17. The remarks summed up are,—

1st. By all means, with the concurrence of the Horse Guards, entrust company officers more fully with the instruction of their men.

2nd. Allow the present system of instruction in Native regiments to remain undisturbed. It works well. The proposals of the Commission are retrogressive.

3rd. Allow the number of Musketry Staff for each army corps to be decided by the Commander in Chief, who alone is aware of the requirements.

4th. Musketry appointments should be permanent, as at present.

5th. Increase rather than lessen the standing, and with it the personal influence, of the Musketry Staff. Regiments can be led on to proficiency, they cannot be driven. This fact has been amply proved both in England and in India.

— 2. —

MINUTE by the Honourable Sir *Alexander Arbuthnot*, K.C.S.I.

I HAVE read with care the Report of the Commission on the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in India, and such of the Appendices as bear upon matters upon which I feel in any way competent to form an opinion, and I now proceed to state my views upon some of the more important of the recommendations made by the Commission. The points with which I propose to deal are,—

1st. The proposal to remove the armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of the Local Governments, and forming the Army of India into four army corps, to place the whole under the Commander in Chief in India.

2nd. The proposed removal of the Commander in Chief in India from the Council of the Governor General.

3rd. The creation of the office of Chief of his Staff, and other matters connected with the head-quarter staff.

4th. The organisation of the British Army in India.

5th. The organisation of the Native Army, including the question of the large reduction proposed in the Native Army of Madras.

2. I must premise the remarks which I have to make by the observation that I concur in what is said by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in his Minute of the 20th ultimo, as to the inexpediency of the course taken in continuing the Commission after its composition had been so greatly altered by the removal of Sir F. Roberts, General Macpherson, and Colonels Baker and MacGregor, and after the heavy duties devolving on Sir Peter Lumsden had practically disabled him from taking any active part in the work of the Commission, while Generals Phayre and O'Connell had joined it too late to take any share whatever in the earlier discussions. The continuance of the Commission under these circumstances has all along appeared to me to have been a measure of very questionable expediency, and this opinion is confirmed by the terms in which the Commission allude, in the opening page of the Report, to the withdrawal of four of their colleagues. The Commission admit that their work was much impeded by the removal of their colleagues, but they add that at that time their inquiries were so far advanced that the remaining members of the Commission were in complete possession of the views of their absent colleagues on all the principal questions of army organisation before them, that they were able to keep them informed from time to time of the progress which they had made in working out a scheme of reorganisation, and that it is a satisfaction to them to find that their absent colleagues are in a position to join with them in their recommendations. Now, if there is any meaning in words, the gist of these observations is, that before the

the Commission had completed one-third of the period for which it sat, before their Bombay colleague had been with them for any length of time, and almost before their Madras colleague had joined them, the majority of the Commission had determined what the scheme of reorganization should be, and that the remainder of their sittings were occupied in working out the details of a foregone conclusion. To imagine that officers employed upon the important duties which occupied Sir F. Roberts, General Macpherson, Colonel Baker, and Colonel MacGregor at Kabul, during the autumn of last year, could have given any serious attention to the proceedings of their colleagues at Simla, is simply absurd. In these circumstances I cannot wonder at the distrust with which the recommendations of the Commission have been received by my two military colleagues in the Government, nor shall I be surprised if the distrust thus engendered shall materially weaken the force of the recommendations made by the Commission in the minds of other high authorities by whom those recommendations will have to be considered. However this may be, I trust that the course which has been taken concerning this Commission will not be regarded as a precedent to be followed upon future occasions.

3. While, however, I consider that the Report of the Commission labours under a very serious disadvantage from the circumstances under which it was prepared, I feel bound to say that I regard this Report as a very able and valuable document, and that there is much in it in which I very cordially concur. I entertain no doubt whatever as to the expediency of withdrawing the armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of the Local Governments. I see much that appears to me to be excellent in principle in the proposals for reducing the cost, without diminishing the strength of the British and Native Armies in India, and for reforming the system under which the Native Army is officered. The suggestion at the close of the chapter on medical organization, for the formation of a medical corps for India, which shall provide officers for all medical duties, military and civil, in substitution of the present plan of the two medical services, one British and the other Indian, appears to me to be admirable; and as regards transport, ordnance, and military works, on which I feel less competent to form an opinion, I observe that the recommendations of the Commission are accepted by the Commander in Chief and by the Military Member of Council, and are, I have no doubt, perfectly sound. The arrangement of the Report is very good. The recommendations which it contains, and the grounds of them, are clearly and fully stated, and, with its Appendices, it constitutes a repertory of information on Indian military subjects, which cannot fail to be very valuable to those who may be employed hereafter in directing and improving our military system.

4. With these preliminary remarks I will pass on to the particular points on which I desire to state my views somewhat more at length.

5. The removal of the Armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of the Local Governments, and the organization of the Army of India in four army corps, are measures which are strongly objected to by my military colleagues, as well as by the late Governor of Bombay, and the present Commander in Chief at Madras, and by two members of the Commission, Sir Peter Lumsden and General O'Connell. They are measures which may be considered separately; for the withdrawal of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the control of the Governments of those Presidencies does not necessarily involve the division of the Bengal Army into two army corps. The armies of the two minor Presidencies, with the officers commanding them, by whatever designation the latter may be hereafter styled, might be placed under the Commander in Chief in India, acting under the orders of the Governor General in Council, without any change in the present organization of the Bengal Army. I have carefully considered the arguments which have been advanced by the high authorities to whom I have referred against the withdrawal of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the control of the Local Governments, but I cannot say that I am in any way convinced by them. The subject is one to which I have given a good deal of attention, and on which I am able to write from a not inconsiderable personal experience, having served for 10 years with one of the two Governments concerned, first as Chief Secretary and afterwards as a Member of Council, and having acted for a time as Governor of the Presidency. During the whole of that

that period I had constant opportunities of observing the manner in which military business was disposed of; and the conclusion at which I arrived was, that, whatever may have been the case in former years, for many years past, in fact ever since the mutiny, the control of the Local Government had been for all practical purposes of little use, and that in all military matters of essential importance that Government was little more than a post office, through which the references made by the local Commander in Chief were transmitted to the Government of India. It also appeared to me that the intervention of the Local Government between the local army and the Commander in Chief in India inflicted a positive injury upon the army, and especially upon the European officers, excluding them from employment and from service which would have been open to them under a different system. A remark made by the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army on this point appears to me to be deserving of consideration. Lieutenant General Warre writes, referring to the troops serving in the Punjab and in the North Western Provinces, "being under the immediate control of the Viceroy and Govern-"ment of India, as well as the Commander in Chief in India, these provinces "have enjoyed a monopoly of Government patronage which the Armies of "Bombay and Madras could not expect to be filtered through the Local Govern-"ments under which they are immediately serving." A natural consequence of the present system has been to maintain, and in fact to intensify, in the case of the officers of the Madras and Bombay Armies, those provincial jealousies which are so detrimental to good administration, and which it should be the policy of every wise statesman to appease. When I say this, I do not at all under-estimate the importance of maintaining the separation which has hitherto existed between the Armies of Madras and Bombay and the Army of Bengal. This is a principle which is admitted on all hands, and by none more strongly than by the Commission, whose Report we have now before us. The Commission assert, and, as I think, upon valid grounds, that the separation will be in no way prejudiced by the withdrawal of the armies from the control of the Local Governments, provided that they are retained under separate commanders, and that their recruitment and employment in time of peace is restricted to the tracts of country which they are intended to garrison. The opponents of the measure, on the other hand, while they affirm that the subordination of the armies in question to the Local Governments is "a distinct source of power to the State;" that the separation contemplated would "facilitate and in time evolve a disastrous fusion of interest between the armies of India;" that "the "fact of serving under a particular Government, as the armies at present do, "tends to keep the armies distinct;" and that "in the Councils of the Local "Governments, or in the person of a Lieutenant Governor with his military "Staff, the State possesses the only safeguard against administrative military "action tending to engender discontent in the Native ranks," fail, as it appears to me, to adduce any really strong arguments in support of their position. Their reasoning appears to be this: It is admittedly desirable to maintain the separation of the Native Armies. Hitherto that separation has been maintained in connection with the subordination of two of the armies to the Local Governments. Therefore, if the subordination of the armies to the Local Governments be discontinued, it will be impossible to maintain the separation between the armies. The incompleteness of the proposition is obvious, and its practical defects are, I think, not less real than its failure as a logical argument. Sir Richard Temple would seem to have been sensible of the weakness of the argument; for, after putting it in a very cursory form, he travels at once to other ground, and proceeds to urge that the change would involve an excess of centralization which would entail upon the Commander in Chief in India more work than he could properly perform; but this, in my opinion, he entirely fails to prove, and, on the contrary, it seems certain that if the Commission's recommendations are adopted, the result will be, if anything, less centralization than exists at the present time. There is one observation in Sir Edwin Johnson's Minute to which, before passing from this topic, I should like to advert. I refer to his remark that "the sympathy which is now felt by the Local Govern-"ments with the territorial armies under them would no longer exist if the "connection between them was broken, and the beneficial effects of that good "feeling between the army and its civil rulers would disappear." If there be any force in the argument which this observation implies, it would furnish a reason

for placing the several divisions of the Army of Bengal in subordination to the Governments of the territories in which they are, or are intended to be, employed—an arrangement which is not likely to be seriously entertained. My impression is that, as a matter of fact, the sympathy supposed to exist between the Local Governments and the armies under them is rather imaginary than real. The authorities to whom the sepoys look are the military, and not the civil authorities, and I cannot think that the disconnection of the armies from the Local Governments will produce the slightest impression upon the minds of the Native soldiery.

6. The only real advantage, as it appears to me, of maintaining the present system is the hindrance which it interposes in the way of summary reductions, and I can well imagine circumstances under which such a hindrance might be usefully interposed; but, on the other hand, I am confident that the effect of the proposed change will be in other respects so beneficial to the two armies in question as to counterbalance any disadvantage that may be apprehended from the removal of this cog-wheel in our present military system, in that those armies, while still retaining their distinct positions in all those matters in which it is politically expedient that they should remain distinct, being placed in the same relations to the Commander in Chief in India and to the Government of India as the other branches of the Indian Army, will have a far better chance of receiving their fair share of active service and opportunities of distinction than has hitherto been the case. When I left India in 1872, and for many years previously, it was the universal complaint at Madras that the Madras Native Army was systematically excluded from active service. Of late, owing to the present Commander in Chief in India having served for many years in the Madras Presidency, the claims of the armies of the two minor Presidencies, in the matter of active service, have been recognized; but Sir Frederick Haines' tenure of office is drawing towards its close, and his successor, in all probability, will be an officer who knows nothing of either of the two southern armies, and who will therefore be as amenable as many of his predecessors have been to the influences immediately around him. In such matters it is better that the recognition of just claims should, as far as possible, be provided for by the system in force, than that it should depend upon the dispositions of individuals. If the proposals of the Commission are acted on, no branch of the army of India will have reason to complain of exclusion, either from active service, or from employment on the head-quarters staff.

7. The question of the division of the present Bengal Army into two army corps is another question upon which the recommendations of the Commission are opposed by both my military colleagues. Sir F. Haines considers that "it "would be highly objectionable to leave Oudh, Rohilcund, and the North "Western Provinces in the hands of Native troops which have been drawn only "from the population of those territories." He affirms this to be a "cardinal "error, fraught with dangers against which the experience of the past conveys "an impressive warning," and that to apply this system to the Punjab would be to commit "a blunder of the first magnitude, and one that would hardly fail "to carry with it most baneful results." I do not find this point specially noticed in Sir Edwin Johnson's Minute, but I am aware that his views entirely coincide with those of the Commander in Chief. Sir Neville Chamberlain, on the other hand, who has had long experience of the troops in the north of India, and especially in the Punjab, is decidedly in favour of the plan of localization advocated by the Commission. When such high military authorities differ, it is very difficult for a civilian to form an opinion on a question of this description. I will only say with reference to it, that the arguments which are universally accepted in favour of localizing the armies of Madras and Bombay, appear to me to apply, in some measure at all events, to the localization of the different sections of the army of Bengal, and that if content in the minds of our sepoys with their position is, as I think it is, a consideration of great importance, there would seem to be much to be said in favour of employing them in time of peace in climates to which they are accustomed, and in comparative proximity to their homes.

8. I agree with the minority of the Commission and with my military colleagues in the opinion that the Commander in Chief in India should continue to

to be a member of the Supreme Government, as well as the executive head of the army. The arrangement may be anomalous, and it may be without precedent in other armies; but there is much that is anomalous in our position in India, and I am persuaded that in this particular case the abandonment of the arrangement which has been in force so long, and under which the Commander in Chief has been occasionally able to support in Council the measures which he has recommended in his administrative capacity, would be a mistake. The evidence of experience, both that which I find recorded in the history of the past, and that which I have derived from my own personal observation, teaches me a different lesson from that which it has taught to the majority of the Commission. In my opinion the position of the Commander in Chief requires to be strengthened rather than to be weakened; and I should regard with grave apprehension any change which would diminish the influence which the Commander in Chief is able to exert in the disposal of military questions. We must remember that there is a strong, and perhaps not unnatural, tendency on the part of Governors General to interfere in military questions, especially in time of war, when political questions and military questions are necessarily much intermixed, and if we may judge from the experience of the past, the temptation to supersede the authority of the executive head of this particular department of the administration, in matters in which, if he is fit for his post, he ought to be allowed a large discretion, is peculiarly a temptation which Governors General of India have been unable to withstand. During my Indian service there have been at least three Governors General who have more or less interfered, or have endeavoured to interfere, with the functions of Commander in Chief in the direction of military operations. In the Report before us we have the evidence of the late Lord Sandhurst and of Sir Peter Lumsden of the mischief which has been done, and the difficulties which have been created, by the interference of irresponsible advisers surrounding the Governor General; difficulties which would be greatly intensified if the Commander in Chief were debarred from those opportunities of personally urging his views which his position as a Member of Council at present affords to him. During the time that I have been a Member of Council the instances of acrimonious discussions in Council on military affairs have been extremely rare. I cannot call to mind a single instance of the kind during the Government of the present Viceroy and the incumbency of the present Commander in Chief; but if such cases were more frequent, and unless they were far more frequent than they ever have been under any previous administration, I do not think that the evil which they would cause, could be compared to the loss which would result from the removal of the Commander in Chief from the Council; for apart from the advantage, as I regard it, of enabling the Commander in Chief to take a part in the discussions which take place in Council upon purely military questions, it seems very desirable, looking to the close connection which such questions often have with questions of a political nature, that he should continue to see the political correspondence of the Government, and that he should have an intimate acquaintance, not only with our foreign policy, but with our relations with our great Native feudatories, such as he is now enabled to obtain, as a Member of Council, from a perusal of much of the political and civil, as well as of the military, correspondence. The argument used by Sir Edwin Johnson, that the position of the Commander in Chief as a Member of Council acts as a salutary check upon his making, in his capacity of Commander in Chief, extravagant propositions for military expenditure, is also I think deserving of consideration. That the Commander in Chief should be free to make frequent inspections of the several army corps under his command, every one will admit; but, with the facilities of locomotion which now exist in India, there is no reason why he should not perform this duty most thoroughly during the four or five months of the cold season, a period which is quite as much as he can spare from his other business as Commander in Chief for the particular duty of inspection.

9. On the inexpediency of creating the office of Chief of the Staff, as a part of the normal arrangements of the head-quarters staff of the army in time of peace, as well as in war, I agree with the Commander in Chief and Sir Edwin Johnson. The creation of such an appointment is a favourite theory with a school of military men, which appears to be acquiring a considerable influence in the disposal of military questions, both in England and in India; but I see

great force in the objections urged against it by my military colleagues, and I entirely concur with them in deprecating the proposed amalgamation of the departments of Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. The qualifications and aptitudes required for the successful discharge of the duties of these departments are very different, and, without laying down that an officer is never to be transferred from one department of the staff to the other, it seems to me wise to maintain the separation which at present exists. The inexpediency of making any change in the present arrangements of the Artillery Staff, is, I think, conclusively shown in the Minute of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

10. Notwithstanding the adverse opinions which have been recorded by my military colleagues, I am disposed to think, supposing the present British force to be sufficient for our military requirements, that the Commission have shown good reasons for their recommendation in favour of substituting a diminished number of large battalions for the present number of small battalions. The result will be a considerable reduction of expenditure, without, as it appears to me, any decrease of fighting power. The argument that a great number of small regiments is better than a small number of large regiments, because the former plan admits of our garrison being more extensively distributed, applies, I think, to a state of things which no longer exists in most parts of the country. The inhabitants of the remotest tracts are now perfectly well aware of the existence of our military force, and no longer require constant ocular demonstration to assure them of the fact; but if such demonstration is needed, it would be better, in my opinion, to organise moveable columns from time to time than to maintain small forces at a number of unimportant places at a considerable expense, and with some loss to discipline and military efficiency. In regard to the proposed reduction in the Artillery arm, and especially in the Horse Artillery, I concur in the objections urged by the Commander in Chief; and in connection with this subject I would invite attention to Sir Henry Daly's remarks in his letter of the 5th January 1872, printed on pages 51 to 53 of the 1st Volume of Appendices*, on the importance of maintaining an adequate force of Artillery. "Chiefs," he wrote, "and Natives generally estimate our strength "by our guns rather than by our bayonets. It is the precision and prestige "of our Artillery which strike awe and call forth admiration, whether from "Scindia or from Jung Bahadur. It was owing to this superiority in days long "past that success in every struggle was almost a certainty. It was the "'electric fire' of the same power by which Havelock with his small body "achieved victory after victory, dispersing thousands with heavy loss, almost "untouched himself. On the other hand it was the want of Artillery which "protracted the struggle at Delhi, and made each success ruinously costly to "us. British batteries form bonds of cement between us and Native States, "and prevent fears of the stability of our power from undermining the faith of "our mercenary troops, and these batteries should be conspicuous in all our "garrisons." The recommendations of the Commission for diminishing the ill effects of the present short service system, in the case of the British force in India, appear to be admirable as far as they go.

* Not printed.

11. In the preceding remarks I have qualified my concurrence in the proposals of the Commission for reducing the number of British Cavalry and Infantry regiments, while increasing their strength, by the important proviso that the present strength of the British Army in India shall be decided to be sufficient for our future requirements. At the present moment, with the large drain upon our army which is caused by the war still in progress in Afghanistan, I believe the British force in India, as I stated in a recent Minute on the subject of the reinforcements advocated by the Commander in Chief, to be dangerously small, and regard as utterly insufficient the obligatory garrison for which the Commission provide in the tabular statements entered on pages 24 to 27 of their Report. What the normal British garrison of India shall be, is a question which cannot be safely determined, until it is settled what our permanent North West Frontier, and what its military requirements, are to be.

12. Very similar considerations appear to me to apply to the proposed organisation and strength of our Native Army. Here again I consider that the Commission have adduced sound reasons for increasing the strength of the regiments in rank and file; but it appears to me impossible to determine at present

present whether it will be safe to accompany this increase by the proposed reduction, or by any reduction, in the number of regiments. My impression is, that if what is called the Gandamak Frontier, with the addition of a garrison at Kandahar, is to be retained, a considerable increase will be required to our Native Army; but this is a question which cannot be settled at present. The large reduction which is proposed in the Madras Native Army is the most serious point in the Commission's recommendations under this head. It is proposed to reduce the number of Infantry regiments in Madras from 40 to 25, and of Cavalry from four to two. This means a reduction of the Madras Army from a force of 30,308 Natives of all ranks, to a force of 24,018 Natives of all ranks, and consequently the discharge of 6,390 Native soldiers. Three years ago a proposal for an extensive reduction of the Madras Native Army, emanating from Sir Garnet Wolseley, was brought under the consideration of the Government of India by the Secretary of State, and was opposed by four out of five of the Members of Council, who noted upon it. The reduction proposed by Sir Garnet Wolseley was greater than that recommended by the Commission. It involved the reduction of the regiments of Madras Infantry and Cavalry from 44 to 22, and the disbandment of 11,674 Native soldiers. The Despatch forwarding Sir Garnet Wolseley's Memorandum has not been replied to up to the present time, and, consequently, the Secretary of State has had no opportunity of considering the objections advanced against Sir Garnet Wolseley's proposals by the Commander in Chief and other members of the Government of India. At present, however, we are not concerned with Sir Garnet Wolseley's proposals, which, in point of fact, have been superseded by the recommendations of the Commission. In regard to these recommendations, I would observe that, assuming the aggregate strength of the Native force, for which the Commission provide in the four proposed army corps, to be sufficient for our future military requirements, and supposing that we had a *tabula rasa* to deal with, I should not regard the strength of the army which the Commission assign to Madras as unreasonably small. One important point to be kept in view, as I have always considered, is that the Armies of Madras and Bombay should be maintained at such a strength as will make them, when led by British officers, and supported by British troops, a fair counterpoise to the army or armies of the northern provinces, in the event of the former again becoming disaffected. I am not prepared to say that this object would not be sufficiently secured by the arrangements of the Commission, which would give to Madras and Bombay Native forces* aggregating 49,472 men against 58,083 men, the aggregate of the proposed Native forces of Bengal and the Punjab. Nor do I question the wisdom of reducing the territorial area within which the Madras troops are now employed in time of peace, the extent of which apparently has of late had a disastrous effect upon recruiting. But we are not now dealing with a *tabula rasa*, and the disbandment of 17 regiments and of 6,390 Native soldiers, in an army which has already suffered heavily from previous reductions, is a very serious question, which cannot be disposed of in the spirit in which the Commission seem disposed to treat it. It must be borne in mind that in the case of a very large majority of Madras sepoys, their regiment is their home, and that in this case the rural home and the agricultural life to which, according to the evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan, quoted in para. 242 of the Report, the Madras soldier returns with readiness, are mere pictures of the imagination, in no way consistent with the actual facts. I cannot think that it would be politic or right to make this very heavy reduction in the Madras Army. In my opinion, a reduction of the Native Infantry to 30 regiments, and of the Madras Cavalry to three regiments, of the proposed strength, is as much as ought to be attempted. This will involve the disbandment of over 1,300 men, and whether even this can be done must depend upon our future military requirements, when it is possible to ascertain them. The five infantry regiments and the one cavalry regiment in excess of the number provided in the Commission's scheme may be advantageously employed in Burmah, in the Northern Circars, in the Deccan, and in the Ceded Districts.

13. On the question of reserves, I agree with Sir Edwin Johnson. It appears to me a dangerous experiment, which can only be carried out upon a very limited scale, which is altogether inapplicable to India, and from which it will be wise to abstain.

14. I entirely

* This is exclusive of local corps, such as the Hyderabad Contingent, &c.

14. I entirely approve of the Commission's plan of providing European officers for the Native Army, including the prospective abolition of the Staff Corps, and of promotion by length of service, and a system of promoting the officers in army rank on vacancies in the general list of officers of the army corps to which they belong, while their regimental promotion will depend upon their position in the cadres of their regiments.

15. In this Minute, while expressing my concurrence in many of the recommendations made by the Commission, I have not scrupled to criticize those which, either in principle or with reference to the extent to which it is proposed to carry them, have appeared to me to be opposed to sound policy. Before concluding this paper, I wish to say a few words on one or two points which not only have an important bearing upon the subject of the Commission's inquiries, but which, in my opinion, demand the anxious consideration of those who are responsible for the administration of India. In connection with the proposed strength and distribution of the army, I have stated my opinion that the obligatory garrisons which the Commission have deemed sufficient for the maintenance of internal order in time of war are altogether insufficient, and that at the present moment the British force in India is dangerously small. Of late it has been a favourite theory in some quarters, and it has been adopted by men of established reputation, whose general ability gives weight to their opinions, that large results may be accomplished by means much smaller than those which have been hitherto deemed requisite, and the advocates of large armaments have been denounced as old-fashioned persons, ignorant of the true principles of military organization. One of the most remarkable instances of the lengths to which such theories will carry their supporters was the assertion put forward a few months ago, that provision could be made for a permanent military occupation of Afghanistan at an annual cost of 20 lacs of rupees over and above the normal military expenditure of India. Any such visions must have been rudely dispelled by the events of December last, and by the unmistakeable evidence since furnished by the occurrences of every week of the hatred with which our occupation of that country is regarded by the people. But theories of this nature are often very obstinately maintained, and cannot be too often or too emphatically condemned. Another point upon which, as it appears to me, very erroneous, and, as I think, very dangerous, views are held, is the extent to which our system of railways and telegraphs enables us to dispense with troops. No sensible man would be foolish enough to argue that the great extension of railway and telegraph lines in India has not very materially added to the strength of our military position, but it is an increase of strength which may be easily over-estimated, and which, in the event of internal disturbances, is liable at any time to fail us. Notwithstanding our present facilities of railway communication, I cannot believe it to be safe at a time of war, which might or might not, but which, in the event of any serious disaster to our arms, probably would be combined with popular excitement, to leave Lucknow with a single regiment of British infantry, and such places as Allahabad, Agra, Cawnpore, and Delhi with only half a regiment each. Another matter which, as it seems to me, is not always sufficiently considered, is the danger of over-taxing our Native troops, especially in such a campaign as that in which we are now engaged. Recent events, I think, have shown that the commendations which of late years have been bestowed by successive Commanders in Chief upon our present Native Army have been fully deserved. The conduct of the Native troops who have served in Afghanistan during the last 18 months has been admirable. Their gallantry on many occasions, their patience and endurance under severe privations, have been such as it would be difficult to surpass. I have read of few incidents in military history more honourable to a regiment than the conduct of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, on that most trying night in the snows of an Afghanistan December, when it marched to join Brigadier General Gough's relieving brigade. But the service has been a most trying one to the Native troops, and there can be no question that service in Afghanistan, or anywhere in that direction beyond our old North Western frontier, will in future be anything but popular with them, unless care is taken so to fix the strength of our Native Army as to admit of Native troops employed upon service of this nature being frequently relieved. This will apply to the regiments employed in Kuram or Candahar, or anywhere along

along the line of the Gandamak frontier, should that frontier be maintained. For this reason, I am of opinion that any suggestions, either for reducing the strength of our Native Army, or for abstaining from increasing it in proportion to the extension of our frontier, should be most jealously scrutinized. This point has not been overlooked by the Commission, who, in the sixth paragraph of the Report, recommend that "any actual reduction of Native regiments "should not be carried into effect until the question of the future occupation "of Afghanistan has been finally settled." Another matter which demands, as I think, very grave consideration, and which materially concerns our political position in India and the question of our military force, is the tendency which has arisen of late to substitute unpopular forms of taxation for sources of revenue, which, even if they were more open than they are to objection upon economical grounds, have the great merit of not being felt by, and consequently not being unpopular with, the people. The imposition of license taxes upon traders, and of public works cesses upon the agricultural classes of the community, both of which we know to be regarded as hateful imposts by the taxpayers, in conjunction with the reduction and contemplated removal of import duties upon cotton goods, a measure which we now see is likely to entail upon us at no very distant date the loss of the greater part of our customs duties, is the outcome of a policy which, pressed by interested men upon the leaders of the two great parties in Parliament, and adopted by the latter, not in the interests of India, but in the interests or supposed interests of their respective parties, is regarded by most thinking men in this country as an unjust and dangerous policy, which, if persisted in, is certain to increase the difficulties, already sufficiently great, of Indian administration.

(signed) *Alexr. J. Arbuthnot.*

12 April 1880.

— 3. —

MINUTE by the Viceroy on the Report of the Army Commission.

1. BEFORE expressing any opinions on the Report of the Army Commission, I wish, with special reference to the Minutes written on this subject by Sir Edwin Johnson and Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, as also to the introductory portion of the Minute by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to make a few remarks as to the nature and character of the Commission, and the way in which its Report was framed and adopted by the Members of it.

2. The Commission numbered, in addition to its Civilian President and one Civilian Member, the following Military Officers as Members:—

Sir P. Lumsden, Adjutant General of the Army in India, and late Chief of the Staff;
Sir F. Roberts, late Quartermaster General of the Army in India;
Brigadier General Phayre, formerly Quartermaster General of the Army of Bombay;
Brigadier General O'Connell, Quartermaster General of the Army of Madras;
Brigadier General Macpherson, who was selected with special reference to his long regimental experience;
Colonel T. D. Baker, Military Secretary to the Viceroy of India, and formerly Assistant Adjutant General at Head-quarters in London;
Colonel MacGregor, Assistant Quartermaster General at Head-quarters in India; and
Major Newmarch, Accountant General to the Army in India.

3. It would, I think, be difficult to name a body of officers possessing, among them, more varied and valuable experience respecting the Army of India, its organisation and requirements, its merits and defects. I cannot for a moment admit that officers of such standing and experience would lend themselves to what Sir E. Johnson calls "ruthless uprooting of stable and solid principles "shaped

"shaped by circumstances peculiar to India," or that they would be animated by "a foreign spirit—a spirit engendered by an exaggerated feeling of confi-"dence in the future, and an ignoring of the lessons taught by the past." It is impossible to believe that this Report, if carefully considered and agreed upon by the officers who signed it (all of them tried and trusted servants of the Crown), can be anything but the deliberate statement of their conscientious opinions upon the important question submitted for their consideration.

4. But the Commander in Chief, in the introduction to his Minute, assumes that the Report was not carefully considered and agreed upon by the Officers who signed it. His Excellency urges that this strong body of military opinion was not available, or was only available in a fitful manner, for the purpose of influencing the matter and tone of the Report; and he expresses his belief that much now stands on the record which could not have been allowed to stand, had the Report been subject to the careful revision of its various chapters in detail by the full Commission.

5. Upon this subject the President of the Commission, his Honour Sir Ashley Eden, writes to me as follows:

"I must protest against his Excellency's assumptions, which are entirely opposed to the facts. There is not a single paragraph of a single chapter of the Report which was not seen over and over again by every Member of the Commission. It is true that Generals Roberts and Macpherson, and Colonels Baker and MacGregor, were called away on service while the Commission was still sitting; but, if his Excellency had read the Report, he would have seen the following statement of the extent to which their removal impeded business: 'During the progress of our discussion, our work was much impeded by the 'withdrawal of four of our colleagues, who were suddenly ordered away on 'service to Afghanistan. Fortunately, however, our inquiries were at that 'time so far advanced that we were in *complete possession* of their views on all 'the principal questions of army organization before us. We have been able 'to keep them informed from time to time of the progress which we have 'made in working out a scheme of reorganization determined upon before they 'left.'

"As a matter of fact, General Roberts and Macpherson, and Colonels Baker and MacGregor, were placed on sub-committees within a few days of their arrival at Simla. At our preliminary meetings we found we were unanimously of opinion that certain great changes in the organization of the army were called for. We set to work and issued questions to all the Local Governments, and officers in command and officers of special experience; and sub-committees were formed for preparing roughly the schemes on which the Commission's Report was to be based, it being understood that these rough schemes were to be considered again when the complete evidence of the officers consulted was received. The officers ordered away to Kabul were on the sub-committee for the reorganization of the Native Army and of the European Army, Army Corps, and the distribution of the army, commands, administration of the Military Department, Transport, the reduction of cadres, the Staff Corps, clothing and equipment. On all these questions those gentlemen who were taken away to Kabul had opportunities of stating very fully their views, and left behind in most cases a record of their opinions. As a matter of fact the distribution tables of the four Army Corps, the division into normal, obligatory, and troops available for field service, were all drawn up by Sir F. Roberts and Colonel MacGregor jointly, and printed before they left Simla. This distribution was slightly changed on further consideration, and on the receipt of fresh evidence; but the changes were very slight. It was to Sir F. Roberts, too, that the Commission was indebted for the calculation of the forces required for the purpose of forming armies in certain specified directions. But, besides this, every chapter, as it was roughly drafted, was forwarded to the absent officers at Kabul, and was received back with their alterations, suggestions, and amendments, and carefully considered by the Committee.

"The Commander in Chief forgets that the Commission were ordered to send in their complete Report on the 31st October, while none of these officers left for Kabul till the beginning of September.

"There is not a single chapter of the Report the rough draft of which was not signed by each of the absent members, and their signatures were afterwards

wards attached by them to the final copy. I may add, that I received from Sir F. Roberts an intimation that they concurred in every word of the Report.

"Brigadier-General Phayre was present at nearly every meeting of the Commission. From almost the first he sat daily either on Committees or Sub-committees.

"Brigadier General O'Connell arrived late, but remained till the end, and most carefully discussed and revised in Committee every syllable of the Report. He disapproved of the severance of the Local Governments from the local armies, but appeared to agree to everything else, and helped us to work out every detail, especially those connected with the Madras Army, its reduction and distribution, but, finally, on General Lumsden writing a protest, he said he would like to sign that.

"Sir P. Lumsden attended irregularly, but every paper was sent to him every day, and he wrote numerous notes and minutes on all the leading points for consideration, and he drew out the system of reserves with his own hand. He agreed to the Report in every detail, except,—

"(1.) He thought it a mistake to change the organization of the army until the war was completely over.

"(2.) He objected to the severance of the Local Government from the control of the local army corps. He fully supported the substitution of four army corps for the three armies (*see* his Dissent).

"(3.) He objected to the proposal to deprive the Commander in Chief of his seat in Council.

"He agreed to everything else. He went over the final Report in Committee for days together, paragraph by paragraph, and made innumerable suggestions, and, indeed, the Report was in many places modified to meet his views.

"In the face of these facts, the position taken by the Commander-in-Chief is perfectly untenable and unjustifiable."

6. These statements dispose of Sir A. Arbuthnot's assumption that it is absurd to imagine that officers employed upon the important duties which occupied Sir F. Roberts, General Macpherson, Colonel Baker, and Colonel MacGregor at Kabul during the autumn of last year, could have given any serious attention to the proceedings of their colleagues at Simla. We are, it appears to me, bound to acknowledge that the Report of the Army Commission was carefully considered by all the members of that Commission. Sir P. Lumsden and Brigadier General O'Connell dissented from the proposals to remove the Commander in Chief from the Council of the Governor-General and the armies of Bombay and Madras from the control of the Presidency Governments. But it cannot be denied or doubted, by any one who is cognizant of the facts, that, with these exceptions only, exceptions confined to two out of the numerous and important recommendations made by the Commission, its Report was deliberately and unreservedly agreed upon by all the officers whose names appear at the foot of it. Their Report, therefore, must be taken to represent their united opinion, and I must again observe that the opinion thus seriously and authoritatively commended to our consideration is that of a body of officers second to none in varied experience of Indian warfare and Indian military administration.

7. There is one other point upon which I must touch before passing to the consideration of the proposals contained in the Report now before me.

8. The order for the appointment of the Commission was issued at a time when the financial prospects of the Government of India were seriously menaced by the unfavourable rate of exchange. The instructions to the Commission were, therefore, directed primarily, though not exclusively, to the financial aspect of the existing military organization. The Commission was instructed to assist the Government in determining what share of necessary reductions in the public expenditure could be borne by the military charges, without injury to the general efficiency of the army, and in what manner such reductions could best be effected. Now, although, since the date of that order, the revenues of India have been in all respects satisfactory, and although, were it not for the war in Afghanistan, we should have been able to budget, this

year, for a surplus of nearly four millions sterling, renewed operations in Afghanistan, consequent on the massacre of the Embassy at Kabul, have involved us in very heavy expenditure, which swallows up more than that surplus. The rate of exchange has not perceptibly improved, and a fresh loan has become necessary.

9. Admitting that our financial position appears much less anxious now than it did last July, I must point out that it is certainly not such as to absolve us from the duty of reducing expenditure, if by so doing we in no way diminish efficiency; and I would here repeat the substance of what I said in a recent Minute upon another subject, viz., that "not even the most opulent Govern-" ment is justified in spending upon administration more money than is requi-" site to maintain administrative efficiency at its highest standard." Still more evident is it that, if any Government can see its way to measures which will simultaneously increase efficiency and reduce expenditure, it is, in the interests of the taxpayers of the country, bound by every duty to adopt those measures. I find it impossible to speak too highly of our Native troops and officers. They constitute the backbone of the British power in India, and, regarded as fighting material, they leave little to be desired except that we had more of them, easily and cheaply available, for fighting purposes. But all my observation and study of the practical experiences of the present and previous campaigns in Afghanistan have convinced me that the value of the Indian Army, regarded purely as a fighting machine, is most vexatiously and quite needlessly restricted by serious, though not unremediable, organic defects. I am persuaded that we do not at present obtain, for the money we spend upon it, the best war engine that the splendid military resources of the Empire, if better organized and administered, could furnish for the price we pay. And yet the cost of our military establishments has been, and still is, steadily increasing, without any proportional increase of efficiency. The unaltered maintenance of the present system means nothing less than the uncontrollable annual increase of a military expenditure which the Government of India is, in my opinion, unable to afford, as a current and permanent charge on its financial resources, with due regard to its many other imperial obligations. But, if this Government were the richest in the world, I should still, in the interests of efficiency alone, most strongly advocate immediate and far-reaching reforms in the organization and administration of the Indian Armies. The reforms advocated by the Army Commission would, according to its Report, effect a total annual saving of one and a quarter million sterling. It only remains, therefore, to consider what would be the effect of those reforms upon the efficiency of the Armies of India.

10. I shall not, as a civilian, attempt to deal with matters of detail, requiring special technical military knowledge or experience for the formation of sound conclusions about them. I observe that his Excellency the Commander in Chief assents, with small divergence of opinion, to the recommendations of the Committee in regard to the Staff Corps, Pension and Retirements, Commissariat, Clothing, Ordnance, Military Works and Barrack Department, subject always to his general disapproval of abolishing the Presidential system of armies and commands, and that he objects to some of the proposals for re-organization of Transport and Remount Establishments. These are matters which, in my opinion, may, and practically must, be left for consideration chiefly by military experts, after a decision has been arrived at upon those main questions which demand the attention of the statesman no less than that of the soldier.

11. Such main questions are directly raised upon the following preliminary points:—

1st. Shall the Government of India accept the recommendation of the Commission to remove the control of the Bombay and Madras Armies from the Local Presidency Governments, uniting the whole Army of India under the command of one military chief, subject only to the control of the Supreme Government?

2nd. Shall we agree to the proposed removal of the Punjab Frontier Force from the control of the Punjab Government?

3rd. In

3rd. In the event of our adoption of the above proposals, shall we accept the principle of the division of the army for military command into corps, each corps being confined to a certain geographical area? And, in that case,—

4th. Are the territorial divisions recommended by the Commission the best that can be devised?

5th. If the previous questions are affirmatively answered, shall we accept the principle of concentration of force at important strategical points, and the abandonment of minor cantonments?

6th. Shall we accept the proposal to reduce the number of regiments and increase their strength?

7th. Shall we accept as sufficient the number of troops (*a*) European, (*b*) Native, proposed by the Commission?

8th. Shall we accept the proposal to form reserves of Native troops?

9th. Shall we accept the proposal to reduce the Madras Army?

10th. Shall we accept the proposal to create a War Department, and assign to the Commander in Chief in India the same position as that occupied by the Commander in Chief under the Secretary of State in England, relieving him of his functions as a Member of the Governor General's Council?

Upon each of these subjects I have now to record my opinion, and I will endeavour to record it briefly.

I.—*Shall the Government of India accept the Recommendation to remove the Control of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the Local Presidency Governments, and to unite the whole Army of India under the command of one Military Chief, under the control of the Government of India?*

12. I have already, in a Minute sent to the Secretary of State in April last, expressed my reasons for holding the opinion that it is desirable to abolish the Presidency Governments, or rather to abolish the Presidency Councils, and to place those Governments upon the same footing as that of the Lieutenant Governorships of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab. If this change were carried out, the question now under consideration would be much simplified. But, as there is no immediate probability of such a change, the question must be considered in the light of existing arrangements for the civil government of the Presidencies. And it has been so considered by the Commission.

13. To my mind the arguments adduced in the Report appear conclusive in favour of withdrawing the Armies of Madras and Bombay from the direct control of the Local Governments, and in the few remarks I have to make on this proposal I shall endeavour to avoid going over beaten ground.

14. Under the present system, the Armies of Madras and Bombay are neither independent armies nor parts of one great Army of India. All the evils of provincialism are maintained, without that complete independence which, were it proved to be desirable, could alone justify the maintenance of the control at present exercised by the Local Governments. The jealousy with which the Armies of Bombay and Madras regard the Army of Bengal is notorious. Nor is this jealousy unjustified. The remark made by the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army, that the officers of the Bengal Army, "being under the immediate control of the Viceroy and Government of India, "have enjoyed a monopoly of Government patronage which the Armies of "Bombay and Madras could not expect to be filtered through the Local "Governments under which they are immediately serving," is perfectly true. No army can reach a high standard of efficiency if its officers are debarred from a large sphere of experience and those chances of eminent command and

active service in the field which increase with the size of the army they belong to, and the extent of frontier covered by it.

15. In the event of war, it has been found absolutely necessary to bring under one supreme control the whole of the troops in the field, no matter to what Presidency they belong, and the interference of the Local Governments can then only be a hindrance to effective action, fraught with certainties of embarrassment and chances of failure. At the present moment a division of the Bombay Army is garrisoning Kandahar, and keeping the line of communications to that place. Another division of the Bombay Army is held in reserve for the same line. The political situation, which entirely dominates the military situation, is directed solely by the Government of India; and the military movements consequent upon the varying phases of the political situation, not only in Southern Afghanistan, but also in Northern Afghanistan, must be directed by the Government of India also. An order was, therefore, issued by the Government of India to the effect that General Primrose, commanding the troops at Kandahar, and on the line of communications, will receive his orders direct from the Commander in Chief in India. It was recently found necessary to mobilize the reserve division; and an order was then issued to the effect that, once moved forward to the line of communication, the troops of this division would be removed from the command of the Bombay Commander in Chief, and come under the sole orders of General Primrose and the Government of India. To this order the Commander in Chief of Bombay demurs, asking whether it could possibly be meant that he is not to command a portion of his own army; and he is very properly told that such is the meaning of the order. Yet the Military Departments, which are responsible for feeding and clothing these troops, for supplying them with munitions of war, for keeping them up to war strength, are not under the control of the Government of India, but of the Government of Bombay.

16. Other instances involving difficulties of a similar nature have recently occurred in Bombay. But, in order not to suggest any invidious distinction, in this matter, between the two minor Presidencies, I will here mention an instance, also of recent date, furnished by the conduct of the Madras Government. That Government, on one occasion, without sanction sought from or given by the Government of India, and without being subsequently able to allege any intelligible cause or excuse for its action, suddenly raised the pay of syces to Cavalry corps proceeding on service, and thereby seriously embarrassed the Imperial Government by giving ground for similar demands from all syces attached to British Cavalry regiments and Artillery ordered on service from other parts of the Empire.

17. So long as the armies of Madras and Bombay are under the Local Governments, and so long as their Commanders in Chief possess their existing semi-independence of the Government of India, difficulties of this sort must continue to arise—difficulties that increase a friction, occasionally mitigated by the personal influence of special character, but always present, and always fruitful of embarrassment in the relations between the Local and the Supreme Governments of India.

18 Were this a question only of the withdrawal of the European portion of the armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of Local Governments, the expediency of such a measure would probably be recognized without hesitation. But the *primâ facie* merits of the proposal now before us must, no doubt, be considered with careful reference to the probable effect of its adoption on the local feeling, and practical efficiency of the Native Armies.

19. Now, I am prepared to admit without reserve that any change destructive of the good feeling at present existing between the local authorities and the Native soldiery of Bombay and Madras would be a serious evil. It is asserted by the opponents of the proposed change that this would be the effect of it. I have heard, however, no argument in support of this assertion, and I have failed to discover from inquiry and observation any fact on which such an argument could be reasonably based. As a matter of fact, none of the real local authorities, that is to say, the Commissioners and Collectors, have anything whatever to say to the control of the troops garrisoning the divisions and districts wherein

wherein they exercise authority. That control is exclusively exercised by one bureau at the Presidency, and it seems to me absurd to allege that the abolition of this bureau, and the transfer of its control, or such portion of its control as has not already been transferred, from the Presidencies to the Supreme Government, can seriously affect, or indeed affect at all, the sympathy now felt by the local authorities with the armies located within their jurisdiction, recruited from the population they govern, and forming their only safeguard against the dangers incidental to the ruling race, in a conquered and alien country. If that sympathy is to be of any value, it must be a sympathy not confined to the Governor, his small Council, and his military bureau, who never come into direct and personal relations with the soldiers. It must be a widespread sympathy between the European officials scattered throughout the Presidency, and the army quartered in the provinces of the Presidency; and, if such sympathy or good feeling does now exist, it will certainly not be prejudicially affected by the mere removal of certain powers of military control from one set of officials to another. Neither the Presidency towns of Bombay and Madras, nor the hill stations of Mahableshwur and Ootacamund, the seats of the Presidency Governments, are the points of contact between the European officials and the Native Army. It is in the provinces, in the recruiting grounds, that the influence of the Commissioner and the Collector may be felt, and I have too high an opinion of Madras and Bombay officials to believe that they would refuse to lend their influence in favour of recruiting, or of bettering the condition of the Native soldier, if the Governments of Bombay and Madras were required, in the interests of the whole Empire, and those of the local armies concerned, to cede to the Central Government of India the nondescript military authority they now possses.

20. On the contrary, I am persuaded that, throughout the whole of India, a far greater influence might be exerted by the local officials in favour of the army than they have hitherto been encouraged to exert in any of its provinces; and it is to the intelligent exercise of such personal influence as the Government of India is entitled to expect and require from all its local agents, and to the judicious management of our relations with the more virile and energetic portion of the Native population, that I look not only for the maintenance of the manifold ties which now bind the satisfied allegiance of the Native Army to the considerate authority of the ruling race, but also to the strengthening and extension of those ties, whether in Bombay, Madras, or Bengal.

21. If the proposals of the Commission involved unification of the Native Army, its amalgamation into one homogeneous body, or the abolition of those distinctions of race and caste which enable us to hold its dangerous elements in check; if, in other words, the proposals of the Commission were incompatible with the maintenance of what is familiarly known as "the water-tight compartment system," then I should strenuously oppose those proposals. But, as it is quite clear that the recommendations of the Commission on this question tend rather towards the extension and development of "the water-tight compartment system," I give them my unqualified support. I am convinced that the present system of three separate commands is unwieldy, and unnecessarily expensive. I am convinced that it tends to promote friction between the Supreme and Local Governments in time of peace; whilst in time of war it must always be abandoned, so far as relates to any troops sent into the field. And, holding these convictions, I am also satisfied that the remedy recommended by the Commission for this bad state of things is thoroughly sound in principle, perfectly safe and easy from a practical, and altogether advantageous from a financial, point of view.

22. Before closing my reference to this subject, I must, however, point out the great distinction which I conceive to exist between a "control over the local armies by the Local Governments," and an "intimate union between the local armies and the Local Governments."

23. Without this latter condition the Indian Armies could not exist. Under any conceivable organization the local civil authorities must aid the military

 authorities

authorities in obtaining recruits, in obtaining supplies and transport, and in moving troops by rail, &c. On the other hand, the commanders of the troops must comply with the requisitions of the local civil authorities for the services of troops to keep order; and they should assist in public works, in the collection of harvest, &c. It is desirable that this union should be of the most friendly nature; and I can see no more reason why it should fail to be of such a nature, because the troops are removed from Presidential Governmental control, than why the Dean and Canons of York should be unfriendly to the troops stationed in that town, because those troops are not under the command of the local mayor.

II.—*Shall we agree to remove the Punjab Force from the control of the Punjab Government?*

24. The arguments for keeping the Punjab Force under the control of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab are entirely different from those employed in favour of the retention of the separate Presidency commands. I cannot say that I think them valid; but they are, at least, intelligible, and deserving of attention. They will be found in the Note addressed to the Commission by the Secretary to Government, Punjab Military Department, on this subject. I have read that paper with great care, and I am bound to say that I find in it powerful reasons for not adopting the conclusion it advocates; reasons which, on the contrary, appear to me to be strongly in favour of placing the Punjab Force under the Commander in Chief and the Government of India.

25. The Punjab Frontier Force was raised at a time of anarchy, immediately after the annexation of the Punjab; and in 1850 Lord Dalhousie averred that his object in placing it under the Local Government (the Board of Administration) of that day was "to secure for the Local Government the full and complete control of military means, sufficient to effect any object which political "considerations may, in their judgment, render it expedient to secure on the "distant frontier."

26. But, at the present time, if there be one thing to which both the Government of India and that of Her Majesty, at home, would emphatically object, in the administration of our North Western Frontier, it is the exercise by the Lieutenant Governor of an unconditional power "to effect any object which "political considerations may, in his judgment, render it expedient to secure on "the distant frontier." To give him this power is to give him the means of embroiling the Empire of India in endless frontier wars; wars which, begun with the small force under his own control, might easily expand into operations of considerable magnitude, requiring the whole strength of India to bring them to a successful issue.

27. No one, I think, can read Lord Dalhousie's Minute of 1852 without seeing that every condition which made it then desirable to give the Local Government this power of prompt and uncontrolled action has been modified by the construction of the telegraph, by the rapidity with which letters are carried by railway, and by the greatly altered condition of our present borders. Lord Dalhousie, in explaining to the Punjab Government his reasons for investing it with independent military powers, observed that "there cannot be two masters "having the power to control public measures; and as the distance at which "the Supreme Government is placed obliges it to delegate the mastery to some "authority, and as your Board is, most properly, to receive that power, in order "that your means may be commensurate with your responsibilities, the military "power cannot be admitted to any authority co-ordinate with your Board." From this statement it is clear that Lord Dalhousie's object was to avoid the inconvenience and absurdity of "two masters having the power to control public "measures." But such inconvenience and absurdity are now actually created by the perpetuation of a system that has long survived all the circumstances and conditions to which it was then appropriate. The Supreme Government is no longer "placed

"placed at a distance." The circumstances contemplated by Lord Dalhousie, in which it might be "of the highest importance that the Punjab Government "should have the power of acting effectively without waiting for the sanction "of the Supreme Government," can now never occur. The "responsibilities" of independent action then devolving on the Punjab Government have now ceased to exist; and its "means" of independent action, still adjusted to the requirements of a pure administrative faction, would, if employed by it, be utterly subversive of all the realities of administrative duty and propriety. As a matter of fact, the Punjab Government has no authority to undertake the smallest military operation on the frontier without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government; by whose authority proposals for any such operation are carefully considered in every detail before sanction is given to them. During the greater part of the year, which, moreover, happens to embrace the season most favourable to, and customarily employed for, military operations on and beyond the frontier, the head-quarters of the Supreme Government are stationed in the locality which, during the same period, contains the head-quarters of the Punjab Government. Here the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor can be in daily personal communication with each other. It is not more difficult for the Governor General than it is for the Lieutenant Governor to authorise or control from Simla military operations on the North-West Frontier, and it is as easy for the Governor General to issue his orders through the Commander in Chief as to issue them through the Lieutenant Governor in reference to such operations.

28. Sir Robert Egerton has expressed his belief that the withdrawal of the Frontier Force from the personal control of the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab would weaken the defensive strength of the frontier, and impair his administration of it. But Her Majesty's Government has already decided, in compliance with the strong recommendations of the Government of India, and in recognition of the unavoidably imperial character of frontier questions, in the present circumstances of the Indian Empire, to withdraw the frontier itself, so far at least as regards the political and military administration of it, entirely from the control of the Punjab Government. The only practical question, therefore, which we have now to consider is, whether, in these circumstances, the Punjab Frontier Force shall remain exclusively under the civil authority as represented and exercised, not by the Punjab Government, but by the Government of India itself, without reference to the Commander in Chief; or whether it shall be placed, like the regular forces, under the immediate orders of the Commander in Chief, whose authority is, of course, subject in all respects to that of the Supreme Civil Power.

29. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab admits that "the Officers of the "force have, rightly or wrongly, been supposed to labour under the disadvan-"tage, that, on account of this force not being directly under the orders of his "Excellency the Commander in Chief, their war services are not so readily "acknowledged and recognized by the head of the Army in India as they would "have been if the force had not been removed from his immediate control." But his Honour urges that, because the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force are as efficient as the rest of the Bengal Army, there is no reason for placing that force under the Commander in Chief.

30. I am unable to adopt this conclusion. Even in the last few days inconvenience has been caused by the removal, by the Local Government, of a battery stationed on the frontier without reference to the Government of India, and by the issue of detailed instructions from the Punjab Government for adding a troop and a company to each regiment of the Punjab Frontier Force, in disregard of the conditions laid down by the Government of India for the recruitment of that force. The preposterous anomaly of the present divided command on the Punjab frontier is fairly, though forcibly, illustrated by a case which has actually occurred under my own administration. The Commandant of Kohat requires the support of a couple of heavy guns from the batteries at Peshawur. All the authorities concerned being at their respective head-quarters, this is what takes place in conformity with the present system: The Commandant at

Kohat (which is 40 miles distant from Peshawur) writes to the Commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force at Abbotabad (which is 100 miles on the other side of Peshawur). The Commander of the Punjab Frontier Force at Abbotabad then writes to the Military Secretary to the Punjab Government, who is at Lahore. The Military Secretary to the Punjab Government sends on this letter to the Military Department of the Government of India, which is at Calcutta. The Military Department of the Government of India refers it to the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief forwards it to the General Officer commanding at Peshawur. The General Officer commanding at Peshawur returns it to the Commander in Chief with his remarks. Finally, after having four times travelled backwards and forwards from one end of India to the other, the answer at length reaches Kohat, which is only 40 miles distant from the seat of the authority whom the application concerns.

31. But I base my opinion upon the broader ground that, in these days of rapid communication, the Government of India must retain for itself alone the right to judge when frontier operations are necessary, and the power of sanctioning and directing such operations. This is obviously one of the most important functions of its general foreign policy. It has been unanswerably affirmed by one of Her Majesty's late Ministers that "where there is responsi-"bility there must be power." It is not the Local Government of the Punjab, but the Supreme Government of India, that is responsible to the Empress of India for the peace and protection of Her Indian frontier, and the conduct of Her relations with its bordering States. If the Government of India adequately recognizes this responsibility, and adequately exercises the power obviously requisite for the proper discharge of it, there can remain no conceivable reason for the retention of the Punjab Frontier Force under the semi-independent control of the Punjab Government.

32. I cannot, however, too unreservedly endorse all that has been said by the Lieutenant Governor as to the value and efficiency of this fine force. Any change in the constitution, character, and spirit of it I should regard as an immense misfortune to India. I am persuaded that there is not to be found in any part of the Empire a body of men and officers superior, and there are few, perhaps, which can fairly be considered comparable to the Punjab Frontier Force in respect to fighting efficiency. By recruitment, organisation, training, and experience, this force is admirably fitted for the peculiar work it has to perform, and to which its service should always be strictly confined. I must here again distinctly state that I repudiate any idea of delocalising the Punjab Frontier Force, as completely as I repudiate the idea of delocalising the Armies of Madras and Bombay. An alteration of the political and military centres of control need involve no change in the local and territorial character of the force. Border warfare is a special military art, requiring complete knowledge of, and intelligent familiarity with, a variety of local conditions, which have no counterpart in regular campaigning. For the efficient conduct of it special training is necessary. The functions of the Punjab Frontier Force essentially differ from those of the regular army, and to delocalise, disperse, and absorb this force into the regular army would be an irreparable error. On this point my own opinion is in complete accordance with those expressed by General Sir Neville Chamberlain and Major James. In previous official papers, however, on the subject of frontier administration, I have had frequent occasion to point out, as one of the great and indisputable defects of the present system, the fact that, under this system, the local officers charged with the political and, therefore, to a great extent, the military management of the frontier, are heavily overweighted with purely civil and judicial work. They look for preferment rather to their character as magistrates and collectors of statistics than to the ingenuity and vigour of their political and military action. Certain it is that, under this system, the Punjab Frontier Force has not, of late years, been adequately employed in the exercise of its natural vocation. Instead of being constantly on the alert, always moving, and rarely out of the saddle, its officers and men have been shut up, for lengthened periods of inactivity, in circumscribed localities, and employed on ordinary garrison duties, in no wise differing from those of the regular army, whilst raids were being perpetrated with impunity, sometimes in broad daylight, by small bodies of marauders, in the very heart of stations on the frontier. In short, the treatment and employment of the Punjab

Frontier

Frontier Force have, of late years, in no wise differed during peace time from the treatment and employment of any division of the regular army. This state of things, against which I have laboured as well as protested ever since I assumed charge of the administration of India, is of comparatively recent growth, and it is one which I believe to be fully recognised and greatly deplored by that fine frontier officer, Sir Neville Chamberlain, with whom I have frequently discussed it. The fact is, the old and splendid school of Punjab frontier officers has died out. For the revival of it the Supreme Government of India, with its larger patronage and wider interests, is far better qualified than any Local Government. That school produced men of strong character and original intellect, formed by the constant exercise of personal responsibilities, to which more peaceful times afford scantier scope, no doubt, but on which a vicious system has needlessly inflicted every possible discouragement. When I came to India I found, to my astonishment, that frontier officers, political or military, were forbidden, under severe penalties, to cross the border, mingle with the tribes, or explore the country beyond it; and that, if those who disobeyed this injunction were murdered by our trans-frontier neighbours, their murder was officially regarded as a legitimate exercise of the recognised national rights of their murderers. Had the Queen's subjects on our Peshawur border been English farmers or tradesmen, or British colonists, who could make their voices heard in Parliament, I cannot believe that a system of administration which allowed them, whilst living under the nominal protection of the Government of India, to be annually plundered and massacred with impunity by their savage neighbours, would have been tolerated for a single year by any British Government. To our oldest frontier officers the whole Afridi and trans-Afridi country was, four years ago, for all practical purposes, a *terra incognita*. When we made war upon Sher Ali, our knowledge of it was dependent upon rough maps and sketches surreptitiously made by soldiers in the Guide Corps who had relatives beyond the border, or European officers, who, like Major Cavagnari and Mr. Christie, had been punished or reprimanded for their indulgence of a forbidden curiosity. The greater part of the trans-frontier country up to the Hindu-Kush has now been accurately surveyed and mapped; and, under the present Indian administration, all unconditional prohibitions upon personal enterprise have been removed. The war, moreover, has interposed a salutary, though temporary, interruption of the state of things above discussed. But, with the close of the war, the old system, unless forcibly got rid of, will reassert itself, reproducing the old evils; nor can it be effectually got rid of by any measures which the Government of India is competent to enforce without the approval and support of Her Majesty's Government. Such is the state of things which will certainly be perpetuated if we yield to the appeal of the Punjab Government, whose Note to the Commission naturally indicates no recognition of its defects. Those defects may be tempered by the intelligence and loyalty of the Lieutenant Governor for the time being; and, under the administration of Sir Robert Egerton, their practical inconvenience will doubtless be reduced to a minimum. But such a state of things must be prejudicial to the production of first-class frontier officers, whether military or political. I cannot doubt that the spirit and efficiency of the Punjab Frontier Force would greatly benefit from the changes recommended by the Commission in its Report, and by myself more than three years ago. Nor can I see any sufficient reason why this fine force should any longer remain an outcast from the prizes open to the Bengal Army; a penalty which it must continue to suffer so long as it is effectually isolated from the personal control and, therefore, from the personal attention of the Commander in Chief.

33. But, in recording these opinions, I am anxious to make it clearly understood that I neither ignore nor underrate the necessity, established by experience, of providing for the independent use, not of the Local Government, but of the local officer, or officers, charged with the political management of the frontier, or of any considerable portion of it, an appropriate armed force; not excessive, but sufficient, very carefully selected, and exclusively subject to the orders of such officer or officers, without reference to those of the military authority, central or local. This is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of that personal influence on which the successful management of the frontier entirely depends. It is not the Local Government acting invisibly from a dis-

tance (Lahore or Simla), but the local officer acting visibly on the spot, who requires a moderate supply of military force permanently available, at a moment's notice, for the support of his authority, or the execution of his decisions. Without such a force entirely at his own disposal, for all such necessary and legitimate requirements, which are of daily occurrence on our frontiers, Sir Robert Sandeman could certainly not have acquired throughout Biluchistan that remarkable personal ascendancy which has enabled him, in less than two years' time, to effect the complete pacification of our Khelat frontier and the whole of the neighbouring country. My approval and support of the Commission's proposal to transfer the control of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander in Chief are entirely conditional upon previous or simultaneous provision for this indispensable requirement. Of course, a portion of the Punjab Frontier Force could at all times be detailed for the special service of the Punjab Frontier Officer, *after* that force had been made over to the Commander in Chief. But, on the whole, I certainly think it better that, *before* the frontier force is handed over to the Commander in Chief, a small but select body, formed from its existing elements, and chiefly from the Guide Corps, should be placed at the personal disposal of the officer or officers in political charge of the frontier. Such a body might be styled a Military Frontier Police; but, in any case, its constitution and training should be suited to the functions implied by that title. The local political authority, for whose assistance it is required, should be empowered to employ it for the maintenance of order, the protection of his own person, and the prevention of ordinary raids. But it should be distinctly understood by that authority that, if his employment of it ever gives rise to the necessity for more extensive or important operations, the entire control and direction of such operations will be immediately transferred to the Commander in Chief. I am satisfied by experience that this simple condition would suffice to stimulate the ingenuity of frontier officers in effecting the maximum of political result with the minimum of military force; and that it would act as a salutary check upon that impulsive and ill-considered recourse to superfluous military effort which has so often drifted the Government of India, insensibly and unwillingly, into inconvenient military operations; for which the personal responsibility of their local authors cannot be too severely enforced. There is, and must be, on the least settled parts of our frontier an almost daily occurrence of petty troubles, which, under the personal management of an efficient frontier officer who understands his business, ought to be promptly settled without even coming to the knowledge of the Government of India. But it is the tendency of inefficient officers, who wish to make themselves important, yet shrink from personal responsibility, to magnify instead of minimising such incidents.

III.—*In the event of our agreeing to the above proposals, shall we accept the principle of the division of the Army for military command into Corps, each Corps being confined to a certain geographical area?*

34. Though I have expressed my opinion that the whole Army of India should be brought within the direct control of the Commander in Chief in India under the Government of India, I fully recognise the necessity for a subdivision of the troops into manageable units, on the same principle as that whereby the country is divided into governable areas.

35. The size of each of the largest military units must be determined by the number of troops whose administration can be carefully supervised by a moderate staff; and I do not see that the Army of India, consisting, as it does, at its present strength, of about 66,000 British, and 123,000 Native, soldiers, is so large as to require a subdivision into more than four commands.

36. I unreservedly accept the principles laid down by the Commission for the subdivision of the army into territorial district commands. Each command should, in my opinion, be entirely self-contained in the matter of arsenals and stores. Each Commander of one of these large corps should be responsible for everything within his command, and should have as complete a staff as though he had an army in the field. I consider that he should have the appointment, within his own command, to all commands held by officers under the rank of Major General; but that, for commands of that rank, the selection should be made

made by the Commander in Chief in India, in the case of Indian Officers, and by the Commander in Chief in England in the case of British Officers. The Commander of each corps should have the nomination of the staff within his command, including his own Chief of the Staff; for, unless his Chief of the Staff is congenial to him, and thoroughly trusted by him, the work of detail will centre in the Corps Commander instead of in the Chief of the Staff, and the latter will be an incumbrance instead of an invaluable help.

37. The utmost possible decentralization should be encouraged. Nothing should be referred to army head-quarters, except matters involving expenditure not included in the estimates, matters of discipline affecting the army at large, and questions affecting the general defence of the Empire. Unless this decentralization is real, and not a mere sham, we shall do better to remain under the existing system of Presidency commands. If centralization be carried in India to the extent, for instance, to which it prevails in England, we shall soon have our army commanded by clerks and civilians, and junior Officers in the Military Department of the Government of India will be reviewing the decisions of Generals in command.

38. *Centralization* for all that belongs to the general defence of the Empire, for unity of offensive action in case of war beyond our frontier, for uniformity of payment and account, of armament, instruction, and manœuvring, and *decentralization* for minor discipline, patronage, account, control, and supply, should, I conceive, be the principles guiding the division of the Indian Army.

IV.—*In case of our accepting III., are the territorial divisions recommended by the Commission the best that can be suggested?*

39. There is one great advantage in assimilating the army corps to the areas of the several Governments, viz., that the Commander of each corps comes directly into connection with the governing authority of his own district, is responsible to him alone for the preservation of order in the district, and can obtain the advice and assistance of the officials of that district in all matters of supply, transport, and recruiting.

40. The importance is universally admitted of keeping the recruitment for each army corps confined to one particular territory, and maintaining certain well-marked distinctions of race between the several Native Armies, or, as in the proposed organisation, different portions of the Native Army serving in its several corps.

41. I do not feel justified by my personal experience in expressing any independent opinion on the details of the territorial distribution so carefully worked out, and unanimously approved by the Commission. But, believing, as I do, that the President of the Commission is quite the ablest of all our local administrators; knowing, as I do, that Mr. Bernard, its Civilian Member, possesses an exceptionally wide and varied knowledge of the administrative conditions and social circumstances peculiar to each great division of the Empire; and considering what we are bound to bear in mind, that the Commission has commanded, and fully utilized, the means of detailed consultation with all the Local Governments; I am of opinion that the Government of India cannot do better than accept without hesitation the conclusion thus authoritatively commended to its adoption on this question, by all its most experienced civil and military officers. Certain it is, in any case, that neither this Government, nor that of Her Majesty in England, can augment or contest the volume of local evidence and advice upon which the Commission has founded its recommendations in regard to the territorial distribution of our military establishments.

V.—*If we accept the above, shall we accept the principle of concentration of force at important strategical points, and the abandonment of minor cantonments?*

42. On the principle here involved I am entirely in accord with the Commission. Sir F. Haines says: "The concentration of troops, as far as circum-"stances would permit, has always been the object sought by military Com-"manders." And the Commission truly observes that "the present system of "scattering the troops at small stations in peaceful parts of the country has "long

"long been condemned and deprecated." I am surprised to find a single voice raised in defence of that system. It is a waste of power, and a waste of money. It makes relief a matter of great difficulty and expense. It is the unconscious and uncorrected growth of time, originated by circumstances which no longer exist. Sir E. Johnson, however, upholds the system. India, he says, is to be held by force, and by force only. All the Natives of all the provinces of the Empire are ready, and more or less able, he believes, to rise against us at any moment. There are, he maintains, chronic and ineradicable elements of danger in the ambition or fanaticism of the population. These dangers, he thinks, can only be averted by the employment of European troops, who must for that purpose be scattered broadcast, in little handfuls throughout the country, where they may be "palpably *en evidence*," and act as a constant threat to all classes of the Queen's Native subjects. India, he contends, can only be treated, and must always be treated as an enemy's country, in hopelessly permanent and never mitigated military occupation, and the army is to preserve "the peace of "the country after the fashion of military police." "Never," he avers, "can "we harbour the hope that in our time Kuram and Peshin, like Alsace and "Lorraine, may be garrisoned by a 'peace establishment.'" I know not what duration of time this prediction is intended to indicate, but it is certainly "by "a peace establishment" that "in our time," we garrison the recently annexed provinces of Sindh and Oudh. For, whether our establishment be or be not excessive for peace, recent experience has proved that it is quite inadequate for war. Again, Sir E. Johnson observes that in Europe every governing power absolutely requires "a system" enabling it "to place a vigorous and exacting "hand" on all its military resources "in the shortest space of time;" yet he adds that in India there is no need of any such system, because here the governing power is surrounded by "the latent dangers connected with the forcible retention "of an uncongenial soil, and the repression of an unsympathetic population." This population he believes to be ready to rise at any moment against the governing power, which, nevertheless, he considers, apparently for that very reason, to be in no need of "a system enabling it to lay a vigorous and exacting "hand on all its military resources in the shortest space of time."

43. I find it impossible to understand, and therefore difficult to deal seriously with, such reasoning as this. But it appears to me that my honourable military colleague has in his mind the vision of an India altogether different from the India of to-day; and even if it be desirable that troops should be placed "palpably *en evidence*" before the people, that object can be far better attained by marching moveable columns of all arms through the country in the cold season than by holding a number of small stations with weak and immobile battalions. Such a practice would indeed be most valuable, not only as training for the troops, but also as a test of the sufficiency and condition of the transport to be maintained for the moveable columns. Sir E. Johnson says that "garrison duties at large stations are at all times arduous and harassing." This, however, does not arise from too many, but from too few, regiments being stationed at the same garrison, and the stations he mentions forcibly illustrate the fact. The duties at Calcutta and Peshawur are heavy, but why? Simply because the regiments stationed there are too few for the number of duties and guards which have to be provided for, and which must be provided for, whether the garrison be large or small. It is not the regiments which make the duties, but weak regiments are stationed where there are heavy duties to be performed. If the duties of guarding the Fort, Arsenal, Government House, Belvedere, the Mint, the Jail, and the Bank, were divided amongst four strong regiments instead of two and a-half weak ones, the duty would not be onerous. To enable some regiments to sleep away three or four years of their existence at such stations as Jhelum, Goruckpore, Moradabad, Bhaugulpore, Jhansi, Muttra, Shajehanpore, &c, double duty is imposed on the regiments at the large centres. Thus, instead of the work being easily distributed throughout the army, half the army is worn to death by want of a sufficient number of nights in bed, while the other half is rotting in idleness at a petty out-of-the-way station, and when Government has to move a force for field service, instead of being able to send off a brigade fully equipped and ready for service, the regiments have to be got in from these distant out-stations; whilst even then only a portion of each regiment is efficient, as they have to leave behind a third of their force for station guards and depôt.

69. But in India the Military Member of Council is, under the present system, a soldier of military rank inferior to that of the Commander in Chief; nor could the proposals of the Commission, if unreservedly adopted, effect, in his purely military status, any change for the better that would be recognised as a reality by military men. He is, in fact, an Officer who may have been serving yesterday under the orders of the Commander in Chief, and will be serving under them again to-morrow, but who meanwhile, during his tenure of office, is required to issue orders to his military senior and superior, and, in the words of the Commission's Report, "to protect the Government from blind confidence "in an inefficient Commander."

70. The uncongenial and incongruous position of comprehensive subordination in which the Commander in Chief is thereby placed, as regards his daily official relations with one of his own Officers is tempered, under the present system, by the seat assigned to him in Council with a rank second only to that of the Viceroy, and by the theory (undisputed though irreconcilably inconsistent with fact) that he is "the Viceroy's intimate and chief responsible "adviser in all military matters." It is, of course, notorious that the Viceroy cannot act on the advice of the Commander in Chief in a single military matter without "intimate" consultation with the Military Member; but the Commander in Chief's seat in the Viceroy's Council is at least a reality which serves to give an external semblance of substance to the theoretical responsibility of an adviser who has, in his military capacity, no financial responsibility at all. Take away this seat in Council and intensify the Commander in Chief's subordination to the Military Member, as the Commission proposes to do, and it seems to me that the official position of the great executive head of the army in India must forthwith become not only intolerable but untenable. I cannot but fear that no Officer conscious of his own abilities and possessing, with the independence of character and intellect which is desirable, the military rank and reputation which are requisite to fill with adequate efficiency and influence the great office of Commander in Chief in India, would then be found willing to accept it on such terms, and this would be a serious misfortune for both the Government and the Army of India. I cannot too emphatically record my conviction that the dual military Government organised in this country "on a "system of want of trust" should be abolished as speedily and completely as possible. To quote once more the wise words of Lord Dalhousie, "there "cannot be two masters having the power to control public measures."

71. My conclusion is, then, that the Commander in Chief should be himself the Military Member, *and the only Military Member*, of the Viceroy's Council. In him alone, as in the War Minister of every country not governed by parliamentary institutions, should be united and concentrated the executive command and the administrative control of the army. At present the Commander in Chief in India unavoidably exercises a certain amount of power not assigned to him by the constitution of the Government, but, practically, inseparable from the great influence and authority of his position both in and out of Council, in matters involving military expenditure, for which, nevertheless, he is entirely without any financial responsibility, whilst at the same time the powers appropriate to his office, powers which cannot be as conveniently exercised by any other authority, are unrecognised; and his initiative is disputed, his utility crippled and paralyzed at every turn, by the natural consequences of his unfortunate exemption from that financial responsibility which ought to be commensurate with the executive, no less than the administrative, activities of a sound military Government.

72. For working the simplified machinery of such a Government the Commander in Chief would require the co-operation of, first, a Chief of the Staff, and, second, a Financial Secretary. The ablest men available should be carefully selected for these two important offices. The first would be directly responsible to the Commander in Chief for the efficiency of the army, the second for its economical administration. The Chief of the Staff should be an Officer second only in rank to the Commander in Chief himself. The respective heads of all the combatant and non-combatant departments, and of all the various branches into which he might distribute the collective business and duty of the military staff, should be placed directly under this Officer. In his

hands should be concentrated all business relating to the administration of the army, and all proposals for its improvement should be submitted through him. Upon the Financial Secretary should devolve the permanent duty and responsibility of putting promptly and clearly before the Commander in Chief the financial aspects of all such business and all such proposals. This last-named officer should also be responsible to the Commander in Chief for keeping military expenditure well within the bounds sanctioned by the Government of India. The Financial Secretary should be an official trained in the Financial Department.

73. Under the present inconvenient and irrational system, the Commander in Chief has no personal or professional interest in economy. He gains no credit from the maintenance, incurs no censure by the disregard of it. His natural desire and legitimate object is to get the largest and best paid army for whose maintenance money can by any means be screwed out of the Military Department, and to that Department he leaves the odium, in military eyes, of rejecting magnificent proposals submitted and urged without the smallest regard to their financial consequences; but, under any other system, it would be perfectly easy (and, in my opinion, it is absolutely necessary) to fix upon the Commander in Chief that strict responsibility for combining efficiency with economy, from which no other head of any great spending department is exempted. If this were done, I cannot doubt that the means annually placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief would go very much further than they do now; and he would then become, in *fact*, what he is now only in *theory*, "the most intimate," because "the most responsible adviser of the Viceroy in "all military matters."

74. So far as I can judge, there is, amongst army reformers in India, only one opinion (an opinion which I share unreservedly) as to the great importance of strengthening, if possible, but in no case weakening, the purely military power and personal position of the Commander in Chief. The proposals of the Commission, as I understand them, have been suggested from this point of view, and framed under a strong impression that the effect of their adoption would be not to diminish but greatly to increase the military influence and usefulness of the executive head of the army. It is apparently under this impression that the writers of the Report refer to the fuller freedom and enlarged leisure which the Commander in Chief would at once enjoy, if released from attendance in Council, for personally inspecting the army under his command, and making himself more thoroughly acquainted with the sentiments and requirements of its Officers and troops in all parts of India. I cannot, however, resist a different impression, equally strong on my own part, that no exemption from attendance in Council could enable any Commander in Chief, however great might be his powers of physical exertion, to personally inspect all the troops of the Armies of India; and that any attempt at such inspection of them would be a sheer waste of time and effort. The area is too vast for personal inspection by any single man; but in this, as in other matters, *qui facit per alium, facit per se.* If the Generals commanding army corps cannot be sufficiently trusted (and I see no reason why they should not) to ensure, by personal inspection and report, the necessary uniformity on points in regard to which uniformity is essential, then Inspectors General should be appointed for that purpose.

75. The recognised head of this great Army of India cannot, with advantage to it or to the State, be long or frequently absent from the seat of Government, and were the Commander in Chief in India fully invested (as I for one would wish to see him) with all the important functions and responsibilities appropriate to his natural position in a non-Parliamentary Government, he would I feel sure be the first to recognise that his proper place is by the side of the Viceroy, and that it is not consistent with the efficient discharge of his highest duties to absent himself from the Council table of the Governor General in order take personal command of fractions of his own army which may happen to be employed at any time on active service.

76. It is quite impossible to deal fully, within the scope of any ordinary minute, with all the recommendations of the Commission; nor is it necessary that I should attempt to do so. I have now recorded my opinion, at some length,

length, on all those great organic measures, the settlement of which must necessarily precede the consideration of minor details and determine the character and effect of the whole scheme of army reform in India. I would here point out, however, that there are some recommendations made by the Commission which, involving no great questions of policy, might at once be adopted with appreciable advantage to our financial interests; and notably those which have reference to the reorganisation of the Medical Departments. The reorganisation of the Transport Service also claims early practical attention; but, in reference to that question, I must confess that I view with misgiving the adoption of any system which is not equally suitable to war as well as peace time; and I trust that the Government of India will not, without careful consideration, confide to the Commissariat during peace any duties which cannot be efficiently performed by the Commissariat during war.

77. To sum up I approve and support the recommendation of the Commission; 1st, to remove the armies of the minor Presidencies from the control of the Local Governments, and to place them under the Commander in Chief of India; 2nd, to apply similar treatment to the Punjab Frontier Force, subject only to certain reservations which I have explained; 3rd, to divide the army for the purposes of military command into four corps respectively assigned to the geographical areas defined by the Commission in its Report; 4th, to concentrate our forces at certain strategical points, abandoning minor cantonments; 5th, to increase the strength of the Infantry regiments and Cavalry regiments, reserving for further consideration, after the close of the present war, the proposal to reduce the number of them; 6th, to form reserves of Native troops, on the principle explained by the Commission; 7th, to reduce the Madras Army; 8th, I do not approve or support the proposal to exclude the Commander in Chief from Council. But I am, nevertheless, deeply convinced of the expediency of putting an end to the dual element in our present military administration.

78. I should be neglecting the pleasantest of my remaining duties as Viceroy and Governor General were I to close this Minute without recording my high appreciation of the great value of the difficult and very important task performed, on behalf of the Government and Army of India, by the late Army Commission, with an ability conspicuous in every page of its Report, and an industry which I believe to be unparalleled by any previous Commission in this country. The practical spirit in which all the members of the Commission have approached the labours assigned to them, the firmness and fulness of their final grasp on every essential point of the important questions examined by them, and the satisfactory unanimity of their conclusion on the majority of those questions, entitle the recommendations now before us to most serious and impartial consideration from the members of this administration and the Ministers of Her Majesty. Whatever differences of opinion may exist in reference to these recommendations, I feel sure that amongst those who have studied, or will hereafter study, the Report of the Commission with the care and impartiality it deserves, there can be no difference of opinion as to the completeness and rapidity with which the Commission has collected, from all parts of the Empire, a most valuable body of information respecting the organisation and administration of the Indian armies, nor as to the ability with which it has arranged and examined all this information for the assistance of the Government in a task which, if continued in the same spirit, cannot fail to be productive of great benefit to the armies, the finances, and the people of India.

This result, so creditable to all concerned, is mainly attributable to the talent and energy of the Honourable Sir Ashley Eden, who deserves the warmest thanks of the Government of India (and I venture to think of Her Majesty's Government also) for the great services rendered by him in connection with the late Commission, of which he was President.

79. In conclusion, I desire that the present Minute may be appended to the Despatch which the Secretary of State is now awaiting from the Government of India, on the subject of the Commission's Report, and in which it will be the duty of the Government of India to lay before the Secretary of State the collective result of its deliberations on the proposals submitted to it by the Commission.

sion. I also request that if any one of the Minutes already written on this subject, by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, General the Honourable Sir E. Johnson, and the Honourable Sir A. Arbuthnot, or of the Minutes which may hereafter be written on the same subject by any of my other honourable colleagues, is eventually laid before Parliament, or otherwise published, this Minute of mine may be similarly treated.

Lytton.

Simla, 16th May 1880.

— 4. —

MINUTE by Major General *Alex. Fraser*, R.E., on the Report of the Special Commission on the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in *India* (1879).

1. IN noting on the "Peace formation of the Army in India," the Commission write as follows:*—

* Para. 39, chapter IV., of the Report.

"One of the first and most important questions which came before us for consideration was the territorial formation of the Army in India in time of peace, its distribution and its command; these indeed form the base from which all our proposals in respect to the organisation of the army proceed."

2. This being the case, it is clearly premature to discuss the details of the proposals until we have established, with the consent of Her Majesty's Government, the general principles on which the detailed recommendations are based.

3. I propose, therefore, to confine myself in this Minute to a consideration of the main outline of the Commission's scheme, which may be briefly summed up as follows:—

I.—The substitution of four territorial army corps, as distinct forces, independent in themselves, but under one supreme authority, in place of the three separate armies which now exist.

II.—A re-arrangement of the location of the army, with reference to the strategic points to be held.

III.—The exclusion of the Commander in Chief from the Council of the Viceroy and Governor General.

4. The present territorial distribution of the army has grown with the growth of the Empire, the existing arrangement has survived the changes inseparable from the conditions under which the British Indian Empire has been gradually acquired and consolidated, and which have more or less modified all other departments of the administration, but it is not on this account the less open to reconsideration at the present time.

5. The conditions under which the Empire has grown need not be sketched out here; commencing at different periods at what are now the Presidency towns, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, it has gradually extended till the territories administered from each centre have become co-terminous. Up to the time† when the railways were linked in between the Presidency Towns, the Presidencies were absolutely isolated from each other. Indeed, in 1845, when I first came to India, the quickest means of joining from Calcutta the army on the Sutlej, then operating against the Sikhs, was by *palki* borne on men's shoulders. There were then, practically, neither roads nor bridges in India, except the Grand Trunk Road extending to Delhi, and the Great Deccan Road. There were no telegraphs. The soldiery were armed with the "Brown Bess," and our heaviest pieces of siege ordnance were 24-pounders and 8-inch howitzers.

† Through communication between Calcutta and Bombay was completed on the 8th March 1870. Madras was connected with the system on 1st May 1871, the railway was opened to Delhi in 1867, to Lahore and Mooltan on 15th October 1870, and Mooltan was connected with Karachi on 27th October 1878.

6. While

6. While the Presidencies and the Presidency Armies were thus distinct, and means of communication so limited and precarious, it must not be lost sight of that excellent service was often rendered by the respective armies beyond the limits of their Presidency. The military force which won the battle of Plassey in 1757 was principally composed of Madras troops, Native and European, with part of a Royal Regiment of Foot, and the Madras troops further took conspicuous part in the Burmese wars of 1824 and 1852-53. In 1845-46 and 1848-49 the Bengal and Bombay Armies were employed together against the Sikhs; and in 1857-1858 the Bombay and Madras Armies were employed, with what remained faithful of the Bengal Army, for the suppression of the mutiny, and again in 1879-80 all three armies have been employed in Afghanistan.

7. I further observe, from perusal of past history, that all the territorial Native armies have been from time to time mutinous, which has always been suppressed by bringing either the European force or that force combined with other territorial Native armies to bear on them.

8. In 1845-46 and in 1848-49 the Sepoy Army, the Poorbeahs, fought in our interests against the Sikhs, and overcame them. In 1857 again, the Sikhs fought on our side against our mutinous Poorbeah sepoys.

9. Our circumstances are now very different to what they were 40 years ago. The country has been welded into one by the construction of a network of roads and railways; the telegraph has been introduced and extended to all the important centres of trade or politics, and our soldiers are armed with the best and most accurate weapons, the fire from which is, as the Afghans describe it, "like "rain" from which no shelter can be got. While the country has been at peace for the last 20 years, its populations have been quieting down, and it is quite true, and highly creditable I think, to the British Government, that the arms even of the fighting classes have been turned into ploughshares.

10. And in these days of scientific soldiering, unity of command and equality of service are absolutely necessary for combined movement against a common enemy, whether it be in the shape of mutiny or external foe. Hence it is my distinct opinion that, while the whole of the armies in India should be combined in one under the supreme Commander in Chief, there should be a sub-division of the army into corps, convenient to immediate movement at the instance of Local Governments for the suppression of outbreak other than mutiny, and convenient to the recruiting grounds where the best material for soldiers is to be found.

11. Further, I hold that any reasons which may be put forward for the segregation of the Bengal and Madras and Bombay Armies, would apply with still greater force to the separation of the fighting races of the north, and to the sub-division of the Bengal territory, which, as now constituted (for army purposes), includes the recruiting grounds of Oudh and Behar (the nurseries of the Poorbeah sepoys, who with the help of our European force conquered the Sikhs in 1845-49), as well as the Punjab, whence are drawn the men who, in 1857-58, were mainly instrumental in putting down the mutiny of the Poorbeah sepoys.

12. Therefore from the record of the past, and my own personal experience in India for the last 35 years, as well as for the reasons given by the Commission, I am brought to the identical conclusion formulated in the 52nd paragraph (page 21, Chapter IV.) of their Report.

13. I believe, however, that the present Bombay Army is largely composed of soldiers recruited from the north, and that the Madras Army must be looked on, so far as the Native element is concerned, as the great counterpoise to our northern armies, as being wholly recruited from its own districts, and as having proved themselves in the past good soldiers, and I would deprecate any large reduction of its force. From the facts I have referred to previously, and also from my own observation, I hold that the Madras sepoy is a fine soldier, worthy of our utmost confidence, and that we shall do well to encourage him to take a large part under our colours. It may be argued that the Madras sepoy is not the

the soldier he was, owing to the long period of peace which has been enjoyed by the Madras people; but this argument is fast becoming applicable to the northern nations also.

14. With a fair balance of fighting power between the east and the west, and the north and the south, and the great facilities we have now, not only in bringing reinforcements from England, but in moving troops about within Indian limits by railway, whereby, with our arms of precision, we should be able to nip in the bud, with a regiment, an outbreak which in former days would have required an army to suppress, I should look for financial relief to the reduction of the European force in the country, or of the northern armies, rather than to that of an army which has in the past done grand service, and whose soldiers are at the present time doing, in common with those of the other armies, good work in the field. Under this view, I would also observe that the recruiting for the Bombay Army should be restricted to its own area, as is, I suppose, intended.

15. I have no doubt that we shall more easily find recruits by giving to the army corps certain areas for recruiting and for relief, which areas shall be within a reasonable distance from their homes. The Native troops in the present Afghan war have behaved nobly, and always will do so on foreign service; but to ensure recruits, the men must know that when the active service is over they will return to their own ground, within a reasonable distance from their homes, for furlough, &c., otherwise recruits will not be found to fill up our ranks.

16. It is of course essential that *all* fortresses and arsenals should be in the hands of European troops, supplemented by only such number of Native soldiers as may be necessary to take guard during the heat of the day.

17. In regard to the head-quarters of the commands and the strategical positions suggested, I agree generally in the views of the Commission, except that I would make Lahore, and not Rawal Pindi, the head-quarters of the Punjab command. Although it does not appear to me to be necessary to maintain separate Military Governments (such as those in Madras and Bombay), I think it very desirable that the Lieutenant General commanding each army corps should be in immediate and personal communication with the heads of the Governments chiefly concerned with the more turbulent or comparatively isolated nationalities to be dealt with. Lahore is, both politically and sentimentally, an important centre placed at the junction of great railways. My own opinion is that a fort should be built at Lahore, where our chief arsenal in the north should be placed, doing away with Ferozepur as a first-class arsenal, the protection of which, indeed, appears to be now the only reason for its being maintained as a military station at all. Such a fort at Lahore would also overawe an important city, protect an important railway junction, and become a general refuge for European or Eurasian non-combatants in case of local outbreak.

18. In respect of the lines of communication (Chapter XI.) I agree in what is stated, except in para. 537, where a comparison is drawn between the Khyber and the Kuram routes to Kabul. I do not, however, intend to write anything further on the subject here than to indicate my opinion that, while the Kuram route must be held, holding that line there is no necessity for maintaining a line beyond Lundi Kotal on the Khyber.

19. Lastly, I observe that the principle of the Commander in Chief being in Council has frequently been recognized by successive Acts of Parliament, while doubts have been expressed of the necessity for an additional Military Member. I do not at all agree with the Commission in thinking that the Commander in Chief of all India should be kept out of the Council of the Governor General. It seems to me quite certain that the inspection of troops, except at reviews, fields of exercise, &c., is not the *rôle* of the Commander in Chief in this vast country. He will not be required to exercise immediate control over the army corps, except possibly in case of a combined movement against an enemy. It will be his business to see that the general organization of the army is kept up, on the lines laid down by the Government: and for this end he should certainly be in the Council, not only for purposes of general organization, but for command in the field, in direct communication with the Viceroy in cases where two or more army corps act together.

20. On

20. On the other hand, I am of opinion that the Military Member is not needed, may in fact prove mischievous. If he agrees with the Commander in Chief, the military element is too strong for the Council; if he disagrees, the Department may come to a deadlock between the two. Moreover, there is a distribution of responsibility under present arrangements which is adverse to efficiency. With a Military Member in Council, between the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief, a responsibility which is due to the head of the army is thrown upon the Governor General. The Secretary to the Government in the Military Department is the Officer responsible that the orders of the Government of India are not overlooked; but, under present circumstances, he is liable to become merely a secretary to the Military Member of Council. Some provision would, however, in this case have to be made for the conduct of the Council's business during the possible absence of the Commander in Chief in the field. But this appears to me to present no practical difficulty when the Governor General in Council has always the aid of a high military officer in the Secretary in the Military Department.

21. To sum up, I agree to the following extent in the main principles of the Commission's recommendations contained—

I. In Chapter IV., formulated in paras. 52 and 67, except that I would make Lahore the head-quarters of the Punjab Army Corps, and place the first-class arsenal there instead of at Ferozepur; that I deprecate any large reduction of the Madras Army, and would propose that the strength of the troops and their obligatory garrisons be the subject of reconsideration after the close of the present war.

II. In Chapter V., with such modifications as would be necessary if the opinions that the Commander in Chief should be a Member of Council, and that an additional Military Member is neither necessary nor desirable, be adopted.

22. If these main principles are agreed to by Her Majesty's Government,—and I think whatever is done on military or financial grounds in respect of the Madras and Bombay armies, it is essential to the safety of India that there should be as great distinction between the Bengal troops and those of the Punjab as there is between those of Madras and Bombay,—the details of the recommendations of the Army Commission in other chapters may be usefully considered. But, if the present organization and distribution of the Presidential armies be adhered to, much time will have been wasted if we enter on considerations of a superstructure dependent on a foundation which is not made secure by the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

23. This Minute was written so far previously to my seeing any of the Minutes of my honourable colleagues,* or that of his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 16th May 1880. Before submitting it to his Excellency, I desire to make a few further remarks.

* His Excellency the Commander in Chief.
Sir Alexander Arbuthnot.
Sir Edwin Johnson.

24. In regard to what Sir Edwin Johnson says about his advocacy of placing the military branch of the Public Works Department in the hands of the Military Department, I have already stated, in another Note, that I think this would be a mistake, unless the measure is carried further, even to the breaking up altogether of the Public Works Department as a central department of the State. The service of Royal Engineers of the old Indian regiments and of the Imperial corps is so mixed up with their service on the public works of India, that any such new condition would require grave consideration.

25. I cannot agree with Sir Edwin Johnson in what he says about the "progress of railways" (page 13 of his Minute of 4th March 1880) in India. Although my honourable colleague's statement of present lengths of lines as compared with areas in India and other countries may be true, yet it must be considered an "essential" fact, as bearing on the "potential volcanic dangers" of which he speaks, that a force from Bombay, Madras, or Calcutta can be placed at Lahore or *vice versâ* within ten days of its being required, and in a shorter space of time at any intermediate place. Before the advent of railways, this would not have been possible within four or five months.

26. If we admit the possibility of all districts and provinces being in revolt at the same time, then no doubt we should be in a fearful plight, and railroads might not help us. But the possibility of all the volcanoes bursting into action at once need not be contemplated, except as one which, it appears to me, the organization proposed by the Commission tends to prevent.

27. The potential fact is that now we are able to bring a force to bear, at all events on the borders of any State in India not on the seaboard, in as many days as before it took weeks or months to do. And if the great lines of railway which have already been built, and which have always been considered strategic as well as commercial from Lord Dalhousie's time downwards, are not to be taken into account in estimating our military power and its cost, then indeed there would be little justification in placing the country under the burden which is involved in the expenditure necessary for extending them for almost purely military purposes.

28. As to what the Commander in Chief says, under the head "Communica-"tions," in para. 65 of his Excellency's Minute, I do not understand that the break of gauge has been fixed at Sibi further than as a temporary and convenient measure.

It is still open either to come back with the metre gauge to Sukkur, or to go on with the broad gauge to the higher plateaux. The latter course, however, will be costly and inconvenient as regards any Native establishment it may be necessary to employ, whatever advantage it may have in regard to Europeans. My own opinion is that, save to Peshawur and Karachi, our railway system beyond the Indus should be on the narrower gauge.

We should, I think, look (although the Commander in Chief would at present be content with a metalled and bridged road, which would, however, be very costly) for a possible connection by railway of the Kuram (if that be made) and Kandahar lines through the stations of Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan in the Derajat.

I cannot admit the propriety of laying down lines which may have to run along the foot of the hills west of the Indus, and penetrate them at intervals on the broad gauge; but the possibility of arriving at so great an accession of military strength on our frontiers would certainly be, for financial reasons, indefinitely postponed by doing so.

29. In respect of para. 70 of the Commander in Chief's Minute, it seems useless to regret accomplished facts; but the Rajputana Railway presents a line, from Bombay (as far as Delhi and Agra) to the Punjab or the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, alternative to the routes *viâ* Allahabad and Karachi, which to my mind is another potential fact bearing on our military command over "volcanic dangers" which may exist in either of those important localities.

30. I have now only to add that I entirely agree with the views expressed under the heads, I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., VIII., and X. of the 11th paragraph of the Viceroy's powerful review. In regard to IX., the proposal to reduce the Madras Army, all that I desire in respect of that fine army will be met if the matter be brought under reconsideration by the Commission, which his Excellency recommends (para. 47 of the Minute) should again meet to report on the numbers of Europeans and Native troops (and I suppose their distribution) proposed by the Commission, whose Report is now being reviewed by the Members of the Government of India.

27th May 1880. (signed) *Alex. Fraser.*

N.B.—I assume, in the above remarks, that Her Majesty's Government absolutely forbids any foreign Power to interfere with any of the nations or tribes on our frontier. If it be otherwise, then the "volcanic dangers" would become as real to my mind as they are apparently to that of Sir Edwin Johnson. Under such circumstances, we should have to increase our forces, especially of Europeans, to such an extent that India would become an intolerable financial burden to us.

A. F.—27th May 1880.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 287 of 1880—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 10 *August* 1880).

My Lord Marquis, Simla, 20 July 1880.

IN our military letter, No. 204, of the 1st June 1880, formally submitting for the consideration of your Lordship in Council and Her Majesty's Government the Report of the Army Organization Commission, with the opinions recorded thereon in Minutes by several members of our Government, we stated that a further Minute by our colleague Sir Edwin Johnson would follow by a later mail.

2. We have now the honour to forward this second Minute, which we request may be recorded with the previous correspondence on the subject.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
F. P. Haines.
J. Strachey.
E. B. Johnson.
W. Stokes.
J. Gibbs.
C. U. Aitchison.

Enclosure referred to.

MINUTE by General Sir *Edwin Johnson*, K.C.B., C.I.E.

I REGRET that the further Minute, which it was stated in the Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 1st June 1880, would follow by a later mail, has not been submitted earlier; but as my honourable colleague, Mr. Rivers Thompson, expressed his intention of recording a Minute to accompany my own, I deferred writing until he had done so.

As, however, from press of work, Mr. Thompson had been unable, he informed me the day before he left Simla, to complete his paper, I must now no longer defer writing what I am anxious to put forward.

I must premise my observations by stating that the Minute which I attached to the Despatch of the 1st June was not written as a Minute, but simply as a departmental note, formally submitting the Report and Appendices of the Army Organization Commission for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, and that of the members of Government, to be subsequently considered and discussed in Council, together with any notes on the same subject which might be written by his Excellency and my colleagues.

The ordinary procedure not having been adopted, and no discussion in Council having taken place, it became necessary for me, at the last moment, to ask that my original and informal note might be turned into a Minute and attached to our Despatch of the 1st June forwarding the Report, with the Minutes of his Excellency the Viceroy, his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and the other members of the Council, who had recorded them. The Viceroy's Minute, I may observe, was only sent to me on the 26th May.

This departure from the ordinary procedure was due, no doubt, to the anxiety of the late Viceroy to place the Report of the Commission, together with his Excellency's own Minute on the same, in the hands of the Secretary of State before leaving office. I cannot but regret, however, that this necessity arose, and that the papers on this most important subject should have left our hands without one single discussion in Council. I regret it personally, because I was thus deprived of the opportunity of explaining to the Viceroy and my colleagues many points in my note which required explanation, and because, owing to the absence of such explanation, my views and opinions have been misunderstood and so unsparingly criticised in his Excellency's Minute.

I believe that, had the opportunity of discussion and of personal explanation been afforded me, Lord Lytton's Minute, however much he may have differed

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from me, would not have taken the shape and form in which it has been forwarded to the Secretary of State.

It is not my intention to remark paragraph by paragraph on his Lordship's Minute, but there are some points in it to which it is incumbent on me to reply; and this I will endeavour to do as briefly as possible, and with all the respect which is due to his Lordship's high position.

Concentration of Troops.

The first point is that relating to the concentration of force at important strategical positions and the abandonment of minor cantonments.

On this subject Lord Lytton remarks that he is entirely in accord with the Army Commission, which states that the "present system of scattering the "troops at small stations in peaceful parts of the country has long been con-"demned and deprecated;" and, in support of his opinion, his Lordship quotes his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, who says "that the concen-"tration of troops, as far as circumstances would permit, had always been the "object sought by military commanders;" and with reference to this policy, his Lordship says, especially adverting to the opinion I expressed on this subject in my departmental note, "I am surprised to find a single voice in defence of "that system." * * * "Sir Edwin Johnson, however, upholds the "system."

I beg to point out that on this most important question my opinions are almost, if not entirely, identical with those of the Commander in Chief in India; for, so far as circumstances, political as well as military, will permit, I quite agree that economy and the military efficiency which would be derived from the concentration of troops for the purpose of military exercise render such concentrations desirable.

Sir Frederick Haines' observation, thus quoted by his Lordship, was, however, followed by his bringing prominently to the notice of Government the opinion held by General Sir Neville Chamberlain on this subject, and in every word of which his Excellency states he "most cordially concurs."

Sir Neville Chamberlain expresses himself as follows:—

"I submit that concurrent authority was unanimously opposed to the sweep-"ing reduction of stations and regiments of Native infantry as recommended "by Sir C. Trevelyan and Lord Napier and Ettrick; and in my opinion it is "most unadvisable now to adopt such a course. Although I most heartily "accept the principle of concentrating troops, as far as possible, at obligatory "and strategical positions, and of reducing the number of single or out-stations "to the utmost, still I am deeply impressed with the circumstance that the "number of our Native troops is small as compared with the area to be "occupied, and to the duties they may any day be called upon to discharge; "and that consequently, do what we may, after having met our local require-"ments, only a small force remains at our disposal for concentration. The "utility or the absolute necessity for the presence of troops may not be recog-"nized so long as they are present; but I venture to affirm that, if this necessity "be neglected or ignored, local disturbance will soon arise to prove that large "areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held, save by presence of "troops, ready if need be to act in support of order."

Sir Frederick Haines further states: "On similar grounds, I cannot recom-"mend that such stations as Segowlie, Gorakhpur or Moradabad should be "done away with;" nor, he adds, can he "admit the force of the arguments "that, because in the event of war with Nepal, the troops now stationed at "Segowlie and Gorakhpur would not be capable of dealing with that event, all "semblance of military power should be withdrawn from that long and exposed "frontier. His honour Sir George Couper, primarily responsible for the peace of "this district, urges the continued occupation of the posts named, viz., Morad-"abad and Gorakhpur."

I agree with the Commander in Chief. It might as well be said that, because insufficient in strength to oppose an enemy in front, advanced picquets should not be sent forward. These single regiment stations on our frontier represent, in relation to our larger garrisons in rear, what outlying picquets are to the body of an army in the field.

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I am induced to introduce these extracts from the recorded opinions of the high authorities I have quoted, notwithstanding that they may be found in the papers which have already been forwarded to the Secretary of State, because without a direct reference to them, and read by the light of Lord Lytton's Minute alone, it might be supposed that I stand alone in my objection to the abolition of small stations; whereas it will be seen from these extracts that my objections are shared by some of our highest and most experienced officers.

To the impolicy of large concentrations of Native troops, unless absolutely necessary for strategical purposes, I have already drawn attention in my former Minute; but of my remarks on this head, and of those of the high authority (the late Lord Sandhurst) whose strong opinions on the subject I quoted at length in support of my own, Lord Lytton has taken no notice.

Regarding his Lordship's remarks on my contention that we hold India by force, which he treats with scarcely disguised derision, I can only state my belief that my conviction is shared in by every man of long experience in this country who has ever given a thought to the subject. I am not aware of having put forward any new doctrine; I imagined it to be an axiom not to be disputed.

In saying this I would not be supposed to imply that our hold on India is not, in a large degree, maintained, or rather aided, by good Civil Government. On the contrary, I am aware that with double our military forces we could not maintain our position if the masses of the people were made discontented with our rule through a corrupt, vicious, and unjust administration.

I must protest, however, against the implication, which Lord Lytton's Minute suggests, that I regard the Natives of this country as generally disloyal. I deny altogether the justice of Lord Lytton's observation, that I appear to consider that "all the Natives of all the provinces of the Empire are ready and more "or less able to rise against us at any moment" I have never said this; and assuredly I have never thought it.

I have the privilege of the acquaintance of very many Native gentlemen; and I hope I may say also of the cordial friendship of not a few of them. It would pain me to think that they could believe me capable of holding the opinions which have been ascribed to me, or that I underrate or undervalue their loyalty to the Empire.

I only ask these gentlemen, and all indeed who have a stake in the country, and whose interests are bound up in the maintenance of peace and the prosperity of the people, to refer to what I really did write on the subject, and which has been so strangely misrepresented by the late Viceroy. I am convinced that they will recognize, not only the justice of the remarks themselves, but also the injustice which has placed upon them so unfavourable a construction.

I said: "India can admittedly only be held by force; to count on the love "and loyalty of the masses would be fanciful and fatal to the continuance of "our existence here.

"Such force is best and most cheaply applied when placed palpably *en* "*evidence;* and as the temptation of the Natives to disaffection and resistance "would be concurrent with the display of our weakness (in their minds mean-"ing absence of force), it is but reasonable to suppose that Sir Charles Wood's "conclusions, made at the head of his Council in 1864, after mature con-"sideration of the argument in favor of reduction and concentration of troops, "still held good."

He said: "It is impossible to deny" * * * "that there are constant "elements of danger in the ambition or the fanaticism of portions of the "population in various parts of India; and that the presence of a body of "European troops may prevent disturbances, which, if they broke out from the "absence of any such repressing force, might cause far more expense than "would be incurred by the maintenance of a permanent effective force on the "spot."*

I cannot

* I will quote here as very apposite to these views some remarks by my friend Sirdar Atta Singh, Chief of Bhadour, in his preface to a work on the Sikh religion, published by him in 1876. Speaking of the Sikh prophecies, he says: "Injustice, tyranny, and misrule are the main sources of commotions; but "as these disturbing agents have vanished under the present administration, which has introduced laws "and regulations suited to the age, and to the altered condition of the country, having refrained from "interference in religious matters, far greater peace and tranquillity than existed at any former period "have

I cannot for a moment admit that these remarks are susceptible of such a construction as Lord Lytton has put upon them.

Army Reserves.

I must again express my very great regret that the Report of the Army Commission has never been discussed in Council, and especially that the question of an army reserve has been so inadequately considered. Had such discussion taken place, I might possibly have satisfied the Viceroy that the position I took up, and which appeared to his Excellency so unintelligible, was really capable of explanation; and that my objections to the recommendations of the Commission, because their result would on the one hand be dangerous, and on the other insignificant, were sound and not as paradoxical as he appeared to consider them.

In my former note, since turned into a Minute, I said: "There are some "very important questions dwelt on by the Secretary" (Colonel Allen Johnson, Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department) "to which I "invite special attention." One of these questions was that of reserves. I said; "I have already expressed myself on this subject in reference to the "impolicy of the proposed system. Colonel Johnson's note treats not only "directly on this point, but also of the inadequacy of the measures proposed in "a numerical point of view."

As the Secretary's notes have not been considered in Council, I beg permission to introduce, *verbatim*, into this Minute so much of them as relate to the question of reserves.

When I wrote my opinions on the recommendation of the Army Commission, I had not, I desire to state, then seen the departmental notes of the Secretary, which, I believe, were not even written when the remarks contained in the earlier part of my Minute were penned; but they are so entirely apposite to what I have said in connection with the Commission's recommendations, first, on account of the inadequacy of their contemplated results, and, secondly, on account of their impolicy, that I gratefully adopt them in defence of my position, which has been so assailed by Lord Lytton, and as an answer to the remarks which have been made by his Excellency on the subject.

I make no apology for quoting the Secretary's opinions; for they are those of one possessing as long an experience and intimate knowledge of the subject of which he writes as those of any single Military Member of the Army Commission:—

"Para 260. The Commission calculate on obtaining in a certain time 19,200 "men of the first reserve, at the rate of 200 men per regiment.

"They allow 40 as the largest number of corps available for field service, "whose share of the reserve, deducting three Goorkha regiments, would be "7,400. The number of corps retained for obligatory garrison duty is 61, "whose share, deducting two Goorkha regiments, would be 11,800. These "11,800 men would not need to be called out, for their corps would not be "proceeding on service. Thus 19,200 men would be kept on pay to provide "for a possible demand of 7,400. This is aggravated when we come to the "second reserve of 300 men per corps; then the figures are respectively 11,100 "and 17,700, or, as a total result of the proposed reserve, 18,500 reservists "that might be wanted, with 29,500 that would not; for the essence of the "system is that the regiments shall have their own men, and there is no "pretence that the regiments in garrison will require to be strengthened by "200 or 500 men, or that the reservists shall take their place in garrison while "the corps are released from garrison duty.

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"have been secured. There should have been no mutinies under such an administration, and a con-"tinuous peace should have reigned over the country; but we find that disturbances have taken place. "These are to be attributed to the religious prejudices of the people, by whom the very tolerance of the "Government is regarded as a hardship. The old prophecies affect their minds to such a degree, that "they are often tempted to strike for freedom. Without multiplying instances, it will be sufficient to "mention the Mutiny of 1857 and the recent Kuka outbreak.

"The ignorance of the people, the tolerance of the Government, and the jealousies and suspicions "arising out of antagonistic creeds, have often endangered the country. Designing men, prompted by the "extravagant assurances of prophecy, have often lured their countrymen to destruction, and impregnated "their minds with an undying hostility to their rulers."

"For such a result is it worth while to upset the whole Native pension "system, so recently recast on its old lines; to introduce an entirely new "system into an army notoriously jealous and suspicious of innovation and "change in the terms of enlistment, retirement, and pension; to unsettle the "minds and arouse the suspicion of men on points of which they are above all "tenacious? The Secretary does not wish to intrude into the discussion of the "Commission's Report any counter-scheme of his own; but he would suggest "whether, if special steps are needed for hastily adding 200 men to the new "cadre of 912 rank and file, it would not be simpler to link on paper two or "three battalions—enlisting men on the condition that they are liable to be "drafted into either of the linked battalions proceeding on service, and then on "hostilities breaking out to transfer the requisite drafts to the leaving battalions, "and at once commence recruiting to complete the establishment. The Secre-"tary believes this would be attended with no kind of difficulty, would save "much embarrassment, would be far cheaper, would give far more effective men "to the corps in the field, and would avoid the elaborate machinery proposed "by the Commission, every step of which would be productive of correspondence, "expense, and administrative inconvenience. There would infallibly be an "Inspector General of Reserve Forces, or something like it; Inspectors of "Reserve Depôts, and the 101 little and big demands which always grow out of "a new institution; and all to bring to the colours some 7,000 or 8,000 men "more or less fit for duty, and some 11,000 or 12,000 much less than more so. "There is, it is submitted, no true analogy between India; where it would be "politically dangerous to maintain a really important reserve, and which it "could not use if it were maintained; and countries like Germany or France, "requiring to bring and able to move 300,000 or 400,000 troops to its frontier "in a fortnight, and dependent for its existence on its ultimate power to raise "800,000 or 1,000,000 men to defend its frontier or invade its neighbour. The "Secretary believes sincerely that he is neither a pessimist nor an alarmist, nor "given to oppose change as change; but he would urge, in the strongest "manner, that this subject of reserves and pensions should receive the deepest "consideration which can be given, it being, as it is, so closely allied to the "most serious questions affecting the feelings, or, if the phrase is preferred, the "prejudices, of the Native army. It would be, at the best, but an experiment, "which, if successful, would be productive of trifling results, but, if unsuccessful, "must be followed by unhappy consequences."

In his note, the Secretary refers to a project which, I am aware, he put forward some years ago, for a system of linked battalions, on which he briefly touches. A scheme of this sort appears to me to be well worthy of consideration, as one, whilst avoiding the objectionable system of reserves proposed by the Commission, tending to meet in some and no inconsiderable measure the difficulties we have at present to contend with, in a prolonged campaign, in a foreign and inhospitable country.

If there should be any substantial objection to a system of linked battalions, then as an alternative, and one, in my opinion, far preferable to the proposed reserves, our object might be attained by increasing to 900 rank and file the permanent establishment of our regiments—such increased numbers to be the war establishment—and by allowing long furlough, with considerably diminished pay whilst on leave, to two or even three hundred men, to reduce the "war" to a "peace" establishment. By some such scheme we should always have a reserve of the first class on furlough available at the shortest notice to join their regiments if ordered on service.

But whatever our difficulties may have been in the way of recruiting, and of maintaining our battalions in the field at effective strength, the greatest difficulty we have experienced is that caused by our inability to provide reliefs for battalions which have suffered in health from a prolonged campaign; and though the system which I have just suggested for increasing the regimental establishments by regimental reserves would greatly diminish the difficulty of keeping our regiments in the field effective in point of numbers, it would not, I am aware, increase our facilities for relieving battalions.

But still less would the proposals of the Commission meet that difficulty. On the contrary, they would greatly add to it; for as their proposals embrace a large reduction of battalions, those retained being on an increased establishment, it is evident that the difficulty of relieving battalions would be very greatly augmented;

augmented; and this is one of the many objections I entertain to the proposed reduction in the number of our regiments.

Position of the Commander in Chief.

Lord Lytton has gone at great length into the proposal of the Army Commission to create a War Department, and assign to the Commander in Chief in India the same position as that held by the Commander in Chief in England under the Secretary of State for War, excluding him from the Council of the Governor General.

After a full examination of the views held by the Commission, and of the arguments with which they support their proposal to remove the Commander in Chief from the Government, his Lordship unhesitatingly rejects such proposal, giving the strongest possible reasons for maintaining the Commander in Chief in his seat in Council.

On this point I venture to observe that it appears to me that his Lordship's arguments are unanswerable; and I do not presume, even if it appeared necessary to do so, to add anything in support of the conclusion at which his Excellency has arrived.

But Lord Lytton, whilst maintaining the position of the Commander in Chief as a Member of the Council, advocates at the same time that he shall be the sole Military Member and adviser of the Government, and that the present post of Military Member of Council shall be abolished.

To this proposal there appear to me the gravest objections; and I cannot believe that it can ever be seriously entertained by Her Majesty's Govern nent.

It is a proposal, neither more nor less, to combine the functions of the military administration with those of the executive command of an army, and would be, virtually, to place in the hands of the Commander in Chief unrestricted financial control of the whole army and its civil and military establishments.

For aiding the Commander in Chief in carrying out these dual functions, Lord Lytton proposes that he should be assisted by two officials, the one a Chief of the Staff, the other a Financial Secretary.

The first would be directly responsible to the Commander in Chief for the efficiency of the army, the second for its economical administration. Further, his Lordship lays down that the Chief of the Staff shall be an officer second only in rank to the Commander in Chief himself.

The Financial Secretary, Lord Lytton proposes, shall be an official trained in the Financial Department, responsible for placing promptly and clearly before the Commander in Chief the financial aspects of all proposals involving expenditure, and also for keeping military expenditure within the bounds sanctioned by the Government of India.

In regard to the Financial Secretary, it appears to me that it would be very difficult for the Government of India to find a man fitted for such a responsible duty. If he is to be of any use in advising the Commander in Chief on questions of military finance, he should possess an intimate knowledge of the system of military administration. If he is without such knowledge he would be merely an accountant, incapable, from the absence of any special experience and training, of forming influential opinions on the nature, bearing, and value of the military projects which might come before him for review.

If this be granted, then the whole military power would virtually be exercised by two high powerful military officers, the Commander in Chief and Chief of the Staff.

Further, on all great questions of military policy, and with these are so intimately united great political questions, the Commander in Chief, especially if he were a man of great force of character, would possess a power in his high professional rank, his military knowledge and great experience, which would carry all before him, and place the revenues of the country almost at his mercy.

For against such power, I say without hesitation, a Viceroy, himself probably ignorant or ill-informed on military matters, supported only by the Civilian Members of his Council, who, however great their experience in India, would have little more knowledge than himself of military questions and technicalities; a Viceroy, I say, so situated would be either so deprived of all power of resistance as could not fail to be dangerous to the State, or would be driven to the mischievous alternative of relying on the irresponsible opinion of the military members of his personal staff.

For

For this reason I regard the proposed abolition of the Military Member of Council as a fatal mistake. All the responsibility which now attaches to that officer in controlling and checking military expenditure, and advising the Viceroy on questions of military administration and policy, would be centred in a Commander in Chief whose interests might not improbably be at home rather than in India, and whose ambition might easily lead him to undervalue the importance to India of a strictly economical administration.

A Commander in Chief on whom this dual responsibility might be imposed would be placed in a false and unfair position. If he were a strong man, bent only on what he might conceive to be advancing the interests of the army, he would probably disregard financial considerations, his whole aim and object being centred on the improved efficiency and strength of that army. If he were a weak man, or one overpowered by a sense of his financial responsibility, the army would suffer, for he would place the financial considerations before the requirements of military efficiency.

It appears to me that the objections to such a system as that proposed by Lord Lytton are so serious and unanswerable that it would be an almost preferable alternative to place at the Commander in Chief's disposal a certain number of millions of money, annually, to make the best of; in fact to contract with the Commander in Chief for the maintenance of the army considered necessary for the internal and external protection of the Empire. I need hardly say that I am not advocating such a measure, but I believe most conscientiously that it would, if any change in the constitution of the Council be contemplated, be an infinitely preferable alternative to that proposed by the late Viceroy.

Further I hold, circumstanced as we are in this country, that it would be dangerous to place in the hands of a Commander in Chief such exclusive power over the army and its interests as that which it is proposed to give him.

In saying this, I desire emphatically to state that I am pointing at no officer who of late years has held this high and responsible post, for the late possessors of the chief command have been officers of exceptionally large experience in the country and of the Native armies. The dangers that I speak of, so far as Lord Sandhurst, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Sir Frederick Haines are concerned, would be minimised in their hands. I point to a possible Commander in Chief, to one whose experience of India may be limited, whose knowledge of the Natives, their habits, customs, and prejudices may be as nothing, and whose sympathy with, from not understanding them, would almost necessarily be cold and ungenial.

Such a Commander in Chief may find in his Chief of the Staff one equally unsympathetic and equally ignorant of the Natives as himself. I do not say that it is altogether probable, but I do say that it is possible, and that the consequences of placing unrestricted power over the army in the hands of such a Commander in Chief would be dangerous in the extreme.

Staff Corps.

I have already said that it is not my intention to remark paragraph by paragraph on Lord Lytton's Minute; and having touched on the more important points on which his Lordship differs from the opinions I have expressed in my former Minute, it does not appear to me necessary or desirable to add to the length of this paper by entering more fully on the questions treated of by his Lordship in his general review of the Report of the Commission.

In my former Minute, however, I said that there are some important questions to which, not having noticed them in the body of my observations, I invited especial attention, referring more immediately to the Secretary's remarks on those parts of the Report of the Commission having reference to the Staff Corps.

As this question has not been discussed in Council, I think it necessary to put on record in the present Minute the departmental note on this subject.

Colonel Johnson, having been an Assistant in the Military Secretariat at the time Sir Henry Norman, as head of the Department, took so large a part in the discussions which led to the formation and organization of the Staff Corps, which, indeed, it may be said, was in a large measure his own work, Colonel Johnson was thoroughly cognisant of all that went on during those discussions,

and of the grounds on which Sir Henry Norman's recommendations were made and accepted, much more than I can possibly pretend to be.

As it is necessary that the remarks of the Army Commission on the subject of the Staff Corps should not remain unnoticed and unanswered, it seems to me desirable that the observations of one so competent to deal with the question should appear on record; and I accordingly enter them in this Minute:—

"The Secretary regrets very much that he has not at present time to analyse "what he believes to be the errors and misapprehension of fact on the part of "the Committee in dealing with the question of the creation and operation of "the Staff Corps. These appear to him to be so patent that he does not under-"stand how some of the military members of the Committee can have fallen "into them; but as no dissent is recorded he must assume that all agree in the "remarks in paragraphs 275 to 281 of the Report, the accuracy of which may "be gauged by the fact that from first to last there is not a hint of the operation "of the Parliamentary decision, that, though the Native army might be reduced "to one-half or to one-quarter, there should be no reduction at all of the officers. "Nor is there any hint of the 'Henley Clause,' nor of the lamentable miscarriage "of justice to India through the intervention of Parliament in 1866. It is these "measures, and not the Staff Corps organization, which produced the evils "wrongly attributed to the Staff Corps. What the Staff Corps organization "was intended to do it did thoroughly; it evoked order out of chaos, and from "the *débris* of a revolted army created another, whose efficiency, loyalty, and "courage have never in past times been surpassed; an army which for 18 years "has gone from good to better, whose excellence has been tested on many fields, "in many countries, its last proof being perhaps its highest and most conclusive. "The Commission seems to have fixed their eyes on one glaring defect of the "army of to-day, which is in no way inherent in the Staff Corps, viz., the dis-"proportion of the senior to the lower grades; and they give an estimate of the "proportions these ranks should bear to each other. They lose sight of the "whole principle which must govern promotion, and to which the elastic "character of the Indian regimental system is admirably adapted to conform "itself, viz., the fair equality of promotion in the several branches of the army, "Home and India. It is quite impossible to fix a permanent establishment "which shall meet this requirement, and no system of fixed numbers, pensions, "enforced retirements, can be promised which will not require to be constantly "shifted and changed to meet the varying rules of promotion of other lists. It "seems that the best system to follow will be the simplest, and, that is, the "Staff Corps system of promotion by length of service. The periods could be "adjusted from time to time should it be found needful, and would maintain a "just balance of promotion; not so fast as to unfairly supersede others, and not "so slow as to deter candidates from entering the Indian Army.

"However, it is not necessary to go into these points until the normal state "of the Staff Corps shall have been brought to the test proposed by the Com-"mission in paragraph 300 of their Report, viz, to subject the system to strict "actuarial investigation, in order to ascertain whether the Staff Corps will "attain, 'under the operation of present and proposed changes in pension and "retirements, the proper proportion of grades.' The Commission do not appear "to have had before them an actuarial table prepared at the India Office some "years since, which does bring out this result, even without the aid of the "special pensions, &c., and compulsory retirements now proposed; but it will, "of course, be more satisfactory to have the ground gone over again and a "searching inquiry made by approved actuaries with the new additional con-"ditions imposed by the Commission. The Secretary believes that the result "will be to show that the excessive proportion will then be found in the junior "and not in the senior grades. Meanwhile, pending this enquiry, the admission "of officers to the Staff Corps must continue on its present footing, and no "opinion need be given on paragraphs 289 to 300, inclusive."

In this paper I have purposely avoided entering into a consideration of the recommendations of the Commission in regard to the distribution of the army and its command in time of peace; for such must necessarily depend on the conclusions arrived at by Her Majesty's Government on the general question of territorial division, which, as the Commission say, is the base from which their proposals in respect to the organization of the army proceed.

This

This being so, I concur with my late colleague, Major General A. Fraser, that it is premature to discuss details until the general principles have been approved and confirmed by Her Majesty's Government.

Nor, on similar grounds, have I spoken of the strength of the army required for our position in India.

Neither the strength nor the distribution of the army can be decided until we know the final determination of Her Majesty's Government in regard to our future frontier.

The number of soldiers and guns required for India and their distribution must be carefully considered and fixed on intelligible principles; they must, in fact, be considered with reference to the altered position and circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

The present amount of force and its distribution was regulated by and adapted to a former state of things; was the outcome of the deliberations and opinions of such able soldiers and administrators as Lord Strathnairn, Lord Lawrence, Lord Sandhurst, Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Henry Durand, and Sir Henry Norman; and as such was not, I venture to assert, based, as suggested by the late Viceroy, on either "empirical data" or "unintelligible principles."

In conclusion, I desire to express my most earnest hope that whatever may be the ultimate decision of Her Majesty's Government on the Report of the Army Commission, whether their recommendations may be accepted or not, no early action may be taken to carry out those measures which relate to the organization of the army, so vitally affecting the interests of the Native soldiers.

A very large portion of that army has, during the last two years, been actively employed in Afghanistan. During this period they have been subject to the greatest hardships and considerable privations; in fact, to all the hardships and privations incident to a prolonged campaign in a foreign country and inimical climate.

I need not repeat here what their conduct has been under all these trying circumstances; nor how gallantly they have behaved on the many occasions in which they have come in contact with the enemy. This has already been recorded in the pages of history.

But perhaps, of all the privations they have undergone, none have been so severely felt as their having been deprived for so long of the privileges which they so highly value, of going to their homes on furlough.

This has fallen not only on the troops engaged in the field, but on the whole army.

The army requires rest, and deserves every indulgent consideration that a grateful Government can extend to it.

To carry out the recommendations of the Commission for the reorganization of the army would involve a reduction of regiments and a wholesale redistribution of the army and its component parts; not only the regiments to be reduced would be affected, but, more or less, every regiment in the service.

If, therefore, it should be decided to adopt and to give early effect to the proposed new organization, the rest and the liberal furlough which the Native army has so justly earned could not be accorded to it.

To deprive the soldiers of what they must all be looking forward to so eagerly and so confidently, at the same time to break up their regimental associations and destroy that *camaraderie* and *esprit de corps* engendered by a severe and protracted campaign, would, I do not hesitate to say, be the height of ingratitude, and the very *acmé* of impolicy.

I now only ask that, if the Minutes which accompanied our former Despatch be made public, this paper may be included with them.

Simla, 7 July 1880. (signed) *E. B. Johnson.*

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 333—Military) to the Government of India.

India Office, London,
14 October 1880.

My Lord Marquis,

Para. 1. ON the 15th September I addressed to your Excellency the following telegram, having reference to the Report of the Indian Army Commission:—

 "Your

"Your letter, 204, Military. I desire information on what points the Govern-
"ment are unanimous, and think immediate action may be taken. Despatch
"follows."

2. The transmission of this message was rendered necessary by the absence of any detailed opinions of the Government of India as to the expediency of adopting, wholly or in part, any of the recommendations of the Commission. It is true that in your predecessor's Despatch of the 1st June, No. 204, it is stated that some of the proposals of the Commission have the "unanimous approval" of your Government, but it is nowhere stated which of the proposals are here referred to, though various Minutes by the Viceroy, and certain members of the Government, dealing with parts of the Report are forwarded.

3. The usual and convenient course to be pursued in a case of this kind is for the Governor General in Council, after full discussion of the recommendations, to make such proposals to the Secretary of State as seem proper to the majority of the Government, and any dissentients can then record Minutes for the Secretary of State. My desire is that such a course should be pursued in the present instance, and I shall then be in a position to take all your proposals into attentive consideration.

4. I desire to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the ability and industry shown in the preparation of the Report of the Commission, and I request you will communicate my thanks to Sir Ashley Eden and his colleagues for the service they have performed.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 85 of 1881—Military Department) to the Secretary of State for India (*received* 21 *March* 1881).

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 28 February 1881.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch of the 13th October 1880, No. 333, we have had under consideration the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the organization of the Indian Army, and, after giving to it the earnest attention which the importance of the subject demands, we have now the honour to lay before you, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the conclusions at which we have so far arrived upon the various matters which formed the subject of inquiry.

2. We had first to determine in what order this great question should be taken up and discussed. It will be seen that the Report of the Commission covers the whole ground of the organization and administration of the Indian Army, and that while they have proposed various comprehensive changes, involving indeed an entire reform of our military system, they have also at the same time matured a detailed scheme for the revision of each of the various establishments and departments of the army. And we had to determine whether it might not be expedient, leaving aside for the present a consideration of the great administrative changes proposed, to take up, in the first instance, their proposals regarding the different Army Departments,—the Staff, the Commissariat, the Ordnance, the Medical Service, and so forth,—as to which the claim made by the Commission for a large saving of charges by the adoption of their recommendations has, at least, established the necessity for searching inquiry on our part. The acceptance in whole or part of the recommendations of the Commission on this head offered the prospect of effecting a sensible reduction of military expenditure, which it might be possible to bring about without raising the larger and more difficult questions involved in the attempt to recast the entire organization of the Indian Army.

3. But, on the other hand, these detailed recommendations of the Commission for dealing with the various Army Departments are all based on the assumption that their main recommendations would be adopted. They have set out by proposing the reorganization of the Indian Army in four bodies of nearly equal strength,

strength, to be placed all in direct subordination to and occupying the same relative position towards the Commander in Chief and the Government of India, and all their subsequent proposals are framed accordingly. So that any mere departmental changes carried out on the existing basis of army reorganization might, and probably would, be superseded by the further changes involved, if it should be found necessary or desirable to adopt the comprehensive recommendations of the Commission, either in whole or part. If the case of the Commission has been made out, and the Indian Army does need to be reformed, it is obviously desirable that the matter should be taken up and dealt with once for all in a complete and comprehensive way.

On all grounds, therefore, it seemed best to address ourselves in the first instance to the larger question of the organization of the army, and it is upon this accordingly that we propose now to record our opinion.

4. In the fi st place, then, must be put the recommendation of the Commission, that the Madras and Bombay Armies should pass from the control of the Local Governments under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief and the Government of India. They combine with this the proposal that these bodies should in future be styled "army corps," and for certain reductions in the number of regiments composing them. Upon this proposition we have to record our opinion that it would not be desirable to make any change in the designation or constitution of those armies, although, if after full consideration hereafter it shall appear to be our duty to do so, we shall be prepared to make the needful proposals for reducing such parts of our military establishments in all parts of the country as may be safely dispensed with. But we are satisfied that the main and essential part of the Commission's proposal,—the suppression of the offices of two of the three Commanders in Chief now maintained in India, and the transfer of the direct control of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the Local Governments to the Government of India,—ought to be adopted.

5. The reasons in favour of the change appear to us conclusive. They are stated very forcibly by the Commission in the fifth chapter of their Report; and without wishing to lay too much stress on the fact that the present cumbrous and costly organization would certainly have never been purposely adopted, but has been the outcome of circumstances which no longer hold good, we may at least say that the inconvenience of the present divided administration of the military forces of India makes itself constantly more and more felt, while the inutility of the arrangement also becomes more apparent as the means of communication in this country are improved. The evil, for we can call it no less, has never been more prominently manifested than during the late war, when all the disadvantages were exhibited which might be looked for in carrying on a campaign with allied armies under divided control, without any compensating benefit.

6. As regards the European troops, it needs hardly be said that, for the command and administration of the very moderate force serving in this country, the maintenance of three Commanders in Chief and three separate Military Departments and other establishments is wholly unnecessary. With respect to the Native troops, a good deal might, no doubt, be said for a system of purely local forces, that is, a system under which each province should have its own separate local establishment, serving wholly within the province. This was indeed the case originally with the Native Armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, but we need hardly say that this state of things has long passed away. The Madras Army now occupies stations far beyond the limits of that Presidency, and the greater part of it is employed in provinces under the direct control of the Government of India, in Burmah, in Hyderabad, in the Central Provinces, and even in Bengal. The Bombay Army also is largely employed out of the Bombay Presidency. The case, however, is so fully stated in the Report of Commission that it is needless to repeat their arguments; we will only say that the effects of a divided military administration were found so embarrassing during the late war that, even if the Commission had not made their recommendation, we should have felt bound to propose an effectual and final remedy in the same direction.

7. It may perhaps be objected to the change that it would tend to bring about a fusion of military bodies, which as a matter of policy should be kept apart.

apart. The importance of maintaining a segregation of the Native Armies in peace time can indeed hardly be too strongly insisted on. But, as we have stated, we propose that the Armies of Madras and Bombay should still be kept absolutely distinct from each other and from the Bengal Army. We do not think then that any real objection will hold good on this score.

8. It might also be urged that the connection of the Local Government with its army gives the former an interest in its efficiency which works beneficially when active operations have to be undertaken. But we have always found that the resources of the country have been made available to the fullest extent by the Government of Bengal and the Government of the North-Western Provinces for the campaigns undertaken on the North-eastern and North-western Frontiers, although these Governments have no direct concern with military matters, nor is there reason to suppose that any benefit would be derived during the conduct of a campaign in Burmah from the connection which now exists between the troops serving there and the Government of Madras.

9. A more plausible objection might be that the dignity of the two Local Governments would suffer if they were relieved of even the limited control of their armies, but we incline to think that the result would be rather of the opposite kind, and in any case it is a consideration which should not be allowed to stand in the way of a necessary reform. The truth is that the financial control which it is found necessary to exercise in military matters in this country is much more minute and particular than obtains in other branches of public business. In the civil departments there is no difficulty in keeping within the sanctioned scales of establishments and the annual estimates of expenditure, while a large amount of independence has been given to Local Governments in the disposal of their provincial revenues. But in the administration of the army unforeseen demands for expenditure not provided for in the annual estimates are constantly arising, involving either that a wide margin of latitude must be given to the local authorities in dealing with them, or constant reference to the central Government, and, as that alone is financially responsible, the latter course has been found in practice to be the only alternative. If each local army were stationed wholly in its own province, there might be something to be said for a system of local army finance, similar to that which obtains in regard to some branches of civil expenditure. But, as the distribution of the armies of India has no such connection with the limits of provincial authority, such a system appears quite impracticable. In any case, the necessity for maintaining a general uniformity of pay, privileges, and equipment throughout the army involves a close and searching control by the central authority, and practically results in reducing the authority and control of the Governments of Madras and Bombay over their armies to a minimum. The greater part of the patronage rests with the local Commander in Chief; the finance and administration are controlled by the Government of India. The powers of the Local Governments, are in fact practically limited to the right of making appointments to the Civil Departments of the army, the Commissariat, Ordnance, and Military Secretariats, while the Government of India has constantly to be referred to on matters of the minutest detail. The case is very clearly stated in the fifth chapter of the Report, wherein the inconvenience, not to say the absurdity, of the present arrangement has been put not at all too strongly. The Military Departments of Madras and Bombay are in truth but little more than transmitting offices for business which might come much more conveniently direct to the Government of India from the Commander in Chief, and we are of opinion that the relations between the Governments of these Presidencies and the central Government would certainly be placed on a more harmonious and satisfactory footing if the former were relieved of the vexatious and minute control which is an inevitable consequence of the present system. The change of circumstances from the time when the complete separation of the three armies was a natural and proper condition to that which now obtains has been a gradual one, and perhaps it could not until the present time be distinctly said that the point had been reached when the inconvenience of maintaining the arrangement was so great as to justify a change of system. But we think that every one must be sensible that the present divided administration of the Indian Army could not be permanently maintained, and we are of opinion that the present time, when a fairly complete system of railway communication throughout India has been completed,

completed, marks the point when the change has become absolutely necessary. Finally, it is only in this way that we see the way to reorganizing the army and the various departments connected with it, and placing them on a thoroughly satisfactory and economical footing.

10. The next proposal of the Commission on which we have to record our opinion is that the Commander in Chief should no longer have the immediate administration of the Bengal Army, and that he should cease to be a Member of the Governor General's Council. On the first point we concur, but we are opposed to the second proposal. We think that the personal advice of the Commander in Chief should always be available for the Government of India in its collective capacity, while, in considering the degree of inconvenience involved, as pointed out by the Commission, in the Commander in Chief being able, in his capacity of Member of Council, to enforce and press the opinions and proposals which he submits to Government as executive head of the army, there is also to be remembered the advantage of an arrangement under which he is always liable to be called on to submit those proposals to personal discussion with his colleagues. We believe that the present arrangement tends to promote harmonious relations between the executive head of the army and the Government rather than the reverse, and that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

11. As regards the Bengal Army, the Commission propose its division into two separate bodies or "army corps," consisting of the existing Hindustani and Punjabi portions respectively, each under a Lieutenant General, with separate lists and lines of promotion for the European Officers. As a matter of fact, the two classes of sepoys of which this army is composed have always to some extent been kept apart, and on the return of the troops from beyond the frontier the Punjabis would, under the new arrangement, be quartered west of the Jumna, and the rest of the army in the other districts of the Presidency. The records show that in the past the Punjabi and Hindustani regiments have, roughly speaking, spent about two-thirds of their entire service in the districts from which they are mainly recruited, and we are inclined to think that this separation may be further extended in peace time, both on the ground of general policy and as tending to make military service popular with the sepoy, although no public declaration is necessary on the subject. But we do not propose to alter the organization of the Bengal Army; this would involve the consideration of the position of the officers and other matters into which we do not desire now to enter.

12. We recommend, however, that the Commander in Chief in India should be relieved of the direct command of the Bengal Army, and that he should be thus set free to exercise the same degree of general control over all the three Indian Armies, from which the Army Head-quarters staff should be taken in equal proportions. We are also of opinion that the Punjab and the rest of the Bengal Presidency should each be constituted a separate Lieutenant General's command.

13. We also recommend the adoption of the Commission's proposal to place the Punjab Frontier Force under the orders of the Commander in Chief. It should form part of the command of the Lieutenant General in the Punjab, but its separate organization and local character should be strictly maintained.

14. These are the recommendations which we have in the first instance to submit to Her Majesty's Government.

They may be summarised as follows:—

I. The Madras and Bombay Armies to come under the direct control of the Commander in Chief in India. The civil establishments connected with those armies to come under the direct orders of the Government of India, and the Military Secretariats of those Presidencies to be abolished.

The designation of the officers commanding those armies might conveniently be changed from "Commander in Chief" to "Lieutenant General Commanding."

II. The Commander in Chief in India to give up the direct control of the Bengal Army, but to retain his seat in the Governor General's Council.

III. The Bengal Army to be commanded by two Lieutenant Generals.

To meet the charge for these officers, whose salaries might be the same as those of the Lieutenant Generals Commanding in Madras and Bombay, we may say at once, in anticipation of the proposals to be hereafter submitted, that we are prepared to accept the recommendations of the Commission for reducing the number of Major Generals and other officers, to an extent at least sufficient to cover the charge. We shall shortly lay a definite proposal on this head before Her Majesty's Government.

IV. The Punjab Frontier Force to be maintained as a separate body, but to come under the orders of the Commander in Chief.

15. Having thus arrived at a conclusion on the leading principles involved in the Commission's Report, we shall now proceed to consider the detailed proposals regarding the various military establishments, with the anxious desire to obtain the utmost financial relief that may be practicable, as well as increased army efficiency and greater simplicity in our military administration. We shall submit our views shortly on this subject.

16. We cannot forbear, in conclusion, from expressing our hopes that the new organization proposed may be found to conduce materially to the benefit of the Armies of Madras and Bombay. So long as those armies occupy their present subordinate position, it is impossible but that the officers should feel placed at a disadvantage as compared with the officers of the Bengal Army, who come so much more directly than they do under the chief military and civil authority in this country. The larger share of the military appointments has always fallen to the Bengal Army; the other two armies have been excluded by it in great measure from the advantages of active service. They have, in short, been overshadowed by the larger body. The arrangements which we propose will put an end to these invidious distinctions. All the military forces in India will be on the same footing; all should have an equal share of the prizes of the service in peace time, and the same opportunity for distinction in war; and we may hope that a healthy feeling of emulation will take the place of the class jealousies and prejudices which have unfortunately been too often manifested in past times.

17. We regret that the Commander in Chief does not agree in all these proposals. By his Excellency's desire, we attach a Minute which he has recorded on the subject.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
Fred. P. Haines.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
D. M. Stewart.
E. Baring.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India on the Abolition of the Commanders in Chief of the Madras and Bombay Armies, and on the Separation of the Bengal Army into two.

I REGRET to find that Government support the views of the Commission regarding the Commanders in Chief of the minor Presidencies; that these are to be abolished, and that the armies are to be placed under the command of Lieutenant Generals; the Army of Bengal likewise being placed under the command of two Lieutenant Generals, all these officers reporting to the Commander in Chief in India, who is to command the whole.

2. I regret this, for I have always looked upon these three separate and complete centres of military administration as adding greatly to our power and resources in this vast country. For if at any time we should fail to retain our supremacy

supremacy in one part of the country, there would remain two bases, each complete in itself, from which to operate for the re-establishment of affairs wherever they may have got out of gear.

3. As regards the faulty working of the system alluded to in paragraph 5 of the Despatch, we must beware of imputing to the organization the faults of those who work it. I am unable to support the contention of that part of the Despatch, and I think that something more than vague assertion should be put forward to justify the indictment against the separate Governments. What has occurred between the Supreme Government and that of Bombay seems to me to go no further than what might arise out of the method of working a system by individuals rather than from any inherent defect in the system itself. We have had large dealings with Madras in the course of the war, and I am not aware that anything suggestive of a faulty system has been shown there; nor has there been any friction between high functionaries. Could not Sir Richard Temple's energetic action regarding the construction of the railway, and his excellent work in aid of transport and supply, all under the direct authority of the Government of India, be quoted in favour of the Presidential system?

4. I am not certain that, even in theory, the system now in force is bad; but I have always felt that, viewing our peculiar position in India, it is singularly well suited to our actual wants and the demands we may at any time be called upon to meet. When I affirm that the existence of three separate Governments, and of three separate armies under them, is a distinct source of safety and of power to the State, which a mere army corps, lightly connected with the local power, and reporting to a distant, unseen, and somewhat mythical chief, could not give, I by no means wish to say that the Armies of Madras and Bombay should be segregated from that of Bengal, or from one another. Far from it. I would do everything I could to enlarge the scope of their military functions; they should be associated together in all great enterprises; they should be used to fill up the voids in garrison created by the departure on service of troops from a sister Presidency; they should be associated together on all occasions of ceremonial display, such as that of the Delhi Assemblage or the Lahore Durbar. More especially should they be so associated in the event of their services being demanded beyond sea. The point I look to as the one conferring strength is the complete organization which exists in each Presidency. So complete is it that on emergency it is always capable of independent action. The separate commissariat, ordnance, and manufacturing establishments will come to be looked upon by the centralised administration now about to be introduced, as so many superfluities to be ruthlessly destroyed; but they have been, and they are still, insurances against possible disaster at one point or another, which it will not be wise to dispense with. It is not wise to place all your eggs in one basket. Fattehgarh, Cawnpore, Delhi (then our largest arsenal in Upper India) were all, within our recollection, in the hands of an enemy. The Commander in Chief and Army Head-quarters were absolutely severed from the Government of India. The separate and complete organization of the Armies of Madras and Bombay, and the existence of a strong Government in those Presidencies stood the country in good stead at that period, and may do so again. It can hardly be supposed that for a body of troops separated from the Local Government, under a Lieutenant General, the factories and departments will be maintained. Their abolition will be too attractive a financial bait, and figures will be forthcoming to show that Fattehgarh, Cossipore, Ishapore, Dum-Dum can do all the work now done by the corresponding factories in the minor Presidencies. Even if it were true, the policy of concentrating all our manufacturing resources would be equally pernicious.

5. I am aware that Sir Alexander Arbuthnot can be quoted* as favouring the doing away with the separate Commanders in Chief of the armies of the minor Presidencies. When he says the sepoy knows nothing about the local Governors, that he has a more or less indefinite idea of the "sirkar" whom he is serving, I think he mistakes the general intelligence and knowledge of things possessed by the Madras sepoy; but when he says he looks to his immediate chiefs, and none else, I admit that the sepoy attaches great importance to them, and

* *Vide* his Minute of 12th April 1880.

and that he will grievously feel the loss of the Commander in Chief of whom he is about to be deprived, and to whose rule he has been accustomed. To the assertion that the change of masters might be made without the Native troops knowing anything about it, I absolutely demur.

6. There are many points on which I am proud to have been in full accord with Sir Alexander Arbuthnot; but there are two on which I must be content to differ. These are—

Firstly. The abolition of the Commanders in Chief of the minor Presidencies.

Secondly. The abolition of the Governorships and Councils of those Presidencies themselves. It is easy to see that the one is a mere stepping-stone to the other, and that the disintegration of the local Councils is attained the moment the Commander in Chief is removed from them.

7. I advocate the retention of the Commanders in Chief, because they are part and parcel of that system of government and military command which gives us three separate bases from which we can deal with internal trouble, while the whole military power of the country is, for every purpose of foreign war, as much and as readily at the disposal of the Supreme Government and of the Commander in Chief in India as it can be under the system it is now proposed to adopt.

8. As regards the proposal to separate into two portions the Bengal Army, I maintain to-day the opinions I recorded in paragraphs 23 to 29 of my Minute of 20th March 1880.* The Commission advocate this measure on the ground that it will induce the segregation of the Hindustani races from those of the Punjab.

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* 23. I am so adverse to the introduction of the army corps, the command proposed for it, and the system by which it is to be worked, that I shall say but little on the subject, trusting that eventually the organization now in force will be maintained. But for the moment we are asked to accept a system which, under totally different circumstances, has been found to answer elsewhere. The territorial system which suits Germany, with its more or less homogeneous population, the vigorous manhood of which passes through the ranks of the army, and retains a place in them under some head or other throughout a long portion of existence, may be, and in my opinion is, singularly inappropriate here. For it must be allowed that our Indian armies, our Indian populations, and our English rule in India have not one single feature in common with the army of Germany and its population (which in effect are one and the same thing) or s Government.

24. The local association here is one of race only, engendering and maintaining community of feeling between the inhabitant of the country and the sepoy placed near him, nominally for his control. The soldier, the cultivator, and the ryot have a certain amount of homogeneity, the ruling race alone being alien. This is not a wholesome state of things, and is totally unlike the military situation of any European nation.

25. The Commission, in proposing to localise its Hindustani regiments in Oudh, Rohilcund, and Bengal, and the Sikh and Punjabi regiments in the Punjab itself, have been careful to declare that this localisation avoids the evils generally associated with that form of service. This I cannot admit, and I am of opinion that it would be highly objectionable to leave Oudh, Rohilcund, and the North Western Provinces in the hands of Native troops which have been drawn only from the population of these territories. I hesitate not to affirm this to be a cardinal error, fraught with dangers, against which the experience of the past conveys an impressive warning. But when we come to apply this system to the Punjab, I cannot but think that we are on the point of committing a blunder of the first magnitude, and one that could hardly fail to carry with it most baneful results.

26. If the territorial division of the Army of Bengal is to effect the separation of the races serving in its ranks, and their localisation, with a view of bringing the sepoy of each district within easy reach of his own home, and to keep him under home influences, I maintain that every point that was held to be important, every safeguard sought to be attained, when the Bengal Army was reconstituted after the frightful convulsions of 1857–58, is disregarded and abrogated by the proposals set forth in paragraph 47, and those dealing with this question which follow it.

27. The very essence of our policy then was truly to divide and command. A proposal to bring together in Oudh, Rohilcund, and the North Western Provinces all the Hindustani elements of the army would never have been tolerated for one moment; far less the more dangerous aggregation of Sikhs and Punjabi Mahomedans in the Punjab. That dispersion of race, and that mixture of peoples, which so greatly offends the sense of scientific distribution entertained by the Commission, is in reality the sheet anchor of our security in India. Bring such classes together and locate them permanently within the range of family, of home, and of race influences, and who will answer for the result? The Punjab is the newest of our provinces. The Hindustani element has failed us once. Madras and Bombay, on their present footing, have well stood the test of time and trial. The partial mutinies which have occurred in these armies have always been connected with a wrangle about pay, or some interference with their head-dress.

28. It is well known that what may be called Punjabi opinion was always in favour of the system of localisation, as quoted by the Commission; but, on due consideration, those responsible for the reorganisation of the army preferred an opposite course, and in doing so I cannot for one moment doubt the correctness of their judgment.

29. The Commission write of the dangerous intermingling of the different nationalities which arises from our present distribution of the army, and the system on which reliefs are carried out. This system as introduced many years ago, has been carried out under at least five Viceroys, and with the approval Lord Clyde, Lord Strathnairn, Lord Sandhurst, and Lord Napier of Magdala, all of whom accepted it without

Punjab. It has also been stated that the measure can be easily carried out, because in practice the division has been generally maintained, and that at present regiments have been brought near their homes on their return from the war. This last is a fact. It was thought desirable that the sepoy on his return from service should be brought near to his family, and that liberal furlough should be granted to him after the labours of the campaign; that in taking furlough he should be put to as little expense as possible; and that the money accumulated during the course of his foreign service should be spent for the benefit of his family. But this arrangement I look upon as a very temporary one, not to be maintained as a system.

9. I am strongly averse to lessening in any degree the time passed by sepoy regiments outside of the country from which the men were recruited, say roughly, five out of 15 years. I believe this is a most wholesome system, both as regards the health and discipline of the army, as well as regards the safety of the Empire; and if for the purposes of command and control it shall be determined to cut the Bengal Army into two parts, I trust that the system of interchange of regiments between the two districts may be maintained. I entirely repudiate the grounds on which the Commission seek to effect the separation. It is a wholesome thing that the Sikh should visit Calcutta, and that the Bengali should rub shoulders with the Punjabi at Pesháwar. It is a good thing to show our distant, and for the matter of that our home, population the various races of which our armies are composed. The appearance on the scene of fresh faces and of unaccustomed uniforms is not without its effect, and it is well that Punjabi regiments should see with their own eyes the power which contact with the sea confers upon us. The same applies to the employment of Madras troops beyond sea in the Central Provinces, and in those of Bengal, as has been the case of late years. This gives them a wide range of service. Their tour of three years in Burmah gives them about one-fifth of their time absolutely beyond sea.

10. The segregation sought for by the Commission is not the separation I seek for. In my belief it would tend to reduce our fine Native soldiers to the state of a localized force. The water-tight compartment I advocate is of a far different pattern to that put forward by the Commission, for it should contain within itself a complete organization of its own, capable of working under its own head, based on its own sources of supply, controlled by its own administration, thus becoming a source of strength, even were the whole country disintegrated over again as it was in the days of the mutiny.

11. In paragraph 6 of the Despatch it is stated that the Madras Army now occupies stations far beyond the limits of that Presidency, in provinces under the direct control of the Government of India—Burmah, Hyderabad, the Central Provinces, and even in Bengal. This is no new thing. The Madras Army has supplied the Native portion of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force ever since we have held relations with the Nizam. It is the army to which such an occupation falls with the greatest propriety, geographically and territorially. To no other army has it ever been assigned. The occupation of Nagpore fell to Madras long ago, so did that of Burmah immediately after the conquest of Pegu, a military operation in which the Madras Army so largely participated. The occupation of Saugor, Jubbulpore, and other stations beyond the Nerbudda, as well as those in Bengal, is of more recent origin, and has been forced upon us by the great strain imposed on the Native portion of the Bengal Army by service elsewhere. All these facts tend to prove the value of the Madras Army, and the flexibility of its organization under the Presidential system.

12. From

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without protest. The late Sir H. Tombs is quoted in favour of army corps; but this is what he wrote to the Governor General's Agent when he was commanding at Gwalior: "In conclusion, I would most "strongly urge that there should be as little of the Poorbea element in the Native portion of the British "force at Morar as possible. . . . . So long as the troops of the Gwalior State continue to be "recruited from Oudh and the North Western Provinces, it would seem a proper precaution to employ "Punjabi regiments in garrisoning Morar." The organization of the army corps which Sir H. Tombs had in his mind did not therefore involve a separation of races, as in the scheme of the Commission. It may be as well to explain here what is the principle on which reliefs of Native corps are made. The system in force is to let Punjabi troops serve two tours of relief (about five years) down country, and 10 years in the Punjab. In the same way Hindustanis serve five years, or two reliefs, in the Punjab, and 10 years in the North West and Bengal. It is therefore clear that the sepoy is not disassociated from his home to the extent suggested by the Commission. It is true that this system cannot always be carried out, but the programme of reliefs submitted to Government has always been based upon it as far as practicable. I trust the mixture of races in the military occupation of the country will be maintained.

12. From the above remarks it will be seen that I affirm that a real and wide, instead of a limited, connection subsists between the Governments of Madras and Bombay and their armies.

13. As to the financial control in matters infinitesimally small, over which the Government of India sees fit to retain complete control, and the ridicule it is sought to throw on the minor Presidencies on account of it, I can say no more than what was recorded in para. 15 of my Minute of the 20th of March 1880. The Government of India can as easily relax this control in favour of the Government of a Presidency as it can in favour of any other system of administration.

14. I concur most cordially in that part of the Despatch which recommends that the Commander in Chief should retain his seat in Council. Whatever may be done under other heads, it is essential that the closest connection should be maintained between the Government of India and the Commander in Chief in India.

15. I would thus summarise my views on this Despatch:—

I would maintain the Commanders in Chief and the civil establishments connected with the Madras and Bombay Armies as at present, under the Local Governments.

The Commander in Chief should retain his seat in Council.

In the event of two Lieutenant Generals being appointed to the staff of the Bengal Army, it is an error to count on the reduction of military divisional commands as providing for the increased cost of the proposed administration. In the first place, to do this at this stage of the discussion on the Report of the Army Commission is to come to a foregone conclusion on a section of that Report which has not yet been brought before the Council. Many of our divisional commands are territorially of greater extent than are some kingdoms in Europe. Reduction can, in my opinion, go no further in this direction, having in view the efficiency of local command and control.

The Punjab Frontier Force should, as suggested, come under the direct control of the Commander in Chief, and that whether the proposals now before the Council are carried out or not.

If the Punjab Frontier Force, why not the Hyderabad Contingent and the Central India Force?

16. I would add that, however convenient it may be that the Government should report section by section on this grave question of military reorganization, I trust that no final decision may be passed on any one portion of it until the whole Report shall have passed under review, otherwise a harmonious whole may not be arrived at.

(signed) *Fred. P. Haines.*

Fort William, 26 February 1881.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated 16th May 1881.

YOUR Despatch, 85 of 1881: Am advised that the separation of Local Armies from Local Governments requires Parliamentary sanction. Have you considered this? This must involve delay; meanwhile prepare detailed recommendations. Letter follows.

TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 17th May 1881.

YOURS, 16th—Military. We have always thought it probable that you would consider it necessary to introduce a Bill into Parliament in connection with the separation of Local Armies from Local Governments. Any delay that may arise in consequence is to be regretted, but cannot be helped. We trust you will do all you can to reduce such delay as much as possible. What are the detailed recommendations you wish us to prepare. We are proceeding steadily with the consideration of the various questions raised in the Report of the Army Commission.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated 18th May 1881.

YOURS, 17th. Your detailed recommendations for reduction of major generals and other officers, whereby it is proposed to meet extra charge caused by lieutenant generals, are absolutely necessary to my consideration of that point.

TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 22nd May 1881.

YOUR Lordship's telegram, dated 18th. Our recommendations regarding general officers are as follows: Present establishment: two Provincial on 5,500, 12 major generals on 3,500, 13 first-class brigades on 2,228, nine second-class brigades on 2,028. Proposed establishment: four lieutenant generals at 4,500, eight first-class districts at 3,500, eight second-class districts at 2,500, nine or perhaps 11 third-class districts at 2,000. Total saving about two lacs a year in pay of generals alone. Considerable saving will also result from reduction of Staff appointments consequent on reduction of divisional and district commands as above, but precise figures cannot yet be given.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 203) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 16 June 1881.

Para. 1. I DESIRE to acknowledge your Military Letter, No. 85 of 1881, forwarding the conclusions at which your Lordship in Council has arrived on certain points contained in the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Indian army.

2. Your Lordship in Council points out that, as the detailed recommendations of the Commission for dealing with the various Army Departments are all based on the assumption that their main recommendations would be adopted, it is best that you should address yourselves, in the first instance, to the larger question of the organisation of the army in army corps under undivided command and control, on the adoption of which measure the greater part of the Commission's recommendations depend, and your Lordship in Council thinks it undesirable to deal with mere details before the main points have been accepted.

3. Some of these details, however, are very important, and, as I am advised that the withdrawal of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the control of the Local Governments can only be given effect to under Parliamentary sanction, and as there is no prospect of obtaining such sanction during the present Session, there is ample time for me to receive and to consider your detailed recommendations as to how this great change is to be effected in the manner most conducive to efficiency and economy.

4. Your Excellency's telegram of the 22nd May has, to a certain extent, placed me in possession of your views as to a reduction of divisional and brigade commands in India, by which it is stated that a saving will be effected more than sufficient to cover the cost of substituting four Lieutenant Generals for two Commanders in Chief of Presidencies, but I wish to receive this information in full detail; so that I may know what commands it is desired to abolish or reduce, and what is proposed as the Staff of the Commander in Chief in India, and of each Lieutenant General, as well as what alterations are contemplated in the establishment of the Military Secretariat of the Government of India, or in any of the departments connected with the army.

5. I may observe here that your proposals differ materially from those of the Army Commission. Their recommendation was, that instead of maintaining the three Presidential armies, the Army of India should be divided into four separate and distinct bodies to be called army corps, subject to the general control of the Government of India, and of the Commander in Chief in India, but the complete amalgamation of which should be prevented by their territorial segregation, and by the independent powers conferred on the Lieutenant Generals commanding.

But, in your Despatch now before me, you do not recommend that the armies of India should be even nominally united, and you propose that the armies of Madras and Bombay should still be kept absolutely distinct from each other, and from the Bengal Army, whilst at the same time you would transfer the direct control of these armies from the Local Governments to the Government of India.

6. Be this as it may, until I have before me a full outline of the arrangements which you consider necessary if the Madras and Bombay armies are to be removed from the control of the Government of these Presidencies, and if the immediate command of the Bengal Army is to be exercised by two Lieutenant Generals, it is almost impossible for me to arrive at a final decision upon your main proposals.

The problem to be solved, though difficult, may not be incapable of solution, but it is is clear that its satisfactory solution depends, not only on the clear definition of principles, but also on the careful elaboration of details.

7. It is therefore necessary that I should have full information as to how your Excellency proposes to conduct the various branches of military business now performed by the Governments of Madras and Bombay. Without attempting to exhaust the list of business which will have to be arranged for, I would indicate some subjects of importance:—

I. The amount of authority, apart from that ordinarily exercised by General Officers in India, to be vested in the four Lieutenant Generals.

II. The way in which it is proposed to deal with all the details of business connected with estates, furlough, promotion, pensions, clothing, equipment, and the like, of the armies of Madras and Bombay, the greater part of which is now disposed of in the Military Departments of those Presidencies, and most of which requires prompt attention.

III. The mode of effecting promotions in the various Staff and Administrative Departments, and in the Medical Services, and whether it is intended to amalgamate any of the departments of the three Presidencies.

IV. The system to be adopted for the control of the Military Public Works of the two Presidencies of Madras and Bombay.

V. The control of sea transport arrangements at Madras and Bombay, bearing in mind that at times large numbers of vessels may have to be taken up promptly, a measure attended with a heavy expenditure of public money, as illustrated in the past by the expeditions to China, Burmah, Persia, Abyssinia, and Malta, and also to some extent during the Afghan wars.

8. No doubt some of the points above referred to were touched on in the Report of the Army Commission, but, as I have pointed out, in connection with different proposals; and what I desire is, to be in possession of the proposals of your Excellency's Government for giving effect to the changes you advocate. I am not prepared to say that you may not be able to suggest satisfactory arrangements for the transaction of all military business now conducted in Madras and Bombay, but I am doubtful whether, on full inquiry, you will retain the opinion expressed in the 9th paragraph of your Despatch under reply, viz., that "the "Military Departments of Madras and Bombay are in truth but little more than "transmitting offices for business which might come much more conveniently "direct to the Government of India from the Commander in Chief."

9. In the proposals to be made, your Excellency will, no doubt, bear in mind the evils of over-centralisation, or of burdening the Military Department of the Government of India with a mass of business that it will be unable to grapple with, and I am assured that your Excellency is fully impressed with the necessity that the controlling authorities shall be provided with the means of being at all times accurately informed of the peculiarities, and even the prejudices, of the different armies, and have such knowledge as will enable them to understand and to protect the feelings and just interests, and to foster the separate *esprit de corps*, of those armies.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 282 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received 22nd August* 1881).

My Lord Marquis, Simla, 29 July 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's Despatch of the 16th June, No. 203, replying to our Military Letter, No. 85, of the 28th February 1881, in which we reviewed that portion of the Report of the Indian Army Commission which dealt with the more general principles which should govern the proposed re-organisation of the Indian Army, and submitted to Her Majesty's Government certain specific recommendations on this subject, the result of long and earnest deliberation.

2. Your Lordship now calls for further information on several parts of the general plan we have proposed.

3. As we stated in that Despatch, it was our intention to take up each portion of the Report separately and in turn; and, in pursuance of this intention, we have already (in our Military Letter, No. 141, of the 24th April) communicated our proposals for the future establishment of the British troops in India, proposals which, although they do not effect so large a reduction of battalions, regiments, and batteries as was recommended by the Commission, nevertheless, by supplying the same aggregate number of men as at present in units somewhat larger and more serviceable, according to the accepted standard of all other armies, would result in a substantial saving to the Indian Exchequer. This Despatch was followed by that of the 24th June, No. 230, embodying our proposals for the organisation of the Native army. These proposals were based on the same lines as those which governed our recommendations regarding the European troops, namely, to furnish the same aggregate strength as at present in a smaller number of units. Here, again, we have adopted a middle course between maintaining the very expensive organisation at present in force and the larger reduction of separate regiments proposed by the Commission. We have proposed an establishment which, while we believe it will be more efficient as a military body than the existing Native army, will be considerably less expensive.

4. Having thus disposed of the most important parts of the subjects, the general organisation of the Indian Armies, and the strength and establishment of the British and Native forces, we proceeded to turn our attention to the more detailed parts of the various administrative and executive departments connected with the army. Meanwhile your Lordship, in a telegram dated the 18th May, informed us, with regard to our first Despatch (No. 85) regarding the general organisation proposed, that it was necessary you should be placed in posssession of further information as to the reduction in the staff of general and other officers, whereby to meet the extra expense caused by the proposed division of the command of the Bengal Army under two Lieutenant Generals. We telegraphed in reply on the 22nd May, showing in abstract how our proposed arrangements would admit of a considerable saving in the total charge incurred for general officers' commands on the Indian establishment. Your Lordship now informs us that you wish to receive this information in full detail, so that you "may know what commands it is desired to abolish or reduce, and what is "proposed as the Staff of the Commander in Chief in India, and of each Lieu-"tenant General, as well as of the alterations which are contemplated in the "establishment of the Military Secretariat of the Government of India, or any "of the departments connected with the army."

5. A separate Despatch, No. 274, of the 22nd July, which went home by the last mail, will, we believe, furnish all the information regarding the Army Staff which your Lordship desires. The organisation of the Staff has been under our consideration for many weeks, and the establishment which we have now proposed will, in our opinion, be sufficient and suitable, and as is shown in that Despatch, considerably cheaper than the present establishment.

6. Another Despatch to follow shortly, will embody our views regarding the proper organisation of the Medical Service for India. The Veterinary Department is also under consideration.

 7. Two

7. Two separate Despatches, now under preparation, and to follow by the next mail, will convey our opinions on the proper organisation for the Commissariat and Ordnance Departments, as to which we have adopted very closely the recommendations of the Commission. In this case there will be no saving in salaries; but we consider that the proposed organisation will be much more efficient than that which it supplants, and will admit of much greater economy in the large expenditure controlled by these very important departments.

8. The question of the Army Transport Service is still under consideration. As your Lordship is aware, an officer of great experience in this special line, Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Low, C.B., is now especially employed on the subject. We hope to communicate within a few weeks the result of our conclusions upon the report he will submit to us.

9. The proper organisation for the conduct of Military Works is also still under consideration.

10. There remains the question of the Military Secretariats, on which we shall shortly submit a separate report. We may just mention that the staff of the Secretariat, as well as that of Army Head-Quarters, should be chosen from all the Indian Armies.

11. The foregoing subjects cover the whole ground of army administration as dealt with by the Commission; and as soon as these Despatches are received your Lordship will be in possession of our views and detailed recommendations upon every branch of the subject. But your Lordship has now specified certain points of importance on which you desire early information; and although the manner in which we have been dealing with the case will, to a great extent, anticipate this demand, we now desire to submit some observations on the various points indicated by your Lordship as demanding further elucidation. We will take them up in the order specified in your Despatch.

12. I.—As to the amount of authority, apart from that ordinarily exercised by General Officers in India, to be vested in the four Lieutenant Generals.

13. As regards the Lieutenant Generals commanding at Madras and Bombay, although they are no longer to be styled Commanders in Chief, we contemplate that, subject to the general control of the Commander in Chief in India, their military functions should remain in all essential respects unaltered. Having no longer a seat in the local Council, they would cease to be concerned with the civil administration; they would also cease to correspond direct with the authorities at the Horse Guards in respect of the British troops under their command. The medium of communication for all British officers with the home authorities would be the Commander in Chief in India; and having regard to the moderate strength of the establishment of British troops in this country; to the improved means of communication; and to the fact that the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, while now mainly effected at Bombay, is essentially a business which is conducted under the immediate administration of Army Head-Quarters, we consider that there should be no sort of difficulty in conducting this business under one authority, and that it would be much more simple and convenient to do so. But as regards the Native Armies of Madras and Bombay, the Lieutenant Generals commanding would continue to select officers for regimental promotion, and to nominate for staff appointments, in the same manner as the Local Commander in Chiefs do now, and to exercise the same authority in regard to discipline as heretofore, subject to the general control of the Commander in Chief in India. Further, we are of opinion that it would be both expedient and practicable to transfer to the Lieutenant General a considerable part of the authority now exercised by the Local Government. That authority, as we shall presently show, is in fact extremely limited at present, and we believe that, while establishing unity of control over the Indian Armies. it would be quite possible to carry decentralisation much further than it is now practised without any ill results.

14. We propose that the two Lieutenant Generals commanding the Punjab and Bengal portions of the Bengal Army shall be on precisely the same footing as the Lieutenant Generals commanding in Madras and Bombay.

15. II.—As

15. II.—As to "the way in which it is proposed to deal with all the details of business connected with estates, furlough, promotion, pension, clothing, equipment and the like, of the Armies of Madras and Bombay, the greater part of which is now disposed of in the Military Departments of those presidencies, and most of which require prompt attention."

16. On this head we may first observe that the whole Indian Army is now smaller than the Bengal Army alone used to be in former days. In 1857 the Indian Armies comprised nearly 300 Native regiments, including irregular corps, besides a considerable body of European infantry and artillery, with more than 5,600 effective officers. Of these, the Bengal Army, including the irregular corps attached to it, comprised 178 regiments, and more than 2,600 officers. The whole Indian Army now numbers about 2,250 effective officers, and, when the reductions we have proposed shall have been carried out, will comprise 162 regiments, while the European element, the business connected with the affairs of which used to be very considerable, has disappeared. Consequently, even if it should be proposed to concentrate in Calcutta the whole of the business connected with estates, furloughs, and promotions, now transacted at the three presidencies, the amount of this business would not be greater than that which used to fall on our Military Secretariat when it had to deal with the affairs of the Bengal Army alone; while, owing to the improved state of the communications throughout the country, correspondence between Simla or Calcutta and any part of India is now conducted with much greater rapidity and facility than it used to be between Calcutta and the outlying stations of the Bengal Presidency. We apprehend, therefore, that if the abolition of the Bombay and Madras Military Departments were to result in the transfer in the whole of the business now transacted by them to the Military Department of the Government of India, there should be no practical difficulty in coping with it. It would be just as easy, for instance, to communicate with an officer at Madras as with an officer at Peshawar; and an officer serving in Central India or Burma may obtain his furlough certificates quite as readily from an office in Calcutta as from an office at Madras. With regard to clothing, equipment, and the like, practically all matters of principle connected therewith have now to be referred to the Government of India; the mere mechanical business of distributing these things is conducted by the different departments concerned. This is, in fact, a matter of routine, and does not involve frequent reference to any Government; and we are not apprehensive that there will be any appreciable difficulty in superintending this part of the army administration from one central office. With respect to pensions, these are in ordinary course issued according to fixed rules embodied in the Indian Pay Code, under the orders and supervision of the local Controllers. References to the Government are necessary only when cases arise which are not provided for specifically by those rules; and it has to be observed that even now, when such cases do arise, they have equally to be referred to the Government of India, whether they arise in Bengal, Madras, or Bombay. On this head we are satisfied that no extra work will devolve on the Government of India; the only difference will be that the reference will come direct from the local Controller to the Accountant General, instead of coming through the Military Department of the Local Government to our Military Department, and being referred from that to the Accountant General for report. In this, as in so many other matters of the like kind, we anticipate a great saving in correspondence and simplification of procedure by the change of system which we advocate. But further, we are of opinion that a good deal of business now goes up to the Local Governments which, under a better system, and by a reasonable degree of decentralisation, might be properly disposed of by the departmental administrative officers, and need not come up to any Government at all.

17. With regard to the correspondence carried on by the Military Departments at Madras and Bombay direct with the Secretary of State, this would, no doubt, have now to be transacted by the Military Department of the Government of India, and to that extent there would be an increase of work falling on the latter. Judging from the number and contents of the letters which pass between these Governments and the Secretary of State, copies of which are now supplied to us, we do not consider that this extra work will be particularly onerous. With respect to indents for stores, which is perhaps the most

important part of the business connected with the local armies that is transacted at home, it has to be observed that these are already submitted through the Government of India, and undergo careful check and frequent alterations before they are passed on; and we are satisfied that, so far from the responsibility and labour of the Government of India being increased by the proposed new system, there will be a great simplification of procedure, if all matters of ordnance and commissariat supply should be dealt with directly by that Government, acting with the advice and assistance of its own administrative officers, immediately responsible to it for the efficient control of these important departments.

18. The Military Department of the Government of India will, no doubt, require to be strengthened, although taking all the three Secretariats together we anticipate a considerable saving. But the extra work devolving upon that department is not due to the business connected with estates, furlough, promotion, pension, and the like, which are for the most part of a routine nature, and as regards which we have already pointed out that the total number of persons to be dealt with is not sensibly larger now for the whole of India than it used to be for the Bengal Presidency alone. The increase of work which has already occurred in that department, and which is likely to continue, is really due to the much greater complexity which of recent years has been introduced into all departments of army administration. The greater care bestowed upon the health and welfare of the troops; the substitution of short for long service, and the more frequent movement of troops to and fro; the introduction of arms of precision; the greater complexity of ordnance equipment; the necessity of sanitary supervision; the more elaborate provision of barracks and the buildings connected therewith; last, but not least, the more rapid and constant communication with England—these and other causes of the same kind are sufficient to account for the increasing labour thrown upon the Military Department; and with respect to all these matters we may observe that, so far from there being any saving in correspondence and business generally from the interposition of the Local Governments between the Government of India and the executive departments of the Indian Armies, the transaction of business would be much simplified, and more economically and speedily conducted, if the circuitous channels of communication were removed, and the Indian Armies administered directly by the Government of India. We cannot insist too strongly on this point. In fact, it may be said without exaggeration that if the Bengal Army were at present dealt with through the medium of a Local Government, as are the armies of Madras and Bombay, the difficulty of administering the Indian Armies would become almost intolerable.

19. The truth is, that the amalgamation of Indian Army Administration virtually took place in all essential respects when, some years ago, the establishments of Army Finance and Account underwent amalgamation. Previously to that, when the local offices of Audit and Account were under the direct orders of the Local Governments, and the members of those establishments looked to the Local Governments for advancement and promotion, those Governments exercised a certain degree of latitude and authority in the disposal of references arising out of the business of local army finance. As time went on the anomalous condition, under which the authority which was financially responsible for all Indian Army expenditure had only an imperfect control over a considerable part of it, became more and more apparent; and eventually, as a natural consequence of the more rigid conception of the functions of an Audit Department adopted of late years, it was found necessary to bring all the establishments connected with Army finance directly under the orders of the Government of India, and the existing Department of Military Account was created by the fusion of the three separate departments of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. When that step was taken, the financial administration of the Local Governments over the Local Armies ceased nenceforward to be much more than formal. The virtual administration of them has rested ever since with the Government of India; and when it is remembered that the greater part of the Madras Army, and a large part of the Bombay Army, are serving in territories of which the civil administration is directly under the Government of India, it may readily be understood that the interposition of the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay between those troops and the authority which really administers the business connected with them is not only a mere matter of form, but is the cause of needless trouble, embarrassment,

embarrassment, and delay, to all concerned. And it may at least be questioned whether, so far from the Governments of Madras and Bombay losing in dignity, were the transfer of the nominal authority over those armies to follow the course of the virtual authority, the result would not be rather the reverse. They would, at any rate, be positive gainers by the cessation of that interference with their affairs in this department, which, although necessary, is no doubt vexatious, and which is not extended in the same degree to the business of the civil administration. In the latter decentralisation has made great progress, and may go still further; for efficient military administration, on the other hand, unity of control, although quite compatible with decentralisation, is essential; and this fact should, in our opinion, be distinctly recognised and carried out to its legitimate conclusion.

20. III.—Next, as to "the mode of effecting promotions in the various Staff and Administrative Departments and in the Medical Services; and whether it is intended to amalgamate any of the three departments of the three presidencies."

21. The answer to these questions has been partly anticipated in our Despatch (No. 274, dated 22nd July 1881) dealing with the Staff and Divisonal Commands, and, as we have already stated, the subject will be followed up by detailed proposals regarding the Medical Service and the various Army Departments. We may, however, here add the following explanations.

22. District and Divisional Commands will be on precisely the same footing as at present. British officers will be appointed to commands under existing rules; officers of the Indian Army will be eligible for commands in the presidency to which they belong under existing rules. These rules will also hold good for Staff appointments, so far that nominations thereto will be made in the respective armies by the Lieutenant Generals commanding, subject to the approval of the Government of India. The Staff at Army Quarters will be chosen in equal proportions from all the Armies.

23. The Military Accounts Department has already for some years been one service, under the direct orders of the Government of India, and recruited indifferently from all the Armies. This arrangement will, of course, continue.

24. The organisation of the Commissariat Department will remain as at present, as will be seen from the Despatch on the subject about to follow, the commissariat operations of each army being subject, however, to the general supervision and control of the Commissary General in Chief attached to the Government of India, and who will be selected from any of the three services. Two Deputy Commissary Generals of the Bengal Army will become Commissary Generals (on a lower rate of pay), having jurisdiction within the respective limits of the two Lieutenant Generals' commands. Hereafter it may be found expedient to effect a more complete separation of the Bengal Commissariat into two portions; but that is a matter which does not press for early settlement. We attach great importance to this introduction of this degree of general control. The experience of the late war has brought very forcibly to view the extreme inconvenience and embarrassment attending the supply of an army in the field conducted through two departments working independently of each other; and in time of peace also the Government of India has constant reason to feel the need for a responsible adviser and administrator for this great branch of public expenditure.

25. The Despatch regarding the Ordnance Department will explain that a complete amalgamation of the Department is contemplated, We attach the greatest importance to this change also, which has been for many years under consideration, and which was recommended to the Secretary of State as long ago as 1873.* We are satisfied that the Ordnance Department can be placed on a perfectly satisfactory footing only by appointing a head of the department in immediate communication with the Government of India, who should be its responsible adviser regarding the administration of this service for the whole of India, instead of, as at present, only for the Bengal Presidency.

* Government of India, Military Letter No. 170, dated 11th August 1873.

 26. We

26. We have already, in our Despatch No. 200, dated 27th May 1881, recommended that the administration of the Army Remount Department should be placed under one head. To limit the supervision of the Director to the remount operations in Bengal only involves a great waste of power.

27. With respect to the Medical Department, we have already stated that our recommendations will be given at length in the Despatch relating thereto, which will shortly be prepared.

28. IV.—We have now to reply to the question put as to the system to be adopted for the conduct of Military Public Works in the provinces occupied by the Armies of Madras and Bombay.

29. This subject is still under our consideration, and we shall communicate our views upon it in detail in a subsequent Despatch. But we may state at once that our recommendations will certainly take the form of placing the whole of these works throughout India under one administration, on the lines advocated by the Commission in Chapter 10, Section 4, of their Report. We have already apprised your Lordship of our intention to transfer the administration of the Military Works in Bengal from the Public Works to the Military Department.* There remains to deal, therefore, with the case of Assam, which, although for military purposes generally it is a part of the Bengal Presidency, is beyond the present jurisdiction of the Inspector General of Military Works, and the various provinces garrisoned by Madras and Bombay troops.

* Military Letter No. 151, of 1st May 1881.

30. As regards the provinces† which, although under the direct administration of the Government of India, are garrisoned by the Madras and Bombay Armies, and in which the larger part of those Armies is quartered, the existing arrangements for the conduct of Military Works are in the last degree cumbrous and inconvenient. In these provinces the Local Administration (in the case of Native States the Governor Generals Agent), which is in no other respect immediately concerned with Army Administration, constructs and repairs the barracks and other buildings required for the service of the troops, the fund being supplied by the Government of India. In these cases, therefore, that is to say, for a very large part of India, there are three authorities concerned in this business—the Local Administratration, which carries out the works, but has no direct interest or responsibility in the matter; the Government of the Presidency, whose troops are quartered in the province, and whose business it is to make proposals and bring wants to notice; and the Government of India, which finds the money and controls the expenditure.

† Central Provinces. Mysore. Burma. Central India. Hyderabad. Rajputana.

31. Such a distribution of work and responsibility necessarily involves a continued corrrespondence about the conduct of the business throughout every stage of it, from the first origination of a proposal and the preparation of the estimates to the appropriation and final outlay of the money. For example, in determining what amount should be proper for Military Works, say in Burma, the Government of Madras, which is nominally responsible for the administration of the troops in that country, has only an indirect knowledge of the wants of the troops there, or of the state of the works in progress, or of the executive means at the disposal of the Local Administration for carrying out those works. The Local Administration, on the other hand, has no knowledge of the requirements of the Madras Army anywhere but in Burma; and it can only carry out such works as the Government of India may sanction and supply funds for. This is surely a very unfavourable condition for effective administration. The ill-effects of the system are seen in the cumbersome circumlocution which attends the conduct of this class of business.

32. Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that a requisition occurs for some trifling work at Rangoon. The local military authorities refer the case to the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army; the Commander in Chief refers it to the Madras Government; the Madras Government to the Government of India; the Government of India, after calling upon the different authorities concerned for such further information as may be necessary, involving possibly a prolonged correspondence through the same circuitous channels, finally instructs the Local Administration to comply with the requisition, and

and provides the funds, which again probably involves another lengthy correspondence, inasmuch as the funds in question have to be abstracted from those already appropriated to some other Local Government. This sort of thing is going on all over the country. We certainly think, then, that the last objection which could reasonably be brought against the proposed change is, that it would involve a greater degree of work falling on the Government of India. On the contrary, we are satisfied that the labours of this Government will be greatly lightened, and the distribution simplified of the funds available for military works, if the arrangements now in force in the Bengal Presidency were extended to the other parts of the country, and carried out through the agency of a department immediately responsible to the Government of India. Our recommendations will, therefore, probably point to the extension of the functions of the Inspector General of Military Works to all India, a Deputy Inspector General being appointed for each of the four Military Divisions of the country, with a staff of Royal Engineers for the needful executive duty. The requirements for Military Works in any part of the country can then be considered simultaneously by the Lieutenant General Commanding and his departmental adviser, and, if not disposed of by them under the definitive powers to be conferred, will come up with their collective opinion before the Government of India through the responsible head of the department.

33. We consider that such a mode of procedure will constitute a reform of much value.

34. In the 5th paragraph of your Lordship's Despatch it is observed that the proposals of the Government of India differ materially from those of the Army Commission, for that, whereas their recommendation was, "that instead of maintaining the three Presidential Armies, the Army of India should be divided into four separate and distinct bodies, to be called Army Corps, subject to the general control of the Government of India, and of the Commander in Chief in India, the complete amalgamation of which should be prevented by their territorial segregation, and by independent powers conferred on the Lieutenant General Commanding," in our Despatch we do not recommend that the Armies of India should be even nominally united, but propose that the Armies of Madras and Bombay should be kept absolutely distinct from each other, and from the Bengal Army, whilst at the same time we would transfer the direct control of those Armies from the Local Government to the Government of India.

35. As from the foregoing criticism it might appear that we have not represented our views with sufficient distinctness, we may here explain exactly in what respects our proposals agree with and differ from those of the Commission.

36. We would first observe that, as regards the British troops, the two proposals are practically identical. In both cases it is assumed, that while the British troops in India for purposes of administration should be under the orders of the four Lieutenant Generals within whose commands they are serving, the whole of them would be under the immediate orders of the Commander in Chief in India, and their administration directly managed by the Government of India. And this is essentially the position of the European troops at present, the Local Governments having really no concern with their administration except as regards barrack accommodation for the portion serving actually within their own territories; discipline is controlled by the military authorities; while all matters connected with pay, equipment, and clothing have to be decided by the Government of India. So that neither we nor the Commission make any change on this head.

37. With respect to the Native troops, the Commission proposed that the existing Madras and Bombay Armies should be styled Madras and Bombay Army Corps, and that their administration should pass from the Local Governments to the Government of India, the Lieutenant General Commanding communicating with the latter through the Commander in Chief in India; also that the Bengal Army should be divided into two separate bodies, respectively termed the Bengal and the Punjab Army Corps, each under a Lieutenant General. These four Army Corps being thus all under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief in India.

 38. The

38 The modifications of this arrangement proposed by us are, as regards the Madras and Bombay Armies, that the style and title "Army" should still be maintained. We recommend this, because, while we advocate complete unity of administration, we consider it very important to maintain, to the fullest possible extent, the distinctive character of these Armies. This is a point which cannot be too strongly insisted on, nor is there any danger of its being lost sight of under the safeguards we propose; while we believe that the separate interests of these Armies will be better cared for if their officers are able to communicate direct with the Government of India, which has the means of satisfying their wants, than they can be so long as those Armies are under the nominal control of Governments who have only a part at a time serving within their own jurisdiction, and whose authority is limited in many respects to making representations on their behalf.

39. The Commission also proposed a new system of promotion for the European officers; and, as regards the Bengal Army, that this promotion should run in separate general lists for the Punjab and Bengal commands respectively. We have recommended the maintenance of the staff corps system of promotion, and if that is maintained, it does not matter, so far as the Bengal officers are concerned, whether they are placed on separate lists for the two divisions or are still kept on one list, as their promotion would be the same in either case. Nor, so far as the Native troops are concerned, is it material whether the Bengal Army be nominally divided or not, provided the important point is kept in view of segregating the Hindustani and Punjabi portions thereof as much as possible in time of peace. This appears to us to be the essential feature of both schemes alike; and, so far from its being in the direction of centralisation with respect to the Native troops, the virtual division of the Bengal Army (which would be a necessary result of its being placed under the command of two Lieutenant Generals, even without prescribing any rule upon the subject), and the more strict conditions now introduced, limiting the recruiting of different armies to the territories in which they serve, will surely have a precisely opposite effect, and constitute a decentralising measure which we regard as of extreme political importance. Against this the change in the other direction, caused by the transfer of the administration of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the Local Governments to the Government of India, is in our opinion, so far as regards the Native troops, comparatively insignificant, and one of which the sepoys themselves will, we believe, be hardly sensible.

40. It will be seen from this explanation that the difference between our plan and that proposed by the Commission is only nominal, so far as the Native troops are concerned. In both cases the principle of segregation is carried very much farther than at present in peace time; while the fact that the four bodies into which the Indian Army will now be divided will all be placed exactly in the same relations towards the Government of India and the Commander in Chief, will, we believe, ensure—what we regard as a point to be particularly aimed at—that in time of war all four armies shall have a more equal share than they have hitherto had of employment in the field, and that the cry of partiality and favoritism, and all the jealousies thereby engendered, will no longer be raised with any show of justice. To keep the Native armies apart in quiet times, but to employ all of them freely and impartially in time of war, we believe to be the two cardinal principles to be observed on this head. The first has been too much lostsight of in past years; the last has only become generally practicable with the development of railways. We anticipate the greatest possible advantage to the military character of the Madras and Bombay armies by the change; while, as regards the present Bengal Army, we are satisfied that the new plan, under which his duty, for both Hindustani and Punjabi, will be carried on in ordinary times within a reasonable distance from his home, will render military service much more popular with the sepoy.

41. There now only remains to reply to the last question put, as regards the control of sea transport arrangements at Madras and Bombay; and on this it seems sufficient to observe that the business in question is already managed directly by the Government of India through its Marine Department and the Army Staff, and that no change is proposed. Should any extraordinary measures be

be called for in regard to embarkation of troops for foreign expeditions, we doubt not that the co-operation of the Governments of Madras and Bombay would be cordially given, as well as the co-operation of the Governmenst of Bengal and Burma.

42. We have now replied on all the points raised in your Lordship's Despatch, anticipating thus in some respects the proposals which we intended to make on various points, and which, if they had been dealt with separately, would have been expressed in greater fulness of detail. We would conclude by expressing our conviction that the more completely the matter is considered, the more clearly it will be seen that our proposals are calculated to conduce largely to the economy and efficiency of the Indian Army, and merit the approval and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 401 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 21*st November* 1884).

My Lord Marquis, Simla, 29 October 1881.

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch of the 14th October 1880, No. 333, and of the intention expressed in our reply of the 28th February 1881, No. 85, we have now submitted to Her Majesty's Government, in a series of Despatches, our views and recommendations upon the various proposals contained in the Report of the Special Commission appointed by the Government of India in July 1879, to inquire into the organisation and cost of the army in India.

2. This Commission was appointed in 1879, in consequence of the financial condition of India at that time rendering it necessary to effect extensive reduction in the public expenditure. The primary duty laid on the Commission was, therefore, to show how the army expenditure might be cut down, but they were further instructed to make a comprehensive investigation into the whole subject of military organisation and expenditure in India; they were desired to study the improvements in administration which had been recently introduced into the British and other European armies, and to consider how far such changes could advantageously be introduced into the Indian army, in view to rendering it thoroughly efficient with the smallest permanent peace establishment and the lowest expenditure; and they were specially to consider and report whether the existing organisation in separate presidential armies, with separate staffs and administrative departments, should be maintained; in fact, their inquiry was to cover the whole ground of Indian army organisation.

3. The Report of the Commission was presented in November 1879; but various circumstances prevented the Government of India from taking it into their early consideration, and before it could be dealt with in detail the composition of that Government had undergone a great change, and the various Despatches which have been from time to time addressed to your Lordship on the subject, except the first, have been signed by a Governor General, a Commander in Chief, and several Members of Council who had no share in the appointment of the Commission, and who have come to the subject without any previous bias for or against the opinion implied in its appointment, that the Indian army stood in need of reform. We may thus claim to have given the Report a perfectly impartial consideration, and we have had the advantage of the advice of a Commander in Chief who has had unusual opportunities of seeing the practical working of the present system, while in command of a large portion of the Indian armies during protracted service in the field.

 4. The

4. The Commission was composed as follows :—

President.

The Honourable Sir Ashley Eden, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.

Members.

Lieutenant General Sir F. Roberts, G.C.B.

Mr. C. Bernard, C.S., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

Major General Sir P. Lumsden, K.C.B., Adjutant General.

Major General Napier Campbell, R.A., Inspector General of Ordnance in Bengal.

Major General Sir R. Phayre, K.C.B., late Quartermaster General, Bombay Army.

Brigadier General H. O'Connell, Quartermaster General, Madras Army.

Major General Sir H. T. Macpherson, K.C.B., Bengal Army.

Major General Sir C. M. MacGregor, K.C.B., Quartermaster General, Bengal Army.

Brigadier General Sir T. D. Baker, K.C.B., British Service.

Lieutenant Colonel O. R. Newmarch, Accountant General, Military Department.

Secretary.

Captain E. H. H. Collen, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

The Commission thus comprised some of the most distinguished officers serving in India, several of whom have had great experience with Native troops, and in the field. We would take this opportunity to express our sense of the able manner in which the Commission have performed their task, and the great industry, intelligence, and public spirit which they brought to bear on it.

5. In pursuance of the intention expressed in our first Despatch upon the subject, No. 85, of the 25th February 1881, we have taken up and reported to Her Majesty's Government separately upon each of the main subjects of inquiry comprised in the Report.

These are as follows :—

I.—General organisation of the Indian Army. This was dealt with in the Despatch above quoted of the 25th February last.

II.—The strength and composition of the British forces in India formed the subject of our Despatch No. 141, of the 24th April.

III.—Despatch No. 230, of the 24th June, conveyed our views upon the recommendations of the Commission with respect to the Native Army.

IV.—Despatch No. 274, of the 22nd July, conveyed our recommendations for the organisation of the staff suitable to the strength of the army, European and Native, proposed in the two foregoing Despatches.

V.—In our Despatch No. 282, of the 29th July, we furnished your Lordship, in reply to an enquiry addressed to us,* some further information in regard to the general principles which should govern the proposed reorganisation of the Indian army as laid down in the previous Despatches.

* Secretary of State's Despatch No. 203, of the 16th June 1881.

VI.—Despatch No. 283, of the 29th July, supplied some further information as to the numbers and cost of the staff proposed in the Despatch of the 22nd July.

VII.—Our Despatches Nos. 292 and 293, of the 5th August, conveyed our recommendations regarding the changes necessary in the Commissariat and Ordnance Departments to adapt them to the proposed reorganisation of the army.

VIII.—Our

VIII.—Our Despatch No. 315, of the 26th of August, embodied a scheme for the reform of the Medical Service in India, on a plan which will be attended with a very large saving of expense, and at the same time a great increase of efficiency.

IX.—Despatch No. 236, of the 9th September, contained our recommendations in regard to the Military Department, the Department by which the administration of the army is conducted, in view of the increased functions which would now be placed upon it.

X.—Despatch of the 16th September, No. 340, related to the organisation of the Veterinary Service.

XI.—Our Despatch No. 345, of the 24th September, dealt with the arrangements necessary to be made for the conduct of military works throughout India.

XII.—Our Despatch No. 399, of the 29th October, contained a proposal for the redistribution of the Military Accounts Department in accordance with the general scheme of army reform.

XIII.—Our Despatch No. 400, of the 29th October, referred to the Army Transport Service.

6. These subjects cover almost all the ground traversed by the Commission, and embrace the whole organisation and administration of the Indian army, and with the last of these Despatches our labours on this head are concluded. But it may be useful if we now pass in review, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, the recommendations which, after the most careful and anxious consideration, we have felt it to be our duty to submit on this great question.

7. First, as regards the general organisation of the Indian Army. The military forces at the disposal of the Indian Government are now divided into three separate establishments, comprising in each case a separate Native army and the proportion of British troops attached to it; those of Madras and Bombay, comparatively small bodies of about equal size, which are administered by the Governments of those Presidencies; and the much larger Bengal army which is under the direct administration of the Government of India.

8. There is also the body known as the Punjab Frontier Force, which is under the direct administration of the Punjab Government, subject to the general control of the Government of India; this is, in fact, a small separate army, but the officers attached to it belong to one or other of the three presidential armies. There are various other local forces, the largest being the Hyderabad Contingent, all under the direct orders of the Government of India, without the intervention of the Commander-in-Chief, and officered, like the Punjab Frontier Force, by officers from the three presidential services temporarily attached to them.

9. The recommendations of the Commission with respect to this organisation were, briefly, that the administration of the Madras and Bombay armies should be transferred from the Local Governments to the Government of India; that the Lieutenant Generals commanding those armies should no longer be styled Commander in Chief or have seats in the Local Councils, but should be in all respects under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief in India. On the other hand, the latter was to be relieved of the immediate command of the Bengal army, which was to be placed under the orders of two Lieutenant Generals, one for the troops stationed in Bengal and Hindustan, the other for the remaining portion of the Bengal army which is quartered in the Punjab, to which command was to be attached the Punjab Frontier Force, the local and separate character of that force being, however, still maintained.

10. The Indian military forces would thus be organised in four commands, all directly under the orders of the Commander in Chief in India, who would be, as at present, in direct communication with the Government of India.

11. The Commission further proposed the abolition of the staff corps system of promotion, and that the officers of each "Army Corps," as they proposed to style these four bodies, should rise on separate general lists for substantive

promotion, regimental and departmental advancement being regulated, as at present, by selection.

12. These proposals were accepted by us as suitable and proper, so far as the general principle was involved of bringing the armies of Madras and Bombay under the direct administration of the Government of India; of dividing the Bengal Army into two commands; and of relieving the Commander in Chief in India from the immediate administration of that army; but in regard to the details of the measure we have recommended some important modifications.

13. First, as regards the title "Army Corps," which the Commission proposed for each of these four bodies. As it is intended to maintain to the fullest extent the existing separation of the Madras and Bombay armies from each other, and from the Bengal Army, we think that the existing designations of the Madras and Bombay Armies should be maintained, as being more appropriate to the fact that they are separate armies, and because it is not desirable to make any change which can be avoided.

14. Next, the arrangement proposed by the Commission, of creating General Lists of officers for each army, in lieu of the existing Staff Corps, for the purpose of regulating promotion, with a fixed number of officers in each grade, did not appear to us to be suitable for the needs of the Indian service; and, on the whole, we considered it desirable to retain the staff corps system of promotion, under which the officer is promoted to captain, major, lieutenant colonel, and brevet colonel, after fixed period of service, and without reference to the occurrence of vacancies or to the nature of his employment.

15. The staff corps system of promotion being maintained, there would be some difficulties in dividing the officers of the Bengal Army into two absolutely separate bodies: and while we entirely approve of the recommendations of the Commission, that the Hindustani and Punjab forces of the existing Bengal Army should be quartered in peace time apart from each other, each under the direct command of a Lieutenant General, the Commander in Chief in India ceasing to have direct administration over that army, we propose that the officers of the Bengal Army should continue to be one body, as at present. It is true that, inasmuch as under the staff corps system the promotion of an officer from grade to grade up to the rank of Colonel depends entirely upon length of service, while advancement to the rank of General Officer is made upon one list for the whole of the Indian Army taken together, and the succession to the Colonel's allowances being also regulated by length of service, the promotion of the officers of the Bengal Staff Corps would be absolutely unaffected if that corps were to be separated into two parts; but by leaving it as at present the officers would continue to be eligible for employment in either of the two portions into which it is proposed to divide the troops composing the Bengal Army. And on the general principle that change should not be made where it is not absolutely necessary, we think that the Bengal Staff Corps might be maintained, as at present, for officering the two armies into which the existing Bengal Army will now be virtually divided.

16. The general constitution of the Indian Army, therefore, under these proposals, will be that the Bombay and Madras Armies, both as regards the organisation of the officers and the status of the Native troops, would be entirely unaltered, but that the general officers commanding these armies would be under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief in India. The Bengal Army would undergo no nominal change, but the troops serving in the eastern provinces* would ordinarily be kept apart from those serving in the Punjab. The Hindustani troops would thus be so far localised, if the term can be applied to such a great extent of territory, that their peace cantonments would not extend beyond the limits of what, before the annexation of the Punjab, was popularly known as the Bengal Presidency. The troops of the Bengal Army serving in the Punjab would also be a local force, in the sense in which the Madras and Bombay Armies are to be local forces; that is to say, they would ordinarily be quartered in one or other of the different military stations spread over that extensive country. Each of these two bodies would thus be placed on the same footing as the Madras and Bombay Armies, in being under the orders

* Assam. Bengal. North-Western Provinces and Oudh. Central India. Part of Central Provinces.

orders of a Lieutenant General Commanding, instead of being under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief in India, the latter thus exercising the same degree of control over all the four military bodies which make up the Indian Army.

17. Upon another point of general organisation, namely, in proposing the retention of the Commander in Chief as an Extraordinary Member of the Supreme Council, we have differed from the Commission, for the reasons given in our previous Despatch on the subject, of the 25th February.

18. We may here observe, with regard to the many recommendations which we have made in the course of our several Despatches, that we have given our reasons in detail only when we have found cause to differ from the Commission. The reasons for the various recommendations they have made are stated at great length in their Report, and where we have agreed with them we have not thought it necessary to repeat their arguments. We have assumed, therefore, that those Despatches should be read and considered in connection with the Report, and by the light of the various arguments which the Commission have employed. This was particularly the case with regard to our Despatch of the 25th February, dealing with the general question of Indian army organisation. The Commission entered at length on the defects of the present organisation, and have supported their opinion by a great mass of evidence; but we will observe that the more the subject is examined the more it appears to us that the changes proposed by them are such as are forced upon the Government by the circumstances of the case, and which ought not to be any longer delayed. The smallest recommendation in favour of the proposed changes is that they furnish a much more simple and symmetrical organisation than the present. If that were all that could be said in their favour, we should never have proposed them; but the reforms seem to us to be rendered necessary by important political, administrative, and financial reasons.

19. As regards the Bengal Army, high authorities, whose opinion is entitled to great respect, have long ago raised their voices in protest against the manner in which the existing organisation of that army tends to fuse into one homogeneous body the various races which compose it. All experience goes to show that the mere inclusion in one regiment or in one army of men drawn from a variety of different races does not suffice to maintain that separation of feelings and interest which no Government situated as is the Government of India can, we admit, afford to ignore; and it may be doubted whether, in allowing the Punjab levies which were raised to put down the mutiny to become an integral part of the Bengal Army, the lesson taught by the catastrophe of 1857 was sufficiently kept in view. At that time the Bengal Army was an overgrown homogeneous force; although it has now been greatly reduced in numbers, it is still an overweighty body, in the sense that it occupies the same extensive territory as before; that it is larger than the other two armies taken together; that it is too widely distributed, and that it may become more homogeneous in feeling and interests than is desirable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that service distant from the sepoy's home, such as is now involved by enlistment in an army which occupies the country from Peshawar to Assam, is unpopular with him, and that the change which we propose to introduce in this respect will nevertheless be highly acceptable to the Native troops. Every reason which counts for keeping up the Madras and Bombay armies as separate bodies is equally strong for dividing the existing Bengal Army into two smaller ones. And if it be objected that this division will tend to detract from the martial qualities of the Hindustani sepoys, by shutting them off from the frontier which has of late years been the chief school of practical training in warfare, it has to be observed that the mere occupation of a cantonment in the Punjab in peace time does not of itself tend to make the Hindustani sepoy a better fighting soldier. For this training and experience on active service are necessary; and now that railway extension to the frontier is approaching completion it would be even easier to employ Hindustani troops from Meerut or Cawnpore on an expedition beyond the North-West Frontier than it would be to send Punjabi troops to Burma or any other place beyond the sea. It must be remembered that the territory to which the Hindustani troops are to be restricted is almost as extensive as that which was occupied by the Bengal

Army before the campaigns on the Sutlej. Finally, it has to be observed that the maintenance of the Bengal Army in its present form as one body does not secure that the different component elements of it should necessarily be allowed their fair share of active employment. Hardly any of the Hindustani regiments were actively engaged during the late war; the portion of the army which did the fighting was composed almost entirely of Punjabi and Goorkha troops, a circumstance which we think is to be regretted. Hereafter, we hope, all four armies will be allowed their fair share in all military operations. Only in this way can the spirit of honourable emulation be maintained, which it should be the aim of our military administration to foster.

20. With respect to the proposed change in the administration of the Madras and Bombay armies, as we have already pointed out in our previous Despatches on the subject, this change will be of a much smaller kind than might at first sight be supposed, the fact being that, from a variety of circumstances, the Governments of Madras and Bombay have already ceased to have more than a partial control over the armies of those presidencies, and have become, as the Commission observe with perfect truth, but little more than channels for communication between the Government of India and the troops in all matters concerned with the military administration. Prominent among the causes which have brought about this has been this, that in the course of time, as the frontiers of British India have been extended in different directions, the Madras and Bombay Armies have been gradually moved up from their own presidencies to occupy other territories. The Madras Army now supplies garrisons for Mysore, for the Central Provinces, for Hyderabad, for Burma, and even for parts of Bengal; and when therefore it is urged, as it has been urged, that by bringing these armies under the direct administration of the Government of India the advantage would be lost of that sympathy and interest in all the business of the army which is gained when the army is locally administered, the reply seems an obvious one. The larger part of the Madras Army is now serving without the limits of the Madras Presidency, and therefore, in respect of that larger part the Local Government which is really most concerned about the troops is not the distant government of the Madras Presidency, but the Government of the province in which the troops happen to be stationed. In all these cases the anomaly arises, under the present system, that in all matters relating to the administration of the troops, it is not the Government of the province where they are quartered which has to be consulted, but the Government of another province. The same thing holds good to a large extent with respect to the Bombay Army. That army now garrisons Rajputana and part of Central India, as well as the Bombay Presidency itself. Hence arises a great amount of inconvenience in the conduct of public business, and often an embarrassing conflict of authority.

21. If, therefore, it should be objected that we are proposing to pull to pieces a military system which has been carefully built up, it seems sufficient to reply that the present condition of the Indian Army, so far from having been carefully built up, or built up at all in the sense of having been advisedly constructed, has come about entirely as the result of unforeseen and unexpected circumstances. When the three presidential armies were first created, the provinces which they respectively occupied were widely separated from each other by independent and often hostile states; communication was tardy and imperfect; and although the Government of Bengal was vested by law with a certain degree of authority over the proceedings of the other two Presidencies, practically each Government was allowed and often required to act independently. In those days, then, the maintenance of three separate military administrations was both reasonable and necessary. But now, when the Madras and Bombay armies are no longer confined within the limits of their own presidencies, but form a part of the general garrison of India, and Madras and Bombay are merely two out of the many different provinces over which they are spread; when the British cantonments join hands over the whole of India; and when communication has become so rapid and easy as it is at the present day; it appears to us that the argument from what has been ceases to have any force.

22. Futhermore, the Government of Bengal in course of time has developed into the Government of India; yet while it has long ceased to exercise the direct administration

administration of Bengal, or any other province, and its duties are now limited to a general control over all the different provinces of India, it still retains the direct administration of the Bengal Army.

23. As regards that army, too, its present condition is purely accidental. The regiments of the old Bengal Army were composed almost entirely of men of one class, high-caste sepoys, the warlike race of India. When these mutinied, the Punjab Frontier troops, largely augmented by newly-raised Punjabi levies, were brought down to act with the British troops against them. At the same time a number of levies were raised in the North-West Provinces to hold the country as it was re-occupied, composed, through a natural revulsion of feeling against the high-caste sepoy, for the most part of classes and castes which had not hitherto been admitted into the ranks. Thus at the conclusion of the war a new Bengal Army had arisen, even larger than the old, consisting partly of the few old regiments which had not mutinied, of Punjabi troops mostly newly-raised, and of the new Hindustani low-caste levies. With the restoration of peace this army had to be reduced, and under financial pressure the reduction was as sudden and as little the result of deliberation as the first creation. The regiments selected for reduction were selected on no defined principle, except that the high-caste sepoy who had conquered India was generally discredited. A considerable number of the new and untried levies were retained, which, it may be observed, have remained untried up to the present day, while, contrary to general expectation and against the advice of some of the most experienced authorities, the Punjabi troops were incorporated into the new Bengal Army. That army as it now stands is, therefore, a mere fortuitous congeries of regiments, raised in haste, brought together in haste, reduced in haste.

24. It seems then to us that to speak of the existing state of things as a carefully built up system is to ignore the actual facts of the case. The present condition of the Indian Army is the result of circumstances quite unforeseen by its original founders. To assume that it works well in practice is equally to ignore experience. When, to take one instance, any business connected with the troops at Nagpur, for example, has to be referred to the distant Government of Madras, simply because the troops in the Central Provinces, European as well as Native, belong to what is called the Madras "Establishment," we cannot discover any countervailing advantages to be placed against the inconvenience involved in maintaining a system which has long ceased to be in accord with the actual conditions and requirements of the day.

25. If it be desired, in order that the interests of the Local Governments may be secured on behalf of the troops stationed in their province, to give them a share in the administration of the army, then the separate Local Governments of Burma, Bengal, the North-West Provinces, &c., should be the channels of administration for the troops stationed in those provinces; there should, in short, be as many separate military administrations as there are Civil Governments in India. This is impossible from the nature of the case, and the only other reasonable alternative, in our opinion, is that which we have proposed. We may repeat what we have said on a previous occasion, that there is no reason to suppose that any inconvenience has ever been experienced in the conduct of military operations which had to be undertaken in the North-West Provinces, or Bengal, through want of interest or co operation on the part of the Governments of those provinces, although they have not even a nominal share of the administration of the armies stationed therein. On the other hand, the inconvenience of carrying on the business connected with the movements and administration of the Madras and Bombay armies, especially those parts of them which are not stationed within their own Presidency, is constantly brought to notice.

26. It has to be remembered that one reason which might in former years have been alleged for maintaining the present state of things has now disappeared, in consequence of the abolition of the local European army of the East India Company. That army, which comprised nine infantry regiments and the whole of the European artillery serving in India, used to be divided into three separate "Establishments," one for each Presidency; and although these were not stationed within presidential limits, any more than the Native troops, still they were, no doubt, a local force; they were not under the authority of the Horse Guards; and the considerable amount of business arising out of these troops in regard to clothing, pensions, transport, &c., was conveniently managed

by the Local Government concerned, in direct communication with the Court of Directors. But, now that all the European forces in India are furnished from the British Army, the arrangement is almost grotesquely anomalous, under which Her Majesty's cavalry and line regiments, serving under precisely similar conditions in every part of India, are yet nominally distributed in three separate "Establishments," involving that the charges for them should be collected in three separate accounts of a perfectly artificial kind, and under which the Government of India, when desiring to move one of Her Majesty's regiments in Hyderabad or Central India, has to go through the form of applying to the Government of Madras or Bombay, which has no real concern in the matter, and is not responsible for the discipline, economy, or barrack accommodation of a regiment, nominally under its orders, but really serving in another part of the country. In respect of the British troops, at any rate, the estimates and accounts of the so-called Madras and Bombay armies have in truth no sort of reference to the Madras and Bombay Presidencies; and in the accounts of the Indian Army, as in everything else connected with the Indian military administration, these artificial distinctions are a source of trouble and embarrassment at every point without any compensating advantage.

27. We may further observe, as we have already pointed out in a previous Despatch,* that the real transfer of authority over the Indian armies, so far as all the essentials of administration go, wast carried out some years ago, when the various presidential offices of account were fused into one department directly responsible to the Government of India. So long as the accounts of the local armies were dealt with by separate local departments, subordinate to the respective Governments, those Governments exercised a more or lessirregular but independent financial control; but now that the officers of the Account and Audit Department are bound by the rules of the Government of India, and take their orders from it only when reference to higher authorities is necessary, the intervention of the Madras and Bombay Governments, in all matters which call for the intervention of a higher than departmental authority, is in truth a mere matter of form, but in the case of troops stationed beyond presidential limits, a very troublesome form. The report of the Commission contains abundant illustrations of the needless circumlocution which the present system involves; since the smallest charge, if not provided for by some existing rule or already sanctioned in the estimates, has to be reported to the Government of India for sanction, In fact it may be said that the present arrangements, so far from enhancing the dignity and importance of Local Governments, tends rather the other way; because it involves a much greater degree of interference in matters of military expenditure than is required in civil affairs. And we are satisfied that the maintenance of such a system would sooner or later be found intolerable.

* No. 282, of the 29th July, paragraph 19.

28. There are, in fact, only two alternatives. One would be to give a much greater degree of latitude and authority to the Local Governments; but to this there appear to be insuperable objections. In the first place, the sort of provision which is practicable in regard to civil expenditure, of placing a gross sum at the disposal of the Local Government to meet unforeseen charges, is not applicable to military expenditure. In regard to civil expenditure, the contingent items year by year are much of the same sort. But in regard to military charges, the expenditure of one year is no sort of criterion of what will be required in the next. This year the contingent expenditure may arise on account of a military expedition; next year it may be in consequence of an outbreak of sickness, and so on. In the second place, financial independence of this sort would necessarily involve the gradual divergence of the systems obtaining in the armies in respect to pay and allowances. There still exist some differences of this sort, which are found extremely embarrassing when the troops are brought together; and it would be in the highest degree undesirable that these should increase. But lastly, if the Local Government is to be permitted a latitude in these matters, it should be the Government of the province in which the troops are stationed. There can be no reason in the nature of things why the Madras Government should be vested with discretional authority to incur expenditure for the troops in British Burma, regarding the propriety of which the authorities most capable of judging are not the Madras Government,

Government, but the Local Administration of that province and the Government of India. In short, as we said before, it comes to this, that there should be a local army for each local province.

29. The other alternative, that the nominal as well as the virtual administration of all the armies should be vested in one head, is the only one practicable.

30. As a striking illustration how little these remaining relics of a past *régime* are in harmony with the realities of the present time, we may refer to the procedure which obtains in regard to the relief of the European troops. This is for the most part carried out at the port of Bombay, where the troops bound from and to England arrive and depart. The business is conducted almost entirely by the Government of India, in communication with the Secretary of State and the Admiralty; yet, as the case now stands, it is unavoidable that the formality should be to a certain extent maintained of employing the agency of the Bombay Government, and the fiction be set up that these troops while passing through Bombay are for the time being under its orders. So a regiment starting from a station in Bengal to go home passes for a few days from under the orders of the Commander in Chief in India to those of another authority, and the arrangements for the embarkation are to a certain extent carried out by the staff of a separate army from that to which the troops belong. All this gives a great deal of perfectly unnecessary trouble. When troops embark or disembark at Calcutta, nothing of the sort occurs.

31. It may be objected that, if the Governments of the minor presidencies have not much authority over their armies, yet they have some patronage of which our proposal would deprive them, and that to this extent their status and dignity would be abated. This is true; but the amount of this patronage is very small. All military appointments made in India are made by or on the nomination of the Commander in Chief, and the patronage of the Presidential Government, like that of the Government of India, is limited to the civil army departments. The Military Account Department has already become an Imperial service, and local appointments to the Ordnance Department must practically cease so soon as the old Indian Artillery regiments disappear. The different Governments in India cannot be bidding against each other for the services of Royal Artillery officers. There remains the Commissariat Department, practically a seniority service. The loss of the nominations to first appointments in this Department is not to be seriously weighed against the other considerations involved in the proposed measure. It may be added that even now all rewards and honours to the three armies are bestowed by or on the recommendation of the Governor General in Council.

32. If the present state of things is cumbersome in peace time, on active service it is almost intolerable. Without wishing to prolong or revive more than is necessary the recollection of what happened in this respect during the late war, we still cannot but revert to the correspondence which passed with the Government of Bombay on that occasion: and we believe that to any impartial mind it will be manifest that, with respect to the operations in Lower Afghanistan, the war was carried out with all the disadvantages and with none of the advantages attendant upon the operations of allied armies. Appointments to high commands were made by one authority, while the sole responsibility for the result rested upon another. There were all the jealousies, all the delays, all the recriminations which are incidental to war carried out under such unfortunate conditions, although the money had in reality to be supplied entirely by one of the two parties concerned, which also prescribed the strength and disposition of the troops furnished by the other. We are quite unable to discover any countervailing advantages to compensate for the grave objections to such a cumbersome way to conducting military operations. That military forces of such very moderate magnitude as the Indian Army should in these days of easy communication and rapid movements be still wielded by three separate Governments is, to our thinking, to subject the Indian military administration to a needless and dangerous embarrassment.

33. It may be well to point out here that in the countries where decentralisation of the Civil Government obtains in the highest degree, as Switzerland, the United States, and the German Empire, the most complete unity of control is exercised

exercised by the Central Government over the administration of the army. The Government of India stands alone in having to conduct its military administration from a number of different and *quasi*-independent centres.

34. It has also to be observed, as we pointed out in our Despatch of the 29th July,* in answer to the objection raised that the administration of the Indian armies would be too weighty a charge for one Government, that the whole Indian Army is now smaller than the Bengal Army alone before 1857, both in men and officers, while the Local European army has been abolished; and that, owing to the improved state of communication throughout the country, correspondence with any part of India is now conducted with much greater facility than it used to be within the Bengal Presidency. All the Indian Armies could now be inspected in a shorter time than it took formerly to inspect a single army. The whole Indian Military Administration should not therefore be more burdensome than was that of the Bengal Army alone before 1857. Finally, as we have already insisted, the Government of India does now in reality administer all the Indian Armies, although in a cumbersome roundabout way, since all business of any importance connected with every army comes up to it for disposal.

* No. 282, paragraph 16.

35. At the same time, while we insist upon the paramount importance of introducing unity of control into the Indian Army, and doing away with the last remnant of divided responsibility, we are not unmindful of the great importance of the danger of over-centralisation; this all the arrangements which we have in view are designed to prevent. The Commission have enlarged upon this subject, and suggested how certain specific powers may be conferred upon the Lieutenant Generals commanding the four armies. This is a matter which is engaging our anxious attention, and we shall be prepared to give full effect to the principle of decentralisation. We believe it to be quite possible to maintain economy, while yet conferring considerable latitude upon the various officers connected with the army. At present no one, except the Government of India, is really responsible for keeping down expenditure; no one else is sufficiently interested in economy. We believe it to be possible to enlist the interests and sympathies of the various executive departments, including the military officers themselves, in this direction; and while giving them greater latitude than they now possess, and diminishing the number of petty references which are now made to the Government of India on all sorts of matters connected with expenditure, to exercise as efficient a financial control as is maintained at present. In short, we believe that complete unity of control is quite compatible with decentralisation in the conduct of business, and it should be our aim to enforce this view.

36. One more objection remains to be answered. It has been said that if the Indian Armies are brought under the direct control of the Government of India, there will be a danger lest they should be all moulded gradually too much into one pattern; that local differences would be got rid of, and that eventually the different armies might be fused into one body. It is, of course, impossible to prove that this would not be the case; undoubtedly such a result might be brought about by injudicious and ill-considered attempts to secure uniformity; but we can only say that the present Government of India is in the fullest degree convinced of the extreme importance of maintaining the complete separation in peace time of the different Indian armies, and we desire to place on record our distinct opinion that this separation should be the cardinal principle to be observed by the Indian Government in the future. It is unquestionable, indeed that the increasing facility of communication throughout India, the spread of education, and other patent causes must, do what we may, tend more or less to break down the barriers between classes and races, and to soften down those differences which are such a striking peculiarity of the people of this country. But it is not desirable to hasten this inevitable process, and we believe that the measure which we now propose will, so far as is possible, anticipate the danger which might follow from this change. The virtual division of the Bengal Army will be a much greater measure in the direction of decentralisation than that proposed in regard to the Madras and Bombay Armies can be in the other direction. And when these armies are all administered under one authority, it may be possible to maintain the distinctions between them in even a greater degree

degree than is possible now. Quite lately it came to our notice indirectly that a corps of the Bombay Army was in process of being recruited from the Punjab. We considered this to be objectionable, and we have put a stop to it. Had the Bombay Army been directly under the administration of the Government of India the thing could not have happened. Further, we may observe that this has been the principle which we have had in view in our recommendations for the necessary reduction in the number of Native regiments of the Indian armies. The Commission proposed to make the bulk of this reduction in the Madras Army. We have thought it better to distribute the proposed reduction much more equally over the four armies, in order that these bodies may be, when remodelled, of nearly equal strength.

37. Lastly, we have to point out that, of all the changes we have proposed, none will touch the sepoy, except so far as that some of those belonging to the regiments to be reduced are to be discharged with very liberal compensations. Some such reduction would be necessary, whether or not any other change was carried out. But, so far as the great administrative change is concerned which we are now pressing upon Her Majesty's Government, it may be confidently asserted that the whole arrangement might be carried out almost without the sepoy being even so much as aware of it. To the sepoy his own regiment is the only body with which he concerns himself. He is not liable to transfer to another regiment against his will, much less to another army; and provided the regulations under which he is serving are not disturbed, and our proposals do not disturb them, it will be a matter of perfect indifference to him whether his commanding officer reports to a General, who reports to a Commander in Chief, who reports to the Government of Madras or Bombay; or whether some change or other be made in the chain of responsibility which is far out of his sight.

38. Nor can we lose sight of the contingency that, while the change we have proposed will be of this safe and temperate kind, yet if the present cumbersome and antiquated administrative system be not reformed in this way while circumstances are favourable for doing so, a time may come when under the influence of popular excitement, caused by an administrative breakdown under emergency such as might readily happen, the organisation of the Indian Army may be subjected to a much more sweeping and dangerous reform. Of this we are quite certain, that a change of some sort cannot be withstood much longer.

39. It is, of course, impossible to disprove the assertions of those who predict that such and such evil consequences will arise out of the very moderate and reasonable changes which we have proposed; but if criticism of this sort is to prevail, reform of any kind and of any thing becomes impossible. It is only to be expected that the system of Indian Administration, and the Indian Army amongst other things, should at some time or other require to be modified or recast, and when what may be termed the accidents of its organisation, which arose out of conditions that have long passed away, should in course of time need to be readjusted.

40. We may now refer to our proposals regarding the establishment of British troops in India, which form the subject of our Despatch of the 24th April, No. 141. On this head the Commission proposed a reduction in the number of British infantry battalions from 50 to 43, and of cavalry regiments from nine to six; while they would reduce the batteries of artillery from 86, with 384 guns, to 77 batteries, with 360 field guns. This reduction was to be accompanied with an increase of strength to the rank and file of each battalion and regiment, so as to leave the establishment of British soldiers practically unaltered.

41. The proposals which we have made in the same direction do not carry the reduction of independent units so far. We have recommended that the number of British infantry battalions should be reduced by four only, this reduction being accompanied by an increase in the strength of each battalion from 820 to 920 rank and file, or 30 less than the strength now fixed for the battalions first for service at home. We propose also an establishment of eight

instead of nine regiments of cavalry, with an increase of 65 sabres per regiment. With respect to the artillery, we have adopted generally the recommendation of the Commission, and proposed an establishment as follows :—

	Present Strength.	Proposed Strength.
Horse Artillery - - -	15 Batteries	10 Batteries.
Field „ - - -	43 „ -	40 „
Heavy „ - - -	4 „ -	4 „
Mountain „ - - -	2 „ -	6 „
Garrison „ - - -	22 „ -	17 „
TOTAL - - -	86 „ -	77 „

42. The general result will be a total strength of British troops almost exactly as at present, but organised on a more economical as well as, in our opinion, a more efficient footing. In thus modifying the proposals of the Commission, we have had in view both what we believe to be the wants of the country, and also the desire to create as little inconvenience as possible to the authorities at the War Office; and we must here express our conviction that we have made the most moderate demand which, in the interest of this country, we should be justified in doing. The establishment of a British infantry battalion in this country is at this moment much smaller than that of one of the battalions at home first on the roster for foreign service in peace time, and nearly 200 less than the recognised strength for a battalion sent on active service from England; and this although the regiments in this country have usually to take the field without any means of being quickly reinforced, and although the Army Reserve is practically not available for Indian needs. The case of the cavalry is even more striking. The strength of a regiment in India, which ought to be really on a war establishment, constantly ready for service, is actually considerably smaller than that of the smallest peace establishment of the cavalry regiments at home. No other army, not even the British Army, takes the field in such attenuated companies and squadrons as those which the Indian Government is now compelled to employ, while the conditions of Indian service, with the high rate of pay allowed to officers, renders this organisation exceptionally expensive.

43. With regard to the artillery, the present number of horse batteries is unquestionably in excess of the wants of the country, while the garrison batteries are too weak numerically for efficiency: we have proposed to strengthen these last from 80 to 108 rank and file; also to increase the number of mountain batteries.

44. We are aware that it may be objected that the present establishment of the British Army has been fixed with some reference to the wants of India, and it might be urged that there is a sort of implied understanding that this establishment having been once fixed should not be disturbed. We are not unmindful of this consideration. But it has to be observed, on the other hand, that whereas the British garrison in India has practically remained unaltered in respect of numbers and efficiency for many years past, its cost has been in course of constant increase, from the various changes which have been made in the organisation of the British Army, changes made entirely, it may be said, from imperial considerations, and in which Indian interests have not been consulted or advanced. The introduction of short service, the increase in the higher ranks of officers, the rules relating to promotion, have all made large demands on the Indian Treasury; in return for which India has derived no commensurate advantage. Most of the changes of recent years in the British Army organisation have

have followed out of the introduction of the short service system, in view to supply an Army Reserve. This Reserve, however, is not available for service in India, and therefore, in view of this great and constantly increasing expense for the British troops in India, we think it is but common justice to India that the establishment of British troops in this country should be organised on a footing adapted in a reasonable degree to the real requirements of the country. It has to be remembered that changes which do not cause any very serious additions to the English estimates, and which are carried out without the least reference to India, involve very much larger charges on the Indian revenues by reason of the much more liberal allowance enjoyed by officers in this country. The conversion, for example, of the First Captains of the Royal Artillery into Majors gives the officer so promoted an increase of only 5 *s.* a day in England; in this country the difference between the pay of a major and a captain of artillery is 342 rupees a month.

45. In 1864-65 increased rates of pay were granted to medical officers of the British service in India amounting to 20,000 *l.* a year; and a revised scale of clothing and compensation to the British Army was introduced costing 20,000 *l.* a year.

In 1865-66 increased rates of pay granted to Veterinary Surgeons amounting to 3,500 *l.* a year.

In 1866-67 gymnastic instruction was introduced for British troops at a cost of 15,000 *l.* a year.

In 1867-68 an increase of 2 *d.* a day was made to the pay of British soldiers, and an additional penny on re-engagement, the cost being 250,000 *l.* a year.

In the same year skeleton companies of Royal Engineers were formed in India, at a cost of 2,500 *l.* a year.

In 1868-69 increased pay was given to paymasters, quartermasters, and riding-masters of British regiments, amounting to 15,000 *l.* a year.

In 1870-71 the grant of good-conduct pay at earlier periods to British soldiers increased our Army Estimates by 35,000 *l.*

In 1871-72 instruction in army signalling and telegraphy was introduced, at an annual cost of 4,000 *l.*

In 1871-74 garrison instruction was introduced, at a cost of 27,000 *l.* a year.

In 1871-74 the appointment of additional subalterns to regiments in India, to allow others to attend the course of garrison instruction, formed a new charge of 5,000 *l.* a year.

In 1873-74 improvements in the regimental schools of British regiments in India by the application of home regulations increased the estimate by 7,000 *l.* a year; the grant of band allowance to British regiments in India by 14,720 *l.*; and the readjustment of ranks of the British medical service in India by 48,000 *l.*

In 1874-75 revised rates of pay of British troops in India added to the Estimates 64,000 *l.* a year.

In 1875-76 the grant of pay of rank to Majors of Royal Artillery and Engineers in India created a new annual charge of 27,000 *l.*

In 1876-77 the increased pay of non-commissioned officers and lance ranks amounted to 40,000 *l.* a year.

In the same year prospective charges for deferred pay were introduced, the maximum to be reached in 1890 being 165,000 *l.*

In 1876-77 also the promotion of British medical officers after 12 years' service, and non-effective charges by changes in the rules for compulsory retirement, introduced a new item of 29,000 *l.*

In 1879-80 the readjustment of Veterinary Surgeons' pay cost 1,900 *l.* a year.

In 1880-81 a reorganisation of the Army Medical Department non-effective charges involved a new annual charge of 13,320 *l.*

In 1881 the Royal Pay Warrant of 25th June 1881 raised a fresh charge for the pay of non-commissioned officers and men of 30,000 *l.* a year.

46. This process of increasing the charges of the European forces in India has indeed been carried on of late years to an extent of which Her Majesty's Government are perhaps hardly aware. A very large number of field officers has

has just been added to the regiments of British cavalry and infantry. We have received no official communication upon this subject, and we therefore do not know what will be the precise additional charge involved by this great change; but we presume that in any case it will be considerable.

47. These additional charges amount to more than 800,000 *l.* a year. Some of them were for necessary improvements; others were imposed with little or no reference to Indian wants, and in most cases without the Indian Government having any voice in the matter. But at any rate it will be seen how the charges for British troops in this country have been increasing, and we submit that the Indian Government may fairly claim, as some set-off against these heavy burdens, that the establishment of British troops in this country shall be placed on a footing which will not only be more efficient for the purposes of actual service, but shall be of a more reasonable kind, considered with reference to the recognised tactical units of every army in the world, than is the case at present. The existing small cadres of British infantry and cavalry regiments, and the garrison batteries of artillery which contain a mere handful of men, do not satisfy this condition, and we think we may fairly expect that Her Majesty's Government, looking at the matter from an impartial point of view, will support the very moderate recommendations we have made on this head, which as above stated, while maintaining the number of British troops in India at their present aggregate strength, will furnish that establishment in a less extravagant way than the present system, although even then organised in regiments of cavalry and battalions of infantry which will be below rather than above the strength fixed for the establishments of regiments at home when proceeding on service. To do less than this would be to do less than justice to India, and we are sure that English public opinion will support Her Majesty's Government in carrying out these recommendations.

48. With respect to the Native Army our recommendations have been framed in the same spirit of moderation which have guided us in dealing with the British troops. The Commission pointed out in what appear to us to be convincing terms, that the present organisation of the Native Army in such small regiments, while very expensive, is also inefficient. Very small cadres are suitable only if capable of rapid expansion. In the absence of any system of reserves, and we are not prepared to recommend the introduction of such a system for this country, battalions containing a nominal establishment of only 712 native soldiers of all ranks, from which the depôt has to be supplied, soon dwindle away under the exigencies of service to mere handfuls of men, altogether too small for tactical purposes or economical administration. The late war, in which the losses in action were small, clearly demonstrated this. Battalions were reduced to little more than the strength of the companies of continental armies, and brigades to what battalions should be. Stronger regiments are a necessity, and since there is no question of increasing the whole army, the only alternative is to reduce some of the existing regiments, and to distribute the same aggregate strength of Native troops over the remainder. The Commission proposed to carry out this reduction to the extent of 30 Native infantry and 10 Native cavalry regiments, raising the strength of the remainder, in the infantry from 712 to 912, and in the cavalry from 457 to 609. Here again we have proposed a less extreme measure. The reductions we have recommended comprise 18 regiments of infantry and four of cavalry; the strength of the infantry regiments retained being fixed at 832, and the cavalry (except in Madras where no change is proposed) at 550 of all ranks. This modification on the proposal of the Commission was adopted, because, while we deemed it necessary to obtain a substantial saving in the cost of the army, we were extremely desirous to deal as lightly with it as possible; and because, moreover, we had in view the fact that the Indian army is required quite as much to maintain internal peace as for external operations; that in short the army must be seen; and that in this view there is a point beyond which the concentration of the troops in a smaller number of stations ought not to be carried. But we are satisfied that no smaller measures than we have proposed could properly be recommended by the Government.

49. Further, while the Commission would have laid the brunt of their reductions upon the Madras Army, we have distributed them pretty equally over the three armies.

The

The general result is given below :—

NUMBER OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

	Present.	Proposed by Army Commission.	Proposed by Government of India.
Cavalry:			
Bengal - - - - -	24	17	21
Madras - - - - -	4	2	4
Bombay - - - - -	7	6	6
	35	25	31
Infantry:			
Bengal - - - - -	61	51	55
Madras - - - - -	40	25	32
Bombay - - - - -	30	25	26
	131	101	113
TOTAL - - -	166	126	144
Present strength of Indian Army - - - - - -			110,964
Proposed " " " " - - - - - -			110,995

50. This arrangement, with the proposed virtual division of the Bengal Army into two parts, will furnish four armies of nearly equal strength.

51. The Commission discuss the question whether the army should be organised in single battalions as at present or in multiple battalions. The weight of the evidence taken by them is in favour of the change, but they recommended the maintenance of the existing single battalion system. We have also pronounced in favour of it as regards the Native troops, although with such small regiments there would be an advantage in having regiments of two or more battalions, as a ready means of strengthening battalions in the field by depôt battalions remaining behind, recruiting for the army when regiments are on service being now a matter of great practical difficulty. But we had in view the great importance of disturbing as little as possible the existing status of the sepoy. So far as he is concerned, his military life and the military system under which he serves is bounded by his own battalion, in which he enlists, from which he is never transferred against his own will, and beyond which he never rises. And although it would be quite possible under the multiple battalion system to maintain the separate character of each individual battalion, by providing that no man should ever be transferred from one to the other against his will, we have deemed it on the whole expedient to leave this, for the present at any rate, untouched.

52. We have proposed liberal provision for such of the men and Native officers of the regiments to be reduced as may not be transferred to other regiments to make up the increased complement of the latter. We have also proposed that this occasion should be taken to improve the position of the Native non-commissioned officers, by giving them a moderate increase of pay for good service.

53. With respect to the mode of appointing officers to Native regiments, the Commission proposed to leave this very much as at present; that is to say, that every regimental appointment with the Native Army should be a staff appointment, almost as much a matter of selection as appointments to the staff of the army. They recommended that advancement in substantive rank should be determined by seniority in general lists for each army.

54. We have pronounced in favour of maintaining the Staff Corps system of substantive

substantive promotion; but, as we have explained in our Despatch upon the Native army,* we are satisfied that some change is necessary in the mode of regulating appointments to and advancement in Native regiments. At present every appointment with a regiment is a staff appointment, selection for which is made at the discretion of the Commander in Chief; and although it has been attempted to limit the exercise of this power by rules, so that advancement may to a certain extent be regulated by regimental seniority, tempered by selection, the rules are so elastic, as any rules must be which are applied to the circumstances, that military employment in India of all kinds, regimental as well as staff, continues to be a matter of almost pure selection. There is much practical difficulty in making regimental seniority the condition of advancement, since where the cadres are so small great inequality must arise in the course of advancement from post to post in different regiments; while, in order to maintain equality of advancement throughout the different regiments, officers have to be frequently transferred from one regiment to another. In view, therefore, of establishing a greater degree of regularity in advancement throughout the different regimental posts, and to diminish the frequency of transfers throughout the whole army, we have proposed that the existing regimental cadres of officers should be distributed in bodies of three regiments each; the officers in each group, while obtaining substantive promotion under Staff Corps rules, to rise by regimental seniority in the regiments comprising each group of linked battalions, and being eligible for transfer only within that group. In this way frequent movements of officers from regiment to regiment will be prevented, as well as the supersession and uncertainty now attaching to the prospects of individuals. Officers will be identified with a particular establishment, and will not look beyond it for regimental advancement; *esprit de corps* may be engendered, and a much greater equality in the rate of regimental advancement should be possible than can be maintained under the present system. Further, if one or two of the linked regiments are ordered on service, they can be reinforced as regards the officers, and vacancies filled up from the establishment of the linked regiment or regiments remaining behind, instead of the vacancies being filled up by young officers brought in from British regiments, and unaccustomed to serve with Native troops. The only objection which it occurs to us could be brought against this plan is, that it might involve changes of officers among the different linked battalions composing a regiment. We are of opinion, however, that the change will be very much less in amount, as well as less objectionable in kind, than that which takes place now, while it may be reduced to a minimum by ruling that such transfers should not be made except in the case of commandants and seconds-in-command of regiments, and possibly also of the second wing-commanders.

* No. 230, of 24th June 1881.

55. The present establishment of European officers per regiment is seven; we have proposed that it should be fixed at eight. This will give very nearly the same total establishment of regimental officers for the whole Native Army as at present,† and we consider that it cannot be safely reduced. The number of military officers in civil and miscellaneous duties is rapidly decreasing, the places of existing military civilians being taken by civilians, while the officers of the staff and army departments cannot safely be spared from their regular duties in war time, and the only available reserve at such times is to be found in the regiments which do not take the field. It has, moreover, to be remembered that the late reorganisation of the establishment of British officers has involved a reduction in the establishment of British officers serving in India.

† *Present*— 166 regiments at seven officers, 1,162. | *Proposed*— 144 regiments at eight officers, 1,152.

56. We have pointed out in the same Despatch that, although there would be no reduction in the number of the British officers attached to the Native army, the proposed organisation will furnish a considerable saving in their cost, because the additional officer to be appointed to each regiment will be in a subordinate grade, while the posts of commandant, second in command, and other staff appointments of 22 regiments will be abolished.

57. The establishment above proposed of eight officers per battalion is the effective establishment; officers serving on the staff are at present seconded during the tour of duty, while officers proceeding on furlough for more than a certain

certain time, and all others who are absent for specific periods defined by the rules, are made supernumerary to their regiments, and their places filled up. We have proposed that this system should be maintained.

58. In addition to the officers employed on the army staff, there are a large number of officers employed with what are called the local regiments, the Hyderabad Contingent, Central India Horse, &c., who under present rules are permanently removed from the regiments to which they originally belonged. This arrangement is open to objection. It is not desirable that officers should pass the whole of their service in a purely local corps; on the other hand, it is very difficult at present to provide for bringing back an officer of standing to the regular army without interfering with the just claims of regimental officers. The same difficulty used to be found in dealing with the officers of the general staff until the seconding system was introduced. We propose to extend that system to all officers employed in a military capacity; that is, that it should apply to those serving on the general staff, with local regiments, and in the military departments of the army, excepts as regards the imcumbents of a few of the highests posts, who would cease to be borne on the regimental establishment. Every officer would thus have, so to speak, a regimental home to fall back upon, and the too extended service of officers with local forces in remote localities, which is bad both for the officers and the service, will be prevented.

59. We have thought it necessary to propose a limitation of the tenure of regimental appointments. We consider that the practice of the British army in this respect must be adopted for the Native army, while the fact that service in the Indian army is of a permanent kind, and that there is no compulsory retirement in the lower ranks, makes it the more important that there should be an outlet at the top, and that the command of regiments should not be retained for protracted periods. The new and liberal pension rules lately sanctioned for the Indian army render it practicable to introduce this condition without hardship to individuals.

60. With regard to the civil departments of the army, we have thought it desirable to lay down some new rules for the conditions of service. At present an officer on appointment to the Commissariat or the Military Accounts Department is finally removed from his regiment. We have proposed that for the future an officer appointed to either of these two branches of the service should be seconded in his regiment until he has completed 10 years' service from the date of first appointment to the department, after which he would be permanently struck off the regimental list. This will afford the officer, who for any reason desires to exchange the work of a civil department for regimental life, an opportunity of returning to military duty before he has ceased to be efficient as a military officer. This rule is also recommended in the interests of the department as a further inducement to make service in them popular with young officers, there being at present a dearth of eligible candidates.

61. We have further proposed to extend to all the higher departmental offices the limitation of the tenure of them to five years. It is much better to extend the tenure in cases of special merit than that officers should be entitled to hold these high appointments for indefinite periods, to the exclusion of others of perhaps almost as long service, and of equal merit, while it is of the greatest importance that these offices should be filled by men in their full vigour.

62. The number of military officers in civil employ is rapidly decreasing. The police used formerly to be largely recruited from the army, but this service is now almost entirely civil, and of late years very few appointments have been made of military officers for district duties in the non-regulation provinces, which used to be largely supplied in this way. We have recommended that military officers appointed to this line of service should be dealt with in the same way as officers of the civil departments of the army; that is, they should continue to be borne as supernumerary on the strength of their regiments for 10 years from date of first appointment, after which they should be struck off the list and not be eligible to return to military duty. We have also recommended that officers in civil employ and in the Military Accounts Department shall in no case be promoted beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel. It should, we think, be an object of our military administration to do all that is possible to

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enhance the value of military rank. The reduction lately made in the establishment of general officers is a good step in this direction, and we think that officers who, for the greater part of their service, have performed no military service, should not be allowed to retire with the honorary rank of major general.

63. We have made an important recommendation in support of the proposals of the Commission for altering the regulations which govern admission to the Indian Army. That army is now entered only through the British Army, by the transfer to one or other of the three Indian Staff Corps, under certain tests and conditions, of young officers attached to regiments serving in India. The advantages contemplated by this arrangement are that every officer entering the Indian Army shall have had the military training afforded by service in a British regiment, and also shall have passed a certain time in India. But their is good reason to suppose that service with a British regiment in India in many cases induces a distaste for service with Native troops; that the young officer attached to a British regiment, especially one which has been only a short time in the country, too often learns to look down on the Native soldier; and that while many young officers who come out to India, intending to enter the Staff Corps, are dissuaded from doing so, on the other hand, young officers are sometimes driven to enter the Staff Corps, not from any desire to take service with Native troops, but from want of means to meet the expenses of service in a British regiment. There are probably no conditions of Indian life less favourable for becoming acquainted with the people of the country, and seeing them to advantage, than service with a British regiment. But further, it is surely opposed to the general principle by which army appointments are now regulated, that the opportunity of joining the Staff Corps should be made to depend upon the accident whether a young officer happens to be gazetted to a regiment serving in India, or that having become eligible in this way, and perhaps having qualified for Staff Corps service, he should become ineligible from his regiment returning home before his transfer has taken place. An officer now gains his commission in the army in the first instance entirely by his own exertions, and it does not appear reasonable that appointment to the Indian branch of it should be left to be a matter of accident. But lastly, the present system has failed to procure a sufficient supply of candidates from the only source which it renders available, the British regiments in India. As we lately reported, there are at the present time nearly 150 vacancies in the three staff corps. In Madras and Bombay this difficulty has been of long standing, and it is likely to continue so long as those armies are placed at their present disadvantage with regard to that of Bengal, in not being under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief and the Government of India, and in the fewer opportunities for preferment and distinction now open to their officers. In Bengal the same difficulty has not occurred permanently, and the existence of vacancies in the present time is probably due to the fact that the army has but lately returned from Afghanistan, and that intending applicants have not yet had time to qualify.

64. If the present system is to be maintained, of entering the Indian Army through the British regiments, we consider that the Staff Corps should be thrown open to the whole army, and not merely to the regiments serving in India; but we think it would be still better to make direct appointments to the Indian Army from Sandhurst. The cadets on leaving that institution could then select the British or Indian services, according to their standing in the class list, and to the number of vacancies, so that every young man would owe his choice of position in one service or the other to his own exertions. The candidates who select the Indian service would be distributed to fill vacancies in the three staff corps. And when all the Indian armies are placed in the same position with respect to the Government of India and the Commander in Chief, and the officers of them have the same opportunity of advancement and distinction, we believe that the disfavour in which the Bombay and Madras Staff Corps are now held will disappear.

65. The other recommendations which we have made in the several Despatches dealing with them have necessarily followed out of the general reform proposed in the Indian Army administration.

66. At

66. At present each army has its separate departments of ordnance and commissariat, small departments for Madras and Bombay, large ones for Bengal, but all the important business connected with them ultimately comes up to the Government of India, which has no departmental heads attached to it, and has to seek the needful advice in a more or less informal way from the departmental heads of the Bengal Army. The arrangements now proposed provide for this defect. There will be a local departmental head of the ordnance and commissariat attached to each of the four armies, in immediate communication with and acting as the responsible adviser of the Lieutenant General Commanding; the head of the whole department would be an officer attached to the Government of India, responsible for the general conduct of the whole business connected with it. We consider that this will constitute a valuable reform.

67. The different presidential offices of account and audit have already been for some years past amalgamated into one department for all India. The revised arrangements now proposed in regard to these are merely such as are necessary to fit in with the division of the Bengal Army into two commands, the department being distributed under four local Controllers, instead of three as at present.

68. The comparatively small Remount Department has already been in effect constituted as one imperial service, under sanction lately given by your Lordship.

69. Military works in the greater part of the Bengal Presidency are now carried out through the agency of the Inspector General of Military Works and his Department, under the immediate orders of the Government of India, without the intervention of the local Governments. The change under which the conduct of this class of business was transferred from the local Governments of Bengal, North Western Provinces, and Punjab to a separate department created for the purpose, was carried out some years ago, in consequence of the great practical inconvenience found in employing the agency of the civil Government in an important class of business connected with the army. We have explained in a previous Despatch* that it will be necessary to extend this system to the rest of India, as a part of the general reorganisation, and have furnished particulars in detail of the staff of engineers which will have to be set apart from the existing establishment of the Public Works Department for this purpose, to be organised as a Military Works Department, with a local departmental head for each of the four armies, in immediate communication with the Lieutenant Generals, and under the general control of the Director General to be attached to the Government of India. This organisation will greatly simplify the conduct of this large and important part of army business.

* No. 345, dated 24th September 1881.

70. We have also proposed a very important reform in the Indian Medical Service, which, although it is not based on the lines of that proposed by the Commission, has the same object in view, increased efficiency accompanied by a great saving in expenditure. The existing system of maintaining two medical services in India, one for the British troops, and one for the Native troops and the civil duties of the Government, is condemned on all sides, as involving needless double establishments in a great many places, and as being the cause of expense and embarrassment in a variety of ways. As officers of the British Medical service cannot be employed with Native troops, nor officers of the Indian Medical Service with British troops, it follows that two medical officers have to be kept up at many stations where, so far as the amount of work to be done is concerned, one would suffice. The competition of the two services against each other for candidates is from first to last productive of great inconvenience. After careful consideration of what is certainly a difficult subject, we have come to the conclusion that the medical duties of India now performed by the two services, civil as well as military, should be undertaken by the Army Medical Department, a special branch of it being organised for Indian service. We will not attempt to recapitulate here the manner in which we have proposed this measure should be carried out; this has been fully detailed in the separate Despatch which deals with it; † we will merely observe that none of the many reforms which we have proposed promises a larger field for economy.

† No. 315, of the 26th August 1881.

 71. We

71. We have also proposed a reorganisation of the Indian Veterinary Department. The plan differs from that proposed for the Medical Service for reasons on which we have entered at length in the Despatch on the subject; * but we anticipate a similar result of increased efficiency, with a saving in expenditure.

No. 340, of the 16th September 1881.

72. The transfer of the administration of the armies of Madras and Bombay to the Government of India necessarily involves the abolition of the military administrative departments of those presidencies, and the transfer of the duties now performed by them to the Military Department or Secretariat of the Government of India Our Despatch No. 336, of the 9th September, treats of this matter, and shows a saving from the measure estimated at 1½ lakhs of rupees. For, although the arrangement must necessarily throw more work upon the Military Department of the Government of India, this will be by no means proportionate to the saving of work which will occur in Madras and Bombay, the fact being, as we have pointed out already, and as has been pointed out also in great detail by the Commission, a very large part of the business now transacted in the local secretariats consists in the mere transmission of business connected with the local armies to the Government of India for disposal, which might with great advantage be transacted direct.

73. Moreover, in all our proposals we have kept distinctly in view the importance of administrative decentralisation, and to reduce the amount of detailed business coming up for disposal to the Government of India. The method which heretofore has pervaded our military administration has, in our opinion, been based too much on the sentiment of distrust. No authority except the Government of India is now invested with more than a trifling discretion in matters relating to expenditure. While high officials thus learn to avoid responsibility, and to look to Government for orders on trifling matters of departmental routine, the system also forms a very bad training for general officers who may be destined to command troops in the field. While they are thus fettered in peace time, and their duties limited to the supervision of mere routine business, and on all matters involving expenditure they are merely the channels for transmitting proposals to the Government of India, in time of war the general and the heads of departments in the field exercise of necessity almost unbounded authority in regard to expenditure. And when it is considered how the frugality of years will not suffice to make good the waste of a single campaign, it may be understood how important the aim should be in any system of military administration to train up all officers, from the highest to the lowest, to the practice of economy. All classes of officers, regimental as well as departmental, generals as well as staff, should be taught to feel themselves responsible for not only the efficiency of the troops, but also their economical administration. In this way, by enlisting the sympathies of all concerned in this direction, the task of the Government of India in keeping down expenditure will be sensibly lightened. At present all other authorities concerned, and we cannot exclude even the Governments of Madras and Bombay, seem to be concerned only in suggesting fresh expenditure; and the Government of India finds itself constantly challenged, as it were, to accept the alternative of either sanctioning some expenditure demanded or taking the consequences of refusing to do so. We do not consider that it should be difficult to enforce such a system as we have here sketched out, although no doubt the introduction of it will be attended with a great deal of trouble; but trouble and difficulty are not the same things. And, in assuming the direct administration of all the Indian Armies, we shall be quite prepared to set at once about putting this principle in practice. With a uniform system of account and audit, and with a head of each of the army departments attached to the Government of India as its responsible adviser in regard to that department, the Government of India will have full information on every point; and there is no reason to fear lest it should lose a firm grasp over the army expenditure in all essential points. The needs of a vigorous administration do not require that the head authority should do the work which ought to be done by those subordinate to it. As we have said before, decentralisation is perfectly compatible with complete unity of control; and a system which has been found possible with regard to the huge armies of Europe is surely equally practicable for the smaller army of India.

74. Lastly, we would here recapitulate the financial results of the various measures which we have proposed.

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I.—The alteration in the establishment of British troops will effect a saving of nearly 200,000 *l.* a year in pay and allowances alone, exclusive of all indirect saving in repairs of buildings, hospitals, maintenance of cantonments, Native establishments, transport, and so forth.

II.—The change in the organisation of the Native Army will furnish a saving of nearly 100,000 *l.* a year in pay and allowances alone, exclusive of all the indirect saving as above.

III.—The redistribution of the staff of the army, adapted to the new organisation, involves a reduction of 30,000 *l.* a year.

IV.—The proposed reorganisation of the Medical Service will give a saving of about 7,000 *l.* a year in the administrative staff alone, exclusive of the very much larger saving which will arise in the executive staff, which may be set down at not less than from 73,000 *l.* to 80,000 *l.* a year.

V.—The proposed reorganisation of the Veterinary Department will furnish a present saving of nearly 7,000 *l.*, and an eventual saving of about 10,000 *l.* a year.

VI.—The reorganisation of the Military Department will give a saving of 15,000 *l.* a year.

VII.—The changes in the Remount Department will furnish a saving of 7,000 *l.* a year.

VIII.—The change in the Commissariat and Military Works Departments will practically make no change in the charges for this service, although contributing much to their efficiency.

IX.—The only departments in which increase of charge is proposed are the Ordnance and Military Accounts Departments, in which additional expenditure has been proposed of about 6,000 *l.* and 5,700 *l.* respectively a year. As we have stated in the separate Despatches dealing with those departments, the reductions have of late years been carried too far, and an increase of the establishments would have been necessary in any case.

75. The total saving afforded by our proposals amounts to about 360,000 *l.* a year in direct charges; the additional indirect savings will also be very considerable, and the whole financial gain may be estimated at between 500,000 *l.* and 600,000 *l.* a year. The saving which would result by adopting the proposals of the Commission in their integrity would have amounted to a much larger sum, due to the larger reduction of cadres of British and Native troops. Our own proposals on this head have been made in the fullest spirit of moderation which we conceived to be compatible with the circumstances of the case.

76. This completes all we have to say upon the important subject which Her Majesty's Government has entrusted to us. As we observed at the outset, the duty was not one of our own seeking, but we took it up under instructions from your Lordship as an inheritance from our predecessors in the offices of Governor General and the Members of the Government of India, and we claim to have come to it with perfectly unbiassed minds. We have given the subject our fullest and most anxious consideration during the whole of this year, and we now submit the result of our deliberations, deliberations which have been unanimously arrived at by those who are responsible for the government of this country, with the hope that it will receive the final and unqualified approval of Her Majesty's Government, and in the confident assurance that our recommendations will commend themselves to all persons who examine them in the same spirit of impartiality and freedom from prejudice as that in which they have been made.

77. The Honourable Major Baring, in his financial statement last March, referred to the saving which might be expected to accrue from the proceedings to be taken on the Report of the Commission. We should be glad to be able to announce the result in a definitive form when the time comes for the next financial statement.

78. Absence on a tour of inspection in Assam has prevented the Commander in Chief from signing this Despatch, which will now be sent to him for his Excellency's concurrence.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 2nd February 1882.

YOUR Military Despatch, No. 409, of 28th October 1881, para. 78. Does the Commander in Chief in India concur?

TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th February 1882.

YOURS, 2nd, Military Despatch, 401, 29th October 1881. Commander in Chief, India, entirely concurs in Despatch, except as regards seconding of officers of local regiments and contingents referred to in paragraph 58. I need not point out that this is quite a minor matter, which has no kind of connection with our other recommendations.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 243) to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office, London,
26 July 1883.

My Lord Marquis,

PARA. 1. Your Lordship's Military Letter of the 28th February 1881, No. 85, replying to the Marquis of Hartington's Military Despatch of the 14th October 1880, No. 333, informed Her Majesty's Government of the conclusions at which you had so far arrived on the various matters contained in the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the organisation of the Indian Army.

2. Before proceeding to examine those conclusions, I desire to express the high sense which Her Majesty's Government entertains of the care and ability which have been shown by the Commissioners in the able and exhaustive Report which they have presented on the important subject referred to them, as well as by your Lordship's Government in preparing your proposals based on that Report, and in working out the details of such measures for the improvement of the military system in India as have already been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

3. Your letter dealt only with the main recommendation of the Commission, namely, the re-organisation of the Indian Army in four bodies of nearly equal strength, to be all placed in direct subordination to, and in the same relative position towards, the Commander in Chief and the Government of India.

4. Your Government, while accepting generally this scheme of organisation, departed from it in some important details, such as the proposed change in the designation and constitution of the Madras and Bombay Armies, the division of the Bengal Army into two distinct bodies, with separate lists and lines of promotion for the European officers, and the severance of the Commander in Chief in India from the Council of the Governor General.

5. Your Lordship's actual recommendations on the leading proposals of the Commission are thus summarised:—

I. The Madras and Bombay Armies to be placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief in India. The civil establishments connected with

with those armies to come under the direct orders of the Government of India, and the Military Secretariats of those Presidencies to be abolished.

The designation of these officers to be changed from that of "Commander in Chief" to "Lieutenant General Commanding."

I understand that it is intended they should cease to be Members of Council.

II. The Commander in Chief in India to give up the direct control of the Bengal Army, but to retain his seat in the Governor General's Council.

III. The Bengal Army to be commanded by two lieutenant generals. The increased cost caused by the salaries of these lieutenant generals to be met by a corresponding reduction in the number of major generals and other officers.

IV. The Punjab Frontier Force to be maintained as a separate body, but to be placed under the orders of the Commander in Chief.

6. Your Lordship's letter further stated that, as the detailed recommendations of the Commission with respect to the various army departments were all based on the assumption that the main recommendations above referred to would be adopted, your Government thought it undesirable to deal with mere details before the larger question of the organisation of the army in four army corps had been decided.

7. In reply, Lord Hartington, in his Military Despatch of 16th June 1881, No. 203, observed that some of those details were very important, and that it appeared to him essential, to enable him to arrive at a final decision upon the main proposals, that he should have before him a full and careful statement of the details of the several arrangements which your Government considered necessary if those proposals were adopted.

8. At the same time his Lordship pointed out that, as he had been advised that the withdrawal of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the control of the Local Governments could not be carried into effect without Parliamentary sanction, and there was no prospect of obtaining such sanction during the current Session, there would be ample time for him to receive and consider your Lordship's recommendations.

9. Your Government replied by sending from time to time the several Military Letters noted in the margin,* dealing with all those minor or subsidiary recommendations of the Commission which had your Lordship's support.

* No. 85, of 28th February 1881
„ 141, of 24th April 1881.
„ 230, of 24th June 1881.
„ 274, of 22nd July 1881.
„ 282, of 29th July 1881.
„ 283, of 29th July 1881.
„ 292, of 5th August 1881.
„ 293, of 5th August 1881.
„ 315, of 26th August 1881.
„ 336, of 9th September 1881.
„ 340, of 16th September 1881.
„ 345, of 24th September 1881
„ 399, of 29th October 1881
„ 400, of 29th October 1881.
„ 401, of 29th October 1881.

10. I will refer to these later, but, in the first instance, I propose to considerthe main question of the severance of the armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of the Local Governments, and I will in the first place state, as briefly as possible, the grounds on which I understand your Government to support the proposed new organization.

11. In your Military Letter of 29th October 1881, No. 401, you observe that with regard to the many recommendations which you have made in your several Despatches, you have given your reasons in detail only when you have found cause to differ from the Commission; that the reasons for the recommendations made by the Commission are stated at great length in their Report, and when your Government agree with the Commissioners you have not thought it necessary to repeat their arguments. Your Government have assumed, therefore, that your letters will have been read and considered in connection with the Report, and by the light of the arguments which the Commission have employed.

12. This, your Government say, was particularly the case with regard to your Military Letter of the 28th February 1881, in which it is stated that the reasons given by the Commission for the suppression of the offices of the Madras and Bombay

Bombay Commanders in Chief, and the transfer of the direct control of the Madras and Bombay armies from the Local Governments to the Government of India, appear to you conclusive.

13. The Commission place their recommendation on the general ground that the authority of the Local Government is only nominal; that the retention of this nominal authority is most inconvenient, involving much delay in the transaction of business and a break in the chain of responsibility of the officers really commanding the troops; that it imposes great hardships and disabilities on the officers of the armies of the minor Presidencies, who are kept out of the sight of the central authority, and in consequence do not obtain their fair share of recognition; that the armies themselves do not obtain their due proportion of work and service, and thereby incur the risk of losing some of their efficiency in war; that, if it was really essential to the efficiency of the administration that each Local Government should control the military forces within its own jurisdiction, the system should in consistency have been extended to the other Local Governments of Bengal, the North West Provinces, the Punjab, &c.; but as it would be obviously unreasonable to maintain a separate army for each large Government, and much more so for each Local Administration, the only remedy is to place the higher administration of the army entirely and exclusively under the Supreme Government. It is further urged that a military administration worked by three separate sets of Staff and Army Departments is an anomaly which is not merely useless but hurtful to the efficiency of the army; that even in peace it impedes the conduct of military affairs, hampers the energies of officers and men in war, and wastes the revenues of the country, and that, finally, the protection of the Native soldiers of the local armies from sudden and ill-considered reforms would be at least as great under the control of the Government of India as that which they now possess under the control of their local Governors and Commanders in Chief.

14. It is unnecessary to follow the arguments of the Commission in the same chapter in favour of the severance of the Commander in Chief in India from the Supreme Government, as their views on this point, although it constitutes a leading part of their scheme of organization, have not received the support of your Lordship's Government. I will, however, refer to the two Military Letters from your Government, which contain your further arguments in favour of the Commissioners' propositions on the main point, and in refutation of the arguments which may be brought against them.

* Military Letter No. 85, 28th February 1881.

15. Your Government urge* that the evils resulting from the present divided administration of the military forces of India have never been more prominently manifested than during the last war in Afghanistan, when its effects were found so embarrassing that, even if the Commission had not made their recommendation, you would have felt bound to propose an effectual and final remedy in the same direction. You believe that, under the proposed system, the separation of the Native armies will be more effectual than is possible at present. You do not consider from past experience that the connection of the Madras and Bombay Governments with their respective armies gives them an interest in their efficiency which is in any especial degree more beneficial when active operations have to be undertaken than if no such connection existed; while you incline to the opinion that, so far from the dignity of the two Governments suffering if they were to be relieved of the limited control they now exercise over their armies, the contrary would rather be the result, inasmuch as they would be relieved of the vexatious and minute control which is, you consider, an inevitable consequence of the present system. Your Lordship believes that the change of circumstances from the time when the complete separation of the three armies was a natural and proper condition has been a gradual one, and you are of opinion that, whilst every one must be sensible that the present divided administration of the Indian military forces cannot be permanently maintained, the establishment of a fairly complete system of railway communication throughout India marks the point when the concentration of authority has become absolutely necessary. Your Lordship adds, that it is only in this manner that you see your way to reorganizing the army and the various departments connected with it, and placing them on a thoroughly satisafctory and economical footing.

16. Your

16. Your recommendation, therefore, that the armies of Madras and Bombay should now be withdrawn from the control of the Local Governments is based on the twofold ground of increased efficiency and economy. I propose to deal, first, with the subject in its financial aspect, premising that the primary object of the Secretary of State in authorising the appointment of the Army Commission was the reduction of military expenditure.

17. At the outset it appears to me necessary to distinguish the proposals made in your Military Letter, No 85, of the 28th February 1881, which relate exclusively to the superior control of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, from those made in your later letters, which affect the divisional, brigade, and station commands and the Army and Staff Departments. The proposals taken altogether show a considerable saving, but as they do not appear to me to have any necessary dependence on each other it is more convenient to consider them apart, and each on its own merits.

18. The important question of the probable financial results of the scheme for reorganizing the Indian Army into four Army Corps, as proposed by the Commission and as modified by your Lordship's Government, has received very careful consideration in Council, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that it has not been shown that it would in itself effect any reduction of charge, or increased economy in administration.

19. I will proceed to state the reasons for this conclusion.

20. The statements furnished by your Government do not show separately the financial results of the proposed formation of four armies, the amalgamation of staff departments, and the reduction in divisions, brigades, and stations, so that it is difficult to trace out the details of comparative cost of the present and proposed systems, but the means for doing so are to be found in the undermentioned documents:—

I. Vol. IV. of Appendix to Army Commission Report, pages 1742 to 1746.

II. Your Military Letters, Nos. 274 and 283 of 1881, regarding the future distribution of command in India and organization of the staff, especially the statement of figures attached to Despatch No. 283.

III. Your Military Letter, No. 336 of 1881, regarding the organization of the Military Department.

IV. The Indian Civil Estimates.

V. The Military Estimates of the Indian Army.

In document I. the Army Commission estimate 9,38,427 rupees per annum as the saving under their scheme in divisional and other minor commands and staff, less 2,11,056 rupees extra cost for administrative and superior commands and staff, leaving an apparent saving of 7,27,371 rupees. According to document II, you estimate that the saving on the whole Army Staff will be 3,00,000 rupees a year, and according to document III. the saving in the Military Secretariat Department will be about 1,50,000 rupees per annum which together make a total of 4,50,000 rupees, and this last sum is the amount given in paragraph 74 of your Military Letter, No. 401 of 1881.

21. The proposals under discussion, which are defined in paragraph 4. only involve, on the one side,—

Reduction of Commanders in Chief in Madras and Bombay, and their staff, general and personal;

Reduction of the Military Secretariats of Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab; and

Any reduction that may be effected in the staff at Army Head-quarters or elsewhere in consequence of the formation of four armies.

And on the other side,—

The cost of four Lieutenant Generals commanding armies and their staff;

Additional cost of the Secretariat of the Government of India; and

Any additional cost that may fall on other departments owing to the abolition of the Military Secretariats of the Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab.

22. The first items to be considered are the cost of the Commanders in Chief in India and at Madras and Bombay, and of the staff and departments at the three head-quarters. The cost of these, including office expenses, is reckoned by the Army Commission at 17,29,365 rupees a year, and they calculate that, if their proposals are adopted, the cost of the whole of the officers and establishments at army head-quarters in India, and of four Army Corps, would be 21,03,408 rupees, or about 3,74,000 rupees in excess of the present expenditure. As mentioned, however, in paragraph 20, they have, in their general statement, changed this excess charge of 3,74,000 rupees into a reduction of 7,27,371 rupees. This result is arrived at by a proposed saving of 9,38,427 rupees on the divisional and brigade and station staff, which has no direct or necessary connection with the formation of the four Army Corps, and by a saving of 1,63,000 rupees on the Secretariat Departments, being a total reduction of about eleven lacs of rupees on these two items. If from this sum of 3,74,000 rupees excess expenditure on the Army Staff is deducted, a net saving of 7,27,000 rupees is arrived at. If it be proper to reduce the divisional brigade and station staff, or to amalgamate the departments of the Adjutant General and of the Quartermaster General, points on which in this place I will offer no opinion, these measures could be carried out apart from any change in the system of superior commands.

23. Your Government estimate the saving, by the proposed changes in staff and commands, at three lacs of rupees a year, and from an examination of the statements forwarded with your Nos. 274 and 283 the following appear to be the results: The present cost of the officers on the head-quarters staff of the three armies is shown to be *Rs.* 92,462. 15. 2. per mensem. This comprises the pay and allowances of the three Commanders in Chief, the officers on their personal staff, and all officers included in those statements who can be considered as serving on the staff at army head-quarters in India and in the two Presidential armies, or 56 in all. The proposed establishment, according to your estimate, will cost *Rs.* 1,12,605. 2. 6. a month. This sum provides for 78 officers, and includes the Commander in Chief in India and his personal staff, four Lieutenant Generals commanding armies, with their personal staff officers, and the officers of the general staff, considered necessary under the proposed arrangement for head-quarters in India and for the four armies. As, however, a garrison instructor is included in this latter estimate as attached to each Lieutenant General, and the appointment of these officers would enable four garrison instructors at certain centres in Bengal to be dispensed with, these latter officers may be added to the cost of the present head-quarters, which would thus amount to *Rs.* 95,410. 15. 8. a month, with an establishment of 60 officers. There would then remain an addition of 18 officers for the proposed establishment over the number now allowed, and an increased cost of *Rs.* 17,194. 2. 10. per mensem.

24. In arriving at these figures the interpreter to the Commander in Chief in India has been assumed to be a Lieutenant Colonel; the two interpreters, Aides-de-Camp to the Presidential Commanders in Chief, have been assumed to be captains: and of the five remaining Aides-de-camp, two have been assumed to be Captains and three Lieutenants.

25. With regard to divisional, brigade, and station staff, your calculations show an estimated saving of 42,254 rupees per mensem, and if from this is deducted the extra cost of forming four armies, as shown in the preceding paragraph, it will be seen that there remains a net saving of about 25,000 rupees a month on the whole of the measures, or, as stated by your Government, three lakhs of rupees a year. This saving, however, does not appear to be due to the proposed alteration in the constitution of the three existing armies, but to savings in branches of the staff which have no necessary connection with that alteration, and in fact the economy proposed in the divisional, brigade, and station staff would be considerably diminished by the formation of the existing forces into four armies under Lieutenant Generals.

26. But

26. But from these figures it is necessary to make certain further reservations.

I. Your Government, in stating the present cost of the head-quarters staff of the army in India and at Madras and Bombay, properly calculate on the basis of the existing system under which the two departments of the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General are distinct; but, in estimating the cost of the proposed scheme, the officers of these two departments are amalgamated into one department, and the cost is thereby made much less than it would be without this amalgamation. Such an amalgamation, if feasible and desirable, appears to me to be quite as applicable to the present three armies as to the proposed four armies, and therefore a not inconsiderable reduction is taken credit for, which has no necessary connection with the reorganisation of the armies.

II. No estimate is given of the cost of office establishments. The Army Commission, while assuming that the cost of the offices at army head-quarters in India would be unaffected, estimated that the cost of the office establishments at the head-quarters of the four army corps would exceed by nearly a lakh of rupees that of the present office establishments at the head-quarters of the armies of Madras and Bombay.

III. In some cases the rank or staff pay of officers at head-quarters in India on the new organisation is estimated on a lower scale than at present. For example, in the statements of present cost, the Interpreter to the Commander in Chief in India is entered as a Lieutenant Colonel, with 450 rupees a month salary. In the statement of proposed establishments, he is entered as a Major, with a staff salary of 400 rupees, thus bringing out a saving of 237 rupees a month. Two Aides-de-Camp to Presidential Commanders in Chief are entered as receiving 130 rupees a month each, as salary for performing interpreters' duties. Under the proposed establishment no provision is made for interpreters for the Lieutenant Generals commanding armies. The Deputy Judge Advocate General at army head-quarters in India is entered as a Lieutenant Colonel, with a staff salary of 800 rupees a month. In the proposed scale he is entered as a Major and Assistant Judge Advocate General, with 500 rupees staff salary, thus showing a reduction of 487 rupees a month. It appears to me that rank could not be necessarily affected by the change of organisation, and that in all cases a reduction in the staff salary could be as readily effected at present as under the proposed scheme.

27. It would seem, therefore, that under Head II. a considerable addition should be made to the cost of the new scheme; that certain savings taken credit for under Head I. are not dependent on the adoption of the new scheme, while a doubt attaches to the proper incidence of charges under Head III.

28. There seems, further, to be no good ground for contending that the full savings proposed under the head of Divisional, Brigade, and Station Staff could not be as readily effected now as if the present three armies were divided into four. It is, for instance, proposed to allot a Judge Advocate General to each of the four armies, aided by an Assistant, which will be the means of enabling certain Deputy Judge Advocates in divisions to be dispensed with. But it is difficult to see why two officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department should not suffice now for the Madras and Bombay Armies, as well as for the Army Corps into which it is proposed to convert them. Nor does it seem at all improbable that six officers, as proposed for the Judge Advocate General's Department at head-quarters in India and in Bengal, would be sufficient under the existing organisation. So, again, as to the proposed reduction in the number of divisions, it is difficult to see why the Madras and Bombay Armies under the control, as at present, of their Commanders in Chief and the Presidential Governments, should not be as readily divisible into two instead of three divisions as they would be if they were under Lieutenant Generals.

29. After giving full weight to all these considerations, I am unable to come to any other conclusion than that the creation of the four armies would involve an additional expenditure approximating to two lacs of rupees a year, without taking into account the incidence of the charges adverted to above in paragraph 26.

 30. Next

30. Next, with regard to the Secretariats, the Army Commission estimated that, by the abolition of the Military Secretariats in Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab, and after some additions had been made to the Secretariat of the Government of India, there would be a saving under this head of about 1,63,000 rupees a year. According to the present recommendations of the Government of India, the three local Military Secretariats would be abolished, while the Secretariat of the Supreme Government would be increased by one officer, additional pay would be given to the Deputy and First Assistant Secretary, and two temporary officers would be added to the establishment for six months of each year. These additions would cause an increased expenditure of 20,880 rupees a year, while it is estimated that 15,000 rupees annually would cover increased office charges arising out of work transferred from Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab. On the other hand, the abolition of the three local Military Secretariats is calculated to save 1,91,700 rupees a year, which is the present total cost of these departments. This would give a saving of 1,55,000 rupees a year, which you have reduced to 1,50,000 rupees.

31. It is, however, doubtful whether one additional Assistant Secretary would suffice for the work taken over from Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab, each of which Governments has a Military Secretary. In reference to this, I note that during the Afghan war there were added to the Military Secretariat of the Government of India an additional Assistant, on 7,690 rupees per annum, and a personal Assistant to the Member of Council, on 13,000 rupees, a larger addition than is now proposed for all the permanent work to be transferred from the Presidencies and the Punjab. Though some of the work might be made over to local civil or other Departments, an arrangement which would add to their cost, and some may be disposed of by the Lieutenant Generals and their staff, still a great deal would necessarily come to the Government of India, and it would not be suprising to me if the proposed establishment proved inadequate. In no aspect of the question is it probable that 15,000 rupees, the sum provided in your estimate, would in practice be found sufficient for work which now costs 35,700 rupees in Madras, 56,000 rupees in Bombay, and 23,660 rupees in the Punjab, or in all, 1,13,360 rupees. The Bombay Secretary performs duties quite apart from the Army, such as those of the Ecclesiastical Establishment, and Local Marine of the Bombay Presidency, which cannot be transferred to Simla. If the office of Military Secretary at Bombay is abolished, that work must be done in Bombay, by some one else with an office establishment. The Military Secretary, Punjab, I understand, supervises the finance of the frontier militia, and the many contingent military frontier charges. Further, if the Madras, Bombay, and Punjab Secretariats are reduced, the clerks dispensed with must receive pensions or gratuities. It is hence difficult to avoid the conclusion that a very considerable portion of the estimated saving of 1,50,000 rupees a year under the head of Military Secretariat would disappear in practice.

32. On the whole, therefore, the result is an estimated saving under the head Secretariat of 1,50,000 rupees, and an excess expenditure on the Staff of the Head-quarters of the Armies of about 2,00,000 rupees. The measure would thus, if these calculations are correct, cost, for the Secretariats, about an additional half lac of rupees annually, instead of producing a saving, and, for reasons already given, I think there are grounds for apprehending that the excess expenditure might eventually amount to considerably more than half a lac.

33. Although I do not think it necessary here to go into any detailed discussion of this branch of the subject, it is obvious that a real and undoubted saving would be effected, without the formation of Army Corps or severing the connection of the local armies with the Governments of Madras and Bombay, if such reductions as may seem on consideration to be right were effected in the Army Head-quarter, Divisional, and Brigade Staffs, and by the consolidation of the Staff Departments. If this were done, and, as I have said before, I am unable to see anything in the existing organization to prevent it, there would be a clear saving to whatever extent these reductions were effected, without any counterbalancing increase of cost.

34. Your recommendations also embrace modifications of system which, with some increase in the Departments of the Ordnance and Military Accounts, would produce savings in the Medical and Veterinary Departments; but if

these

these savings are practicable, I see little difficulty in effecting them as completely under the present system of Presidential Armies, as under that which is proposed, though, of course, there would have to be some alteration in details.

35. But apart from the question of direct saving of expenditure, it would, no doubt, be a strong point in favour of your proposal, if it were shown that a more strict financial check would be ensured by the adoption of the new scheme. It is believed, however, that the financial control in the military departments is already adequately provided for. In time of war, of course, a rigidly effective financial control becomes very difficult, but this applies as much to military operations under the Supreme Government as to those conducted under the supervision of the Presidential Governments. Your Lordship speaks of giving greater latitude with respect to expenditure to the Lieutenant Generals commanding the Army Corps, and of enlisting the sympathies of officers in the cause of economy. I fear that experience shows that discretionary powers in such cases are more commonly used to add to expenditure than to effect economies. It is not apparent in what sense the term decentralization can be properly used with reference to the financial powers which could be prudently given to officers, such as the proposed Lieutenant Generals, who would only be retained in their commands for five years, and might be new to the forces and country, and, in many cases, would be only temporarily serving under the Indian Government. It is, indeed, recognized by your Government (para. 28 of Military Letter, No. 401 of 1881) that the restraints which can be applied in the case of civil expenditure would be inoperative in controlling military charges, and you hold that there are insuperable objections to extend the financial powers of the Local Governments in respect to these last. If this is true of Governments composed, besides the Governor and Commander in Chief, of two civilians of the Indian Services, aided by a Secretary who is a selected Indian officer of great experience, it is difficult to understand how enlarged powers, such as, till now, have neither been exercised by any military commander in India, nor have been entrusted to the Local Governments, would be likely to conduce to economy if conferred on the Lieutenant Generals.

36. It is not, however, on financial grounds alone, important as these are, that this subject is to be considered. The political and administrative bearings of the question are, in my judgment, also of great weight, and I will now consider the scheme in these aspects.

37. I observe that much stress is laid on the weight of authority against the present system, and it is unquestionably true that many officers, both civil and military, of large experience and high reputation, including all the members of your Lordship's Government, are in favour of the new organization. I have given to these opinions, as they deserve, the most respectful attention, but I must observe that there is also a considerable weight of authority on the other side. For example, his Excellency Sir F. Haines and General Sir E. Johnson, the two military members of the Government to whom the Report was submitted, and officers of such distinction and recent experience as Sir R. Temple, the late Governor of Bombay, and Sir Neville Chamberlain, the late Commander in Chief in Madras, disapproved the scheme. I mention these names not as outweighing those of officers who support the scheme, but in order to show that I could not press the measure on Parliament on the ground that there is a general agreement in favour of the scheme on the part of the military and administrative officers who have been consulted, but that, on the contrary, I should have to state that there is a considerable body of experienced opinion opposed to it. This opinion, I should add, is shared by the majority of those officers of extended Indian and military experience who have been consulted in this country.

38. In reviewing the leading administrative objections made to the existing organization, I am prepared to admit that some inconvenience in executive procedure and the mode of correspondence arises, during time of peace, from the control of the armies of Madras and Bombay being vested in the Local Governments, but I cannot doubt that these inconveniences are capable of being greatly diminished, without resorting to the very extensive administrative and

 political

political changes which are involved in the measures advocated by the Commission.

39. As respects the British portion of the Army in India, the executive control is now virtually vested in the Government of India, acting through the Commander in Chief in India, who again is governed in all essential matters by the rules and regulations laid down by the War Office. The administrative inconvenience, therefore, of dealing through the Commander in Chief in India with the British troops on the establishments on the Madras and Bombay Armies cannot be of a serious character, and such as exists could, I believe, be reduced to a minimum, as I have already intimated, without making any radical change in the relations of the Local Governments to the armies.

40. With regard, however, to the Native Armies, the circumstances are so different as to render any extensive change in their administration a difficult and even hazardous task. They are composed of men of various nationalties, speaking different languages, of different religions and prejudices, suspicious of change, and apt to infer from it designs foreign to the intention of their rulers. They are also, I understand, for the most part, possessed with a deeply-rooted sentiment in favour of what exists, a feeling that constitutes in effect a form of loyalty to the institutions under which they live which it is wise to foster, so long as its encouragement does not militate against the higher interests of the State.

41. It can scarcely be doubted that the change proposed is material, and would be greatly felt by the Madras and Bombay Native Armies. Every officer and soldier now in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay is under the orders of the Governor in Council, and must obey those orders, an authority which in times of disturbance is of great importance, and which, if withdrawn, might at a very critical time have to be temporarily restored under the disadvantageous circumstance of disuse and a want of knowledge of the qualifications and characters of the combatant and departmental officers coming suddenly under the control of the Local Government.

42. Though it is quite true that the financial control of the Government of India over the whole army is complete, and that to that extent the Indian Army administration may be said to be already virtually amalgamated, yet in itself this does not constitute a sufficient reason for withdrawing from the Local Governments the administrative authority they now possess over the *personnel* of the Presidential Armies. While the Governments of Madras and Bombay continue as they are now constituted, the Native troops naturally regard them as bound in a special degree to support their just claims and rights, and to represent their grievances; and it may be contended, not without reason, that matters connected with the separate privileges or prejudices of the Native Armies, the recruiting system, and questions affecting local pay and allowances can be more satisfactorily dealt with by a Government on the spot, with a military secretary invariably selected from the local army, and with a Council in which there are civilians with great knowledge of the Natives who compose that army, than by a military officer who may have no personal knowledge of these subjects, and will not have the advantage of a body of advisers such as now exists.

43. I am aware that the scheme of reorganisation provides for a representative of each local army in the Military Secretariat of the Government of India, but I think it is open to grave doubt whether any single subordinate officer could supply the Central Government with that intimate knowledge of the capabilities, peculiarities, and requirements of the officers and men composing the several armies which, is in all circumstances, essential in efficient military administration, but in a very special degree for the satisfactory and safe direction of an army so peculiarily constituted as that of India. In respect to the Bengal Army all those special sources of information which are requisite are now possessed by the Government of India, but as regards the other two armies they cannot be at your disposal in anything like the same degree. Your Government must, almost of necessity, continue to exercise its functions in Eastern and Northern India, and cannot therefore, come into immediate contact

tact with either the officers or men of the southern and western armies; while, so long as the Commander in Chief in India retains his present position as a member of the Supreme Government, he is debarred from the possibility of obtaining by personal relations a really complete and adequate knowledge of the officers and regiments of the two presidential armies such as he possesses of the Bengal Army.

44. Your Government lay much stress on the importance of the complete segregation of these several armies, and the degree of decentralisation which you hope to maintain. I concur unreservedly in the importance of such segregation, but I am not satisfied that it will be possible to maintain it as thoroughly under the proposed as under the existing organisation.

45. It may indeed be said of the three Native Armies of India, and of the Punjab Frontier Force, that they are even now under four separate military commanders, and are separate armies, subject only to such general regulations and orders as may be issued by the Supreme Government, and, of course, to the control of the senior military officer when brought together for field service or on any other occasion. The feeling that these forces are separate is not weakened by the circumstances that they are under the same Articles of War; that they have a uniform system of drill, and with certain unimportant exceptions a uniform regimental organisation nor has it been weakened by regiments of one army occasionally serving in a Presidency to which they do not belong, or by their serving occasionally with regiments of other Presidencies, At no place has it hitherto been necessary to quarter the regiments of the different armies permanently together, and no complaint has been made that the segregation has been weakened by the recent practice of using Madras regiments to occupy certain stations in the Bengal Presidency, such as Cuttack and Dorundah. No doubt this measure is productive of expense and inconvenience, and on that ground may be advantageously discontinued, but it is no necessary part of the present system, nor has it been found to bring the Bengal and Madras Armies into very close connection with each other. To place, however, the whole of the Native Armies under four Lieutenant Generals, subject to one Commander in Chief, and altogether separated from the Local Governments, cannot, I think, fail, not perhaps at once, but gradually, to weaken the segregation now existing. The system of control proposed, being essentially military, would, in my opinion, have a greater tendency to produce complete uniformity than the present system, under which changes cannot be made by a Local Commander without the assent of the Local Government, who may be expected to be anxious to maintain a proper degree of separation, and to give weight to those considerations which are not of a purely military character, but which must be carefully weighed before changes are made in the Native Indian Army.

46. Much the same line of argument appears to be applicable to the question of decentralisation. I am not convinced that the proposed change would be productive of that greater degree of administrative decentralisation which your Lordship's Government anticipate from it. In the proposals submitted for my consideration it is not explained how far the Army Departments of the several armies are to be under the administrative control of the Lieutenant Generals in command, subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief in India, and how far under that of the chiefs of the several Departments under the Government of India. If it be intended, on the command being vested in the Lieutenant Generals, to relax the control now exercised over the local authorities, it appears to me that a corresponding relaxation might with even greater safety be permitted under the present system. On the other hand, with the heads of each Army Department collected at the head-quarters of the Government of India, it seems that the inevitable tendency must be to diminish rather than to enlarge the limited discretionary powers now vested in the local authorities.

47. With regard to the strongly-expressed opinion of your Government, that the friction caused by the present system of organisation is almost intolerable in time of war, I must point out that, although the system was exposed to the severest strain during the recent campaigns in Afghanistan, no complaint reached Her Majesty's Government at the time that the inherent difficulties of war were aggravated by obstructive action on the part of the Local Government,

or that the plans of the Commander in Chief in India, were hindered by the fact that he was working, as regards the dispatch to the field of the Madras and Bombay troops, through the agency of the Local Governments and the Commanders in Chief; in fact, Sir F. Haines, who exercised the chief military command throughout the whole war, expressly states, in para. 3 of his Minute of Dissent which accompanied your Military Letter 85, of 28th February 1881, that he cannot support any such contention. Neither, I would add, was any complaint made to Her Majesty's Government that the Local Governments failed to place unreservedly the whole resources of their several Army Departments at the disposal of the Government of India and of the Commander in Chief for the maintenance of the troops under his Excellency's Command, whether in the field or on the lines of communication, and it has never, as far as I am aware, been maintained that, in the important and successful wars in China, Burmah, Persia, and Abyssinia, the powers possessed by the Governor General in Council were not amply sufficient to enable him to exercise an effective control over the dispatch of the military expeditions, notwithstanding the necessity which existed for employing the Local Governments to execute his instructions.

48. The only other point in connection with the administrative aspect of the case to which I will refer is the argument that the change will raise the tone of the Madras and Bombay Armies, remove jealousies, give to those armies a juster proportion of the prices of the service than at present, and ensure them a fair share of field service in time of war. With regard to the question of the composition of a force for field service, I would observe that the recent Egyptian campaign proves that, when the occasion arises, the present organisation is no bar to the employment on active service of corps from all three Presidencies. On war breaking out, however, the main consideration must always be what troops can most readily be placed in the field, and which are those most suited for the service to be performed; and these considerations would, I am certain, never be subordinated by the Government of India or the Commander in Chief to the less immediately important question of an equal distribution of field service over the whole Indian Army. With respect to the more advantageous position in which it is contended the change in the organisation would place the officers of the Madras and Bombay Armies, I must express my doubt as to its reality. The Supreme Government would necessarily continue to see much more of the Bengal Army than of the Armies of Madras and Bombay, and the Bengal officers would still have better opportunities of attracting the notice of the Government of India and the Commander in Chief. The Madras and Bombay officers are at present so far compensated that, whilst they have the prospect of some appointments from the Government of India, the prizes of their own Presidencies are secured and reserved to them, an advantage which they would no longer retain. On the other hand, I believe that the proposed division of the Bengal Army into two portions would be attended with some hardship to the officers allotted to the eastern portion, who would feel that by being permanently removed from the frontier, which has hitherto offered the most frequent opportunities for active service, their prospects of distinction would be injured.

49. Though I have considered it necessary to examine in detail the financial part of the question, I have not, you will perceive, discussed *seriatim* all the grounds on which your Government support the measure as an administrative reform. In confining my remarks to a few points only of that part of the case, I beg your Lordship to believe that it is from no desire to underrate the force of the other arguments adduced in favour of the scheme, but because, even if the validity of those arguments were admitted, they would not, taken apart from financial considerations, in my judgment, be sufficient in themselves to outweigh the political advantages of maintaining the connection of the Civil Governments of Madras and Bombay with their respective armies, and so enabling them, in the event of any unforeseen contingency, to act vigorously by themselves, without reference to the Central Government.

50. In support of this view I feel justified in appealing to the remarkably apposite instance of the Punjab Government during the crisis of 1857. It cannot, I think, be questioned that the military power which the Civil Government

ment of that province was able at once to create and employ with such happy results would have been altogether wanting but for the very intimate connection which existed between the Civil Government and the Punjab Frontier Force or local army, as it may fitly be called.

51. It is proposed, as part of the scheme, to place the Punjab Frontier Force under the Commander in Chief and under the Lieutenant General commanding in the Punjab, retaining it, however, as a separate body. This proposal is, of course, dependent on the formation of four Army Corps under Lieutenant Generals, and I am not convinced of the expediency of placing the Punjab Force under the Commander in Chief. No sufficient reason seems to me to be given for thus, to a great extent, destroying the individual character of this distinguished force. For 34 years this force has existed as a separate body, and its entire separation from the rest of the army formed, as I have remarked above, one of the greatest elements of strength in the mutiny. The force has always been declared to be efficient, and its regiments have at all times been freely available for operations under the control of the Commander in Chief, while the circumstance of its being immediately disposable by the Local Government for less important services in dealing with the tribes on the frontier, without the intervention of the Commander of Chief, has been a great advantage. The Army Commission, though recommending this transfer, seem to have felt the necessity for having troops at the disposal of the political authorities on the frontier, for they proposed the creation of three corps of guides, each complete in the three arms, for frontier service under the political officers, a suggestion which, however, has not been adopted by your Government.

52. That the first formation of this separate force was a wise measure does not appear to be questioned, and so long as the condition of the frontier remains materially unchanged the reasons still exist for maintaining its present simple and efficient organization. The considerations are obvious which render it desirable that the Local Government which is responsible for the peace of the frontier districts, should have the power to select and propose for advancement the officers to whom will commonly be entrusted the management of the delicate relations with the frontier tribes, and I am therefore, on general grounds, disinclined to approve a change which would tend to weaken the segregation of the Punjab Force from the rest of the Army.

53. On the whole, I have come to the conclusion, for the reasons which I have explained, that it will not be expedient to ask Parliament to legislate for the purpose of giving effect to your recommendations. Your Lordship will, I am sure, understand that it is with much regret that Her Majesty's Government find themselves unable to adopt a measure which all the members of your Government support, but looking to the difference of military opinion on the question, to the political objections which may be urged against the proposed changes in the constitution of the Madras and Bombay Armies, and the absence of proof of financial saving, they do not find such a weight of argument and authority in its favour as would justify them in recommending to Parliament so extensive and fundamental a change in the Indian military system.

54. Having conveyed to you this decision, I desire to invite proposals for the reduction of the Staff and other establishments referred to in your Despatches, Nos. 274, 283, and 336 of 1881, to such extent as you may consider practicable, and at the same time consistent with the maintenance of the Presidential system of control. To a large extent, though with some modification as to details, your proposals already made are as applicable to the army divided as at present into three Presidential commands as to an army divided into four separate corps, while on the other hand, as has been already shown, the division of the army into four corps would necessitate the creation of various appointments that do not now exist.

55. I would especially desire you to consider whether the Judge Advocate General's Department might not be considerably reduced, now that the officers of the Army Staff are well instructed in military law. As this Department has to deal with one Army Discipline Act for the British forces, and one set of Articles of War for the whole Native Army, I see no objection to the consolida-

tion of the officers throughout India into one department, and I should hope that your Excellency's Government would be able to propose a substantial reduction. There is no ground apparent to me why more than two officers of this Department should be needed for the armies of Madras and Bombay, as as present constituted, if, as you have estimated, that number would be sufficient for those armies if placed under Lieutenant Generals.

56. Any reduction in divisional and brigade and station commands that it really practicable and expedient might, as far as I can judge, be equally well made under the present as under the proposed organisation, but I would remark that it is essential to maintain such a proportion of higher commands as may ensure they may not be too extensive, and that a considerable number of officers in the higher ranks of the active list of the army may be accustomed to exercise control over bodies of troops, since, without this, it may be difficult to find officers of sufficient experience for appointment to commands when armies have to be sent into the field.

57. I shall also be glad to receive proposals for the simplification of military business generally, such as I have no doubt you will be able to make without weakening the military control that belongs by law to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, and which I consider should be maintained in principle as heretofore.

58. I will, in conclusion, review the various proposals made from time to time by your Government for changes in military organisation, or for reduction or increase of military expenditure, arising for the most part directly or indirectly from the Report of the Simla Army Commission.

That Commission made certain recommendations which, according to their estimate, would produce the following savings :—

Page 1746, of Vol IV. of Appendices, Simla Army Commission.*

* Not printed in this Collection.

	Estimated Saving per Annum.
	Rs.
British Army - - - - - - - -	36,41,447
Native Army - - - - - - - -	16,64,249
Divisional, District, and Station Commands and Staff.	9,38,427
Medical Department - - - - - - -	31,00,000
Army Departments, including Veterinary Service -	11,92,448
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	1,05,36,571
Less cost of increase in administrative and superior Commands and Staff.	2,11,056
Net Saving - - - *Rs.*	1,03,25,515

The Commission added that no credit had been taken for the probable saving in the Ordnance Department, in the Department of Military Works, and in the number of Veterinary Surgeons and lower pensions for Native Army, owing to reductions in the establishment of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers; they observed also that 300 officers less would be required for the army and for staff, and this, added to smaller charge for reliefs and some minor savings, would make the eventual reductions probably equal to 1,25,00,000 rupees.

It was, however, obvious that these figures could only be accepted as rough estimates, and that such large reductions as were proposed could not be made without heavy additions to non-effective charges both in India and in England.

59. Your

59. Your Government were unable to suggest reductions to the extent proposed by the Commission, but recommended measures which you estimated would result in the following saving:

	Estimated Saving per Annum.
	Rs.
British Army - - - - - - - -	20,00,000
Native Army - - - - - - - -	10,00,000
Staff of the Army - - - - - - - -	3,00,000
Medical Service - - - - - - - -	8,00,000
Veterinary Department - - - - - - -	1,00,000
Military Secretariat - - - - - - -	1,50,000
Remount Department - - - - - - -	70,000
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	44,20,000
Less increase of 60,000 rupees for Ordnance, and 57,000 rupees for Accounts Departments.	1,17,000
Net Saving - - - *Rs.*	43,03,000

You stated* that these proposals would effect a direct saving of 360,000 *l.* a year, but that, if indirect savings were taken into account, the result would be a probable saving of between 500,000 *l.* and 600,000 *l.* a year. As in the case of the estimate of the Commission, the counter-charges sure to arise from extensive reductions were not taken into account.

* Paragraph 74, Despatch No. 401, 20th October 1881, from Government of India.

60. Taking, however, the figures as given by the Commission and by your Government respectively, and putting both into sterling money, the whole estimated saving of the Commission in direct charges was about 870,000 *l.*, and that of your Government 360,000 *l.* In both estimates the indirect savings are reckoned at very high figures, both by the Commission and your Government, but it is impossible to check the data on which those estimates are made, and it is probable that the savings would, to a large extent, disappear when measures for reduction were actually carried out. It is sufficient, therefore, to remark that you were unable to recommend economies in the direct charges to a greater extent than would produce a saving of about 41½ per cent. of that estimated by the Commission.

61. As has been already observed, very little of the reduction of expenditure recommended by the Commission or your Government had any connection with the formation of the proposed four Army Corps. The greatest saving in either case was to arise from a reduction in the number of regiments of cavalry and infantry and batteries of artillery in India, accompanied by an increase of rank and file in those that remained. This, which was estimated at 20 lacs of rupees, involved very important changes in British Army organisation, and, after much discussion with the War Office, my predecessor was only able to inform you† that Her Majesty's Government had assented to the reductions in the artillery. These were estimated to produce a saving of more than 11 lacs of rupees out of the 20 above mentioned. You were at the same time informed that Lord Hartington held himself at liberty, on some future opportunity, to propose reductions in the European cavalry and infantry.

† Despatch from India, No. 141, of 24th April 1881. To India, No. 12, of 5th January 1882, and No. 239, of 13th July 1882.

62. Your proposal‡ for reduction in the cost of the Native Army by disbanding 22 regiments, and by an increase in the number of privates in each

‡ Despatch from India, No. 230, of 24th June 1881. Despatch to India, No. 49, 2nd February 1882.

each regiment, as well as an addition of one European officer to each corps, was allowed, if, on full consideration, you thought it expedient. This measure was carried out by your Government, with an estimated saving of 10,00,000 rupees a year. The proposals made by your Government* for the consolidation and reduction in the Remount Department of the army, estimated by you to result in as aving to the extent of 70,000 rupees a year, were also approved in full by my predecessor. Thus, of the total saving of 43,03,000 rupees which your Government calculated on from direct reductions, a saving which on your calculations will amount to 21,70,000 rupees has actually been made.

* Despatch from India, No. 200, of 27th May 1881. To India, of 25th August 1881.

63. Various alterations in the organisation of the Medical and Veterinary Departments have been proposed. They have formed the subject of discussion with the War Department,† with the result that I have asked you for modified proposals. Meanwhile, however, large savings have been effected, first, by a reduction of the administrative medical staff, and, secondly, by a considerable diminution in the number of officers sent out to supply vacancies in the British and Indian Medical Departments and the Veterinary Department. In the Commissariat and Military Works Departments you have not proposed any savings,‡ and in the Departments of the Ordnance and Military Accounts you have proposed an increase of establishment.

† Despatches No. 81, of 28th February, and No. 160, of 26th April 1883.

‡ Nos. 292 and 293, of 5th August 1881; No. 345, of 24th September 1881; and No. 399, of 29th October 1881.

64. The main question of the scheme for formation of four army corps having been disposed of, I am now in a position to address you with respect to each of these departments, and shall do so in separate Despatches.

65. I have referred in this Despatch to all the principal heads of reduction or increase of expenditure enumerated in your summary, at para. 74 of your Despatch, No. 401, of 20th October 1881, but, as you are aware, correspondence has taken place on other important matters connected with army organisation, such as the tenure of regimental commands and appointments in the Native army, the seconding or final removal from regiments of officers in civil employ, the recruitment of the staff corps, the prospective abolition of colonel's allowances, revised pension rules for officers of all branches of the Indian Military Service, and formation of a separate Transport Department. Many of these questions have already been disposed of, and I have every reason to believe that the general result of all these measures will be increased efficiency in the Army in India, with a material reduction of expenditure.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 200 of 1883—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received 9th November* 1883).

My Lord, Fort William, 15 October 1883.

WE have had the honour to receive your Lordship's Despatch of the 26th July, No. 243, conveying the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon our recommendations on the general organisation of the Indian Army, with respect to the proposals of the Army Commission of 1879.

2. We must first express our deep regret at the nature of this decision, and that the proposals which, after the fullest deliberation, we had submitted to Her Majesty's Government, in the full assurance that they were calculated to improve the efficiency of the Indian Army, and which involved, in our opinion, the smallest degree of that change which the altered conditions of the country demanded, should not have been accepted. We now desire to offer some remarks upon certain criticisms on our proposals contained in your Lordship's Despatch.

3. The reasons on which our recommendations were based are briefly summed up in your Lordship's Despatch, paragraphs 13 and 15. We will not, therefore, repeat

repeat these reasons here, but we will proceed to notice some of the objections which are taken to them.

4. Objection is first taken to the claim which we assumed of a saving of expense from the proposed organisation.

5. The proposal is for concentrating the administration of all the Indian armies directly under the Governor General in Council, and involves an alteration in the status of the Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay, who would come directly under the orders of the Commander in Chief in India, with a reduction of their emoluments and of their staffs; the abolition of the Military Secretariats of Madras, Bombay, and Punjab, and certain reductions in the staff of Army Head-Quarters; it provides also for the appointment of two Lieutenant Generals, in addition to those in command of the Madras and Bombay Armies, for the two bodies into which it was proposed to divide the Bengal Army, and for the necessary staff for these two bodies. On the other hand, and as a means of meeting the extra cost of the new Lieutenant Generals and staff for the Bengal Army, considerable reductions are proposed in the number of divisional and district commands, and in the staff connected with them. Some additions are also proposed to the Secretariat of the Government of India.

6. The result of our proposed changes in organisation, as summed up by your Lordship (paragraph 22), would involve a net additional expenditure of about two lakhs. On the other hand, the saving proposed in the divisional and brigade and station staff amounted to about 9¼ lakhs, making a net reduction of about 7¼ lakhs. Upon this point your Lordship observes that the reduction proposed has no direct or necessary connection with the proposed organisation of the Indian Army in four bodies, and that if it be proper to reduce the divisional and brigade and station staff, or to amalgamate the departments of the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General, these measures could be carried out apart from any change in the system of superior commands. You go on to observe (paragraph 25) that the economy proposed in the divisional and brigade and station staff would be considerably diminished by the formation of the existing forces into four armies under Lieutenant Generals. Your Lordship adds some further remarks upon the various points in detail in support of this opinion.

7. Upon the general point thus raised, that the savings proposed should not be claimed as a set-off against the extra charges proposed, we may observe that the same sort of criticism might be applied to almost any scheme of administrative reorganisation which might be proposed. In framing such measures it is customary to consider the savings created under certain heads as connected with the increased expenditure proposed under others. It is not that the reductions proposed in such cases are in themselves always desirable, but it is usually felt by those who have to propose the measure that the case for change will be strengthened if it can be effected without total increase of charge. The Army Commission had recommended that the number of divisional and district commands, and the staff attached to them, should be reduced, and it must be remembered that the duty primarily imposed upon them was to effect a reduction of army expenditure. It appears impossible to say on *à priori* grounds exactly what number of such commands are absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the army: this must be ultimately a matter of opinion, rather than to be arrived at by any specific reasoning. But in proposing a reform of army organisation, to which we attach the highest importance, it appeared to us to be extremely desirable to show how this could be done, not only without any increase of expenditure, but with the result of a saving. In view of the great benefit to be derived by the army from its reorganisation, we should have been prepared to carry out the reduction of commands and other higher appointments very much after the plan proposed by the Commission, believing that the army would have accepted such a reduction as a necessary part of a great scheme of reform. But further, we considered that in this particular case the proposed redistribution of commands followed as a natural result of the general scheme. The most important feature of this was the withdrawal from the Governments of Madras and Bombay of the administration of the local armies, which were to be

be placed under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief in India. If that change were to be carried out, it appeared to us absolutely necessary that the Commander in Chief should also be relieved of the direct administration of the Bengal Army; and that being so, it appeared to follow as a necessary consequence that the Bengal Army for purposes of administration should be placed under two separate commanders. A single officer in command of the whole Bengal Army, in subordination to the Commander in Chief in India, would occupy an altogether unsuitable and inappropriate position. Hence the appointment recommended of two Lieutenant Generals for Bengal, with the necessary staff.

8. This division of the Bengal Army further recommended itself to us from important political considerations, upon which we have dwelt at length in our previous Despatches, and need not therefore refer to now.

9. The Bengal Army being thus divided into two parts, the generals commanding which would be able to gain a more complete and direct acquaintance with their officers and troops than the Commander in Chief in India can now possess, we considered it practicable to reduce the number of divisional and district commands of the armies. Thus it appeared to us that the reductions we proposed, at any rate as regards Bengal, were necessarily bound up with and formed part of the whole scheme. And, apart from the considerations alluded to in paragraph 7, we should not be prepared to recommend this reduction of appointments unless the Bengal Army were to be subdivided.

10. On the other hand, the subdivision of the Bengal Army, which we regard as of extreme importance politically, could hardly be carried out and the rest of the military system be left unaltered. If the Bengal Army were subdivided, each of its two subdivisions would necessarily be provided with a separate commander; that, under these circumstances, the functions of the Commander in Chief in India should be limited to the command of the Bengal Army, thus subdivided, through the agency of the two Lieutenant Generals intermediate between him and the district and divisional commanders, and that he should continue to have no more immediate connection with the armies of Madras and Bombay than he has at present, would be a form of organisation that would probably not recommend itself in any quarter.

11. For the reductions proposed in the divisional and district commands of the Bengal Army with their staff, the proposed appointment of the two Lieutenant Generals with their staff may be taken as a fair set off. As regards the Madras and Bombay Armies, the same thing did not hold good, because the change proposed in their case is merely of the status and designation of the officer commanding the troops, who would be, as now, of the rank of Lieutenant General; the reductions of higher staff appointments in those armies might therefore, no doubt, be carried out on their own merits, irrespective of any change of general organisation: and to that extent, and considering only the case of the Madras and Bombay armies, your Lordship's criticism must be accepted as valid. Nevertheless, even as regards these armies, the matter cannot, we think, be properly viewed altogether apart from the considerations set out above (paragraph 7); the sacrifice of the interests of officers involved in a reduction of the number of higher and staff appointments would undoubtedly be more cheerfully accepted if it were seen to form part of a valuable administrative reform.

12. We submit, therefore, that the scheme can be properly considered only as a whole, and that our proposals are not fully met by withholding the increase and carrying out the decrease.

13. Your Lordship after remarking (paragraph 26) on some of the detailed figures of our schedule of proposed establishment, next proceeds (paragraph 30) to criticise our estimate of the effect of the proposed change in respect of the Secretariat establishment. Your Lordship considers it doubtful whether the additional establishment which we propose for the Military Department of the Government of India would be sufficient for the extra work to be placed upon it, and you also point out that the Military Secretary, Bombay, and the Military

Military Secretary, Punjab, perform certain duties which cannot be transferred to the Secretariat of the Government of India. We admit that, in dealing with this large measure, we may possibly have omitted from consideration some small items of expense here or there. No doubt the small local marine of the Bombay Presidency, which consists of one or two small steamers, and the Bombay Ecclesiastical establishment would require an office establishment in some form or other to deal with them. And the business arising out of the Punjab Frontier, Police would still need to be dealt with. But, as regards the general question, we desire to record our opinion that, so far from the business of the Military Department of the Government of India being largely increased by the proposed change in army organisation, the result would be very probably the other way. Some additional business, mostly of a routine kind, would come to that department as a consequence of the change of organisation; but against this must be set the very large saving of correspondence, which would result from the abolition of the present cumbrous presidential system. How cumbrous that system is, was brought out very prominently during the Afghan War, and also during the late expedition to Egypt, when the strain placed upon the Military Department was quite out of proportion to the extent of the operations, and quite incompatible with a proper military organisation. For this the presidential system is to blame. The fact is that, when any operation, however small, has to be undertaken in which a share is taken by the three separate armies, each controlled by its own Government, each commanded by its own Commander in Chief, each with its own distinct staff and Ordnance Clothing and Commissariat Departments, the burden of distributing their duties between these different authorities, and disposing of the references which arise, and must needs arise even under the most harmonious and intelligent co-operation on the part of all concerned, falls to the Government of India, which thus has to discharge duties which ought not to come up to the Secretariat, and which would, under a proper system of organisation, be disposed of by the responsible departmental heads. There are no responsible departmental heads under the present system, the local head of each department is responsible only for that portion of it which is serving in its own presidency; and when any question arises of the supply of stores, or equipment or clothing for a joint expedition, such as that to Egypt, the orders of the Government of India have to be invoked at every stage. The same thing holds good with regard to the movement of troops. In matters of this kind, the Commander in Chief in India cannot, except in an unrecognised way, correspond direct with the Commanders in Chief of the local armies. To do this would be to strike at the root of the presidential system. And so, whether it is a question of settling which army should furnish a detachment for any duty, or which of the three presidential departments shall supply certain articles of ordnance, or food, or clothing, the orders of the Government of India have to be sought at every point, and that Government thus becomes a referee on a multiplicity of details which, under a proper system, should not go beyond the heads of departments. It comes, in fact, to this, that the Military Department of the Government of India has practically on such occasions to exercise the functions of a Chief of the Staff, of a Commissary General, and of an Inspector General of Ordnance, and, it may be added, of the chief medical authority, an arrangement involving an amount of correspondence and circumlocution quite incompatible with the prompt dispatch of business. Such a state of things violates the first principles of vigour, simplicity, and directness of responsibility, which should underlie every reasonable system of military administration.

14. It may be said that these objections could be overcome by appointing responsible departmental heads for the different services of the army, a chief commissariat officer, a chief ordnance officer, a chief clothing agent, and so on, attached to the Government of India; officers who would exercise a general control over the different presidential departments, distributing between them their respective share of the business, and thus disposing of the references which now come up at every point to the Government of India. But it is obvious that just so far as such a system were carried out would the presidential system be in fact abolished. If an officer were attached to the Government of

India for each of the departments of supply, in our opinion a very necessary and pressing measure, this would remove the last remnant of presidential responsibility for army finance which remained after the greater measure of financial centralisation was carried out in 1877 by the formation of a general Department of Military Account for all India. But the reform would not stop at this point. What is good as regards supply for the troops would equally hold good as regards the troops themselves. To get rid of the existing cumbrous and dilatory system, the Commander in Chief should be competent to send instructions to the generals commanding the local armies regarding the movements of troops ordered by the only authority which even now is competent to order it, the Government of India. This, in fact, is just what we propose, and would involve the abolition of the presidential system.

15. We have enlarged on this point as an answer to the criticism of your Lordship that the saving in Secretariat establishments under our proposals has been over-estimated. The experience gained by the Egypt Expedition since that proposal was made, in addition to the experience already furnished by the Afghan War, has satisfied us that, under the more simple system of army administration which we recommend, the additional work thrown upon the Military Department of the Government of India would be almost, if not quite, compensated for by the saving of work in other directions. We believe that the whole increase proposed for the establishment of that department would not be necessary, and that at any rate our estimate of the total saving is a safe and fair one.

16. We have so far been dealing with the subject in its financial aspect. But, as your Lordship observes (para. 36) the political and administrative bearings of the question are also of great weight. And, considering the subject first of all from an administrative point of view, with the object of obtaining the greatest possible degree of efficiency from the army, combined with simplicity of administration, we cannot doubt that this is to be found only by the measure we propose of centralising the whole administration of the Indian Armies, European and Native, under one authority.

17. As regards the British troops in India, your Lordship observes (para. 39) that the executive control is now virtually vested in the Government of India, acting through the Commander in Chief in India, and that the administrative inconvenience of dealing through the Commander in Chief in India with the British troops on the establishments of the Madras and Bombay Armies cannot be of a serious nature, and that such as exists could, you believe, be reduced to a minimum without making any radical change in the relations of the Local Governments to the armies.

18. It must indeed be admitted, and we have already pointed it out in our previous letters, that the control of the Madras and Bombay Governments over the British troops quartered at places occupied by the Madras and Bombay armies, and therefore stationed within what, in a military sense, are technically know as the Madras and Bombay presidencies, is but little more than formal. But it is not the less a source of needless trouble and embarrassment. It is practically a source of constant inconvenience that business relating to the administration of British troops in Burmah, the Central Provinces, and Rajputana, countries with the civil administration of which the Governments of Madras and Bombay have no concern, should have to be conducted through the medium of the Governments of Madras and Bombay. With respect to the discipline of these troops and questions affecting the internal economy of regiments, the Commander in Chief in India does indeed convey his instructions directly to the local Commander in Chief; but in matters involving army finance, as those relating to clothing, equipment, and barracks, as well as the movement of troops, the orders on which emanate from the Government of India, the correspondence must necessarily also pass through the Local Governments. The degree of circumlocution thus involved is in its cumulative effect a source of grave administrative inconvenience, while involving a needless expense for the establishments required to carry it out.

19. The incongruity of still maintaining the presidential system as regards British

British troops is, perhaps, most strongly exemplified in the case of the reliefs to and from England. The business connected with the moving of British troops cannot be separated from the general business of the Indian armies, and this comes under the cognisance of the presidential Government. And thus every year, and for a great part of the year, a state of things is in force under which British troops of the Bengal and Madras establishments passing to and fro between India and England come during their passage under the orders of the Government of Bombay, and during that time are removed technically from the jurisdiction of the Governments and Commander in Chief of their own presidencies, a state of things productive of much needless trouble and correspondence.

20. But it will probably be admitted that the presidential system would not have been maintained so long, and would not be maintained any longer, if British troops only were concerned. The maintenance of the presidential system is confessedly tolerated only out of consideration for the Native armies, and upon this subject we desire to submit a few observations.

21. Your Lordship observes, in the 40th paragraph of your Despatch, that any extensive change in the organisation of the Native armies would be a difficult and hazardous task; that they are composed of men of various nationalities, speaking different languages, of different religions and prejudices, suspicious of change, and apt to infer from it designs foreign to the intention of their rulers. Also that they are possessed of a deeply-rooted sentiment in favour of what exists, a feeling that constitutes in effect a form of loyalty to the institutions under which they live, which it is wise to foster, so long as its encouragement does not militate against the higher interests of the State. We need hardly assure your Lordship that we are very sensible of the impropriety of making any changes which are not absolutely necessary, and we should certainly not propose any change in the administration of the Native Army if we did not believe the disadvantages, and indeed the dangers, of abstaining from reform more than outweighed those which on a reasonable view might be expected possibly to arise from it. But, in the first place, as we pointed out at some length on a previous occasion, we do not propose any extensive changes in these armies themselves. We contemplate that these armies should remain organised exactly as they are at present, and entirely separate from each other. We did not propose even the amalgamation of the different Indian staff corps, although as the officers of these bodies are promoted under precisely the same conditions, their amalgamation would involve none of the inconveniences which such measures usually entail. If the three staff corps were amalgamated to-morrow, the rights and status of no officer would be affected.

22. Changes affecting the European officers are, however, politically of comparatively small importance. The measure would need to be considered mainly in its relation to the Native troops; and as regards these Native troops no change was proposed in their conditions. It was not even intended to alter the designation of the Bengal Army, but only that the Hindustani troops should be kept apart in peace time from the Punjabi troops. And as regards these, we would desire again to record our opinion that this proposed separation would be a change in the direction of safe political organisation far outweighing, in our judgment, any danger to be apprehended from a transfer of the command of the Madras and Bombay sepoys from the Government of their Presidencies to the Government of India. For it seems to us that to speak of the Indian armies as being now separated by nationalities, as if a safe political condition were thereby secured, when Punjabis and Hindustanis have been serving indiscriminately at all the stations between Calcutta and Peshawar; when, in fact, the segregation which obtained before the mutiny has been abandoned, contrary to the advice of Lord Lawrence and other experienced administrators, whose warning voice has for long been disregarded; it seems to us that the notion of safe political administration being found in the maintenance of this state of things is not justified by the realities of the case. The organisation which we propose will, we are satisfied, be far safer politically than that which obtains at present.

23. Your Lordship observes (paragraph 41) that the change would be greatly felt by the Madras and Bombay Native Armies, and it may be inferred that your

your Lordship considers them to be composed of different nationalities from those serving in the Bengal Army. The Madras Army is certainly composed almost entirely of different materials from the other two, but the Bombay Army is largely recruited from Northern India, too largely indeed, and we have lately protested more than once against the efforts of the Bombay Government, and still more lately of Bombay officers acting in defiance of the orders of their Government, to obtain recruits from Northern India. In fact it may be said that for some years there has been a continual struggle on this point between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India, the former being desirous of obtaining what they considered to be the best material for their troops regardless of race and nationality, so that, if they had carried their point, the Bombay Army would in time have been almost homogeneous with the Bengal Army; the Government of India desiring, on the other hand, to insist that the Bombay Army should be maintained separate in race and nationality from the Bengal Army.

24. We cannot doubt that, if the Bombay Army had been under the direct administration of the Government of India, its present condition, under which more than one-third of its numbers are what are locally termed foreigners, that is, soldiers from Punjab and Hindustan, would never have been allowed to come about.

25. Your Lordship observes (paragraph 42) that the connection between the Local Government and the local armies tends to create a greater amount of attention to the wants, and it may be to the prejudices, of the Native soldiers than a distant Government might be expected to give it, and it is implied that the local advice which is thus available for the administration of the army constitutes a source of political safety.

26. We may admit that there is an apparent degree of probability in such a view of the case, but we must observe that the past history of the Indian Army seems hardly to bear it out. It is a remarkable fact that the outbreaks which have occurred in the Indian Armies have not been foreseen by the local authorities. We may especially advert to the mutiny of Vellore, which was brought about by the injudicious action of the Local Government, and was entirely unexpected by it. A still more striking instance is afforded by the great mutiny of the Bengal Army which was entirely unforeseen and unexpected both by the Government of India and at Bengal Army Head-quarters. The conclusion to be drawn from these two notable instances, and others which might be cited, that local knowledge does not always afford that safeguard which might *primâ facie* be expected from it; the real safeguard for maintaining the loyalty and good conduct of the Indian Armies is, we believe, to be looked for rather in the maintenance of strict discipline and that segregation of the different races to which we have attached so much importance, combined with a scrupulous regard for the claims and rights, and we may even say the prejudices, of the sepoy, points as to the importance of which we have reason to believe the Government of India to be as fully alive as any other authorities. We have already pointed out how much the views of the Government of India have differed from those of the Government of Bombay as regards the proper composition of the Bombay Army, and we might cite other circumstances connected with both Madras and Bombay to show that the Government of India has had occasion to exercise a moderating influence over the Local Governments in their proposals for changes, which the former deemed to go further than was prudent.

27. Your Lordship observes (paragraph 44) that, while concurring unreservedly in the importance of maintaining the segregation of the Native Armies, you are not satisfied that it would be possible to maintain it as thoroughly under the proposed as under the existing organisation. It is of course impossible to prove that this segregation will be maintained by the Government of India. It is from the nature of the case impossible to prove that something will not happen that has not happened. All we can say is that we are very sensible of the importance of maintaining this principle. We have already pointed out how we propose to do so, and the steps we have taken in the past as regards the Bombay Army, and how largely the principle of segregation would be extended by the proposed division

division of the Bengal Army, and we submit that, with these views so distinctly placed on record, it seems at least reasonable to believe that the Government of India in the future will be prepared to abide by them.

28. Another point is dealt with in your Lordship's letter, which, although comparatively one of detail, may yet properly be noticed. Your Lordship expresses a doubt (paragraph 46) whether it would be possible to carry out that greater degree of administrative decentralisation which we desire to introduce, and which, properly worked, must be productive of efficiency and economy under the proposed system, any more than it has been found possible to carry it out under the present system. We will merely observe on this point that a chain of administrative subordination, whereby the generals commanding the local armies were under the immediate orders of the Commander in Chief in India, through whom alone they would receive their instructions, appears to us more calculated to ensure strict financial discipline than a system under which the local Commander in Chief, sheltered by the authority of a strong Civil Government, too often assumes a position of antagonism, not only to the Government of India, but to the Commander in Chief in India. That such has been the state of things in the past the records of the Government of India show only too clearly; that the Government of India has often found great difficulty in obtaining ready and loyal obedience to its orders is a matter only too notorious. While, as regards the state of things which we propose to substitute for the present, we may observe that in the British Army, where the generals commanding districts, whether at home or abroad, are under the direct orders of the Horse Guards and the War Office, there has been found no difficulty in maintaining complete discipline in army finance. Nor we believe is any difficulty of the kind experienced in other European armies. We can only say on this head that we are quite prepared to assume the responsibility of carrying out a system of army financial decentralisation which we believe would be attended with improved economy, efficiency, and simplicity in the administration of the Indian Armies, but that the centralisation of that administration under the Governor General in Council is a necessary condition for undertaking it.

29. Your Lordship (paragraph 47) takes exception to the picture drawn by us of the evils of the present system when the Indian Armies are engaged on active service. We must therefore again repeat our convictions that this evil is a very grave and serious one, and the records of this Government show that it was very strongly exemplified during the Afghan War. Your Lordship quotes the authority of Sir Frederick Haines, who was Commander in Chief at that time in support of the opposite view. We feel bound to assert, however, that the correspondence between the Government of India and Sir Frederick Haines, when he was Commander in Chief, does not bear out his contention. More than one serious complication arose, not only from the orders given by the Government of Bombay during that war being at variance with the orders given by the Government of India in regard to the business of the army in the field, but because on more than one occasion the orders of the local Commander in Chief conflicted with those given by Sir Frederick Haines himself. We would rather not dwell upon these delicate matters, but we feel bound to refer to them when the case of that war is cited as being opposed to our views on the subject. We could, if necessary, substantiate and illustrate our statement by references to the correspondence which took place between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India after the end of the war.

30. There is one more point in your Lordship's Despatch on which we desire to add a few words. Your Lordship (paragraph 51) lays great stress on the importance of maintaining the separate constitution of the Punjab Frontier Force. In that view we entirely concur, although we have certainly proposed to place that force under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief in India, believing that the general military administration would thereby be simplified and improved. Although this force is under the orders of the local administration, it has been for many years past the practice to consult the Commander in Chief upon all proposals relating to it, and such references would be dealt with more promptly and satisfactorily if coming to the Government of India through

Army Head-quarters, with the Commander in Chief's opinion recorded on them in the first instance. The value of the local character of this force appears to us to be derived, not so much from its being administered by the Local Government as from its intimate connection with the frontier, and its own great local experience. The force certainly suffers from not getting its proper share of the staff appointments of the army, and of late years, owing to the more peacable state of the frontier, it has had a much smaller share of active service than used to fall to it. The force being comparatively a small one, it is not practicable to maintain so even a flow of promotion in it as obtains in the rest of the army; and at the present time the state of promotion among the officers is very unfavourable. We think, therefore, that on the whole the force would gain if, while its local character were strictly maintained, it were placed under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief.

31. Your Lordship (paragraph 50) observes on the important effect which followed from the Civil Government of the Punjab being unable to employ a military power of its own during the crisis of 1857. We are very sensible of the extreme value which the circumstances of the Punjab local force and its connection with the local administration brought to the military position on that occasion, and of the admirable use to which it was put by Sir John Lawrence. But we should be disposed to say that the great qualities of that eminent man were still more markedly manifested in the virtual assumption by him of the command, not only of the troops under his immediate orders, but of the whole of the forces in the Punjab and the military resources of that country. Sir John Lawrence practically assumed the military as well as the civil administration of the province, a position at once recognised by all the military authorities, who, under the influence of his strong character, gave a loyal and complete obedience to his wishes, and it was he who organised the whole of the military movements of both British and Native troops, whether of the Regular army or of the Punjab Frontier Force, undertaken in that province. But it was the great qualities of the man and his exceptional experience, much more than his position in command of an independent force, which enabled him to do what he did, and we may observe that in a less degree Sir Bartle Frere, as Commissioner of Sind, took upon himself the same sort of responsibility in regard to the troops and the military resources of his province, although in his capacity as Civil Governor of that country he had no connection with either the one or the other. And in times of emergency the Civil Government, if in competent hands, will always assume the direction of military affairs, whether or not it has the nominal command of the army, while if vigour and ability are wanting, the possession of this command will assuredly prove of little value.

32. Your Lordship observes (paragraph 37) that opinion in favour of the new organisation is not unanimous, and that a considerable weight of authority may be quoted on the other side. This must be the condition under which all reforms are effected. There are always to be found persons who will predict that dangers and inconveniences will arise from reforms, and it is impossible to prove beforehand that their predictions will not be verified. But we submit that the degree of unanimity in favour of the change is a remarkable one, considering the circumstances of the case and how many interests are likely to be affected by it; and we may appropriately refer to the fact, to which we drew attention in our Despatch of February 1881, embodying our proprosals, that this inquiry was not undertaken by the present Government of India. The Army Commission, with whose proposals we have been dealing, was appointed by the late Viceroy, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and the question of reforming the Indian Army was only taken up by the present Governor General in Council in 1881 upon the requisition of Lord Hartington, who referred it back to India, and expressly called for the opinion of the Government of India upon the proposals of the Commission. We may therefore claim to have come to the inquiry with unbiassed minds; the conclusion we have formed on it has been arrived at unanimously.

33. We have now ended the remarks which we have felt it our duty to make on your Lordship's Despatch. They have necessarily been extended to some length, but the great importance of the subject must be our justification for the freedom

freedom with which we have met your Lordship's opinions and arguments. We desire again to express our deep regret that Her Majesty's Government should not have felt themselves able to accept the proposals which we had submitted for approval, believing them to be not only calculated to produce a sensible economy and to add greatly to the efficiency of the Indian Armies, but to be absolutely necessary in the present condition of British India if a reasonable standard is to be attained to in either respect. As we said in a former letter, the existing organisation of the Indian Armies in the presidential divisions is a fortuitous circumstance arising out of a state of things that has long passed away. Time was when these armies were separated from each other by wide extents of foreign country, when communications were difficult and tardy, and when each Government and its army were necessarily to a great extent self maintained and independent. This has now passed away. The armies are now in contact with each other, communication is easy and complete, and the armies of the minor presidencies have overflowed into other provinces subject to different civil administrations, and it appears to us that the necessity of revising so cumbrous and antiquated a system of army administration becomes every day stronger and stronger.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
T. F. Wilson.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
T. C. Hope.
A. Colvin.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military—No. 76) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 13 March 1884.

Para. 1. I HAVE received your Lordship's Military Letter No. 200, dated the 15th October 1883, replying to my Despatch of the 16th July 1883, No. 243, on the subject of your recommendations on the general organisation of the Indian Army, with reference to the proposals of the Army Commission of 1879.

2. I have not failed to read your Lordship's remarks with attention, but as the questions raised have been already very fully discussed, and I have conveyed to you the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon them, there will, I think, be no advantage in prolonging the discussion by an examination of the arguments in your present letter.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

— II. —

ORGANISATION OF BRITISH TROOPS.—REDUCTIONS OF ARTILLERY.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 141 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 16*th May* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 24 April 1881.

In our Despatch No. 85, dated the 28th February 1881, we laid before your Lordship the expression of our views regarding some of the larger questions raised in the Report of the Indian Army Commission, and we stated that, in our opinion, it would be desirable to take up separately, and in order, the various other subjects dealt within their Report. In pursuance of this arrangement, we have now the honour to submit to your Lordship the conclusions at which, after careful deliberation, we have arrived upon another very important subject, the strength of the European troops in India.

2. This forms the subject of the VIth Chapter of the Report. It will be seen that the Commission propose a reduction in the number of British infantry battalions serving in India from 50, the present establishment, to 43, accompanied by an increase in the strength of each battalion from 820 to 978 rank and file, which would give nearly the same aggregate number of bayonets. They propose to reduce the number of British cavalry regiments from nine to six, involving a reduction of sabres from 4,095 to 3,516. And they would reduce the number of batteries of artillery from 86, with 384 field guns, to 77 batteries, with 360 guns.

3. We are unable to support these recommendations to their full extent. While admitting that there is much force in the argument put forward by the Commission, that the extension of railways has greatly increased the mobility of the Indian Army, and that therefore the necessity which obtained at the time when the present organization and strength of the British garrison in India was determined upon, for its distribution over the country in a great many stations, no longer exists to the same extent; still we think that the recommendations of the Commission go too far.

4. It is quite true that the railway system adds largely to our military strength by increasing the mobility of the army; but, on the other hand, the protection of long lines of railway imposes greater responsibilities and heavier duties on the troops in disturbed times. Moreover, the primary object for which the British garrison of India is required is the maintenance of internal peace; and past experience shows that it is quite as important that the troops should be actually present at the various points where disturbances might arise, as that they should be in reserve at a distance, available to put down disturbances after they have arisen. The concentration of the troops therefore, and their organization in strong cadres, although an economical arrangement, and an efficient one for an army held in readiness to act against an external foe, cannot in India be safely carried beyond a certain point. And we think that the proposals of the Commission go too far in this respect. To take, for example, only one part of the country, they would denude Oudh and Rohilkund of European troops to an extent which we could not approve.

Further, it is necessary to preserve an equilibrium between the European and Native army units, on the basis, as far as may be practicable, of one European to two Native regiments. This principle has not been kept in view by the Commission in their recommendations regarding the cavalry. They propose to reduce the number of British cavalry regiments from nine to six. Even supposing, then, that their scheme for the reduction of the Native cavalry units also were carried out, still the proportion of British to Native cavalry would be as 6 to 27. The experience of the late war has shown very forcibly the importance of providing a proportion of European cavalry as well as European infantry for every column in the field; and there is reason to suppose that, on more than one occasion, advantages gained in action have not been made the most of, because the cavalry portion of the force contained no Europeans.

5. It

5. It might be said, indeed, that the comparative strength of the regiments of British cavalry proposed by the Commission would admit of their being distributed by wings. The Commission, however, did not propose this. They recommended the abandonment of Muttra, Sialkot, and Bangalore as British cavalry stations, and that a whole regiment should be placed, as at present, at each of the six remaining stations to be maintained. And there are great objections to breaking up cavalry regiments as a permanent arrangement.

6. For these reasons we are unable to accept the recommendations of the Commission as they stand. We are, nevertheless, of opinion that the Commission have established the fact that the present organisation of the European portion of the Indian Army is unduly expensive. It must, we think, be admitted that the extension of railways has altered the conditions of the case, and admits of the concentration of the troops being carried somewhat further than would have been safe 20 years ago. And assuming that the numerical strength of the European garrison of India should not be reduced, the time has come when the composition of the regiments of which it is formed should be such as will furnish the most convenient organisation compatible with economy. On this point the present system fails. The strength, both of cavalry and infantry European regiments on the present establishment, is too small for proper efficiency. A British cavalry regiment in India is actually weaker than a regiment at home,* although the one may be called upon to take the field without warning, and to remain there for some months before it can receive reinforcements; whereas the British regiments ordered on service from England can be at once augmented from the regiments remaining behind. The statistics of the late war show that, as soon as the stress of a campaign begins, regiments, both cavalry and infantry, of the present establishment become reduced to a strength which all authorities agree is too small for efficiency, while the bringing them up to a proper standard in this respect is a long process.

* In England—
9 regiments have 542 rank and file.
10 „ „ 444 „ „
In India—
the strength is 408 „ „

7. The late Commander in Chief, in a Minute which, at his request, we attach to this Despatch, gives some figures to show that, at a certain period which he selects, many of the British regiments serving beyond the frontier had a respectable strength on their muster rolls. But these figures include the sick and other non-effectives, and moreover they refer to a late period in the war, when most of the regiments named had not been engaged for several months, and had been largely reinforced by drafts from England. The muster rolls of the effective forces engaged in various actions during the war give very different figures. We observe that in the new organisation of the British Army, lately announced by the Secretary of State for War, the strength of the battalions held ready for foreign service is fixed at 950 rank and file. There is, we think, an incongruity in maintaining a much lower establishment for service battalions in India than that which is apparently about to be provided for field service elsewhere, when the climate of this country, the strain it produces on the European troops, the necessity for being always prepared for active service, and the distance from support, are all taken into consideration. We trust, therefore, that we shall receive the support of Her Majesty's Government in proposing a moderate reduction in the number of European regiments in India, combined with such an increase in the strength of each cadre as shall keep the total establishment of British troops in India at the present figure.

8. Our recommendations on this head are as follows :—

First, as regards the European Cavalry.—We propose an establishment of eight instead of nine regiments and an increase of 65 sabres per regiment, which will give a total strength of 4,160 sabres against 4,095 as at present. Bangalore to be abolished as a station for European cavalry.

Next, as regards European Infantry.—We recommend that the establishment for India be fixed at 46 instead of 50 battalions, the strength of each being increased from 820 rank and file to 920, or 30 less than the strength now fixed for the battalions first for service at home.

9. Lastly,

9. Lastly, with regard to the Artillery.—We consider that the recommendations of the Commission upon this head should be adopted, with slight modifications, and the establishment we propose is as follows:—

	Present Garrison.	Proposed Garrison.
Horse Artillery - - -	15 Batteries	10 Batteries.
Field " - - -	43 " -	40 "
Heavy " - - -	4 " -	4 "
Mountain " - - -	2 " -	6 "
Garrison " - - -	22 " -	17 "
TOTAL - - -	86 Batteries	77 Batteries.

The present establishment of horse artillery is out of proportion to the strength of the cavalry in the Indian Army; and, having regard to the great additional expense of horse artillery, as compared with field batteries, and field batteries being for most purposes of Indian warfare quite as efficient as horse artillery, we consider that the reduction should be mainly in this arm.

10. The great value of mountain batteries has been strongly exemplified in the late war. The number of these batteries has been, in fact, already increased from the establishment given above, which was that of 1877, by the conversion of a battery on the Burmese frontier from field to mountain equipment, and the equipment of a garrison battery in the same way. And we think that there should be at least six European mountain batteries in India.

11. The number of garrison batteries should be reduced by five; but this numerical reduction will be more than compensated for by the increased efficiency to be given to the garrison artillery. The present strength of a garrison battery in India is 70 rank and file, which is altogether too small a number; we propose to increase it to 120, which is about the strength of a garrison battery serving at home. The total number of artillerymen in India will be reduced by about 800.

12. We attach tables showing the present and proposed strength of the British troops in India, from which it will be seen that the effect of our recommendations will be to give a British force of 62,420 of all ranks against 62,347 of all ranks, as at present. We also attach an estimate of the saving involved in this arrangement, which, it will be seen, amounts to about 20 lakhs a year, exclusive of non-effective charges.

13. This completes the statement of our recommendations on this important subject. After having carefully considered the matter in all its bearings, we submit those recommendations to your Lordship in the full conviction that they will adequately meet the requirements of India, and that, while they will secure an economy which we estimate at not less than 200,000 *l.* a year, they will in no respect diminish the efficiency of our military establishments. We have felt it our duty to regard the subject from an Indian point of view; but we are well aware that it will be necessary that Her Majesty's Government should consider also how the arrangements which we recommend may affect the general organisation of the British Army. We present them to your Lordship in the belief that they will be found as compatible with that organisation as we are confident that they will prove advantageous to the interests of India.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
Rivers Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
G. T. Chesney.

(I.)

British Troops in India.

PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.								AS PROPOSED BY INDIAN ARMY COMMISSION.								AS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.							
Distribution.		Detail of each Corps and Battery.				Total Strength.		Distribution.		Detail of each Corps and Battery.				Total Strength.		Distribution.		Detail of each Corps and Battery.				Total Strength.	
		Officers, including Medical Officers.	Staff Sergeants and Sergeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.			Officers, including Medical Officers.	Staff Sergeants and Sergeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.			Officers, including Medical Officers.	Staff Sergeants and Sergeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.
15	Batteries, R. H. Artillery -	6	9	2	146	90	2,355	10	Batteries, R. H. Artillery -	6	9	2	146	60	1,570	10	Batteries, R. H. Artillery -	6	9	2	146	60	1,570
43	„ Field Artillery -	6	9	2	146	258	6,751	38	„ Field Artillery -	6	9	2	146	228	5,966	40	„ Field Artillery -	6	9	2	146	240	6,280
4	„ Heavy Artillery -	5	6	2	80	20	352	4	„ Heavy Artillery -	5	6	2	80	20	352	4	„ Heavy Artillery -	5	6	2	80	20	352
2	„ Mountain Artillery	6	9	2	83	12	188	8	„ Mountain Artillery	6	9	2	83	48	752	6	„ Mountain Artillery	6	9	2	83	36	564
22	„ Garrison Artillery	5	5	2	80	110	1,914	17	„ Garrison Artillery	5	5	2	108	85	1,955	17	„ Garrison Artillery	5	5	2	108	85	1,955
86	Total Batteries - -	-	-	-	-	-	11,560	77	Total Batteries - -	-	-	-	-	-	10,595	77	Total Batteries - -	-	-	-	-	-	10,721
9	Regiments, Cavalry - -	28	41	6	408	252	4,095	6	Regiments, Cavalry - -	34	51	8	527	204	3,516	8	Regiments, Cavalry - -	28	41	6	473	224	4,160
50	Battalions, Infantry - -	33	50	6	820	1,650	44,300	43	Battalions, Infantry - -	33	50	16	978	1,419	44,892	46	Battalions, Infantry - -	33	50	16	929	1,518	45,356
	Total Strength - - -					2,392	59,955		Total Strength - - -					2,064	59,003		Total Strength - -					2,183	60,237
						62,347								61,067								62,420	
						384 Guns.								360 Guns.								360 Guns.	

(II.)

STATEMENT showing the Annual COST of BRITISH TROOPS in *India* as at Present and as Proposed.

DESCRIPTION OF BATTERIES AND CORPS.	PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT AND ESTIMATED COST. Established Strength of each Battery and Corps, including Combatant Officers.	Number of Corps and Batteries in India.	Rate of Annual Cost.	TOTAL Annual Cost.	REMARKS.
			Rs.	*Rs.*	
Batteries of Royal Horse Artillery -	164	15	2,02,990	30,44,850	
Ditto - Royal Field Artillery -	163	43	1,71,016	73,53,688	
Ditto - Heavy Artillery - -	93	4	1,32,152	5,28,608	
Ditto - Mountain Artillery - -	100	2	1,44,336	2,88,672	
Ditto - Garrison Artillery - -	92	22	76,830	16,90,260	
		86		1,29,06,078	
Regiments of British Cavalry - -	483	9	5,67,271	51,05,439	
Ditto - ditto - Infantry - -	919	50	5,84,473	2,92,23,650	
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - - *Rs.*				4,72,35,167	

DESCRIPTION OF BATTERIES AND CORPS.	PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AND ESTIMATED COST. Established Strength of each Battery and Corps, including Combatant Officers.	Number of Corps and Batteries in India.	Rate of Annual Cost.	TOTAL Annual Cost.	REMARKS.
			Rs.	*Rs.*	
Batteries of Royal Horse Artillery -	164	10	2,02,990	20,29,900	One Veterinary Surgeon allowed for each Horse Battery and one to two Field Batteries.
Ditto - Royal Field Artillery -	163	40	1,71,016	68,40,640	
Ditto - Heavy Artillery - -	93	4	1,32,152	5,28,608	
Ditto - Mountain Artillery - -	100	6	1,44,336	8,66,016	
Ditto - Garrison Artillery - -	120	17	91,350	15,52,950	
		77		1,18,18,114	
Regiments of British Cavalry - -	548	8	6,17,040	49,36,320	
Ditto - ditto - Infantry - -	1,019	46	6,26,572	2,88,22,312	
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - - *Rs.*				4,55,76,746	

ABSTRACT.

	Rs.
Total Annual Cost of Present Establishment of British Troops in India - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	4,72,35,167
Ditto - - Proposed - - ditto - - ditto - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	4,55,76,746
Saving per Annum - - - *Rs.*	16,58,421
ADD— Saving in Home Effective Charges for 214 officers of 9 Batteries of Artillery, 1 Regiment of Cavalry and 4 Regiments of Infantry proposed to be reduced, including pay of Colonels, contribution for depôts, &c., and pensions of above officers, &c., estimated roughly—say	(*a*) 3,50,000
TOTAL Saving per Annum - - - *Rs.*	20,08,421, or say 20 lacs roundly.

(*a*) This is only approximate, taken from the figures in Appendix 64 of the Co mission's Report.

III.

STATEMENT showing the Approximate Annual COST of a Regiment of BRITISH INFANTRY, with a Strength of 920 Rank and File.

ITEMS OF CHARGES.	Approximate Annual Cost of a Regiment of British Infantry.
Established Strength.	
Numbers { Combatant and medical officers	33
Numbers { Non-commissioned officers and rank and file	986
Cost—	*Rs.*
Pay of combatant and medical officers	1,43,793
Pay of non-commissioned officers and rank and file	1,94,359
Pay of Native establishment, regimental hospital, educational, Native artificers and followers, conservancy and commissariat attendants, including regimental establishment and purveyors	17,864
Regimental, command, staff, horse, library and contract allowances, prizes for schools and soldiers' gardens and workshops, together with good conduct, good shooting, and family allowances, including other staff allowances of a regimental nature for officers and men	52,858
Cost of provisions for Europeans, including loss on malt liquor, after taking into account the gain by the sale of rum	1,10,500
Regimental equipment, &c.	990
Cost of clothing and compensation in lieu (average of two years)	30,500
Compensation to Native followers for dearness of provisions	858
Barrack charges, including bedding, punkha-pulling, lighting, and miscellaneous supplies, but not furniture	30,100
Medical charges, including medicines, diets and medical comforts	23,550
Ordnance charges, including arms, tools, instruments, camp equipage, line gear, annual practice ammunition, &c.	21,200
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - - *Rs.*	6,26,572
Average Cost per Man per Annum - - - *Rs.*	635·47

IV.

STATEMENT showing the Approximate Annual COST of a Regiment of BRITISH CAVALRY, with a Strength of 473 Rank and File.

ITEMS OF CHARGES.	Approximate Annual Cost of a Regiment of British Cavalry.
Established Strength.	
Numbers { Combatant and medical officers	28
Numbers { Non-commissioned officers and rank and file	520
Cost—	*Rs.*
Pay of combatant and medical officers	1,46,797
Pay of non-commissioned officers and rank and file	1,27,964
Pay of Native establishment, regimental hospital, educational, Native artificers and followers, conservancy and commissariat attendants, including regimental establishment and purveyors	56,725
Regimental command, staff, horse, library and contract allowances, prizes for schools and soldiers' gardens and workshops, together with good conduct, good shooting, and family allowances, including other staff allowances of a regimental nature for officers and men	67,360
Cost of provisions for Europeans, including loss on malt liquor, after taking into account the gain by the sale of rum	59,323
Purchase of horses (including depôt charges) to replace annual casualties after taking into account the proceeds of sale of cast horses	45,300
Feed of horses and regimental equipment, &c.	36,376
Cost of clothing and compensation in lieu (average of two years)	22,476
Compensation to Native followers for dearness of provisions	5,232
Barrack charges, including bedding, punkha-pulling, lighting, and miscellaneous supplies, but not furniture	15,987
Medical charges, including medicines, diets and medical comforts	12,800
Ordnance charges, including arms, tools, instruments, camp equipage, line gear, annual practice ammunition, &c.	20,700
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - - *Rs.*	6,17,040
Annual Average Cost per Man - - - *Rs.*	1186·61

(V.)

MINUTE by His Excellency General Sir *F. P. Haines*, G.C.B., C.I.E., Commander in Chief in India, on the Report of the Special Army Commission, 1879.

The Number and Strength of Cadres; Redistribution of the Army.

1. IN my opinion this is the subject on which we are most in danger of inflicting damage on our military strength and position in India.

2. I have dealt with this question in paragraphs 32 to 41 of my Minute of the 20th March 1880, to which I would refer, observing that the experience gained in the past year fully justifies the opinions therein recorded. I am more than ever averse to the reduction of cadres, whether British or Native, cavalry or infantry.

3. The only ground on which such a reduction can be successfully supported is that of economy; and I would most earnestly warn all those who may be finally responsible for the decision of this question against sacrificing the efficient composition and distribution of the army to a financial emergency which in reality does not exist.

4. It is a mistake to suppose that, with a strength of 820 per battalion, our infantry does not turn out an efficient fighting unit. I take at haphazard from my file a statement showing the approximate strength of the battalions in the field. It is that of the 2nd of June 1880, most of the troops having been on service since the previous October; and they stand as under:—

REGIMENTS.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File.
92nd Highlanders	18	695
72nd Highlanders	22	857
67th Foot	23	717
2-9th Foot	21	743
2 60th Foot	22	714
59th Foot	26	720
1-5th Foot	19	697
1-18th Foot	16	787
2-14th Foot	19	742
1-25th Foot	21	610
51st Foot	21	753

The above were with Sir Donald Stewart at Kabul, or under him on the line of communications; whilst in Kuram we had—

REGIMENTS.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, Rank and File.
2-8th Foot	17	821
85th Foot	24	800

These numbers are subject to deductions for sickness; but it can hardly be stated

stated that a battalion of this nominal strength has often barely half that number really available with the colours I admit that statistics may be made to tell anything, but I have as yet seen none which support this contention.

5. I should prefer a stronger unit; but I would not sacrifice a single cadre to procure it, because, with a little forethought in our demands for drafts from England, the facilities we enjoy in volunteering, and the power to retain for one year the services of time-expired men (in itself a valuable reserve), our battalions in India should be kept at such a strength as to enable us to put them in the field as perfectly efficient fighting units. It will be seen that the strength of some of the battalions in the field approached pretty closely to their nominal strength; in one case (the 72nd) exceeding it.

6. A saving is claimed on barrack accommodation. It may not be generally known that our infantry barracks at some of our most important military stations are not constructed to hold a complete battalion at the present strength of 820. Meerut and Umballa are notably in this case.

7. The strength of the cavalry regiments is too small, undoubtedly; but to me this is an argument why we should raise it, not why we should reduce the number of the cadres.

8. The provision made by the Commission is manifestly inadequate as regards this branch of the service, as a condition of things is considered possible under which we might find ourselves without a single British cavalry soldier in any garrison in India save one (Hyderabad Deccan), with no cavalry whatever on the main trunk line between Allahabad and Peshawar, while off the line there would be 304 Native cavalry at Lucknow and 609 at Hoti Mardan. This state of things, or any thing at all approaching to it, is not, in my opinion, worthy of a moment's consideration.

9. Referring to the experience of the immediate past, it is a fact that, since November 1878, every British regiment of cavalry on the Bengal establishment has been in the field, two of them having been employed twice over. In the first instance this branch of the service was most sparingly used. One regiment (15th Hussars) was allotted to the Kandahar force; one squadron, 10th Hussars, to the Kuram force; and the remainder of the 10th to the Khyber. Subsequently the 10th Hussars were concentrated in the Khyber, and the 9th Lancers were broken up between the two lines. Thus in the first phase of the campaign there were but three regiments employed; but in the wider range of operations which took place in the second phase it so happened that the 10th Hussars alone bore no part, the 9th Lancers and 15th Hussars having served in both phases. Whatever number of cadres may be fixed upon as the proper quota for service in India, it must be remembered that a reserve is absolutely necessary, so that the trained horses of the regiments in quarters, and if need be the men, may be available as a reserve for the regiments in the field. The depôt as constituted on a regiment leaving quarters for active service gives next to no assistance in this respect, for every fit man and horse is taken for the front. So that a system which under conceivable circumstances gives us no reserve whatever for our British cavalry in the field, such as that advocated by the Commission, does not commend itself to my judgment, especially when tested in the light of absolutely cotemporaneous military history.

10. But if a system of reserves is necessary for the cavalry, how much more so is it for the artillery? The cavalry soldier, man and horse, requires much training and instruction, but the artillery in both cases far more.

11. To place a battery in the field, the first thing to be done is to transfer to it men and horses, not recruits and raw horses, but men and animals trained to their work. These the batteries in cantonments have to supply, and on them devolves the duty of training the raw horses, and of receiving the young soldiers from England and the unfit men of battalions ordered to the front. This is the first step only; but the wear and tear in the field is excessive, and has also to be met from batteries in the rear. The history of I-C Royal Horse Artillery, and a statement of the drafts required to keep it efficient, and the necessity

 under

under which it became obligatory to relieve it, would astonish those who have had no concern with the details of such affairs.

12. In paragraph 37 of my Minute of the 20th March 1880 reference is made to the fact that Bombay had but two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, that they were in or about to take the field, and that they had no reserve. What happened? E-B suffered severe losses at Maiwand, and it was necessary to repair them by the dispatch of a complete division, men and horses, harness and guns, from a battery at Umballa, Bombay having no reserves, either in men or horses, trained to that branch of the service. The process of placing a field battery on a service footing is much the same as with a battery of Royal Horse Artillery. The establishment of men and horses has to be increased, and the wear and tear of service has to be made good from batteries in rear. The note at foot* explains more fully what has actually occurred to us in keeping the batteries in the front efficient.

13. Experience shows that extreme caution is required in dealing with the cadres of cavalry and the number of batteries of artillery. The local wants of Governments and Administrations have very little to do with it; and this probably accounts for the facility with which avowals of readiness to dispense with British cavalry and batteries of artillery are put forward. These are pure military questions of far deeper root and significance than mere local interests and requirements. I cannot consider the proposals of the Commission at all suitable, and I deem any appreciable reduction unwise.

14. The only regiments of Bengal cavalry which have not been in the field are the 2nd, 6th, 9th and 16th. It was at one time thought possible we might have to send the 9th, Bengal Cavalry to the front. No one will say that during the absence of these regiments the garrisons of the Bengal Army contained a due proportion of Native cavalry. I may here remark that from Madras we have received the help of one Native cavalry regiment, whilst Bombay has furnished the whole strength of its Native cavalry for service in the field, save one regiment.

15. It will be at once recognized that the reduction of cadres is the point at which the interests of the Native service are most intimately affected, and at which their present contentment may be disturbed. I do not see how the supernumerary cadres can be made to disappear without gravely prejudicing the interests of those belonging to them. I well remember the dispiriting effect the large reductions after 1860 had on the Madras army, and how long it lasted. The consequences entailed were,—

1. Retardation of promotion, affecting all grades, from the Native officer downwards.

2. The hardships entailed upon men of all ranks transferred to existing regiments from those disbanded.

3. Injury

* In the absence of any artillery reserve or depôt in India, either of men or horses (trained), it becomes necessary on the outbreak of war to complete the batteries selected for service in the front from those that remain in the rear. Now although, with the exception of the extra horses, there is little difference between the peace and war establishment of batteries, yet there are many men and horses in the ranks who, though equal to the ordinary duties of peace time, are quite unfit to stand the exposure and privations of active service; and all these have to be eliminated, and their places filled up by effective transfers from the other batteries. This same process has to be continued throughout the war; and the result is that, whilst completing and maintaining the batteries in front, we render inefficient a large proportion of those in rear; and this to an extent which is not apparent from the mere returns of the casualties occurring in front. For, whilst giving away their serviceable men and horses, the rear batteries in many instances have been receiving in exchange the inefficients they replaced; so that not only are their numbers reduced, but their quality becomes seriously deteriorated. In fact, they can no longer be relied on as efficient batteries; and this fact should be taken into account in any calculation of the effective strength remaining in India whilst active operations are being carried on over the border. An idea of the drain on the rear batteries which takes place under the present system may be formed from the following.

To complete 10 batteries to a war footing in 1878, it required 105 transfers of men. To complete the same batteries for service again in 1879, 244 more men were required. The drain, therefore, on the rear batteries during one year alone amounted to 349 men, which is equal to the strength of 2 batteries. For these batteries to start with, independently of those it became necessary to exchange as unfit, 200 horses were required; so that it may be said to put 10 batteries in the field and maintain them there for 12 months lessens the effective strength of the artillery in rear by two batteries at least. The case of I-C Royal Horse Artillery is the most instructive. To complete and maintain this battery in the field for the first period of the war, lasting eight months, 42 men and 44 horses were required. For the second period, lasting five months, 41 men and 46 horses; or in the whole period of 16 months, which expired from the time they were warned for service in October 1878 until their recall in February 1880, they expended 83 men and 90 horses, which was more than half their original strength.

3. Injury to discipline generally in existing regiments from the above transfers.

4. The enlargement of the unemployed list of British officers, rendering it more and more difficult to revert to something more like a regimental system of promotion than any which has obtained since the institution of the Staff Corps, and in which some progress has been made.

I could give instances, in so far as Madras is concerned, under all these heads; but it would be useless to enter into details in this paper.

16. It must be remembered that this process will have to be resorted to, and the effect of it faced in all the three Presidencies. I would observe that the Madras Presidency has already been severely afflicted by reduction since the year 1860.

17. There is another feature I strongly object to; that is, that the ultimate effect of the measure will be to reduce the number of British officers in proportion to men serving in India. How officers could have been supplied for transport and minor staff duties, had we not had spare cadres in rear to draw upon, I am at a loss to understand. There has been some idea of keeping up a reserve of officers to meet such wants; but this would merely amount to an unemployed list. The plan is not a practical one.

18. The proposals for the number and strength of cadres, and the redistribution of the army, by the honourable Member in charge of the Military Department are, unfortunately, not before me; but I earnestly trust that they may be found to differ widely from those put forward in the Report of the Army Commission.

19. The distribution of the army as it stands is no antiquated form of occupation, arrived at before railways were constructed, or even thought of. It was revised and fully reported on in 1871-72 by Lord Napier of Magdala, with a full knowledge of the requirements of the country, both military and civil; for his Lordship had been an active member of the Supreme Government for five years before he became such as Commander in Chief in India. He was therefore well acquainted with the bearing railways, whether actual or prospective, had or would have on the military situation. His Lordship seems to me to have formed a just estimate of our requirements under the three supreme heads which should be held in view in the distribution of troops in India, viz.:—

1. To secure a power to concentrate our troops on any point for actual war.

2. To afford due protection to our frontier.

3. To provide at all points a military support for the civil power.

20. That the first condition has been fulfilled is proved by the ease and precision with which our great military concentrations have been recently carried out; and I would instance the silent and absolutely secret preparation of the force composed of troops from all the three armies for service in the Mediterranean. This was a complicated operation, but was carried out with admirable promptitude. Bombay was working in her arsenal, dockyard, and workshops without the slightest knowledge of the object; and had it not been for a somewhat premature official disclosure, the dramatic effect of this expedition might have been intensely heightened by the retention of the secret up to the time of the arrival of the transports off Aden. The public had persuaded themselves that the expedition was for the Cape.

21. The launching of armies into Afghanistan has recently passed under our observation. It was quickly and efficiently carried out from our military stations as they stand. Indeed, at all times the men have been producible as soon as required; want of transport alone has delayed movement.

22. Some few of our stations are remote from the railway system; but it will be wiser to wait for its extension rather than to disturb the present occupation, whether as regards our frontier or our police requirements. We can hardly congratulate ourselves in having met the full railway accommodation India demands; probably one-third remains to be constructed.

 23. The

23. The proposals which are before us give a certain increase to some of our larger stations; but to arrive at this, others, ever held to be of great consequence, have been either denuded of troops altogether, or greatly reduced. Our Nepaul frontier is thrown absolutely open; and the Oudh-Rohilkund line of railway, that which provides lateral communication along that portion of the frontier, is almost entirely unprotected. It is difficult to imagine anything more faulty than this proposed distribution under the heads of frontier protection and of military support to the civil power.

24. Under the above heads I would draw attention to the observations I offer in paragraphs 43–52 of my Minute previously quoted :—

Distribution and Allotment of Garrisons.

43. It will, I think, be found that all our principal military stations are on, or close to, the trunk lines of railways. From the first these were looked upon as strategical works, and so aligned throughout India as to bring all our chief military stations into communication one with the other, and with the arsenals, depôts, and manufacturing centres, on which they depend for warlike stores.

44. The concentration of troops, as far as circumstances would permit, has always been the object sought by military commanders, and much has been done to this end. That here and there more may be done, I do not deny. But I wish to bring prominently to the notice of Government the opinion under this head recorded by his Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, in his answer to Question No. 1, of Series III., Madras, which is as follows :—

"I submitted that concurrent authority was unanimously opposed to the sweeping reduction of stations and regiments of Native infantry, as recommended by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lord Napier and Ettrick,* and in my opinion it is most unadvisable now to adopt such a course. Although I most heartily accept the principle of concentrating the troops as far as possible at obligatory and strategical positions, and of reducing the number of single or out stations to the uttermost, still I am deeply impressed with the circumstance that the number of our Native troops is small as compared with the area to be occupied, and to the duties they may any day be called upon to discharge; and that consequently, do what we may, after having met all local requirements, only a small force remains at our disposal for concentration. The utility or the absolute necessity for the presence of troops may not be recognised so long as they are present; but I venture to affirm that, if this necessity be neglected or ignored, local disturbance will soon arise to prove that large areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held, save by the presence of troops, ready, if need be, to act in support of order."

45. In every word of this I most cordially concur; and on similar grounds I cannot recommend that such stations as Segowlie, Gorakhpur, or Moradabad, should be done away with. I cannot admit the force of the arguments that, because in the event of war with Nepal the troops now stationed at Segowlie and Gorakhpur would not be capable of dealing with that event, all semblance of military power should be withdrawn from that long and exposed frontier. His Honour Sir George Couper, primarily responsible for the peace of this district, urges the continued occupation of the post named, viz., Moradabad and Gorakhpur; and when he can quote in support of his views the words of Sir Neville Chamberlain, to the effect that large areas of conquered territory cannot be peaceably held, save by the presence of troops, ready, if need be, to act in support of order, I think his views are entitled to more consideration than has been accorded to them. Bearing in mind that Sitapur is to be abandoned, a glance at a map will show how large a tract of frontier territory is to be exposed without the visible presence of a soldier.

46. Jhansi is a station from which I have the greatest desire to withdraw the troops; being off the rail it is highly inconvenient, and the climate is not good. As soon as this can be done with safety, I trust it will be done. However, even in this case, I would recommend caution in carrying it out.

47. Sir Neville Chamberlain combats the abandonment of stations in Madras, which the Commission determine shall be evacuated nevertheless. There, again, caution should be exercised; for the views of Sir Charles Trevelyan and Lord Napier and Ettrick, on which the Commission seem to rely, have not been accepted either by the Members of the Government or by the military authorities of their day. Between the years 1856 and 1860, which covers all Sir Charles Trevelyan's period of government, some 20 small stations

* "*See* Minute by my predecessor in this Command, Sir Frederick Haines, dated Madras, 16th March 1872, and by other Members of Council; also their previous Minutes, dated December 1871 and January 1872."

stations were abandoned at Sir Patrick Grant's advice. This was a most salutary measure' but has it not been carried far enough? I would recommend a careful study of the views that Sir Neville Chamberlain has recorded under this head; for I feel that a dangerous course is here recommended, sacrificing real and efficient control over the country, with a view to obtaining a more compact and symmetrical distribution of troops.

48. As an instance of the proposals of the Commission, the redistribution in Bengal can hardly be said to carry out in full the principle they lay down. Before the war broke out there were the following troops at Calcutta, Dum-Dum, Barrackpore, and Alipore:—

2 field batteries,	2 British infantry,
1 garrison battery,	4 Native infantry,

¼ Native cavalry.

The Commission propose as the normal garrison of the same stations—

1 field battery,	1½ British infantry,
1 garrison battery,	4 Native infantry,

¼ Native cavalry,

which they state can be reduced to provide for field service by—

1 field battery,	2 Native infantry,
1 British infantry,	⅛ Native cavalry,

thus leaving the Arsenal, the Small-Arm Ammunition Factory, Gunpowder Factory, Mint, &c., with only half a regiment of British infantry (552) and two regiments of Native infantry (1,824) for their protection, to say nothing of Calcutta itself. With the armies in the field which the Commission contemplate no assistance could be hoped for from Dinapore, Cawnpore, Lucknow, and Allahabad, as their garrisons would also have been reduced to what the Commission consider obligatory.

49. On this point Sir Henry Norman wrote in 1870:—

"The Commander in Chief (Lord Napier of Magdala) proposes to leave the two regiments at the Presidency as at present; and in this I entirely concur. With the vast wealth and importance of Calcutta, the great arsenal of Fort William, with the powder and cartridge factories in the neighbourhood, the presence of two regiments is, as a rule, most desirable; but I think, apart from all this, we should have two regiments, so as to be able to send off a regiment by sea at a day's notice, if a disturbance occurred in Burma, where our force is weak in the extreme."

In 1878 it became necessary to send away a wing of British infantry and a wing of Native at 24 hours' notice to Burma.

50. As regards the Eastern Frontier District and Assam, it is proposed to rearrange the military posts throughout Assam, and to make over all outposts and frontier stations to armed police, keeping the military as a reserve. This view is entirely concurred has been acted on by the military authorities; but the armed police has hitherto been too weak for the work. If the police is increased as recommended, the distribution of the troops as proposed will be unobjectionable, except in one essential point, viz., that out of four regiments only one would be left intact, the others being divided into wings, stationed at considerable distances apart. The Commission state that one regiment could be withdrawn for field service elsewhere. This has recently been tried, the result being that the regiment removed had to be suddenly recalled. More than two regiments have lately been in the field, and one and a-half additional regiments have had to be sent up on account of disturbances occasioned by the Nagas.

51. The Commission lay great stress on the importance of concentrating troops on the main trunk lines. To effect this, it reduces the British garrison at Calcutta and vicinity by 206 infantry,—

	Infantry.
Dinapore by	138
Meerut	138
Cawnpore	364
Benares	443

while it increases—

Allahabad by	158
Delhi	79
Agra	158

52. It certainly may be said that one main line of communications through the Bengal

army corps provinces is through Oudh and Rohilkund to Saharanpur; but what do the Commission provide for this?

	Men.
Benares altogether reduced	443
Fyzabad reduced by	625
Lucknow increased by	55
Sitapur reduced altogether	443
Shahjhanpur ditto	443
Fatehgarh* ditto	220
Bareilly reduced by	144
Roorkee ditto	443
Moradabad reduced altogether	220

But the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor, North-Western Provinces, is that the normal strength of garrisons of—

Lucknow,	Benares,
Fyzabad,	Bareilly,

should be maintained, and the garrisons of Shahjahanpur and Sitapur might then, he thinks, be withdrawn. It is unnecessary, I think, to enter here into further details regarding the proposed distribution of troops; but I would desire to bring prominently to notice that not a single European cavalry soldier is left in the obligatory garrisons throughout the whole of India, except at one station (Hyderabad), and that no cavalry whatever is left on the main trunk line between Allahabad and Peshawar, while off the line there are only 304 Native cavalry at Lucknow, and 609 at Hoti Mardan. Holding the views I have already expressed regarding the number of horse and field batteries to be maintained, I cannot but consider that such a great reduction in the number of British cavalry regiments as is proposed is entirely out of the question.

25. But what do we seek in this distribution? The reduction of cadres and the attainment of a tactical and territorial unit. The first with a view to economy; the second with a view to conferring a mobility and power of concentration, which, in my belief, we possess practically now in as great a degree as would be the case under the proposals put forward by the Commission; whilst, as we stand, the police of the country is infinitely better supported.

26. The recent disturbances in Sontalistan show that, even so near the chief city of the empire, it is not wise to withdraw our troops from the actual sight of the people, or to trust them entirely to police control, merely in order that cadres may be the more easily reduced and a tactical unit attained. I should be specially suspicious of a move in this direction when an increase of the police force is involved as a consequence. The imperial gain from such a reduction is not net. I believe that the withdrawal of troops from such stations as Segowlie, Gorakhpur, Shahjahanpur, Fatehgarh, Moradabad, and the reduction in the strength of many others, cannot take effect without a large increase to the police. It is well known that the police is not a popular force in this country.

27. Fatehgarh cannot by any possibility be done away with, so long as the Gun Carriage Agency exists there. The labour entailed in its removal and the paralysis of work which would arise from it, have been vastly underestimated in the consideration of the question. It must remain one of our obligatory garrisons.

28. I quite admit that we are bound to administer the army on the most economical principles which may be consistent with efficiency; but I place, and would maintain, efficiency in the first rank. The tactical unit is, to my mind, a myth. It is in reality not worth striving for. If we had it, I doubt if it would work out with all the precision which the carefully-prepared and well-balanced tables of the Report appear to confer on it on paper. The conditions of health, previous service, and many others have to be considered in selecting troops for service; and, as an Indian commander of long standing, I should wish the composition of a force to be placed in the field to be left to me, free to select the troops I thought best suited for the purpose in hand.

29. The reduction of cadres and the redistribution of their troops will be felt more in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies than in Bengal. Since the rendering

* The Gun Carriage Factory being located at this station, it specially requires military protection.

rendering of their Report by the Commission, we have had abundant proof that the inhabitants of these territories are not all so very peaceable and law-abiding as has been assumed. The Rampa rebellion on the one hand, and the dacoities in the Deccan on the other; more recently still, the Kolhapur conspiracy, insignificant as it may appear, all tend to prove that the country at large cannot safely be handed over to the care of the police, and that we should be careful not to withdraw our troops from the sight of populations inhabiting vast and wild tracts of country.

30. It seems to me that these questions of the reduction of cadres and the redistribution of their armies, as presented to us by the Report under consideration, should be referred to the Local Governments for such obervations as they may wish to make, having in view the present aspect of affairs as affected by Rampa, the Deccan, and Kolhapur disturbances.

31. I request that this Minute may be permitted to accompany the Despatch which may be sent to the Most Honourable the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the number and strength of cadres and the redistribution of the army, which subjects have as yet been discussed in Council only in an incomplete manner. My approaching departure from India, and the breaking up of Council in Calcutta, preclude the hope of my being present at future discussions.

(signed) *Fred. P. Haines.*

Calcutta, 22 March 1880.

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 2nd June 1881.

YOUR letter, 141, of 1881. Please telegraph names of stations from which the four reduced infantry corps will be withdrawn.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th June 1881.

YOURS, 2nd. Reduction of four British battalions. Two in Bengal by wings from Faizabad and Seetapur, and reductions at Jhansi, Barrackpore, Dum Dum. Madras, one battalion, Cannanore. Bombay, one battalion, Deesa, Ahmednuggur, and Neemuch, according to local requirements.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 14th November 1881.

WAR Office consents to Artillery reductions of your letter, 24th April, leaving future Indian Establishment 10 Horse, 40 Field, 27 Garrison batteries. Telegraph your proposed arrangements for carrying out reduction speedily.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 6th December 1881.

ARTILLERY reductions. Retain in India, for absorption into remaining 10 batteries, Horse Artillery, one-fourth of Non-commissioned Officers of four reduced batteries, making no promotion until absorption is complete.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 10th December 1881.

MINE, 6th. Artillery reductions. War Office arrangements telegraphed to Chief, 23rd November, have my concurrence.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 12) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 5 January 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Military Letter, No. 141, dated 24th April 1881, conveying the proposals of your Lordship's Government as to the establishment of British troops to be maintained in India.

2. The Indian Army Commission reported in favour of a reduction of the British Infantry battalions from 50 to 43, accompanied by an increase in the strength of each battalion from 820 to 978 rank and file; of the British Cavalry regiments from 9 to 6, involving a reduction of sabres from 4,095 to 3,516; and of the number of batteries of Artillery from 86, with 384 field guns, to 77, with 360 guns.

3. Your Government were unable to support these recommendations to their full extent, and propose—

For European Cavalry an establishment of 8 instead of 9 regiments, and an increase of 65 sabres per regiment, giving a total strength of 4,160 sabres against 4,095 as at present.

For European Infantry an establishment of 45 instead of 50 battalions, the strength of each being increased from 820 to 920 rank and file.

For Royal Artillery—

10 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, instead of 15.
40 batteries of field artillery, instead of 43.
4 batteries heavy artillery, as at present.
6 batteries mountain artillery, instead of 2; and
17 garrison batteries, instead of 22, or a total of 77 batteries, instead of 86.

The whole of these recommendations, it is estimated, will give a British force of 62,420 of all ranks against a present strength of 62,347. The saving, it is estimated, will amount to about 20 lacs a year, exclusive of non-effective charges.

4. In forwarding these proposals, your Lordship stated that the Government of India were well aware that it would be necessary that Her Majesty's Government should consider also how the arrangements which you recommend might affect the organization of the British Army. I have been in close communication with the War Office on this very important subject, and I forward, for your Lordship's information, the whole correspondence which has passed between the two officers. I am still in correspondence with the Secretary of State for War in regard to the proposed reduction of a Cavalry regiment on the Indian establishment, with its corresponding increase of 65 sabres to each of the remaining corps. I hope very shortly to be able to inform your Government of the conclusion arrived at on this point; meanwhile it appears desirable that you should be informed of that come to in respect to the Infantry and Artillery.

With regard to the proposed reduction of four battalions of Infantry, though I was prepared to support the wishes of your Government, and in that view pressed the measure on the Secretary of State for War, yet, on Mr. Secretary Childers' assurance that it would involve the disbandment of the whole of them, I decided in Council that the demand might be allowed to stand over for the present.

5. I was the more inclined to this course from the consideration that the saving estimated to result from the reduction, though very appreciable, was not, in

in my opinion, important enough to counterbalance the objections arising from the fact that the reduction would necessarily interfere with the scheme of organization so recently introduced in the British Army, and from the loss to India of a large number of the officers who form a reserve, not only for the Staff Corps, but also for special and temporary Staff services in time of war. It would further seriously reduce the proportion of Non-commissioned Officers, a class essentially important in a short service army, and of much value to the Services in India as a reserve for the supply of subordinates for the various military departments.

6. With regard to the Artillery the case was different. The financial result of the proposed reduction will be so material that I felt justified in accepting the responsibility of the measure, notwithstanding the objections urged to it on military grounds by the authorities at the War Office.

7. I desire, however, to point out that the financial statement forwarded with your Lordship's letter under reply is based on an erroneous estimate of the existing establishment, which consists of 14 and not 15 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, and 41 and not 43 field batteries, with an increase of five batteries of garrison artillery. This oversight decreases the saving estimated to accrue from the reduction by more than three lacs of rupees.

8. Your Government have been informed by telegraph of the decision to carry out the whole of the proposed Artillery reductions, and a direct communication was made to the Commander in Chief in India by the War Office on the 23rd November, detailing the batteries to be sent home, and the other arrangements for increasing the 17 garrison batteries, and disposing of the Non-commissioned Officers and men, except Staff Serjeants of the field and garrison batteries ordered home. My concurrence on these instructions was communicated to your Lordship by my telegram of the 10th December 1881.

9. I have further informed your Government of my concurrence in the proposal of the Secretary of State for War to retain in India one-fourth of the Non-commissioned Officers belonging to the four batteries of Horse Artillery, and to absorb them as vacancies arise in the 10 batteries of that arm which are retained, no promotions in the Non-commissioned grades being made until the absorption is fully effected.

10. I shall be glad to be informed, as early as practicable, of the several orders which have been issued for giving effect to this measure of Artillery reduction which, it will be seen, entirely meets the wishes of your Lordship's Government, in regard to this arm, expressed in your letter under reply.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

Enclosures referred to.

— No. 1. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 24th March 1881, No. 271 W.

Sir,

TERMS having been entered into with the Boers of the Transvaal, and as in consequence it may be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw some of the troops now in South Africa, I am desired by the Marquis of Hartington to request that you will move Mr. Secretary Childers to direct that no steps be taken for sending the 14th Hussars back to India pending the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of State for India in Council to the War Office on the question of the permanent reduction of a cavalry regiment on the Indian Establishment.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson,*
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 2. —

(079—3842.)

Sir, War Office, 24 March 1881.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th February, No. 139 W., I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that in consequence of the conclusion of peace negotiations with the Boers, the services of the 14th Hussars are no longer required in Natal, and that orders have accordingly been given for the return of the regiment with its horses to India.

I am to request that you will convey an expression of Mr. Childers' thanks to Lord Hartington for the loan of this regiment.

I am, &c.

The Under Secretary of State for India. (signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

— No. 3. —

(079—4190.)

Sir, War Office, 25 March 1881.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Childers to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant (No. 271 W.), requesting that no steps may be taken for sending the 14th Hussars back to India, pending the receipt of a communication on the question of the permanent reduction of a cavalry regiment on the Indian Establishment.

In reply, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of Lord Hartington, that the estimates for the ensuing financial year having been finally settled, and the pay of the troops voted by Parliament, it would, in Mr. Childers' opinion, be impossible at a moment's notice to add a cavalry regiment permanently to the Imperial Establishment. I am, however, to add that on its being represented to this office that the Secretary of State for India in Council deems it for the public advantage to make any diminution in the number of troops in India, Mr. Childers will be prepared to give such a proposal his most careful attention.

I am, &c.

The Under Secretary of State for India. (signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

— No. 4. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 25th March 1881, No. 277 W.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 079—3842, of 24th March 1881, relative to the return of the 14th Hussars to India.

The Marquis of Hartington desires me to request that my letter of yesterday's date may be brought to the earliest possible notice of Mr. Secretary Childers, and that meanwhile no action may be taken towards the return of the corps in question.

I have &c.

(signed) *Allen Johnson,*
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 5. —

(079—4194.)

Sir, War Office, 29 March 1881.

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th instant, No. 277 W., Military, relative to the return of the 14th Hussars to India, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that it has been determined by Her Majesty's Government that, pending the receipt of the report of the Commissioners appointed to consider questions in connection with the settlement of the Transvaal, the force in Natal shall not be diminished.

Under these circumstances, I am to request that you will move the Marquis of Hartington to allow the 14th Hussars to remain in Natal for the present.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

— No. 6. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 31st March 1881, No. 293 W.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th March instant, No. 079—4194, and to acquaint you in reply, for the information of Mr. Childers, that Lord Hartington has no objection to the 14th Hussars remaining in Natal for the present, and that the Government of India have been informed accordingly by telegram.

A further communication will be very shortly made on the question of the India depôt charges for this corps, and other points indicated in my letter of the 24th March 1881.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson,*
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 7. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 12th April 1881, No. 330 W.

Sir,

I AM directed in continuation of previous correspondence on the subject of the permanent withdrawal of the 14th Hussars from India, to request that you will again bring the subject under the notice of the Secretary of State for War.

2. I have already acknowledged your letter of the 29th March acquainting the Secretary of State for India that it has been determined by Her Majesty's Government that, pending the receipt of the report of the Commissioners appointed to consider questions in connection with the settlement of the Transvaal, the force in Natal shall not be diminished, and that therefore, with the concurrence of the Marquis of Hartington, it was proposed to retain the 14th Hussars in Natal for the present.

3. The Secretary of State for India in Council is not aware for how long a period it is proposed to retain the regiment. Having regard, however, to the season of the year, and the grave risk which would be incurred if the corps were to be returned to India during the hot season, the period will probably be extended for several months. It appears, therefore, to Lord Hartington a fitting

fitting opportunity for the permanent withdrawal of the corps at the conclusion of this duty, and the reductionof the Indian Establishment from nine to eight regiments of British cavalry.

4. I am to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying copy of telegrams* which have passed between the India Office and the Government of India on this subject. The War Office has been for some time aware of the probable intention of the Indian Government to propose a reduction in the number of British regiments, both cavalry and infantry, on its establishment, with a corresponding increase of sabres and bayonets in the remaining corps. On this point I am to request that you will bring under the notice of Mr. Secretary Childers the following extract from my letter, dated 23rd February 1881, No. 170 W., paragraph 8: "I am to request that "you will inform the Secretary of State for War that the Indian Army Com-"mission has recommended a reduction of the number of regiments in India, "with an increase of the numerical strength of corps. Lord Hartington has "not yet received the views of the Government of India on this proposal, but "he thinks it right to apprise Mr. Childers that possibly a recommendation may "be received for the reduction of the number of regiments of cavalry and "infantry on the Indian Establishment." The telegrams received from India show that in this particular point the Government of India have expressed their agreement with the Commission to the extent at any rate of the reduction of this regiment.

* From Viceroy, No. 36, 25th February 1881. To Viceroy, No. 44A, 14th March 1881. From Viceroy, No. 42, 15th March 1881. To Viceroy, No. 40, 29th March 1881. To Viceroy, No. 42, 30th March 1881.

5. The Marquis of Hartington does not believe that any objection can be raised to the proposal to add to the strength of the remaining eight regiments, as even when they receive, each, such increase as will fully compensate for the loss of the ninth corps, they will still be under the strength laid down for regiments first for service on the Home Establishment.

6. With regard to the incidence of the charge, the Secretary of State for India would propose an arrangement on a similar basis to that adopted when the reduction of the Indian Establishment was carried out in 1870.

7. Meanwhile Lord Hartington will be glad to learn what orders Mr. Secretary Childers would wish to be given to the Government of India regarding the disposal of the depôt of the 14th Hussars which is still in India.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*,
Colonel, Military Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 7.

14th Hussars.

EXTRACT TELEGRAM from Secretary of State for India, dated 28th December 1880.

IN case more troops are wanted for South Africa, could you spare any battalions besides those coming home?

EXTRACT TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 30th December 1880.

If necessary, 14th Hussars could be spared from Bangalore.

— No. 8. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 19th May 1881, No. 405 W.

Sir,

THE concluding paragraph of my letter, No. 170 W., of 23rd February last, requested you to be good enough to inform the Secretary of State for War that the Indian Army Commission had recommended a reduction of the number of regiments serving in India, with an increase of the numerical strength of corps, and stated that though Lord Hartington had not yet received the views of the Government of India on this proposal, he thought it right to apprise Mr. Childers that possibly a recommendation might be received for the reduction of the number of regiments of cavalry and infantry on the Indian Establishment.

I am now directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that the recommendations of the Government of India on this very important question have just been communicated to this Department in a Military Despatch, No. 141, dated 24th April 1881, and I am to forward a copy of that Despatch in order that Mr. Childers may be made fully aware of the proposals of the Indian Government, and their possible bearing upon the questions, which are at present understood to be under his consideration, in connection with the reorganisation of the British Army.

I am to add that the Marquis of Hartington will at once take into consideration the recommendations of the Government of India, and will communicate his views to Mr. Childers as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson,*
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 9. —

(No. 20—Genl. No. 1374.)

Financial Secretary's Department,
War Office, 14 July 1881.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of Colonel Allen Johnson's letters of the 12th April and 19th May last, communicating to this Department, by direction of the Secretary of State for India, the proposals made by the Government of India for a reduction of the number of regiments serving in that country, and an increase in the numerical strength of corps. These proposals comprise the reduction of one cavalry regiment, four infantry battalions, and nine batteries from the European force now serving in India; and this reduction in cadres is to be met by an increase of 50 sabres to each of the eight cavalry regiments, of 100 bayonets to each of the 46 infantry battalions, and of 50 gunners to each of the garrison batteries still remaining on the Indian Establishment.

Mr. Childers understands that the recommendations of the Indian Government have not yet been considered by the Secretary of State for India in Council, and he desires that the view which he feels constrained to take of the changes proposed may be made known to Lord Hartington before the subject is discussed by the Council of India.

I am to observe, in the first place, that there is no doubt that the scheme suggested by the Government of India would be advantageous to the revenues of that country, at all events in time of peace. Mr. Childers, however, desires me to recall to mind the settlement effected in 1870, when a proposal precisely similar was made. The agreement then come to has been regarded as final on the subject of the organization of the force so long as it remained at the same total number of men. To depart from that organization would transfer the whole cost of maintaining the necessary elasticity of the force from Indian to Imperial revenues, and I am directed by Mr. Childers to state that he is unwilling to accept that liability on the part of the Home Government.

In settling the organization of the Army upon its present basis the number of cadres to be located at home, in India, and in the Colonies, has been carefully considered,

considered, not only with reference to local requirements, but also with due regard to the defence of Her Majesty's dominions generally; and Lord Hartington will readily understand that if any change in distribution is to be made, it can only be agreed to by this Department after much deliberation as to how far the general military organization may be affected by it.

With regard to the cavalry, I am to point out that the saving upon the depôt charges by the withdrawal of a single regiment would be insignificant, because, although there may be one or two officers and serjeants less at the depôt, the number of recruits to be raised to replace casualties would not vary if the total number of sabres in India remains unchanged.

With reference to the last paragraph of the letter of the 12th April, I am to state that there will be no objection to the transfer of the charges for the depôt, 14th Hussars, left behind in India, and that such charges will be borne by the Imperial Government from the date of the embarkation of the regiment for active service at the Cape.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

— No. 10. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 24th August 1881, No. 668 W.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 079—4899, dated 5th August 1881, inquiring whether, in the event of the 14th Hussars returning to India. Lord Hartington would wish that the regiment should take its horses (about 400) to India.

In reply, I am to state that pending a decision on the question of a proposed reduction of the cavalry force in India, which you are aware is now under discussion, Lord Hartington considers it very desirable that no immediate steps shall be taken for the return of the 14th Hussars from the Cape to India. The Secretary of State for India hopes very shortly to communicate the views of his Council on the subject.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson,*
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 11. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 15th September 1881, No. 732 W.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to request you will bring under the notice of the Secretary of State for War the whole of the correspondence regarding a reduction of the number of batteries of Royal Artillery, and regiments of British cavalry and infantry in India that has taken place within the last few months, as per margin,* and in reference thereto I am to convey to you, for the consideration of Mr. Childers, the decision at which the Marquis of Hartington has arrived on the subject.

* India Office, 271 W., of 24th March 1881.
War Office, 079—3812, of 24th March 1881.
War Office, 079—4190, of 25th March 1881.
India Office, 277 W., of 25th March 1881.
War Office, 079—4194, of 29th March 1881.
India Office, 293 W., of 31st March 1881.
India Office, 330 W., of 12th April 1881.
India Office, 405 W., of 19th May 1881.
War Office, 20—Genl., No. 1374, of 14th July 1881.
India Office, 668 W., of 24th August 1881.

From this correspondence it will be seen that on the 23rd February last Mr. Childers was informed that the Indian Army Commission had recommended a reduction in the number of batteries and corps serving in India, with an increase in the numerical strength of those to be retained, and that although the Marquis of Hartington had not received the views of the Government of India on this proposal, he thought it right to apprise Mr. Childers that possibly a recommendation might shortly be received for the reduction of the number of regiments on the Indian Establishment. It was considered by the Secretary of State for India important to give the Secretary of State for War the earliest intimation on this subject, as it was

was known that certain questions of Army organization were before Mr. Childers which might be affected by any diminution of the number of corps serving in India.

On the 19th May I forwarded, by Lord Hartington's desire, a copy of a Despatch of the 24th of the previous month from the Governor General of India in Council, making specific proposals for a reduction in the number of batteries, and regiments in India, with an addition to the numerical strength of the regiments and of certain of the batteries, and stated, by his Lordship's direction, that as soon as he had fully considered these recommendations, he would communicate his views to Mr. Childers.

On the general question of reduction of the number of corps in India, no official communications have since taken place; but, as Mr. Childers will recollect, an official conference was held at the War Office on the subject, and certain demi-official correspondence has passed. Apart from this the Government of India have urged, and the Secretary of State for India has pressed upon Mr. Childers, that the 14th Hussars withdrawn from India without relief at the request of the Secretary of State for War should not return to India, but should be permanently struck off the Indian Establishment, and the complement of regiments of cavalry for India be thus reduced from nine to eight.

The Marquis of Hartington is very sensible of the inconvenience that may be occasioned to the War Department by a reduction in the number of batteries and corps in India, and he has been anxious to lessen these inconveniences as much as possible, but his Lordship in Council feels bound to support the Government of India in their anxious desire to reduce their very heavy military expenditure when, as in this case, reduction can be effected without unduly weakening our military strength in that country.

Giving every weight, therefore, to all that the Marquis of Hartington has heard from the Secretary of State for War on the one hand, and from the Government of India on the other hand, his Lordship in Council has arrived at the conclusion that in justice to India he must request Mr. Childers to arrange for the permanent withdrawal of the 14th Hussars from the Indian Establishment, and for the reduction of the number of batteries of Royal Artillery to the following complement:—

10 batteries Royal Horse Artillery.
40 „ „ Field „
27 „ „ Garrison „

of which latter four should be attached to heavy field batteries, and six to mountain batteries.

At the same time I am to request that, in accordance with the recommendation of the Government of India, the following numerical addition may be made to the cavalry and artillery remaining in India:—

I. Each cavalry regiment to be augmented from 408 to 473 rank and file.

II. Each garrison battery to be increased from 80 to 108 rank and file, the heavy and mountain batteries remaining at their present establishment.

Upon the information before him, the Secretary of State for India in Council has no doubt that the force of Royal Artillery and British cavalry to remain on the Indian Establishment, after the proposed reductions have taken place, is ample for the security of India, and he, therefore, considers in Council that it would not be right to maintain the existing force at the expense of India, although he is willing to aid in meeting any unexpected increase temporarily thrown on the Home Estimates by these reductions.

With regard to the infantry, Lord Hartington will not at the present time press for reductions. The Government of India are anxious to be relieved of four battalions, and to add to the strength of the 46 battalions of this arm that would then remain, but considering the objection taken on the ground of its interference with the schemes of organization very recently introduced in the British Army, and as it would reduce the number of officers, serjeants, and corporals, that is, the seasoned and tried soldiers, and replace them by an increase of private soldiers, who under existing rules are necessarily of short service, the Marquis of Hartington will consent to this proposal standing over for the present.

Having made this concession, the Secretary of State for India in Council trusts that no delay may be allowed to take place before arrangements are made for the withdrawal of the requisite number of batteries of Royal Artillery, and of the depôt of the 14th Hussars from India, and that the 14th Hussars itself may, whether it is retained at the Cape or brought to England, be altogether removed from the Indian Establishment.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*,
Colonel, Military Secretary.

— No. 12. —

(No. 20—Genl. No. 1422.)

Sir, War Office, 22 September 1881.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Childers to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant (No. 732 W.), in which, after a narrative of the recent communications between this Department and the India Office, on the subject of the strength of the British force in India, you convey to the Secretary of State Lord Hartington's opinion as to the measures which should be taken for carrying out his Lordship's views with respect to the regiments of cavalry and batteries of artillery.

The discussion which took place at the conference which your letter mentions has rendered unnecessary any present reference to the proposed changes in the number and strength of the batteries of artillery, as to which Mr. Childers hopes to be able to arrive in detail at an agreement with the Secretary of State for India.

But as to the cavalry, Lord Hartington makes a specific suggestion, and proposes that it should be at once carried out. In his opinion, the rank and file of the Indian Cavalry Establishment should be increased from 9 × 408, *i.e.*, 3,672, to 8 × 473, *i e.*, 3,784; but, as against this increase, that the number of officers should be reduced by distributing the men among eight instead of among nine regiments, and, as it happens that a particular cavalry regiment has been lent for a few months from the Indian to the Imperial Establishment, for service in South Africa, Lord Hartington recommends that this regiment should be brought to England, and that large drafts should be sent in its place from England to India to make up the eight regiments to their proposed augmented establishment.

To this there are two objections of detail :—

1. That the 14th Hussars is not the first regiment on the roster for return to this country, and that, if the increase in the force of cavalry in India and simultaneous diminution in the number of regiments were to be adopted, a different regiment would be brought home; and,

2. That Mr. Childers is not now in a position to supply large drafts to make up the remaining eight regiments to the establishment proposed, neither would it be possible for him to do so within the next two years by recruiting and training men for the purpose, the only course which Mr. Childers would be willing to adopt.

But Mr. Childers deisres to point out to Lord Hartington the practical inconvenience which would result from the proposed increase in the cavalry on the Indian Establishment, coupled with the sudden reduction in the number of regiments.

Either (1) the Imperial Estimates would have to bear the charge for an additional cavalry regiment; or, (2) the establishment of each of the home regiments (raised in number from 19 to 20) would have to be reduced, while those in India would be increased; or, (3) at least one cavalry regiment would have to be disbanded.

The first course Mr. Childers would not feel justified in proposing to Parliament; the second, diminishing the rank and file of each home cavalry regiment (immediately after their strength had been settled, under the Estimates of 1881-82, on a reduced establishment), would be open to serious objections; and

and the third, Mr. Childers considers, could only be adopted after grave deliberation by Her Majesty's Government. For besides the objection, in itself, to the disbandment at the present time of a regiment of cavalry, Lord Hartington will not fail to see that, if it be conceded by the Secretary of State for War that a cavalry regiment is to be disbanded because the Government of India desires to add to the rank and file of cavalry there, the whole question of the organisation of the European forces in India is conceded, and the same principle may equally be applied to the infantry. This change from the system deliberately accepted by the Indian Government in 1870 Mr. Childers is not prepared to accept, without the fullest consideration of the question by the Government.

But beyond these objections to the particular reduction now in question is the very important general one, that in using the Imperial Army for service in India the organisation of that army must be accepted in its integrity. It has been deliberately decided, after careful consideration, that a certain number of cadres should be kept up at a reduced strength, so as to be capable of rapid expansion in time of war, and that expansion is provided by means of the Army Reserve wholly at the expense of the Imperial Government, which also maintains an important reserve force in the Militia, indirectly beneficial to India.

Mr. Childers cannot, until Her Majesty's Government have deliberately considered the subject, adopt any arrangement by which the considerable burden thus cast upon the Imperial Government is sought to be increased by the addition to the force in this country of an undue number of cadres, while the Government of India escapes its due share of military expenditure by filling up its reduced number of cadres to any strength which it may find financially convenient.

Under these circumstances I am to express Mr. Childers' hope that the Indian Establishment of cavalry regiments will be, at least for the present, left undisturbed.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

No. 13.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 21st October 1881, No. 857, W.

Sir,

IN your letter of the 22nd September 1881, acknowledging mine of the 15th September 1881, No. 732, W., in which the Secretary of State for India in Council requests that arrangements may be made for the permanent withdrawal of the 14th Hussars, and that the number of batteries of Royal Artillery on the Indian Establishment may be reduced to the following complement,—

10 batteries Royal Horse Artillery,
40 batteries Field Artillery,
27 batteries Garrison Artillery,

with an increase of each cavalry regiment of 65, and of each garrison battery of 28 rank and file, respectively, Mr. Childers, giving his reasons in full why the 14th Hussars should not be immediately removed from the Indian Establishment, expresses a hope of being able to arrive in detail at an agreement with the Secretary of State for India as to the other proposals for change in the number and strength of the batteries of Artillery.

2. Lord Hartington, I am to state, has anxiously awaited this communication from Mr. Secretary Childers; but as, after a month's delay, nothing further has been received from the War Office, and as the relief season is passing, and the time is approaching for the preparation of the Army Estimates, his Lordship considers it of pressing importance that the subject should receive the immediate attention of the Secretary of State for War, in view to the reduction at the earliest possible date of that excessive force of Artillery maintained on the Indian Military Establishment, which has been some time since brought to the notice of the War Office.

3. Your letter of the 22nd September, which deals almost entirely with the question of the cavalry reduction, and incidentally with the general principle on which the Indian Military Establishments shall be adapted to its needs, will be replied to in detail in due course. Meanwhile, I am to request that this communication may be submitted to Mr. Secretary Childers as early as practicable.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 14.

(20—Gen. No. 1431.)

Sir, War Office, 11 November 1881.

In acknowledging the receipt of the India Office Letters, dated the 15th September last and the 21st ultimo, respectively (numbers as per margin*), of the subject of the reduction of the force of Artillery hitherto maintained on the Military Establishment of India, I am desired by the Secretary of State for War to offer the following remarks:—

*732 W., Military; 857 W., Military.

2. The reduction of Artillery proposed by the Government of India may be divided into two parts, viz.:—

1. A reduction of the fighting strength of the Artillery in India by four batteries of Horse Artillery and one field battery.

2. A reduction of the number of garrison batteries in India by six, with an increase of the rank and file of 17 of those batteries from 80 to 108.

3. On the first point, Mr. Secretary Childers, with the concurrence of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, feels bound to point out that so great a diminution in fighting strength appears to him a very serious matter, and that the information in possession of the War Office, amongst the principal officers of which department are two former Deputy Adjutants General of Artillery in India, leads the Secretary of State to deprecate the proposal.

4. In this proposal the Government of India has, with slight modifications, accepted the recommendations of the Army Commission, of which Sir Ashley Eden was President.

5. According to the distribution proposed by that Commission there would be available for external warfare a force of nearly 68,000 cavalry and infantry, with 180 field guns, besides 18 heavy and 42 mountain guns; and for this force the number of field guns appears to be sufficient even for operations in the plains.

6. It is for the force assigned for the preservation of internal order in India, a force stated by the Commission to be over 96,000 cavalry and infantry, besides local troops and volunteers, that the sufficiency of field artillery appears to be open to doubt.

7. For the whole of this force there would remain only 120 field guns of British field artillery, of which only eight guns would be horse artillery.

8. It has been represented to Mr. Childers that, according to the distribution proposed by the Commission, there would appear to be an insufficient margin for the requirements of moveable columns, and no guns available for the protection of some of the principal stations. Calcutta, for instance (the seat of the Governments of India and Bengal, the principal base of supplies from England, with the small-arm ammunition, shell, and powder factories in its vicinity), Morar, Mooltan, and Ferozepore, are to be left without a field gun, and Mhow with only two guns; and other stations, such as Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Dinapore appear to be insufficiently provided for.

9 The Government of India, it is true, proposes the retention of two batteries of field artillery in addition to those recommended by the Commission, and

and the withdrawal from the Kuram has set free a third battery. These will, no doubt, be a most useful addition to some of the above-mentioned garrisons, but even with them it is a question for consideration whether there are any guns properly available for moveable columns, or whether to supply these columns with guns it will not be necessary either to leave stations without proper means of defence, or to make a considerable reduction in the number of guns allotted to the army in the field.

10. The Commission, no doubt, only contemplated the actual employment in the field of two army corps, with a total of 58,000 of all arms, but Lord Hartington is aware that not many months after the date of their report a much larger force had to be mobilised for operations against the levies of Afghanistan, unassisted by trained troops and without skilled leaders; and it is not impossible that our next operations, either in Afghanistan or on our own side of the frontier, may be conducted under conditions putting a much greater strain on our resources.

11. One consideration which, in Mr. Childers' opinion, should not be lost sight of is, that the batteries in rear are employed to a great extent as reserves to those employed in active operations in front, and that consequently the efficiency of the former is necessarily seriously impaired. This, Mr. Childers is informed, was the case during the late Afghan campaign, and is deserving of consideration in estimating the requirements in artillery of the force assigned for the preservation of internal order.

12. The mountain batteries allotted to what the Commission designate as the "obligatory" army have not here been taken into consideration, as, on account of their want of mobility and the small shell capacity of their guns, they cannot supply the place of field artillery in the plains.

13. Mr. Childers has felt it his duty to bring to the notice of the Secretary of State for India the above objections to the proposed reduction of horse and field artillery in that country, but as this is a question more for the consideration of Lord Hartington than himself, he will be prepared to withdraw the four batteries of Royal Horse Artillery and the one field battery from India, if finally decided upon.

14. With regard to the second point, the reasons which, in Mr. Childers' opinion, exist against the withdrawal of the horse and field artillery do not apply to the proposed reduction in the number of garrison batteries, and the Secretary of State for War will not offer any objection to their withdrawal.

15. As these proposals, if carried out in their integrity, will throw upon the Home Establishment a large body of officers and men, amounting to —

11 Majors,
11 Captains,
33 Lieutenants,
75 Staff Sergeants and Sergeants,
22 Trumpeters,
734 Rank and File,

hitherto maintained, both as regards pay and pension, by the Government of India, I am desired by Mr. Childers to state that he accepts the offer made by Lord Hartington, expressed in paragraph 8 of the India Office Letter, dated September 1881,* to aid in meeting any unexpected increase thrown on the Home Estimates by these reductions, and he proposes that the consequent financial settlement be entered into by officers of the two departments without delay.

*No. 732 W., Military.

16. As regards the disposal of the officers who by the adoption of these proposals will become surplus to the Home Establishment, Mr. Childers is of opinion that this may be accomplished by Lord Hartington inducing a certain number of officers of the higher grades in the cadres of the late Indian artilleries to retire from the service upon the Indian pensions to which they may be entitled, with the extra annuity specified in Article 978-X. of the Royal Warrant, dated 25th June 1881, without requiring the qualifying periods of service

for each rank, as laid down in Article 92-III. of the Warrant, in accordance with the precedents of 1872 and 1878. Further, he suggests that an extra pension of 50 *l.* per annum, in addition to the pension to which they may be entitled under the Warrant, be offered from Indian funds to a certain number of regimental colonels, the number of retirements on the several lists being fixed so that each may have a fair proportion of these retirements.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

No. 15.

Sir, War Office, 24 November 1881.

REFERRING to the Letter from this office, dated the 11th instant, number as per margin,* on the subject of the reduction of the batteries of Artillery in India, I am now desired by the Secretary of State for War to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram which was yesterday despatched to the Commander in Chief in that country, containing instructions relative to the withdrawal therefrom of the batteries to be reduced, and of the steps to be taken with regard to the non-commissioned officers and men composing them.

*No. 20, Gen. No. 1431.

2. In transmitting this telegram, for Lord Hartington's information, I am desired by Mr. Childers to point out that, in carrying out the reduction of the Horse Artillery batteries, some time must necessarily elapse before the large number (80) of non-commissioned officers belonging to those batteries can be absorbed into the Home Establishment.

3. The absorption of the whole of this number in the batteries at home would cause a stoppage of promotion in the non-commissioned grades for an unduly long period, and, in order to obviate this, and to avoid the expense which would be incurred by the process of their absorption being prolonged, Mr. Childers proposes, for Lord Hartington's concurrence, that instructions be sent to the Government of India to retain in that country one-fourth of the non-commissioned officers belonging to the four batteries of Horse Artillery, and absorb them in the batteries of that arm remaining in India as vacancies arise, no promotions in the non-commissioned grades being made until the absorption be fully effected.

4. The remainder of the non-commissioned officers would accompany the batteries to England, and be absorbed at home as speedily as possible, and, with this view, instructions will be given to stop promotion at home until the necessary absorptions have been made.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Enclosure in No. 15.

COPY of TELEGRAM despatched to the Commander in Chief in India, 23rd November 1881.

YOUR telegram, 15th. The following batteries to be sent home:—I/A, A, B, and C, B Brigade, 0/6, 19/8, 1 and 19 Ninth Brigade in addition to the seven garrison batteries already ordered home.

Seventeen of the garrison batteries remaining in India are to be completed to 108 rank and file.

Horse Artillery remaining in India to be completed in non-commissioned officers and men from batteries ordered home.

All

All non-commissioned officers and men, staff sergeants excepted, of the field and garrison batteries ordered home, who have not completed six years' service in India, and whose time will not expire until 1883, to be transferred to batteries of their own branch remaining in India.

Volunteers of more than six years' service may remain if there are vacancies, not being allowed to extend their service.

I/A and 0/6 will be disbanded on arrival. Officers of these batteries wishing to remain may be transferred to existing vacancies.

(signed) *C. G. Arbuthnot,*
Deputy Adjutant General.

No. 16.

LETTER to the Under Secretary, War Office, dated India Office, 7th December 1881, No. 992, W.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge your Letter of the 11th November 1881, on the subject of the reduction of the force of British Artillery hitherto maintained on the Military Establishment of India.

2. Following the recommendations of the Government of India, my Letters of the 15th September and 21st October 1881 proposed a reduction in the existing Indian Establishment* of four batteries Royal Horse Artillery, one battery Field Artillery, and six garrison batteries, with an increase of the rank and file of 17 of the latter to 108 each, thus leaving the establishment at,—

Royal Horse Artillery	10
Field Artillery	40
Garrison†	27
Batteries	77

3. With respect to the reduction of four Horse and one Field Batteries Mr. Secretary Childers, with the concurrence of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, deprecates so serious a diminution in the fighting strength of the Indian Army, but states, that should the Secretary of State for India in Council finally decide on the reduction, he will be prepared to withdraw from India, not only the garrison batteries, to whose withdrawal the objections do not extend, but also the four batteries of Horse and one battery of Field Artillery.

4. The Marquis of Hartington desires me to express his thanks to the Secretary of State for having consented to forego opposition to this measure of reduction, should his Lordship in Council still, notwithstanding the representations of the War Office, desire to support it.

5. On this point I am to observe that my Letter of the 15th September 1881, strongly urging these reductions, was written after a very full and careful consideration of the Memorandum of the Deputy Adjutant General of Royal Artillery, unofficially forwarded to Lord Hartington by Mr. Secretary Childers.

6. The

* Royal Horse Artillery	14	† Heavy	4
Field Artillery	41	Mountain	6
Garrison	33	Garrison	17
Batteries	88	Batteries	27

6. The objections now officially put forward, though entering more fully into detail, are, I am to observe, substantially the same as those advanced in that Memorandum, but which the Secretary of State for India in Council had not thought sufficient to justify him in setting aside the elaborated and serious representation of the Government of India as to their true requirements in this arm.

7. Lord Hartington, while greatly regretting to find himself in discord with the War Office on so important a point, and recognising the weight of the authority opposed to his view, feels bound to repeat that justice to India requires him to accept Mr. Secretary Childers' concession, and to take the necessary measures for giving effect to the reduction.

8. Seeing that the season in which the needful steps can alone be taken is passing by, it has been considered expedient to warn the Government of India of the consent of the War Office to the reduction, and to instruct them to report to this Office their proposed arrangements for carrying it out speedily. No reply has as yet been received, but on its receipt an early communication will be made for Mr. Secretary Childers' information.

9. Meanwhile I am to state that Lord Hartington concurs with Mr. Childers in desiring that the financial settlement with the War Office consequent on these reductions shall be entered into by officers of the two Departments without delay.

10. My letter of the 11th November 1881, No. 904, W., will have informed you of the desire of the Marquis of Hartington to extend the provisions of the Royal Warrant of 25th June 1881, Article 978-X., to those colonels who may be promoted before they have served their qualifying period for special annuity. I am now to add that following Mr. Childers' suggestion, his Lordship is prepared to dispense altogether with the qualifying period of service in each rank until the number of surplus officers due to this reduction shall be absorbed. This measure Lord Hartington trusts will prove sufficient inducement for retirement without the offer of further extra pensions.

11. I am to take this opportunity of acknowledging your subsequent letter of the 24th November, 20/Gen. No. 1431, forwarding copy of a telegram despatched by Mr. Secretary Childers to the Commander in Chief in India, containing instructions relative to the withdrawal of the batteries to be reduced and of the steps to be taken with regard to the non-commissioned officers and men composing them, and I am to state for Mr. Childers' information that, while concurring in these measures, the Secretary of State for India in Council agrees to send instructions to the Government of India to retain one-fourth of the non-commissioned officers belonging to the four batteries of Horse Artillery, and absorb them in the batteries of that arm remaining in India as vacancies arise, no promotions in the non-commissioned grades being made until the absorption be fully effected.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 41 of 1882, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (received 6 March 1882).

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 13 February 1882.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 12, dated the 5th January 1882, on the subject of the establishment of British troops to be maintained in India.

2. With regard to the Artillery, Her Majesty's Government have accepted the reductions proposed by the Government of India, and these reductions were carried out under the instructions conveyed to us by your Lordship's telegram of the 14th November 1881. The several orders which have been issued

issued for giving effect to this measure are shown in the margin, and a revised distribution statement of the Royal Artillery in India will be forwarded so soon as ready.

Telegram to Adjutant General in India, No 29 C, dated 15th November 1881.
Letter from Quartermaster General in India, No. 114 C, dated 6th December 1881.
Letter from Quartermaster General in India, No. 158 C, dated 9th December 1881.
Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 1342 C. dated 14th December 1881.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, No. 1343 C, dated 14th December 1881.
From Quartermaster General in India, No. 231 C, dated 13th December 1881.
To Quartermaster General in India, No. 1344 C, dated 14th December 1881.
Telegram from Government of Madras, dated 17th December 1881.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 17th December 1881.
To Quartermaster General in India, No. 1374 C, dated 19th December 1881.
Letter from Government of Bombay, No. 2802, dated 26th December 1881.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 5th January 1882.
To Quartermaster General in India, No. 37 C, dated 10th January 1882.
From Quartermaster General in India, No. 122 A, dated 11th January 1882.
Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 68 C, dated 13th January 1882.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, No. 70 C, dated 13th January 1882.
To Quartermaster General in India, No. 78 C, dated 14th January 1882.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 13th January 1882.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, dated 18th January 1882.

3. In para. 7 of your Lordship's Despatch it is pointed out that the financial statement forwarded with our letter, No. 141, of the 24th April 1881, is based on an erroneous estimate of the establishment of Artillery then existing in India, an oversight which decreases the saving estimated to accrue from the reduction by more than three lakhs of rupees. We would, however, observe that the proposed establishment and estimated cost was compared with the establishment as it stood before the war, because the changes which had been made during 1878, 1879 and 1880, were considered as only temporary, and subject to reconsideration when the war was over and the permanent garrison came under review.

4. Had, however, the establishment been taken as it actually was at the time the proposals were forwarded in our Military letter, No. 141, of the 24th April 1881, the present and proposed cost would have compared as shown in the accompanying Memorandum. This actual establishment is taken from your Lordship's Despatch, No. 378, of the 10th November 1881.

5. According to the calculation in this Memorandum, the saving effected by the proposals would have been 41,646 rupees more than was shown in Table II. of our letter, No. 141, and not three lakhs less, as stated in para. 7 of the Despatch under reply.

6. We propose to address your Lordship separately regarding the other points referred to in the Despatch.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

Distribution of Army Reliefs.

Copy of a Telegram from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 29, C., dated Camp Agra, the 15th November 1881).

Secretary of State telegraphs that Her Majesty's Government sanction proposals of Government India fixing artillery establishment at 10 horse, 40 field, 27 garrison, total 77 batteries, and desires that arrangements proposed for carrying out reduction speedily may be telegraphed home. Viceroy requests Chief will favour Government with proposal for giving effect to these instructions.

From Major General Sir *C. M. MacGregor*, K.C.B., &c., Quartermaster General in India, to Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta (No. 114, C., Movements—Relief, dated Army Head-quarters, Fort William, the 6th December 1881).

In reference to your telegram, dated Ajmere, 21st November 1881, I am directed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to forward copy of telegram received from the Horse Guards, dated 23rd November 1881, naming the batteries to be sent to England in addition to the seven garrison batteries already under orders for England in relief.

2. As regards the four batteries of horse artillery to be reduced, Sir Donald Stewart recommends that henceforward batteries of horse artillery be no longer stationed at the following places, viz., Peshâwar, Campbellpore, Morar, and Kirkee.

3. His Excellency proposes not to replace the field battery on removal from Bellary.

4. To meet the reduction of three garrison batteries named, the Commander in Chief recommends that a garrison battery be no longer stationed at Lucknow, and that the garrison batteries at Aden and Bombay be reduced from three to two in each case, the two garrison batteries remaining at Aden and the two remaining at Bombay to be increased in strength to 108 rank and file.

5. The very early approval of Government to these proposals is requested, to enable the necessary changes to be made in the relief movements of artillery in India now in progress.

6. It will be observed that the reduction dealt with above is of only eight batteries in all, whereas the total reduction ordered is of eleven batteries. His Excellency has telegraphed to his Royal Highness Commanding in Chief to ascertain whether the full reduction is to be completed by not sending to India the three garrison batteries whose arrival at Bombay was expected in April.

7. On receipt of this information, the necessary further proposals for redistribution of garrison artillery will be submitted for sanction of Government.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, dated 23rd November 1881, to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

YOUR telegram 15th. The following batteries to be sent home, I-A., A.-B. and C.-B. Brigade; O-6th, 19-8th, 1-9th and 19-9th Brigade, in addition to the seven garrison batteries already under orders for home; 17 of the garrison batteries remaining in India to be completed to 108 rank and file. Each horse artillery remaining in India to be completed in non-commissioned officers and men from batteries ordered home. All non-commissioned officers and men, staff serjeants excepted, of the field and garrison batteries ordered home, who have not completed six years' service in India, and whose time will not expire until 1883, to be transferred to batteries of their own branch remaining in India. Volunteers of more than six years' service may remain if there are vacancies, but not to be allowed to extend their service. I-A. and O-6th will be disbanded on arrival. Officers of the two batteries wishing to remain may be transferred to existing vacancies.

From Major General Sir *C. M. MacGregor*, K.C.B., &c, Quartermaster General in India, to Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta (No. 158, C., Movements—Relief, dated Army Head-quarters, Fort William, the 9th December 1881).

IN continuation of this office, No 114, C., dated 6th December 1881, I am directed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to forward copy of telegram* from Horse Guards, London, by which it will be seen that the total reduction of 11 batteries, Royal Artillery in India, is to be effected by not sending from England the three batteries noted in margin, whose arrival in Bombay had been previously expected on 2nd April 1882.

* Dated 7th December 1881.
No. 6 Battery, 9th Brigade.
No. 8 Battery, 9th Brigade.
No. 8 Battery, 10th Brigade.

2. In consequence of this decision, the Commander in Chief proposes to reduce one garrison battery in Burma, increasing the other two to the new strength

strength of 108 rank and file each ; to reduce the garrison battery at St. Thomas' Mount, increasing the strength of the battery at Fort St. George; to reduce the battery at Govindgarh or that at Lahore, increasing the other of these two.

3. I am to request the very early approval of Government to these proposals.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, dated 7th December 1881, to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

YOUR telegram 6th. Total reduction 11 batteries. The three garrison batteries ordered to India in March will not be sent.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department (No. 1342, C., dated Fort William, the 14th December 1881).

UNDER instructions from Secretary of State, establishment artillery in India to be reduced by four horse, one field, and six garrison batteries. Chief proposes to withdraw one field battery from Bellary, to reduce one garrison battery of the three in Burma, and one of the two at Madras, raising strength of remaining three to 108 rank and file.

Concurrence of Government, Madras, desired, and favour immediate reply.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Secretary to Government, Bombay, Military Department (No. 1343, C., dated Fort William, the 14th December 1881).

UNDER instructions from Secretary of State, establishment artillery in India to be reduced by four horse, one field and six garrison batteries. Chief proposes withdrawing one horse battery from Kirkee, and reducing garrison batteries Aden and Bombay from three to two in each case, raising batteries to 108 rank and file each.

Concurrence of Government, Bombay, desired, and favour immediate reply.

From Major General Sir *C. M. MacGregor*, K.C.B., &c., Quartermaster General in India, to Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta (No. 231, C., Movements—Relief, dated Army Head-quarters, Fort William, the 13th December 1881).

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to forward copy of the enclosed telegram,* showing the changes in distribution of Royal Artillery in Madras caused by the reductions now ordered in Royal Artillery in India. These proposals of the Commander in Chief, Madras, have been approved by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, and I am specially to request the very early sanction of Government to them, and also to the proposals contained in this office, No. 114, C., and No. 158, C., dated 6th and 9th December 1881, respectively.

*Dated 11th December 1881, from Quartermaster General, Madras Army.

2. I am to point out that changes are required in relief programme already in progress in India; that a further programme has to be issued for movements in India; that the whole of the troopship programme has to be recast for the service

service between Bombay and England; that the Madras and Burma sea relief will be affected; and that the Commanders in Chief of Madras and Bombay are calling for instructions, and the Secretary of State for India and Horse Guards for information.

3. Under these circumstances, his Excellency trusts that these letters may receive the earliest possible attention.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from the Quartermaster General, Madras Army, dated 11th December 1881, to the Quartermaster General in India.

Madras, 11th December.—Your telegram of yesterday about garrison batteries. Propose that 2-8th from Secunderabad and 3-8th from Toungoo go to Bengal, 7-8th to Secunderabad to be heavy battery, 4-9th at Toungoo to be mountain battery, half of 7-9th garrison battery to be moved from Thayetmyo to Toungoo, 4-8th St. Thomas' Mount with detachment in Fort St. George. Is this approved?

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General in India (No. 1344, C., Distribution of Army Reliefs, dated Fort William, the 14th December 1881).

IN reply to the communications marginally noted, which have been laid before the Governor General in Council, regarding the reductions of the Royal Artillery in India, I am directed to say that the Government of India approve of the proposals made by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to withdraw four batteries, Royal Horse Artillery, one field battery, and six garrison batteries, on the following plan:—

No. 114, C., dated 6th December 1881.
No. 158, C., dated 9th December 1881.
No. 231, C., dated 13th December 1881.

	From Bengal.	From Madras.	From Bombay.
Horse Batteries - - - -	3	–	1
Field " - - - -	–	1	–
Garrison " - - - -	2	2	2

and of the detailed proposals as to distribution, subject, however, to the concurrence of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, which has been asked for by telegraph.

2. I am to point* out that, although four batteries, Royal Horse Artillery, are to be withdrawn, only three armed, viz., 1 A, A B, and C B; the fourth will, it is presumed, be taken from Kirkee, as his Excellency proposes that this station shall no longer have a battery of Royal Horse Artillery.

* Since explained in demi-official note from Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery in India.

3. I am to request that the Government of India may be favoured with a revised distribution statement of Royal Artillery in India when orders have been issued for these withdrawals and changes to be carried out.

TELEGRAM from Secretary, Military Department, Madras, to Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta (dated the 17th December 1881).

YOURS 14th. Army and Government approve proposed reduction garrison batteries, but strongly advocate retention field battery Bellary. If reduction field battery, Madras presidency, actually necessary, withdrawal of one of two batteries at Kamptee recommended.

TELEGRAM from Secretary, Military Department, Bombay, to Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta (dated the 17th December 1881).

474. YOUR telegram 15th. Reduction of batteries, Royal Artillery; Government accept proposals, but Army strongly in favour of battery, Royal Horse Artillery, being retained at Kirkee and losing that at Mhow in preference.

From Captain *E. H. H. Collen*, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General in India (No. 1374, C., Distribution of Army Reliefs, dated Fort William, the 19th December 1881).

IN continuation of my letter, No. 1344, C., dated 14th December 1881, I am directed to forward the accompanying copies of telegrams* from the Governments of Madras and Bombay regarding the reduction of batteries in those presidencies, and to request that the Commander in Chief may be moved to favour the Government of India with his opinion as to whether the proposals therein contained should not be acted on.

*Dated 17th December 1881.

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta (No. 2802, dated Bombay Castle, the 26th December 1881).

474. Your telegram 15th. Reduction of batteries, R. A. Government accept proposals; but Army strongly in favour of battery R. H. A. being retained at Kirkee and losing that at Mhow in preference.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 17th instant, quoted in the margin, I am directed to communicate, for the information of the Government of India, the following reasons advanced by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in favour of the retention of the battery of horse artillery at Kirkee in preference to retaining the battery at Mhow:—

"Touching the reduction of one of our two horse batteries, I strongly oppose the reduction of that at Kirkee. If we must be left with a single one, it should be where it is most available *for general service*, and where it can maintain its efficiency by being brigaded with others on ground and *in a climate* best suited to *constant instruction*. There it has two cavalry regiments at hand for sudden emergencies such as might more readily occur in the South Mahratta Country, which I am inclined to look upon as more uncertain than the neighbourhood of Mhow, where its conjunction with an English cavalry regiment would hamper rather than facilitate its speedy use. At Mhow there is a battery of 40-pounders, and a field battery at Neemuch is within 10 hours' rail from Indore."

2. I am desired to submit that the matter seems one for the discretion of the Bombay Government, unless treaty obligations required a field battery at Mhow, in which case the Neemuch battery might be moved up.

TELEGRAM from Secretary, Military Department, Bombay, to Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta (dated the 5th January 1882).

6. MY No. 2820, of the 26th ultimo. Quartermaster General reports E-B., Royal Horse Artillery, has been ordered to move from Kirkee to Bangalore. Commander in Chief therefore proposes to move D-B, Royal Horse Artillery, from Mhow to Kirkee, sending in its place to Mhow a field battery, A-4th Royal Artillery, from Karachi. Government propose to carry out these moves, but before doing so, request to be informed if there is any political objection.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General in India (No. 37, C., Distribut on of Army Reliefs, dated Fort William, the 10th January 1882).

In continuation of my letter, No. 1374, C., dated 19th December 1881, I am directed to forward, for the opinion of the Commander in Chief, a copy of a further communication* received from the Government of Bombay, conveying the reasons of the Commander in Chief of that presidency for the retention of the battery of horse artillery at Kirkee instead of that at Mhow, and to say that, if his Excellency sees no objection, the Government of India propose to accept the recommendation of the Bombay Government.

* No. 2802, dated 26th December 1881.

2. It will be seen from the second communication* from the Bombay Government that it is now proposed to send a field battery to Mhow from Karachi in place of the horse artillery battery to be transferred from Mhow to Kirkee, if there is no political objection. This latter point will be considered hereafter, but as the Madras Government is also pressing for instructions, I am to request that you will move his Excellency the Commander in Chief to favour the Government of India with a very early reply to Military Department, No. 1374, C., dated 19th December 1881.

* Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 5th January 1882.

The two points for consideration are:—

(1.) Whether his Excellency concurs with the Madras Government that the field battery should be withdrawn from Kamptee instead of from Bellary.

(2.) Whether he concurs with the Government of India that the wish of the Bombay Government should be conformed to, for withdrawing the horse artillery battery from Mhow instead of from Kirkee.

P.S.—Copy of a further telegram received from the Bombay Government on the subject is annexed.

From Major General Sir *C. M. MacGregor*, K.C.B., &c., Quartermaster General in India, to Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta (No. 122, A., Camp, Movements—Relief, dated Army Head-Quarters, Fort William, the 11th January 1882).

With reference to Military Department, No. 1374, C., dated 19th December 1881, regarding the reduction of batteries in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, I am directed to state that his Excellency the Commander in Chief considers the distribution of batteries in those presidencies should be left to the Commanders in Chief of the respective presidencies to decide in communication with the local Governments.

Copy of a Telegram from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department (No. 68, C., dated Fort William, the 13th January 1882).

Yours 5th. Withdrawal field battery from Kamptee instead Bellary approved.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 70, C, dated Fort William, the 13th January 1882).

YOURS 10th. Withdrawal horse artillery battery from Mhow instead Kirkee sanctioned.

From Captain *E. H. H. Collen*, for Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General in India (No. 78, C, Distribution of Army Reliefs, dated Fort William, the 14th January 1882).

No. 122, A. Camp—dated 11th January 1882.
No. 145, A. Camp—dated 12th January 1882.

WITH reference to your communications marginally noted, I am directed to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that as much delay might have been caused by again referring the matter to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, and the local Commanders in Chief, the Government of India have sanctioned, in anticipation of the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, and the Agent, Governor General, Central India, the withdrawal of the field battery from Kamptee, and the horse artillery battery from Mhow which, it is understood, is recommended by the Governments of Madras and Bombay, and the local Commanders in Chief, and has the concurrence of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

2. The Governments of Madras and Bombay have been informed by telegraph accordingly, and the Agent, Governor General, Central India, has been asked whether he considers it necessary to have a field battery at Mhow in the place of the horse artillery battery withdrawn, as it was suggested by the Government of Bombay to send one of the field batteries from Karachi to Mhow.

TELEGRAM from Secretary, Military Department, Bombay, to Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta (dated the 13th January 1882).

17. DOES the authority conveyed in your telegram to-day, withdrawal horse artillery battery from Mhow, include sanction to the proposal to move A-4th from Karachi to Mhow, as stated in my telegram, No. 6, of 5th instant. A-4th has been temporarily located at Karachi, where there is no proper accommodation for two field batteries.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from Secretary to Government, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 110, C., dated Fort William, the 18th January 1882).

YOURS 13th. Move A-4th from Karachi to Mhow sanctioned.

Copy of the above forwarded to the Agent, Governor General, Central India, for information, with reference to his telegram, dated 14th January 1882.

Copy of the above forwarded to the Quartermaster General in India, in continuation of Military Department, No. 78, C., dated 14th January 1882, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

STATEMENT showing the TOTAL ANNUAL COST of the actual existing Establishment of 88 Royal Artillery Batteries in India in April 1881, as shown in Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 378 of 1881, compared with the Cost of the Establishment of 86 Batteries, as exhibited in India Military Despatch, No. 141 of 1881.

DESCRIPTION OF BATTERIES.	Actual Sanctioned Establishment in India in April 1881, as per Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 378 of 1881.		
	Number of Batteries in India.	Rate of Annual Cost.	Total Annual Cost.
		Rs.	*Rs.*
Batteries of Royal Horse Artillery - - - -	14	2,02,090	28,41,860
" of " Field - - - - - -	41	1,71,016	70,11,656
" of " Heavy - - - - - -	4	1,32,152	5,28,608
" of " Mountain - - - - - -	5*	1,44,336	7,21,680
" of " Garrison - - - - - -	24	76,830	18,43,920
TOTAL Number and Cost per Annum -	88	- -	1,29,47,724

	No.
* Former establishment of mountain batteries in Bengal - - - - - - - - - -	2
In lieu of one horse and one field battery reduced in Bengal, as per India Military Despatch, No. 229 of 1881 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2
In lieu of the field battery at Thayetmyo - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1
TOTAL - - -	5

ABSTRACT.

	Rs.
Total annual cost of actual establishment of 88 batteries in April 1881, as detailed above - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,29,47,724
Total annual cost of assumed establishment of 86 batteries, as per details in the statement attached to India Military Despatch, No. 141 of 1881 -	1,29,06,078
Increased cost of the actual establishment over the former estimate of assumed sanctioned establishment - - *Rs.*	41,646

7 February 1882. (signed) *O. R. N.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 60 of 1882, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (received 11th April 1882).

My Lord Marquis, Fort William, 16 March 1882.

WE have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's Despatch of the 5th January last, No. 12, replying to our proposals respecting the establishment of British troops to be maintained in India.

2. Your Lordship has obtained the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the proposed change in the establishment of Royal Artillery serving in this country; the number of batteries is to be reduced from 86, the sanctioned establishment before the war, to a total of 77 batteries, with various modifications in their strength, and we have already reported the arrangements which have been made in consequence of this decision.

Despatch No. 41, of 13th February 1882.

3. With respect to the cavalry, our proposal to reduce the number of British regiments serving in this country from nine to eight, with such an increase in the strength of the rank and file of the regiments to be maintained as would practically keep the total strength of British sabres in India unaltered, is still the subject of correspondence between your Lordship and the Secretary of State for War.

4. We

4. We observe from the correspondence enclosed with your Despatch that Mr. Secretary Childers took objection to the proposal on the grounds, first, that the 14th Hussars could not be sent direct to England from the Cape, because, as that regiment was not first on the roster to return home, it must in any case return to India; next, that he is not in a position to supply immediately large drafts to make up the remaining eight regiments to the increased establishment proposed. It is further urged that the establishment of each regiment serving at home would have to be reduced, or one cavalry regiment would have to be disbanded. It is also implied that the settlement of the military establishments in India effected in 1870 was to be regarded as final, and it is objected that to depart from the organization then established would be to transfer the whole cost of maintaining the necessary elasticity of the British forces from Indian to Imperial revenues.

5. With respect to the objection that, if the Indian establishment is reduced by one regiment of cavalry, a regiment would therefore have to be disbanded, from which it might be inferred that the home establishment of cavalry is an absolutely fixed quantity, to which the Indian establishment is extra, we may point out that, before the Mutiny, the establishment of British cavalry, exclusive of the Household troops, consisted of 25 regiments, of which four were serving in India and 21 at home. After the Mutiny the regiments of Bengal European cavalry which had been raised at that time were transferred to the British Army, and constitute the present 19th, 20th, and 21st Hussars. But the Indian establishment has been raised from four to nine regiments, so that, while the British cavalry has been increased by three regiments, there are two less serving at home than there were when the total establishment of British cavalry was fixed at its present strength. Consequently, if the Indian establishment was reduced, as we propose, to eight regiments, there would still be one regiment less in England than there were before. Such being the facts, we think it can hardly be maintained that the existing establishment at home has been fixed with reference to Indian requirements. It is now deemed expedient to maintain the regiments at home on a stronger footing than they used to be maintained. But what holds good for home service should surely be applicable also to India. In former days the regiments on the home establishment were weak in numbers, and the organization was consequently expensive; the regiments on the Indian establishment were comparatively strong, and their organization was comparatively economical. Now the situation is changed; and when, as we pointed out in our Despatches, Nos. 141 and 401, of last April and October respectively, the cavalry regiment in this country is actually below the strength of what may be termed the reserve regiments on the home establishment, we submit that our proposal to raise the establishment of the former to a somewhat higher figure is a very reasonable one, more especially when, as we here pointed out, the reduction proposed of one regiment here will still leave fewer regiments at home than there were before the Mutiny.

6. It may be useful to draw attention to the fact that in 1869 Lord Mayo's Government proposed to reduce the establishment of British cavalry in India to *seven* regiments.* We shall be satisfied, however, if it can be reduced to *eight*, even on the less economical scale than was then proposed.

* Military Letter to Secretary of State, No. 349, of the 4th October 1869.

7. We trust, therefore, that your Lordship will be able to obtain the authority of Her Majesty's Government for our sending home the regiment first on the roster next trooping season without relief.

8. With regard to the infantry, our proposal is for the reduction of the number of battalions in India from 50 to 46, with a proportionate increase of the establishment of rank and file per battalion; but, in consequence of the objections raised by the Secretary of State for War, your Lordship in Council has decided that the demand might be allowed to stand over for the present.

9. The main objection which appears to be raised on the part of the War Office to this proposal is to be found in Mr. Thompson's letter of the 14th July 1881, in the plea that a settlement was effected between the War Office and the India Office in 1870, which should be regarded as complete and final, and that the Indian Government are in consequence not at liberty to propose a revision of their existing establishments.

10. The

10. The settlement to which Mr. Secretary Childers refers is, we suppose, to be found in the correspondence which took place in 1870 between the India Office and the War Office, consequent on the proposal of the Government of India to reduce the number of British infantry battalions in this country from 50 to 45, and British cavalry regiments from 11 to 7, which correspondence was attached to the Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 133, of the 12th May 1870. It would appear, however, from that correspondence that the objection raised by Mr. Cardwell, then Secretary for War, was based mainly on the difficulties in dealing with such a measure, arising out of the impending abolition of purchase, and also those involved in meeting the claims of the cadets who had lately passed or were about to pass out of Sandhurst. We cannot find anything in the correspondence implying that the settlement made, whereby the establishment of British infantry was brought down to 50 battalions, and the British cavalry to nine regiments, was accepted by the Duke of Argyll as permanently binding upon the Secretary of State for India, or preventing his reopening the question. And we think that such a plea could be deemed to hold good only if the conditions of that settlement had been maintained, and if the cost of the army in respect of charges arising out of British regiments had remained unaltered. But we need hardly point out to your Lordship that this is not the case. The Indian estimates have been subject to a constantly increasing charge on account of the British forces in India, arising out of changes which in many cases the Government of India did not desire, and about which they were never consulted; and it is the accumulated increase of these charges which has brought about the present reconsideration of the subject. As we pointed out in our letter, No. 401, of the 29th October last, the various changes which have been made in the pay and allowances of British officers and soldiers in India since 1864-65 altogether involve an additional burden on the revenues of India of about 800,000 *l.* a year. Since 1870, the increase has amounted to nearly 500,000 *l.*, and even since our proposal for this reduction was made, last April, a new item of charge has been imposed on our military estimates of about 90,000 *l.* a year, arising out of the Warrant of the 25th June 1881, an item which we may observe does not fall far short of absorbing the saving produced by the artillery reductions just sanctioned. It was found that under the system of promotion introduced in 1877 large numbers of officers would be compulsorily retired in the rank of captain and major long before they had become inefficient from age. To meet this difficulty the course has been adopted of largely increasing the number of lieutenant colonels and majors, so that while the ages for compulsory retirement in each grade are maintained, officers will rise to the higher grades more quickly than before. The result is that every regiment has now a second lieutenant colonel, and a number of majors who are doing the work of captains of companies; and, as we pointed out in the Despatch above referred to, while the difference between the pay of a major and a captain, and that of a lieutenant colonel and a major, is inconsiderable in England, in India it amounts to some hundreds of pounds a year. This change alone throws an extra charge upon India of about 45,000 *l.* a year, from which the Indian Government in respect of efficiency derives no corresponding benefit. The efficiency of the army has indeed been diminished in one important respect, the strength of British officers in the country having been diminished by one per regiment.

11. The average rate of increase in the cost of the European army in India arising from changes over which the Government of India has no control, has been during the last 18 years 50,000 *l.* a year. It is the constant recurrence of new charges of this sort which has made it imperatively necessary to reconsider the military estimates, and to reduce them in some way or other, and the very moderate measure which we have proposed, a more moderate one than was proposed in 1869, still seems to us to be both reasonable and proper.

12. In Mr. Thompson's letter of the 22nd September 1881, one of the enclosures to your Lordship's Despatch of the 5th January last, to which we are now replying, Mr. Secretary Childers says that he objects to the Government of India escaping its due share of military expenditure by filling up its reduced number of cadres to any strength which it may find financially convenient. We submit to your Lordship that this objection really begs the question, whether India is not now paying more than its due share of military expenditure. The criticism

criticism would have been just had the Indian Government proposed to revert to the state of things which obtained before the Mutiny, when the battalions in India had a strength of over 1,000 rank and file, while those on home service were kept at a smaller strength. But our proposal goes only to the very moderate point of maintaining the infantry battalions in India at a strength absolutely smaller than that which is now recognised to be proper for the regiments at home which are first for foreign service. That establishment having been fixed at 950 rank and file, we think it cannot be reasonably contended that the present Indian establishment of 820 rank and file is a proper one for regiments which are actually on foreign service; which are at a distance from their reserves; which cannot look to the army reserve for augmentation as the battalions at home can, and which may be called upon to take the field at a day's notice. We may observe that while we now propose an establishment of 920, the establishment proposed by the Government of India in 1870 was for battalions with 930 rank and file; also that Lord Salisbury, in the Military Secretary's letter to the War Office of the 3rd May 1877, suggested the reduction of the number of battalions in India from 50 to 40, and the augmentation of those remaining to 1,000 rank and file.

Enclosure of Despatch from Secretary of State for India, No. 185, dated 9th June 1881.

13. It may be said that to reduce the number of British regiments in India is to reduce the reserve of officers immediately available for times of emergency. We are very sensible of the value of such a reserve, if it were available; but the establishment of officers for a British regiment has been so largely reduced in numbers, although not in cost, by the alterations of late years, that few, if any, can now be spared from regimental duty; and the reduction in this reserve caused by the withdrawal of four battalions is practically inappreciable.

14. From all points of view, then, we submit that the proposal we have made is as moderate as could be justified by the circumstances of the case, and we trust that your Lordship will endeavour to obtain for it the assent of Her Majesty's Government before the time comes for the next season's reliefs.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 239) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 13 July 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 60, dated 16th March 1882, acknowledging my Military Despatch of the 5th January, No. 12, on the subject of the establishment of British troops to be maintained in India.

2. In paragraph 4 of that Despatch, I informed your Lordship that, while the question of the reduction of British Infantry battalions and batteries of Royal Artillery had been, for the time, settled in communication with the Secretary of State for War, the proposed reduction of a regiment of British Cavalry, with a corresponding increase of strength to the remaining corps, was still under discussion.

3. As I had accepted the proposals of your Government as practicable and expedient, the measure was pressed on the Secretary of State for War with much urgency, but Her Majesty's Government having decided against its adoption, I was constrained to accept that decision, reserving, however, the right to again propose this reduction whenever opportunity might offer.

4. I am of opinion that it would serve no useful purpose to do so in the immediate present, but, as I still continue satisfied that the measure is desirable, your Excellency may be assured that it will not be allowed to drop out of sight.

 5. With

5. With respect to the question of the Infantry reduction referred to in paragraphs 8 to 13 of your Lordship's letter under reply, I have already, in paragraph 5 of my Military Despatch of 5th January 1882, stated the grounds on which I ceased from pressing this measure on the Secretary of State for War; though I by no means consider that these objections preclude a renewal of the proposals for cadre reductions, yet they still, in my judgment, possess sufficient weight to induce me to refrain from urging Her Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision during the present year.

6. Although it has not been possible for me to obtain the assent of Her Majesty's Government to the reduction of one Cavalry and four Infantry regiments before the coming relief, yet I fully recognize the seriousness of the growing charges of our European force, and I have forwarded to the Secretary of State for War a copy of your representations in a letter* a copy of which I enclose.

*12th July 1882, M. 11,723.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

Enclosure referred to.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 12th July 1882, No. M. 11,723—82.

Sir,

I WAS directed by the Secretary of State for India to inform you in my letter, No. 857 W., of the 21st October 1881, paragraph 3, that a reply would be subsequently given to your letter of the 22nd September 1881, which dealt mainly with the question of the reduction of a regiment of British Cavalry in India, and incidentally with the general principle on which the military establishments of India shall be adapted to its needs.

Mr. Secretary Childers is aware that subsequently to the foregoing correspondence the proposed Cavalry reduction has been the subject of careful deliberation, and finally Her Majesty's Government, in agreement with the views of the Secretary of State for War, decided adversely to the representations of this office and of the Government of India.

That Government, having been made aware of this decision, have again addressed the Secretary of State for India on the whole subject of the proposed cadre reductions, both Infantry and Cavalry, and I am desired to forward their letter for Mr. Secretary Childers' information.

The Marquis of Hartington, I am to state, having temporarily accepted the adverse decision of Her Majesty's Government, does not propose for the present to press for the Infantry reduction, nor during the present year, at least, for that of the Cavalry corps, but I am to request that it may be clearly understood that he reserves the right of again bringing forward the question of reduction so soon as it appears to him that the occasion serves for doing so, and that by not immediately renewing his representations he is by no means to be understood as admitting the principle apparently laid down in your letter of the 22nd September 1881, that the Government of India is to have no voice in considering what is the suitable strength and organization of the European military establishments in that country, but, on the contrary, I am directed to assert the claim of that Government to a prominent voice in a matter which so vitally affects the financial position of the country.

In making this communication I am, with reference to the remarks in your letters of the 14th July and 22nd September 1881, directed to observe that the Secretary of State for India in Council is not aware of any system having been accepted or arrangements entered into by the Indian Government in 1870 which should bar him from pressing Her Majesty's Government to affect changes in the strength of British cadres on the Indian establishment, and Lord Hartington will be glad if such a specific reference can be made to the passages relied on by the War Office in support of their view, as will enable him to correct any misapprehension which may exist on this point.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

(SUPPLEMENTARY.)

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 378) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 10 November 1881.

Para. 1. IN explanation of my telegram,* dated 29th October 1881, and previous communications on the subject of the establishment of Royal Artillery in India, I have to draw your Lordship's attention to the following facts.

2. It is not, I believe, questioned that the authorized establishment in the early part of the year 1878 was 15 Horse, 43 Field, and 28 Garrison, or, in all, 86 batteries (heavy and mountain batteries being, as establishment, identical with "Garrison").

3. In your letter, No. 229, dated 7th July 1879, you requested that three Garrison batteries should be substituted on the establishment for one Horse and one Field battery. This was sanctioned in my letter, No. 285, paragraph 14, dated 16th October 1879.

4. The authorized establishment then stood as 14 Horse, 42 Field, and 31 Garrison, or, in all, 87 batteries.

5. Subsequently on your telegram of the 22nd September 1879:—

"Our 181 of 1878. On recommendation of Commander in Chief and assurance that Horse Guards will not object, we have, in anticipation of approval, sanctioned conversion of K Battery, 1st Brigade, at Thayetmyo into Garrison battery with mountain equipment, and retention in addition, as equivalent for Field battery reduced, of 10th Battery, 8th Brigade, as additional to establishment. This not to affect number of garrison batteries going out."

6. You obtained sanction to this arrangement in Military Despatch, dated 27th November 1879, No. 353.

7. The authorized establishment thus stood as 14 Horse, 41 Field, 33 Garrison, or 88 batteries in all.

8. Since then I am not aware that any change of establishment has been asked for or made.

9. Possibly some confusion may have been caused as to the authorised existent and permanent establishment, by inadvertence in my Despatch of 7th July 1881, No. 219, paragraph 9, which gave the number of field batteries as 40 instead of 41, an error which was repeated in my telegram of the 22nd August 1881, but this was corrected in your telegram of the 30th August 1881.

10. I agree with your Lordship's Government that the existing establishment is in excess of the requirements of the country, and I am in immediate communication with the Secretary of State for War in view to a considerable reduction in its strength.

11. On this point I hope very shortly to be able to inform you that a satisfactory arrangement has been made.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

* Yours 30th August—Artillery. In 1878 regular establishment stood 15 horse, 43 field, 28 garrison batteries. In 1879 five garrison substituted on fixed establishment for one horse and two field batteries, at which your Artillery force now stands. General question. Artillery reductions under present consideration. Meanwhile await instructions before sending home any battery in excess of reliefs authorised in my Despatch 296 of 1881.

—III.—

REMOUNT DEPARTMENT.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 200 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (received 22 June 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 27 May 1881.

From Government of Bombay, No. 5803, dated 8th October 1880.
From Government of Bombay, No. 5905, dated 14th October 1880, and Enclosures.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, dated 23rd October 1880.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 29th October 1880.
To Government of Bombay, No. 1962 D. S., dated 1st November 1880.
To Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 1963 D. S., dated 1st November 1880.
From Adjutant General in India, No. 49 F. C., dated 12th November 1880, and Enclosure.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 17th November 1880.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, dated 22nd November 1880.
From Government of Bombay, No. 6885, dated 26th November 1880.
To Adjutant General in India, No. 950 D., dated 27th November 1880.
From Government of Bombay, No. 7167, dated 11th December 1880.
To Government of Bombay, No. 1145 D., dated 18th December 1880.
From Government of Bombay, No. 7391, dated 22nd December 1880.
To Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 1232 D., dated 30th December 1880.
From Government of Bombay, No. 7451, dated 24th December 1880, and Enclosure.
From Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 65, dated 3rd January 1881.
Telegram to Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 35, dated 8th January 1881.
To Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 478 S D., dated 19th May 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, the marginally noted correspondence arising out of the proposal of the Government of Bombay for the appointment of a Remount Agent, and the establishment of a Reserve Remount Depôt in that Presidency.

2. We have considered it desirable to decline both these proposals.

3. In arriving at this decision, however, we have had to consider the whole question of supplying all the Indian armies with remounts; and having especially in view the experience of the recent campaign in Afghanistan, we have come to the conclusion that it is desirable rather to reduce the number of horses in reserve, and available for the wants of the Indian army generally, than to establish any new depôt.

4. We have therefore determined to abolish the reserve depôt at Hapur, maintaining depôts at Saharanpur and Oosur only, and to reduce the number of horses in reserve from 1,300 to 800. This measure is in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 508 of the Army Commission Report; it is one which past experience fully justifies us in adopting, and we trust it will effect a considerable saving. Our instructions in connection with the abolition of the Hapur Depôt will be found in the accompanying letter * to the Director of Army Remount Operations.

* No. 478 S. D., dated 19th May 1881.

5. On a full consideration of the present system of army remount operations, we are of opinion that it will be expedient to place the general management and supervision of the business throughout India in charge of one Director.

6. The present system of having three separate and independent agencies for the purchase of horses in the three Presidencies is one which has not proved successful. Each Presidency being dependent on its market, the supply is not always adequate to the demand; while the class of horse required for a particular branch of the service is not always available for the purpose at the place where it is required. Thus for example it was found necessary last year to send 400 Australian horses from Bengal to Bombay. On the other hand, horses which would be suitable for some purposes of the Bengal Army are often to be procured only at Bombay. To effect this distribution properly, one controlling authority is necessary, and we think it very desirable that there should be one uniform system throughout the three Presidencies under the Director of Army Remount Operations.

7. In strongly recommending this proposal for your Lordship's approval, we desire to point out that it is one which has constantly been advocated by the various authorities who have from time to time reported on matters connected with the stud in India.

8. Thus

8. Thus General Chamberlain, President of a special committee which reported on the subject in 1873, has shown* that by dealing with the matter as one operation, and by adopting the same arrangements for purchasing in Bombay as in Madras and Bengal, the remounting of the army will be more satisfactactorily and simply effected.

* Letter to Government of India, Military Department, No. 1495, dated 12th November, 1873, and Enclosure.

9. Major General Sir S. Browne, President of the Special Stud Commission of 1875, reported † that, by having one agency for dealing in the several metropolitan and Mofussil horse marts, the Government would then govern the entire horse market in India, develop each source of supply as deemed necessary, and would command a supply of the classes of horses required. The whole of the Artillery and British Cavalry would then be uniformly mounted, as each reserve of horses could furnish remounts irrespective of Presidency, but with due reference to economy of distribution and suitability to the respective branches of the service.

† Letter to Government of India, Military Department, No. 48, dated 2nd August 1875, and Enclosure.

10. The Army Commission have also recorded their opinion ‡ that there should be one Director of the Remount Department for all India, under whose directions the number of remounts annually required should be determined, and instructions issued as to their classification and place of purchase.

‡ Paragraph 503 of Report.

11. We may add that it is desirable on general grounds that all the Indian horse markets should receive a due share of Government support, by a distribution among them of the purchases to be made for the whole army,

12. We believe that under the arrangements we propose the purchasing operations in the various markets will be better controlled and the supply improved, while the general remounting operations for the army will be better managed. We hope, therefore, that our proposals will meet with your Lordship's approval.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

Enclosures referred to.

From Major General *C. T. Chamberlain*, C.S.I., President, Special Stud Commission, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1495, dated Camp Ghazipur, 12th November 1873).

In reply to your No. 89 of 3rd September last, I have the honour to forward copy of a report§ and enclosures as per margin, from Mr. J. H. B. Hallen, detailing his proceedings at Poona and Bombay, and making certain suggestions regarding the remounting of the armies of India.

§ No. 89 H., dated 23 October 1873.
App. A.—Roll of stallions.
„ B.—Questions and replies.
„ C.—Ali Abdoollah's letter of 11th October 1873.

The information he collected from the horse dealers therein named || establishes the probability of about 1,000 remounts being available annually in the course of a few years for distribution in the three Presidencies, in addition to such number of colonial horses as the local market may supply.

|| Abdool Rahman.
Ali Abdoollah.
Hussun Khan.
Morad Khan.

2. The particulars which Mr. Hallen gathered in Bombay regarding the latter class led him to believe that the trade with that port is precarious. Freight during the present season has been so high as to prevent shippers sending horses there. At all events, these are the reasons given for shipments not being expected, and it is known that some 60 walers were landed last month by Messrs. Warren and Lalor at Madras, and sent by rail to Poona and Bombay. The prizes offered in Calcutta for colonial horses this year may, to a certain extent, have affected the Bombay market.

3. It is rumoured that the Governments of Bombay and Madras, and the shippers of horses to those ports, hold the belief that the Government of India grants an advantage to the Bengal Army in allowing horses to be purchased in Calcutta and elsewhere in this Presidency at—

600 rupees for Horse Artillery, and
500 rupees for other branches.

But it must be remembered that the above sums are the maximum allowed, and according to the system now obtaining, are seldom given, because every horse purchased is paid for at the price considered to be his market value. Up to the present time the average cost of 280 remounts this season in Calcutta is *Rs.* 487.15.11. This is owing to the horses brought before the agent not being of a higher value. Some few have been priced, and bought for as high sums as 700 and 750 rupees; again, others as low as 350 rupees.

4. It is believed that in Bombay the price sanctioned for all branches is 500 rupees; and in Madras 575 rupees for Horse Artillery and Hussars, and 500 rupees for other horses; but these prices are, it is understood, always given. In other words, the maximum price sanctioned is the only sum known. Consequently, if an average be struck of the cost of a Madras or Bombay remount, it will be found to be as much, if not more, than that now given in Bengal under the system of valuation.

5. At first sight it appears that Bombay and Madras labour under a disadvantage by the maximum of 600 rupees not being allowed, and for this reason it seems advisable to authorise standard rates throughout India, viz., those of Bengal. If the information about the Madras rates is correct, the gain in that Presidency will simply be nominal. In Bombay it will not be much, because there are but few Horse Artillery batteries in that Presidency, and the outlay on their account will be very trifling.

To the public, dealers, and shippers the advance in price will be considered a boon, and will remove the feeling of any particular market having any particular advantage.

6. But, if this concession be made, it will be for Government to guard its interests, both on the score of economy and efficiency, by impressing upon the Governments of Bombay and Madras the necessity for introducing the system now in force in Bengal. At first, it will be unpalatable to the dealers; but if the officers appointed to the duties of purchasing have a real knowledge of horses, and conduct their work with tact and judgment, the merchants will soon learn that they must bring good horses if they wish to secure the top price, and they should be told that Government prefers to pay it, in preference to buying cheaper animals. This is the only practical way of bringing the dealers to see that, in future, the Government will only pay a commercial value for their horses, and does not accept proposals of the nature mentioned in Ali Abdoollah's letter (the passage marked marginally in red ink), Appendix C., "to enter into an agreement and engage to give" him 600 rupees for artillery horses (not horse artillery only), and 500 rupees for cavalry in Bombay.

7. With reference to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Mr. Hallen's report, in which he explains the system he advocates for remounting the army, I think it must be looked at in its practical light, which embraces greater efficiency with substantial economy.

The

The fuller details promised in that paragraph are explained to me as follows:—

That instead of regarding the interests of the three armies as separate, they should be considered as one, and that the purchases should be made on one account, distributing horses wherever they may be wanted.

For example—

The supposed requirements to be as follows:—

———	Horse Artillery.	Foot Artillery.	Hussars.	Total.
Bengal - - - - -	200	400	600	1,200
Madras - - - - -	50	150	200	400
Bombay - - - - -	50	150	50	250
Total - - -	300	700	850	1,850

The total for the year, for the whole armies, will be—

Horse Artillery - - - - - - - - - - -	300
Field „ - - - - - - - - - - -	700
Hussars - - - - - - - - - - - - -	850
Total - - -	1,850

The remount agents at each port will register these wants, and from time to time keep each other acquainted with the state and prospects of their respective markets and of the purchases made. If in one market deficiency occur, the other agents would meet its particular wants (given in the register), instead of as at present being left to its own resources, so that each Presidency would mutually assist the other, and all market rates being alike, both for the dealers and for Government, the cost of the horses should be about the same. If it should happen that the prices in one market be raised, Government will have two others to fall back upon, and this would doubtless bring about a decline in the tariffs in the high market.

Should combination amongst the dealers of the three markets lead to a general rise, then Government, being the chief purchaser, will always make an impression by holding back for a time. This is, in my opinion, a very strong element of this scheme, as it places the horse trade in the hands of the State.

8. Each agent having a register of purchases duly classified for the different arms, the allotment of the remounts to the reserve depôts would be as described in the 13th paragraph of Mr. Hallen's letter.

9. As to the economy of the plan, it may be assumed that horses which may have to be sent from one Presidency to another by road will not cost the State, appreciably, more than if standing in a reserve depôt, and so far from doing them any harm, it will tend to improve their condition and acclimatize them, provided they are sent under charge of an European officer as it is recommended they should be.

10. When the Persian and Cape trades come to be fully developed (with the double view of securing the best class of horses and of counteracting the evil influence which a dependence on the Australian trade is calculated to engender), Bengal must always look to receiving a certain portion of its remounts from Bombay. Therefore, so far as this Presidency is concerned, it must be dependent upon external aid, and it will be more economical to include the requirements in the general list, than to offer additional inducement to the

 dealers

dealers to bring horses to Allahabad. This latter measure was originally proposed in my letter, No. 5A., of the 26th August last, with the object of securing Persian and other horses for this army. It was one of the points upon which Mr. Hallen was directed to report (paragraph 4 of your letter, No. 89), and is included in the information obtained from the Bombay merchants. Attention is invited to the statements made by Ali Abdoollah in answer to Question 8, wherein he says:—

"I would prefer buying horses in Persia for the Bengal Presidency, to go there direct to Allahabad, and as there is no other port to land them at, must bring them to Bombay. If I were to let the Bombay Remount Committee pick from my horses, then the Bengal people would say the best horses have been taken, and the refuse only brought to Allahabad."

There is great truth in this; there is fair play in Mr. Hallen's scheme where horses will be allotted, as they stand on the register, impartially.

11. It will be observed in the concluding sentence of that report that the two officers with whom he conversed were favourable to his views. It is evident, therefore, that they did not consider the scheme unfavourable to their respective armies, and it certainly is not so to Bengal. It will induce co-operation on the part of the several Governments, it will stifle competition, and give the State every chance of remounting its army efficiently at a moderate cost.

From *J. H. B. Hallen*, Esq., Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, and Member, Special Stud Commission, to the President, Special Stud Commission, Mussoorie (No. 89 H., dated Mussoorie, 23rd October 1873).

In obedience to orders contained in letter No. 89, of 3rd ultimo, from Government of India, Military Department, I left here on the 20th ultimo, and arrived at Poona on the 15th idem, and have the honour to submit the following report.

2. On the 17th ultimo I had an interview with the Secretary to Government of Bombay, in the Military Department, on the subject of my mission, and fully explained my intentions of not interfering in any way in the horse market with the proceedings of the Bombay army purchasing officers; and that from the knowledge gained in connection with the Bombay horse market for many years, I had every hope of obtaining such information as would render it probable that the Persian horse trade in Bombay might be considerably developed, so that not only could the Bombay army be secured a sufficiency of remounts, but other portions of the Indian army might also become supplied with horses imported from that country.

3. I also assured the Secretary to the Government that all information I might obtain during my stay in Bombay would be submitted to him by me, for the information of his Excellency the Governor of the Presidency. I had also the honour of an interview with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, also with the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, and explained the intentions of the Government of India in directing me to inquire into the state of the horse market of the Western Presidency.

4. Adverting to paragraph 1 of letter No. 89, dated 3rd ultimo, from the Government of India, Military Department, I have to report having attended the horse show held at Poona during the first four days of the current month, and having assisted in the judging of the merits of the several competing horses and the awarding of the prizes in the different classes. I thus had an excellent opportunity of forming an opinion of the present state of horse-breeding, and the beneficial results obtained through the system adopted by the Local Government in distributing stallions in the several horse-breeding districts. I purpose reporting on this subject in a separate communication.

5. I was not able to purchase any stallions for the stud at the show. Two horses, "Satellite" and "Kingcraft," both Australians, were respectively priced at 10,000 rupees and 13,000 rupees, figures, in my opinion, far above their respective

respective merits. Had they been obtainable at a reasonable price, I would have brought "Satellite" and probably "Kingcraft" also. The reason why such high prices where put upon them rests upon their being considered valuable as race horses; and as their value as such will probably ere long become decreased by accidents to which horses on the turf are liable, and which will not lessen their worth for stud purposes, they will eventually become obtainable at reasonable prices, and in the interim they will have the opportunity of proving their goodness and enduring qualities or otherwise.

Another stallion, an Arab, "Silvertail," I would also have purchased; but as I found the purchasing officer of stallions for the Bombay horse-breeding districts wished to obtain this horse, and though he was priced at a figure above the maximum allowed by the Bombay Government, and within the limit allowed by the Government of India, I was most careful in not competing for the purchase; and by assuring the Bombay purchasing officer and the owner of the horse of my intentions, the former was enabled to purchase the horse at his own price, and his services are thus secured by the State.

6. Owing to the embargo lately placed on the exportation of Arab horses, there will be for some time a scarcity in India of good horses of that breed.

7. I was more fortunate in my search for stallions in the city of Bombay, and after some days I obtained eight, all Arabs, several of them of high quality, and the remainder of an average standard. A register and descriptive roll of these horses is attached, marked A, and it will be observed that their prices averaged *Rs.* 1,035. 12. per horse, a sum which may be considered very moderate.

I brought these horses with me on my return from Bombay, and have handed them over to the officer in charge of the depôt at Saharunpore, whence they will be distributed for service.

8. I purchased no remounts, as I only saw five or six horses at the Poona Horse Show and in Bombay fit for army purposes; and as I had been informed by the Secretary to Government of the local feeling that there would be a dearth of remounts this season in the Bombay horse market, I thus carefully obeyed the injunctions conveyed in paragraph 3 of No. 89, dated 3rd ultimo, from the Government of India, Military Department.

9. The annual importation of horses from the Gulf and Northern India to Bombay commences this month.

10. I beg now to report with reference to the subject of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Government of India letter, Military Department, above quoted.

The practical experience I had gained during my residence in Western India, especially on occasions when I had assisted in the purchasing of remounts in Bombay, and my personal acquaintance with the men who import or receive imported horses in that city, placed me in a favourable position to make full inquiry as to the prospects of the trade and the price for remounts that it may be considered necessary to give.

The names of the principal Persian dealers are Abdool Rahman, Ali Abdoollah; and of those of Northern India, Hussun Khan* and Morad Khan.* I had several interviews with these men, and the information obtained from them will be found in their replies to questions put by me, and noted on the appended document marked B.

* Sons of the late Alum Khan, mentioned by the Cabul Envoy at Simla.

11. It will be observed that if inducement be steadily offered by the Government that many more and better horses than are at present imported can be obtained from Persia, Candahar, and Cabul. By Ali Abdoolla's letter attached to his replies, it will be seen that he is prepared to bring some Persian horses this season to Bombay under certain terms. He is doubtless a very good judge of horses, and will if the opportunity be afforded him, probably bring good horses; but by the latter part of Abdool Rahman's 13th reply, it is very evident that the prices allowed in Bengal by the Government of India for remounts are quite sufficient to allow of dealers having a fair profit. Abdool Rahman is a most respectable man, very trustworthy, is a native of Persia, and his information can be relied on. I therefore consider the prices now given by the Government of India should not be increased, and they should be laid down as the prices *throughout* India.

The enduring qualities, power, and substance of the Persian horse have

proved him to be excellent for army purposes, and it is most desirable that as large a supply of horses as possible should be obtained from Persia, not only because of the goodness of the breed, but also to ensure another class of horses competing in the Indian market. Again, many of the horses imported from those countries around Northern India are known to be admirably fitted for remounts, and from the information now recorded, it is most advisable that every inducement should be given to importers to bring horses from those countries. Indeed it seems obvious that if only such inducement be offered, and support by purchasing be steadily given and continued, we may in a year or two calculate upon obtaining at least 1,000 good remounts annually in the Bombay market from Persia, Candahar, and Cabul. Let me here note the policy of having mares, not stallions or geldings imported.

12. As the annual requirements of the Bombay army may be considered as from 250 to 300 remounts, I would now suggest what means should be adopted with a view of securing for the rest of the mounted branches of the Indian army the remainder of remounts which will be obtainable in the Bombay market.

I have carefully thought over this subject, and I have arrived at an opinion as to the best means towards effecting such an end; but I will defer fully entering into details until I have the opportunity of conferring with you. Meanwhile, I will note my belief that to ensure securing all good remounts that may be in future offered for sale in the different horse markets of India, we should submit to the Government of India that the remounting of the armies of the three presidencies should no longer be separately but collectively considered, that is, as a question of remounting the Indian army as one army; that a Remount Agent should be appointed in each of the three presidencies; that the requirements of horses for the Indian army be annually made known to these officers; they should co-operate, each keeping the others informed by post or telegram, when necessary, of purchases from time to time made; that the prices for remounts should be in each presidency the same; a maximum price allowed for horses suited for the different branches; and that the system of purchasing according to the actual market value of each animal, which now obtains in the Remount Agency in Calcutta, be steadily enforced by the other Remount Agents, and that the average price of the remounts purchased should not exceed the maximum price sanctioned.

I feel assured that a system of purchasing based upon such principles would ensure the efficient providing of horses for the Indian army.

13. The allotting of the horses so purchased would be a simple matter. Each Remount Agent would keep his own register of purchases, and the horses should be allotted alternately and according to classes to the different nearest corps and batteries or reserve depôts as required in the order they are borne on his register.

This would create emulation on the part of the Remount Agents, as their several horses would be distributed to different parts of India, and have to be criticised and reported on by many General Officers of Divisions, the Inspector General of Artillery, and the several Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons of the Indian Army, and doubtless the Remount Agent who practically proves himself most efficient in his office would obtain the credit due to him.

Again by having the different breeds of horses now found in the Indian army, viz., Australian, Persian, Candahar, Cabul, Northern Stud, and country-bred, and we may hope for Cape, proportionately distributed to different corps and batteries throughout India, we shall in time find the latter mounted and horsed alike, a desideratum which certainly should be aimed at, and, if possible, gained.

14. I beg to add, with reference to paragraph 3 of this letter, that I handed a copy of the papers maked B, attached, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, prior to my leaving Poona, in order that his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in Council might be cognizant of the information I had gathered during my stay in that presidency. The letter of Ali Abdoollah, attached to his replies in the appended document marked B, I received from him on the eve of my leaving Bombay to return here, and I intend to send a copy of the letter to the Secretary to the Bombay Government.

15. I have

15. I have to record also that I had the opportunity when at Poona of conferring with the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Governor of Madras, who had been deputed by the Madras Government to attend the horse show, and, I believe, inquire into the state of the horse market of Bombay. This officer gave me to understand that the subject of providing remounts is under the earnest consideration of the Government of Madras, and he has requested me to send him a copy of the papers marked B. This I am about doing.

16. In conclusion, I would mention that in the course of my conversations with the Secretary to the Government of Bombay and the Military Secretary of the Government* of Madras, I avowed my opinions as to how the more efficient remounting of the Indian army might be carried out, and I have reason to believe that both officers fully concur with my views.

* Governor?
(signed) *C. T. Chamberlain.*

From Major General *S. Browne*, C.B., V.C., President, Special Stud Commission, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 48, "Studs Report"—Horse Trade; Future supply)"; dated Mussooree, 2nd August 1875.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a report on the late stud gathered from data furnished by a previous committee and by the Special Stud Commission, together with the opinion I have been able to form since I assumed charge of the office of President, Special Stud Commission.

2. I will allude first to the opinions given by Major General C. Troup's Committee expressed in their report (paragraphs as per margin) as follows:—

Opinion of General Troup's Committee on the late stud.

Paragraph 15, page 35, General Troup's Committee Report.—"The Committee are forced to the conclusion that the stud is now in a most unsatisfactory state from the following facts:—

"1st. The steady decrease in the number of remounts;
"2nd. The large proportion of unsound horses;
"3rd. The great number of narrow chests and twisted fore-legs; and
"4th. The very bad results of the stud operations as shown by the remounts of the last year."

Working of the Stud Department.

Paragraph 2, Part IX., page 36, General Troup's Committee Report. "With regard to the first and mainly essential question, viz., the general management of the department with reference to the supply of a sufficient number of remounts at a reasonable cost, and taking also into account its influence upon the improvement in the breed of horses in India, the committee neither consider that the studs at present work satisfactorily, nor can they supply a sufficient number of suitable horses to complete the requirements of the service; but it is believed that if its suggestions be carried out, they will some years hence be in a fair position to do so, *and at a more reasonable cost*;" and to the conclusions arrived at by the Special Stud Commission given in paragraphs 54-57, inclusive, of their Letter No. 3671, dated 27th June 1874, as follows:—

Opinions of the Special Stud Commission.

Paragraph 54. The immediate decline is accounted for in this way:

"Up to a certain time very superior stallions were imported from England, and there being some 3,000 mares in the breeding districts, greater selection could be made in choosing for brood. When, moreover, the supply of stallions ceased for a period, and, when supplied, were inferior in quality, when, also, strain was put upon the department by the large augmentation, to the mounted branches, inferior mares were sent into the district to meet the demand for remounts; and this course has been continued up to the present time, even to employing three-year old fillies for the purpose. This is said to have been done under the orders of the late Earl of Mayo."

Paragraph 55. "I beg reference to the Result Statement, Appendix D., in proof of the large number of unfit mares brought before this Commission straight from the breeding districts; also to extract (Appendix J.) from Colonel Couper's letter showing the number of mares *he* disposed of in November last; and again to "Appendix C.," which proves that of 1,743 mares on the books on the

the 1st January 1873, only 1,048 remained to be resumed. The balance, consequently, either died or were disposed of as not worth keeping."

Paragraph 56.—"I ask how it is possible that horses could be bred at a reasonable cost in the Central Division, where everything was against success. I account for the narrow-chested, congenitally unfit and malformed stock, also for the creaking joints, knuckling-over fetlock, elbows in, toes out, seedy toe, bad action, weedy frames and other degeneracy—

Opinions of Special Stud Commission regarding degeneracy in the Central studs.

"1st. To a damp climate altogether inimical to horses.

"2nd. To the operations being trusted to a race of people inhabiting a country where horses are not indigenous, and who, therefore, have no taste for them.

"3rd. To the impossibility of giving the mares the exact horse they require. Such stallions being often unavailable, or too far distant for the purpose, they had to be put to whatever horse was handy. To this may be added in many instances faulty classing.

"4th. To neither sires or dams having had liberty for many generations.

"5th. To the impure air in confined non-ventilated hovels where they were kept, sometimes not loosened for months together (in the rains communication between villages is often by log boats), always standing in their own filth, except when the depôt officer was known to be on tour.

"6th. To improper food, especially injurious to the mare *in* foal and the foal at foot.

"7th. To a chronic system of stall rearing and forcing when the foals were taken up, with sham liberty and exercise of two or three hours per diem, a system which produced yearly epidemics of strangles as well as by a large crop of diseases endangered by inactivity and pampering, which told upon them when drafted into the 'service' or 'brood.'"

Paragraph 57. "It would be impossible to state what number of mares have been shot for 'œdema' and 'down behind,' as no regular record has been kept; but it would not be wrong to say that hundreds have been so dealt with.

"As they were not sent to the breeding districts in this state, they became so from being tied up for years in succession.

"I ought to explain that 'down behind' means the falling of the fetlocks, even to their touching the ground in consequence of the pastern joints losing their elasticity from want of motion, the blood thereby stagnating, and not only producing loss of power in the part, but also causing the 'œdema.'

"The animal seen under the extreme conditions were suffering intensely; the oldest, and they the best mares, some of them grand specimens, were the most affected; the middling aged ones were less so; the younger ones still less; those recently sent out not at all. The produce of the former showed that this defect had become hereditary (I am told that Veterinary Surgeon Parry asserted some years back that it would become so).

"Some of them were destroyed at once, and others parted with owing to this malformation.

"If liberty had always been the rule, all the defects, barring climate, would have been avoided, the produce would have been considerably greater, and far less unsound."

3. Major General Troup's Committee, for the reasons assigned, condemned the stud as it stood, a decision shared in by the Special Stud Commission. Having lately inspected the Saharanpur, Hapur and Karnal depôts, and perused the papers connected with previous Reports and inspections, I cannot but come to the same conclusion that the stud, as carried on under its old arrangement, failed to supply the requirements of Government, was falling off in its supply of remounts for the army; and those that were supplied cost Government of late as follows:

Failure of studs to supply remount.

Cost of stud remounts. In General Troup's Committee Report, paragraphs 19, 20, pp. 29, 30.

		Rs.
"For seven years (1861-62—1867-68 inclusive)	-	1,485
" five years (1863-64—1867-68 ditto)	-	1,789
" three years (1865-66—1867-68 ditto)	-	2,194

showing

showing a steady and enormous increase in the cost of a remount from the Stud Department.

"The Committee further notice that for the last seven years there has been a great and unaccountable increase in the net expenditure of the department, it having risen from 10,71,169 rupees in 1861-62 to 14,30,500 rupees in 1867-68, notwithstanding which, the outturn has been steadily diminishing.

Causes tending to regeneration.

4. Some of the causes tending to the degeneration and to the enhanced cost may be briefly stated as follows:—

1stly. Not sufficient care in selection when purchasing colts and fillies, hundreds yearly being subsequently rejected and sold for a trifle after costing Government a high sum (*vide* Appendix A.)

Here I must add that in my inspection last month I reject 119 animals, though the depôt had only been inspected two months previously, when a number were cast. Had I complied with the wishes of the stud officers, many more would have been ordered to be sold. I note this to show that the Commission had not been too severe when in March and April last they rejected 586 from this depôt (Hapur) alone.

Reasons of degeneration as shown in General Troup's Committee Report.

5. I beg to support my reasons for the cause of degeneration by the following extracts from General Troup's Committee Report:—

Paragraph 67, page 9. "It will be observed from the above that about *one-third of the stock in hand is bad and not worth keeping;* none of these animals should have been brought in the first instance; but if a few by accident had been brought into the depôts, they should have been weeded and sold as soon as their unfitness was discovered.

"Nearly one-fifth of the whole is put down as 'unlikely,' of which it is believed that many were kept on in the hope of some of them eventually turning out fit for the service; but from the calculation of the Committee noted below, it is apparent that this is a mistake and false economy; for not more than 5 per cent. will ever be passed as remounts, and at least one-half should therefore have been rejected and sold. It is understood that many of the animals pronounced 'bad' by the Committee have since been disposed of; but still there remain numbers in the depôt which should be cleared out."

Paragraph 23, page 14. "The Committee do not consider it necessary to comment any further on the young stock selected for purchase, as purchasing or otherwise is not optional to the stud officer in several districts, however bad the animal may be. But during the inspection of these districts several foals, either from malformation or other causes, being found worthless were put up at once to auction, and realised, considering the animals, high prices. Had all the bad colts and fillies been similarly disposed of, a great saving would have been effected and more room and green food would have been available for those in the depôts; and the Committee is of opinion that 18 per cent. are 'unlikely,' and it is quite certain that half of them or 210 should have been weeded out and sold soon after their arrival in the depôts.

"This would have been a further saving of fodder, green food, and what is more important, room in the stables."

Paragraph 39, page 6. "The Committee were informed by the Deputy Superintendent of Studs that only 37 per cent. of the number purchased by him were expected to get into the service, this having been the average number for previous years.

Paragraph 41, page 6. "The Committee observed many foals purchased as young as eight or nine months old. They also noticed in the depôts many of the young stock that ought never to have been selected or retained, being either lame from hereditary disease, or unfit from malformation and other causes.

"These purchases were made with the idea, *first*, that young foals would get better food in the depôts, and have a better chance of turning out well; *secondly*, that horses with hereditary diseases already developed might grow sufficiently out of them to render them serviceable; and, *thirdly*, that young stock with twisted toes in at the hocks and such malformations would, as they grow older, improve so much as to become fair remounts."

Paragraph 5, page 37. "The Committee has already in Part VI., paragraph 18, fully entered into the subject of the cost of a remount furnished from the stud, and has expressed its opinion generally respecting the evident and apparent causes of these high rates, which may be briefly enumerated as follows:—

"1st. Enormous expenditure in buildings and repairs.

"2nd. The maintenance of depôts and establishments altogether disproportioned to the stock in hand.

"3rd. Higher rank of officers and consequent increase of pay, the result of present army organization.

"4th. Over-purchase and subsequent retention in depôts of useless stock.

"5th. The pay and travelling allowances of two Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons of the army debited to the Stud Department.

"6th. Decrease in outturn.

"7th. The retention of unprofitable and bad Government mares in the breeding districts."

System of branding zemindary fillies.

Secondly. The system in the north-west districts of branding zemindary fillies as yearlings and under (reserved for brood purposes) whose produce Government purchased eventually, as shown below:—

Paragraph 2, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 1022, dated 8th August 1873. "The correspondence will speak for itself. Colonels Couper and MacDougall both consider that the breeders with whom they have been personally associated for a number of years look to the Government to purchase their young stock; *vide* paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 of Colonel Couper's letter, No. 104, of 31st ultimo, and paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, and 15 of Colonel MacDougall's No. 182 of the 28th item, especially paragraph 11, which shows that distinct promises have been held out by Deputy Superintendents."

Brood mares unfitted from size, form, &c.

Thirdly. Brood mares unfitted from size, form, breeding, and hereditary disease. In this is included not only the stud brood mares, but those also under the assamee and zemindary systems.

General Troup in his Committee Report says:—

"There are in the North-West about 18,000 zemindary brood mares on the register in the Deputy Superintendent's Office, of which the Committee inspected 1,548, and classed them as follows:—

Good - - - - - - -	454
Congenitally unfit - - - - - -	239
Bad - - - - - - - -	855
TOTAL - - -	1,548"

Paragraph 13, page 4. "The Committee, after a careful retrospect of what it has seen, has come to the unanimous opinion that the majority of the mares are either too small, ill-shaped, or possess such defects as render them totally unfit to breed from for any purpose."

Paragraph 34, page 5. "There are about 800 mares (assamee) in the North-West, located near Saharanpur and Deoband which are under charge of the Saharanpur Depôt Officer. The Committee inspected 716 mares, with 401 foals, which they classed as follows:—

Mares:—Good - - - - - - - -	297
Congenitally unfit - - - - - -	195
Bad - - - - - - - - -	224
TOTAL - - -	716

Foals:

Foals:—	Good	65
	Fair	116
	Unlikely	75
	Bad	145
	TOTAL	401

"Considering both mares and foals on the whole, they are deemed a very indifferent batch, and not more than 300 of the brood mares are fit for the purpose. In proof of this, an abstract showing their outturn will be furnished hereafter.

"From local inquiries made during their tour, the Committee are convinced that no Government mares should be retained on the circle system in the North-West for the following reasons: —

"(1.) The animals, as a rule, are neglected by the assamees, and presented an appearance of bad keep and starvation, which was the more apparent after the Central Stud mares had been inspected; and the great difference in condition between the Government mares and the zemindary mares brought up for inspection at the same villages was most remarkable. In fact, several Government mares were observed in such disgracefully bad condition that it was evident they had been starved for months; and as some of the men openly complained that they had not the means to feed the animals, the Committee consider that in the interests of Government, where this was the case, they should have been resumed at once.

"(2.) The produce was very much inferior to what it should have bee from mares the property of Government.

"(3.) These mares cost the State in the first instance a large sum, and the Government are bound to purchase their produce, whether *good or bad.* Therefore it must be conceded that it is the most expensive system, and to make it at all advantageous none but the very best brood mares should be given out.

"(4.) The two systems cannot live beside each other, and it was clear to the Committee that the plan of giving out Government mares killed the zemindary ones; for all the small farmers got rid of their animals that they may obtain possession of those the property of Government."

Inspection of zemindary mares by Special Stud Commission.

6. The Special Stud Commission, when writing on the inspection of zemindary mares in the breeding districts, North-West Provinces, state:—

Paragraph 14, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 4677 A., dated 10th December 1874. "Of the 1,586 seen at four stands,—

8 per cent. were good;
48 „ „ middling;
43 „ „ bad.

"If the truth is to be told, the two first grades are leniently dealt with. As they passed by we were reminded of the warning given at Buxar and Ghazipur when rejecting stud mares.

"Wait till you see the brutes in the North-West, which will make you wonder how they ever bred remounts.

"Hundreds of their foals that have been passed into the service would not have been fit for an 'ekka' if left to grow in the districts; but good feeding, *i.e.*, forcing in depôts, has produced the bone and size as well as infirmities.

"Although prepared for much inferiority, there never was room to anticipate what really came under observation.

"Some of the matrons are the veriest ponies; one measured 12 hands 3 inches; many do not exceed 13-3; two-thirds of the whole are branded.

"Their general condition, which is good, presents a marked contrast to the Government mares seen last year in the Central Division, which were more or less neglected as a rule."

The same Commission, in submitting a *résumé* of their visit through the districts reported having seen 7,000, of which there were—

Résumé of Special Stud Commission visit to the districts.

Paragraph 7, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 13, dated 24th April 1875.

"Good - - -	550
"Middling - -	4,200
"Bad - - -	2,250"

They also stated, when giving reasons for degeneracy of the Central Division stock (as per extracts below), that the Central Stud mares were in bad condition, fed on garbage, and uncared for.

Paragraph 56, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 3671, dated 27th June 1874, Clause 6.—"To improper food, especially injurious to mares *in* foal, and the foal at foot;" and on another occasion said, when visiting the stables in which assamee mares in the Central Division were located,—

Paragraph 5, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 3013, dated 28th February 1874.—"Anything more wretched or shameful, it would be difficult to describe."

"They were found in the same small courtyard as the horned stock; but whilst the latter were feeding off nicely cut, clean, sweet kurbee and green tops, mixed with oil-cake, out of a clean, well-made trough, the Government mares were either tied apart by the fore-legs, or else stowed away in a cramped, low hovel, hardly broad enough to allow of their lying down. The ground all uneven, and in a state of filth. The doorway almost the only source of air. One or two were allowed a space in a courtyard, but all was dirty. Their principal food appeared to be marshy grass and rushes. Their earthern mangers did not show trace of grain food, nor of the nice mixture which the cattle were eating."

"On asking if they or their foals would eat the latter, we were told no, but on releasing one from her picket, she soon gave her assamee the lie."

4thly. Mismanagement of stock in the "Stud." On this point, Major General Troup's Committee commented strongly as follows:—

Mismanagement of stock in the stud.

Paragraph 60, Page 9, General Troup's Committee Report. "Young stock from confinement and overfeeding become fat and heavy; and from being forced to stand so long in one position, an unnatural weight is thrown for a continuance on the legs. The consequence is a due development and tenacity of muscles and tendons is prevented, weak and oblique pasterns, narrow chests, twisted fore-legs and cow-hocks are induced; and as a general rule, the result is the total want of freedom in action so remarkable in all the stud horses."

Paragraph 61, page 9. "The Committee are of opinion that all the advantages of good blood and excellence of food are more than counterbalanced by this most unnatural system of keeping a young horse tied up in a hot and crowded stable for 22 out of the 24 hours, and would strongly recommend that all the stables (with the exception of those for stallions and reserved colts) be converted into open sheds, and that the whole of the young stock (except reserved colts) be allowed to run loose all day in the cold, and all night in the hot seasons, including the mornings and evenings."

"This is the very least amount of liberty that should be allowed to them; but where practicable, it would decidedly be preferable if they could be left loose altogether, except at feeding hours, and for inspection morning and evening. General Gilbert strongly animadverted in 1851, on the want of liberty allowed to the young stock."

8. The same Committee, when writing about the system of tending and feeding at the stud depôts, reported:—

System of tending and breeding stud stock.

Paragraph 10, page 39, General Troop's Committee Report. "The great faults are—

"1st. Want of sufficient liberty.
"2nd. Overcrowding in stables.
"3rd. Overfeeding with grain."

Notwithstanding the above remarks and recommendations, the Special Stud Commission ascertained that no change was introduced until ordered by them.

In their letter marginally quoted, they reported—

Special Stud Commission Office, No. 4677A., dated 10th December 1874.

Paragraph 25, Special Stud Commission Office, No. 4677, dated 10th December 1874.—"The 4th to 7th paragraphs of his Grace the Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 58, of the

the 20th of March 1873, prove that the present condition of the studs is the sequence to the disregard by the Superintendent of Studs of the recommendations made in 1851, by Sir Walter Gilbert's Committee, which stated that the then system (which existed in 1873, 22 years later) was capable of great improvement, which, if carried out, would render the studs more profitable and capable of supplying a better description of cattle than at present.

Appendix E., page 22, General Troup's Committee Report.

"Even if the reformation so loudly called for had been adopted on the receipt of the Secretary of State's Despatch (October 1866) sanctioning the retention of the studs, the cost of remounts which is shown by the Controller of Military Expenditure to have been in—

	Rs.	a.
1861-62 - - - - - - - -	967	9
1862-63 - - - - - - - -	881	3

but which rose enormously afterwards (causes of which are explained in Part IX., pp. 36-41) would by this time have been very reasonable; and why these sanctioned reforms were not carried out seems incomprehensible."

Unsuitability of sites for studs.

5thly.—Unsuitability of sites for studs. Central Studs, especially as regards climate, and where the most valuable stock were kept as shown in paragraph 2, "Opinion Special Stud Commission" of this report—

No definite arrangements for a proper strain of blood.

6thly. No definite arrangements by which a proper strain of blood once introduced was carried on.

That any real and proper results should be arrived at, it was most essential that the same strain should have been continued; for instance, if a country mare was first covered by an Arab or English horse, the produce, if a filly and reserved for brood purposes, should have been served by a stallion of the same breed, and so on; thus a particular class or a specific strain in the course of a few generations would have been obtained; but there was no arrangement for this, nor could be under the conditions of the stud as existing. Consequently the animals, eventually from not being mated properly, became of a mixed strain, and thus the benefit of so many years' patience and expense are thrown away, or the produce became a mongrel breed, which at the present time a greater portion of the home stud mares are.

Causes of deterioration in stud stock.

9. Less causes than those above enumerated were sufficient to insure a deterioration, added to which the high price a remount cost before he was admitted into the service clearly established the fact that the stud on such a footing was not only a dead loss to Government, but failed to supply the proper number and class of remounts or improve the breed of the country.

Location of some stallions in unhealthy situations.

10 Valuable stallions were located at different stands, some of them in unhealthy situations. These animals were often not properly cared for, and were not under sufficient supervision. The number and description of mares they covered could never be actually tested, this being left to the discretion and report of the Darindah and Zilladar, whose interests were supposed to be directly concerned in how much they could make.

Register of covering kept, but unreliable.

11. A register was kept, but this could not always be relied on, as ascertained by subsequent inquiries. The result of this is proved by the miserable produce fathered to the stallion and the disgraceful state some have been returned in to the stud, not often from want of fodder, but from being overtaxed.

Unfit stallions.

12. A number of stallions were also utterly unfitted from shape, substance and hereditary disease, and should never have been employed.

Classing of Stallions by General Troup's Committee.—This is verified by General Troup's Committee, which describes that of 148 English and Arab stallions which were inspected by them—

One-third were "good and fair,"
Ditto "bad,"
Ditto "utterly unfit,"

or, in other words, one-third only should have been employed.

The result of the Special Stud Commission inspection of those actually seen was as follows:

Classing of stallions by Special Stud Commission.

Good	55
Fair	70
Indifferent	22
Bad	38
	185

Those as yet not seen by the Commission, but reported on by the Deputy Superintendent, are classed,—

Classing by Deputy Superintendent.

Good	10
Fair	18
Middling	13
Indifferent	20
Bad	5
	66

From the above it appears that of the whole lot seen there are,—

Classing of the whole.

Good	65
Fair	88
Middling	13
Indifferent	42
Bad	43
	251

13. The latest returns (dated 1st June 1875) give the number of stallions, all told, as follows:—

Return of stallions on the 1st of June.

Hapur	40	118	158
Saharanpur	36	42	78
Karnal	15	-	15
TOTAL	91	160	251

In the year 1869–70 there was a total of 365 stallions; and the remounts issued from them passed from the service in 1874–75, have been 382.

14. Appendix B. shows the number of stallions during the years 1861 to 1870, as also the number of remounts passed each year into the service for the last 10 years.

Number of stallions during the years 1861 to 1870, and remounts passed for 10 years.

15. Before concluding my observations on the stallions, I would beg here to allude to the difficulty now stated by Colonel Thornhill, the agent in England, in a letter received from him by the last mail, in which he states that he has only been able to secure five thorough-bred stallions this year; he sees little prospect of obtaining the remaining 19.

English stallions. Colonel Thornhill's difficulty.

16. With this difficulty before us, I do not think it unadvisable to recommend endeavour being made to procure stallions from Australia and the Cape, the more so, as there seems little prospect of any in the Arab market at present.

Recommendation to procure stallions from the Cape and Australia.

The scheme started in England by Lord Calthorpe enhances the difficulty, as the very class of horses required in India is what will be taken up there.

17. The past experience of Government breeding their own stallions leads me to urge the introduction of the plan of purchasing yearling or two-year olds *in* England, and farming them out *till* of a proper age for their use and transport to India.

Recommends the introduction of the plan of purchasing yearling or two-year olds in England for ultimate use as stallions in India.

Such stallions would in all probability cost at the most from 200 to 300 guineas each.

Mr.

Mr. Thacker believes in his report that fit stallions could be obtained in the Australian market for from 300 *l.* to 500 *l.*

Those issued from the Home Stud at Karnal must have cost Government at least five times the amount.

18. Finally, from the data given in this report and from my own observations, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that there was no hope of any amelioration either in class or number of remounts as supplied by the stud, and that the cost to Government was excessive.

From data given concludes that there was no amelioration either in class or number of remounts from the stud, and cost excessive.

19. The extent of the farm lands at Saharanpur comprises 2,413 acres. This supplies lucerne, carrots, gram, barley, oats and hay and impey, as well as pasture for the horses, also cattle worked on the farm.

Farm lands, Saharanpur.

The rent paid by the Government is a nominal sum of *Rs.* 112. 12. 9. per annum, and the remission of revenue is 2,945 rupees per annum.

Rent.

20. The advantages and profit accruing to Government in the above arrangements are very considerable; and I beg most strongly to recommend that it may be kept up. A saving per horse per annum of 29 rupees is effected, exclusive of the pasturage for cattle.

Advantages.

The advantages of a good supply of hay (which is never made by Natives), lucerne and carrot and impey would be lost, and the cattle be constantly at the mercy of contractors and of the market, which so often fails at the proper time.

21. The farm will ensure a proper supply of hay, grass, &c., at all seasons, whereas, as is proved by trusting to the market, we should be certainly in dire misfortune for supplies not usually grown by Natives, and the horses will suffer.

Farm will ensure a proper supply of hay, grass, &c., at all seasons.

22. The abstract Appendix C will exhibit how profitable the farm was under the old stud arrangements; and though I am not able to show, yet I am confident that the profit, instead of being 29 rupees a horse per annum, will nearly, if not quite, double that sum, independent of the comfort to the horses and pasturage for the cattle.

Accounts of the farm.

The one thing wanting to make the farm still more productive is a better supply of canal water; and this, I trust, will be arranged.

Better supply of canal water required.

23. With regard to Hapur. There are only grass lands to the extent of 1,630 acres, which lie between and adjoin the different stables, and answer the purposes of rukhs from which hay is collected; there is no other farming here except a few roots and lucerne and impey in a garden between buildings.

Hapur farm lands.

24. The six classes of horses enumerated below are generally looked on as sources of supply of remounts.

Remount prospects.

I have endeavoured to show what prospect each class affords.

Sources of supply.

1st. Australia.	4th. Arabia.
2nd. Cape.	5th. Cabul.
3rd. Persia.	6th. India.

25. With regard to Australia, I think we may safely predict an unfailing supply of excellent animals.

Australia.

Hitherto a too coarse and under-bred description have been purchased, causing much dissatisfaction; but the last year's purchase have been a great improvement, and with the measures now in the course of adoption by Mr. Thacker the class of horse will improve.

Improvement in class hoped for.

The re-allotting Committee, assembled at Hapur on 19th and 20th July 1875, remarked "a good batch of remounts above the average of New South Wales horses"; and it is satisfactory to find that at Saharanpur the Committee passed into the Horse Artillery 149 walers out of 399 presented.

Numbers.

As to numbers, any amount can be procured.

A great difference of opinion exists as to the merits of the waler; fully half the service are opposed to them. The grounds of their dislike are the inability of the Australian horse to stand exposure under a tropical sun in the hot weather, and consequently the fear of their breaking down in a campaign.

Opinion regarding walers.

Some cause for dislike.

Some cause for such a dislike has arisen from the fact of so many very *low-bred coarse* horses having been supplied as remounts, heavy and ugly, on which account they failed to please the eye, and, no doubt, many were constitutionally unfit to stand exposure. The better bred a horse is, whether English, Australian or Arab, the more he will prove his capacity to stand exposure, hard work, poor and scanty food. The Australian horse also from his timidity at first, and some with waler tricks, have given more trouble in breaking in, hence another cause of dislike.

The better bred a horse, the more capable will he be of withstanding exposure.

Cape.—Excellent qualities.

26. With regard to Cape horses there is not a dissentient voice; all admit the excellent qualities of this breed. They contain every quality to make the most valuable army remounts.

Mr. Thacker's report awaited.

It would be premature to state now what we may expect from the Cape, as until Mr Thacker's report is received we cannot form any idea.

Hopes of re-opening the trade.

He may be able, and I sincerely trust so, to re-open the trade, which has for years past been at a standstill.

Causes of cessation of supply.

The apparent causes of this cessation of supply may be briefly stated as follows:—

Decrease of shipping.

The decrease of ships trading by the Cape route since the Suez Canal was opened.

Superfluous stock owing to want of means of export.

The farmers, from the sudden cessation of the shipping and want of transport for their horses, had stock thrown on their hands which led them into difficulties, and stopped further breeding of that class of horse.

Diamond mania another cause.

The diamond mania which induced so many to throw up farming, and bankers having a lien on the farms, they insist on other cultivation as more paying than horse-breeding.

Introduction of the breed of cart-horse stallion another cause.

The introduction of the breed of the cart-horse stallion for breeding for farm purposes, instead of the former class of riding horses.

These are the causes which inquiries have elicited as the reasons for the non-supply of Cape horses. Mr. Thacker's report may in the course of two months be expected, when we shall be able to gather how the prospects of a supply from there will stand.

Persia.—The Turcoomanee horse most valuable and of good blood.
Recommends the opening of the trade.
Persian horse (Gulf Arab).
No difficulty in procuring Persian horses.

27. Under this head I will include the Turcoomanee horse. This breed is a most valuable one, good blood, enduring, handsome, and tractable; but few now find their way into the markets. Previously they were far more abundant, and the Bombay Horse Artillery were most efficiently horsed with them. I would strongly urge that Government should take measures to open this trade. The Persian horse, otherwise "the Gulf Arab," there should be no difficulty in having the markets well supplied with, the more so just now as the occupation of the Arab merchants is reduced by the prohibition of the export of Arabs.

Difficulties of obtaining a supply.

28. The Turcoomanee horse from around Merv and Meshed are undoubtedly a very superior class of animal; and though they may be obtained in the numbers stated by Colonel V. Baker in his report, and at the price given, I feel constrained to state that the distance and situation of the places where they are procurable makes it almost impossible to obtain them.

Distance to port of embarkation.
Bad feeling between sects.

29. By the most direct route it is nearly 1,200 miles to Bushire, the port of embarkation; the bad feeling between the sects of Sheeahs and Soonees would alone endanger, if not altogether prohibit, any chance of their reaching the sea coast. As for the other route *viâ* Afghanistan, the internecine troubles in that country, coupled with the lawless character of the people, precludes the possibility of their ever reaching British territory.

Major General Sir H. Lumsden's opinion.

30. Colonel (now Major General) Sir H. Lumsden in his Kandahar Mission Report, speaking of the Turcoomanee horse and the other breeds, says that the difficulty and danger prevents dealers from attempting to bring them down through Afghanistan.

Colonel

Colonel Sir F. Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawar, writing to Major General C. T. Chamberlain, says:

Colonel Sir F. Pollock's opinion.

"I can quite confirm what Lumsden says of the great merits of the blood of the Turkoman horse to be seen in the Meshed province; but at present it is no use sighing for them."

No reason why the Gulf Arab should not be procured.

But there is no reason why the Persian (Gulf Arab) should not again be provided; and I think that we may look forward to a supply from thence if the dealers are encouraged with the promise of Government guaranteeing the purchase of a certain number if of prescribed standard.

Abdul Rahman might undertake to bring horses.

Abdul Rahman, the Arab dealer in Bombay, a most respectable man, a Persian by birth, would, I feel assured, undertake to bring horses.

Arabs.—Supply almost in abeyance.

31. At present this source of supply is almost in abeyance from the embargo put on by the Turkish Government.

Some, of course, manage to elude the authorities and land a few; but the Turkish Consul at Bombay from orders from his Government notes the name of every dealer who is successful in landing a cargo.

One merchant who re-landed after forwarding a batch was apprehended. This restriction may continue for some years; but independent of this, the price of pure Arabs prevents our looking on them as a certain source of supply, as the large ones would only be passed, and their value proportionately greater, but probably no better.

Cabul.—Considered unfit for the service.

32. The Cabul or northern horses, such as are brought down, are, in my opinion, unfit for the service. Undoubtedly, excellent horses are bred in Cabul, but these are not permitted to leave the country; only the coarse heavy underbreds (and some good ponies) are allowed to come away; the former are unable to stand exposure and the duties we require of them, and the latter are too small.

Some good galloways, about 14-1, were passed into the service for Bombay Artillery formerly, and did good service.

From my own personal experience on the frontier for many years, from the trial I gave them in my own regiment, and from what I saw of them in other corps, I found them a complete failure.

In letter No. 3671, Assamee mares, dated 27th June 1874, Major General Chamberlain, referring to the Cabul horse, says (paragraph 68):—

"An incessant grumbling and clamour of disapproval has resounded from the corps and batteries to which they have been allotted;" and, again, paragraph 70, alluding to Major General Sir H. Lumsden's Candahar Mission Report, says:—

"Paragraph 45 describes the ordinary Cabul or Afghan horse, which need not be here detailed. Colonel Lumsden was dead against them on account of their inability to stand excessive heat."

I think, therefore, that any hope or reliance on this class is out of the question.

India.—Horse-breeding as a private enterprise disappeared in the North West.

33. Formerly, no doubt, a good stamp of horse was procurable; but horse-breeding as a private enterprise and the class of horse-breeders have disappeared in the North-West, though it is, I understand, kept up to some extent in some parts of the Bombay Presidency, and to a slight extent in that of Madras; and I must confess I am not sanguine as to our prospects of a supply from India for years to come.

Reasons for a poor prospect of supply.

My reasons are—

1st. That the old class of horse-breeders have died off.

2nd. The present generation have taken to a new and more remunerating livelihood.

3rd. Cultivation has been encouraged and enforced, and has extended all over the country where 50 years ago there were hundreds of acres where horses might be brought up. There is scarcely any now.

34. The assessment on lands is higher now than formerly, and the Native has to look to a higher return for his outlay than horse-breeding will bring him, besides so many various ways of investments.

However, now that Government is no longer a competitor in horse-breeding, but a purchaser only, it may encourage the Native to attempt it; and in one or two places Ally Jan, the Deputy Collector (who was associated with this Commission to explain to breeders the intentions of Government) reported that Native gentlemen had expressed their willingness to purchase mares, and to commence operations provided Government supplied stallions.

Chances in the Punjab more hopeful.

35. In the Punjab the chances are cheering.

Horse-breeding under Sikh rule.

Horse-breeding was in favour under Sikh rule; it has been fostered by us, and has never gone down to that degree to make its rise again either an innovation or a difficulty. Our rule in the Punjab is one only of yesterday, and the men who bred horses under the Sikh rule are alive now. It has never died out.

Reasons for hoping that horse-breeding will succeed.

36. With the impetus now being given by the Imperial and Local Governments I have every reason to hope that the anticipation of Government will be realised in the number of young stock being raised, but apprehension exists in my mind with regard to the method of their being educated.

No rukhs or runs for zemindaree young stock generally.

37. With a few exceptions, the zemindars generally have not any rukhs or runs where the young stock can have any liberty. As soon as weaned, the colts are, as a rule, disposed of to dealers, who gorge them with fattening and heating food, and keep them tied up in close and unventilated hovels, standing in a mass of filth.

Hobbling young stock.

It is to be hoped that when they find horse-breeding a remunerative operation they will learn to give their young stock some liberty by following the Persian and Arab system of hobbling when let loose to graze.

Prospects of horse-breeding in the Punjab.
Purchase of three-year olds as remounts.

38. After consideration of the Rawalpindi horse fair rules for the last three years, it is very evident that horse-breeding is year by year improving. The young stock shown at this year's fair was of so superior a stamp that the officer commanding the 4th Hussars addressed this Commission proposing that in future fairs three-year old colts should be purchased, and he would gladly receive them as remounts into his regiment.

Distribution of prizes in different approved parts of North West and Punjab.

39. In connection with the hope of inducing the Natives to follow the occupation of horse-breeding as a business, it is more desirable that the prizes awarded by the Government of India in different approved parts of the North-West and Punjab should not only be continued but added to in proportion as the field of breeding is extended. Such sums should be awarded under terms that breeders alone will profit.

Probynabad and Bhawalpur Farms.

The success that has attended the Probynabad and Bhawalpur Farms denotes the good management and energy shown, and evinces the capability of the country and climate in connection with horse-breeding.

Advisability of having a remount agent to purchase at all fairs.

40. I may here be excused from bringing to the notice of Government and urging strongly the advisability of having a remount agent to purchase at all fairs and stations where horses would at any time be procurable.

By such a plan one uniform good stamp of horse would be obtained.

There would be no competition or imposition as arises now from dealers going from one committee to another; and committees would not bid against one another. And I have no hesitation in saying that experience proves that the choice and selection by haphazard committees are most vexatious as well as a dead loss to Government; but they are measures approved of by the dealers.

Remounts in Madras and Bombay.

The fact of the Madras and Bombay armies having been supplied independent of the stud affords assurance that the Bengal Army can be horsed in a similar manner, viz., from purchasing in the open market.

Development of horse-breeding.

41. With reference to the developing of the several sources whence horses are imported, and ensuring a sufficiency of competition amongst dealers, so that a supply of remounts of a proper stamp may be obtained,—

Mr. Hallen's Report.

I would here refer to the report of Mr. Hallen in his letter No. 89-H., dated 23rd of October 1873, and letter No. 1495, dated 12th November 1873, from my predecessor, General

neral Chamberlain, wherein it is clearly shown that by viewing the question of remounting the several armies of India as that of remounting *one* army, the "Indian Army," and by adopting the same measures of purchasing and keeping a reserve of horses in Bombay as has for so many years so satisfactorily obtained in Madras, and now obtains in Bengal, the remounting of the army will be more satisfactorily and simply effected.

System for remounting the "Indian Army."

Were the system advised carried out by having one Indian Army agency co-operating in several metropolitan and mofussil horse marts, the State would then govern the entire horse market in India, could develop each source of supply as deemed necessary, and ensure being supplied with the classes of horses required; moreover, will be enabled to have the whole of the artillery and British cavalry uniformly mounted, as each reserve of horses could furnish remounts irrespective of Presidency, but respective of regiments and vicinity.

Advantages of the system.

42. With reference to the question of the Karnal Home Stud Farm, to which full replies were submitted in letter No. 4677-A., dated 10th December 1874, from President, Special Stud Commission, and further with regard to paragraph 6 of Military Department Letter No. 1165, dated 26th November 1874, I can only beg to advise the issue of the best brood mares for breeding operations to the most approved districts in the Punjab and North-West, the selection of any fit for the service, and transfer to the Army Reserve Depôt, and any that may remain to be disposed of by auction.

Home Stud.

43. With regard to the stallions and their future employment, the orders of Government are solicited.

Stallions.

APPENDIX A.

MEMORANDUM of the Requirements of the Army in HORSES as taken from the latest Returns received after the last Issues in July 1875.

BRANCH OF THE SERVICE.	Wanting to Complete.	Number of Chargers required.	Number likely to be Cast at next Inspections.	TOTAL.
Horse Artillery - - - - -	50	20	105	175
Field Artillery - - - - -	29	12	108	149
Hussars - - - - - -	52	6	88	146
TOTAL - - -	131	38	301	470

(signed) *G. B. C. Simpson*, Major,
Secretary, Special Stud Commission.

PRESENT State of ARMY RESERVE HORSES at Depôts on 1st August 1875.

DEPÔTS.	WALERS.				STUD-BRED.				OTHER BREEDS.				TOTAL.
	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mounted Cavalry.	Hussars.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mounted Cavalry.	Hussars.	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.	Mounted Cavalry.	Hussars.	
Hapur - - - -	38	44	16	10	8	110	31	36	4	1	–	1	299
Saharanpur - - -	135	180	40	63	1	120	–	3	–	2	–	–	544
TOTAL - - -	173	224	56	73	9	230	31	39	4	3	–	1	843
TOTAL of each Class	526 - - Unseasoned.				309				8				

(signed) *S. Browne*, Major General,
President, Special Stud Commission.

APPENDIX B.

STATEMENT showing the Number of STALLIONS during the Years 1861 to 1870, inclusive, and the Number of REMOUNTS produced by the said Stallions.

Stallions.		Remounts Passed into the Service.		
Year.	Number.	Year.	Number.	
On 1st May 1861 - -	293	1865–66 - -	291	
„ 1862 - -	324	1866–67 - -	527	
„ 1863 - -	355	1867–68 - -	825	
„ 1864 - -	362	1868–69 - -	861	
„ 1865 - -	354	1869–70 - -	978	
„ 1866 - -	362	1870–71 - -	547	
On 1st April 1867 - -	371	1871–72 - -	560	
„ 1868 - -	395	1872–73 - -	283	
„ 1869 - -	384	1873–74 - -	440	
„ 1870 - -	365	1874–75 - -	382	
TOTAL - - -	3,565		5,694	= 1·59 remount stallion per annum.

(signed) *S. Browne*, Major General,
President, Special Stud Commission.

APPENDIX C.

EXTRACT of Letter, No. 488, dated 21st November 1874, from the Deputy Superintendent, North-West Studs, to the Secretary, Special Stud Commission.

SAHARANPUR FARM ACCOUNT.

THIRTY-ONE years' growth of oats in straw, average profit *per annum* as shown, 5,901–3–1 rupees, "with hay, green grass, and wood off the farm," but how much of each is not shown.

Accounts for 1873–74:		*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Credit - - - - - - - - - -		25,944	7	5
Expenses - - - - - - - - -		20,747	13	10
Profit - - - - - - - - -	*Rs.*	5,196	9	7

N. B.—The farm has been worked for the purpose of making oats in straw (not money), so the sum of 5,196-9-7 rupees represents the value of the oats in straw estimated at a very low rate.

(signed) *S. Browne*, Major General,
President, Special Stud Commission.

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Acting Secretary to Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 5803, dated Bombay Castle, 8th October 1880).

WITH reference to your letter, No. 679-S., dated 26th July 1875, in which you observed that his Excellency "the Governor General in Council would desire to postpone consideration of the other questions connected with this subject* until the submission by the Special Stud Commission of their final report," and to your letter, No. 1-S, dated 1st August 1876, in which it is stated that "the Government of India regret that a decision on this question† cannot be arrived at until certain general questions connected with the remounting of the army in India, which are now under consideration, have been settled, but that it is

* *i.e.*, questions connected with the supply of remounts for the Bombay Army.

† Re-establishment of a remount depôt at Ahmednagar.

is hoped that no great delay will take place," I am desired to inform you that the Government of Bombay will almost immediately resubmit proposals for the appointment of a Remount Agent, the establishment of a reserve remount depôt, and the extension of the operations of the Poona Veterinary School; but in the meantime, to save delay, I am again to point out, for the information of the Government of India, the extreme disadvantage in which this Presidency is placed as compared with Calcutta and Madras in respect to the supply of colonial horses for the ranks.

See letter from the Adjutant General, Bombay Army, No. 70, M., dated 15th April 1875, submitted to the Government of India with Military Department letter, No. 2164, dated 28th May 1875.

2. There is no direct spontaneous importation to Bombay of Australian horses, though private companies import regularly and largely for their own purposes, and as the Governments of India and Madras give 550 rupees for the horses delivered at Calcutta and Madras respectively, it follows that Bombay only gets the refuse of the Australian market, and that the utmost they can expect is to obtain from the dealers who send horses on speculation from Calcutta or Madras a horse worth 550 rupees, less the cost of the railway journey and a certain margin to cover all risks, the result being that the Australians in the ranks of the Bombay Army are very inferior to those supplied to the Bengal and Madras armies.

3. The Government of Bombay have long been anxious to improve the unsatisfactory conditions heretofore and at present existing, and they are of opinion that the proposals about to be submitted are calculated to produce the required effect; but in the meantime they are anxious to secure a better stamp of Australians to supply their present wants, seeing that over 400 remounts will be required this season to replace casualties and condemnations, and that there is no prospect of the local market producing the required supply of suitable horses. . I am therefore to ask the permission of the Government of India to an officer being detailed to Madras to purchase there the Australian remounts required for this season, the price to be paid being that allowed by regulation, viz., an average of 550 rupees, the cost of the rail journey from Madras being a charge against the State.

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 5905, dated Bombay Castle, 14th October 1880).

WITH reference to my letter, No. 5803, of the 8th instant, I am directed to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of letters from the Adjutant General, noted in the margin, and of the Resolution of this Government thereon, No. 5905 of this date, and to strongly recommend that, as the present system of remounting the army of this Presidency is proved to be defective, and for the other reasons set forth in the Resolution, the sanction of the Government of India may be accorded to the proposals for (1) the appointment of a Remount Agent, and (2) the establishment of a reserve remount depôt in this Presidency, regarding the details of which a further communication will be made to the Government of India.

No. 404, A., dated 26th July 1880.
No. 4077, R. A., dated 27th July 1880, with accompaniment.
No. 5305, R. A., dated 30th September 1880.
No. 5389, R. A., dated 4th October 1880.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Wardrop*, Officiating Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 404, A., "Horses," dated Poona, 26th July 1880).

THE failure of the Bombay market to supply remounts for the artillery, which has necessitated Bengal being indented on to complete our requirements, has again brought the question of remounting in this Presidency prominently to notice; and in view of the decision of the Supreme Government to purchase in Bombay, and the recent proposal to add two batteries of field artillery to the Bombay establishment, the Commander in Chief is of opinion that a change in our system is absolutely necessary. I am therefore directed to submit, for the consideration of Government, his Excellency's views on this subject.

2. The Commander in Chief considers it impossible to provide in a satisfactory manner for the remounting of the Bombay army except by means of a Remount Agent and the establishment of a reserve remount depôt. The necessity for these has been recognised in the other presidencies and was, his Excellency considers, fully established in the correspondence submitted to Government in 1873. The objections that were then urged against purchase by committee have gone on increasing, and his Excellency is convinced that the committee system should at once be discontinued. The absence of a remount depôt during the present campaign has necessitated crippling the batteries that have remained in India and has proved, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, a most serious evil. Had it been necessary to send the regiment of British cavalry to the front, it is impossible to say how their wants could have been supplied. Another evil resulting from the want of a fixed reserve has been the impossibility of letting dealers know in time what are our requirements for the year, and this, combined with other causes, has created a constant difficulty in our supply.

3. His Excellency is of opinion that a Remount Agent and the establishment of a reserve, together with a due encouragement of the local market, will go a long way towards solving our present difficulties; but he also considers that some more definite system as to the proportion of the different breeds of horses admitted into the ranks is absolutely necessary.

4. The system that has been hitherto in force has been to leave to the judgment of individual commanding officers what breed is supplied to them. This system, his Excellency considers, is wrong. It has mixed together in the ranks colonial and Asiatic horses, classes which from considerations of size and shape are much better kept separate, while the growing demand for Australians has seriously affected our local market. In short, this system has left to the caprice of individuals a matter that should be determined on far broader grounds.

5. The geographical position of Bombay precludes our getting any but the refuse of the Australians imported into India; but, on the other hand, it ensures our getting the pick of the Gulf market. The relative value of these two classes has not, perhaps, yet been definitely decided, but the excellent qualities of the Gulf horses have at any rate been fully proved on this side of India, while the capabilities of the Australian for service have yet to be determined. Taking these facts and the present distribution of breeds into consideration, the Commander in Chief thinks that it would be advisable to lay down as a general principle to be followed in this command, that the two batteries of horse artillery should be horsed with Australians, and that the regiment of British cavalry and all the field batteries should be mounted from our local market.

6. Any immediate change of organisation, such as is proposed, is impossible. It could only be carried out gradually by transfer as opportunities occur. But his Excellency is convinced that either this or some corresponding principle should be adopted to govern the demand for horses in this command, and in this sense, I am to submit it for the consideration of Government.

From the Adjutant General of the Army, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 4077, R.A., "Royal Artillery Horses," dated Poona, 27th July 1880).

ADVERTING to Government Resolution, No. 3219, of 28th ultimo, I have the honour, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to submit, for the information of Government, the annexed communication from the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon regarding the necessity for the appointment of a Remount Agent for this presidency, in which his Excellency concurs.

2. The need for this appointment was represented to Government some years ago, *vide* Adjutant General's letter, No. 1614, of 2nd October 1871 (Government Resolution, No. 5215, of 12th December 1871).

3. Mr.

3. Mr. Lamb also represents the absolute necessity of having a remount depôt to supply trained horses. His Excellency fully concurs in these views and begs to refer to the correspondence ending with Government Resolution, No. 2665, of 5th July 1879, in which this question is fully discussed.

4. The defects of our present picketing system have already been brought to the notice of Government, in this office letter, No. 3856, R. A., of 17th instant. Mr. Lamb reports to the same effect and suggests an improvement which is worth a trial.

5. His Excellency thinks Mr. Lamb's suggestion to extend the operations of the Poona Veterinary School worthy of every support. This institution has already done most useful work in training men of this presidency, as well as from Madras and from several Native States. The school is now self-supporting, and its usefulness is limited by the very short time during the year that it can be kept at work. His Excellency is of opinion that, by enlarging the scope of its operations, as proposed by Mr. Lamb, and with State aid to the extent of making it a separate charge under a specially selected officer, the school would be able to fully supply our wants as regards farriers, besides educating them more usefully for India than could be done in England.

6. There is no class of men in the service so difficult to obtain as a farrier serjeant, and his Excellency thinks, if by means of the Poona School the Bombay army (and that of Madras also, if considered advisable) is able to supply its own wants, a most useful reform will have been effected.

From *W. Lamb*, Esq., Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, to the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army (No. 933, "Horses," dated Poona, 12th July 1880).

In compliance with Government Resolution, No. 3219, in the Military Department, dated 28th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following remarks on the subjects noted.

Paragraph 3 of the Resolution.
My letter, No. 236, of the 3rd idem.

2. My views as regards the necessity of appointing a Remount Agent and forming a remount reserve depot for this army were laid before you so long ago as March 1873, and as those views are, so far from being changed, only confirmed by further experience of the defects of the present system, and as I understand that the whole subject has recently been or is now before his Excellency the Commander in Chief, it is needless for me to refer further to it here.

Paragraph 5 of Government Resolution.

3. The cause of so many batteries having been without veterinary surgeons and farrier serjeants was, as regards the former, so many of these officers having been required for service with the transport train, Afghanistan Field Force. The established strength of these officers is barely sufficient for this army in times of peace, and is decidedly inadequate for war times, when such numbers of them are always required for the transport service.

4. As regards farrier serjeants, I am probably not fully acquainted with all the causes of their deficient numbers; but one, no doubt, is the absence of veterinary surgeons, for then there is no one to teach men to qualify for the post, battery commanding officers not having the time to spare for this purpose, even if they had the necessary knowledge. Another cause this year may have been that the course of instruction at the Army Veterinary School last season was so inefficiently conducted during my absence in England, that no men were there qualified for promotion to farrier serjeants.

Paragraph 6 of Government Resolution.

5. The chief defects of our present system of picketing are, first, the insecure junction of the hook of the head-rope with the ring of the head-stall, by reason of which the former often slips out and the horse gets loose; and second, the moojama of the heel-ropes. As regards the first, I have seen it remedied very simply in some batteries, and by the battery artificers, by making the opening of the hook so narrow that it will pass over and into the ring only at one spot where a little slot has been filed in the substance thereof for the purpose. Thus it

it can readily be hooked and unhooked by hand, but can hardly come undone by mere accident.

6. Secondly, the complicated, cumbersome, expensive, and insecure moojama at present in use is universally condemned, the simple loop and button moojama being found much more secure. The reason is that the former is troublesome and takes a minute or two to fasten properly, and it may be so left as to appear to be properly fastened when it is not; whereas the loop and button moojama can be put on in an instant, and if by chance left unbuttoned that could not easily escape the notice of the most careless eye.

7. Reverting to the scarcity of farrier serjeants and the means of teaching men to qualify as such, I would take this opportunity of pointing out that, if the Army Veterinary School were made a separate charge under a competent officer, the course of instruction there might be much extended and be carried on all the year round, vacations excepted, instead of during only four months in each year, as at present; and so it might be made a most valuable institution, both for the army and for the country at large, the want of veterinary practitioners being much felt in private civil life.

8. Now it is under the sole charge of the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, who is necessarily absent on tour the greater part of the year, and who, even when present, has other arduous duties to perform in connection with the army and with horse and mule-breeding operations and other civil duties throughout the presidency.

9. The example of forming a veterinary school under a veterinary surgeon whose only duty it is, has just been set at Aldershot, and the army out here may in time derive some benefit from it, as we may expect to receive thence farrier serjeants of a better stamp than those that now come out with or for the royal artillery. But equine diseases and all the circumstances surrounding horses in this country differ so much from those found in England, that men even well taught there have much to learn here, as well as something to unlearn, and for this a local veterinary school will still be necessary.

10. Moreover, my term of office as Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon expires next March, and if my successor should be recently from home or should have but little Indian experience, he may even be himself somewhat in the position of the men he would, under present arrangements, be called upon to teach. Still greater would be his difficulty with the important class of men, Natives, from our Silladar cavalry regiments, who, as a rule, speak no language but their own.

11. If, from these and other considerations which may be urged, his Excellency the Commander in Chief were pleased to support a proposal to extend the operations of the Army Veterinary School by making it a separate charge, I would gladly offer myself for the post, and should be happy to submit a scheme in detail.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Wardrop*, Officiating Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5305, R.A., "Royal Artillery Horses," dated Poona, 30th September 1880).

In reply to your letter, No. 182, P., of 12th instant, I have the honour to state that the probable number of remounts required annually by cavalry, horse artillery, and field artillery is as under:—

Cavalry	29
Horse artillery	42
Field artillery	107

2. The probable number required this year will be as follows:—

Cavalry	92
Horse artillery	84
Field artillery	226
Total	402

and these should be procured by the 1st of February 1881, if possible.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Wardrop*, Officiating Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5389, R.A., "Royal Artillery Horses," dated Poona, 4th October 1880).

REPLYING to your letter, No. 209, of yesterday, I have the honour, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to state that, under existing regulations, the standard height of horses for all branches of the service is 14 hands 2 inches; age from 4 to 7 years. It is also laid down that a small proportion of younger horses not under 14-1 may be taken, if of good breeding and make.

I am to add that, if the system of mixing Australian and Asiatic horses in the ranks is to continue, it would be advisable to buy only strong short-legged horses of the former class not exceeding 14 hands 3 inches in height.

If, however, it be determined to keep the above classes separate, a taller class of Australian horse would be desirable.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5905, "Horses Remounts," dated Bombay Castle, 14th October 1880).

READ the following:—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 404, A., dated the 26th July 1880).

Represents the desirability of making a change in the present system of remounting in this presidency, and proposes the appointment of a Remount Agent and the establishment of a reserve remount depôt. States that it is also desirable to adopt a system for regulating the proportion of the different breeds of horses admitted into the ranks.

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 4077, R.A., dated the 27th July 1880).

Submits, with remarks, a letter from the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, replying to the several points noted in Government Resolution, No. 3219, dated 28th ultimo, on the annual report and veterinary statistics by that officer for 1879-80.

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5305, dated 30th September 1880, and No. 5389, R.A., dated 4th October 1880).

RESOLUTION.—In consequence of the present unsatisfactory manner of providing for the remounting of the Bombay army, the Adjutant General submits the following proposals of his Excellency the Commander in Chief for the consideration of Government:—

(*a*) That a remount agent be appointed as in former years.

(*b*) That a Reserve Remount depôt be established.

(*c*) That it be laid down, as a general principle to be followed in this command, that the two batteries of horse artillery should be horsed with Australians, and that the regiments of British cavalry and all the field batteries should be mounted from our local market.

(*d*) That the operations of the Poona Veterinary School be extended, and that it be aided by the State to the extent of making it a separate charge under a specially selected officer.

2. In dealing with the first question (*a*) it will be well to take a retrospect of the past. Owing to the abolition of regular Native cavalry regiments, the reduction of

of numerical strength of horses of the artillery and European cavalry, and the abolition of several field batteries of artillery, which diminished the demand for horses on the public account, Government, with the concurrence of the Madras Government, abolished the joint Remount Agency for the presidencies of Madras and Bombay (maintained here) from the 30th April 1861; and it was then ordered that remounts for the mounted branches of the artillery and for European cavalry were to be purchased by the officers commanding under such arrangements as might be adopted by his Excellency the Commander in Chief. G.G.O., No. 552,* of 1863, provided, among other staff offices, for a Remount Agent for Bombay on 700 rupees per month; and in 1865 the Adjutant General proposed that, pending decision on the question of allowances of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon (then under consideration), that officer might, for the various duties he was called upon to perform, be nominated Remount Agent under the provision of the G.O. above quoted. This was done; but the Government of India demurred on the grounds that (1) it altered the pay of an officer whose remuneration was under the consideration of the Secretary of State; and (2) placed in the hands of an officer two duties which were supposed to be incompatible; in reply to which this Government offered the following explanation:—

G. G. O., No. 208. 19th May 1861.
*Republishing G. O. G. I., No. 156, A., of 1863.

"It is quite possible that the present experimental system of remount agency may be so altered as to require the separation of the Agent's duties from those of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon, in which case the decision of the Secretary of State as to the proper salary of the latter officer will have full application.

Government letter No. 2645, dated 28th August 1865.

"I am desired to explain that, under the present experimental system, the distinctive points of which are the purchase of horses in any part of the country as opportunities offer (instead of the purchase only at the presidency marts and at one season as in former years) and the encouragement of breeders of indigenous stock, the two duties are not only compatible, but could not be so effectually performed by independent officers, because the Principal Veterinary Surgeon's tours of inspection and his responsibility for the measures taken to improve the indigenous breed give him peculiar facilities for aiding commanding officers in purchases and for making them himself. It was on this account that the appointment of Remount Agent was for some time left vacant."

And the arrangement was not disturbed; but the Principal Veterinary Surgeon ceased to hold the appointment of Remount Agent when he became Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon.

G. O. C., No. 443, dated 12th June 1867.
(From 17th October 1866.)

3. In 1867, with the sanction of Government, his Excellency the Commander in Chief published rules for the purchase of horses for the service in supersession of all orders and regulations then existing. Among other things they provided as follows:—

G. O. C., No. 338, dated 26th April 1867.

"Officers commanding brigades of royal artillery and regiments of British cavalry will take their own measures for filling up vacancies in the ranks of their respective commands, either by themselves purchasing horses or deputing competent officers under their command to do so.

"In order to facilitate such purchasing the commanding officer or officers deputed will be at liberty to proceed to Bombay or other places in the vicinity of their stations (under local sanction) accompanied by the Veterinary Surgeon of the regiment.* * *

"All horses purchased must be submitted to a committee to consist of the purchasing officer, the Veterinary Surgeon, and an officer from the garrison.

"Government has been pleased to fix the average price of horses of all branches of the service at 500 rupees, the standard height 14 hands 2 inches; the age from four to six years. A small proportion of promising younger horses (not under 14-1) may be taken if of good breeding and make.

"But in 1869 the Adjutant General submitted the opinions of the several commanding officers of the mounted branches, as also those of officers of experience and the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, which his Excellency the Commander in Chief (Lord Napier) considered afforded sufficient evidence that the result of the trial under the above-quoted rules had not been satisfactory, and that there was ground for reconsidering the question of a remount agency, the strongest objection to the mode of purchase referred to being the possible competition between the several commanding officers.

Letter, No. 1469, dated 24th August 1869.

Government Resolution, No. 4874, dated 29th October 1869.

officers. But Government considered that "sufficient remedy for the inconveniences of the present system of purchase regimentally would be found in adopting the plan proposed for this season, viz., the special appointment in each season of an officer associated with a veterinary surgeon, for the duty."*

Letter, No. 1614, dated 2nd October 1871.

4. In 1871, however, the Adjutant General, under the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, Sir Augustus Spencer, represented that the course of procedure above alluded to, tried experimentally, had failed to give a satisfactory result, and in endorsing fully the opinion and views recorded by the late Commander in Chief (Lord Napier) in 1869, Sir Augustus Spencer was "strong in the belief that the return to the system of purchasing by a Remount Agent is that which will prove most beneficial to the interest of the State," and after detailing the several objections to the then existing system, he strongly advocated the reappointment of a Remount Agent. It was then proposed to the Government of Madras, that in the event of a Remount Agent being sanctioned for this presidency, he might be authorised to purchase such horses as that Government might require, but the proposal was not entertained. About this time the Government of India sent to this Government a copy of a letter addressed to the Adjutant General in India, suggesting that, "when the stud is unable to supply the required number of remounts," officers commanding batteries of royal artillery and corps of British cavalry might with advantage be authorised, under certain conditions, to purchase remounts under regimental arrangements; and inquired whether any objection existed to the measure; and added that in the Bengal Presidency it had been proposed to limit the prices of remounts for horse artillery, cavalry, and field artillery at 500 and 400 rupees respectively. The reply of the Adjutant General in India was as follows:—

Letter, No. 29 B., dated 21st October 1871.
No. 667, dated 20th October 1871 (Government Resolution, No. 4576, dated 1st November 1871).

"I have the honour, by direction of Lord Napier of Magdala, to state that this system was introduced at Bombay shortly after His Lordship's arrival there, and the arguments against the measure were that it was not always possible to secure a knowledge of horses in commanding officers, and that they bid against each other. A very strong opinion prevailed that a good remount agency would be better, in which I am to state his Excellency fully concurs. But before laying down any rule on the subject the Commander in Chief would venture to recommend that the Bombay Government should be asked what is the practice now pursued in that presidency, and how the purchase by commanding officers answered."

Letter, No. 85, M., dated 7th December 1871.

The Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, with reference to the Government of India's suggestion, stated that the arrangements made in 1867 and 1869 (paragraph 3 above) had both failed to give a satisfactory result, and that it was this which induced his Excellency the Commander in Chief (Sir Augustus Spencer) to recommend a reversion to the old system of purchasing through a Remount Agent, a plan which had been "unanimously supported by commanding officers." He added that, after the experience gained in 1865, 1866, 1867, the price fixed in 1867, viz., 500 rupees all round, was found to be the lowest at which a really good serviceable stamp of horse could be procured in the Bombay market. The Government of India were informed of the practice prevailing in this presidency in regard to the purchase of remounts since the abolition of the joint remount agency in 1861, and that "in consideration of the strong opinion expressed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the Government would not recommend a return to the plan of purchase by the several commanding officers;" also that they would not recommend any reduction in the average of 500 rupees † fixed for all in 1867. To this the Government of India replied as follows:—

Government Resolution, No. 5215, dated 12th December 1871.
Government Resolution, No. 113, dated 10th January 1872.

"The

* *Note.*—A committee of officers selected from the cavalry and artillery branches of the service, with a veterinary surgeon to attend, was appointed.

† *Note.*—Government Resolution, No. 3127, dated 2nd August 1875, embodied the sanction of the Government of India to the same amount being given in the Bombay Presidency as in Bengal for remounts, viz., an average of 550 rupees, "each horse being bought for what he is worth."

Letter, No. 1853, dated 28th February 1873 (Government Resolution, No. 1211, dated 14th March 1873).

"The several modes of purchase by a Remount Agent, by commanding officers, and by special committees composed of officers of cavalry and artillery, have been very carefully considered by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, and the arguments urged for and against each system have been fully weighed.

"After careful deliberation his Excellency in Council is satisfied that the system at present followed in Bombay, under which horses are purchased by special committee, works well, and is not open to the serious objections which are urged against the other modes proposed, and has been pleased to decide that it shall remain undisturbed."

Government Resolution No. 2289, dated 29th May 1873.

5. On the 3rd May 1873 (No. 66), the Government of India forwarded an extract from a Despatch from the Secretary of State regarding the encouragement of horse-breeding in India, and asked to be furnished with the information called for as regards Kathiawar and the valley of the Bheema, and with the opinion of Government as to the distribution of stallions, the offer of prizes, the purchase of remounts and other measures calculated to further the object indicated in the Despatch; and in a subsequent letter, dated 8th January 1874 (No. 381) they called for reports* from all officers commanding batteries of royal artillery and British cavalry on the merits of the horses supplied to the Bombay army within the preceding five years, together with their opinions on the qualities of the different breeds supplied both for draught and saddle. In replying to the questions raised in the accompaniments to Government Resolution No. 2289, dated 29th May 1873, the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon submitted copy of a letter (No. 236, dated 3rd March 1873), previously addressed by him to the Adjutant General, wherein he advanced certain reasons in support of the re-appointment of a Remount Agent, and which are below quoted :—

Government Resolution, No. 323, dated 24th January 1874.

* *Note.*—These were furnished to the Government of India with letter, No. 1516, dated 21st April 1874.

(3.)—"The falling off in the supply of Gulf horses commenced soon after the mutinies, when the strength of the army was much reduced; few horses were bought, and the price was reduced to 400 rupees. By these means many of the old importers were ruined, and the Remount Agent having also been abolished, the duty being entrusted instead to commanding officers individually or to committees, they (the Native dealers) lost confidence in the market or in their own powers to suit the varying requirements of so many different purchasers for Government. Having had also to compete against Australians, they have many of them taken to the Madras market, being encouraged to do so by having to deal with one man whom they know the Remount Agent, who promises them individually and in writing to take a certain number from each, if found fit, and even, it is said, sometimes advances them money to enable them to make their purchases. Hence it is that we constantly see batches of fine Persians pass through Bombay or touching at the port without landing and without our being able to buy any of them."

(24).—"The re-appointment of a Remount Agent will be almost a necessary consequence of forming a remount depôt, for it would be unwise to divide the responsibility of the purchase and of the subsequent care of the remounts.

(25).—"From what I have said above regarding the supply of Gulf horses, it is evident that such an appointment is essential to restore the confidence of the Arab and Persian dealers. They will never give it to impersonal, ever-changing remount committees, but for a man whom they learn to know and trust they would do anything, and bring as many horses as he might tell them to, for I believe there is no doubt the horses are there.

(26).—"The Remount Agent should have perfect liberty of action in purchasing horses. He should not be trammelled by any committee. Only, if not a veterinary surgeon himself, he should be allowed the assistance of one. He would communicate personally with the dealers, both colonial and oriental, making what arrangements he could with them.

(27).—"So situated, an officer of experience, a judge of horses, and knowing the requirements of the service, being also a man of honour, probity, tact, and firmness would, if he can be found, buy to much greater advantage than a casual committee ever can do.

(28).—"Every

(28).—" Every thing being thus left to him, he must in return be held solely responsible for the remounts of the army, and if it should appear from the proceedings of the committees periodically assembled to distribute them, and from the concurring testimony of commanding officers receiving them, and from the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon's reports, that the remounts are not first class and in every way satisfactory, it should be a condition of the appointment that in such a case he should be summarily removed from it."

Government Resolution, No. 900, dated 7th March 1874.

A copy of the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons reports was sent to the Government of India with an intimation that "any process which will enlarge the sources for the supply of sound horses for remount purposes is to be recommended, and so far as the country-bred animal is concerned, no better means for improving that class of horse and rendering it fit for military purposes can be adopted than securing a regular supply of thorough-bred sires of the kind described by Mr. Lamb, and by offering liberal prices for colts fulfilling the requirements of the service. The views of Government touching the establishment of a remount agency and depôt for young horses, to which allusion is made in these reports, will be recorded in their resolution on the Adjutant General's letter, No. 67 M., dated 21st April 1873."

6. The subsequent proceedings will be more conveniently dealt with when considering the second point, (*b*) raised by the Adjutant General in his present letter, No. 404 A., dated 26th July 1880. It will be seen from the above *résumé* that the existing system of purchasing remounts by committee was emphatically and unanimously condemned many years ago, and the Adjutant General now represents that the objections then urged against the system in question " have gone on increasing," that his Excellency the Commander in Chief is convinced that a change therein is "absolutely necessary," and that "the committee system should at once be discontinued." The Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, too, says that so far from the views expressed by him in 1873 having been changed, they have only been confirmed by further experience of the defects of the present system. There is therefore quite a consensus of opinion as to the ill effects of the present system; and as his Excellency the Governor in Council fully concurs therein, the proposal of his Excellency the Commander in Chief that it be superseded by the appointment of a remount agent, will be strongly recommended to the Government of India for sanction.

Letter, No. 933, dated 12th July 1880. Accompaniment to Adjutant General's letter, No. 4077, R. A., dated 27th July 1880.

7. The next question (*b*) brought under consideration by the Adjutant General is the establishment of a remount depôt. This matter was very fully treated of in the Adjutant General's letter, No. 67 M., dated 21st April 1873 (referred to in Government Resolution, No. 900, dated 7th March 1874, quoted in the preceding paragraph), and in the accompaniment thereto from the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon. In submitting these reports to the Government of India, this Government recorded the following views in Government Resolution, No. 1567, dated 23rd April 1874 :--

(3.) "When first the proposals submitted by Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon Lamb came under consideration, Government recorded an opinion that, judging the question from a purely economical point of view, it would be better to depend upon the open market for obtaining what the service required, even though the doing so might involve the paying an exceptionally high price for the stamp of horses needed, because all risk of rearing and all the expense of an establishment for taking charge of colts would be avoided. In adopting this course Government would be doing in India what they do in England, viz., pay down the market value of what they want, leaving all risks to be met by the breeder.

(4.) " In Europe where the sources from which remount stock can be drawn are numerous, the system of depending upon the open market is a good one. In India, however, our sources of supply are distant, and consequently more or less precarious. Those sources are in Arabia, Persia, Australia, the Cape and Natal, all at a distance, all liable to be cut off, and at best furnishing not always exactly what is required for army purposes.

(5.) " Under the admitted exceptional circumstances which exist in connection with the supply of remounts to India, there appear to his Excellency the Governor in Council sufficient grounds for recommending

Mr. Lamb's proposals for the favourable consideration of the Government of India.

(6) " If these proposals are adopted, this Government would recommend that a depôt or nursery for three-year old colonials be formed at Ahmednagar where there is an abundant supply of good water, good stables, and, in the neighbourhood, a plentiful supply of grass. The climate of Ahmednagar and its convenient distance from the south-eastern line of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway render it a particularly suitable place in which to form a rearing depôt for young horses.

(7.) " According to the estimate submitted, the cost of keeping up a reserve of 300 horses would amount to nearly a lakh of rupees as an annual recurring charge. But this amount is undoubtedly susceptible of reduction. For instance, the cost of feed might be put down at one-third less than the amount given in the estimate—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Or say - - - - - - - - -	35,948	6	–
Line gear - - - - - - - - -	3,460	–	–
150 instead of 300 syces - - - - - -	12,100	–	–
Staff pay to eight rough riders instead of 20 -	960	–	–
Shoeing (under) - - - - - - -	2,000	–	–
Pay of Superintendent - - - - - -	4,800	–	–
Veterinary charge allowance - - - - -	200	–	–
Medicines, &c. - - - - - - - -	1,000	–	–
TOTAL - Rs.	60,468	6	–

(8.)—" Whether the rearing depôt or nursery for three-year old horses be eventually established or not, his Excellency the Governor in Council would advocate the appointment of a remount agent in Bombay being revived for the purpose of purchasing not, as formerly, solely for this Presidency but for all India."

Letter, No. 70 M., dated 15th April 1875.

8. Subsequently the Adjutant General reported that the purchase of remounts for the season of 1875 at the authorised price of 500 rupees, had been concluded, but that the requisite number of horses to complete the wants of the year had not been procurable, between 20 and 30 still being required to complete the establishment. He also stated that " the import of Persian horses is decreasing yearly," that the Australian horses were brought by rail from Madras, and that when it was considered that the Madras Government gave 575 rupees for each horse, and the cost of carriage to Bombay averaged about 50 rupees per head, an estimate might be formed of the stamp of Australian horses left for selection for the ranks of this Presidency; that " no doubt very good Persian horses are still to be got if a larger price is offered for them, and the confidence of the dealers is once restored, but so long as the remount agent in Madras can give commissions to the Persian dealers for large numbers of horses and pay them large sums of money as advances, with authority to pay 75 rupees a head more than the Bombay Government are permitted to pay, it can hardly be expected that the dealers will prefer the Bombay market, though its position is so much better suited to their trade, possessing as it does so many conveniences and advantages in the way of return purchases, &c." He added: " My letter, No. 67 M., of the 21st April 1873, urged the paramount importance of some decided steps being taken by Government to ensure the certainty of a sufficient supply of remounts for the future. The experience of the two years which have intervened shows that the necessity now is still more urgent, and there can be no question that the matter is one of serious import affecting the future efficiency of this army." Hereupon the Government of India were asked to pass an early decision on the recommendations submitted under No. 1567, dated 23rd April 1874 (quoted above); and in their reply dated 26th July 1875, No. 679 S, they sanctioned the same amount being given in the Bombay Presidency as in Bengal for remounts, viz., an average of 550 rupees, each horse being bought for what he is worth, and added " the Governor General in Council would desire to postpone consideration of the other questions connected with this

Government Resolution, No. 2164, dated 28th May 1875.
Government Resolution, No. 3127, dated 2nd August 1875.

Letter, No. 17, S., dated 1st August 1876; Government Resolution, No. 3,371, dated 10th August 1876.

this subject until the submission by the special Stud Commission of their final report." On 24th June 1876 (No. 2660), an early decision was again applied for, when it was replied, "The Government of India regret that a decision on this question cannot be arrived at until certain general questions connected with the remounting of the army in India, which are now under consideration, have been settled," but that it was hoped no great delay would take place.

Government letter, No. 4817, dated 8th August 1877.
Government Resolution, No. 5120, dated 20th December 1877.

9. Subsequently at the request of the Government of India the Revenue Department of this Government submitted an estimate of the expenditure proposed to be incurred by the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon on horse-breeding operations in this Presidency, compared with the expenditure then incurred on that account, and showing an increase of 76,018 rupees. The Government of India replied to this in the Military Department by forwarding copies of communications from the Director of Army Remount Operations and General Superintendent of Horse-Breeding Operations on the subject, "in view to any modifications the Government of Bombay may desire to make in its previous recommendations;" but it was added "that owing to financial considerations the Government of India doubt very much whether the new system can be inaugurated in the coming official year." The communications in question were generally in favour of the proposals of this Government as regards the re-appointment of a Remount Agent, the establishment of a remount depôt and of horse-breeding operations; but in consequence of the doubt expressed by the Government of India as to funds being available, no further action was taken in the matter.

10. The Adjutant General now represents that it is impossible to provide in a satisfactory manner for the remounting of the Bombay army without the aid of a reserve remount depôt, the necessity for which has been recognized in the other Presidencies. He adds: "The want of a remount depôt during the present campaign has necessitated crippling the batteries that have remained in India, and has proved, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, a most serious evil. Had it been necessary to send the regiment of British cavalry to the front, it is impossible to say how their wants could have been supplied. Another evil resulting from the want of a fixed reserve has been the impossibility of letting dealers know in time what are our requirements for the year, and this, combined with other causes, has created a constant difficulty in our supply." The Adjutant General does not say, with reference to Government Resolution, No. 5120, dated 20th December 1877, whether any, and what, modification of the scheme previously submitted is desirable. His early attention will be invited thereto in view to the sentiments of his Excellency the Commander in Chief being elicited thereon; but meanwhile his Excellency the Governor in Council will strongly recommend to the Government of India that sanction be given to the establishment of a reserve remount depôt, the details of which can be settled on receipt of the Adjutant General's report now called for.

11. In support of the third point (*c*), the Adjutant General says:—"The system that has been hitherto in force has been to leave to the judgment of individual commanding officers what breed is supplied to them. This system, his Excellency considers, is wrong. It has mixed together in the ranks Colonial and Asiatic horses, classes which from considerations of size and shape are much better kept separate, while the growing demands for Australians has seriously affected our local market. In short, this system has left to the caprice of individuals a matter that should be determined on far broader grounds." His Excellency the Governor in Council concurs in these views so far as the system of purchases and the inexpediency of mixing breeds in the ranks are concerned, but his Excellency does not consider it expedient at present to lay down a hard-and-fast rule that the field batteries and regiments of British cavalry shall be horsed with Asiatic horses to the exclusion of Australians. The extent to which Colonial or Asiatic horses shall be purchased should, his Excellency considers, be regulated by the state of the market for those classes of horses respectively, and the difficulty about teaming them in batteries or sizing them in the ranks should be overcome by having certain teams or whole batteries, if need be, horsed by colonials, and keeping the colonials in one or more troops of the cavalry regiment distinct from the Asiatic horses.

In view of the difficulty represented by the Adjutant General (paragraph 5 of his letter, No. 404 A, 26th July 1880) of getting in the Bombay command any but the refuse of the Australians imported into India, a difficulty which has been before Government for years past; *see* paragraph 8 of this Government Resolution; the Government of India have been requested to allow this Government to depute an officer to Madras to purchase there the horses required as remounts for this Presidency for the present season, the price to be paid being that allowed by regulation, viz., 550 rupees, the cost of the rail journey to Poona being a charge against the State; and if this arrangement is not found to suit, purchase in the Australian market will be considered to meet the future wants of the Bombay Army.

12. The next point (*d*) affects the Poona Veterinary School. His Excellency the Governor in Council approves generally of its operations being extended, but, before coming to any definite conclusion on the subject, would be glad to receive the details of the scheme referred to in the last paragraph of the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon's letter, No. 933, dated 12th July last.

13. The other portions of the letter of the Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, above referred to, call for no special remark. The question respecting the defects of our present picketing system will be separately dealt with in connection with the Adjutant General's letter, No. 3856 R.A., dated 17th July 1880, now under consideration.

TELEGRAM from Captain *T. Deane*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (dated Simla, the 23rd October 1881).

YOUR 5803, 8th, and 5905, 14th, instant.

Horses required will be supplied from Bengal sources. No officer need be detailed to Madras. As Bombay cannot meet own wants, is it to be understood that a remount agent is to be deputed there from here? Government do not desire to depress Bombay Arab market by importing too many walers. Would not, therefore, less than 400 horses suffice for this year, bearing in mind that artillery may possibly be reduced to peace strength?

TELEGRAM from Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Government of India, Military Department (dated the 29th October 1880).

YOUR telegrams, dated 23rd and 28th, regarding horses. Only a short supply of eastern horses is expected in Bombay market this season. Requirements Bombay army will probably absorb the whole supply; therefore the dispatch here of Bengal remount agent unadvisable for present. Pending receipt of reports of casting committees it is impossible to state accurately the lowest number of remounts which will be required; but, after careful reconsideration, it seems probable that our demand may be reduced from 400 to 340 horses. Of these as many eastern horses as can be procured locally will be purchased, leaving the balance to be filled up by walers.

From Colonel *Allen Johnson*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1962 S.D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, the 1st November 1880).

WITH reference to your letters and telegram marginally cited, regarding the supply of horses for the Bombay Presidency, I am directed to state as follows:—

No. 5803, dated 8th October 1880, and 5905, dated 14th October 1880. Telegram dated 29th October 1880.

2. The question of appointing a remount agent in Bombay, of establishing a remount depôt, and of instituting arrangements for opening out a veterinary school, will hereafter be separately replied to.

3. The

3. The subject requiring immediate consideration in the correspondence referred to is that of the supply of horses to meet the present requirements of the British mounted branches of the Bombay army.

4. The Government of India, I am to say, for the information of the Governor in Council, regret to find that there is a probability of the supply of eastern horses failing in the Bombay market during this season; and this somewhat unexpected announcement, together with the inability expressed in your telegram of the 29th October to state accurately the requirement of Bombay to be met from Bengal sources, render it difficult for the Government of India to institute suitable arrangements to govern present purchasing operations in the Calcutta market or future measures in regard to the Bengal reserve depôt.

5. It is assumed, however, that the non-deputation of a Bengal remount agent during this season to Bombay to purchase eastern horses will release a larger number of these remounts for Bombay requirements than was anticipated in the earlier communications from the Government of Bombay under acknowledgment.

6. I am, however, to express a hope that the Government of India may be favoured by telegram at the earliest possible date with information of the approximate number and class of remounts which will be required from Bengal sources.

7. I am also to add, for the information of the Governor in Council, with reference to my telegram marginally cited, that the Government of India, whilst desiring to assist Bombay remounting operations as far as possible, consider that the sudden importation from Bengal of any considerable number of Australian horses will tend to further depress the supply of eastern horses in Bombay, a result which from every point of view it is most desirable to avoid.

Dated 23rd October 1880.

From Colonel *Allen Johnson*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Director of Army Remount Operations (No. 1963 S. D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, 1st November 1880).

WITH reference to the correspondence marginally cited, I am directed to forward a copy of a telegram received from the Government of Bombay showing the state of the case, so far as is at present known to that Government, in regard to the supply of horses for the Bombay army.

From Government of Bombay, No. 5905, dated 14th October 1880.
No. 5803, dated 8th October 1880.
Telegram to Bombay, dated 23rd October 1880.

2. It will be observed that the deputation of a remount agent from Bengal to purchase eastern horses in Bombay is considered for the present as unadvisable; and the Government of India consider that, unless the state of the Bombay market so far improves as to admit of most of the requirements of that Presidency being met locally, no purchasing agent should be deputed this year from Bengal to Bombay.

3. The inability of the Bombay Government to state accurately its requirements in horses this year renders it impossible for the Government of India to inform you of the calls which may be made upon the reserve depôts, but it may be fairly assumed that the non-purchase of eastern horses for Bengal will enable the Bombay authorities to secure locally most of the number (340) required, leaving but a small balance to be supplied from this Presidency.

4. It is not considered desirable that any additional horses should at present be purchased by the remount agent in Calcutta. The Bombay Government will be urged to state accurately their requirements at the earliest possible date; and these requirements will, I am to say, have to be met from the horses now in the depôts or from those being purchased now in Calcutta.

5. The number thus given to Bombay can, if necessary, be replaced by purchases made next season, or possibly by purchases made during the latter end of this season; for it has been observed by the Government of India that, as a rule, requests have annually been made towards the end of the Calcutta season for additional horses to be purchased by Government to the number for which

which sanction has been accorded, and regarding which official intimation has been sent to the colonies.

However, the Government of India have, I am to say, no anxiety regarding the replacement of the horses which may have to be supplied for Bombay, and desire to leave this matter to your discretion, with a remark that under the arrangements suggested in paragraph 508 of the Report of the Army Commission it is possible that hereafter the reserve of horses in Bengal may be considerably reduced.

From Major General *G. R. Greaves*, C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 49 F. C., "Royal Artillery in India—Horses," dated Mian Meer, 12th November 1880).

I HAVE the honour by desire of the Commander in Chief in India to forward, for the early consideration of Government, the enclosed copy of a telegram from the Commander in Chief, Bombay Presidency, reporting the inefficiency of the batteries of Royal Artillery in that Presidency owing to want of horses and his inability to complete "F" Battery, 2nd Brigade, Royal Artillery.

2. This telegram is in reply to one from this department requesting that arrangements might be made to supply 22 horses to complete the above-named battery, and in Sir Frederick Haines' opinion it shows a deplorable state of affairs, deserving of the very early consideration of Government, as it is most detrimental to efficiency that the authorities of the Bombay Presidency should be unable to keep their batteries complete in horses without assistance from Bengal.

TELEGRAM from His Excellency the Commander in Chief, Bombay Army, to the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery in India (dated Poona, 4th November 1880).

YOUR telegram third. Cannot complete F 2; Bombay has no reserve horses. I inspected I 1 yesterday, 30 horses short; ordered to Ahmedabad; must march without wagons. Every battery rendered inefficient to complete batteries on service unless Government India sanction expenditure, establish Bombay remount agent and reserve horses; neither artillery nor cavalry can be kept efficient; officers also wanting to complete.

TELEGRAM from Secretary to Government of Bombay, Military Department, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department (dated Mahableshwar, 17th November 1880).

YOUR telegram dated 23rd October last, intimating that horses required for Bombay will be supplied from Bengal sources. Bombay Government propose to buy from an Australian dealer named Keckraouse as many suitable horses as he can supply. He has landed his horses at Madras and will bring them to Poona at his own risk and cost. Government wish to support this dealer as he supplied good horses last year, and has brought over about 100 horses for this Government on the strength of former satisfactory dealings, although without any distinct order to do so. Government will, therefore, buy from him unless Government India order to contrary. Please telegraph reply.

TELEGRAM from Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 921 D., dated Fort William, 22nd November 1880).

GOVERNMENT India sanction horses of Mr. Keckraouse's consignment being purchased. Please telegraph what number are bought for army purposes.

EXTRACT from Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 6885, Horses—Remounts, dated Bombay Castle, 26th November 1880.

Read the following letter :—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 6340 R. A, dated 20th November 1880.

"REFERRING to Government Resolution, No. 5905, dated 14th October 1880, paragraph 6, I am directed to state that as the selection of remounts in the Bombay market cannot be conveniently delayed, his Excellency the Commander in Chief has directed Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon Lamb to commence purchasing horses, pending the decision of the Government of India on the general question."

RESOLUTION.—The Adjutant General should be referred to Government Resolution, No. 6884, of this date, and informed that the report called for in paragraph 2 of Government Resolution, No. 6712, dated 20th instant, will be awaited.

2. The Government of India to be informed of the instructions issued by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, with reference to paragraph 2 of Secretary Colonel Johnson's letter, No. 1962 S. D., dated 1st instant, intimating that the question of appointing a remount agent in Bombay and of establishing a remount depôt, &c., would be separately replied to.

No. 6885.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India for information, with reference to paragraph 2 of Secretary Colonel Johnson's letter, No. 1962 S. D., dated 1st instant, "Horses—Remounts."

ENDORSEMENT by the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1146, D. dated Calcutta, 18th December 1880).

COPY to Director of Army Remount Operations, for information, in continuation of the endorsement for this department, No. 925 D., dated 23rd November 1880.

From Colonel *W. M. Lees*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 950 D, "Horses—Remounts," dated Fort William, 27th November 1880).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, No. 49 F. C., "Royal Artillery in India—Horses," dated the 12th November 1880, relative to the inefficiency of batteries of Royal Artillery in the Bombay Presidency owing to want of horses, and submitting the Commander in Chief's recommendation that the subject may receive the very early consideration of Government.

2. In reply, I am to acquant you, for his Excellency's information, that the Government of India are in communication with the Government of Bombay and the Director of Army Remount Operations with the view not only of meeting present requirements in remounts, but of placing the supply of horses for regiments and batteries in that Presidency permanently on a satisfactory footing.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 7167, "Horses—Remounts," dated Bombay Castle, 11th December 1880).

Read the following :—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 6469 R. A., dated 27th November 1880.

"ADVERTING to paragraph 10 of Government Resolution, No. 5905, of 14th ultimo, regarding the proposal to establish a remount reserve depôt at Ahmednagar, under a remount agent, in order to have a supply of efficient horses in hand to meet all ordinary demands, I have the honour, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, to submit the following scheme :—

I. The number of horses to be maintained at the depôt should represent about a year's supply.

II. Assuming that one British cavalry regiment, two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, and twelve field batteries are to be kept up at peace establishment in this Presidency, the yearly demand may be taken as follows :—

Cavalry 436 horses @ 9 per cent. - - - - -	40
Horse Artillery (two batteries), 356 horses @ 12 per cent.	42
Field Artillery (twelve batteries), 1,320 horses @ 10 per cent. - - - - - - - - - -	132
	214
Add for Contingencies - - -	36
TOTAL - - -	250

III. The depôt should be established on the same footing as those in Bengal and Madras.

IV. It is suggested that the horses sent to the depôt should not, as a rule, be under four years of age, but that discretionary power be given to the purchaser in this respect."

RESOLUTION.—To be communicated to the Government of India, with reference to paragraph 10 of Government Resolution, No. 5905, dated 14th October 1880.

No. 7167.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India, with reference to this office letter, No. 5905, dated 14th October last.

From Captain *T. Deane*, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1145 D.S., "Horses—Remounts," dated Fort William, 18th December 1880).

WITH reference to the communications noted in the margin, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the supply of remounts for the Bombay Presidency, I am directed to request that under the orders of his Excellency the Governor in Council, the Government of India may be informed if any horses are still required from Bengal, or if the wants of the Bombay Presidency, which it is understood are now being met from the local market, will be fully supplied therefrom.

Telegram to Bombay Government, No. 921, dated 22nd November 1880.
Telegram from Bombay Government, No. 6885, dated 26th November 1880.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 7391, "Horses—Remounts" dated Bombay Castle, 22nd December 1880).

Read the following :—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 6850 R. A., dated 18th December 1880).

"REFERRING to Government Resolution, No. 6712, dated 20th November last, and in continuation of my No. 6478 R. A. of the 29th idem, I am directed to report that about 200 remounts will, in all probability, be required from Bengal sources this season.

2. "Of this number it is desired that 81 should be fitted for horse artillery, as per margin, and that the remainder should be selected for field artillery draught. It is advisable that as many of the field artillery horses as possible should be wheelers, and that they should not exceed 14 hands 3 inches in height.

Horse artillery wheel - -	14
" " lead - -	20
" " riding - -	47
Total - -	81

3. "The demand for field artillery will be reduced if it is found possible to obtain a larger number of horses in this market than is now anticipated, but it is improbable that any considerable reduction can take place. The total demand is quite independent of our requirement for a reserve for next season.

4. "It is suggested that the officer now purchasing for the Bombay Government, Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon Lamb, may be placed in direct communication with the Bengal Remount Department in regard to any modification in this demand that may be hereafter necessary."

From Captain *T. Deane,* Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1145 D., dated 18th December 1880, "Horses—Remounts").

"WITH reference to the communications noted in the margin, and to previous correspondence on the subject of the supply of remounts for the Bombay Presidency, I am directed to request that, under the orders of His Excellency the Governor in Council, the Government of India may be informed if any horses are still required from Bengal, or if the wants of the Bombay Presidency, which it is understood are now being met from the local market, will be fully supplied therefrom."

Telegram to Bombay Government, No. 921, dated 22nd November 1880.
Telegram from Bombay, No. 6885, dated 26th November 1880.

RESOLUTION.—A copy of the Adjutant General's letter to be communicated for the information of the Government of India, with reference to Secretary Colonel Johnson's letter, No. 1962 S. D., dated 1st November 1880, "Horses—Remounts," and to Captain Deane's letter above entered.

2. The attention of the Government of India will be drawn to the suggestion conveyed in the 4th paragraph of the Adjutant General's letter.

No. 7391.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India for information, with reference to the preceding Resolution.

ENDORSEMENT by the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1232 D., dated Calcutta, 30th December 1880).

COPY to Director, Army Remount Operations, for information and guidance, in continuation of the endorsement from this Department, No. 1163 D., dated 22nd December 1880, with a request that the Government of India may be informed at an early date how he proposes to meet the demand.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 7451, "Horses—Remounts," dated Bombay Castle, 24th December 1880).

Read the following :—

LETTER from the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 6478 R. A., dated 29th November 1880).

"REFERRING to letter No. 1962 S. D., dated 1st instant, from the Secretary to the Government of India, which has been forwarded for report under Government Resolution No. 6712 of 20th instant, I am directed to state that, although it is correctly assumed that the non-deputation of a Bengal Remount Agent will widen our field for selection, yet it has scarcely been anticipated that the Bombay market could supply the whole of our wants this year, and that this view has been confirmed now that the season has commenced. From causes that have been already explained the market is in a depressed state, and it is not likely to recover itself until the importers of horses regain confidence in the constancy and regularity of demand.

"2. It is proposed to buy this year every suitable Eastern horse that is to be had. Moreover a batch of Australian horses are now on their way from Madras for selection at Poona. Until it has been ascertained how many of these Australians can be accepted, and until the prospects of the Eastern market are more fully known, it is impossible to reply to the question asked in paragraph 6 of the letter under report. The information will, however, be given as soon as it can be ascertained.

"3. I am to add that it is not expected that the local market will be affected this year by the importation of horses from Bengal. But His Excellency the Commander in Chief is of opinion that, in order to avoid depression of the market in future years, it is necessary that no fixed principle should be adopted in regard to the number of Eastern horses that are to be admitted into the ranks of the Bombay Army."

From the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army (No. 2235, dated 10th December 1880).

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 6747 R. A., dated 15th December 1880).

"IN reply to your No. 2235 of 10th instant, I am directed to state that the fixed principle advocated by the Commander in Chief is that whole batteries, or whole regiments, should be horsed exclusively with Colonial or Asiatic horses, the object being to obviate the difficulty that occurs in teaming these classes together, and also to establish a basis whereby we may regulate our orders to dealers, and determine the number of each class required to be kept in reserve.

"2. The

"2. The proposition of Government that separation of classes should not extend further than teams or troops, is in reality a repetition of the present system, and has not been found to answer. In a battery of artillery every draught horse should be able to take the place of another on emergency. By separating the teams of a single battery in the manner proposed, the difficulty of interchange is greatly increased, and a distinct loss of efficiency results. Moreover the difference in make and size of the classes is so great that the substitution of one for the other involves complete re-adjustment and re-fitting of harness and appointments both in cavalry and artillery, and thus another avoidable difficulty is created.

"3. It will be observed that although a definite proposition has been made which fixes the future proportion of Colonial and Asiatic horses among the British Corps in this command, yet it has also been stated that this change must be carried out gradually. It may now be added that it can only take place to the extent to which the markets are capable of supplying our wants. In order that they may be hereafter in a position to do so, it appears to the Commander in Chief that it is very necessary to adopt some fixed system by which to regulate our yearly demand for horses, and it was in view to this principle being recognised and acted on for the future, that His Excellency brought forward the proposition which was submitted for the consideration of Government in the communication referred to."

Vide No. 404 A., paragraphs 5 and 6.

RESOLUTION.—On reconsideration of the proposal of His Excellency the Commander in Chief that it be laid down as a general principle to be followed in this command that the two batteries of horse artillery should be horsed with Australians and the regiment of British cavalry and the field batteries with Asiatic horses, His Excellency the Governor in Council is pleased to approve thereof and to authorise its being carried out, the change being made gradually.

2. A copy of the Adjutant General's letters and this Resolution to be forwarded to the Government of India in connection with Government Resolution No. 7391, dated 22nd instant.

No. 7451.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India for information, with reference to docket No. 7391, dated 22nd instant.

From Colonel *J. D. Couper*, Director of Army Remount Operations, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 65, "Remounts—Bombay Presidency," dated Meerut, 3rd January 1881).

WITH reference to Memorandum No. 1232 D., "Horses—Remounts," dated the 30th December 1880, I have the honour to report that, after the requirements of the Bengal Presidency for the year have been met, there will remain about 13 horse artillery and 101 field artillery *seasoned* remounts.

2. The balance required by Bombay can be easily supplied from the horses purchased this year, most of which are in good condition and fit to give out, but this will reduce the reserve to 442* horses only, and I think, therefore, it will be desirable, if possible, to make further purchases of walers this year.

* This does not include the following:—
To be bought this season if procurable—
Country-bred remounts - 60
Young stock at the Saharanpur depôt - - - - - 75
all of which will be four years old by November 1881.

3. The Remount Agent, Calcutta, telegraphed to me on the 31st December 1880, that there were 237 good horses at Madras, and that the shipper had telegraphed to him to know if he should bring the horses on, but as I did not know the wishes of Government, I directed the Remount Agent to apply to the Military Department direct on the subject.

4. Yesterday I met Lieutenant Colonel B. Williams, Superintendent, Reserve Remount Depôt, Saharunpur, on his return from Oossoor, and he told me that Colonel Drury, the Remount Agent there, had informed him that some 300 horses had

had been landed at Madras, and that he thought that, if necessary, he could purchase the 200 required for Bombay from them. I think it probable that these horses may be the same as those referred to by the Remount Agent, Calcutta, in his telegram.

5. Under the circumstances, perhaps the better plan would be to telegraph to the Madras Remount Agent to purchase these 200 horses, or as many of them as he can get.

6. If the Government adopt this view, I would suggest that instructions should be sent direct to the Madras Remount Agent, or if the Government think it more desirable, I will arrange matters with the Remount Agent if the Government will be good enough to telegraph to me their wishes.

TELEGRAM from Captain *T. Deane*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Director of Army Remount Operations (No. 35 D., dated Fort William, 8th January 1881).

YOUR 65, 3rd instant. Horses to be supplied to Bombay from this year's purchases Bengal. Arrange accordingly.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Director of Army Remount Operations (No. 478 S. D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, 19th May 1881).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marginally cited, regarding the reduction of the Hapur depôt in view to effecting a reduction in the expenditure of your department; and I am now to convey to you the orders of Government thereon, as well as on other points connected with the remounting of the army in India.

No. 24, dated 5th June 1879. No. 46, dated 27th July 1879. No. 69, dated 28th January 1881.

2. The Government of India are of opinion that, apart from the question of the number of horses which may be retained in reserve, which number has been reduced, under the orders contained in Military Department No. 293 D. of 29th January 1881, from 1,000 to 500, it has been conclusively shown in your predecessor's letter, No. 24, of 5th June 1879, that the present establishment of the remount depôts is in excess of actual requirements.

3. In carrying out, therefore, the reduction of the Hapur depôt, which is now approved by the Government of India, I am directed to request that you will submit a statement showing the revised establishment for retention at Saharanpur which you would propose as sufficient under the altered circumstances.

4. The reduction of the depôt at Hapur should be carried out as soon as possible, but not until you are of opinion that sanitary reasons fully admit of it, with reference to recent reports * regarding suspicious cases of glanders or farcy which have therein occurred.

* Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 74, dated 8th February 1881. Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 82, dated 7th March 1881. Director of Army Remount Operations, No. 4, dated 14th April 1881.

5. All surplus Native establishment of the Hapur depôt should be at once discharged, and any bullocks, carts, &c., which may not be required for the use of the Saharanpur depôt or of the Horse Breeding Department should be sold. The stables and buildings should be made over to the General Superintendent of Horse-Breeding Operations, who will utilise them for the location therein of the stallions of his department during the hot season, whereby a saving will be effected in not having to build stallion stables elsewhere.

6. The future reserve of horses will be entirely stabled in the Saharanpur depôt, and will number 500 in all, exclusive of any very promising young country-breds which may be purchased at up-country fairs under the permission accorded in Military Department, No. 1430 S. D., of the 13th August 1879. The reserve may

may possibly be still further reduced in the event of the strength of the horses with British cavalry regiments being reduced, as has been recommended by the Army Commission.

7. In the purchasing or drafting season, however, it is understood that the number of horses at the depôt will sometimes reach 1,400 or 1,500; and should additional temporary accommodation be required for any of these, such accommodation may be provided. I am however, to suggest that, in order to obviate the necessity for the provision of additional accommodation at Saharanpur, and also in order to avoid needless expense, all horses which may be purchased for the season's requirements by the Remount Agent in Calcutta, and which may be regarded by him as not requiring a period of acclimatisation in the country previous to being sent to work, may be, as soon as purchased and classified by him, at once despatched straight to regiments and batteries stationed below Saharanpur, those horses only being sent to that depôt which may be required for the reserve, or to regiments north of Saharanpur, or such as for which a period of acclimatisation is required.

8. With regard to the reduced establishment of officers which will be required in the Remount Department consequent on the abolition of the Hapur depôt as a reserve, I am to say that the following establishment appears to the Government of India to be sufficient:—

Reserve Remount Depôt, Saharanpur.	*Rs.*
1 Superintendent of the Reserve Depôt, Saharanpur (Colonel Smith), staff pay - - - - - - - - - - -	700
1 Assistant Superintendent of the Reserve Depôt, Saharanpur (Lieutenant Colonel Rochfort), staff pay - - - -	350
1 Veterinary Surgeon in charge of ditto, staff pay - - -	250
Remount Depôt, Calcutta.	
1 Remount Agent (Major Roberts), staff pay - - - -	700
1 Veterinary Surgeon - - Temporarily attached as at present.	

Orders regarding the officers in excess of the above establishment, viz.:—

Major Jamieson,

Major Capel (now on furlough),

will be communicated to you on receipt of information that the reserve depôt at Hapur has been finally closed, its accounts adjusted, and the buildings, &c., made over to Mr. Hallen for the use of his department.

9. I am to request that you will be good enough to state what reduction you would suggest in the warrant officers of the department. The stable and store overseers can doubtless be reduced in numbers, or dispensed with altogether; and your suggestions on this point are awaited by Government. The surplus jemadars, daroghas, and mates can be disposed of under the ordinary rules regarding pensions and gratuities on reduction; and I am to take this opportunity of suggesting whether it might not be advisable, as opportunity occurs, to introduce pensioned non-commissioned officers and sowars of Native cavalry regiments in place of the expensive subordinate warrant and Native establishments hitherto kept up at the remount depôts.

10. Considerable savings can doubtless be effected by the measure herein suggested; and I am in conclusion to request that you will be good enough to submit, for the information of Government, a statement showing the approximate amount at which you estimate that saving to be.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 283) to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office, London,
25 August 1881.

My Lord,

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 200, of 27th May 1881, on the general subject of the remounting operations for the Army in India.

2. Your Lordship in Council informs me that your Government have determined to abolish the reserve depôt at Hapur, maintaining depôts at Saharanpur and Oosoor only, and to reduce the number of horses in reserve from 1,300 to 800.

3. These measures, your Lordship believes, will result in a considerable saving, and will not at the same time be at all detrimental to the efficiency of Her Majesty's troops in India.

4. I concur with your Lordship's Government, and approve of the measures now reported.

5. After full consideration of the present system of Army remount operations, aided by the experience gained in the recent campaign in Afghanistan, you state your opinion that it will be expedient to place the general management and supervision of the business throughout India in charge of one Director.

6. In this view your Government is supported by the opinions of General Crawford Chamberlain, Lieutenant General Sir S. Browne, and the Army Commission.

7. I sanction the change now recommended, and trust it may prove as efficient as your Government anticipate, but I request that the operation of the new system may be carefully and continuously scrutinised, and that special and periodical reports may be made to me as to its working.

8. I request to be furnished as early as practicable with the orders it is proposed to issue to give effect to this sanction.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DISSENT by Mr. *R. A. Dalyell*, C.S.I., C.I.E., dated 27 August 1881.

Amalgamation of the Three Remount Agencies.

I REGRET that I cannot assent to the Despatch passed on Tuesday last which sanctions the amalgamation of the Remount Agencies at Madras and Bombay with that of Bengal under one Director General. Though the Government of India urge some good reasons in favour of the measure, the opinions of the two local Governments concerned do not seem to have been obtained. Nothing is said of any possible objections, nor is any hint given of the establishment and probable cost of the new department. The papers show that the proposal was brought forward by two Committees, which reported respectively six and eight years ago; but nothing is told us of the reasons which prevented its adoption at that time. It is also stated that the measure is strongly urged in the Report of the late Army Commission; but this paper has not yet been brought under the consideration of the Council. I have always been very strongly of opinion that the amalgamation of departments, in different Presidencies under a distant central authority, instead of leading to increased efficiency, tends rather to a complication of accounts and a large increase of correspondence, and I cannot bring myself to believe that the Remount Agency of the Madras Army, situated at Oosoor, will be better controlled by an official, who must make a railway journey

journey of about 4,000 miles, in order to visit it, than if it were left, as at present, under the direct orders of the Madras Government and the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, who must pass within a few miles of the depôt, whenever he visits his principal force at Bangalore. The fact that the systems under which the three armies are horsed have always been different, owing to local peculiarities, render it less likely that such control will be either useful or efficient. Holding these views, I am not disposed to look favourably on the proposal; but my main reasons for dissenting from the Despatch are—

(1.) Because the scheme has been brought forward in such an incomplete form as to give no idea of the ultimate cost of carrying it into effect.

(2.) Because, in my opinion, the settlement of this question should be deferred until the much more sweeping changes proposed in the Army Commissioner's Report have been disposed of, and—

(3.) Because no expression of local opinion has been obtained upon a question very seriously affecting local interests.

(signed) *R. A. Dalyell.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 360 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received 24th October* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 1 October 1881.

WE have to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's Military letter, No. 283, dated 25th August 1881, conveying sanction to the several proposals for the management of the future Army Remount Operations in India, and forward, as desired in paragraph 8 of that Despatch, copies of the orders which we have issued on the subject.

To Director of Army Remount Operations for India, No. 1333 S. D., dated the 7th September 1881.
To Government of Madras, No. 1334 S. D., dated the 7th September 1881.
To Government of Bombay, No. 1335 S. D., dated the 7th September 1881.

2. The working of the new system will receive our careful attention, and your Lordship will be furnished in due course with reports thereon.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Director of Army Remount Operations for India (No. 1333 S. D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, 7th September 1881).

THE sanction of the Secretary of State having been received to the general management and supervision of the Army remounting operations of India being controlled by one Director, I am directed, in continuation of the letter from this Department, No. 478 S. D., dated 19th May 1881, to convey the following orders of Government to you in regard to the future management of your Department.

2. From this date the general management and supervision of the remounting operations of India will be conducted by the Director of Army Remount Operations for India. He will periodically visit the various remount establishments and horse markets throughout the country, reporting from time to time on their merits and defects, and suggesting, for the consideration of the Government of India,

India, such measures as he may deem expedient for improving their general management and utility.

3. He will estimate for the requirements in horses of the British mounted branches of the service throughout India, and, in accordance with such requirements, will order the despatch of remounts to the corps concerned, either direct from the markets where they may be purchased in any locality, or from the depôts of Saharanpur or Oosoor. It is to be understood that these depôts will supply, as may be most convenient, any Australians required for the remounting of the Bombay Army (*vide* Military Department, No. 1963 S. D., of the 1st November 1880). The remaining horses required for that Army should be purchased in the local market; and the Director will see that the earliest notice is advertised of the number of horses to be purchased in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.

4. It is to be understood* that the officers of the Remount Department shall be available for duty as purchasing agents; and it will rest with the Director to depute any officer to any market to purchase, or to purchase from them himself. In this respect, however, the Bombay market for Eastern horses should be exceptionally treated, it being advisable that, whether purchases are made therefrom for the Bombay or other Armies, the Remount Agent should not be constantly changed, so that the Persian and Arab dealers may know the officer with whom they have to deal. The cause of the decline of the Arab and Persian horse market is understood to be the uncertainty and great variation in Government requirements, and the uncertainty as to who the purchasing officer or officers may be. As the purchasing season in the Bombay market occurs at a later period than that at Calcutta, it will probably be found expedient to depute the Calcutta Remount Agent (Major Roberts) to Bombay to make the annual purchases there.

* *Vide* Military Department, No. 1425 S. D., dated the 27th October 1880.

5. Copies of the letters to the Governments of Madras and Bombay on the subject, Nos. 1334-35 S. D. of this date, are forwarded herewith for your information. The Director should carry on his business, so far as it relates to the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, in frequent communication with the Government thereof, endeavouring to meet their views and wishes in all ways practicable.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department (No. 1334 S. D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, 7th September 1881).

I AM directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter, No. 1333 S. D. of this date, to the Director of Army Remount Operations for India.

2. It will be observed that it has been decided that the general management and supervision of the Army remounting operations of India shall be controlled by one Director.

3. This measure is one which has been repeatedly advocated by the various authorities who have reported to the Government of India on matters connected with the stud, and it is one also which the experience of the past campaign in Afghanistan shows that the Army Commission were well justified in recommending† for adoption. The sanction of Her Majesty's Government has now been obtained to this arrangement.

† Paragraph 503 of Report.

4. I am therefore to request that, under the orders of the Governor in Council, the Remount Agent, Oosoor, may be requested to place himself in communication with the Director of Army Remount Operations for India in all matters relating to the purchase and supply of remounts.

5. I am, however, to observe that it is not intended to make any change in the system of management of the Oosoor Remount Depôt, which, as regards results, has proved highly creditable to the Remount Agent; but the object sought is to

to have the question of remounting the armies in India no longer separately but collectively considered, whereby the State will govern the entire horse-market in India, develop each source of supply as deemed necessary, each reserve of horses furnishing remounts irrespective of presidency, but respective of regiments and vicinity.

Government of Madras, No. 5285, dated 16th June 1881.

6. The future reserve of horses to be kept at Oosoor should not exceed 300, and every endeavour should be made to keep to this number during the non-purchasing season. It has been observed from the correspondence marginally cited that the authorised reserve of 100 horses in Madras has apparently been exceeded, the average daily number of horses present at Oosoor during the past year being 337.

7. Under the new arrangement Persian and Northern horses will be purchased for Madras in Bombay by the Remount Agent sent there by the Director, who will annually advertise requirements. It will then be unnecessary to make either advances or promises from Madras to the dealers in these classes of horses; and the competition which has hitherto existed between the Madras and Bombay markets, and which has proved one of the causes of the decline of the supply of Eastern horses to Bombay, will be avoided.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1335 S. D., "Horses—Remounts," dated Simla, 7th September 1881).

No. 5905, dated the 14th October 1880.
No. 7167, dated the 11th December 1880.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters marginally cited, regarding the appointment of a Remount Agent and the establishment of a reserve remount depôt in the Bombay Presidency.

2. The reasons for which a change in the present system is deemed necessary are that Bengal has recently had to be indented on to supply remounts for Bombay; that the objections to purchase in Bombay by committees have increased; that the absence of a remount depôt during the recent campaign has involved the crippling of batteries and the British cavalry regiments in the Bombay Presidency; and that the want of a fixed reserve has rendered it impossible to let the dealers know in time the requirements of the year. To remedy these defects the Government of Bombay propose—

That a Remount Agent be appointed, as in former years, and
That a reserve remount depôt, representing a year's supply of horses (250). should be established on the same footing as those in Bengal and Madras.

3. It is also proposed that the horse artillery should be horsed with Austratralians and the regiment of British cavalry and all the field batteries be mounted from the local market.

4. In reply, I am to state that the Government of India, having carefully considered the proposals of the Government of Bombay, are of opinion that it would not be advisable to incur the additional expense involved by the appointment of a separate Remount Agent or the establishment of a reserve depôt.

5. On this point I am to invite the attention of the Governor in Council to the remarks made at paragraph 500 of the Army Commission Report, wherein it is shown that the system of purchasing in Bombay and sending horses direct to corps and batteries is the most economical one, and that in comparison with this system that of Bengal is very expensive. In pursuance of the recommendation contained in their report the Government of India have just abolished the existing depôt at Hapur.

6. Having had the whole question of the supply of horses to the British Cavalry and Artillery in India under careful consideration, the Government of India have come to the conclusion that it will be desirable to place the general arrangements connected therewith in charge of the Director of Army Remount Operations, and a recommendation to this effect having been made to the

Secretary of State for India, the approval of Her Majesty's Government has has now been signified. It will therefore be henceforward one of the duties of this officer to apportion from the existing remount establishments in Bengal and Madras as many horses as may be required for the remounting of the Bombay Presidency. These horses will, as a rule, be Australians, and under the proposed arrangements, will be sent direct to batteries of horse artillery in Bombay.

7. With regard to local purchases of Eastern horses either for Bengal or for the British Cavalry and Field Artillery in the Bombay Presidency, the Government of India consider it highly desirable that they should be purchased by one Agency, and not by the means of ever-changing committees. The Director of Army Remount Operations will therefore for the future delegate to Bombay an officer of the Remount Department, and this officer will purchase the required number of horses for both Presidencies; these will, as a rule, be sent direct to the cavalry regiment and batteries for which they may be required.

8. It will be desirable that early information should be at once sent to the Director of Army Remount Operations as to the probable number of horses required during the coming season, so that he may be able to regulate the purchase and distribution of horses accordingly. It will be his duty to arrange that, as in the case of purchases made in Bengal, the Government of Bombay is kept informed of the number of Eastern horses required during the season, so that advertisements may be issued informing the importers of the number of horses which will be purchased by Government and the price to be given. It appears to the Government of India that if, by this means, timely notice be given to the Bombay dealers, the wants of Government at Bombay can be as regularly and as well supplied as they are in Calcutta.

9. The proposal to extend the operations of the Poona Veterinary School, referred to in paragraph 12 of your letter under reply, has been already replied to in Military Department Letter, No. 1077 S. D., of the 30th July 1881.

10. A copy of the letter* to the Director on this subject is enclosed for information.

No. 1333 S. D., of this date.

— IV. —

ROYAL ENGINEER STAFF.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 216 of 1881—Military Department), to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 5th *July* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 10 June 1881.

THE Government of India have had for some years past under consideration the inconvenience arising from the want of some staff officer of Royal Engineers in India. The number of these officers has largely increased during past years, and now exceeds 400. They are scattered about the country, serving in different departments and capacities, and great difficulty and inconvenience are experienced in supplying any information or returns required from them by the military authorities in England, while the officers themselves have no recognised channel of communication with army head-quarters, or with the staff of their own regiment at home. The Army Commission have included in their report some definite proposals for the re-organization of the Military Engineer serving in this country, on which we shall hereafter record our opinion when that part of the report comes under consideration; but we are unwilling to defer, for so long as that would involve, taking some steps to supply what is certainly much needed.

2. At different times, when proposals to appoint a staff officer of Engineers have

have come before the Government of India, difficulties have been raised on the score of the expense involved in making a new appointment. But we have now to submit a proposal which will obviate this, in recommending that one of the officers in the Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department, and attached to the Inspector General's Office, which is now about to be placed under the Military Department, as reported in our Despatch No. 151 of the 1st May, should be also *ex officio* Assistant Adjutant General of Royal Engineers.

3. There will always be one or more officers of Royal Engineers attached to the Inspector General's Office, which is stationed at the army head-quarters, one of whom might be placed for the purpose in question under the orders of the Commander in Chief. In this way the duties of the appointment could be provided for without cost. Some arrangement of the kind is very much needed. Accordingly, if the Military authorities in England concur, we should be glad of early sanction to its adoption.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military—No. 284), to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office, London,
My Lord, 25 August 1881.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 216, dated 10th June 1881, proposing a remedy for an inconvenience said to arise from the want of some Staff Officer of Royal Engineers in India.

2. Your Lordship in Council recommends that one of the officers in the Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department, and attached to the Inspector General's Office, should be also *ex officio* Assistant Adjutant General.

3. I regret that, as at present advised, I am unable to accede to this suggestion. The purely regimental information and returns required by the Military authorities in England from Officers of Royal Engineers serving in civil departments in India can, I am of opinion, be called for and furnished through Army head-quarters, as at present constituted; while, with respect to the objection that these Officers themselves have no recognised channel of communication with Army head-quarters, I would observe that they have, in the provisions contained in the Indian Army Regulations, the same means as any of the numerous Officers of the Staff Corps or local services in civil employment, which I believe have been found adequate for all practical purposes, while the channel of communication with the staff of their own regiment at home must, I apprehend, under any circumstances, be through their Indian Army head-quarters or direct.

4. Believing, therefore, that there is no actual occasion for creating a new channel of communication for Royal Engineer Officers, it is not necessary that I should discuss the further proposals contained in your Lordship's letter for providing it.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 393 of 1881—Military Department), to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 21st *November* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 29 October 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch of the 25th August 1881, No. 284, declining to sanction the appointment of a Staff Officer of Royal Engineers in India with the designation of Assistant Adjutant General, as recommended in our Military Letter, No. 216, of the 10th June 1881.

2. The appointment was proposed by us in order to obviate the delay and difficulty at present experienced, in supplying information or returns required by the Military authorities at home relating to officers of that service, and because the want has been found of a recognised channel of correspondence generally, between them and head-quarters, or the staff of their own regiments in England.

3. Your Lordship has been unable to accede to the proposal, being advised that the purely regimental information and returns required by the Military authorities in England from officers of the Royal Engineers serving in Civil Departments in India, can be called for through Army head-quarters as at present constituted, whilst the officers themselves have the same channel of correspondence as the numerous officers of the Staff Corps or local service in civil employ, which your Lordship believes has been found adequate for all practical purposes.

4. We have, however, to observe that the analogy thus assumed to exist between the position of officers of the Royal Engineers and those of the various Staff Corps and local services, appears to be based on a misconception.

5 Officers of the Indian Staff Corps employed on civil duties, and consequently not under the control of the Military Department of the Government of India or the Adjutant General in India, constitute a small minority of that service. Further, officers of this class are employed permanently in India; they are serving under definite rules which provide for their status and privileges, and, except when they take furlough or retire, the Military authorities have nothing to do with them. Moreover, under all circumstances, they are the servants of the Indian Government.

6. But the position of the Royal Engineer officers in India is altogether exceptional. They belong to the British and not to the Indian army; they are lent to the Indian Government for short periods of service, coming and going at frequent intervals of relief; while a peculiar circumstance in their case is that, while their transfers and appointments to India are arranged by the Horse Guards, they are almost all serving in a Civil Department; neither the Adjutant General's Office nor the Military Department through which the business passes has any accurate knowledge of their stations or employments, whilst the department under which most of them are serving, is generally very imperfectly informed about the regulations under which their services are obtained. Complications are constantly occurring in consequence.

7. At the present moment it would be not easy even to obtain an accurate return of the Royal Engineer officers serving in India, or to ascertain what is the precise establishment properly belonging to India, or how many there are deficient of that establishment; nor can it be told when an officer comes out whether he is coming in relief, or whom he comes to relieve. It still appears to us, therefore, that the proposal was a reasonable and proper one. The want of such an appointment has long been felt, and has been repeatedly discussed; but considerations of expense prevented it from being definitively brought forward for sanction. The arrangement we had proposed would have met that difficulty. As however we have since made a proposal for the permanent appointment of a Staff Officer of Engineers, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Indian Army Commission, we will not again press the provisional appointment,

ment, although feeling it right to place on record our opinion, that your Lordship would appear to have been imperfectly advised in regard to the circumstances of the case.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

— V. —

ESTABLISHMENT AND OFFICERING OF NATIVE ARMY, STAFF, AND DEPARTMENTS.—RECRUITMENT OF THE STAFF CORPS.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 230, of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (*received* 19th *July* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 24 June 1881.

IN our Despatch of the 24th April 1881, No. 141, we submitted to Her Majesty's Government our opinion upon that part of the proposals of the Army Commission which deals with the establishment of British troops in India. We now proceed to submit our views upon the recommendations of the Commission with respect to the Native Army.

2. This very important subject, which has engaged our continued attention for several weeks past, covers, in fact, the whole ground of Indian Army organization, and may usefully be considered under the following heads:—

Strength and Composition of the Native Army.
Number of European Officers per Regiment.
Mode of Officering the Native Army.
Mode of Officering the Staff and Army Departments.

Strength and Composition of the Native Army.

3. The recommendations of the Commission on this head are set forth in the 4th and 7th chapters of their Report, the first of which proposes the organization of the Indian Army in four separate bodies, termed army corps; the second deals with the strength and organization of Native regiments. We have already, in our Despatch of the 28th February 1881, No. 85, pronounced against the proposal to alter the existing designation and composition of the three Indian Armies; we now proceed to deal with the second of the Commission's proposals, contained in the 7th chapter of the Report.

4. The Commission propose, while maintaining the existing numerical strength of the Native Army (paragraph 218), to reduce 30 regiments of Infantry and 10 of Cavalry, the regiments retained being considerably augmented. Their reasons for recommending this measure are stated at length in the Report, especially in paragraph 219. The present organization of the army in small cadres, of 712 Natives of all ranks, which do not admit of leaving depôts when the regiment takes the field, and which after a short stress of campaigning are reduced to bodies tòo small to be effective tactical units, is decidedly defective. And, "in accordance with the opinions of the great majority of regimental officers,"

officers," they recommend that the strength of a Cavalry regiment be raised from three squadrons, with 457 of all ranks, to four squadrons, with 609 of all ranks; and that an infantry regiment be raised from 712 Natives of all ranks to 912, the existing formation in eight companies being still retained. This organization, in order to give about the same number of sabres and bayonets as at present, would involve a reduction, as above stated, of 30 Infantry and 10 Cavalry regiments.

5. We concur with the Commission in thinking that the present strength of Native regiments, both of Cavalry and Infantry, is insufficient, and that, while the aggregate establishment of the Native Army should remain undiminished, this establishment should be organized in a smaller number of regiments. The experience of the recent campaign, since the publication of the Report, entirely bears out their opinion of the defective nature of the present organization for purposes of war. And the matter having thus come prominently to notice, and when the very expensive character of the present organization is considered, we are of opinion that it is impossible to avoid a large measure of reorganization on the lines recommended by the Commission. But we think that the proposals of the Commission go too far in this respect. Admitting that the establishment proposed by them for a regiment of Cavalry and Infantry would be a suitable one, both for tactical and administrative purposes, it has to be remembered that the Indian Army is required to maintain internal tranquillity rather than for employment against external foes. In this view it is essential that certain obligatory points should be occupied by troops in time of peace. The scheme of the Commission involves the abandonment of certain military stations at which, in our opinion, garrisons ought to be maintained. The troops should not only be available in the country, but they should be actually visible at the points where danger from internal causes might arise. It is true that this necessary distribution of the Native Army might be effected by posting regiments at certain stations by wings or detachments. But there are obvious objections to applying such a system permanently to any considerable portion of the army; and, after giving the matter our most careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the requisite conditions of economy on the one hand, and sound military administration on the other, will best be attained by an arrangement, which is in effect a compromise between the existing organization, which ought certainly to be modified, and the large measure of reduction proposed by the Commission.

6. The arrangement which we recommend is as follows: –

The Native Army to be maintained substantially at its present aggregate strength.

The establishment of the Cavalry regiments in Bengal and Bombay to be raised from 457* and 487 respectively to 550 Natives of all ranks, the strength of the Madras Cavalry remaining unchanged.

The present strength of the Punjab Cavalry Regiment is 493.

That the strength of the Infantry regiment throughout India be raised from 712† to 832 Natives of all ranks.

† The Goorkha and Punjab Frontier Force Regiments are somewhat in excess of this. The three regiments in Assam are 912 strong, and would be retained at this figure.

This will involve a reduction of four regiments of Cavalry and 18 of Infantry.

Of the four Cavalry regiments to be reduced, we propose that three should be taken from the Bengal Army, and one from the Bombay Army.

The reduction in Infantry regiments to be six in Bengal, eight in Madras, four in Bombay. The general result is on page 495:—

NUMBER OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

	Present.	Proposed by Army Commission.	Now Recommended.
CAVALRY:			
Bengal (a)	24	17	21
Madras	4	2	4
Bombay	7	6	6
	35	25	31
INFANTRY:			
Bengal (b)	61	51	55
Madras	40	25	32
Bombay	30	25	26
	131	101	113
TOTAL	166	126	144

Present strength of Indian Army - - - - - 110,964
Proposed " " " - - - - - 110,995

(a) Not including Guide Corps Cavalry. (b) Including Guide Corps Infantry.

7. It will be observed that the brunt of the reductions proposed by the Commission fell on the Madras Army. Under their plan the existing Madras Cavalry regiments would have been reduced from four to two, and the Infantry from 40 to 25. As regards the Cavalry, we consider that four regiments are the least number necessary for this Army, even if the Madras Infantry could be reduced to the extent proposed by the Commission. With respect to the Madras Infantry, while allowing due weight to what is advanced by the Commission in favour of their mode of selection, paragraphs 243 *et seq.*, we are of opinion that the reduction in the number of separate cadres of the Native Army, which we consider to be imperatively necessary, should be more equally distributed over the three armies than the Commission's scheme provides for. The existing defects of the Madras Army may be admitted. That army has laboured of late years under great disadvantages in many ways, and especially in having been officered by men too old for their position, and who have been deprived, by circumstances beyond their own control, of reasonable inducements to the energetic discharge of regimental duty. We shall refer to this point hereafter; we will now merely observe that, while the undoubted defects of the Madras Army should be made good by better discipline and improved regimental organization, and the introduction of younger officers for the subordinate regimental posts, we consider the cardinal principles which should always be kept in view, of recruiting the Indian military force from different parts of the country, will be better preserved by the arrangement we have proposed than the more sweeping measures recommended by the Commission. We may add that the reduction which we now propose in the Madras Army is less than that agreed to by Sir Neville Chamberlain when Commander in Chief, whose evidence will be found at pp. 85–88, Vol. I., of the Appendices to the Report.* * *Not printed*

We attach a statement showing the four Cavalry and 18 Infantry stations which will probably, under our proposals, be selected for reduction.

8. The formation of a reserve for the Native Army is discussed in the 7th chapter of the Report, paragraphs 260 and 268. We have to state on this point that we are not prepared to support the proposal.

9. The arrangements necessary for dealing with the Native Officers and Non-commissioned Officers and men of the regiments to be reduced are treated of in paragraph 241 of the Report, and have our general approval. The privates in the

the reduced regiments should be absorbed, as far as possible, into the strength of the regiments to be retained. As regards Non-commissioned Officers and Officers, inasmuch as it is proposed not to increase the number of troops or companies in a regiment, but only the number of privates, the former could not be transferred to other regiments without interfering with the promotion of the Non-commissioned Officers and Officers already in them. We agree with the Commission that it will be necessary to retire them at once, and that, as the retirement is compulsory, liberal compensation should be allowed. The proposal of the Commission on this point is as follows (paragraph 241, page 80):—

"We presume that, in the case of each army corps, the least efficient regiments would be reduced. The privates in the reduced regiments who may be fit for service would be absorbed in the strength of the remaining cadres. This might also be done in the case of a few of the Non-commissioned Officers, drummers, or farriers, who may wish to serve. But in the case of the Native Officers, and of the majority of the Non-commissioned Officers, special terms of pension and retirement should be granted. To send these men to other regiments would retard promotion, and produce general discontent. Moreover, it would be costly to retain them on full pay. It would be better that they should retire at once; and as their retirement from active duty, after serving the State faithfully for many years, would be compulsory, something more than the ordinary pensions should be given them. We propose, therefore, that the present superior rate of pensions be given to all ranks above that of private who have served in the army for 25 years and upwards, and that those who have served from 15 to 25 years should receive ordinary pensions, and, in addition, a gratuity of one month's pay for every two years' service in the army. The result will be a considerable increase to the pension list and an immediate outlay in gratuities; but this will be far less than retaining the men on full pay. For instance, in the Madras Army, where reductions will be largest, 256 Native Officers, and 1,540 Non-commissioned Officers will have to retire, causing an immediate outlay of some 1,72,345 rupees in gratuities, besides additional pensions. The last two columns of the statement in the Appendix show that in the Madras Army the cost of these extra pensions for one year, *plus* gratuities, will be less than full pay for the same period, whilst in the second and following years the outlay will be diminished by the amount of gratuities."

10. The foregoing figures are, of course, not applicable to the modified scheme of reduction now proposed; but they indicate the general effect of compensation charges.

The terms recommended by the Commission have our approval generally, but they do not provide for the case of men of short service, while the transfer of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers to other regiments would not, as a rule, be desirable.

The proposals for which we ask sanction are as follows:—

I. For Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men who have completed 25 years' service and upwards, the superior rates of pension.

II. For Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men who have completed 14 years' service and less than 25 years' service, the ordinary rates of pension and a bonus of one month's pay for every two years of service.

III. For Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men of 10 years' service and less than 14 years' service, two-thirds of the rate of pension under (II.) and a bonus of three months' pay.

IV. For Non-commissioned Officers and men of five years' service and less than 10 years' service, a gratuity of a month's pay for every year of service and a bonus of three months' pay.

V. For Non-commissioned Officers and men of less than five years' service, a gratuity of six months' pay.

Only men of less than 15 years' service should be transferred to other regiments. In all cases of discharge on account of these reductions, free passes by rail, as allowed by regulation, would be given.

11. The scale of gratuities, &c., for the Cavalry is now under our consideration, and will take the same shape as the foregoing, but with modifications suitable to the circumstances under which the silladar cavalry serve.

12. The

12. The above are the terms of compensation we desire to recommend; but we should wish to be empowered to make any slight modifications in the scale of gratuities or bonus which may appear to us to be necessary on the advice of the superior military authorities in each Presidency.

13. It may be possible to utilize the services of some of the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and men belonging to the regiments selected for reduction in civil situations or in the police, and we believe that if efforts are made in this direction, and, taking into consideration the liberal terms we propose, there should be no cause of complaint on the part of the men of the reduced corps.

14. We recommend that this occasion should be taken to improve the position of the Native Non-commissioned Officers. The Commission make the following recommendations on this head (paragraph 225):—

"There is, however, a strong and general opinion among regimental Officers that the position of Non-commissioned Officers should be somewhat improved. This most useful class received no increase when the rates of pay of all other classes in the Native army were revised three years ago. At present, the Non-commissioned Officers are not, save in respect of pension, much better off than the privates, and they get no progressive increase, as the sepoys do. The present rates of pay are—

	Per Mensem.
CAVALRY:	*Rs.*
Duffadar, with horse allowance - - -	38
Sowar (private), with horse allowance - -	27 to 30
INFANTRY:	
Havildar - - - - - - - -	14
Naik - - - - - - - -	12
Lance Naik - - - - - - - -	7 to 10
Sepoy (private) - - - - - - -	7 to 10

"We recommend that Duffadars and Havildars be allowed one rupee a month for every two years of good service in that grade up to a maximum of four rupees good conduct pay; and that Naiks be allowed one rupee a month for every two years of good service in that grade up to a maximum of two rupees good conduct pay. The Duffadar's pay will thus, in line regiments, be 38 rupees, rising to 42 rupees a month; the Havildar's pay will be 14 rupees, rising to 18 rupees a month; and the Naik's pay will be 12 rupees, rising to 14 rupees a month."

15. We desire to support this recommendation.

Number of European Officers per Regiment.

16. The present rules give a fixed establishment of seven Officers to each regiment of Cavalry and Infantry, Officers employed on the staff being seconded and their places filled up, while supernumeraries are appointed in the place of Officers on furlough and acting in staff appointments. The Commission propose a fixed establishment of 11 Officers for each Cavalry regiment of four squadrons, and nine Officers for each Infantry regiment; and it is to be inferred that they contemplate the discontinuance of the practice of making supernumeraries. It will have been seen above that we propose a strength of Native soldiers for each regiment of Cavalry and Infantry in excess of the present establishment, but smaller than that proposed by the Commission, the Cavalry being maintained on an establishment of three squadrons; and we consider that, provided the present system of appointing supernumeraries in place of absentees be maintained, an establishment of eight Officers per regiment, in lieu of seven Officers as at present, will be proper and sufficient. The additional Officers would be appointed in the grades of squadron and wing Officer respectively.

respectively. The result will be a total establishment of regimental Officers for the whole army of almost precisely the same strength as at present.* The maintenance of this establishment we consider to be a necessary condition; for, although the number of regiments is to be reduced, it is necessary to have the same effective reserve of Officers available in the country as at present; for since the number of military Officers employed in civil and miscellaneous duties is rapidly diminishing, and the Officers of the Staff and Army Departments can seldom be spared from their regular duties in war time, the only effective reserve consists of the regimental Officers. The experience of past wars, as those in Abyssinia and Afghanistan, shows that when the army takes the field, the demand arises for Officers to occupy a variety of posts in connection with the transport and other duties; and the only available reserve is to be found in the regiments which do not take the field. We think, therefore, that the total establishment of regimental Officers should not be reduced below the present amount.

* Present—
166 regiments at 7 officers - 1,162
Proposed—
144 regiments at 8 officers - 1,152

17. But although there would be numerical reduction, this reorganization will produce a considerable saving in the cost of the British Officers. The additional Officer appointed to each regiment will be in the grade of squadron or wing Officer, while the posts of Commandant, second in command, and other staff appointments of 22 regiments will be abolished. The total annual saving of the contemplated change as regards the Native Army is given in the attached estimate, and amounts to about 12 lakhs. Against this must be set, in the first instance, the cost of compensation to the Native soldiers and Officers reduced. The exact amount of this it would be very difficult to estimate with accuracy, and, as regards the pensions now to be paid, this is, in part, rather the anticipation of a liability than the liability itself, since the old sepoys and Native Officers whom it is now necessary to pension would have to be pensioned eventually in any case, although on less favourable terms than are here proposed. On the whole, there will be a substantial saving even in the first year, while, ultimately, the full saving of 12 lakhs shown in the estimate will be realised for pay alone, exclusive of the considerable reductions in the medical and army staff which will be practicable in consequence, and the savings in the maintenance of stations, hospitals, and other buildings, and charges for camp followers and establishments connected with the troops. We believe that the army thus reorganized will gain in efficiency.

18. As regards the Officers of the 22 regiments to be reduced, the juniors can be transferred to other regiments; but it may not be practicable to find suitable employment for the older Officers who thus become supernumerary, and some special treatment of their case appears desirable. The Commission in their Report refer to this subject in the following terms:—

"310. . . . . For these Officers, we consider that some special relief should be afforded beyond what is provided by the above proposals, or by existing regulations.

"311. To all who may thus be deprived of their appointments, and for whom there may be no prospect of early and suitable employment, we would suggest that the following conditions be offered:—

"I. To Officers of 28 years' service and upwards, the pension rate next above that to which they may be entitled by length of service, including service at Addiscombe, no deduction being made for furlough taken in excess of the periods counting for pension, with the additional annuity or bonus allowed under G. G. O. No. 1 of 1879.

"II. To Officers of between 20 and 28 years' service, pensions as above, with the additional annuity or bonus under the above Order, calculated for their age and service, such as was recently sanctioned for officers of the Public Works Department.

"Both classes should receive, in addition, a bonus of six months' staff pay of their appointment, and also be allowed to capitalise, if they wish it, a portion only of the extra annuity. Those who are unwilling to retire on these conditions must necessarily be permitted to continue in the service, and should be provided

provided with such suitable employment as can be found for them according to their rank and capacity."

19. The arrangement which we would recommend is not very different from the foregoing proposal, so far as regards the amounts of pension to be offered. But instead of offering them to the particular Officers of the regiments to be reduced, we think that, as many special pensions as there are senior Officers in each army thrown out of employment by the reductions, should be offered to the Officers of that army employed on military duty in order of seniority by length of service, on the understanding that for every retirement of an Officer holding an appointment, a supernumerary Officer from a reduced regiment shall be brought into his place; in this way the effect of the measure on the prospects of the Officers who remain in the Service, will be the same as if these special terms were offered to the particular Officers whose regiments are reduced, while the incidence of the boon will be more equally distributed. The terms which we recommend are, that for as many Officers of 20 years' service and upwards as are made supernumerary by the reduction of their regiments in each army, so many Officers in each army of 24 years' service and upwards, be allowed to retire on the next higher rate of pension above that to which they are entitled by the regulations, without deduction for furlough taken in excess of the periods counting for pension, and to receive also the additional annuity or bonus representing the value of their expectation to the succession to the Colonel's allowance on the terms of G. G. O. No. 1 of 1875, and succeeding years. Further, that they should receive a bonus of six months' staff pay of their regimental appointment, if that appointment has been abolished.

20. Considering that, under the existing conditions of Indian service, Officers of this standing are entitled to continue in the Service on full pay, whether employed or not, we think that these terms would not be unreasonable, either in the interests of the State or of the Officers concerned.

Mode of Officering the Native Army.

21. This subject is dealt with in the 8th chapter of the Report. It will be seen that the Commission strongly condemn the Staff Corps system, and propose an alternative scheme of organization. But we must observe that the criticisms which the Commission pass on the Staff Corps (paragraphs 278 and 279) appear to be founded, to some extent, on a misconception of what has really happened. They complain in effect that the Staff Corps has deluged the Indian Army with Field Officers. Now the Staff Corps system undoubtedly led to a large increase of the superior ranks, because the Staff Corps rate of promotion is much more favourable than that which obtained in the old Indian Army, with its large proportion of subalterns and Captains to Field Officers, which necessarily entailed slow promotion. But the present disproportion between the senior and junior grades of the army appears to be really due to two causes—one referred to by the Commission, namely, the guarantee given to every Officer who entered the army before 1866 of his Colonel's allowances after 38 years' service, which offers a powerful inducement to Officers to hold on to the Service; and secondly, to the fact, which the Commission do not notice, that while the strength of the Indian Army has been largely reduced since 1861, this reduction has been effected to a large extent by stopping admissions, while the measures which have been taken to get rid of the superfluous seniors have not had the full effect contemplated. This has been especially the case in the Madras Army, which is practically in the position of a moribund service, in which the survivors have risen by efflux of time to the superior grades. This is clearly shown by the figures in the margin,* which also bring out the exceptional and anomalous condition which the Officers' list of that Army has now reached. If the three armies, and the Madras Army in particular, had been reduced at the time when the number and establishment of regiments were reduced to the then actual requirements, and vacancies in this reduced establishment had thenceforward been filled up as they occurred by

* Madras Army.

	1862.	1881.
Lieutenant Colonels and Brevet Colonels - -	40	248
Majors - - - -	132	226
Captains - - -	413	60
Subalterns - - -	616	110
Total - - -	1,201	644

by the appointment of young Officers, instead of by the absorption of senior supernumeraries, the present appearance of the Staff Corps would have been very different from that which it actually presents. And if rules be introduced for limiting the tenure of regimental appointments, such as were recommended to Her Majesty's Government five years ago,* then it would probably be found that the Staff Corps system of promotion, which gives a step of rank at periods of 12, 20, and 26 years' service to Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel respectively, would not involve an excessive proportion of superior grades. Further, the rule, which we understand is about to be introduced, for transferring to the reserve list every Officer who has not attained the rank of Major General at the age of 55, will make a great clearance of senior Officers from active employment, and when it is carried out, the present abnormal condition of the active list of the Indian Army, with its excessive preponderance of senior Officers, will disappear.

* Despatch to the Secretary of State of the 10th of March 1876, No. 53.

22. We consider, then, that the case against the Staff Corps has been put somewhat too strongly by the Commission, and that defects have been ascribed to it which are, in reality, the results of what may be termed accidental and exceptional circumstances, and are not inherent in the Staff Corps system itself. At any rate, we consider that the Staff Corps system is decidedly preferable to that which the Commission propose to substitute for it. Their plan is (paragraphs 278, 279) that "the Officers of each Army Corps . . . . should be "formed into a general list; that the number of each rank should be strictly "limited, and that promotion in army rank should only take place as vacancies "occur in the rank above; and this is the system which we desire to recommend "for adoption." The Commission proceed in the succeeding paragraph to work out their plan, which gives for each army a fixed establishment of Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants for the Native regiments, the Army Staff, and the Army Departments respectively, and for the whole taken together. And we may observe upon their scheme that, while the proportion of senior grades which they propose would give a very insufficient rate of promotion, as compared with that which it is now intended to maintain in the British Army, and which is at present afforded by the Staff Corps, the scheme makes no sort of provision for that inevitable process of expansion and contraction which must be the normal condition of the Indian Army, as the wants of the public service vary from time to time. Supposing even one additional appointment to be created, the difficulty would at once arise of determining in what rank the augmentation should be made; equally so, if a department had to be reduced, in what rank the reduction should be made. Every case of this sort, and such cases would necessarily arise frequently, would involve a special reconsideration of the whole military establishment of the country by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. There would, in fact, be a nominal fixed establishment in a state of constant alteration. Further, while substantive promotion is to be regulated by army seniority, regimental advancement is to be regulated by regimental seniority. It follows that one regiment might find itself with a surplus of Field Officers, and another commanded by a Captain; thus, what is confessedly one of the weak points of the present system would be perpetuated.

23. The Staff Corps system has at least this advantage, that it furnishes a self-acting process for the needful expansion and contraction in the establishment of Officers involved in the conditions of Indian Service. If a new appointment is created, an Officer is taken from a Native regiment, and another Officer is brought into the Staff Corps from the British Army. The augmentation, therefore, is made upon a consideration of the wants of the Service; and the necessity for the appointment having been established, the process of filling it is, so to speak, automatic. Similarly, if an appointment is reduced, an Officer remains supernumerary to the establishment until he is absorbed, and there is one transfer the less to be made of subalterns from the British to the Indian Army than would otherwise have been necessary. We consider, then, that the Staff Corps system is certainly better adapted to the wants of the Indian Service than that which the Commission propose to substitute for it; but it contains, as at present worked in connection with the regimental system of the Native Army, undoubted defects. It is true that when the excess of old Officers who entered the Corps from the old Indian Army shall have disappeared, the proportion of grades

grades will not be unsuitable. But the combination of Staff Corps promotion, with a regimental establishment of seven Officers or eight Officers per regiment, every regimental post being a staff appointment, and bestowed at the pleasure of the Commander in Chief, involves great difficulties in practical working. If regimental promotion is regulated by regimental seniority, great inequalities must arise with such small cadres in the rate of regimental promotion; while if uniformity of advancement is aimed at, and promotion is regulated by army seniority, this involves a constant transfer of Officers from regiment to regiment. The latter arrangement is what has been chiefly attempted in the Madras and Bombay Armies, resulting in a disruption of those regimental ties which ought unquestionably to be maintained. In the Bengal Army all regimental appointments have been made wholly at the discretion of the Commanders in Chief, some of whom have favoured the system of advancement by army seniority, while others appear to have been guided in their selections for appointments by the supposed merits of the Officers, with little reference to their rank or standing. At any rate, the present distribution of the regimental Officers of the Indian Army does not present any appearance of rule or system. Of late years the Government of India have proposed to establish a purely regimental system of promotion. But in cadres of seven or eight Officers, it is manifestly impossible that vacancies shall occur with reasonable uniformity, and if all regimental vacancies are filled up within the cadre, extreme inequalities must arise in the rate of promotion. To meet this difficulty certain exceptions to the rule have been proposed. The rule and the exceptions* are given below:—

* Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 53, dated 10th March 1876.

"IV. On the occurrence of a vacancy in a regiment created by the death, retirement, or† pension, or otherwise, or the relinquishment of regimental duty under Rule III., the promotion in the several regimental positions shall be given to the senior Officer of each lower grade, subject to the following exceptions:—

"1st. If the Officer standing next for promotion be pronounced unfit or undeserving by reason of professional unfitness or misconduct, the unfitness of an Officer will, as a general rule, be determined by the reports of regimental commanders and the inspecting General Officers, with such further inquiry as the Commander in Chief, or (in the case of regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force and the Central India Horse immediately under the Government of India) the Governor General in Council may order.

"2nd. Should vacancies occur simultaneously or within a very brief period in the command and second in command of a regiment, one of them may be filled by an Officer of suitable rank from another regiment or appointment, or from the unemployed list, or may be given to the senior Officer of the next grade if he have special qualifications or claims from length of service or gallantry in the field.

"The position of regimental Commandant, however, is so important that no Officer will have a claim to succeed, either temporarily or permanently, unless considered by the Commander in Chief or the Governor General in Council (as aforesaid) to be perfectly qualified in all respects.

"3rd. If there are Officers who from previous service with a regiment have strong claims upon it, these claims shall be taken into consideration on the occurrence of any vacancies; for instance, where an Officer, owing to promotion, has lost his regimental appointment, or where an Officer, taken from a regiment for staff employ for a fixed term, has completed that term, and thereby come on the unemployed list.

"4th. The order to absorb unemployed Officers and the present preponderance of senior Officers have caused many appointments which usually would be held by subalterns to be held by Captains. As long as this condition continues, the relative position of these Officers in the

† *Sic* in orig. ? on.

the regiments in which they are serving must be according to their present standing, but promotions to the next grade will be decided by their respective claims of length of service with the regiment, standing in the army, qualifications, and conduct. Claims of long regimental service will always receive much consideration."

24. It will be seen that the exceptions are so wide that the rule is practically inoperative, and, as a matter of fact, promotions continue to be a matter of entire selection. Officers have no certainty as to their prospects, and, while always ready to better themselves by transfer to other regiments, are always liable to be superseded by officers being brought into their own regiments over their heads. The position of the regimental officers of the Native Army has been, and continues to be, subject to constant uncertainty.

25. We have therefore had under consideration the proposal which has been made at various times to convert the present system of small battalions into an organisation of multiple-battalion regiments, thereby furnishing a cadre of from 20 to 30 officers, who should permanently be attached to one or other of the battalions composing the regiment. In this way, the *esprit de corps* might be engendered, which it is so desirable to establish, and the uncertainty and caprice which now attach to the prospects of a regimental officer would be, to a great extent, removed.

26. The Commission discuss this proposal in para. 289 of their Report, as follows:—

"Two modes of overcoming the defects of the present system have been suggested. The first is, that three or four battalions of Native Infantry should be united into a regiment, and that the promotion of officers should take effect by seniority in the regiment. There would be no difficulty in initiating such a system in the Madras and Bombay Armies, where there are no class companies or class battalions; and we also think that, with care, patience, and tact, it would be possible to classify the regiments of Bengal and the Punjab in such a way as to avoid any great practical inconvenience from such an arrangement. But, on a full consideration of the subject, we have come to the conclusion that the difficulties arising from the constitution of the regiments, and the various classes and tribes of which the different regiments are formed, are so great, that we should not be justified in recommending the system, so long as the object can be gained in any other way."

27. The other way they propose is that which we have referred to above (paragraph 22), of general lists for each army. Although we agree with the Commission in thinking that there might be some practical difficulties in establishing a system of multiple-battalion regiments in the Bengal Army, we do not think that they are such as to make the alternative scheme which they proposed the preferable of the two. It would, moreover, be quite practicable to establish a regimental system as regards the officers, each regiment consisting of two or more battalions for regulating their promotion, while yet keeping the Native battalions separate and distinct; and such an arrangement would, in our opinion, possess some material advantage over the present system. The change would probably, however, be prospective only; and, on the whole, we are of opinion that, notwithstanding the undoubted objections to the staff corps system, it will be better to maintain it than to introduce any new mode for the promotion of officers of the Indian Army.

28. But, although we have arrived at this conclusion, and recommend that the army promotion of officers be regulated by the rules of the staff corps, we are nevertheless of opinion that it is very necessary to place the advancement of staff corps officers in their regiments upon a more stable and satisfactory footing. And we consider that the needful conditions in view may be fulfilled by introducing the system of multiple-battalions, so far as regards the officers; that is to say, that for the purposes of regimental advancement the existing regimental cadres of officers shall be grouped into bodies of three regiments each; the officers in each group, while obtaining substantive promotion under staff corps rules, to rise by regimental seniority in in the regiment comprising that group of linked battalions, and being eligible for transfer only within that group.

29. In

29. In this way frequent movements of officers from regiment to regiment will be prevented, with the supersession and uncertainty attaching to the prospects of individuals. Officers will be identified with a particular establishment, and will not look beyond it for regimental advancement; *esprit de corps* may be engendered, and a much greater equality in the rate of regimental advancement will be possible than can be obtained under the present system.

30. Further, if one or two of the linked regiments are ordered on service they can be reinforced as regards the officers, and vacancies filled up, from the establishment of the linked regiment or regiments remaining behind, instead of the vacancies being filled up by young and inexperienced officers brought in from elsewhere; we attach great importance to this point.

31. It may be objected to this plan, that it will involve frequently changes of officers among the different linked battalions composing a regiment. We are of opinion, however, that the amount of change will be very much less in amount, as well as less objectionable in kind, than that which takes place now; and further, in order to reduce it to a minimum, we would propose that such transfers should not be made, except in the case of commandants and seconds in command of regiments, and possibly of wing commanders. These posts would ordinarily be held by the seniors of the three linked regiments in order of regimental succession, selection being, however, allowed at the discretion of the Government of India on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief; that is to say, on a vacancy occurring in the command of a Native regiment, the senior second in command of the three linked battalions would succeed to it, unless his promotion was objected to by the Commander in Chief; so also with regard to the second in command.

32. This accordingly is the arrangement which we propose for the approval of Her Majesty's Government, as one which, while it does not interfere with the existing claims or privileges of a single officer, and creates no disturbance of system in the Native army, will have the effect of introducing a much greater degree of permanency into the conditions of regimental service with the Native army.

33. The number of regiments proposed as the reduced establishment for each army will not admit of their being linked throughout in groups of three regiments, but the odd regiments may be provided for by having one group of four, or two groups of two regiments each. We do not attach much importance to the circumstance that so much of diversity would be necessary.

34. It will be observed that we have made this recommendation with respect to the European officers only, and it may obviously be made applicable to them, while yet leaving the status of the Native troops entirely unaltered, each Native battalion being, as at present, separate and distinct from the rest. But the same sort of amalgamation might be carried out as regards the Native troops also. This is a subject which has been much discussed at different times. There would be obvious advantages in such a system, as furnishing a ready means of strengthening the battalions on active service, for which, in the absence of a reserve, there is now no adequate provision, and a large majority of the commandants of Native regiments consulted by the Commission pronounced in favour of the arrangement.* The matter is still under our consideration, and we shall address your Lordship separately upon it hereafter. But we would earnestly request that sanction to the plan we have proposed for regimenting the officers may not be withheld, pending consideration of the mode of dealing with the Native troops; the two points being quite distinct and independent of each other.

* *See* Statement attached.

35. The proposed system of organisation would manifestly be imperfect, if it did not make provision for ensuring an adequate flow of regimental promotion. The system now in force in the British army furnishes a stream of promotion in two ways; enforced retirement on reaching certain age in every rank, and limitation of the tenure of commands of battalions. We are of opinion that the

the first of these methods is not applicable to the circumstances of the Indian army. Enforced retirement in the ranks of Captain and Major, besides involving a very heavy charge for pensions to officers in the prime of life, would tend to render that army much less popular than it is now, the certainty of employment being one of the great inducements to enter the service; but this makes it the more essential to secure a proper outlet at the top. We desire, therefore, to repeat the recommendations which have already been made by the Government of India, to limit the tenure of regimental commands and the length of regimental service. This recommendation, which was contained in the Despatch of the 10th March 1876, No. 53, was as follows:—

"Clause III. An officer, on the completion of 31 years' service, shall not retain any regimental appointment which he may have held for five years, unless reappointed thereto by the Commander in Chief for a further term not exceeding five years. An officer of 31 years' service who has not held his regimental appointment for five years may complete that term; and present incumbents will not be required to vacate them for a period of three years from this date, or a period of eight years from date of their appointments."

36. We recommend, however, that the proposed rule be so far altered that the re-appointment to regimental command, when made, should be limited to three instead of five years; and, further, that, in consideration of the long time which has elapsed since that proposal, the rule should have more early effect, and that officers who have completed 31 years' service, and have had five years' tenure of their present posts on the 1st July next, should be required to vacate those posts on the 1st April 1882. Officers who may have completed similar periods at the date of the promulgation of the Order should be required to vacate six months after the date of such promulgation. The conditions of the Madras army in particular, in which the number of field officers so largely exceeds that of the captains and subalterns, one regiment having actually none but field officers attached to it, calls strongly for remedial measures.

37. We need hardly add that the introduction of the proposed new pension rules, before or simultaneously with these rules, is a necessary condition for establishing the latter.

* Central India Horse	2
Hyderabad Contingent:	
Cavalry	4
Infantry	6
Malwa Bheel Corps	1
Bhopal Battalion	1
Deoli Force	1
Erinpura Force	1
Meywur Bheel Force	1
Mhairwara Battalion	1

38. We do not propose to interfere at present with the existing establishment* of the local regiments under the Government of India; the officers attached to these will be seconded in their own regiments while so employed.

Mode of Officering the Staff and Army Departments.

39. Under the rules now in force, the greater number of the Army Staff appointments are tenable for five years only; and since 1877 officers appointed from Native regiments to the Staff, except to a few of the higher appointments, have been made supernumerary, and retain their regimental position. We propose to make the rule of general application. Every officer of the Staff Corps or Indian Service, holding an appointment in the Army Staff or Civil Departments (except the Commissariat and Military Accounts Departments, and the Department of the Judge Advocate General, in which employment should be permanent), should be attached to some Native regiment, to which he would revert on the completion of his term of Staff Service. Every officer, in short, should have a definite regimental position. The exceptions to this rule should be in the case of the higher appointments, namely, of Secretary and Deputy Secretary in the Military Department, Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Deputy Adjutant General, Deputy Quartermaster General, and Director of Army Remount Operations, Officers nominated to any of these appointments vacating their regimental position.

40. We have in this Despatch been dealing mainly with the regimental system of

of the Native army, and we shall address your Lordship separately upon our staff establishments and the army departments; we have therefore referred to the Staff Officers in this Despatch only so far as regards their relation to the regimental system. For the same reason, it is necessary here to refer to the position of officers in the civil departments of the army. Under the present system an officer appointed to the Commissariat or Military Accounts Department is struck off the list of a regiment as soon as he is permanently appointed to the department. We recommend that, for the future, an officer appointed to either of these departments should be borne as a supernumerary on the strength of this regiment until he has completed 10 years' service from the date of first appointment to his department, when he should have the option of returning to regimental duty, or be permanently struck off the regimental list. We recommend this because it seems desirable to give officers, who for any reason desire to exchange the work of a civil department for regimental life, an opportunity of returning to the latter, and also because we think some inducement of this sort is necessary to make the civil departments more popular with the army, there being at present difficulty in obtaining candidates to fill vacancies in both these departments. After 10 years officers in civil departments should rise, as at present, under the Staff Corps rules of promotion, but should not be eligible to return to regimental duty. If from any cause, at a later period in their service, their services should not be required departmentally, such cases must be dealt with on their own merits.

41. Officers in civil employ are rapidly decreasing in numbers, fresh appointments being now seldom made to the Police, which used to be largely recruited from the army, or to district duty in the Non-Regulation Provinces. We consider that they may be dealt with in the same way as officers in the civil departments of the army; that is, that they should continue to be borne as supernumerary on the strength of their regiments for 10 years from date of first appointment, after which they should be struck off the list, and not be eligible to return to regimental duty. But with respect to officers in the Military Accounts Department and in civil employ, we recommend that they shall in no case be promoted beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; it being, in our opinion, objectionable that officers should be allowed to retire with the honorary rank of Major General, who, for the greater part of their service, have performed no military duty.

42. Lastly, we have one important recommendation still to make, in support of that contained in paragraphs 303 and 304 of the Report, for altering the regulations which govern admission to the Staff Corps. These regulations are well known. The Indian Army is now entered only through the British Army, an officer being appointed to the Staff Corps after having served a certain time in a British regiment in India. The advantages contemplated by this system are, that every officer entering the Indian Army shall have had the military training afforded by service in a British regiment, and further, that his character and qualifications shall have become established by a satisfactory performance of this duty. But we are decidedly of opinion that the disadvantages of the system are greater than the advantages. There is reason to suppose that service with a British regiment in many cases induces a distaste for service with Native troops; that the young officer attached to a regiment, especially one which has been only a short time in the country, too often learns to look down on the Native soldier, and that while, on the one hand, many young officers who come out to India, intending to enter the Staff Corps, are dissuaded from doing so, on the other hand, young officers are sometimes driven to enter the Staff Corps, not from any desire to take service with Native troops, but from want of means to meet the expenses of service in a British regiment; while there are probably no conditions of Indian life in which a young man learns less of the people of a country, or sees them to less advantage, than when serving with a British regiment. The general agreement of opinion on this head among those who have had the opportunity of judging is very decided. We desire, therefore, to record our deliberate opinion that this part of the Staff Corps system should be abolished, and that henceforward first appointments to the Indian Staff Corps should be made direct. An interval of two years might be allowed, during which present intending applicants might qualify for admission, and after that date the Staff

Corps should be recruited from the Royal Military College, the candidates making their selection for the British and Indian Armies, according to the number of vacancies and their standing on passing out of the College. It will rest with Her Majesty Government to decide whether a certain number of Staff Corps appointments might not be reserved for Indian cadets. It is also for consideration whether the young Staff Corps officer might not be attached for a season to a British regiment in England before coming out to India, as suggested by the Commission.

43. It may be useful to recapitulate the proposals contained in this Despatch. They are as follows:—

I. To reduce the Cavalry regiments of the Indian Army by four; three in Bengal and one in Bombay; and the Infantry regiments by 18, six in Bengal, eight in Madras, and four in Bombay.

II. To discharge all the Native officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiments to be reduced, and such of the private soldiers as shall not be transferred to other regiments, on special pensions and gratuities.

III. Certain additions to the pay of Native non-commissioned officers.

IV. That the number of officers attached to a regiment be raised from seven to eight, the existing practice in regard to secondary and supernumerary officers being maintained.

V. That the Staff Corps system of promotion be maintained.

VI. That, for the purpose of regulating regimental promotions, the officers of Native regiments be arranged in groups of three regiments, within which they are to rise, as a rule, in order of seniority.

VII. Limitation to be placed on the length of regimental service and on the tenure of regimental appointments.

VIII. Officers of the Army Staff, and certain officers of the Army Departments, to be seconded on the list to which they belong.

IX. Officers of certain civil departments and in civil employ to be seconded in their regiments for 10 years from the date of first appointment, after which they are to be ineligible to return to regimental duty. Officers in civil employ and certain civil departments not to rise beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

X. First appointments to the Staff Corps to be made direct from the Royal Military College.

44. We have not touched upon the establishment of General Officers, because we understand that Her Majesty's Government are about to issue new regulations for their appointment, promotion, and retirement. We will only express a hope that these regulations may be based on the principle of selection with regard to fitness and securing the efficiency of this class, that the Colonel's allowances may be abolished, and that the establishment of Generals on the active list may be reduced to a scale proportioned to that about to be fixed for the British Service.

45. Our honourable colleague, Major General Wilson, dissents from such of the foregoing recommendations as refer to the perpetuation of the Staff Corps, and has recorded his opinion on this head in a Minute which is attached to this Despatch.

46. We would observe, in conclusion, that it is very desirable that these proposals, if approved by Her Majesty's Government, should take effect promptly. It is now many months since the Commission made their Report, and although this has never been published, it is no secret that they have proposed a great many alterations of system and sweeping reductions. An uneasy feeling of expectation and anxiety has thus been created among both officers and men of the Indian

Indian Army, which it is very desirable not to prolong. The organization of the Indian Army has had our attentive and patient consideration, and our deliberate opinion on the subject having now been submitted, we would ask that an early decision may be recorded thereon by Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

ANNEXURE A.—STATIONS from which NATIVE REGIMENTS would probably be Withdrawn, or at which the Number of Regiments would be Reduced, in carrying out the Reductions recommended in this Despatch.

CAVALRY.	Number of Regiments to be Withdrawn.	INFANTRY.	Number of Regiments to be Withdrawn.
BENGAL:		Eastern frontier	1
Sitapore	1	Jhansi	1
Deoli	1	Talagang	1
Jhelum	1	Jhelum, reduced by	1
	— 3	Peshawur ditto	1
		Dera Ghazi Khan	1
			— 6
MADRAS:			
Nil.		Fort St. George	1
		Vellore	1
		Vizianagram	1
		Palamcotta	1
		Quilon	1
		Mercara	1
		Mangalore	1
		Trichinopoly	1
			— 8
BOMBAY:			
Deesa	1	Sholapur, Sattara	1
		Poona and Ahmednagar	1
		Bombay	1
		Maligaon	1
			— 4
TOTAL	4	TOTAL	18

ANNEXURE B.—STRENGTH and Approximate Annual COST of NATIVE

DESCRIPTION OF CORPS.	PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT AND ESTIMATED COST.						
	Established Strength of each Corps.		Number of Corps in each Presidency.	Total Strength of Corps in each Presidency.		Rate of Annual Cost.	TOTAL Annual Cost.
	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.		European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.		
BENGAL PRESIDENCY.						*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Guide Corps Cavalry - - -	3	341	1	3	341	- -	(*a*) 1,70,022
Bengal Cavalry Regiments - -	8	457	19	152	8,683	2,66,456	50,62,664
Punjab ditto - - - - -	8	493	5	40	2,465	(*a*)2,78,817	13,94,085
TOTAL Cavalry - - -	- -	- -	25	195	11,489	- -	66,26,771
Guide Corps Infantry - - -	7	778	1	7	778	- -	(*b*) 2,12,122
Bengal Infantry Regiments - -	8	712	42	336	29,904	1,82,285	76,55,970
Ditto, ditto in Assam - - -	8	912	3	24	2,736	2,12,547	(*c*) 6,37,641
Goorkha Infantry Regiments -	8	737	4	32	2,948	1,87,974	7,51,896
5th Goorkha Infantry Regiment (Punjab).	8	752	1 } 11	88	8,272	1,90,653	(*d*) 20,97,183
Punjab and Sikh Infantry Regiments.	8	752	10				
TOTAL Infantry - - -	- -	- -	61	487	44,6[illegible]8	- -	1,13,54,812
GRAND TOTAL Bengal -	- -	- -	86	682	56,127	- -	1,79,81,583
MADRAS PRESIDENCY.							
Cavalry Regiments - - -	(*g*) 8	(*e*) 387	4	32	1,548	2,76,434	(*f*) 11,05,736
Infantry ditto - - - -	8	(*e*) 713	40	320	28,520	1,93,941	(*f*) 77,57,640
TOTAL Madras - - -	- -	- -	44	352	30,068	- -	88,63,376
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.							
Cavalry Regiments - - -	8	487	7	56	3,409	2,98,361	20,88,527
Infantry ditto - - - -	8	(*e*) 712	30	240	21,360	1,89,981	(*f*) 56,99,430
TOTAL Bombay - - -	- -	- -	37	296	24,769	- -	77,87,957
TOTAL Present Strength and Annual Cost of Native Troops in India - - - -	- -	- -	167	1,330	110,964	- -	3,46,32,916

(*a*.) This is exclusive of the cost of extra doolie bearers maintained with the regiments.

(*b*.) The cost of carriage, extra doolie bearers, and cooks for Sikh companies attached has been omitted from the calculation.

(*c*.) The cost of boat establishment, extra cost of rations on payment and Assam batta to men and followers has not been taken into account; but compensation for dearness of food has been included for the sake of comparison with the cost of proposed establishment.

(*d*.) Exclusive of the cost of extra doolie bearers, carriage establishment and cooks with Sikh companies attached.

(*e*.) This is exclusive of recruit and pension boys attached to regiments.

(*f*.) These amounts include the cost of recruit and pension boys, although they are excluded from the strength of regiments, as explained in above note (*e*).

(*g*.) The Veterinary Surgeons attached to the Madras Native Cavalry regiments have been omitted from the strength of those regiments; but their pay, &c., has been included in the total cost.

TROOPS in each Presidency and in India as at present and as proposed.

DESCRIPTION OF CORPS.	PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AND ESTIMATED COST.						
	Established Strength of each Corps.		Number of Corps in each Presidency.	Total Strength of Corps in each Presidency.		Rate of Annual Cost.	TOTAL Annual Cost.
	European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.		European Officers.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.		
BENGAL PRESIDENCY.						*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Guide Corps Cavalry - - -	3	341	1	3	341	- -	1,70,022
Native Cavalry Regiments - -	9	550	21	189	11,550	3,06,301	64,32,321
TOTAL Cavalry - - -	- -	- -	22	192	11,891	- -	66,02,343
Guide Corps Infantry - - -	8	832	1	8	832	- -	2,23,911
Bengal Infantry Regiments in Assam.	9	912	3	27	2,736	2,16,456	6,49,368
Bengal Infantry Regiments (including Goorkha, Punjab, and Sikh).	9	832	51	459	42,432	2,04,766	1,04,43,066
TOTAL Infantry - - -	- -	- -	55	494	46,000	- -	1,13,16,345
GRAND TOTAL Bengal -	- -	- -	77	686	57,891	- -	1,79,18,688
MADRAS PRESIDENCY.							
Cavalry Regiments - - -	(*b*) 9	(*a*) 387	4	36	1,548	2,80,943	(*a*) 11,23,772
Infantry ditto - - - -	9	(*a*) 832	32	288	26,624	2,15,610	(*a*) 68,99,520
TOTAL Madras - - -	- -	- -	36	324	28,172	- -	80,23,292
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.							
Cavalry Regiments - - -	9	550	6	54	3,300	3,30,489	19,82,934
Infantry ditto - - - -	9	(*a*) 832	26	234	21,632	2,11,344	(*a*) 54,94,944
TOTAL Bombay - - -	- -	- -	32	288	24,932	- -	74,77,878
TOTAL proposed Strength and Annual Cost of Native Troops in India - - - -	- -	- -	145	1,298	110,995	- -	3,34,19,858

(*a*.) The remarks under (*e*) and (*f*), as regards recruit and pension boys, apply to the strength and cost of the proposed establishment.

(*b*.) The remarks under (*g*) regarding Veterinary Surgeons also apply to the proposed establishment.

ABSTRACT.

	Rs.
Total cost of present establishment of Native troops in India - - - -	3,46,32,916
Total cost of proposed " " " - - - -	3,34,19,858
Saving per Annum - - -	*Rs.* 12,13,058

The extra cost of one additional Officer per regiment is included in the above statement, and is as follows :—

	Rs.
For 31 regiments of Native Cavalry, 31 Lieutenants, at *Rs.* 4,509 = - - -	1,39,779
For 113 " " Infantry, 113 " " 3,809 = - - -	4,41,717
Total Annual Cost - - - -	*Rs.* 5,81,496

N.B.—The extra good conduct pay to Native Non-commissioned Officers proposed in paragraph 14 has not been included in this estimate.

ANNEXURE C.—LIST abstracted from Evidence taken by ARMY COMMISSION showing the Names of the several Commanding Officers in favour of having NATIVE INFANTRY REGIMENTS of more than One Battalion.

NAME.	Corps.	Of how many Battalions.
Colonel J. Doran - - -	Commanding 27th P. N. I. - - -	Two battalions.
„ F. Dandridge - - -	„ 40th N. I. - - - -	Three „
„ G. W. Fraser - - -	„ 39th „ - - - -	Two „
Lieutenant Colonel H. R. B. Worsley.	„ 7th Bengal N. I. - -	Two „
Lieutenant Colonel P. H. F. Harris	„ 11th N. I. - - - -	Three „
„ R. J. Walker -	„ 17th „ - - - -	Two „
„ R. G. Rogers -	„ 20th „ - - - -	Two „
„ F. B. Norman	„ 24th „ - - - -	Four „
„ J. Hudson -	„ 28th „ - - - -	2 or 3 „
„ G. C. Rowcroft	„ 35th „ - - - -	Two „
Major R. S. Robertson - -	4th N. I. - - - - - -	2 or 3 „
„ R. A. Wauchope - -	14th „ - - - - - -	Four „
Captain H. D. Hutchinson - -	40th „ - - - - - -	2 linked „
Colonel R. Sale Hill - - -	Commanding 1st Goorkhas - - -	2 linked „
Major F. F. Rowcroft - - -	„ 4th „ - - -	Two „
Colonel H. F. M. Boisragon -	Commandant, 4th Sikhs - - -	Three „
Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Boswell	Commanding 2nd Sikh I. - - -	Four „
„ B. R. Chambers	„ 6th Punjab I. - - -	Three „
Major A. G. Ross - - -	„ 1st Sikh I. - - -	Three „
Colonel W. Osborn - - -	Officiating Commandant, 9th M. N. I. -	Two „
„ G. Hearn - - -	Commanding 15th M. N. I. - - -	Two „
„ L. W. Buck - - -	Commandant, 20th „ - - -	Four „
Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Tyrrell -	„ 37th „ - - -	Four „
„ P. A. Carnegy	„ 39th „ - - -	Two „
Major E. Faunce - - -	Commanding 14th „ - - -	Two „
Colonel Little - - - -	Commandant, 25th Bombay N. I. - -	Four „
„ S. De B. Edwardes -	„ 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Grenadier Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.	Three „
„ G. W. Hanson - -	Commanding 9th Bombay N. I. - -	Two „
„ H. H. James* - -	„ 10th Bombay N. (Light) I.	Two „
„ R. Mallaby* - - -	„ 13th Bombay N. I. - -	Two „
„ W. Creagh - - -	„ 19th „ „ - -	Two „
„ A. Carnegy - - -	„ 21st „ „ - -	Two „
„ J. Fairbrother - -	„ 22nd „ „ - -	Two „
Lieutenant Colonel O. V. Tanner -	„ 29th „ „ - -	Two „

* Doubtful.

LIST showing the Names of the several Commanding Officers *not* in favour of having NATIVE INFANTRY REGIMENTS of more than One Battalion.

NAME.	Corps.	—
Colonel H. S. Obbard - - -	Commanding 41st B N. I.	
„ T. W. R. Boisragon -	„ 30th N. I.	
„ L. H. Williams - -	„ 14th Sikhs.	
„ F. M. Armstrong - -	„ 45th „	
Major A. C. W. Crookshank -	32nd Pioneers.	
„ A. Battye - - - -	2nd Goorkhas.	
Colonel R. Blair - - -	Commanding 3rd N. I.	
„ F. H. Jenkins - -	„ Corps of Guides - -	Doubtful.
„ A. Jenkins - - -	„ 2nd M. N. I.	
„ W. Bannerman - -	„ 4th Bombay N. I.	
Major R. B. P. P. Campbell -	Corps of Guides.	
Colonel W. Gib - - - -	Commanding 25th M. N. I.	

MINUTE by the Right Honourable Major General *T. F. Wilson*, C.B.

I REGRET being obliged to dissent from the views expressed by his Excellency the Viceroy and my honourable colleagues in those paragraphs of the Despatch, No. 230, dated 24th June 1881, which recommend that the Indian Staff Corps system shall be maintained. It is not without much consideration that I do so; but I believe that its retention will not admit of thoroughly remedial measures being applied to admitted defects in our present military organization, and I think that an organization based on sounder and more economical principles, better adapted to the requirements of the Indian Government, and better calculated to promote regimental efficiency, ought to be recommended for prospective adoption.

Paragraphs 278 and 279 of the Special Commission appointed to inquire into the organization and expenditure of the army in India clearly set forth the chief defects of the Staff Corps system; and I agree generally with the views therein expressed. Twenty years' experience of the working of that system forces me to believe that the unnecessary annual expenditure which it has caused in the past will, if it be maintained, not be materially or sufficiently reduced in the future.

Neither do I entertain the hope that, so long as promotion is governed by time, the Government of India will be able to maintain that just proportion in the several ranks which the requirements of the service, the contentment of the officers, and economy demand. I say this, believing that calculations have been made tending to prove that the existing superfluity of high rank will in time disappear, and that the Staff Corps will eventually assume a shape suited to the needs of the Government of India. Of this, however, there appears to me to be no absolute certainty; and, having in my recollection other expectations held out on behalf of the corps, and which remain yet unfulfilled, I apprehend that, despite of the several safeguards with which it is proposed by his Excellency the Viceroy and my honourable colleagues to surround the existing system, the present difficulties will be more or less perpetuated; and, holding an opinion that it is desirable to take this favourable opportunity for making recommendations which will effectually prevent the continuance of these difficulties in the future, I am unable to agree to proposals which, as I think, will only apply a partial remedy.

In the Appendices to the Report of the Army Organization Commission frequent allusions are made to the want of *esprit de corps* in the present Indian Army.

The late Commander in Chief at Madras is especially strong on this subject; and, having repeatedly alluded to it, he writes: "The most pressing want in "this army at this moment is *esprit de corps*." This, however, is no new complaint. Five years ago the Viceroy of India recorded: "We have endeavoured, "while leaving the Staff Corps as a general list for regimental promotion from "rank to rank and pay within certain limits, to make regulations whereby "advancement from grade to grade shall go regimentally, so that an officer "once appointed to a regiment shall feel that his regiment is his home, and the "regimental *esprit de corps*, which is one of the most admirable characteristics "of the British Army, may, so far as circumstances admit, be encouraged in "the Army of India." These rules received the approval of the Secretary of State in his Despatch, No. 215, of the 10th August 1876. But it was necessary to make the exceptions to them so wide that they are practically inoperative, and they have consequently remained a dead letter.

Fully recognizing that *esprit de corps* can only be revived by retaining officers permanently with regiments, his Excellency the Viceroy and my honourable colleagues propose to develop it by converting the present small battalions into an organization of multiple-battalion regiments, hoping by these measures, and while retaining the Staff Corps system of promotion, that *esprit de corps* will

will be engendered, and greater equality of promotion in regimental advancements be secured thereby. This proposal will, I fear, not produce the desired result, because the measure just stops short of one essential to success—regimental promotion. For, so long as the officers are promoted in one corps and attached to another, it is my belief that they never will feel themselves to be thoroughly identified, associated, and united with the latter; and they will consequently lack that brotherly feeling and zeal in the interests of the regiment and for their mutual honour which is so much to the advantage of the State, and which should ever pervade the small collective body represented by the officers of a regiment. And if regimental promotion is better calculated to bring about what is required, it might without difficulty be yet prospectively introduced in the multiple-battalions which are now recommended to be formed for the purpose of counteracting, as far as possible, some of the present admitted defects in the military system.

It seems to me that there is but little difference between my views and those set forth in the Despatch. In the latter measures are proposed for adoption which, it is hoped, will remedy most of the flaws existing in the present system; but my honourable colleagues, while apparently accepting all the above facts, hesitate to take the one last step which I consider essential to complete success. I, on the other hand, would go further than they propose to do, and, whilst hiding existing blemishes as far as possible, would allow the Staff Corps to gradually die out, and replace it with another organization based on our experience of the past.

This is a favourable opportunity of remedying what is defective, and effectually shielding future Governments from the difficulties and embarrassments with which we have at present to contend, consequent on the existing condition of the Native Armies, admittedly brought about by the Staff Corps system. To provide a complete remedy, a radical and complete change in the mode of officering it is, I believe, necessary, and it can be introduced without the smallest disturbing effect on either officers or sepoys, as any new scheme, such as that of regimental promotion in three linked battalions, would not affect those now in the service. While, as regards the Native soldiers, the majority of them would probably remain unaware that any change had been made in the method of providing them with British officers, the position of the Native officers would not be subverted, altered, or affected in any way. In short, I believe that the prospective demise of the Indian Staff Corps would admit of a greater reduction of military expenditure than the retention of the present system will allow. It would enable us to provide regiments that would be self-sufficing and capable of meeting the requirements of the staff; and such a measure would remove all bar to *esprit de corps*, and eventually give back to the Government of India complete control over the Native Army.

I repeat that I regret being obliged to dissent from the views of his Excellency the Viceroy and my honourable colleagues; but conscientious convictions and a strict sense of duty compel me to do so.

(signed) *T. F. Wilson.*

Simla, 24th June 1881.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 49) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 2 February 1882.

Approved by the Military Committee on the 18th January 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and given my very careful consideration to the Despatch of your Excellency in Council of the 24th June 1881, No. 230, submitting the views of the Government of India upon the recommendations of the late Army Commission with respect to the Native Army, which have been dealt with

with by you under the four heads given in paragraph 2 of that Despatch, viz. :—

Strength and composition of the Native Army.
Number of European Officers per regiment.
Mode of officering the Native Army.
Mode of officering the Staff and Army Departments.

2. I regret that I am unable at present to communicate to you my views upon the two last-mentioned points, which involve questions of difficulty, affecting the system of the recruitment and the employment of the British Officers of the Staff Corps and of the Indian Army; but as it is important that the two first questions should be decided before the publication of the Budget for the coming financial year, I have thought it right at once to convey to you my views and instructions with regard to the proposed reductions in the Native Army, and with respect to the number of European Officers in each regiment.

Reductions recommended by Simla Commission

3. The Simla Army Commission recommended the reduction of 10 regiments of Cavalry and 30 of Infantry in all the Presidencies, in the following proportions, viz. :—

Bengal - - - -	7 regiments Cavalry. 10 regiments Infantry.
Madras - - - -	2 regiments Cavalry. 15 regiments Infantry.
Bombay - - - -	1 regiment Cavalry. 5 regiments Infantry.

They at the same time proposed to augment the regiments to be retained to an uniform strength of 609 Natives of all ranks in the Cavalry and 912 in the Infantry. The Commission also recommended that the Native Cavalry regiments should have four squadrons instead of three as at present.

Reductions proposed by Government of India.

4. Your Excellency, while agreeing with the Commission that the present strength of regiments is insufficient, thinks that the proposals of the Army Commission go too far, and would involve the abandonment of certain military stations which in your opinion ought to be maintained. You accordingly would limit the reduction to four* regiments of Cavalry and 18 of Infantry, divided between the Presidencies in the proportion of three regiments of Cavalry and six of Infantry in Bengal, eight regiments of Infantry in Madras, and one regiment of Cavalry and four of Infantry in Bombay. You would raise the strength of regiments of Cavalry in Bengal and Bombay from 457 and 487, and in the Punjaub Frontier Force from 493, respectively, to 550 Natives of all ranks, leaving the strength of the Madras Cavalry regiments unchanged, and retaining the three-squadron organization throughout the Cavalry. You would further raise the strength of the Infantry regiments throughout India from 712 Natives of all ranks, or in the case of Goorkha and Punjaub Frontier Force regiments from a strength somewhat in excess of this, to 832 Natives of all ranks, leaving, however, the three Assam regiments at their present strength of 912.

* Bengal—
3 regiments Cavalry.
6 regiments Infantry.
Madras—
8 regiments Infantry.
Bombay—
1 regiment Cavalry.
4 regiments Infantry.

5. I understand that neither the Army Commission nor your Excellency's Government propose any change in the number of Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers in regiments, though, with an alteration in the organization of the Cavalry from three to four squadrons, as proposed by the Commission, some increase would seem to have been essential in that branch of the service. Looking, however, now to the recommendations of your Excellency, which involve less extensive changes than those of the Commission, I find that the result as to increase or reduction of strength in the various grades in each branch of the Army will be as follows, but it is to be observed that the numbers given do not include the Body Guards, the Aden troop, or the various local

corps of Cavalry and Infantry, the strength of which you do not suggest should be altered:—

	PRESENT STRENGTH.					PROPOSED STRENGTH.				
	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters.	Privates.	TOTAL.	Native Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters.	Privates.	TOTAL.
CAVALRY:										
Bengal, now 24 regiments, to be reduced to 21 (Guide Cavalry as at present) -	321	1,332	148	9,688	11,489	282	1,170	130	10,309	11,891
Madras, 4 regiments, untouched - - - -	48	220	28	1,252	1,548	48	220	28	1,252	1,548
Bombay, 7 regiments, to be reduced to 6 - - -	91	476	42	2,800	3,409	78	408	36	2,778	3,300
INFANTRY:										
Bengal, 61 regiments, to be reduced to 55 - - -	977*	4,884*	976	37,801†	44,638	880	4,400	880	39,840	46,002
Madras, 40 regiments, to be reduced to 32 - - -	640	3,240‡	640	24,000	28,520	512	2,529§	512	23,008§	26,624
Bombay, 30 regiments, to be reduced to 26 - - -	480	2,400	480	18,000	21,360	416	2,080	416	18,720	21,632
TOTAL - - -	2,557	12,552	2,314	93,541	110,964	2,216	10,870	2,002	95,907	110,995

* Including an extra Native Officer and four Non-commissioned Officers in the Infantry, as now allowed in the Guide Infantry.
† Includes 21 additional privates now allowed in the Guide Infantry, also the extra establishments of sepoys in Goorkha, Punjaub, and Assam regiments.
‡ An extra Non-commissioned Officer per regiment now allowed in the Madras Infantry.
§ This allows for an extra Non-commissioned Officer in each Madras Infantry regiment, as at present, one sepoy less being calculated to make 832 of all ranks.

6. It thus appears that the proposal would effect an increase of 31 men on the whole Army, involving a small increase of Bengal and a small decrease of Bombay Cavalry, the Madras Cavalry remaining as at present, while there would be an increase of 1,362 Infantry in Bengal and of 272 in Bombay, with a decrease of 1,896 Infantry in Madras. As to ranks, there would be a reduction of 341 Native Officers and 1,682 Non-commissioned Officers, with an increase of 2,366 privates, or in other words, while there are now 15,109 Native Officers and Non-commissioned Officers to 93,541 privates, or about 16 per cent. of the former, there would in future be 13,086 Officers and Non-commissioned Officers to 95,907 privates, or 13½ per cent. of the former. The reduction in the superior grades is 13½ per cent. with an increase of more than 2½ per cent. to the privates.

Establishment of British Officers.

7. As regards European Officers, the Commission recommend an establishment of 11 European Officers for each Cavalry regiment and nine for each Infantry regiment, but you infer that they contemplated a discontinuance of the existing practice of appointing supernumerary Officers to corps in place of those who may be on furlough or acting in Staff appointments. It is also clear that their proposal for so large an increase of Officers in the Cavalry was consequent upon their recommendation to have four instead of three squadrons in each regiment of that arm. You consider that, provided the present system of appointing Officers in place of absentees be continued, it will be sufficient to add one British Officer to each regiment, making eight in all.

Saving to be effected.

8. The Army Commission estimated that their proposals would produce a saving in the cost of the Native Army of between 16 and 17 lakhs of rupees per annum, but they admitted that their calculations could only be considered as approximate, while they did not exclude from the saving the necessary increase to non-effective charges arising from the measures of reduction, the amount of which could not be foreseen. Your Government estimate the saving to be effected by your recommendations as likely to amount to about 12 lakhs of rupees

rupees per annum. This calculation is also only an approximate one, and does not take into account the first outlay for gratuities to men on discharge, or the increase to the outlay for pensions necessitated by reductions, nor does it allow for the considerable extra charge proposed by your Government in view to improving the position of the Non-commissioned Officers; but there can be no doubt that there would be a considerable ultimate saving on the whole cost of the Native Army, which may fairly be expected to amount to 10 lakhs of rupees per annum, or thereabouts.

9. It is, of course, evident that an alteration in the organization of an Army which diminishes the number of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, and replaces them by privates, must reduce the cost of that Army; but, apart from the ground of economy, the Army Commission considered that, while the total strength of the Native Army should not be reduced, increased fighting power and efficiency would be gained by raising the strength and reducing the number of cadres of regiments, and they added that almost all the Commandants of Native regiments who have furnished the Commission with reports say that the present strength of Native regiments is too small.

10. Your Government concur in the opinion of the Commission that the present strength of the regiments, both of Cavalry and Infantry, is insufficient, and that, while the existing strength of the whole Native Army should remain undiminished, that strength should be organised in a smaller number of regiments, and you consider that the experience of the Afghan war, since the submission of the Report of the Commission, entirely bears out their opinion as to the defective nature of the present organization for the purposes of war, but you think that the proposals of the Commission went too far. While admitting that the establishment recommended by the Commission would be a suitable one both for tactical and administrative purposes, you remark that the Indian Army is required rather to maintain internal tranquillity than for employment against external foes. You state that, in this view, it is essential that certain obligatory points should be occupied by troops in time of peace, and the scheme of the Commission involves the abandonment of certain military stations which, in your opinion, ought to be maintained, and you repeat the opinion which has so often before been expressed by the highest authorities in India, that troops should not merely be available in the country, but that they should be actually present at the points where danger from internal causes might be apprehended. You, therefore, have arrived at the conclusion that the requisite conditions of economy, on the one hand, and sound military administration on the other, will best be obtained by the arrangement already described in the 4th paragraph of this Despatch, which is in effect a compromise between the existing organization, which you think ought certainly to be modified, and the large measure of reduction proposed by the Commission.

11. I have already recognised that your proposals would produce a considerable saving, but it seems to me open to question whether such an increased efficiency would result from the reduction recommended as would in itself, and apart from the financial gain, sufficiently justify changes which must produce serious effects on the Army.

12. Having regard, therefore, to considerations of efficiency as well as of economy, I must observe that, not long after the mutiny, the Government of India, which then had exceptional military experience at its command, and which was strenuously carrying out all economies thought possible, having regard to the circumstances of India, deliberately fixed the strength of regiments at the establishment which has ever since been maintained, except when augmentations have been made for special services, a contingency always contemplated and usual in all armies. This resolution had the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, although the regiment, as a unit, was, in those days, relatively much weaker with respect to any probable enemies than it is at present, when the Army possesses breech-loading rifles, and may ordinarily expect to be opposed by troops with inferior arms and ammunition.

13. The reduction and change in strength of regiments are, apart from economical grounds, advocated on the plea that the present regiments are too small

small for tactical purposes and too weak for field service, considerations which can hardly have escaped the notice of those authorities who instituted and maintained the present system. It is alleged that the opinions of the majority of commanding officers are in favour of stronger regiments, and that the experience of the Afghan War showed the defect of the present organization as regards strength of regiments.

14. Too much stress should not be laid upon the views of commanding officers on such a question. The late Commander in Chief in India, Sir F. P. Haines, in a Minute dated 20th March 1880, when treating of a similar opinion expressed by commanding officers of British regiments as to the proper strength of their corps, states that "it was not necessary to ask the opinion of "commanding officers; commanding officers are naturally in favour of strong "regiments;" and further, while admitting that strong regiments are best for a fighting unit and that the system of continental armies may be quoted in favour of them, he remarks, "there are strong reasons for rejecting that which, "though good in itself, is likely to produce evils which more than counter-"balance the advantages." His Excellency adds that "continental armies are "massed by brigades, divisions, and army corps, very different from the position "of British regiments in India, where they are of necessity scattered over an "enormous territory. If the proposal to have large units for this scattered "service were accepted, the result sooner or later would be a division of these "units, quartering regiments by wings, which is most destructive to efficiency, "followed most probably by a reduction in the number of men. Having the "increased number of cadres is the most ready means of effecting reinforce-"ments." These arguments, though used especially in respect to British troops, seem to apply equally to the Native Army, and indeed they, to a certain extent, are in accord with the views of your Excellency's Government as expressed in paragraph 5 of your Despatch under reply.

15. But I am unable to accept the conclusion of the Commission that almost all regimental officers who furnished them with reports can rightly be quoted in favour of their proposals. The two questions put to commanding officers were as follows:

"As it is obviously impossible always to maintain an army on a war footing, "what should be the strength of a Native regiment on a peace establishment?" and

"What should be the strength of a Native regiment on a war establishment?"

It cannot be assumed that the replies received to these questions are the same as would have been given had the Commission added to the first question the caution that any increased strength of regiments must necessarily be met by a reduction in the number of regiments, or if the questions had been put in the form of asking what would be the best organisation of regiments of an army of the existing aggregate strength of rank and file. As the question was put, indeed, it is remarkable that not a few commanding officers of experience advocate the present, or even a smaller establishment, while others are satisfied with it as it stands.

16. Your Government quote the experience of the Afghan war as to the necessity of increasing the strength of regiments. No doubt due weight must be given to experience gained in the Afghan war in this as well as in other matters, but it will be unsafe for us to adopt measures merely on the ground that they have proved suitable for a war of so exceptional a character as that recently in progress in Afghanistan. For great and permanent changes suited to the general requirements of India we must look to a wider and broader experience than that gained solely in the late war, but I am unable to gather that the experience gained in that war altogether bears out the opinion expressed. Referring to the returns which show the disposition of troops in Afghanistan throughout the war, it is very striking how constantly the regiments, small as they were, had to be broken up to occupy posts or to form detachments for active operations. The inference from this would seem to be that with weaker regiments there would have been less need to break them up, while a smaller number of stronger regiments would have had to be broken up to an extent even greater than that which prevailed in the late war.

17. There

17. There are also some considerations which would seem to show the advantages of maintaining the large number of small regiments, such as facilities for recruiting and training soldiers in time of pressure, and of effecting reliefs of troops at unhealthy stations. I do not, however, propose to dwell upon these topics, but will advert to the disadvantages, as far as they affect our troops, arising from a reduction of regiments, some of which have, no doubt, been present to the consideration of your Excellency in Council. These, as they affect individuals, seem to me to be mainly as follows:—

Disadvantages of reduction.

I. The disquieting effect of reductions of regiments, not only on the men actually affected, but on the whole Native Army.

II. The hardship on deserving soldiers belonging to the reduced regiments, not only in stopping their career, but in breaking up that body to which the Native soldier, probably more than any soldier in the world, looks upon himself as permanently attached until he can serve no longer.

III. The general diminution of the number of officers and non-commissioned officers, who may be considered and should always be selected men, as compared with the number of privates, a diminution which, as largely diminishing the number of prizes, may affect the popularity of the Native Army.

IV. The inconveniences arising from displacing a considerable number of European officers from their positions in regiments with which they may have served for long periods.

I do not think it is necessary for me to enlarge on these several causes of inconvenience or possible hardship, but it will be manifestly the duty of the Government, in the event of carrying out any reductions such as are proposed, to do all that is possible to mitigate those causes of personal disadvantage.

18. Having carefully reviewed the proposals made by your Excellency's Government for a reduction of regiments and an increase in the strength of those remaining, I have arrived at the conclusion that sufficient reasons are not shown for the proposed reduction, except as a matter of economy; but on the latter ground, and as I trust the hardships on the troops affected will, by the measures to which I shall presently allude, be reduced to a minimum, I authorise your Excellency to carry out the reductions detailed in paragraph 6 of your Despatch either to the full extent proposed, or to any lesser extent that you may, on further consideration, think sufficient.

Reductions authorized.

19. In order to effect the reduction, your Excellency asks sanction to the following measures with respect to the Native grades in the regiments affected:—

I. To grant the superior rates of pensions to officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who have completed 25 years of service and upwards.

II. To grant the ordinary rates of pensions to all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who have completed 14 years' service and have less than 25 years' service, with a bonus of one month's pay for every two years of service.

III. To grant to officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of more than 10 and less than 14 years' service, two-thirds of the ordinary rate of pension, and a bonus of three months' pay.

IV. To grant to non-commissioned officers and men of five years' service and less than 10, a gratuity of one month's pay for each year of service, and a bonus of three months' pay.

V. For non-commissioned officers and men of less than five years' service, a gratuity of six months' pay.

Further, you would give free passes by rail to all men discharged on account of these reductions; and you add that the scale of gratuities for cavalry is under consideration, and will take the same shape as the foregoing, but with modifications

fications suitable to the circumstances under which the Silladar cavalry serve, and you ask to be empowered to make any slight modifications in the scale of gratuities or bonus which may appear to you to be necessary on the advice of the superior military authorities in each Presidency.

20. It is also stated, at the close of paragraph 10 of your Despatch, that only men of less than 15 years' service will be transferred to other regiments, but in paragraph 13 you express a hope that it may be possible to utilise the services of some of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men belonging to the regiments reduced in civil situations, or in the police. I gather, therefore, that all soldiers, of whatever rank, who have served for more than 15 years and cannot be provided for in the police or in civil employ, which I fear can only be the case to a very limited extent, will, under your proposals, be compulsorily retired.

21. As I recognise the great inconvenience of transferring officers or non-commissioned officers of reduced regiments to corps that are retained to the hindrance of the usual flow of promotions in the latter, I, though regretting the necessity for so doing, agree to the compulsory retirement of all soldiers who have served more than 15 years, and I sanction the grant of the pensions, bonus, and donations to all men thus compulsorily retired, who cannot be provided for in the police or civil employ, or in other regiments, in the way I shall presently describe, and to all men of less than 15 years' service in the reduced regiments who wish to take their discharge, or who are considered from physical or other causes not well suited for the service. I also sanction any slight modifications in the terms that you may think fit to order on any representations from the Governments of Madras and Bombay, or the Commander in Chief in India.

22. I have not yet received your proposals for the payments to reduced Cavalry soldiers referred to in your 11th paragraph, but I sanction in anticipation whatever you may think right to grant. I have no doubt that your Excellency will give every weight to the peculiar claims of Silladar soldiers thus deprived of the benefits of the profession in which they have embarked their property.

23. With regard to native officers and non-commissioned officers of more than 15 years' service, it is probable that the measure of compulsory retirement will fall with much severity, as many of them may have a just expectation of further advancement in their profession, of which they may be very deserving, and I fear that, notwithstanding any efforts that may be made by your Excellency, a very small proportion of this class will obtain suitable employment in the police or in civil departments. I would therefore suggest, for the consideration of your Excellency, whether it might not be possible, by a limited offer under Clauses I. and II. of paragraph 19 to officers and non-commissioned officers of regiments not reduced, but who might wish to retire, to create vacancies to which the most efficient and deserving Native officers and non-commissioned officers of reduced regiments might be appointed. In this way they might be retained in the Army without checking promotion. I am aware that, in the Bengal Army, owing to the different classes of which its various regiments are composed, there may in some cases be a difficulty in providing for a deserving officer or non-commissioned officer, but this difficulty will hardly be felt in Madras and Bombay, and I shall be glad if this plan can be carried out to some extent in all Presidencies.

Good conduct pay of Non-commissioned Officers.

24. Your Excellency recommends that on this occasion the opportunity should be taken to improve the position of the Native non-commissioned officers, and you quote and support the recommendation of the Army Commission that Duffadars and Havildars be allowed one rupee a month for every two years of good service in that grade, up to a maximum of 4 rupees per mensem good conduct pay, and that Naicks be allowed one rupee a month for every two years of good service in that grade, up to a maximum of 2 rupees per mensem good conduct pay.

For the reasons stated, I have pleasure in sanctioning the proposed addition to the emoluments of this class, upon whose punctual and efficient performance of duties the discipline and efficiency of regiments so largely depends.

25. I have

Addition of one European Officer to Establishment of Native regiments sanctioned.

25. I have already referred in paragraph 7 to your recommendation that another European officer should be added to each regiment retained. It is not urged that this addition is necessary for regimental efficiency, for although the number of men in each corps is augmented, there will be no increase in the number of those units within the corps to which European officers, apart from the commandant, adjutant, and quartermaster, are attached. Nor is it proposed that the additional officer should interfere with the present position of Native officers in command of troops and companies, a position which I consider should be strictly maintained. Your Excellency thinks the addition necessary in order to maintain as nearly as possible the existing number of regimental officers in India, for you state that although the number of regiments is to be reduced, it is necessary to have the same effective reserve of officers available in the country as at present. In the reasons for this, as stated in paragraph 16 of your Despatch, I entirely concur, and those reasons have been strengthened by the recent diminution in the number of regimental officers of Royal Artillery and British Infantry, who have heretofore proved a valuable reserve for staff and departmental duties in the event of war.

I therefore sanction the addition of one European officer to each regiment of Native cavalry and infantry on the establishment as a squadron or wing officer, on the same rates of pay as those now allowed to officers holding those positions.

26. This addition to the establishment and the vacancies already existing in many regiments will enable all the junior officers of corps reduced to be readily absorbed, but there will still remain the commanding officers and other officers of standing of the disbanded regiments, and though no doubt the authorities in each Presidency will use every endeavour to provide these officers with suitable employment, this must be a work of time, and must be principally effected by placing them in vacancies that may occur in other regiments to the possible injury of officers of those regiments.

Special pensions to European Officers.

27. You therefore propose to offer special pensions, not to the particular officers of regiments to be reduced, but to as many officers in each Army in military employment as there are senior officers thrown out of employment, and that these offers should be made according to seniority by length of service, on the understanding that for every retirement of an officer holding an appointment a supernumerary officer from a reduced regiment shall be brought into his place.

28. The terms you would offer are, that for as many officers of 20 years' service and upwards as are made supernumerary by reduction of their regiments in each Army, so many officers in each Army of 24 years' service and upwards be allowed to retire on the next higher rate of pension above that to which they are entitled by regulation, without deduction for furlough taken in excess of the periods counting for pension, and also to receive the additional annuity or bonus representing the value of their expectation to the succession of colonel's allowances, and, further, that if their regimental appointment has been abolished, they should receive a bonus of six months' staff pay of their regimental appointment.

29. Since your Despatch was written, the value of expectations of Colonel's allowances has been allowed, in addition to pensions, to all officers who entered the staff corps on or before the 12th September 1866, or who were in the old local army, with the proviso that no addition to this is made in consequence of service beyond 32 years.

Other increased pensionary benefits have also been sanctioned since the date of your Despatch, and it is probable that your recommendations might have been modified had the existing retiring regulations been in force when you wrote. I am in doubt, therefore, as to what you would now desire in this matter, and I am very strongly impressed with the inconvenience of giving special terms of retirement to a certain number of officers, especially at a period immediately following a very liberal revision of the regulations.

I am, at the same time, alive to the inconvenience to the Army, as well as the hardship to individuals, of having a considerable number of officers thrown out of employment, who, unless they retire, must remain unemployed until provided for in regiments or on the staff, where they may interfere with the reasonable prospects of advancement of other officers. Instead, therefore, of the

the proposals of your Government, to which I am unable to assent, I sanction your offering the following terms to officers of the reduced regiments who may retire from the service within three months of their regiments being broken up:—

I. To officers of over 32 years' service, the pension to which they may be entitled, not in excess of 456 *l.* 5 *s.* a year, with the value of their colonel's allowances on the scale allowed by General Government Order No. 1, of 1881, together with a bonus of 18 months' staff salary of their regimental appointments, and free passages to England for themselves and their families.

II. To officers of from 20 to 32 years' service, a bonus equal to 18 months' staff salary of their regimental appointments, in addition to any pension to which they may be entitled, with free passages as above.

30. I trust that, by the operation of the new pension regulations and by the concessions sanctioned, there will be little hardship inflicted on European officers, and that in a very short period all the efficient regimental officers of reduced regiments who desire to remain in the service will have obtained employment.

31. In making a selection of regiments for reduction in Bengal, your Excellency will no doubt be guided by the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief as to the comparative efficiency of the several corps, but it will be necessary also to bear in mind the expediency of preserving a proper proportion between the various classes which it is considered desirable to have in that Army. In the Armies of Madras and Bombay the regiments are mainly of the same composition, and it will suffice as respects those armies to instruct the Governments of the Presidencies to select the least efficient regiments for reduction.

32. In selecting stations for abandonment or for reduction, whether in the territories more immediately under the control of your Excellency or those within the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, I trust that every care will be taken not to unduly weaken or to abandon places where important interests require protection; and I wish it to be understood that I have no desire to see large concentrations of troops at particular garrisons. I am entirely in favour of the principle advocated in paragraph 5 of your Despatch under reply, namely, that in India our main object in military dispositions is to have our troops at many points ready to maintain internal order, and I consider that it is not expedient to follow the example of continental nations in forming *corps d'armée*, or to mass bodies of troops permanently, and to hold them ready to operate together. Telegraphic and railway communication no doubt extends now over most parts of India, but too much confidence must not be placed in that circumstance. Telegraphic communication existed in 1857, but was in many places destroyed at the first outbreak of disturbance. Railways are not so easily destroyed as telegraphs, but even railway communication should not be implicitly depended upon, nor does the existence of railways, as a rule, justify the abandonment of garrisons of the nature I have described. What is wanted is to occupy the country in the manner already indicated, to hold its most important strategical positions, to efficiently guard all seats of Government and important Government establishments. This is in general the case at present, and under the existing system, which gives garrisons of all arms of numerous places, quite sufficient opportunity is afforded for the training and supervision of the troops, combined, as should often be the case, with a temporary concentration of troops at camps of exercise, or at divisional or district head quarters.

33. The Army Commission made certain recommendations for the formation of a Native Army reserve, but your Excellency is not prepared to support these proposals. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to discuss them; but I may at once say that I should have felt serious doubts as to the propriety of establishing any system of the kind suggested by the Commission, for I doubt its applicability to the circumstances of our position in India.

34. I have now, I think, replied fully as to the two first points referred to me in your Despatch, No. 230, namely, the strength and composition of the Native Army, and the number of European officers for each regiment, and I have

have conveyed my views as to several collateral subjects. As stated in paragraph 2 of this letter, I am not prepared at present to decide on the two other points submitted, which do not so immediately press for a settlement, namely, the mode of officering the Native Army, and of officering the Staff and Army Departments. These two latter points are, however, now under my consideration.

35. I request that an early report may be made for my information, showing the orders issued by your Excellency to carry out the measures sanctioned in this Despatch; and I shall be glad to learn what steps you have taken to press on Local Governments the importance of providing suitable employment in some civil branches of the administration for efficient and deserving Native officers and Non-commissioned officers who may be compulsorily retired.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

(Confidential.)

DISSENT by Mr. *R. A. Dalyell*, C.S.I.; dated 18th February 1882.

REORGANIZATION of the NATIVE ARMY.

1. I DESIRE to place on record my dissent from the Despatch which passed Council on the 3rd instant. As stated in my Note attached to the Minute of the Military Committee, I felt myself unable to concur with my colleagues, (1) because I find no reliable evidence in the papers which had been referred to us of the assumed defects of the Madras Army, and because, apart from this assumption, I could not discover, either in the Report of the Army Commission, or in the Despatches of the Government of India, any valid reasons for an increase of the Bengal and Bombay armies by about 2,000 men, and a reduction of the Madras Army by about the same number, which is the practical outcome of the scheme of reform submitted by the Viceroy in Council, and proposed to be sanctioned in the draft Despatch; (2) because, under the circumstances so clearly set forth in paragraphs 12 to 17 of the Despatch itself, it is, in my judgment, inexpedient to sanction a reduction in the number of regiments of the three Native armies for the sole purpose of effecting a small economy.

2. The Army Commission proposed a reorganization of the three Native armies which would have involved an increase of the Bengal Army by about 5,000 men, and a reduction of the Madras Army by a still larger number, though in no part of the Report is this result distinctly stated. In fact, if the Report be read without working out the figures, the natural conclusion would be that the reductions spoken of would affect the number of regiments only in each army, and that the strength of the rank and file would remain very much the same as at present. As the Government of India, in summing up their instructions to the Commission, distinctly desired them to bear in mind that the main object in calling them together was "to ascertain what reduction in expenditure could be effected," it was perhaps natural that the proposed *increase* to the Bengal Army should not be put prominently forward; but I submit that, if it was held to be essential to make such a large addition to one army, and to reduce another so heavily, the proposition should have been distinctly stated, with the detailed grounds for bringing it forward. Similarly, I object to the obscurity of the Despatches from the Government of India upon this part of the subject, for, though their scheme does not involve either such a heavy addition or such a large reduction as that of the Army Commission, it does propose to increase the Bengal Army, and to reduce the Madras Army to the serious extent mentioned in the previous paragraph, and yet it is nowhere clearly stated that one army will be increased to the same extent as the other will be reduced; so far, indeed, from this being the case, the statement is made in one Despatch that it was considered imperatively necessary that the reductions should be more equally distributed over the three armies than had been done by the Army Commission. On these grounds, then, I take the preliminary objection to the mode in which the scheme has been submitted. It has not been placed before the Secretary of

State in Council in such a complete manner as to enable him to judge of it in all its bearings.

3. I will now proceed to my objections to the scheme on its merits. It will be observed that the Army Commission, though they nowhere make it clear what the precise result of their proposals will be with regard to the Madras Army, justify a reduction of that army on four distinct grounds: (*a*) That their scheme of reorganization and garrisons did not admit of their retaining the Madras Army at a greater strength than that proposed, especially as service beyond the limits of the Madras Presidency was extremely unpopular with the Madras regiments, and was most expensive to the State, owing to the practice of transporting the families of the men with each regiment; (*b*) that there was considerable difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of suitable recruits to keep the Madras Army up to its present strength; (*c*) that the proposed reduction would not bear heavily on the sepoy, as was instanced in the case of the former reduction of the Madras Army, in regard to which Sir Charles Trevelyan was stated to have said that the Madras soldier, when discharged with a fair gratuity, readily returned to his village and an agricultural life; (*d*) that, in point of fact, the Madras soldier is not as efficient for purposes of warfare as the sepoy of Northern India; this last reason being gathered from the general tenor of their remarks, rather than from any distinct statement to that effect.

Para. 243.

Para. 244.

Para. 242.

4. I venture to think that none of these reasons, except, perhaps, the first, are at all consistent with the evidence from which the Commission profess to derive their conclusions, and which is recorded at length in the Appendices to their Report. If it be considered essential that Madras troops are to be withdrawn from the Central Provinces, it may be difficult to find occupation in peace time for the whole of the present army; but is it not desirable to keep it up to its present strength as a reserve, especially as the proposals of the Army Commission for the formation of a general army reserve have been negatived; and, indeed, is there any real reason why that army should cease to garrison a province it has occupied for a long series of years? So far from service in the Central Provinces being distasteful to the Madras sepoys, as insinuated by the Commission, we have the distinct statement of Sir Neville Chamberlain that, owing to the comparative cheapness of living, this is not the case.* It is true that, owing to the regiments being allowed to take their families with them when not proceeding on active service, the cost of moving a Madras regiment is somewhat high, but this can be in a great measure removed by less frequent reliefs, and it must not be forgotten that the wives and families act as hostages for the good behaviour of the men, no small consideration with a mercenary army. As to the second point, the alleged difficulty in obtaining recruits, we have again the distinct statement of Sir Neville Chamberlain that the number of recruits now required is not more than the population can give, and that a reduction of the army would be likely to have a bad effect, as it would shake the faith of the people in the stability of the service; and as to any difficulty lately experienced in obtaining suitable recruits, the same high authority considered it to be caused, not by any backwardness of the population generally to enter the army because of their aversion to a military career, but rather to the fact that the advantages of military service had decreased, as compared to those offered by other professions. The assertion that the Madras sepoy would willingly retire from the service on pension is also absolutely at variance with the evidence before the Commission. It seems hardly credible that they should have recorded this opinion, with the evidence of the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army before them to an exactly contrary effect, as follows†:—

*App. III, p. 155.

†App. III., p. 152.

> "In no army in the world are the men less inclined to give up the "service, either on the receipt of a gratuity or a pension. A man once "enlisted, his regiment becomes his home; he marries, his family accom-"pany the regiment (save on foreign service), and he and his wife and "children are entirely dependent on the State for their living. An order "for reduction of the Madras Army means, to every man reduced, social "degradation and reduction to poverty, and it is certain that this question "is now occupying the minds of the whole of this Native Army."

5. Probably

5. Probably some such comparison of the evidence placed before the Commission with the conclusions arrived at, as that given above, has been made by the Government of India, for we find nothing in their Despatches urging a reduction of the Madras Army on any of the three grounds to which I have referred, and upon which so much stress is laid by the Commission. As already stated, the Government of India nowhere say that their proposals will involve a reduction in the Madras Army by nearly 2,000 men, but the only justification which they bring forward in support of this outcome of their scheme are some assumed defects in that army, which are apparently supposed to affect prejudicially its discipline and regimental organization.* In spite of the evident bias of the Army Commission against the Madras Army, not a word is stated by them adverse either to their discipline or regimental organization, and the evidence recorded by competent critics is exactly to the contrary effect, so that I am utterly at a loss to understand to what the Government of India alludes. I must here express my regret that it has devolved upon one so little competent to do justice to the task as myself to act as the defender of the Madras Army from what I cannot but feel has been a most unjust attack. I wish the matter could have come forward in former years, when that army was ably represented in this Council by distinguished officers who had served in Southern India, and who would have been competent, from personal knowledge, to have repelled with indignation charges in regard to so vital a matter as the discipline of the army; a matter, too, upon which every Madras officer has always justly prided himself, and which, hitherto, so far as I am aware, has never been called in question.

*Para. 7 of Despatch, No. 230.

6. I cannot but think that these observations of the Government of India are but the reflection of those loosely-expressed opinions adverse to the efficiency of the Madras Army, which have been of late so generally current in Upper India, but which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, are not based upon any reliable foundation. I am quite ready to admit that the mere appearance of the Madras sepoys, clad in their somewhat antiquated, and certainly unbecoming, uniform, is not calculated to impress one with a very high estimate of their capacity as fighting men, especially when the advanced age of many of the men in the ranks is taken into account. The fact, too, that, in many regiments, owing to the paucity of subalterns in the Staff Corps, the duties of wing officers and adjutants, for which smartness is especially needed, must often devolve upon comparatively elderly men, is a decided disadvantage to the army. But for none of this is the army in any way responsible. The clothing of the men is in the hands of the authorities; the economic action of the Madras Government in working the pension rules is proverbial, and has, no doubt, led to the retention of some old men in the ranks who would be better in their villages; and the reduction of the army by 12 regiments in 1859, the adoption of the irregular system of organization a few years later, and the difficulty of recruiting the lower ranks of the Madras Staff Corps, have left us with a body of field officers to provide for altogether beyond the wants of the army, with its present strength, and on its present organization as to regimental officers.

7. The disparaging remarks to which I have referred were at one time directed against the services of the Madras regiments during the mutiny of 1857. It was asserted that, when engaged, there had been comparatively few casualties among them. I believe this to have been an entire mistake, and, at any rate, all historians agree in admitting that Carthieu's brigade acquitted themselves with the highest credit, and that the gallantry of the Madras Native Artillery at Lucknow was beyond all praise. In fact, on no occasion have I been able to discover that Madras troops have ever failed when engaged in the field. The traditions of the old "Coast Army," as it was called in former years, are indeed magnificent. With the great Clive, they were engaged at Plassey, and assisted in laying the foundations of our Indian Empire; later on, under other distinguished commanders, they took part in securing British supremacy in the Carnatic, and on one occasion are recorded to have driven back the European troops of France at the point of the bayonet; and subsequently they gained the approval of the Duke of Wellington at Seringapatam and Assaye. In fact, for upwards of 100 years the Madras Army has maintained its high traditions, and on every occasion on which the Madras sepoys have been employed on active service, whether in India, at Bourbon,

Bourbon, in Egypt, at the Straits, in China, or in Burmah, they have invariably obtained the commendations of their commanders. It is true that, for the past 20 years, the Madras Army has been little employed on active service, and that they were, for some unexplained reason, not permitted to take part in the Abyssinian War or the Perak Expedition; but, as observed by a former Commander in Chief, and one who knew the Madras sepoy well, "Is it just or generous first to exclude troops from all participation in warfare, and then to advocate their abolition on the assumption that they possess no warlike qualities, an assertion not borne out by history?" Moreover, though the army proper has of late rarely been engaged, the Madras Sappers have taken a part in most of the Indian military operations of late years, and have invariably done excellent service. Yet the men of the Sappers are of the same race as the ordinary sepoys of the line, and are drawn from the same classes of the population. Is it right or proper, then, to treat this army with less consideration than those of Bengal or Bombay, especially when we have the evidence of its late Commander in Chief that discharge from the ranks means social degradation and reduction to poverty?

8. Nor am I prepared to admit that this recent exclusion from active service' though, no doubt, it must have had a depressing effect upon the sepoy, has seriously deteriorated the army. In order to justify the direct attack of the Government of India upon the discipline and regimental organization, and the insinuations of the Army Commission against the relative efficiency and martial feeling of the Madras sepoy, it is essential that evidence upon these points should be forthcoming, but, if we turn to the Appendices printed by the Commission, and to the Minutes sent home with the Despatches, we find much independent testimony of a distinctly contrary character. Sir Frederic Haines, the Commander in Chief in India, a British officer who served some years in the Madras Presidency, commanded a division there, and was also for five years Commander in Chief of the Madras Army, writes to the following effect:—

"It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army, and, if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that, by force of circumstances, the martial feelings and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to the Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen little service; for, with the exception of the Sappers, they have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit, for one moment, that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill, training, and discipline, the Madras sepoy is inferior to none, while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours."

Again, in another place, he says:—

"From the enthusiasm displayed in Madras and Bombay, when the regiments were recently required to join their comrades of Bengal in the north-west, I would say that this class of service is eminently popular in those armies. I take it that their manifestation of spirit goes some way to refute the assertion that the martial feeling and characteristics necessary to the true soldier are no longer to be found in the ranks of those armies."

Then, in his Minute on the Army Commission proposals, he writes:—

"I am thoroughly opposed to the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the Madras Army. I would most earnestly suggest that those who have to decide upon its future will well consider the position now held by that army, and how admirably it fills the part assigned to it, viz., that of being the great reserve for India. By its means the garrisons of Burmah have been increased beyond their normal strength, and are held, so far as Native troops are concerned, by Madras alone. Madras regiments garrison Calcutta, Dorunda, and the Saugor District. They assist in holding Gwalior and Mooltan, whilst in the field we have three companies of Sappers and three regiments of Madras Native Infantry in the Khyber line, where the Madras men are reported to be healthier than any other class of Native troops."

Sir Neville Chamberlain, himself a Bengal officer, and Commander in Chief at Madras up to last year, wrote to the following effect when alluding to the superior military instincts of the Natives of Northern India:—

"But

"But I do believe that now, as heretofore, the Madrassi, properly selected and commanded, can be made into a very serviceable soldier; and further, I am convinced that, for many obvious reasons, no greater blunder could be committed than to allow him to lose his place in the military organization by which this Empire is held, merely to let in a better man."

Again:—

"I consider that the surplus of regiments maintained in this Presidency in excess of requirements for local purposes ought to form an efficient reserve in case of danger, either for foreign service or for service within the Presidency. If it does not do so, it is not because the Madras sepoy cannot be made an efficient soldier. The cause would be attributable to want of proper teaching and proper leading on the part of the British officers."

"I admit that the men of Southern India are not physically as strong, nor are they now by instinct as warlike, as the men of the north. But this Presidency can produce men of sufficient stamina to discharge all the calls made upon the Native soldier, and I believe I am justified in saying that the marching powers of the Madras sepoy have not been found wanting. That he is a good shot is established by the musketry returns of the army. The value of Madras as a reserve was fully established in 1857, and it does not seem to me to be prudent to discard such experience. History is apt to repeat itself; and undue reliance on one body of a mercenary army is the way to hasten on such a repetition."

Sir Edwin Johnson, an officer of the Bengal Artillery, and late Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, expresses himself as follows:—

"I also strongly object to the manner in which the 'reconstruction' contemplated is to be made at the expense of the Madras Army. The tone in which such a result is spoken of, is another instance indicative of the 'foreign' spirit in which the Report has been written, a spirit engendered by an exaggerated feeling of confidence in the future, and an ignoring of the lessons taught by the past. Discontent of 'even a few hundred retired sepoys,' who, however, if the Report be accepted, would be numbered by thousands instead of hundreds, when imported into the widespread area of our recruiting grounds breeds feelings which alienate the goodwill of the population.

"Further, it seems to have been forgotten, in proposing their wholesale reduction, that, under the peculiar organization of the Madras Army, the disbandment of a regiment is not the mere sending of men away to their homes, but the disruption and ruin of a community.

"It appears to me a very great mistake indeed to suppose that the feeling of discontent which would be engendered were the Madras Army subjected to the treatment proposed by the Army Commission would be limited to 'a few hundred retired sepoys.' It would permeate through the whole Presidency, not only by reason of the reductions proposed, but by the breaking up of regimental ties and associations, which would be a consequence of the drastic measures it is proposed to apply to that army. The Madras Army has ever been treated as a *corpus vile*, on which to test the extent to which mutilation and dismemberment can be carried out without extinguishing life and loyalty.

"The late Viceroy was sensible of the impolicy of carrying out any large reductions in the Madras Presidency, and in one of his last Notes before leaving India Lord Northbrook said that, though the Madras Army was susceptible of reduction, and still be left in sufficient strength to perform the duties now allotted to it,* 'It must not be forgotten that this army forms a reserve which 'has proved, and may again prove, of service in time of difficulty.

"'Bearing this in mind, as well as the hardship to the British and Native 'officers and to the men, and the unpopularity and disturbance of the minds of the 'people which reductions always occasion, I am of opinion that the Madras 'Army should be retained at its present strength, unless some serious financial 'difficulty should arise.'

"Recent events have proved how useful a reserve this army is, and justify the opinions of those who have urged its retention on its present footing."

*Sic in original.

General Fraser, who is an officer of the late Bengal Engineers, and was for a time acting as member of Viceroy's Council, says:—

"I believe, however, that the present Bombay Army is largely composed of soldiers

soldiers recruited from the north, and that the Madras Army must be looked on, so far as the Native element is concerned, as the great counterpoise to our Northern Armies, as being wholly recruited from its own districts, and as having proved themselves in the past good soldiers; and I would deprecate any large reduction of its force. From the facts I have referred to previously, and also from my own observation, I hold that the Madras sepoy is a fine soldier, worthy of our utmost confidence, and that we shall do well to encourage him to take a large part under our colours. It may be argued that the Madras sepoy is not the soldier he was, owing to the long period of peace which has been enjoyed by the Madras people, but this argument is fast becoming applicable to the northern nations also."

9. These, then, are the views upon the question, not of officers of the Madras Army, who might be naturally supposed to be partial, but of four thoroughly competent and unprejudiced witnesses. I am further in a position to state that Lord Napier of Magdala also expressed himself in most flattering terms as to the condition of the Madras Army when he made his southern tour towards the end of his Indian command, some six years ago. I confess that it seems to me that the opinions of such authorities as these ought not to be lightly set aside, and that in the face of them the Government of India were not justified in the conclusion at which they have arrived, that the Madras Army should bear the brunt of the proposed reductions. The most reliable military authorities are evidently opposed to this view, and especially in the present state of our relations with independent Burmah it is surely most inexpedient to reduce that army, upon which we are mainly dependent for our Burmah garrison. It must not be forgotten, too, that such a reduction as that proposed must necessarily make this purely foreign service bear more hardly upon the men, owing to the difficulty of effecting sufficiently frequent reliefs, for it is to be noted that while the number of regiments retained for service in Burmah will remain, as at present, five, they will in future represent nearly one-sixth of the strength of the Madras infantry, instead of only one-eighth, as has hitherto been the case. On the whole I can come to no other conclusion than that it will be most impolitic to make the large reductions in the Madras Army which have now been sanctioned.

10. As to my second ground for dissent, I cannot but think that little more is needed in support of my contention than a perusal of these paragraphs of the Despatch to which I have referred. It is there stated that the existing strength and establishment of the regiments of the Native Army was deliberately decided upon by a former Government of India, which had exceptional military experience at its disposal, after full inquiry and consideration; that the experience of the late war in Afghanistan shows that the regiments, small as they now are, had to be constantly broken up to occupy posts, or to form detachments for active operations; that, if stronger regiments than the present are employed upon the necessarily scattered garrison duties upon which the army is occupied, it will involve the quartering of regiments by wings, which is most destructive to efficacy; that the employment of a large number of small regiments gives special facilities for the recruiting and training of soldiers in time of pressure, and for effecting the needful frequent relief of troops at unhealthy stations; that the reductions will have a disquieting effect upon the whole Native Army, and will involve serious hardship to deserving soldiers in the reduced regiments; that the reduced number of Native officers and non-commissioned officers to be entertained may affect the popularity of the service; that the displacement of a considerable number of European officers from their positions in regiments in which they have served for long periods will cause inconvenience. To these reasons adverse to the proposals, which, in my humble judgment, are quite sufficient to condemn them, I will merely add one which has been forcibly put forward by the Government of India in para. 48 of their Despatch, No. 401, when objecting to the concentration of troops proposed in the Army Commission's Report. It is there stated that the Indian Army is required quite as much to maintain internal peace as for external operations; that, in short, the army must be "seen." I submit that no argument could be adduced which is more damaging to the proposal to reduce the number of regiments. It is, to my mind, politically essential that our army should be "seen" in all parts of the Empire, and if our Native regiments be reduced from 166 to 144, as has been sanctioned in the Despatch to which I object, the evidence of our power will be to this extent diminished.

11. In

11. In conclusion I think I may safely assert that the reorganisation of the Native Army of India which has now been sanctioned is neither necessary on grounds of military efficiency, nor desirable on grounds of political expediency; but that, on the contrary, there is at any rate some cause for apprehension that the changes when carried out may result in some loss to the former and in some sacrifice of the latter. In these circumstances it is surely undesirable to make a change attended with such serious risks for the sole purpose of effecting an annual saving of about 100,000 *l.* per annum, a saving, too, which must be largely discounted for many years to come by the pensionary and other charges involved in carrying out the change. Moreover, though such a course might have been declared expedient owing to straightened financial circumstances four years back, it can hardly be justified now, when we are about to bring forward a budget announcing a considerable surplus, and proposing large remissions of taxation.

(signed) *R. A. Dalyell.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 90 of 1882—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received 23rd May* 1882.)

My Lord, Simla, 1 May 1882.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 49, dated the 2nd February 1882, in reply to our Despatch, No. 230, dated the 24th June 1881, in which we proposed, among other measures of army reorganisation, the reduction of four regiments of Native Cavalry and eighteen regiments of Native Infantry, and the organisation of the remaining regiments of the Army, with certain specified exceptions, each on a strength of 550 natives of all ranks for cavalry and 832 for infantry.

Your Lordship, with certain observations, now authorises the adoption of our proposals, including the reduction of the above-mentioned number of regiments.

2. In continuation of telegram, dated the 25th April 1882, specifying the Native regiments selected for reduction, we have now the honour to forward the papers marginally noted, concluding with our General Order, No. 210, published in the *Gazette Extraordinary* of the 22nd April, showing the steps we have taken, in consultation with his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India and the Governments of Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab, to carry out the measure.

To Adjutant General in India, No. 177 B., dated 11th March 1882.
To Government of Madras, No. 178 B., dated 11th March 1882.
To Government of Bombay, No. 179 B., dated 11th March 1882.
From Adjutant General in India, No. 204 F. C., dated 13th March 1882.
Telegram to Government of Punjab, dated 16th March 1882.
Telegram from Government of Punjab, dated 16th March 1882.
To Adjutant General in India, No. 208 B., dated 18th March 1882.
To Adjutant General in India, No. 5 S.B., dated 31st March 1882.
Telegram to Government of Bombay—Madras, No. 1617 S. B., dated 9th April 1882.
From Government of Bombay, No. 1874, dated 5th April 1882, and Enclosure.
From Adjutant General in India, No. 373 F. C., dated 9th April 1882.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 10th April 1882.
Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 24 S.B., dated 13th April 1882.
From Adjutant General in India, No. 1380 B., dated 13th April 1882.
Telegram from Government of Madras, dated 14th April 1882.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, No. 41 S. B., dated 20th April 1882.
Telegram to Government of Bombay, No. 44 S. B., dated 21st April 1882.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 21st April 1882.
Telegram from Government of Bombay, dated 23rd April 1882.
G. G. O., No. 210, dated 22nd April 1882.
G. G. O., dated 24th April 1882.

3. It will be observed that the Government of Madras has selected the eight last regiments of Native Infantry on the rolls of the Madras Army for reduction. With regard to the selection of regiments made by the Government of Bombay, we deemed it our duty to draw the attention of that Government to your Lordship's Despatch, No. 334, dated the 13th October 1881, and thus to invite them, if they saw fit, to substitute the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (late Jacob's Rifles) for the 6th Native Infantry. As will be seen from their telegraphic reply, dated the 21st April, they adhered to their former recommendation, which we then accepted.

4. In regard to the request contained in the last paragraph of your Lordship's Despatch,—to be informed what steps we have taken, in accordance with the proposals made in paragraph 13 of our Despatch, No. 230 of 1881, to press on the Local Governments the importance of providing suitable employment in some civil branches of the administration for efficient and deserving Native officers and non-commissioned officers who may be compulsorily retired,—we have

have to say that we anticipate that few, if any, Native officers and non-commissioned officers, physically and mentally fit for civil employment, will be compulsorily retired; but we shall take action in the matter as soon as we have ascertained whether any Native officers, non-commissioned officers, or men are available for and desirous of such employment.

5. We are now in communication with his Excellency the Commander in Chief and the Punjab Government in regard to the detailed measures necessary for carrying out the reductions in the spirit of the General Order we have issued, and we shall hereafter report our further proceedings in the case.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
J. Gibbs.
T. F. Wilson.
T. C. Hope.

GENERAL ORDERS.—MILITARY DEPARTMENT.—Simla, 22nd April 1882.

(No. 210.—Indian Army.)

ORGANISATION.

THE Most Honourable the Governor General in Council hereby announces certain of the measures which have been determined upon, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the regimental organisation of the Indian Army.

2. Under the organisation now to be adopted, every Native Cavalry regiment (except the four regiments of Madras Native Cavalry, whose establishment will remain unaltered) will consist, as at present, of six troops organised in three squadrons, each regiment having the following establishment:—

3 Ressaldars,
3 Ressaldars,
1 Woordie Major,
6 Jemadars,
6 Kote-Duffadars,
48 Duffadars (including 1 Farrier Major and 1 Salootrie),
6 Trumpeters,
477 Privates (including 1 Assistant Salootrie and 6 Farriers).

In the Bombay Cavalry the present establishment of commissioned and non-commissioned ranks will remain unaltered at 87, the privates being raised to 463 in number instead of to 477, the total strength in Bengal and Bombay being thus 550 of all ranks.

The establishment of the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides (Queen's Own) will remain unaltered.

3. Every Native Infantry regiment will consist, as at present, of eight companies, each company having the following establishment:—

1 Subadar,
1 Jemadar,
5 Havildars,
5 Naiks,
2 Drummers,
90 Privates,

104

making a total per regiment of 832 Natives of all ranks.

The Madras regiments will retain their extra Havildar Major, as at present.

4. The three regiments of Assam Light Infantry will retain their present strength of 912 of all ranks. The five Goorkha regiments will also retain that strength for the present.

5. The

5. The establishment of regiments being fixed as above stated, and as the total strength of the Army is to remain substantially unchanged, this measure of reorganisation involves the reduction of four regiments of cavalry and 18 of infantry.

6 The Governor General in Council has determined that of the four cavalry regiments to be reduced, three shall be reduced in the Bengal Army, including the Punjab Frontier Force, and one in the Bombay Army. Of the 18 regiments of infantry to be reduced, six shall be reduced in the Bengal Army, including the Punjab Frontier Force, four in the Bombay Army, and eight in the Madras Army. The present and future establishments of the Indian Army will, therefore, be as follows :—

	Present Establishment.	New Establishment.
CAVALRY:		
Bengal (excluding Cavalry of the Corps of Guides) - -	24	21
Madras - - - - - - - - - - -	4	4
Bombay - - - - - - - - - - -	7	6
	35	31
INFANTRY:		
Bengal (including Infantry of the Corps of Guides) - -	61	55
Madras - - - - - - - - - - -	40	32
Bombay - - - - - - - - - - -	30	26
	131	113
TOTAL - - -	166	144

7. In the Bengal Presidency the following are the regiments selected for reduction :—

CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.
16th Cavalry.	34th Native Infantry.
17th „	35th „ „
4th Punjab Cavalry.	36th „ „
	37th „ „
	41st „ „
	3rd Punjab Infantry.

8. This reduction will be carried out under the orders of the Commander in Chief and the Punjab Government, in the following way :—

9. All Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who wish to remain in the service, and are physically fit and otherwise well suited for it, will be transferred to other regiments by troops and companies, as far as practicable, under subsidiary orders which will be issued by the Commander in Chief and the Punjab Government.

10. All Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who wish to take their discharge, or who from physical or other causes are not well suited for the service, will be discharged on the following rates of pensions and gratuities :—

I. The superior rates of pensions specified in paragraph 611 of the Pay Code, Volume II., to officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who have completed 25 years of service and upwards.

II. The ordinary rates of pensions to all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who have completed 14 years' service, and have less than

than 25 years' service, with a bonus of one month's pay (including good conduct pay) for every two years' service.

III. To officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of more than 10 and less than 14 years' service, two-thirds of the ordinary rate of pension and a bonus of three months' pay (including good-conduct pay).

IV. To non-commissioned officers and men of five and less than 10 years' service, a gratuity of one month's pay for each year of service, together with an additional bonus of three months' pay as above.

V. To non-commissioned officers and men of less than five years' service a gratuity of six months' pay.

11. In the case of the cavalry, the gratuities will be calculated on the rates of ordinary and not net pay.

12. In those regiments in which, in consequence of the transfers made from the regiments reduced, the strength of Native officers or non-commissioned officers may become in excess of the regular authorised establishment, pensions and gratuities under the above scale may be offered to deserving Native officers and non-commissioned officers of such regiments to the extent of the numbers in excess in these ranks, so that the strength of Native officers and non-commissioned officers may thus be at once brought down to the fixed authorised establishment. Should this reduction, however, not be completely effected, and any supernumeraries be still left, they will be absorbed by making only two promotions for every three vacancies, every third vacancy being absorbed.

13. Native commissioned officers of cavalry regiments of 25 years' service and upwards, pensioned under the terms of paragraph 10, will receive a gratuity of 12 months' pay, in addition to the higher rate of pension.

14. Free passes by rail to their homes will be given to all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who take their discharge on pension or gratuity under these orders.

15. In the cavalry regiments about to be reduced, where the chunda (remount) fund of a regiment, after the disposal of all its horses (under subsidiary orders to be now issued), is unable to meet the entire cost of defraying the horse price of men discharged and transferred, the sums necessary for this purpose will be granted by the Government of India, under orders which will be issued hereafter.

16. In order to complete the horse price of men who are transferred to other corps, and who have not as yet paid up their full horse price in their present corps, loans will be granted to commanding officers of regiments receiving men transferred, of the amount of such horse price still due, to be repaid without interest at 2 rupees per man per mensem.

17. Such assistance will be granted to the equipment funds of cavalry regiments reduced as will permit of their paying up in the ordinary way, to men discharged, the proper value of their equipments, the sale proceeds of which will be carried to the credit of the State.

18. The certified actual cost involved in change of uniform and equipment will be allowed to soldiers transferred to other regiments. The necessary changes in the uniforms of the infantry troops transferred will be made at the public expense.

19. The following regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies have been selected by the Governments of those presidencies respectively for reduction:—

Madras Army.	Bombay Army.
The 34th Native Infantry.	The 3rd Sind Horse.
„ 35th „	„ 6th Native Infantry.
„ 36th „	„ 11th „
„ 37th „	„ 15th „
„ 38th „	„ 18th „
„ 39th „	
„ 40th „	
„ 41st „	

20. The

20. The reductions will be carried out under the foregoing rules, as far as possible, by the transfer of soldiers from regiments to be reduced to those which are to be retained; those, however, who wish to take their discharge from the regiments reduced being allowed to do so with pensions and gratuities as above laid down.

21. Consequent upon the increase in the strength of Native regiments, the establishment of European officers will now be fixed at eight officers per regiment, or one more than the present establishment; the additional officer to be appointed in the rank of wing or squadron officer. This augmentation will at once absorb a part of the junior officers of the reduced regiments, while the total establishment of European officers serving on regimental duty with the Indian Army will remain almost unaltered. With respect to the senior officers of these regiments, the following terms are offered, under the orders of the Secretary of State for India, to such of them as may retire from the service within three months from the date of their regiments being broken up:—

I. To officers of over 32 years' service, the pension to which they may be entitled, not in excess of 456 *l.* 5 *s.* a year, with the value of their colonels' allowances on the scale allowed by G. G. O., No. 1 of 1881, together with a bonus of 18 months' staff salary of their regimental appointments and free passages to England for themselves and their families.

II. To officers of from 20 to 32 years' service, a bonus equal to 18 months' staff salary of their regimental appointments, in addition to any pension to which they may be entitled, with free passages as above.

22. The new organisation of cavalry and infantry will have effect from 1st July 1882.

23. The reduction of the regiments hereby ordered will be completed during the month of June 1882, and the transfers of men who elect to serve in other corps will be made on the 30th June 1882, under orders which will be issued by the Commander in Chief in India and the Governments respectively concerned.

24. Officers of the regiments to be reduced who desire to avail themselves of the offer contained in paragraph 21, should notify their intention to the Adjutant General on or before the 30th September 1882.

25. The Governor General in Council takes this opportunity to announce, with the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, the grant of good-conduct pay to non-commissioned officers as follows:—

To Duffadars and Havildars.

After 2 years' good service in that grade				-	-	-	*Rs.* 1	per month
„ 4	„	„	-	-	-	-	„ 2	„
„ 6	„	„	-	-	-	-	„ 3	„
„ 8	„	„	-	-	-	-	„ 4	„

To Naiks.

After 2 years' good service in that grade				-	-	-	*Rs.* 1	per month.
„ 4	„	„	-	-	-	-	„ 2	„

26. Subsidiary orders regulating the above grant will be issued by the Commander in Chief in India and the Governments concerned respectively. It will take effect from the 1st of July 1882, when those non-commissioned officers who have already completed any of the above periods of service will at once receive the corresponding rate of good-conduct pay.

G. Chesney, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India,—(No. 177 B.—"Organization, Native Army,"—dated Fort William, the 11th March 1882)—(*Confidential*).

I AM directed to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have sanctioned the proposals of the Government of India in regard to the establishment of the Native Army arising out of the report of the Indian Army Commission.

2. The Army Commission, as the Commander in Chief is aware, proposed a reduction of 10 regiments of Native Cavalry and 30 regiments of Native Infantry, or 40 regiments in all, the strength of the regiments retained being considerably increased, so as to give the same aggregate establishment of rank and file as at present maintained.

3. The Government of India have proposed a reduction of only four regiments of cavalry and 18 regiments of infantry, or 22 regiments in all; the reduction to be distributed as shown below, from which it will appear that three regiments of Bengal Cavalry and six regiments of Bengal Infantry are to be reduced:—

NUMBER OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

	Present.	Proposed by Army Commission.	Proposed by Government of India.
CAVALRY:			
Bengal*	24	17	21
Madras	4	2	4
Bombay	7	6	6
	35	25	31
INFANTRY:			
Bengal†	61	51	55
Madras	40	25	32
Bombay	30	25	26
	131	101	113
Total	166	126	144

Present strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,964
Proposed strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,995

* Including Punjab Frontier Force. Not including Guide Corps Cavalry.
† Including Guide Corps Infantry.

4. The establishment of the cavalry regiments in Bengal is to be raised to 550 natives of all ranks, the present strength being 457 of the regular army, and 493 in the Punjabi cavalry. The infantry regiments to be raised from 712 to 852 natives of all ranks.

5. The Governor General in Council directs me to ask that the Commander in Chief may be moved to consider and report which six regiments of Native Infantry and three of Native Cavalry he would propose to select for reduction. His Excellency will no doubt concur with the Government of India in thinking that the reduction should be so effected as to maintain as far as possible the present proportion of Hindustani and Punjabi regiments.

6. The Madras and Bombay Governments have been addressed regarding the reductions to be made in the armies under them.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, Military Department,—(No. 178 B.—"Organization, Native Army," dated Fort William, the 11th March 1882)—(*Confidential*).

I AM directed to inform you, for the information of the Governor in Council, that Her Majesty's Government have sanctioned the proposals made by the Government of India upon the recommendations contained in the report of the Indian Army Commission in regard to the number and establishment of Native regiments in the Indian armies.

2. The Government of Madras are aware that the Commission proposed a reduction of 10 regiments of Native Cavalry and 30 regiments of Native Infantry, or 40 regiments in all in the three armies, the strength of the remainder being so increased as to furnish about the same number of troops as at present.

3. The Government of India have proposed the reduction of a smaller number of regiments, 4 of cavalry and 18 of infantry, as shown below:—

NUMBER OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

	Present.	Proposed by Army Commission.	Proposed by Government of India.
CAVALRY:			
Bengal*	24	17	21
Madras	4	2	4
Bombay	7	6	6
	35	25	31
INFANTRY:			
Bengal†	61	51	55
Madras	40	25	32
Bombay	30	25	26
	131	101	113
Total	166	126	144

Present strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,964
Proposed strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,995

* Including Punjab Frontier Force. Not including Guide Corps Cavalry.
† Including Guide Corps Infantry.

4. It will be seen that of this reduction no regiment of Madras Cavalry is to be reduced, but eight regiments of Madras Infantry are selected for reduction.

5. The establishment of the remaining regiments of infantry is to be raised from 712 to 832 natives of all ranks.

6. Further particulars will hereafter be communicated regarding the arrangements to be made for carrying out this reduction, as to the gratuities and other compensation to be given, and the arrangements for transferring officers and men from the regiments to be reduced to other regiments. I am to ask that the Governor in Council will in the meantime be so good as to consider and favour the Governor General in Council by reporting confidentially which regiments he would propose to select for reduction, those which are considered the least efficient being chosen, and which stations of the Madras Army should in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, be in consequence reduced or abandoned.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 179 B.—"Organization, Native Army,"—dated Fort William, the 11th March 1882)—(*Confidential*).

I AM directed to inform you, for the information of the Governor in Council, that Her Majesty's Government have sanctioned the proposals made by the Government of India upon the recommendations contained in the report of the Indian Army Commission in regard to the number and establishment of Native regiments in the Indian armies.

2. The Government of Bombay are aware that the Commission proposed a reduction of 10 regiments of Native Cavalry and 30 regiments of Native Infantry, or 40 regiments in all in the three armies, the strength of the remainder being so increased as to furnish about the same number of troops as at present.

3. The Government of India have proposed the reduction of a smaller number of regiments, 4 of cavalry and 18 of infantry, as shown below :—

NUMBER OF NATIVE REGIMENTS.

	Present.	Proposed by Army Commission.	Proposed by Government of India.
CAVALRY:			
Bengal*	24	17	21
Madras	4	2	4
Bombay	7	6	6
	35	25	31
INFANTRY:			
Bengal†	61	51	55
Madras	40	25	32
Bombay	30	25	26
	131	101	113
Total	166	126	144

Present strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,964
Proposed strength of the Indian Army - - - - - - 110,995

* Including Punjab Frontier Force. Not including Guide Corps Cavalry.
† Including Guide Corps Infantry.

4. It will be seen that of this reduction one regiment of Bombay Cavalry and four regiments of Bombay Infantry are selected for reduction.

5. The establishment of the remaining regiments of cavalry is to be raised from 487 to 550 natives of all ranks, and that of the infantry from 712 to 832 natives of all ranks.

6. Further particulars will hereafter be communicated regarding the arrangements to be made for carrying out this reduction, as to the gratuities and other compensation to be given, and the arrangements for transferring officers and men from the regiments to be reduced to other regiments. I am to ask that the Governor in Council will in the meantime be so good as to consider and favour the Governor General in Council by reporting confidentially which regiments he would propose to select for reduction, those which are considered the least efficient being chosen, and which stations of the Bombay Army should, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, be in consequence reduced or abandoned.

From Major General Sir *G. R. Greaves*, K.C.M.G., C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 204 F. C.—"Army Commission," dated Fort William, the 13th March 1882).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 177 B. (*Organization—Native Army*), dated 11th March 1882, requesting that the Commander in Chief may be moved to consider and report which six regiments of Native Infantry and three of Native Cavalry his Excellency would select for reduction, in pursuance of the sanction of her Majesty's Government to the proposals of the Government of India.

2. In reply, I am to state that his Excellency recommends that the following regiments may be reduced:—

Bengal Cavalry—16th and 17th Regiments.
Bengal Infantry—34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 41st.
Punjab Force—4th Punjab Cavalry; 2nd or 3rd Punjab Infantry, whichever may be selected by the Punjab Government.

3. This proposal does not meet the views of Government in regard to the present proportion of Hindustani and Punjabi regiments; but as the men of the reduced regiments will be drafted into others, the proportion of classes throughout the army can be maintained without difficulty. Further proposals will be submitted hereafter with regard to the replacement of the lower classes of Hindus.

4. Should the Government of India approve of the reduction of the regiments selected, a detailed scheme for carrying the reduction into effect will be submitted.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,—(dated Fort William, the 16th March 1882).

GOVERNMENT of India have determined to include 4th Punjab Cavalry and either 2nd or 3rd Punjab Infantry among the regiments to be reduced. Which of two infantry regiments named does Lieutenant Governor recommend for reduction?

TELEGRAM from Colonel *S. Black*, Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 29, dated Lahore, the 16th March 1882).

MARCH 16th. Your cypher message of yesterday. Lieutenant Governor feels unable to make any selection between the two regiments named. Both are very good, and his Honour leaves it to the Government of India to make the choice.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India,—(No. 208 B., "Organization, Native Army," dated Simla, the 18th March 1882).

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter of the 13th March 1882, No. 204, specifying the regiments of the Bengal Army which the Commander in Chief proposes should be selected for reduction.

I am to say that the Governor General in Council sanctions the regiments being selected accordingly, and I am to forward the draft * of a General Order announcing the proposed measures for the consideration and opinion of his Excellency.

* Three printed copies.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India,—No. 5 S. B., "Organization, Native Army," dated Simla, the 31st March 1882).

WITH reference to your letter, No. 204 F. C., dated 13th March 1882, I am directed to forward a copy of a telegram received from the Government of the Punjab, and to request that you will be so good as to move his Excellency the Commander in Chief to favour the Government of India with his opinion which of the two regiments in question, the 2nd or 3rd Punjab Infantry, he would recommend should be reduced.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay and Madras, Military Department,—(Nos. 16, 17 S. B., dated Simla, the 9th April 1882).

PLEASE expedite particulars of regiments selected for reduction.

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 1874, dated Bombay Castle, the 5th April 1882)—(*Confidential*).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter, No. 179 B., dated 11th March 1882, communicating the instructions of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State in respect of the reductions to be made in the Native regiments in the Indian armies, under which one regiment of Bombay cavalry and four regiments of Bombay infantry are to be reduced, and requesting that the Governor in Council will favour the Governor General by reporting confidentially which regiments he would propose to select for reduction, and which stations in the Bombay Army should, in his opinion, be in consequence reduced or abandoned.

2. In reply, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a confidential letter, No. 5 C. T., dated 25th March 1882, from the Adjutant General, together with copy of the proceedings of Government thereon, No. 1874 of this date, from which the Governor General in Council will observe that the regiments selected for reduction, with the approval of this Government, are—

CAVALRY.

3rd Regiment Sind Horse.

INFANTRY.

6th Regiment Native Infantry.	15th Regiment Native Infantry.
11th " "	18th " "

and that the stations to be abandoned "or reduced" (*for Native Infantry*) are as follows:—

To be abandoned—	
Neemuch	8 companies.
To be reduced—	
Malegaon	by 4 companies.
Bhuj	" 4 "
Ahmedabad	" 7 "
Surat	" 5 "
Bombay	" 5 "
Dharwar	" 4 "
Baroda	" 2 "
	39

3. With regard to the proposed abandonment of Neemuch, I am to invite special attention to the observations of Government at paragraph 3 of their proceedings

ceedings forwarded with this letter; and in regard to Baroda to state that the proposed reduction is recommended only in the event of its not militating against existing treaty engagements.

4. The reductions recommended by his Excellency the Commander in Chief not having been accepted by the Government in their entirety, will necessitate a partial recast of the distribution of the Native Infantry troops of the Bombay Army, as given at paragraph 13 of the Adjutant General's letter, to provide for the maintenance of military posts at the stations which Government think should not be permanently abandoned; but the reductions approved by Government will enable this to be done.

5. In conclusion I am to recommend the Commander in Chief's proposals (paragraphs 4 to 12 of the Adjutant General's letter), in regard to the re-numbering and re-organization of the Native Infantry branch of the Bombay Army into regiments of three battalions each, to the favourable consideration of the Government of India.

From Brigadier General *A. Lyttelton-Annesley*, Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, —(No. 5 C. T., dated Bombay Castle, 25 March 1882)—(*Confidential*).

WITH reference to Government Resolution, No. 1362, dated Bombay Castle, 14th March 1882, I have the honour, in obedience to the instructions therein contained, to submit the views of his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the proposals contained in Letter, No. 179 B., Government of India, Military Department, dated Fort William, 11th March 1882.

2. His Excellency the Commander in Chief submits that the regiments of the Bombay Army to be reduced should be as follows:—

CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.
3rd Sind Horse.	The 6th Native Infantry. The 11th Native Infantry. The 15th Native Infantry. The 18th Native Infantry.

3. His Excellency's reasons for this selection are as follows: That the 3rd Sind Horse is the junior regiment of the Bombay Cavalry, as well as of a brigade whose conditions of enlistment, involving permanent quarters at Jacobabad, have become ill-suited to general service.

1st, 2nd, 3rd Biluch Regiments.

The above procedure (selecting the junior regiment) cannot, however, be extended to the infantry without disbanding the 27th, 29th, and 30th Regiments. These are Biluch Regiments, and of them the two first have a valuable character; the third (late Jacob's Rifles), though it has not equal claim to consideration on the score of efficiency, enjoys advantages for recruiting and a promise of equal efficiency in the future with the 1st and 2nd Biluchis. His Excellency would not therefore desire to terminate its recent reconstruction.

The 28th, 26th, 25th, and 24th are regiments of good service and of good repute, and the 24th is serving in the Quetta Brigade. It seems therefore undesirable to apply to them a principle which has been surrendered in regard to the Biluch regiments, so that selection, based upon records of service and present efficiency, influenced also by financial convenience when the claims of regiments are perplexingly balanced, remains the only alternative of an invidious decision.

The regiments with least field service are the 6th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 22nd. The 22nd have just gone to Aden, which would complicate its disbandment.

The 14th and 16th are regiments of superior physique; the 17th is very favourably reported on; and his Excellency therefore considers that those already noted can be best spared consistently with *public interests*, which have exercised *full* weight in this conclusion.

 4. The

4. The selection of regiments for reduction will entail a very general renumbering of regiments, and this will be a greater grievance to those thus affected if accident exempts others from a similar change. His Excellency the Commander in Chief therefore suggests for consideration that no organisation could be better suited to the peculiarities of Indian service than Native Infantry regiments composed of three battalions. It would rarely be prudent to withdraw more than one-third of the Native troops and more than half of the English force from garrison duties; and this proportion coincides with the contingent of 10,000 to 12,000 men which Bombay is calculated to contribute to an Indian Army in the field.

5. Twenty-four Native Infantry battalions, incorporated into eight regiments, would thus put eight battalions, *the fittest for service, at once* with the first line. Each such battalion would, in war, be backed up by a reserve of two battalions, and would leave its sick, its recruits, and its families with the nearest reserve battalion without any *of the expense* and *mismanagement, which is the inevitable result of Native Infantry depôts.*

6. Such a system as that herein proposed would be an assurance to the army at large that at the first call for service each regiment would be fairly represented in the force by its *best battalion at the time,* thus stimulating, not only greater emulation in the field *between* regiments, but *within* them, supplying an incentive to the greatest efficiency. His Excellency considers the advantages of this system incontestable from a military point of view, provided it can be adapted to the Staff Corps system.

7. His Excellency would further point out that within this Presidency there are eight English regiments of infantry. The number of the Native battalions, exclusive of one battalion at Aden and the Marine battalion in Bombay, will be henceforward 24 battalions, thus classified:—

2 Grenadier battalions.
5 Light Infantry battalions.
1 Rifle battalion.
3 Biluch battalions.
13 Line battalions.

8. His Excellency would propose to add a good Line battalion (the 19th) to the two Grenadier battalions, and form these three into the 1st Regiment; also to assimilate the 3rd and 5th Light Infantry to the 4th Rifles. These would form the 2nd Regiment. The remaining three regiments of Light Infantry would form the 3rd Regiment.

The three Biluch battalions to form the 4th Regiment.

The remaining 12 battalions to be divided into groups of three and to compose four regiments, viz., the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, preserving their present precedence as follows:—

5th Regiment - - -	7th	8th	9th
6th „ - - -	12th	13th	14th
7th „ - - -	16th	17th	20th
8th „ - - -	22nd	24th	26th

9. With regard to the regiments which remain over, his Excellency would propose to add the 28th Regiment N. I. as a fourth battalion to the proposed 8th Regiment, by which arrangement a ninth battalion could, if necessary, be placed in the field, leaving two battalions in reserve. The Marine battalion, whose duties are specific, would remain single and not numbered.

10. His Excellency desires me to point out that, as at Quetta, Poona, Mhow, Bombay, and Belgaum two or more Native Infantry battalions serve together, the usual rotation of relief would not unfrequently bring together at the same station battalions of the same regiment, which would go far to cement regimental sympathies amongst the men, which much facilitate, simplify, and cheapen volunteering on emergency. It would also in a degree mitigate the hardship of unexpectedly shifting officers to regiments with which they have no connection, and would periodically afford them the option of a combined regimental mess.

11. Thus

11. Thus eight Native Infantry battalions at 832 (total 6,656), four European regiments at 886 (total 3,544), together with the proper proportion of cavalry and artillery, would make a compact division with great vitality of resource and elasticity of development.

10,200 infantry.

It would, in his Excellency's opinion, be quite beyond the range of the present proposal to alter any of the existing rules of promotion, or to extend it regimentally so as to contract that field of selection by which the efficiency of battalions is strengthened. The suggestion is limited to a fresh arrangement in the telling off of regiments; and, if palpable advantages can be secured from this opportunity, whilst regimental susceptibilities are also considered, without any increase of expenditure, and with a reasonable promise of augmented efficiency, it is certainly, in his Excellency's opinion, an opportunity which should not be overlooked.

13. With regard to the stations which should, in consequence of the proposed reductions, be reduced or abandoned, his Excellency is of opinion that both from a military and political point of view the following arrangement is desirable, with one exception, however, namely, the retention of Bhuj, which, from a *military* point of view, his Excellency does not consider necessary, or even advisable:—

Bombay - - - - } Detachment Thana - -	2 Battalions.
Poona - - - - - - -	3 „
Mhow 1½ - - - - } Indore ½ - - - -	2 „
Deesa - - - - - -	1 „
Belgaum - - - - - - -	2 „
Satara ½ - - - - } Dharwar ½ - - - -	1 „
Ahmednagar - - - - - -	1 „
Aden - - - - - - - -	1 „
Augur ½ - - - - } Mehidpur ½ - - -	1 „
Nusseerabad - - - - - -	1 „
Bhuj - - - - - - - -	1 „
Rajkot - - - - } Detachment Dwarka - -	1 „
Ahmedabad - - - - - -	1 „
Baroda - - - - } Detachment Surat - -	1* „
Karachi - - - - - - -	1 „
Hyderabad - - - - - - -	1 „
Jacobabad - - - - - - -	1 „
Quetta District - - - - - -	4 „
	26 Battalions.

* The increased strength of regiments will admit of the detachment being furnished without a diminution of Baroda garrison.

14. The stations his Excellency proposes to abandon for Native Infantry are Malegaon, Sholapur, Kaladgi, Sadra, Neemuch; and those where a diminution of garrison is recommended are—Baroda, six companies in place of eight; Bombay, 15 companies in place of 20; Dharwar, four companies in place of eight; Surat, three companies; and Ahmedabad, eight companies in place of 15 companies.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 1874, dated Bombay Castle, the 5th April 1882)—(*Confidential*).

Read the following:—

Letter from the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army,—(No. 5 C. T., dated Bombay Castle, the 25th March 1882).

With reference to Government Resolution, No. 1362, dated 14th March 1882, reports the regiments which should be selected for reduction, and the stations which should in consequence be reduced or abandoned.

Resolution,—His Excellency the Commander in Chief recommends that the following regiments be selected for reduction:—

CAVALRY.

3rd Regiment Sind Horse.

INFANTRY.

6th Regiment N. I.	15th Regiment N. I.
11th Regiment N. I.	18th Regiment N. I.

And his Excellency the Governor in Council being satisfied with the reasons given in support of the proposals, will submit them to the Government of India for adoption.

2. In consequence of the reduction of regiments as above proposed, his Excellency the Commander in Chief recommends that the following stations and outpost shall be abandoned *:—

* For Native Infantry.

FOR NATIVE INFANTRY.

Malegaon,		Kaladgi,
Neemuch,		Sholapur,
	Sadra,	

and that the garrison of the following stations shall be reduced as shown:—

Bombay	from	20	companies to	15	companies.
Baroda	„	8	„	6	„
Dharwar	„	8	„	4	„
Surat	„	8	„	3	„
Ahmedabad	„	15	„	8	„
Total - -		59		36	

His Excellency further suggests the withdrawal of the garrison, viz., one Native Infantry regiment, from Bhuj.

3. With reference to these proposals, his Excellency the Governor in Council observes:—

(1.) That Neemuch being situated under the political administration of the Central India Agency of the Government of India, his Excellency cannot pass any orders as regards the withdrawal of the Native Infantry regiment recommended, but will submit the proposal to the Government of India with the recommendation that it be adopted.

(2.) As regards Malegaon, his Excellency feels obliged to demur to the military abandonment of this station, as in his Excellency's opinion there are strong reasons for retaining a military force there, though probably a wing of a regiment on the increased strength would suffice.

(3.) As regards Sholapur and Kaladgi, the former station has been without troops for some years past owing to the pressure occasioned by the Afghan war, and the latter is held by a detachment from Belgaum, 88 strong; but his Excellency considers that the country along the eastern boundary of the Southern Mahratta Country which adjoins the Hyderabad State should not be entirely without troops, as proposed. It is, however, a matter for his Excellency the Commander in Chief to consider whether they should be placed at Sholapur, Bijapur, or Kaladgi.

(4.) A detachment of Native Infantry is placed at "Sadra" to support the Political Agent, Mahi Kantha, and there are very strong political reasons why the detachment should not be removed.

(5.) As regards Bhuj, his Excellency thinks it undesirable that the troops should be entirely withdrawn as proposed, although possibly a wing of the Native Infantry of the new strength might suffice.

(6.) As

(6.) As regards the proposed reductions of garrisons, his Excellency the Governor in Council has no objection to offer, and they will be submitted to the Government of India for adoption, with the proviso, however, in the case of Baroda, that the reduction does not militate against treaty engagements.

4. The abandonment of certain stations and the reduction of garrison at others would set free, according to his Excellency the Commander in Chief's plan, five regiments and one company (or, with Bhuj, six regiments and one company); and although Government have not been able to accept these proposals in their entirety, the reductions they have admitted will be sufficient to meet the loss of four regiments, and to provide for the presence of troops at the points where Government consider they should be maintained, although it will necessitate a partial recast of the distribution of troops at the military stations of this Presidency as proposed by his Excellency.

5. Government are well aware that it is desirable from a military point of view to avoid the weakening and dispersion of corps in detachments, and would make great sacrifices to allow of the concentration (when possible) of troops in large masses; but, on the other hand, they may well attach importance to the presence of troops here and there in a wide territory, which cannot but carry weight with the people whether belonging to their own Government or to Native States, and they must leave it to the military authority, by frequent reliefs or in other ways, to provide for maintenance of discipline.

6. The proposals of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in regard to the re-organization of the regiments of the Bombay Army, after the reduction, into battalions of three regiments each will be recommended for careful and favourable consideration by the Government of India.

7. A copy of the Adjutant General's confidential letter and of the present proceedings of Government to be forwarded to the Government of India, with a letter giving the further remarks of Government.

From Major General Sir *G. R. Greaves*, K.C.M.G., C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 373 F. C., "*Native Army*," dated Umballa, the 9th April 1882)—(*Confidential*).

IN reply to Military Department Confidential Letter, No. 5 S. B. (*Organization—Native Army*), dated 31st March 1882, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to state that as the Punjab Government do not consider that there is any choice between the 2nd and 3rd Punjab Infantry, his Excellency recommends that the junior regiment, the 3rd, may be reduced.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 180, dated Bombay, the 10th April 1882).

YOURS 9th. Particulars of regiments selected for reduction posted to Simla, 5th, No. 1874.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department,—(No. 24 S. B., dated Simla, the 13th April 1882).

CAN you supply the numbers of the regiments selected for reduction? Please reply express.

From Colonel *T. E. Gordon*, Deputy Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 1380 B, "*Native Army—Organization*," dated Simla, the 13th April 1882)—(*Confidential*).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 208 B, (*Organization—Native Army*), dated the 18th of March 1882, forwarding a draft G. G. O. giving effect to the measures which have been decided on by the Government of India for the reduction of certain regiments, and for the re-organization of the cavalry and infantry of the Native Army.

2. This order having been submitted to the Commander in Chief has received careful consideration, and has been amended on certain points which, in his Excellency's opinion, require modification, and is returned herewith.

3. Sir D. Stewart considers it very desirable to refrain from alluding to the report of the Army Commission, or to discussion in the Legislative Council (as proposed in the opening paragraphs of the draft order), as in his opinion it is sufficient for the army to be made acquainted with the decision of the Government of India in the matter.

4. The following additions to the order are, in his Excellency's opinion, necessary to enable the funds of cavalry regiments to meet the sudden strain caused by reduction:—

17 (*a*). In the cavalry regiments about to be reduced, where the Chunda (Remount) Fund of a regiment, after the sale of all its horses, is unable to meet the entire cost of defraying the horse price of men discharged and transferred, the sums necessary for this purpose will be granted by the Government of India under orders, which will be issued hereafter.

17 (*b*). In order to complete the horse price of men who are transferred to other corps, and who have not as yet paid up their full horse price in their present corps, loans will be granted to commanding officers of regiments receiving men transferred who are in debt, to be repaid without interest at 2 rupees per man per mensem.

17 (*c*). Such assistance will be granted to the equipment funds of cavalry regiments reduced as will permit of their paying up in the ordinary way to men discharged the proper value of their equipment.

5. In the draft G. G. O. no mention is made of public followers of the regiments under reduction.

Every effort will be made to transfer these men to other corps, with the troops or companies to which they have been attached in their former corps; but among them will probably be certain men whom it might be desirable to discharge with a small gratuity or pension. His Excellency will be prepared to forward recommendations on this point later on, if desirable.

The regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force are chiefly those interested in this matter, as they have an exceptional establishment of doolie bearers and puckhalis, for whom a special Chunda Fund is authorised.* The Commander in Chief recommends that the Punjab Government be consulted as to the measures necessary for dealing with these men.

* Standing Orders, Punjab Frontier Force, paragraphs 335–336.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *E. L. Hankin*, Acting Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (dated Ootacamund, the 14th April 1882).

YOURS 13th. Regiments 34 to 41 have been selected for reduction.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 41 S.B., dated Simla, the 20th April 1882).

GOVERNMENT of India think it proper to communicate to you the following extract from Despatch of Secretary of State, dated 13th October 1881, in reply to report announcing conversion of 30th Regiment, which has, it is believed, not been seen by you:—*Begins:* "I must also observe that, at a time when your Excellency proposes to reduce four regiments of Bombay Native Infantry, it was hardly expedient to make a great change in the organisation of the junior regiment of that arm, a regiment incomplete in numbers, and which has been officially declared to be from its physique, as well as its organisation, the least desirable regiment of that arm to retain."—*Extract ends.* With reference thereto, Government of India desire to know whether Government of Bombay would wish to reconsider their proposal to reduce 6th rather than 30th.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 44 S.B., dated Simla, the 21st April 1882).

PLEASE say when may Government of India expect answer to yesterday's telegram? Notification only awaits settlement of point referred before issue.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 9, dated Mahableshwar, the 21st April 1882).

Re your telegram 20th. The expenses of conversion of the 30th Native Infantry having been completed, there is no special advantage in reducing it as compared with 6th Regiment; and, for the reasons already given, the Commander in Chief adheres to his proposals, and Government would support his Excellency's views. Government are not aware by whom the official declaration referred to was made to the Secretary of State; but the composition of the regiment having been so largely changed, this report, if it was well founded, could not now apply.

TELEGRAM from Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 11, dated Mahableshwar, the 23rd April 1882).

IN continuation of telegram No. 9, I am directed to state that the 30th Native Infantry or 3rd Biluch Regiment is reported to be nearly complete; the physique of the men to be superior; the regimental feeling excellent; and its reorganisation of best promise.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 422 of 1881.—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received 5 December* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 12 November 1881.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram, dated the 1st October 1878, marginally quoted, and to paragraph 6 of our Despatch, No. 230 of 1881, we have the honour to report, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that we have deemed it expedient to continue to maintain the Goorkha regiments and the Corps of Guides at the increased strength which was authorised in the marginally noted correspondence, as a temporary arrangement for these corps, while serving across the frontier.

Yours 27th September. I sanction additional 16 sowars per troop and 200 sepoys per regiment detailed for service.

K. Pro., January 1879, Nos. 867, 870, and 879.
" " July 1880, No. 10,522.
" " April 1881, No. 17,526.

2. We have been induced to sanction this measure, owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining suitable recruits for the Goorkha and Guide Corps, and we trust the measure will meet with the approval of your Lordship in Council.

We have, &c.
(signed) *W. Stokes.*
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military.—No. 74) to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office,
My Lord Marquis, London, 23 February 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Letter, No. 422, dated 12th November 1881, in which you inform me that you have deemed it expedient to continue to maintain the Goorkha regiments and the Corps of Guides at the increased strength which was authorised by Her Majesty's Government in 1879, 1880, and 1881, as a temporary arrangement for those corps while serving across the frontier.

2. Your Lordship's Government are induced to sanction this measure owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining suitable recruits for the corps, and you express your hope that the measure will meet with my approval.

3. I observe that the five Goorkha regiments, while in excess of their normal strength, fall considerably short of that specially sanctioned for field service, and I am fully aware of the difficulty which has always existed in procuring suitable recruits in sufficient numbers for these corps. Your Lordship does not, however, explain what difficulty is experienced in keeping the Guide Corps up to its proper strength, for the proportion of Goorkhas in that corps is trifling, while the composition of the main body of the regiment differs very little from the remainder of the Punjab Frontier Force. I wish to be informed on this point, and, further, as it is not stated whether the increased establishment now proposed is to be in excess of the aggregate strength of the whole Native Army, viz., 110,995, fixed by your Government so lately as June last, and approved in my Military Despatch, No. 49, dated 2nd February 1882, I consider it necessary that no doubt should remain on the subject of the total establishment you consider needful.

4. Meanwhile, and pending your Lordship's replies to these points, I approve of the establishment specially sanctioned for the Guides and Goorkha Corps being continued till further orders.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India,—(No. 144 of 1882.—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 20 *July* 1882.)

My Lord, Simla, 23 June 1882.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 74, dated the 23rd February 1882, on the subject of the strength of the Goorkha regiments and of the Corps of Guides.

2. In regard to the five Goorkha regiments, which have been maintained at their present strength of 912 natives of all ranks, pending the final settlement of their future establishment, we now forward, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, the marginally quoted correspondence. It will be observed that his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India would be glad to see the Goorkha regiments maintained at their present strength, the total aggregate strength of the army

Paragraph 4, G.G.O. No. 210 of 1882.

Military Department letter, No. 52 S.B., dated 25th April 1882.
Letter from the Adjutant General in India, No. 2186 B., dated 20th May 1882.

army being increased in proportion. Bearing in mind the difficulties of recruiting these valuable regiments, and that the enlistment of Goorkhas has now been restricted to the purely Goorkha Corps and the 42nd, 43rd and 44th Native Infantry, we desire to support the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, and now ask that sanction may be given to the five Goorkha regiments being permanently maintained at a strength of 912 Natives of all ranks instead of 832, the future normal establishment of a Native Infantry regiment, as laid down in our G. G. O., No. 210 of 1882. This will increase the total future strength of the Native Army of India by 400 men.

Military Department letter, No. 52 S. B., dated 25th April 1882.
Military Departmen letter, No. 86 S. B., dated 9th May 1882.
Letter from the Government of the Punjab, No. 57 C., dated 18th May 1882.
Military Department letter, No. 126 S. B., dated 23rd May 1882.
Letter from the Adjutant General in India, No. 2186 B., dated 20th May 1882.
Letter from the Government of the Punjab, No. 121 C., dated 5th June 1882, and Enclosure.

3. The question of permanently increasing the establishment of the Corps of Guides stands on a different footing. As will be seen from the marginally noted correspondence, no difficulty in recruiting this corps has been experienced in the past or is anticipated in the future. We have given full weight to the considerations urged by the Government of the Punjab, but we do not think that adequate reasons have been adduced to warrant a departure from the general regimental organisation of the Native Army, as laid down in our G. G. O., No. 210 of 1882.

Previous to the Afghan war the establishment of the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides was 337. The strength given in our Despatch, No. 230 of 1881, was 341; but this mistake originated from a clerical error in the Military Budget Estimates, which will be corrected. We consider that the future permanent establishment of the Guide Corps Cavalry should be 337 natives of all ranks. In regard to the Infantry of the Corps of Guides, we consider that its future permanent establishment should be 832 natives of all ranks, as laid down in our G. G. O., No. 210 of 1882.

* Proceedings, August 1881, No. 2813.

† Total given in Despatch, No. 230 of 1881 - - - - -	110,995
Deduct error in establishment of Guide Cavalry - - - -	4
	110,991
Add for extra havildar-majors of Madras Native Infantry - -	32
	111,023
Deduct reductions in Madras Cavalry	12
	111,011
Add for increase in strength of Goorkha Corps - - - -	400
TOTAL - -	111,411

4. The corrected total in annexure B. of our Despatch, No. 230 of 1881, should be 110,991, instead of 110,995, as explained above. By paragraph 3 of G. G. O., No. 210 of 1882, the Native Infantry of the Madras Army have been allowed to retain their extra havildar-major per regiment, so that 32 men should now be added to this total of 110,991. On the other hand, the strength of each of the Madras cavalry regiments, given in the Despatch quoted as 387, has been reduced by three men per regiment, making a total reduction of 12 men.* If sanction be accorded to our proposal to retain the five Goorkha regiments at the increased strength, the total established strength of the Native Army of India, exclusive of European officers and without counting the local corps, will therefore be 111,411, as marginally shown.†

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 52 S. B., "Organisation," dated Simla, the 25th April 1882).

‡ No. 74, dated 23rd February 1882.

I AM directed to transmit herewith a copy of a Despatch‡ from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India relative to the Corps of Guides and the five Goorkha corps being maintained at the increased strength to which they were raised during the late war in Afghanistan, and, with reference thereto, to request that his Excellency the Com-

mander in Chief may be moved to favour the Government of India with an expression of opinion on the following points:—

I.—*As to the strength at which the Corps of Guides should be maintained.*—On this point it is to be observed that no difficulty in recruiting for the corps has made itself apparent, so that on *this* ground the proposed increase does not appear to be necessary. The Army Commission recommended that the corps should be raised to a strength of 800 sepoys and four squadrons of cavalry for the reasons given in their report (paragraph 226). It has now, however, been decided that the infantry of the Corps of Guides shall be of the same strength as other Native regiments, viz., 832 natives of all ranks; and therefore the only point remaining for discussion is whether the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides shall be maintained at a higher strength than that which was allowed previous to the late war.

II.—*Whether the establishment of Goorkha Corps should not be fixed at a higher strength than that now sanctioned for Regiments of the Line.*—In this case the great difficulty which has always been experienced in procuring Goorkha recruits of a suitable description appears to point to the advisability of fixing the establishments of such corps at a higher strength than 832, especially as, under recent orders, the enlistment of Goorkhas is now to be strictly confined to the corps formed purely of this class of men and to the three regiments of Assam Light Infantry.

2. In arriving at a decision on this question, there is one other point that must be considered, viz., that when the aggregate strength of the whole Native Army was lately fixed at 110,995 men, no extra establishment for the Corps of Guides and the Goorkha regiments was included in the estimate submitted to the Secretary of State.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Government of Punjab (No. 86 S. B., "Organisation, Native Army," dated Simla, the 9th May 1882).

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of G. G. O., No. 210, dated the 22nd April 1882, under which the infantry of the Corps of Guides will be raised permanently to a strength of 832 Natives of all ranks, I am directed to request that, under the orders of the Lieutenant Governor, the Government of India may be informed whether any difficulty has been experienced in recruiting for the cavalry or infantry of that corps, or is anticipated.

From Lieutenant Colonel *F. H. Jenkins*, C.B., S.C., Commandant Corps of Guides, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Punjab Frontier Force, No. 393, dated Mardan, the 5th May 1882).

I HAVE the honour to request the favour of being informed whether, unde the new organisation of the Indian Army, it is intended that the present establishment of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides Infantry should be reduced.

2. The present establishment of the Corps of Guides Infantry is 915; and in paragraph 3 of the orders regarding the new organisation, published in the "Punjab Gazette" of 27th April 1882, it is laid down that "every Native Infantry regiment will consist, as at present, of eight companies, each company having the following establishment:—

1	Subadar.
1	Jemadar.
5	Havildars.
5	Naiks.
2	Drummers.
90	Privates.
104	

Making a total per regiment of 832 Natives of all ranks.

No. 224 B.

FORWARDED to the Military Secretary, Punjab Government, for orders.

THE Guides Cavalry (last clause, paragraph 2, of the Order quoted) are to "remain unaltered;" and this reference for a distinct ruling regarding the Guides Infantry appears advisable.

(signed) *T. G. Kennedy*, Brigadier General,
Abbottabad, 9 May 1882. Commandant Punjab Frontier Force.

No. 57 C. (Organisation—Reduction).

COPY forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla, with reference to letter No. 86 S. B., dated 19th instant, for favour of a ruling.

2. The orders as read in this department appear to mean that the Corps of Guides Infantry is to be reduced to 104 per company.

(signed) *S. Black*, Colonel.
Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
Simla, 18 May 1882. Military Department.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 126 S. B., "Organisation," dated Simla, the 23rd May 1882).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 18th instant, No. 57 C., forwarding an inquiry from the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force as to the strength at which the infantry of the Corps of Guides is to be maintained.

2. In reply, I am to refer you to my letter of the 9th instant, No. 86 S. B., and to remark, for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant Governor, that, unless any special difficulty is experienced in recruiting for the Guides, it is proposed to bring the establishment of the infantry of the corps down to that fixed for all other regiments of Native Infantry. On this point the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor is awaited.

From Colonel *T. E. Gordon*, C.B., C.S.I., S.C., for Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2186 B., "Native Army—Organisation," dated Simla, the 20th May 1882).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 52 S. B. (Organisation), dated the 25th April 1882, transmitting copy of a Despatch from the Secretary of State for India relating to the Corps of Guides and the five Goorkha corps being maintained at the increased strength to which they were raised during the late war in Afghanistan, and requesting an expression of the Commander in Chief's opinion on the following points:—

I.—As to the strength at which the Corps of Guides should be maintained.

II.—Whether the establishment of Goorkha Corps should not be fixed at a higher strength than that now sanctioned for regiments of the line.

2. With reference to the first question, the strength of the infantry of the Corps of Guides has already been decided, viz., 832 of all ranks; but as regards the strength of the cavalry, His Excellency considers this a matter in which the Punjab Government should be consulted.

3. As regards the question of the establishment of the Goorkha corps, His Excellency would be very glad to see them maintained at their present established strength, viz., 800 sepoys, the total aggregate strength of the army being increased in proportion.

From Colonel *S. Black*, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 121 C., dated Simla, 5th June 1882).

IN reply to your letter No. 86 S. B. (Organisation—Native Army), dated 9th May last, I am desired to state that no difficulty has been experienced heretofore in obtaining recruits for the cavalry or infantry of the Corps of Guides, nor are difficulties anticipated in the future.

2. On this subject I am to forward a copy of a telegraphic message, dated 29th May, from Brigadier General Kennedy, C.B., Commanding Punjab Frontier Force. The Corps of Guides furnishes the following detachments of infantry on outpost duty:—

	Bayonets.
Abazai Fort	86
Jhenda	35
Narai	21
Total	142

But the posts of Jhenda and Narai are only held until the canal works at these places are finished; and as the former of these two places has proved to be very unhealthy, an endeavour will be made to reduce its strength if it cannot be entirely withdrawn.

3. The present strength of the infantry of the Corps of Guides is as follows:—

16	Native officers.
80	Non-commissioned officers.
16	Drummers.
803	Sepoys.
Total	915

And I am to say that considering the special character of this corps, and the fact that it protects the whole of the Yusafzai border, and may at any time be called upon to furnish strong detachments, His Honour thinks that it should not be reduced below its present strength.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *T. G. Kennedy*, C.B., S.C., Commandant Punjab Frontier Force, to the Military Secretary to the Government of the Punjab (No. 197, dated Abbottabad, the 29th May 1882).

YOUR telegram No. 62, dated the 25th instant. Officer Commanding Guides wires no difficulty whatever has hitherto been experienced in recruiting of any class for Corps of Guides, nor is any anticipated. But if strength be reduced, and unhealthy outposts retained, it is open to doubt whether popularity of service in the corps will remain unaltered.—*Message ends.*

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military No. 268), to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 31 August 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 144, of 23rd June 1882, on the subject of the strength of the Goorkha regiments and of the Corps of Guides, regarding which my Despatch of the 23rd February 1882 was written.

2. Your

2. Your Government ask that sanction may be given to the five Goorkha regiments being permanently maintained at a strength of 912 Natives of all ranks instead of 832, the future normal establishment of a Native Infantry regiment, thereby increasing the total future strength of the Native Army of India by 400 men, which will then stand at a total strength of 111,411 Natives of all ranks.

3. I have much pleasure in sanctioning the proposed future establishment for the five Goorkha regiments of the Indian army.

4. I concur with your Lordship's Government in thinking that the establishment of the Corps of Guides, viz., Cavalry 337, as it stood before the last war, and Infantry 832, as laid down in G. G. O., No. 210 of 1882, will suffice.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 297 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 5 *September* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 12 August 1881.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the correspondence marginally noted, regarding the conversion of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) into a Belooch Regiment on the same footing as regards organisation and service as the other two Belooch regiments of the Bombay Army (the 27th and 29th Native Infantry). From the accompanying statement it will be seen that the change will entail an extra expense on the State of 26,000 rupees per annum.

Proceedings of the Government of India in the Military Department for March 1881, Nos. 945–54.
To Government of Bombay, No. 279 S. C., dated 13th May 1881.
From Government of Bombay, No. 3079, dated 11th June 1881, and Enclosures.
To Government of Bombay, No. 238 B. S., dated 28th July 1881.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

From Colonel *J. A. M. Macdonald*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 937, dated Bombay Castle, 3rd March 1876).

I AM directed to forward the accompanying copy of papers as per margin, relative to a proposal by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the organisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) be changed to that of a regiment of the line.

Letter from the Adjutant General, No. 88 M., dated 2nd May 1874, with Enclosures.
Letter from the Adjutant General, No. 2421, dated 20th December 1875, with Enclosures.
Report by the Controller of Military Accounts, No. 62, dated —— January 1876, with Enclosure.
Report by the Adjutant General, No. 158, dated 31st January 1876, with Enclosure.

2. I am to state that the Adjutant General's letter, No. 88 M., dated 2nd May 1874, would probably have induced Government at that time to entertain the proposal to place the 30th Regiment Native Infantry on the same footing with the other Native Infantry regiments in this Presidency, had not his Excellency the Commander in Chief suggested that if any further reduction of the Native army was (at the time) contemplated, the question as to the future organisation of the 30th Native Infantry would be more easily solved by reducing it as being the junior regiment on the establishment, "and from its physique and organisation the least desirable to retain."

3. Since the date of the letter referred to the regiment has not improved. On the contrary, its health has deteriorated, and as a consequence its efficiency has become impaired. With the exception of the grant to the corps of arms and

and accoutrements, which remain the property of the State, and of compensation for dearness of grain, its organisation remains, in all main points, as heretofore.

4. What the regiment requires, to bring it on a par with the other Native Infantry corps, is better health and a better stamp of recruits. If localised, as at present, in a bad climate, it will attain neither. It is manifest, therefore, that both in the interests of the State and of the men serving in the regiment the local character of the corps should be abolished, and in doing so, the necessity for adhering to a peculiar organisation from which the regiment in a measure suffers will no longer exist.

5. By carrying out the change proposed, all the regular Native Infantry regiments of the line will in their turn have a short tour of service in Upper Sind, and an opportunity of serving on the only frontier in this command will be given to each.

6. The proposal having, for the reasons above given, the approval of this Government, I am desired to submit it to the Government of India, and to request that sanction may be accorded to the slight increase in expenditure the proposed change will involve.

From Brigadier General *C. T. Aitchison*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 88 M., dated Mahableshwar, 2nd May 1874).

In compliance with the last paragraph of Government Resolution, No. 765, of the 16th February 1872, I have the honour, by desire of the Commander in Chief, to forward for submission to His Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, the reports* from Colonels Sir William Merewether and Sir Henry Green, in reference to the advisability or otherwise of continuing the Sillidar system in the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (or Jacob's Rifles).

No. 379, dated 21st March 1872.
Dated 17th April 1872.

2. I am here to remark that it has been demi-officially explained to Government that the Commander in Chief wished to postpone giving his opinion on this important subject until he had visited the head-quarters of the corps, and informed himself, by personal inquiry on the spot, of all the bearings of the question, and this His Excellency was enabled to accomplish on his recent tour through Sind.

3. It will be gathered from these reports that Sir William Merewether objects to altering the organisation of the 30th Native Infantry, and is of opinion that the corps should not take tours of relief with other regiments of the line, and in this latter opinion Sir Augustus Spencer concurs *so long as the regiment holds its present organisation,* as the advantages arising from the special character of the corps would be thrown away.

4. Sir William Merewether recommends, however, an increase of pay to the rank and file in the regiment, by the grant of "good-conduct pay," as a means of attracting recruits, and as a mark of approval for honest services rendered in a very trying climate, but deprecates the introduction of grain compensation, as being "opposed to the genius of the Silladar system," and largely helping to keep up prices, and that the additional cash given to the sepoy under that system would but find its way into the hands of the bunniahs in the Jacobabad bazaar.

5. The Commander in Chief does not entirely coincide with this officer's opinion as regards grain compensation, for, in the first place, Silladar regiments in all other parts of the Presidency are in receipt of this compensation, and His Excellency considers that any combination on the part of the bunniahs at Jacobabad would be defeated if the price of grain ruling at Shikarpur, whence the supplies for Jacobabad are, it is understood, mostly drawn, was taken as the basis on which to calculate the rate of compensation; the prices at that large town could not, it is thought, be affected by a grant of compensation to the small number of fighting men on the frontier; but information on this point could be more satisfactorily obtained in the Civil Department.

6. As

6. As regards the grant of good-conduct pay, it is not apparent how the concession can be made to the 30th Native Infantry without allowing the same boon to the three regiments of Sind Horse, and Government would, in that event, have to be prepared for a further similar claim from all regiments of Sillidar cavalry in this Presidency.

It may be remarked that the Sillidar regiments in Bengal receive good-conduct pay, but receive a lower rate of pay on enlistment.

7. Referring to Sir Henry Green's report, that officer considers the "essence of a frontier force depends upon its power of moving either in a body, or by detachments, complete in carriage and at the shortest notice; that a corps which is unable to do so is useless for frontier service. It was many years' experience gained on the frontier that induced the late General John Jacob to recommend the system which is now in force in the 30th Native Infantry; and adds the knowledge of this capability of moving on the part of the Frontier Force has a very considerable moral effect."

8. Sir Henry Green also upholds the Silladar system, and objects to the regiment being brought on the roster for relief with the infantry corps of the line, adding that 50 of the Jacob's Rifles man the mountain battery attached to the force, and that it would be impossible to replace these men unless by Golundauze.

9. On the whole, the general tendency of the reports from both these officers is in favour of allowing the Silladar system in the 30th Native Infantry to remain as it is, on the ground chiefly that *mobility* is a *sine quâ non* in a Frontier Force; but the Commander in Chief holds that mobility is not inseparable from the Silladar system; nor does his Excellency see any reason why a Native regiment of the line, with properly organised carriage and camp equipage, kept up on the spot by Government, could not be as well prepared for immediate service on the frontier as any Silladar corps, if not even more so. Further, that bringing the Sind Frontier regiments into the regular system of relief would tend more than anything else to reduce to a minimum the baneful effects of the climate.

10. The difficulty raised regarding the manning of the mountain train might perhaps be met by the employment of the Native company of artillery now serving at Aden; but on this point, which is apart from the question to be decided, the Commander in Chief will submit a further report, as his Excellency considers that the present system of manning the Jacobabad mountain train is open to many objections, and that the train is not as efficient as it ought to be, and its important position demands.

11. Taking, however, into consideration the various points discussed in the two reports, together with the information the Commander in Chief has gained on the spot, by personal inquiry, His Excellency is of opinion that there is no immediate necessity to alter the organisation of the 30th Native Infantry, and would rather leave the regiment as it is, pending any further reduction of the Native army of this Presidency, if such is still in contemplation, when the question might be solved, and any further discussion obviated, as the 30th Native Infantry is the junior regiment of the army, and from its physique and organisation, the least desirable to retain.

12. As regards the increase of pay suggested by Sir William Merewether, if that step should be considered necessary, Sir Augustus Spencer is inclined to think that the introduction of grain compensation would best meet the object, and at a far less expense to the State than the grant of good-conduct pay, which could not well be confined to the 30th Native Infantry, or even to the Silladar regiments on the frontier.

From Colonel Sir *W. L. Merewether*, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commissioner in Sind, to the Officiating Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 339, dated Camp Jacobabad, the 21st March 1872).

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter, No. 323 B., dated 8th instant, with accompaniments, I have the honour to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief and of Government, that I do not consider it would be advisable to discontinue the Silladar system in the 30th Native Infantry

Infantry (or Jacob's Rifles), or that they should be changed from Jacobabad in ordinary tour of duty with the two Biluch regiments, the only other Native infantry serving in Sind.

2. My reasons are as follows :—

1st. The Silladar system may be said to be an essential to the position as being in unison with that of the other portion of the Frontier Field Force. Perfect and thorough mobility should always be maintained. This has become the more imperative since the Frontier Force has been reduced to the minimum of strength.

2nd. That the system of making men keep up their own carriage, and responsible for it, so that they can move on the shortest notice, makes them better soldiers and less mere automatons, improving their intelligence and readiness.

3rd. That cost of maintaining carriage for the regiment, as in the Punjab, would be very much greater than continuing the Silladar system, while it would be much less efficient, and the carriage would be liable to be called away elsewhere on an emergency occurring.

4th. As regards remaining on the frontier, the mountain train is manned from the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, and those who perform the duties prove themselves to be very efficient gunners, such as it would take a long time to produce out of another regiment.

5th. That all the married men in the regiment have built houses for themselves and families in the family lines, in rear of the regimental lines, in which they are most comfortable and well satisfied to remain. Though Jacobabad might be still constituted the permanent head-quarters, if the 30th Regiment Native Infantry were sent to Hyderabad or Karachi, many men would like to take their families with them, and the Biluch regiment relieving would bring a portion of theirs. This would involve change and loss of property, and intermixture of families, which is not desirable.

6th. Having their families always left here in comfort and security, the men would cheerfully go on service to any part of the world, knowing they would return at the completion thereof and find their people undisturbed.

3. I am decidedly of opinion it is better to leave the 30th Native Infantry as they are, both as regards the Silladar system and their being kept always on the frontier of Sind.

4. I quite concur in the inexpediency of recruiting too much from the neighbourhood. The enlargement of the field for recruiting, as recommended, would prevent this.

5. The call on the men's pay has been very much lessened since their arms, accoutrements, &c., have been provided to them.

6. Jacobabad is a cheaper place as regards all the necessaries of life than Karachi or Hyderabad, and, when men know, they and their families are not likely to be changed round, they can make arrangements for more economical living than would otherwise be the case.

7. I am quite of opinion that the pay of the Sind Horse is insufficient to make them what they might be. Yet they are a marvellous fine body of cavalry, and since I have been here lately, I have repeatedly remarked on parade that there does not seem any more difficulty now than formerly in obtaining a manly intelligent class of young men to fill vacancies as they occur.

8. The Commandant of the 30th Native Infantry seems decidedly of opinion that some increase in pay is necessary to enable him to fill his ranks properly.

9. I would recommend that good-conduct pay be introduced all round over and above the present pay. This would not alter the system anywhere, and be a mark of Government approval of honest services rendered in a very trying climate,

climate, and it would suffice until the question of increase of fixed pay to the whole army is taken into consideration, which, it appears to me, must be the case before long. Then proportionate increase can be given to the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, or Jacob's Rifles.

10. I would strongly deprecate the introduction here of compensation for high price of grain. It is utterly opposed to the genius of the Silladar system. It tends to make the men indifferent and improvident. They have no longer to exert their ingenuity how to make the best of the means at their disposal, and, what is worst of all, it must largely help to keep up prices. When compensation is given to men in the ranks, it no longer remains the advantage of purchasers to seek for the cheapest market, and to patronise that vendor who gives them a fair article for a fair price. The vendor, therefore, raises the price, and compensation renders it unnecessary for him to lower it to obtain a sale.

From Colonel Sir *Henry Green*, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commandant in Chief, Sind Horse, to the Adjutant General, Bombay Army (dated the 17th April 1872).

WITH reference to that part of the Government Resolution, No. 765, Military Department, under date 16th of February 1872, on which my opinion has been requested, I have the honour to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that it appears to me that the question raised in the above Resolution involves in a considerable degree the safe-keeping of the frontier of Upper Sind. Long experience has proved to me that the very essence of a Frontier Force depends upon its power of moving, either in a body or by detachments, complete in carriage, on the shortest notice, and that a regiment of either cavalry or infantry, which is unable to do so, is utterly useless for frontier service, and might be as well employed in the interior of India on garrison duty.

It was this knowledge gained by the late General John Jacob, after years of frontier experience, that induced him to recommend to the Government the system which he introduced into the present 30th Native Infantry, and which corps would have become, had his ideas been thoroughly carried out, not only the most powerfully armed, but generally the best equipped and practically useful infantry regiment in the army. Circumstances, however, unfortunately prevented such a favourable consummation to General Jacob's views, and the regiment fell to the position, in point of arms and equipments, of an ordinary Native regiment, retaining, however, a superiority in its ability to march, either in a body, or by detachments, at a moment's warning, and which constituted it a Silladar Infantry corps, and rendered it therefore a most powerful auxiliary to the Frontier cavalry regiments.

It will be useful to give an example of the manner in which this regiment was employed on the frontier. I am speaking of the time I had the honour to command, from 1861 to 1868.

To each of the cavalry outposts most exposed to the attacks of the mountain tribes were added detachments from the rifle regiment, which enabled the whole of the cavalry, when necessary, to proceed on patrolling duty or other services, leaving the outpost in charge of the infantry. Occasionally it would be necessary to reinforce suddenly these infantry detachments, which from, the peculiar organisation of the regiment, could be done without a moment's delay from the head-quarters, immediately on receipt of the orders.

Again, it was yearly my custom to march detachments of the three arms composing the Frontier Field Force far into the Boojtee and Murree Mountains, and to be absent from Jacobabad for weeks at a time; an hour's notice was sufficient to enable one of these detachments to move complete in every essential for active service.

The knowledge of this capability of moving, on the part of the Frontier Force, exercised very considerable moral effect upon the predatory mountain tribes, more than a force 10 times as numerous could have done under the cumbersome machinery which it is necessary to call into action before the smallest detachment can be moved from our regular forces.

As none of the papers referring to this question have been forwarded to me for perusal, I am not aware of the reasons which have been advanced for suggesting an alteration in the organisation of this regiment; but I feel sure that there can be none of sufficient importance to render such a change necessary, when taking into consideration the important addition which such an organisation affords to the power and activity of the Frontier Field Force. My opinion is, therefore, that the present organisation ought to be maintained at any cost.

From Brigadier General *C. T. Aitchison*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 2421, dated Poona, the 20th December 1875).

I AM desired by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to refer to my letter, No. 88 M., of the 2nd May 1874, as Sir Charles Staveley is of opinion that the time has arrived to reopen the question of the reorganisation of the 30th Native Infantry, with the object of preparing the regiment to take its tour of relief out of Sind with the other Native infantry regiments of the line.

2. The various opinions bearing on this subject, including those of Colonels Sir William Merewether and Sir Henry Green, were summed up in the 9th and 11th paragraphs of my letter above quoted, which run as follows:—

> "9. On the whole, the general tendency of the reports from these officers is in favour of allowing the Silladar system in the 30th Native Infantry to remain as it is, on the ground chiefly that mobility is a *sine quâ non* in a Frontier Force, but the Commander in Chief holds that mobility is not inseparable from the Silladar system; nor does his Excellency see any reason why a Native regiment of the line, with properly organised carriage and camp equipage kept upon the spot by Government, could not be as well prepared for immediate service on the frontier as any Silladar corps, if not even more so. Further, that bringing the Sind Frontier regiments into the regular system of relief would tend more than anything else to reduce to a minimum the baneful effects of the climate.
>
> As recommended by Sir Robert Napier in letter, No. 1460, of 1867, para. 7.
>
> "11. Taking, however, into consideration the various points discussed in the two reports, together with the information the Commander in Chief has gained on the spot by personal inquiry, his Excellency is of opinion that there is no immediate necessity to alter the organisation of the 30th Native Infantry, and would rather leave the regiment as it is, pending any further reduction of the Native army of this presidency, if such is still in contemplation, when the question might be solved, and any further discussion obviated, as the 30th Native Infantry is the junior regiment of the army, and from its physique and organisation the least desirable to retain."

3. Such was the opinion of the late Commander in Chief, Sir Augustus Spencer; and Sir Charles Staveley, I am to say, having minutely inspected the 30th Native Infantry at Jacobabad during the last cold season, is compelled to say that in physique, drill, and efficiency, the regiment is far inferior to any other Native regiment in the Bombay army.

4. The reason for this state of things may be attributed to climate and organisation, together with absence of emulation, they being the only infantry regiment on the frontier, and wedded to old-fashioned notions, which it is difficult to eradicate.

5. The difficulty of procuring recruits also presses hard upon the regiment. The Natives of the other provinces of this presidency cannot stand the climate of Upper Sind, and consequently will not enlist in a regiment localised there; and enlistment of the hill tribes beyond the border has not only been disallowed, but objected to on political grounds.

See extract from Colonel Phayre's Report, dated 2nd December 1872, attached.

6. The

See last Report of the Army Sanitary Commission for the year 1873.

6. The climate also has told much upon the men, and the medical authorities have frequently urged the necessity of removing the regiment, for a time at least, the death-rate of this regiment having been of late years something beyond all precedent.

In 1872, 37·2 per thousand; in 1873, 18·5 per thousand; and in 1874, 25·3 per thousand.

7. To the above the insufficient rate of pay may be added, the 10 rupees allowed the man, without the addition of grain compensation or good conduct pay, is not sufficient to attract recruits to the hard service of the frontier, combined with the trying climate.

8. For the 10 rupees, the pay allowed to the Silladar soldier of the 30th Native Infantry, he is expected to provide himself with:—

Arms,	Camp equipage,
Accoutrements,	Carriage.
Clothing,	

The supply of arms has not, of late years, been pressed on him, as it was found quite impossible for him to meet the expense; and Enfields in the first instance, and more recently the Sniders, have been issued to the regiment without charge, Government receiving into store the Jacob's Rifles with which they were previously armed.

9. The accompanying comparative statement of the expense of the Jacob's Rifles and a regiment of the line is submitted:—

Jacob's Rifles.		Line Regiment.					
Cost per Mensem:	*Rs.*	Cost per Mensem: As shown by Controller—	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
As shown by the Controller - -	9,019	Ordinary pay -	6,847	2	8	8,406	2	8
To the above should be added on account of good conduct pay, which must be given if present organisation is retained - -	700	Batta - -	1,559	-	-			
		Good conduct pay, average -			-	700	-	-
		Clothing - - - - -				208	-	-
		Arms and accoutrements - -				275	5	4
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	9,719	TOTAL - - - *Rs.*				9,589	8	-

Thus it will be seen that the 30th Regiment, as at present constituted, is but little if anything less expensive than a regiment of the line; and if its organisation was at once changed to that of other regiments of the Bombay army, the only additional expense to the State would be the provision of camp equipage and the usual carriage allowed to a Native regiment when called upon to march.

10. The expense, therefore, of the change in organisation of this regiment cannot be well advanced as an obstacle in achieving the favourable results anticipated by adopting the line organisation, and thereby enabling the 30th Native Infantry to take their tour of relief with other regiments of this army, and Sir Charles Staveley is consequently anxious to recommend the change for the favourable consideration and support of this Government.

EXTRACT Paragraphs 11 and 12 of Letter from Colonel *R. Phayre*, C.B., Political Superintendent and Commandant, Upper Sind Frontier, to the Adjutant General, Bombay Army (dated 2nd December 1872).

Para. 11. IN a political point of view it would be a positive advantage were the infantry duties on the frontier taken in ordinary tour of relief by a regular Native infantry corps recruited in remote districts. I would even except the Biluch battalion from permanent duty there.

 12. My

12. My reason for this is, that such an arrangement would accord more with General Jacob's original plan of having the Frontier Field Force (except the Biluch Guides) wholly composed of foreign troops recruited in remote parts of India. This important principle has been well followed out in the Sind Horse, which is chiefly composed of Mussulmans from the North-West of India, who, being foreigners, have no sympathy whatever with the frontier tribes and their politics. In Jacob's Rifles (and I believe also the Biluch battalions) there are a large number of Brahuis and other border tribes in the ranks, whereby an inconvenient, and it may some day prove a weak and dangerous element, has been introduced into the camp at Jacobabad and the Frontier Field Force generally.

REPORT by Lieutenant Colonel *W. T. Chitty*, Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay (No. 62, dated Poona, January 1876).

PARAGRAPH 7 of the Adjutant General's letter was written prior to the grant of grain compensation to the regiment of Jacob's Rifles, sanctioned by Secretary Colonel Burne's letter* No. 913, of 17th ultimo.

*Government Resolution, No. 5357, of 23rd December 1875.
Government Resolution, No. 916, of 18th February 1868.
Government Resolution, No. 1152, of 28th February 1868.

2. The statement in paragraph 8, that the soldier in Jacob's Rifles is expected to provide himself with arms and accoutrements, appears to have been made by mistake and oversight of the authorities marginally quoted, under which Government undertook the provision thereof.

3. In contrasting the cost, the Adjutant General adds 700 rupees to the "Jacob's Rifles" as good conduct pay, on the grounds that it "must be given if present organisation is retained," but I am of opinion that this is a mistake, for the Government of India would never sanction good conduct pay to men receiving the special and exceptional rates of pay allowed to the 30th Regiment, or Jacob's Rifles.

4. The cost of the two may therefore be contrasted as follows:—

	Jacob's Rifles.			Line Regiment.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Cost per mensem, as per annexed statement - - -	9,019	–	–	8,406	2	8
Good conduct pay - - - - - - - -	-	-	-	700	–	–
Clothing - - - - - - - - -	-	-	-	208	–	–
Camp equipage - - - - - - - -	-	-	-	45	–	–
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	9,019	–	–	9,359	2	8

giving a difference excess in the monthly cost of a line regiment of *Rs.* 340. 2. 8.

5. There is also another item to be added to the cost of the line regiment, viz., hutting allowance or hutting repair allowance, which is not allowed to the Jacob's Rifles; the repair allowance amounts to 2,472 rupees every three years.

STATEMENT showing the COST of a Regiment of NATIVE INFANTRY contrasted with the COST of JACOB'S RIFLES.

No.	30th Jacob's Rifles.	Total of each.	Amount.	TOTAL.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
2	Subadars, 1st class	100 – –	200 – –	
2	Ditto 2nd „	80 – –	160 – –	
4	Ditto 3rd „	67 – –	268 – –	
5	Jemadars	40 – –	200 – –	
3	Ditto	30 – –	90 – –	
40	Havildars	15 – –	600 – –	
40	Naiks	12 – –	480 – –	
16	Buglers	15 – –	240 – –	
600	Privates	10 – –	6,000 – –	
				8,238 – –
	Staff Allowances.			
1	Subadar Major	– –	25 – –	
1	Native Adjutant	– –	10 – –	
1	Havildar Major	– –	15 – –	
1	Bugle Major	– –	15 – –	
1	Quartermaster Havildar	– –	10 – –	
1	Drill Havildar	– –	5 – –	
1	Drill Naik	– –	3 – –	
8	Pay Havildars	5 – –	40 – –	
–	Mess allowance	– –	100 – –	
				223 – –
	Educational Establishment.			
	Schoolmaster	– –	20 – –	
	School-rent	– –	10 – –	
	Stationery	– –	10 – –	
				40 – –
	Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital Establishment.			
2	Hospital Assistants (with batta)	30 – –	60 – –	
1	Native Medical Pupil ditto	– –	10 – –	
1	Ditto ditto	– –	9 – –	
1	Goorgah	– –	7 – –	
2	Bhisties	7 – –	14 – –	
2	Sweepers	5 – –	10 – –	
4	Doolie-bearers	6 – –	24 – –	
				134 – –
	Native Followers.			
1	Tindal	– –	12 – –	
8	Lascars	8 – –	64 – –	
8	Bhisties	9 – –	72 – –	
1	Chowdry	– –	21 – –	
2	Peons	7 – –	14 – –	
1	Muccadum (Attached to the movable column of the regiment.)	– –	9 – –	
32	Doolie-bearers (Attached to the movable column of the regiment.)	6 – –	192 – –	
				384 – –
	Conservancy Establishment.			
1	Cart	Paid at Nirrick rate.		
8	Sweepers			
			TOTAL - - - Rs.	9,019 – –

STATEMENT showing the Cost of a Regiment of Native Infantry contrasted with the Cost of Jacob's Rifles—*contd.*

No.	Regiment of the Line.	Pay. Total of each.	Pay. Amount.	Pay. Total.	Additional Batta if in Sind. Total of each.	Additional Batta if in Sind. Total.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
2	Subadars, 1st class	100 – –	200 – –		15 – –	30 – –
2	Ditto 2nd „	80 – –	160 – –		15 – –	30 – –
4	Ditto 3rd „	67 – –	268 – –		15 – –	60 – –
4	Jemadars, 1st „	35 – –	140 – –		7 8 –	30 – –
4	Ditto 2nd „	30 – –	120 – –		7 8 –	30 – –
40	Havildars	14 – –	560 – –		5 – –	200 – –
40	Naiks	12 – –	480 – –		5 – –	200 – –
16	Drummers	7 – –	112 – –		1 8 –	24 – –
600	Privates	7 – –	4,200 – –		1 8 –	900 – –
24	Boys	3 8 –	84 – –		—	—
				6,324 – –		
	Staff Allowances.					
1	Native Adjutant	–	17 8 –		—	—
1	Subadar-Major	–	25 – –		—	—
1	Havildar Major	–	7 – –		—	—
1	Drill Havildar	–	5 – –		—	—
1	Drill Naik	–	2 8 –		—	—
8	Colour Havildars	2 – –	16 – –		—	—
8	Pay Havildars	5 – –	40 – –		—	—
1	Drum-Major	–	5 – –		—	—
1	Fife Major	–	5 – –		—	—
1	Quartermaster Havildar	–	14 – –		—	—
–	Mess allowance	–	100 – –		—	—
				237 – –		
	Educational Establishment.					
1	Schoolmaster	–	20 – –		—	—
1	Ditto	–	12 – –		—	—
1	Ditto	–	8 – –		—	—
–	School Allowance	–	19 2 8			
				59 2 8		
	Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital Establishment.					
2	Hospital Assistants	25 – –	50 – –		5 – –	10 – –
1	Native Medical Pupil	–	8 – –		–	2 – –
1	Ditto ditto	–	7 – –		–	2 – –
1	Goorgah	–	5 – –		–	2 – –
1	Cook	–	7 – –		–	2 – –
1	Washerman	–	6 – –		–	2 – –
2	Bhisties	7 – –	14 – –		2 – –	4 – –
2	Sweepers	5 – –	10 – –		2 – –	4 – –
1	Leechman	–	10 – –		–	2 – –
4	Doolie-bearers	6 – –	24 – –		1 – –	4 – –
				141 – –		
	Native Followers.					
8	Bhisties	7 8 –	60 – –		1 8 –	12 – –
1	Chowdry	–	10 – –		–	5 – –
2	Weighmen	5 – –	10 – –		2 – –	4 – –
				86 – –		
	Conservancy Establishment.					
1	Cart	Paid at Nirrick rates.				
8	Sweepers					
				6,847 2 8		1,559 – –
		TOTAL	Rs.	8,406. 2. 8.		

REPORT by Brigadier General *C. T. Aitchison*, Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 158, dated 31st January 1876).

THE Government Resolution quoted by the Controller was not lost sight of when Adjutant General's letter, No. 2421, dated 20th December, was submitted to Government.

2. A perusal of the correspondence which led up to Government Resolution, No. 916, dated 18th February 1868, will show that the version given in paragraph 8 of the Adjutant General's letter is substantially what was asked for from Government in behalf of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry.

3. The decision of Government on the case may, however, admit of the wider interpretation put on it by the Controller, viz., that Government have, since 1868, taken upon themselves unconditionally the supply both of arms and accoutrements to the regiment.

4. The late grant of compensation to the regiment does to some extent qualify the entry of good conduct pay as a charge which must be calculated in estimating the future cost of the regiment, but the annexed extracts from a letter from Colonel Sir Henry Green support the views held on this subject by the Commander in Chief, and it should be added that the state of the sepoy is now still more unfavourable, as his monthly deductions for clothing, camp equipage, and carriage amount to *Rs.* 1. 5. 9., exclusive of the donations to the funds of *Rs.* 16. 8.

The items are as follows:—

DONATIONS.	Rs.	a.	p.	MONTHLY.	Rs.	a.	p.
Carriage	13	–	–	Clothing	1	–	–
Camp equipage	3	8	–	Carriage	–	5	9
Rs.	16	8	–	*Rs.*	1	5	9

* LINE REGIMENTS.	Rs.	a.	p.
Pay and batta	8	8	–
Good conduct pay after six years	1	–	–
Total *Rs.*	9	8	–
30TH REGIMENT N.I.			
Total pay	10	–	–
Clothing and carriage	1	5	9
Total *Rs.*	8	10	3
Difference	–	13	9

The rate of pay* therefore is exceptionally low, and the recommendation made by Colonel Sir Henry Green so far back as 1867-68 must, it is thought, sooner or later be granted if the present organisation be continued.

5. With reference to the last paragraph of the Controller's report, it is necessary to remark that the lines of the 30th Regiment at Jacobabad are maintained by Government at doubtless a larger charge than the hutting repair allowances every three years; so the item of regimental lines would be in favour of the line regiment system.

EXTRACT Paragraphs 2, 10, 14, and 15, of a Letter from Colonel Sir *Henry Green*, K.C.S.I., C.B., Commandant in Chief, Sind Horse, to the Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 1036, dated 24th August 1867).

2. THE late General John Jacob, C.B., when proposing the raising of the rifle regiments, of which the one under notice now only remains, after stating in a letter, No. 298, under date 7th June 1858, to the Commissioner in Sind, that he had calculated the rate of pay (10 rupees per mensem) as the lowest sum on which a careful soldier could maintain himself and carriage always ready for the field, adds:* "But, it seems possible that I may have fixed these rates too low, and I would most respectfully state that, in case of Government wishing me to carry out the scheme, and in case of my finding on trial that the pay I have assigned proves to be insufficient for all the purposes to which it is intended to be applied, and the cost of which it is supposed fairly to cover, it will be necessary that the scale of pay should be somewhat increased till the just and proper amount be arrived at, which will give the greatest amount of efficiency at

* Paragraph 6.

at the least possible cost. It is probable that no such revision will be requisite, but it is proper that it should be understood beforehand that, if found really necessary by me, it will be allowed by Government."

10. I find that the lowest rate of pay received by a Native soldier of the line of the third class under six years' service is *Rs.* 8. 8., and after 10 years *Rs.* 10. 8., and that besides the above he receives compensation for the high prices of grain, and has no carriage to maintain. A soldier of Jacob's Rifles of any number of years' service receives 10 rupees, less one-tenth, nine rupees, upon which he has to maintain himself and family, and keep up his carriage, so as to be ever ready to move, and which upon the frontier is of constant occurrence; he is therefore far worse off than a third-class soldier of the line.

14. I am also of opinion that it would have an excellent effect if good-conduct pay were allowed to the men of this corps; it would be an incitement to good behaviour, and facilitate the recruiting, which is daily becoming more difficult, owing, I believe, to the high price of labour obtained throughout Sind and India generally. The commonest description of daily labourer now receives in Sind five and six annas per diem, while an inferior class of overseer gets from 12 annas to a rupee; in fact, the lowest description of labourer is on an equality, so far as pay is concerned, with the Native soldier.

15. I am unwilling to recommend that this corps should as yet be allowed to draw compensation for grain, because I believe that this system when once introduced into a small station, such as Jacobabad, that the native grain sellers combine with the soldiers to maintain the high prices in the station to the detriment of Government; and, from my position as chief civil as well as military authority, I am well acquainted at all times with the real state of the grain market throughout the district.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General (No. 739, "Organisation, Native Army," dated Fort William, 15th March, 1876).

No. 937, dated 3rd March 1876.

I AM desired to forward for the information of the Commander in Chief in India, the accompanying copy of communication from the Government of Bombay, regarding a proposed change in the organisation of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry, on which the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council requests to be favoured with His Excellency's opinion.

No. 746, dated 22nd February 1876.

2. I am at the same time to forward in elucidation of the foregoing a copy of an earlier letter from the Bombay Government, bearing on the question of the insalubrity of Sind generally, and its injurious effect on the health of the local troops.

From Major General *P. S. Lumsden*, C.B., C.S.I., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 106 F. C., "Native Army," dated Bombay, 9th April 1876).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 739 (Organisation, Native Army), of the 15th ultimo, to the address of the Quartermaster General, and in reply to state that the Commander in Chief is of opinion that a regiment generally deteriorates from localization, and His Excellency therefore considers it very desirable that the organisation of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) should be changed to that of a regiment of the line.

2. But in order to secure mobility, His Excellency thinks that a regular carriage establishment of mules should be maintained for the regiment that may be stationed at Jacobabad.

3. As regards the injurious effects of the climate of Sind on the health of the troops, Lord Napier of Magdala considers that sickness may be diminished—1st, by sanitary improvements to be reported upon and carried out by a special sanitary commission; 2nd, by having a better description of hut, well raised and open to ventilation by being built in short blocks with intermediate spaces; and 3rd, continuing to the men the higher rate of pay granted to them when serving in Sind to enable them to procure better food.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department,—(No. 431 S., "Organisation, Native Army," dated Simla, 17th June 1876).

I AM directed, with reference to your letter, No. 937, dated the 3rd March 1876, relative to the proposal to alter the organisation of the 30th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), to request that the Government of India may be informed whether it is understood that the proposed change would in all respects be agreeable to men who have enlisted under conditions entirely different from those which obtain in a regiment of the line.

2. I am also to inquire what amount and description of carriage has been maintained in the regiment to enable it to move when necessary.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 3135, "Army Organisation," dated Bombay Castle, 27th July 1876).

Read the following,—

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 431 S., dated 17th June 1876).

I AM directed, with reference to your letter, No. 937, dated the 3rd March 1876, relative to the proposal to alter the organisation of the 30th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), to request that the Government of India may be informed whether it is understood that the proposed change would in all respects be agreeable to men who have enlisted under conditions entirely different from those which obtain in a regiment of the line.

2. I am also to inquire what amount and description of carriage has been maintained in the regiment to enable it to move when necessary.

REPORT by the Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 3028, dated 22nd July 1876).

THE Officer commanding 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, writes as follows:—

From frequent conversations held with all ranks in the regiment, I am of opinion that the change contemplated would be agreeable to most of the men of the regiment. Married men would be most likely to regret any change, as they, owning houses in the family lines, would suffer if compensation were not given for their property.

2. In reply to paragraph 2, I have the honor to report that 80 camels are maintained in the regiment to enable it to move when necessary, and that this description of carriage has always been maintained.

RESOLUTION. The foregoing report to be communicated to the Government of India.

(signed) *J. A. M. Macdonald*, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

No. 3135.

SUBMITTED for the information of the Government of India with reference to Secretary Colonel Burne's letter above quoted.

(signed) *J. A. M. Macdonald*, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, C.B., Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General in India,—(No. 1157 S., "Organisation, Native Army," dated Simla, 31st October 1876).

IN continuation of my letter, No. 1016 S., of the 27th October 1876, I am now desired to forward the accompanying correspondence regarding the station of Jacobabad as a position for troops, and the proposed alterations in the organisation of the 30th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).

Bombay, No. 937, dated 3rd March 1876, and enclosures.
Military Department, No. 739, dated 15th March 1876.
Adjutant General's, 106 F. C., dated 9th April 1876.
Military Department, No. 431 S., dated 17th June 1876.
Bombay, No. 3135, dated 27th July 1876.
Memorandum of cost by Accountant General, Military Department, dated 7th June 1876.

2. The points on which the Government of India would be glad to receive the opinion of the Commander in Chief after His Excellency shall have visited Sind are—

(1.) As respects the alleged unhealthy nature of the cantonment of Jacobabad and the surrounding country.

(2.) As to the possibility of finding other sites in a more healthy position.

(3.) As to the necessity for the strong outpost now furnished by the Sind Horse.

(4.) Whether it is desirable to alter the present organisation of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry, converting it into a regiment liable to service in any part of the Presidency, and sending a regiment to Upper Sind in periodical relief.

3. I am to beg the favour of His Excellency's opinion on these or any other points that may occur to Sir F. Haines after a personal inspection of the locality.

From Colonel *J. A. M. Macdonald*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 4529, dated Bombay Castle, 9th November 1877).

IN continuation of this office docket, No. 3135, of the 27th July 1876, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of the papers noted in the margin, and to convey the strong recommendation of Government that the grant of good conduct pay to the 30th Regiment Native Infantry at Jacobabad, which will entail an additional charge of about 500 rupees per month, may be sanctioned.

Letter from the Adjutant General, No. 1424, dated 20th October 1877, with enclosures.
Report by the Controller of Military Accounts, No. 1429, dated 26th October 1877.

2. I am at the same time to request that the Government of India may be moved to pass an early decision on the general question of the reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), submitted with my letter, No. 937, of the 3rd March 1876.

From Brigadier General *G. Burrows*, Officiating Adjutant General, Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 1424, dated Poona, 20th October 1877).

ADVERTING to the correspondence ending with Government Resolution, No. 3153, dated 27th July 1876, I am directed to submit the annexed correspondence, and to say the Commander in Chief considers it most desirable that the reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry should be carried out at an early date.

From Brigadier General *G. H. Vyse*, Commanding Sind District, to the Adjutant General, Bombay Army (No. 2099, dated Karachi, 12th October 1877).

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for submission to His Excellency the Commander in Chief, the accompanying representation from the Officer Commanding 30th Regiment Native Infantry at Jacobabad, regarding the pay drawn by the men of his regiment, together with a request that the regiment may be permitted to participate in the benefits of the good conduct pay promulgated in G.G. O., No. 19 of 1877.

2. Colonel Mainwaring's letter, I think, states the case very fairly and fully, and I do not see that I can add to it except by saying that I beg most strongly to recommend his appeal to the favourable consideration of His Excellency.

3. On receipt of Colonel Mainwaring's letter, I asked for information as to the difference in the cost of a sepoy's living now and in 1858, when the 30th Regiment Native Infantry was raised, and the pay of the men fixed; in reply, I received two statements which are annexed, marked A and B: that marked A shows the difference between the sort of food grains and other articles usually consumed by natives now and in 1858, which Colonel Mainwaring remarks, shows that a month's food now just costs the sepoy double what it did 19 years ago. This Table A, although not confined to the articles usually taken into consideration when calculating compensation for dearness of provision, is not, I think, an inaccurate representation of what a sepoy's monthly expenditure would consist.

4. It may be urged that the present year is an exceptional one, inasmuch as the price of most articles is unusually high, but even admitting this, the Table B shows what the prices were in 1876, and though not so high as they are this year, they are still very much higher than those shown in Table A to have been ruling in 1858, while the Table B itself shows a material rise since 1860.

5. Colonel Mainwaring does not mention whether the subscriptions paid by the men towards their carriage and tent funds are the same now as when the regiment was first raised; but looking to the steady rise in prices which has taken place since then, and is continuing now, I do not see how the same expenditure can be found sufficient now, considering the higher wages which must of necessity be paid to camel-men and work proper, so that I am inclined to think that the Silladar system as at present organised in the regiment must of necessity come to a standstill, as no larger subscriptions than those now given could be looked for from the men, already, as Colonel Mainwaring points out in paragraph 5 of his letter, "the re-establishment of the camel carriage on an efficient footing has become a serious difficulty;" this difficulty has arisen from a portion of the regiment having had lately to undertake two marches of (in comparison with what it has hitherto been called on to perform) unusual nature; but looking to the state of affairs on the frontier now, it seems as if such marches would not be so unfrequent in future, and I am therefore strongly of opinion that the reorganisation of the regiment on a system more nearly allied to that on which the two Biluch regiments are maintained is worthy of consideration, if indeed the value and efficiency of the regiment itself as a frontier corps does not depend on such a change being carried out.

From Colonel *W. G. Mainwaring*, Commandant, 30th Regiment Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Sind Frontier Force,—(dated Jacobabad, 31st August 1877).

I HAVE the honour to request that the Commandant, Sind Frontier Force, will do me the favour to forward through the necessary channel, for the favourable consideration of superior authority, the following statement and request.

2. It is doubtless understood that the organisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, is on the Silladar system, and that the men have to provide themselves with clothing, camp equipage and carriage from their pay. Not only have they to provide the two latter when occasion requires, but they are bound to keep them in a state of efficiency all the year round and ready for any emergency.

3. The pay of a private soldier in the 30th Native Infantry is 10 rupees per mensem from date of enlistment. He does not receive any Sind batta, nor good conduct pay, as do the men of the two Biluch regiments; it follows that, if he is not promoted, 10 rupees represents his monthly pay from the day he is enlisted to the day of his discharge, though he should serve faithfully and well for 20 years without relief in the worst station of the Bombay Presidency.

4. The 30th Native Infantry has now served at Jacobabad for 19 years without relief, during the whole of which time I have had the honour to hold the command. The only change of station being represented by two very severe marches to Khelat undertaken by detachments of the regiment crossing the desert under very trying circumstances, and in the hottest months of the year.

5. The nature of the country to which these detachments proceeded and in which they remained is very destructive to camp equipage, and the camels of Sind can with difficulty exist above the passes; thus it has happened that the tents of the regiment have been quite destroyed and the camels belonging to the men died in great numbers. To replace the above and to render the regiment again efficient for field service, a large sum of money is required, so large a sum, when taken in comparison with the pay of the non-commissioned rank and file, as to threaten a collapse of the Silladar system on which the regiment is organised. I have been able to replace the tents from the regimental fund; but the re-establishment of camel carriage on an efficient footing has become a serious difficulty.

6. I would respectfully ask the authorities to compare the monthly cost of one of the Biluch's regiments with that of the 30th Native Infantry. The several statements are attached; and I would beg to point out that, in addition to the pay therein laid down, the two Biluch regiments receive good conduct pay and clothing from Government; whereas the men of the 30th Native Infantry do *not* receive good conduct pay, and they have to provide their own clothing in addition to keeping up camp equipage and carriage, and this on 10 rupees monthly. It follows that the men of the 30th Native Infantry receive a lower scale of pay than any other Native regiment in the Bombay Presidency, whilst they are permanently quartered in the very worst climate.

7. There are men in the 30th Regiment of 19 years' service, without an entry in the defaulters' book, still serving as private soldiers, who do not clear more than eight rupees a month after paying for clothing, tents, and camels. A man of either of the Biluch regiments of the same standing and character would be drawing 13 rupees or 14 rupees a month, and receiving his clothing in addition.

8. In conclusion, I would urgently and respectfully request that men of the 30th Native Infantry may share in the advantages of good conduct pay granted at the time of the Proclamation under Clause III. of G. G. O., No. I. of 1877, dated 1st January 1877, published in No. 19 of 1877, dated Bombay Castle, 10th January 1877.

LIST of PAY, &c., of the BILUCH REGIMENTS.

No.	RANKS.	Pay.			Batta.			Grain Compensation for June 1877.			Total of each.			TOTAL.		
		Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
4	Subadars, 1st class - -	100	–	–	15	–	–	2	10	6	117	10	6	470	10	–
4	„ 2nd „ - -	80	–	–	15	–	–	2	10	6	97	10	6	390	10	–
4	Jemadars, 1st „ - -	50	–	–	7	8	–	2	10	6	60	2	6	240	10	–
4	„ 2nd „ - -	40	–	–	7	8	–	2	10	6	50	2	6	200	10	–
8	Colour Havildars - -	16	–	–	5	–	–	2	10	6	23	10	6	189	4	–
32	Havildars - - -	14	–	–	5	–	–	2	10	6	21	10	6	693	–	–
40	Naiks - - - -	12	–	–	5	–	–	2	10	6	19	10	6	786	4	–
58	Privates, 1st class - -	10	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	14	2	6	821	1	–
191	„ 2nd „ - -	9	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	13	2	6	2,512	13	6
188	„ 3rd „ - -	8	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	12	2	6	2,285	6	–
163	„ 4th „ - -	7	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	11	2	6	1,818	7	6
2	Drummers and Fifers, 1st class	10	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	14	2	6	28	5	–
3	„ „ 2nd „	9	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	13	2	6	39	7	6
4	„ „ 3rd „	8	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	12	2	6	48	10	–
7	„ „ 4th „	7	–	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	11	2	6	78	1	6
8	Bhisties - - - -	7	8	–	1	8	–	2	10	6	11	10	6	93	4	–
24	Recruit boys -	3	8	–	-		-	–	14	6	4	6	6	105	12	–
	Native Staff -	166	–	–	-		-	-		-	-		-	166	–	–
								TOTAL - - - Rs.						10,968	4	–

LIST of PAY, &c., of the 30th REGIMENT of NATIVE INFANTRY.

No.	RANK.	Pay.			Grain Compensation for June 1877, at Jacobabad Rate.			Total of each.			TOTAL.		
		Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
4	Subadars, 1st class - - -	100	–	–	–	10	–	100	10	–	402	8	–
4	„ 2nd „ - - -	80	–	–	–	10	–	80	10	–	322	8	–
4	Jemadars, 1st „ - - -	50	–	–	–	10	–	50	10	–	202	8	–
4	„ 2nd „ - - -	40	–	–	–	10	–	40	10	–	162	8	–
8	Pay Havildars - - -	20	–	–	–	10	–	20	10	–	165	–	–
32	Havildars - - - -	15	–	–	–	10	–	15	10	–	500	–	–
40	Naiks - - - - -	12	–	–	–	10	–	12	10	–	505	–	–
16	Buglers - - - - -	15	–	–	–	10	–	15	10	–	250	–	–
600	Privates - - - - -	10	–	–	–	10	–	10	10	–	6,375	–	–
8	Bhisties - - - - -	9	–	–	–	10	–	9	10	–	77	–	–
	Native staff - - - -	108	–	–	-		-	-		-	108	–	–
								TOTAL - - - Rs.			9,070	4	–

(A.)

STATEMENT showing the RATES at which the undermentioned ARTICLES were sold in 1858, and at which they are now selling at *Jacobabad*.

ARTICLES, 1st Sort.	1858, Lbs. per Rupee.	1877, Lbs. per Rupee.
Wheat flour	54	24
Dhall, toor	20	14
„ oord	36	14
„ moong	40	12
Ghee	6	2½
Mutton	20	8
Sugar	8	2½
Milk	48	26
Salt	160	64
Firewood	640	320
Sweet-oil	20	7½
Tobacco	26	12
Goor	26	11
Rice	28	16

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
A month's provisions for one man in 1858 cost	4	4	6
„ „ „ 1877 „	8	5	6

Jacobabad, 20 September 1877.

(signed) *W. G. Mainwaring*, Colonel, Commandent, 30th Native Infantry.

(B.)

RETURN showing Detail of AVERAGE PRICES in Lbs. and Oz. per Rupee of Undermentioned ARTICLES from January 1860 to December 1876.

ARTICLES.	1860.	1861.	1862.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.
	lbs. oz.	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*	*lbs. oz.*
Wheat flour -	38 2	34 4	36 9	35 6	20 7	30 10	27 9 average of 5 months.	30 0 average of 4 months.	43 10 average of 2 months.	22 0	15 7	21 14	24 0	28 5	28 8	30 9	31 0
Dhall - -	37 10	25 9	28 4	25 14	19 5	23 3	21 4 average of 6 months.	25 0 average of 4 months.	26 0 average of 2 months.	14 9	12 13	15 3	13 0	15 3	19 14	31 8	18 0
Ghee - - -	3 9	3 10	3 8	2 14	3 9	3 0 average of 6 months.	2 5 average of 2 months.	3 0 average of 3 months.	2 10 average of 2 months.	2 14	3 0	4 0	2 6	3 3	3 11	3 9	3 0
Salt - - -	189 4	163 0	93 9	48 13	42 0	47 9	72 0 average of 6 months.	51 0 average of 4 months.	54 0 average of 2 months.	46 4	41 8	67 0	69 4	46 0	62 8	62 5	64 0

Camp Jacobabad;
5 October 1877.

(signed) *H. B. McNeill*, Captain,
Superintendent of Bazars and Brigade-Major, Sind Frontier Force.

REPORT by Colonel *W. T. Chitty*, Controller of Military Accounts. Bombay (No. 1429, dated Poona, 26th October 1877).

So far as can be ascertained from the latest returns of the regiment, the extra charge that would be entailed by the grant of good conduct pay would be about 500 rupees per mensem.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 5864, "Army," dated Bombay Castle, 12th October 1880).

Read the following:—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 474, C., dated Bombay, 6th October 1880).

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of Government Resolution, No. 5451, of the 24th ultimo, which has been transferred to this department for disposal, I am desired to state that there are no difficulties in the Quartermaster General's Department in removing the 30th Regiment Native Infantry from Sind.

2. Nothing, however, can be done till a decision is passed on the correspondence culminating with Government Resolution, No. 2744, of the 6th June 1878, and the Commander in Chief is of opinion that the present is a favourable opportunity for urging on the Government of India to do so at an early date, as the regiment is now much reduced in strength from recent casualties, and by the last received return, dated 1st July 1880, there were only 73 men in the corps belonging to the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency, against 82 Sindis and 598 foreigners or men enlisted beyond presidency limits; and so long as the regiment is permanently quartered in Sind, it is impossible to keep it up to its strength by enlistment of men from this presidency alone.

RESOLUTION. A copy to be furnished to the Government of India, with reference to the Resolution of this Government, No, 2744, dated 6th June 1878, and with a request that that Government will now pass a decision on the general question of the reorganisation of the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles, which is already before them.

SUBMITTED to the Government of India, with reference to the preceding Resolution, and to this office dockets, No. 2744, dated 6th July 1878, and No. 5451, dated 24th ultimo.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, R.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 226 B.—"Organisation," dated Fort William, 15th February 1881).

YOUR letter, No. 5864, of the 12th October 1880, enclosing a Resolution of the Bombay Government on the proposed reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), having been laid before the Government of India, I am directed to state that the Governor General in Council concurs with the Governor in Council in thinking that the present opportunity afforded by the numerical weakness of the corps may conveniently be taken for its reorganisation.

2. After a careful consideration of the circumstances which would effect such a reorganisation, the Governor General in Council is of opinion that the most suitable arrangement would be to convert this corps into a Biluch regiment, and to place it on precisely the same footing as regards organisation and service as the other two Biluch regiments, the 27th and 29th Bombay Native Infantry.

3. Should the Bombay Government concur in this opinion, I am to say that the necessary measures might be taken at once for giving effect to it.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, R.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, (No. 279 S. C., "Military Buildings, Native Lines," dated Simla, 13th May 1881).

I HAVE laid your telegram of the 20th April before the Governor General in Council. The Government of India infer from this telegram that the Government of Bombay approve of the suggestion made in my letter of the 15th of February last, that the 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) should be converted into a Biluch regiment, and placed on the same footing as the other two Biluch regiments as regards organisation and service. * * *
* * * * *

3. Further, I am to ask what arrangements are proposed with regard to the future organisation of the corps. At present it is understood that the men of Jacob's Rifles receive higher pay than the other soldiers of the Bombay army supplying their own carriage. Is it intended to continue this rate of pay to the men now in the regiment; and if so, what regulations are proposed in regard to carriage for them?

4. In short, the Government of India would wish to be favoured with some specific information as to the way in which the reorganisation will be carried out, and what the expense involved would be. * * *

From Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3079, dated Bombay Castle, 11th June 1881).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 279 S. C. (Military Buildings—Native Lines), dated 13th ultimo, and in reply I am instructed to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the proposed reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) involved the consideration of several questions which this Government were not able to determine without investigation and inquiry, which have necessarily occupied a considerable time; and pending settlement of these questions, Government refrained from addressing the Government of India on the subject of your letter, No. 226 B., of the 15th February last; but all these considerations having been discussed, and a decision arrived at, I am now instructed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the Resolutions of Government, No. 2180, dated 25th April, and of No. 3079 of this date, together with copies of their accompaniments, and of the G. G. O., announcing the conditions under which the reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) will be carried into effect, which will place the Government of India in possession of all the details relating thereto; and I am further to request the sanction of the Government of India to the payment of compensation to the regiment for house and other real property, for regimental necessaries and equipment, as therein explained, and to the extent particularised; also to the payment to the regiment, on the lines already laid down by the Government of India, of compensation for losses of regimental baggage animals sustained on the campaign.

I am further to explain that the regimental lines proper were built by, and kept up at the expense of, Government; that the accommodation which they afford is sufficient for any other corps relieving Jacob's Rifles at Jacobabad; but that the lines are not built according to standard plan, nor are they equal to other regular Government lines.

The remaining questions asked in your letter under reply are fully answered in the Government Resolutions and General Orders submitted.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 3079, "Army," dated Bombay Castle, 11th June 1881).

Read the following:—

REPORT by the Commissary General, Bombay (No. O. A., 2, 3—91, dated Bombay, 6th April 1881).

WITH reference to the endorsement by the Military Department, No. 503 C. M. A., dated 6th instant, the undersigned has the honour to report that he has no objection to the proposal to transfer the baggage animals and other carriage therein referred to to the Commissariat Department; and should it be sanctioned by Government, the necessary arrangements will be made. There is now a Commissariat Overseer at Jacobabad, receiving 125 rupees, who can have charge of the animals, if it be determined to locate them there. Supplementary establishment as absolutely needed, with reference to numbers of animals to be received over and maintained, will have to be provided for.

From the Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 795 B., dated Bombay, 7th April 1881).

STATES that there is no objection to the carriage in possession of the 30th Native Infantry being taken over by the Commissariat Department.

From the Superintendent of Army Clothing, Bombay, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1485, dated Bombay, 26th March 1881).

Government Resolution, Military Department, No. 1055, dated 22nd February 1881.

HAVING been informed by the Adjutant General of the Army that "the necessary preliminary arrangements for the conversion of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry into a regiment of Biluchis are at present under consideration," I have the honour to solicit the favour of the early instructions of Government as to whether this regiment will in future receive clothing (*i.e.*, rifle green coats and red serge pegtops with brown canvas gaiters), the same as that now issued to the 27th and 29th Regiments, Native Infantry, instead of the drab coats and pyjamas now in wear.

* Government Resolution, Military Department, No. 6333, of 3rd November 1880.

G. G. O., No. 688 of 1858.

2. Also whether, as the regiment has recently received a complete issue (except 360 coats awaiting arrival of cloth shortly expected from England to replace a quantity condemned),* of both coats and pegtops of drab cloth it should, if to be clothed in future as a Biluch regiment, receive new clothing at once, or in annual instalments like all other Native corps, as hitherto the regiment has received on payment a full supply at once according as the demand has been made by the Commanding Officer. Perhaps it may be considered advisable for the supply to coincide in future with the issue to the 27th Regiment Native Infantry, viz., coats in April 1882-83, and pegtops and gaiters in 1883-84, and so on in alternative years for the future. In this case the issue for 1883-84 might be in advance, or that for 1882-83 in arrears, according as the first issue, which would probably be required in full, is ordered for April 1882 or April 1883.

3. If

3. If it should be decided to assimilate the clothing to that in wear with the other Biluch regiments, I beg that the articles as per margin, included in my annual indent, No. 138, of 1st February 1881, may be struck out, and the following articles substituted therein :—

To be struck out from Indent No. 138 of 1881.

	£. s. d.		£. s. d.
Cloth, drab, No. 1 - - - - yds. 192	110 12 -	Braid, drab, tracing, J. rifles, yds. 330	- 16 10½
" " " 2 - - - - - " 59	30 5 4⅝	Lace " 1 " " " 330	4 4 2
" " superfine, pieces of 24 yards (3)	18 15 9	Thread " sewing - - lbs. 43	5 1 2¾
" " white list " " (57)	282 17 3	" " machine - - " 20	4 2 3½
" " coarse " " (41)	288 - 6	Buttons, horn, large, J. rifles, grs. 21	4 10 6¾
Alpaca, drab - - - - - yds. 31	3 6 10½	" " small " " 11	- 17 10½
Crown silk on drab, J. rifles - - No. 2	- 4 4	TOTAL - - : £.	758 14 10⅜
*Flags " " - - " 2	- 5 5		
*Bugles " " - - " 35	4 14 5½		

	Yds.	in.	£.	s.	d.
Cloth, rifle green, No. 1, superfine - - -	28	0	20	13	6½
" aurora, superfine, pieces of - - -	24	3	19	8	6
" rifle green, superfine - - - -	24	3	19	2	6
" aurora, white list - - - - -	24	3	14	13	3
" rifle green " - - - - -	24	0 (47)	229	14	3
Serge, red, O. R., Biluch N. I. - - - -	1,756	0	229	11	2½
Canvas, brown, gaiters " - - - -	664	0	53	19	-
Lace, black, wood, half-inch - - - -	144	0	-	5	11¼
TOTAL - - £.			587	8	2¼

REPORT by the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army (No. 1596 C. T., dated Bombay, 2nd April 1881).

THE clothing should be assimilated to that of the two Biluch regiments; a full issue to be supplied at once; afterwards in alternate years, as in the case of the 27th Regiment Native Light Infantry.

REPORT by the Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay (No. 800, dated Bombay, 21st May 1881).

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, R.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 279 S. C., "Military Buildings, Native Lines," dated Simla, 13th May 1881).

I HAVE laid your telegram of the 20th April before the Governor General in Council. The Government of India infer from this telegram that the Government of Bombay approve of the suggestion made in my letter of the 15th of February last, that the 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) should be converted into a Biluch regiment, and placed on the same footing as the other two Biluch regiments as regards organisation and service. But with respect to the proposed compensation, I am to ask that some further information may be furnished on the subject.

2. It is understood from previous correspondence that the men of this regiment have their own houses and lines at Jacobabad. If it is intended to give compensation for these, will they become the property of the Government? and will they be sufficient and proper accommodation for any regiment relieving Jacob's Rifles at Jacobabad? or what is the proposed arrangement in this respect?

3. Further, I am to ask what arrangements are proposed with regard to the future organisation of the corps? At present it is understood the men of Jacob's Rifles receive higher pay than the other soldiers of the Bombay army, supplying their own carriage; is it intended to continue this rate of pay to the men now in the regiment; and if so, what regulations are proposed in regard to carriage for them?

4. In short, the Government of India would wish to be favoured with some specific information as to the way in which the reorganisation will be carried out, and what the expense involved will be. I am to add that the appointment of

of the proposed committee appears suitable and proper; the Government of India will be glad to receive in due course the estimate of the proposed compensation, with an explantory note on the points above mentioned.

MEMORANDUM from the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1861 C. T., dated Bombay, 23rd April 1881).

REFERRING to the remarks contained in his letter, No. 1793 C. T., dated 19th April, in reply to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Controller's Report, No. 564, of the 4th idem (Government Resolution, No. 2180, dated 25th idem), forwards proceedings of a station committee assembled at Jacobabad on the 6th April 1881 to estimate the value of all buildings in the lines of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry the property of the regiment or individuals.

From the Commissioner in Sind to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 893, dated Bombay, 12th May 1881).

SUBMITS, with remarks, a letter from the Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, showing the valuation arrived at of the house and other immoveable property situated in the regimental lines of the 30th N. I., and belonging to the Native Officers and men of the regiment.

MEMORANDUM from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, dated Bombay Castle, 20th May 1881).

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 2415 C. T., dated Bombay, 30th May 1881).

TELEGRAM from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, to the Government of India, Military Department (dated Bombay, 4th June 1881).

REQUESTING, as a supplementary indent for the required materials for the 30th Native Infantry as reorganised will be submitted at an early date, that the articles noted in the margin of paragraph 3 of the Superintendent of Army Clothing's letter, No. 1485, dated 26th March last, may be expunged from the Clothing indent, No. 138, which accompanied this Government docket, No. 1820, dated 2nd April last.

RESOLUTION.—The draft G. G. O. amended to meet certain changes that have occurred since it was framed may now be published.

2. The change in the organisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles, will have effect from 1st August 1881.

3. The Inspector General of Ordnance and the Superintendent of Army Clothing to be authorised to at once clothe and equip the new battalion in complete assimilation with the 27th and 29th Regiments, Native Infantry, it being understood that the first issue of clothing to the corps shall be for the year 1881-82.

4. The Superintendent of Army Clothing should at once submit a supplementary indent for the required materials for the clothing of the regiment, and the Government of India will be requested by telegram (dispatched 4th June 1881), to expunge the articles shown at

Cloth, drab, No. 1 - - -	192 yards.	Bugles, silk, on drab J. rifle, No. 35	—
" " 2 - - -	59 "	Braid, drab, tracing, J. rifle -	330 yards.
" superfine, pieces of -	24 " (3).	Lace " 1" " " - -	330 "
" white list " -	84 " (57).	Thread " sewing - - -	43 lbs.
" coarse " -	24 " (41).	" " machine - - -	20 "
Alpaca, drab - - - -	3 "	Buttons, horn, large, J. rifle -	21 gross.
Crown silk on drab J. rifle, No. 2	—	" " small " -	11 "
Flags " " " 2	—		

at the margin from the indent for clothing, No. 138, dated 1st February 1881, submitted with Government docket, No, 1820, dated 2nd April 1881.

5. As regards the questions of—

(*a.*) Compensation for baggage animals,

(*b.*) House property and other real estate,

(*c.*) Regimental necessaries and equipment,

It appears that—

(*a.*) The baggage animals have all died on the campaign, and claims for compensation for these should be submitted in the manner laid down in Government Resolution, No. 3168, dated 25th June 1880.

(*b.*) The house property and other real estate belonging to the Native officers and men of the corps has already been valued by a committee of officers, and the valuation has been reported on and confirmed by the Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier. Government will therefore accept the valuation arrived at, and will recommend to the Government of India:—

	Rs.
(1.) That compensation be granted to the regiment for houses in the family lines to the extent of - -	1,801
(2.) For gardens - - - - - - - -	1,820
(3.) For musjids - - - - - - - -	320
Also for	
(4.) Regimental orderly-room - - - - -	800
(5.) School-house - - - - - - -	300
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	5,041

The family lines to remain in the occupation of, and to be maintained by, the new regiment, and to be handed over in habitable order when relieved by another regiment, who will occupy them under the regulations governing the transfer of lines of Native Infantry regiments.

The gardens will, as recommended by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, be retained for the special use of the garrison at Jacobabad, and the musjids may be used by the regiment occupying the lines, but Government will be at no charge for their maintenance.

The regimental orderly-room and school-room to be kept in repair under the regulations affecting that class of buildings.

(*c.*) A committee should be at once convened to assess the present value of such regimental necessaries and equipments being the property of the regiment as cannot be utilised for issue to the new battalion, the proceedings being submitted to Government with the least possible delay.

6. On receipt of the orders of the Government of India, determining the amount of compensation to be paid to the regiment, such amount will be handed over to the Officer Commanding 30th Regiment Native Infantry for disbursement, the house and other property remaining in temporary occupation of the regiment (paragraph 5 (*b.*)), and the superfluous regimental necessaries and equipment (paragraph 5 (*c.*)) being returned to the nearest arsenal for disposal on account of Government.

7. The new battalion should be recruited in accordance with the system now obtaining with regard to the 27th and 29th Regiments Native Infantry (Government Resolutions, Nos. 1707 and 2348, dated respectively 17th April and 2nd June 1873).

8. Copies of Government Resolution No. 2180, dated 25th April 1881, and of the present proceedings of Government, and of the G. G. O. giving the details of the reorganisation of the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles, to be furnished to the Government of India, with reference to Secretary Colonel Chesney's letter, No. 279 S. C., dated 13th ultimo.

EXTRACT from the Proceedings of the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 2180, "Army—Organisation," dated Bombay Castle, 25th April 1881).

Read the following :—

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1277 C. T., dated Bombay Castle, 19th March 1881).

WITH reference to Government Resolution, No. 1855, of 22nd ultimo, I am directed to forward for the approval of Government and for publication in the Government Gazette, the enclosed draft G. G. O., authorising the conversion of the 30th Native Infantry into a regiment of Biluchis, and in doing so to submit, for consideration and sanction, the following proposals (in addition to those indicated in the draft G. G. O.) with regard to the adjustment of certain vested interests and other peculiarities incidental to the existing organisation of that corps :—

I. That the Inspector General of Ordnance and Superintendent of Army Clothing may be authorised to at once clothe and equip the new battalion in complete assimilation with the 27th and 29th Native Infantry, it being understood that the first issue of clothing to the corps shall be for the year 1881-82.

II. That the whole of the baggage animals and other carriage in possession of the corps be at once taken over by the Commissariat Department on behalf of Government, and maintained permanently at Jacobabad or Quetta (as may be decided hereafter) for purposes of movement on the frontier or as necessity may require; and that a Commissariat Agent be in future stationed there for that purpose.

III. That a mixed committee of civil and military officers of the district be convened at Jacobabad to assess the present value of—

(*a.*) The baggage animals;

(*b.*) Such house property belonging to the Native officers and men of the regiment as may be situated within the regimental lines;

(*c.*) Such regimental necessaries and equipments (being the property of the regiment) as cannot be utilised for issue to the new battalion.

IV. That the amount thus assessed by the committee be paid to the Officer Commanding 30th Native Infantry for disbursement; and that the whole of the house property, stores, &c., be made over to an officer to be appointed by Government to receive charge thereof.

V. That immediate authority be given to recruit the new battalion, in accordance with the system now obtaining with regard to the 27th and 29th Native Infantry (Government Resolutions, Nos. 1707, of 17th April 1873, and 2348, dated 2nd June 1873).

2. In conclusion, I am to suggest for consideration that it would be very convenient for financial and other reasons, and also in the interests of discipline, if the sanction of Government were accorded to the details comprised in the papers now submitted, so that the volunteering may be commenced a few days before the end of the present month.

REPORT by the Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay (No. 564, dated Bombay, 4th April 1881).

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1793 C. T., dated Bombay, 19th April 1881).

In returning the papers received with your docket, No. 503 C. M. A., of the 6th instant, I am directed to submit, for the consideration of Government, the following remarks with reference to the several paragraphs of the report of the Controller of Military Accounts, dated the 4th idem, No. 564.

Paragaph 2. It is beyond all question that the men who volunteer into the new battalion will cease to be Silladars from the date on which the battalion is brought on the regular establishment, and consequently that they will become entitled from that date to all the privileges of the regular army, "clothing compensation" being one of them. The proposal that recruits enlisted to complete the corps should be provided with clothing "free of charge in adjustment of the claims for losses on service" must be a clerical error, as men enlisted to compete the new battalion could have no claims on account of losses on service.

Paragraph 3. The recognition of liability here assumed should not be held to be conditional to the grant of compensation for baggage animals, house property, necessaries, &c. It is for the convenience of the State that the 30th Native Infantry is to be disembodied, and the State is bound to compensate for any damage the measure may entail, whether regimentally or individually. The liability will, therefore, doubtless be recognised by Government, without demur.

With regard to the value of the camels, as indicated by the Controller, it is only necessary to say that (from a report recently received) there are not any such animals now with the corps, 125 having perished during the late campaign. It is, however, assumed that Government will grant compensation for that number at rates to be determined in the manner laid down in Government Resolution, No. 3168, of the 25th June last, the award of the committee of assessment being of course submitted for the approval of Government

Paragraph 4. As there are no baggage animals now with the corps, the course proposed by the Controller will not be requisite.

Paragraph 5. It is feared that if the suggestion here made be followed, there may be much difficulty in carrying out the reorganisation within a reasonable period. The Commander in Chief would, therefore, recommend that the Government of India be asked by telegraph for an early decision on the point; for it is impossible to suppose that if a detail so important is likely to be long left undecided, the men would be willing to volunteer to the new battalion.

Paragraph 6. It is needless to enter on a discussion of this question so long as Government recognise their liability within the law for damage done to vested interests. The civil officers of the district who sit on the committee of valuation will, or ought to, inquire into and satisfy themselves as to the legal rights of the persons claiming compensation whether for houses or for lands. Where no legal rights can be established there cannot of course be any compensation recoverable. This question is also one of the greatest importance, and should be settled at once so as to avoid future discussion and endless heartburnings. His Excellency would consequently suggest that the Commissioner in Sind be requested by telegraph to furnish an immediate report on the subject, with the object of enabling Government to issue such orders thereon as may tend to facilitate and hasten the work of reorganisation.

Paragraph 7. The Officer Commanding 30th Native Infantry reports that of the clothing and equipments in possession of the corps, the great coats alone can be utilised for isssue to the new battalion. This, however, is a question of principle; not of detail. If, therefore, Government should be pleased to accept the principle of compensation for all other articles which cannot be so utilised, the valuation could be proceeded with concurrently with that of the other stores.

Paragraph 8 calls for no remark.

Paragraph 9. It was suggested in the Adjutant General's letter, No. 1277, C. T., of the 19th ultimo, that for general official convenience, and also in the interests of discipline, the reorganisation of the corps should, if possible, be effected on the 1st April 1881; but as the preliminary correspondence in the case has already extended beyond that period, it will now rest with Government to fix whatever date may be considered the most convenient or practicable.

From the Adjutant General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 1794 C. T., dated Bombay, 19th April 1881).

RESOLUTION. Telegrams to be sent to the Government of India and to the Commissioner in Sind (dispatched on the 20th instant) on the points noted in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Adjutant General's letter, No. 1793 C. T., dated 19th instant; and on receipt of replies to these, Government will at once proceed to issue the necessary orders in regard to the reorganisation of 30th Regiment Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles.

REPORT by Lieutenant Colonel *D. B. Young*, Officiating Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay (No. 564, dated Poona, 4th April 1881).

PARAGRAPHS 1 to 4 of the draft G. G. O. appear to call for no remark.

2. With respect to the provision in paragraph 5, that the volunteers "will for the present continue to wear the uniform of Jacob's Rifles, but will hereafter receive the regulated amount of compensation for such period subsequent to 1st April 1881 as they may not be in possession of the first annual supply of clothing under this order," Government having allowed that corps its first equipment free of charge (paragraph 5 of G. G. O., No. 688 of 1858), I am of opinion that there is no obligation with respect to the clothing provided regimentally for the year beginning 1st April 1881. Men enlisted now to complete should be supplied with the new uniform free of charge in adjustment of the claim for compensation for losses on service; and as it is desirable that the whole regiment should be dressed alike; Government might also as a special case permit a free issue to the volunteers from Jacob's Rifles; but the grant of compensation as proposed I consider inadmissible.

3. The baggage animals and carriage referred to in paragraph 7 (*a*) consist, it is presumed, of the camels mentioned in Government Resolution, No. 3135, of the 27th July 1876. There appears to be no objection to the payment of compensation, as recommended, assuming that the liability of the State has been recognised for any loss that the regiment might incur by being compelled to dispose of them. The amount should not exceed 60 rupees in any case, and be determined in the manner laid down in the accompaniments to Government Resolution, No. 3168, dated 25th June 1880, the Committee's award being submitted for the sanction of Government.

4. It is desirable that the suggestion for the disposal of the animals after being taken over by Government, with that for the establishment of a Commissariat Agency at Quetta or Jacobabad (Adjutant General's letter, No. 1277 C. T., dated 19th March 1881, clause II.), should be referred for the reports of the Commissary General and Quartermaster General.

5. The question of compensation for houses and other real estate situated within the regimental lines was mooted in the Adjutant General's report communicated to the Government of India under Government Resolution, No. 3135, of the 27th July 1876; but no orders have been passed thereon. The present proposal on the subject will, if approved by Government, require the special sanction of that authority, and it seems advisable to omit clause (*b*), paragraph 7, pending a reference

a reference to it. The lines of this corps at Jacobabad were erected apparently at the public* expense.

* Accompaniments to G. R., No. 3338, dated 30th August 1879.

6. If by "real estate" land is meant, it is not apparent on what ground compensation is recommended by the Adjutant General, the land within the lines being, it is presumed, Government property.

7. Referring to clause (*c*), paragraph 7, without information regarding the articles of equipments and necessaries referred to, I am unable to report on the proposal to give compensation for them.

8. The general financial effect of the change in the organisation of the 30th Native Infantry having been under the consideration of the Government of India already, no remarks are, it is presumed, called for from me on this point.

G. R., No. 937, dated 3rd March 1876.
G. R., No. 3135, dated 27th July 1876.

9. It will now be necessary to change the state from which the reorganisation should be effected.

REPORT by Lieutenant Colonel *D. B. Young*, Officiating Controller of Military Accounts, Bombay (No. 800, dated Poona, 21st May 1881).

THE necessary materials for clothing similar to that worn by the two Biluch regiments are not in store apparently at present, and it will be some time before they can be obtained from England.

2. It is considered that the first issue should be made to the regiment on the 1st April 1882, or sooner if possible, of coats, pegtops, and gaiters complete, the pegtops and gaiters being viewed as clothing for the current year 1881-82, and the coats for 1882-83. This plan would meet the suggestion of the Superintendent of Army Clothing, that the annual issues should coincide with those to the 27th Regiment, Native Infantry.

3. It will be necessary for that officer to submit a supplementary indent for the required materials, as the indent No. 138, in which he proposes they should be inserted, is for materials required for the clothing of 1883-84, which will not be received in India until next year. But the Government of India will need to be asked at once to expunge the articles specified in the margin of the 3rd paragraph of the Superintendent's letter from that indent.

No. 1861 C. T.

SUBMITTED to Government, with reference to the remarks contained in Adjutant General's letter, No. 1793 C. T., of the 19th instant, in reply to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Controller's Report, No. 564, of the 4th idem.

By order,
(signed) *A. L. Annesley*,
Brigadier General, Adjutant General.

Mahableshwar, 23 April 1881.

PROCEEDINGS of a Station Committee assembled at *Jacobabad* on the 6th April 1881, by order of Lieutenant Colonel *F. T. Humfrey*, Commanding at *Jacobabad*, to estimate the value of all buildings in the lines of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry, the property of the regiment or individuals.

President :—*J. E. Gordon*, Captain 3rd Sind Horse.
Members :—*W. C. Harrison*, Captain 30th Native Infantry.
J. B. Murdoch, Lieutenant, R.E.

THE Committee, having assembled pursuant to orders to inspect the buildings, beg to forward a list of the same, and estimated value of each as far as can be ascertained.

(signed) *J. E. Gordon*, Captain 3rd Sind Horse, President.
W. C. Harrison, Captain 30th Native Infantry, } Members.
J. B. Murdoch, Lieutenant, R.E., }

NAMES of Owners of Houses in the Family Lines, 30th Regiment, Native Infantry Line, with the Value of each House.

No.	Company.	Names of Owners.	Valuation.	Remarks.
			Rs.	
1	1	Hajee Khan, Subadar Major, pensioner	200	
2	1	Ditto - - ditto	5	
3	1	Ditto - - ditto	3	
4	1	Mahomed Khan, Sepoy	20	
5	- -	Buxon Dhobie (dead)	12	
6	- -	Ali Bux, pensioner	5	
7	5	Pir Khan, Sepoy	10	
8	5	Iman Bux, Bugler	10	
9	5	Lall Khan, Sepoy	12	
10	1	Mir Khan, Naik, pensioner	12	
11	3	Shurbut Khan, Naik	12	
12	- -	Moolla Abdool Karrim	14	
13	1	Abdoola Khan, Sepoy	10	
14	4	Mayrab Khan, Sepoy	9	
15	2	Khair Mahomed, Sepoy	7	
16	2	Faiz Mahomed, Sepoy	6	
17	1	Soomur Khan, Sepoy	8	
18	5	Peer Bux, Sepoy	10	
19	4	Huck Newoz, Havildar Subadar, pensioner	6	
20	4	Ditto - - ditto	10	
21	1	Hydu Khan, Subadar Major	15	
22	2	Hazzir Khan, Sepoy	12	
23	1	Hydu Khan, Subadar Major	5	
24	5	Kulluckdad Khan, Subadar (dead)	38	
25	8	Deen Mahomed, Subadar, pensioner	10	
26	3	Ibrahim Khan, Subadar	70	
27	5	Shaik Mahomed Oosman, Jemadar	5	
28	2	Peeroo Khan, Bugle Major	25	
29	1	Hyder Khan, Sepoy, pensioner	8	
30	6	Ahmed Ali, Lance Naik	20	
31	1	Roop Narain, Jemadar	8	
32	4	Faiz Mahomed, Bugler	10	
33	5	Deen Mahomed, Sepoy	5	
34	5	Shaik Mahomed Oosman, Jemadar	10	
35	2	Umiet Khan, Sepoy	6	
36	- -	Ameer Din, Sepoy	5	
37	2	Bhola Khan, Sepoy	5	
38	- -	Samund Khan, Jemadar, pensioner	50	
39	4	Luximon, Barber	8	
40	8	Shunkur Sing, Jemadar	8	
41	3	Gunga Din, Sepoy	8	
42	4	Marootee Pondlay, Subadar	25	
43	5	Punchum Sookool, Sepoy	16	
44	8	Babija Chickney, Sepoy	8	
45	4	Marootu Pandlay, Subadar	6	
46	- -	Sessaram, Sepoy (dead)	8	
47	8	Davee Deen, Havildar (dead)	10	
48	3	Haibuttee Jadow, Sepoy	11	
49	1	Babaji Bhoslay, Sepoy	18	
50	8	Gunnoo Sondker, Havildar, pensioner	25	
51	8	Kinshnaji Chowom, Naik (dead)	25	
52	4	Luximon Cudum, Havildar, pensioner	20	
53	6	Kootub-deen, Havildar	8	
54	6	Maistry Maya, Havildar	8	
55	7	Rasool Shah, Sepoy	12	
56	2	Mahomed Din, Sepoy	6	
57	7	Bagh Ali Khan	6	
58	3	Chungia Khan, Sepoy	6	
59	3	Jooma Khan, Sepoy	4	
60	6	Mitha Khan, Jemadar (dead)	8	
61	- -	Auchee Khan, Sepoy, pensioner	4	
62	3	Mahomed Khan, Subadar, pensioner	60	
63	7	Imam Bux, Havildar (dead)	12	
64	3	Mahomed Khan, Sepoy (dead)	4	
65	7	Thara Khan, Sepoy	4	
66	7	Buxon Khan, Sepoy	4	
67	6	Ismail Khan, Naik (dead)	4	
68	- -	Soomur Khan, Sepoy	3	
69	- -	Ali Bux, Havildar	3	

NAMES of Owners of Houses in the Family Lines, 30th Regiment, &c.—*continued.*

No.	Company.	Names of Owners.	Valuation.	Remarks.
			Rs.	
70	5	Nuzzur Mahomed, Havildar	3	
71	6	Moosa Khan, Havildar	6	
72	3	Veli Mahomed, Bugler	4	
73	1	Imam Bux, Sepoy	5	
74	3	Chungia Khan, Sepoy	5	
75	5	Soondur Sing, Subadar	10	
76	6	Ram Chunder Sing, Subadar	28	
77	6	Bapoo Chowan, Sepoy	14	
78	6	Mungul Khan, Havildar (dead)	4	
79	6	Rumzan Khan, Jemadar	6	
80	6	Shaik Hingun, Subadar (dead)	40	
81	5	Nanun Row Bhoslay, Pay Havildar	80	
82	2	Ragojee Bhoslay, Subadar	12	
83	2	Buldeo Missur, Sepoy, pensioner	12	
84	- -	Ramden Mochee	12	
85	6	Mohun Lall, Naik	14	
86	8	Ori Ram, Sepoy (dead)	15	
87	5	Soondur Sing, Subadar	8	
88	6	Chuta Khan, Sepoy	14	
89	4	Moorad Khan, Havildar (dead)	10	
90	6	Summund Khan, Sepoy (dead)	10	
91	- -	Ram Shaie, Lascar	12	
92	1	Nubbee Bux, Sepoy	6	
93	4	Mir Khan, Sepoy (dead)	5	
94	7	Summi Khan, Naik (dead)	6	
95	- -	Gazi Khan, Sepoy	6	
96	2	Rahim Bux, Havildar	8	
97	2	Munnoo Khan, Sepoy, pensioner	6	
98	1	Biluch Khan, Bugler (dead)	10	
99	3	Pandhi Khan, Sepoy (dead)	4	
100	3	Rodun Khan, Sepoy	4	
101	5	Suleam Khan, Sepoy	4	
102	6	Wali Mahomed, Havildar	4	
103	4	Hajie Khan, Sepoy	8	
104	7	Issa Khan, Sepoy	8	
105	7	Daim Khan, Sepoy	7	
106	2	Fool Khan, Bhistie	12	
107	4	Ali Mahomed, Sepoy	4	
108	4	Lall Bux, Sepoy (discharged)	5	
109	- -	Rumzan Bhustu (dead)	6	
110	8	Muckowra Khan, Havildar	9	
111	6	Vittoo Bhoyee, Sepoy	12	
112	3	Bhickoo Jadow (dead)	8	
113	4	Urjoon Khan, Sepoy (dead)	6	
114	2	Buttair Khan, Naik, pensioner	6	
115	5	Pir Khan, Sepoy	6	
116	8	Jilloo Khan, Havildar, pensioner	6	
117	2	Jaffur Khan, Jemadar	4	
118	5	Nubbi Bux, Sepoy	3	
119	7	Ram Chunder Salru, Havildar	20	
120	2	Ragajie Bhoslay, Subadar	20	
121	- -	Nuthoo, Sweeper	6	
122	2	Fool Khan, Bhistie	4	
123	7	Ali Bux, Barber	5	
124	8	Private Abaji Soorevay	6	
125	3	Jeewajee Nalowday, Sepoy (dead)	6	
126	8	Gunnoo Suckpal	6	
127	3	Wahid Bux, Sepoy, pensioner	8	
128	4	Arub Khan, Jemadar	9	
129	1	Rahim Khan, Sepoy, pensioner	12	
130	1	Goolzar Khan, Sepoy	12	
131	8	Peer Bux, Bugler	10	
132	6	Lowng Khan, Sepoy	8	
133	6	Kulluckdad Khan, Sepoy	10	
134	5	Kurrim Bux, Subadar, pensioner	50	
135	8	Kubhur Beg, Pay Havildar	50	
136	1	Ahmed Khan, Sepoy, pensioner	6	
137	5	Auchn Khan, Sepoy (discharged)	10	
		TOTAL *Rs.*	1,801	

LIST of Regimental Buildings, &c., in the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, with the Value of each.

No.	Names of the Building or Names of Owners.	Valuation.	Remarks.
		Rs.	
1	Colonel W. G. Mainwaring's bungalow out-houses.	3,500	Property of Surgeon Kirtikar, Indian Medical Department.
2	30th Native Infantry mess-room with out-houses	2,000	
3	Regimental orderly-room - - - -	800	Regimental property
4	Colonel F. T. Humfrey's bungalow with out-houses.	1,500	
5	Musjid No. 1 - - - - - -	200	
6	Musjid No. 2 - - - - - -	40	
7	Musjid No. 3 - - - - - -	80	
8	Issur Dass Chowdry's house - - - -	80	Regimental property.
9	School-house - - - - - -	300	- - ditto.
10	Shop occupied by Dhurmoo - - - -	35	
11	Ditto - - Lekhoo - - - -	35	
12	Ditto - - Jumnoo - - - -	35	
13	Ditto - - Jhaman - - - -	35	
14	Ditto - - Lekhoo - - - -	35	
15	Ditto - - Nenoo Mal - - - -	25	
16	Seven shops of Subadar Major Hajee Khan -	140	Pensioned.
17	Issur Dass Chowdry's shop - - - -	30	
18	Nine shops from Bazar fund - - - -	180	Regimental property.
	TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	9,050	

From *H. N. B. Erskine*, Esq., Commissioner in Sind, to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor and President in Council, Bombay (No. 893, dated Karachi, 12th May 1881).

I HAVE the honour to supply the information called for in Telegram No. 14 from the Secretary to Government Military Department, dated 20th April last, as to the nature and extent of the house property and other real estate owned by the Native officers and men of the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry, Jacob's Rifles, within the regimental lines at Jacobabad.

2. There are 137 houses in the family lines of the regiment which are valued at 1,801 rupees, three musjids valued at 320 rupees, and eight gardens valued at 1,820 rupees; total 3,941 rupees.

3. The above is a valuation made by a station committee; but the Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, states that the valuation seems to him a fair one, and certainly not excessive. I append, in original, the report by Lieutenant Colonel Trevor, Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, which gives full details.

From Lieutenant Colonel *E. W. Trevor*, Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, to *H. N. B. Erskine*, Esq., Commissioner in Sind (No. 1391, dated Jacobadad, 7th May 1881).

I HAVE the honour, in reply to your endorsement No. 768 of 22nd ultimo, to submit a statement* showing the value of the house and other immoveable property, situated in the regimental lines of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry, or Jacob's Rifles, and belonging to the Native officers or men of the regiment.

* *Vide* page 578 *supra*.

2. A station

2. A station committee valued the house property a short time ago, and their proceedings were, I understand, sent on in usual course to army head-quarters. My valuation does not differ from that of the committee; but I may mention that, except that the owners seemed satisfied, I should in some instances have been inclined to have given a higher valuation than the committee. As regards the gardens, Native officers and men of the Frontier Force were originally put in possession of pieces of ground by General Jacob on the understanding that if they grew fruit or other trees, they might enjoy the produce during their lifetime, but the gardens themselves were to remain the property of Government, and could not be alienated by the occupants. The object was to give the men and officers of the regiment a tie to the place, and at the same time secure shade, &c., the site of the lines being then bare of trees.

3. I suppose if the regiment is delocalised, that the Native officers and men who are in possession of these gardens are fully entitled to the value of the fruit and other trees grown by them. If they have not incurred actual outlay on the property, they must have given both time and trouble to it, in the expectation that they would enjoy the outturn as long as they remained in the service, if not for their whole lives.

4. The musjids were built by the Mahomedans of the regiment who are, in my opinion, entitled to be reimbursed in the sum expended.

List of Gardens, &c.	Value of Fruit or other Trees.	Area.	
	Rs.	*Acres.*	*Guntas.*
1. Subadar Major Haji Khan - - - - - -	400	2	17
2. " " - - - - - -	100	5	11
3. " " - - - - - -	85	4	14
4. Subadar Mahomed Khan - - - - - -	50	2	18
5. Jemadar Sheikh Kaisim - - - - - -	40	1	36
6. Subadar Shaikh Hingan - - - - - -	85	4	18
7. Jemadar Khan Mahomed - - - - - -	1,000	5	4
8. Subadar Karim Bux - - - - - - -	60	4	9
Total Value of Gardens - - - -	1,820	0	0
Ditto - Musjids - - - -	320	0	0
Ditto - House Property - - -	1,801	0	0
Grand Total - - - *Rs.*	3,941	0	0

(signed) *E. W. Trevor*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *M. W. Willoughby*, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 520 M., 690 A. G., dated Mahableshwar, 20th May 1881).

THE accompanying proceedings of a station committee, received with the Adjutant General's memorandum, No. 1861 C. T., dated 23rd April 1881, are returned to that officer for the favour of an expression of the opinion of His Excellency the Commander in Chief whether it was intended by the proposal contained in Clause III. (*b*) of the Adjutant General's letter, No. 1277 C. T., dated 19th March last, that compensation should be awarded for such buildings as are shown in the second list submitted by the station committee, and which grant as regards the officers, bungalows, and mess-house appears to be inadmissible under the regulations, whilst there is no information before Government with regard to the eight shops not regimental property shown in the list; nor is there any apparent reason why Government should be called on to pay compensation for them.

The accompanying report from the Commissioner in Sind, and from Lieutenant Colonel Trevor, Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier, are also forwarded for favour of the opinion of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, whether the claim for compensation for gardens and musjids should be entertained; the former would not appear to come under the head real estate, and as regards the latter there is the difficulty of disposing of them should they become the property of Government by purchase. It will be noticed that Lieutenant Colonel Trevor has confined himself strictly to the property of the Native officers and men of the corps, and that none of the buildings (except the musjids) shown in list No. 2 of the station committee are mentioned by him.

From Brigadier General *Annesley*, Adjutant General of the Bombay Army, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 2415 C. T., dated Mahableshwar, 30th May 1881).

IN returning the enclosures of your Memoranda, Nos. 208 M. and 522 M., 690 A. G., of the 19th and 20th instant respectively, I am directed to state for the consideration of Government, that—

(*a.*) The houses of the Native officers and men of the 30th Native Infantry within the regimental lines would become the property of Government on compensation being paid for them;

(*b.*) The regimental lines proper were built by and kept up at the expense of Government. The accommodation which they afford is sufficient for any other corps relieving Jacob's Rifles at Jacobabad; but they are not built according to standard plan, nor are they equal to those in regular Government lines;

(*c.*) Compensation for officers' bungalows, mess-house, and shops was not intended to be included in the valuation proposed in Paragraph III. (*b.*) of the Adjutant General's letter, No. 1277 C., of the 19th March last;

(*d.*) Compensation for gardens and musjids appears to be a fair claim, and should, in the Commander in Chief's opinion, be allowed; and as the former are important acquisitions to the station as tending to the health and comfort of the troops, His Excellency thinks that they should not be alienated either by sale or otherwise, but retained by Government for the special use of the garrison;

(*e.*) The whole amount of compensation claimable under every head (excluding officers' bungalows, mess-house and shops) does not appear to exceed 5,000 rupees.

2. In conclusion, I am desired by His Excellency to express a hope that the final orders of Government in this matter may be issued at as early a date as possible.

EXTRACT General Order by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay (No. 388, dated Bombay Castle, 11th June 1881).

WITH the sanction of the Government of India, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) shall, from and after the 1st August 1881, be converted into a Biluch Battalion, and designated the 30th Regiment Native Infantry (or 3rd Biluch Battalion, late Jacob's Rifles), and be placed on the same footing, as regards pay, allowances, clothing, equipments, camp equipage, public carriage, regimental establishments, including recruit boys, &c., as at present obtains in the other two Biluch regiments of this army (the 27th and 29th Native Infantry).

2. Such Native officers, non-commissioned officers, buglers, and privates now borne on the rolls of the regiment of Jacob's Rifles as have less than 32 years' service, and are of undoubted efficiency and good character, are to have the option of at once volunteering into the 30th Native Infantry (or 3rd Biluch Battalion), late Jacob's Rifles, on the understanding that they will be entitled to participate in all the recognised privileges attaching to the same arm of the regular Native army; that they will carry their present regimental rank with them into the new battalion; and that such portions of their past services as are already allowed to reckon towards pension under the present organisaton will also be permitted to count towards good-conduct pay and pension under the new conditions of service.

3. All men so volunteering will be required to serve wherever they may be ordered by Government.

4. Such men as may be unwilling to volunteer into the new battalion on the above terms will be discharged either to pension or with gratuity (as determined by length of service) in accordance with the existing regulation on this head.

5. The arms, accoutrements, clothing, and equipments of the 3rd Biluch Battalion will be supplied at the public expense, and will be similar in all respects to those of the 27th and 29th Regiments Native Infantry. The volunteers, however, will for the present continue to wear the uniform of Jacob's Rifles, but will hereafter receive the regulated amount of compensation for such period subsequent to the 1st of August 1881, as they may not be in possession of the first annual supply of clothing under this Order.

6. The men transferred to the new battalion will be struck off the strength of Jacob's Rifles from the 31st of July 1881 and will be borne on the establishment of the 3rd Biluch Regiment from the 1st August 1881.

7. Compensation (at rates to be assessed by a committee of survey) will be granted to the regiment on account of—

(*a.*) Such house property and other real estate belonging to the Native officers and men of the corps as may be situated within the regimental lines;

(*b.*) Such regimental necessaries and equipments being the property of the regiment as cannot be utilised for issue to the new battalion.

8. His Excellency the Commander in Chief will be pleased to issue any subsidiary instructions that may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Order.

From Colonel *G. Chesney*, R.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department (No. 238 B. S., "Organisation, Native Army," dated Simla, 28th July 1881).

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3079, dated the 11th June 1881, and in reply to state that the Government of India approve of the reorganisation of the 30th Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) on the lines detailed in Bombay Government G. O., No. 388, dated the 11th June 1881.

2. The question of compensation for houses and baggage animals is separately dealt with.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the Approximate Monthly and Annual COST of a Line Regiment of Native Infantry of the Bombay Army, including Batta if ordered to serve in *Sind* (*Jacobabad*), and the Carriage Establishment proposed to be maintained to secure mobility, compared with the Cost of the 30th Regiment, Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), now located at *Jacobabad*.

For 30th Regiment of Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Cost per Mensem.	For a Line Regiment, Native Infantry.	Cost per Mensem.	REMARKS.
	Rs.		*Rs. a. p.*	
Pay and allowances as per details in the annexed statement.	9,019	Pay and allowances as per details in the annexed statement.	9,036 2 8	
		Cost of clothing - - -	208 - -	
		Camp equipage - - -	45 - -	
		TOTAL - - -	9,339 2 8	
		ADD—		
		Cost of carriage establishment proposed to be maintained at Jacobabad in Sind for a regiment of Native Infantry :—		
		Feed of 55 camels, at 10 rupees each per month.	550 - -	The scale of carriage establishment allowed to the Punjab Frontier Force adopted—
		Feed of 40 mules at 11 rupees each per month.	440 - -	
		Pay and batta of camel attendants.	(*a*)156 8 -	*Rs. a.* (*a*) 1 muccadum (Pay and Batta / 10 plus 2—8) - - = 12 8 18 survans at (6 + 2) 8 rupees each - = 144 - Total - - - 156 8
		Pay and batta of mule attendants.	(*b*) 116 8 -	(*b*) 1 muccadum as above - - = 12 8 13 muleteers as above at 8 rupees - = 104 - Total - - - 116 8
		Pay and batta of tindal and lascars.	(*c*) 84 - -	(*c*) 1 tindal (9 + 3) - - - = 12 - 8 lascars (7 + 2) at 9 rupees - - = 72 - Total - - - 84 -
		Pay and batta of dooly-bearers' establishment, exclusive of four bearers permanently attached to the regimental hospital.	(*d*) 233 - -	(*d*) 1 muccadum - - - - - 9 - 32 dooly-bearers at (6 + 1) 7 rupees each - - - - - - - 224 - Total - - - 233 -
		Compensation of dearness of food to above carriage establishment.	56 - -	
		Shoeing 40 mules - - -	30 - -	
		Repair of gear, &c., at 8 annas per mule and camel.	47 8 -	
TOTAL Cost per Mensem - *Rs.*	9,019	TOTAL Cost per Mensem - *Rs.*	11,052 10 8	

ABSTRACT.

	Rs. a. p.
Cost of a Line Regiment, Native Infantry, including the proposed carriage establishment, per mensem -	11,052 10 8
„ of 30th Regiment, Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles), as at present allowed, per mensem - - -	9,019 - -
Difference being increase per mensem - - -	2,033 10 8
Increase per annum - - - - - - - -	24,404 - -
Or including the value of the mules and camels to be replaced annually, say - -	26,000 - -
ADD— *Rs.* For purchase of 55 camels at 100 rupees each - 5,500 „ „ 40 mules at 150 „ - 6,000 } Total Amount of First Charge - -	11,500 - -

N.B.—(*a*) Compensation for dearness of provisions is not included, as the 30th Rifles is already allowed the grant by Government. *See* Military Department Letter, No. 913, dated 17th December 1875.

(*b*) Hutting money is also not taken, as the 30th Rifles has quarters provided by the State.

STATEMENT exhibiting the Establishment and Pay and Allowances of 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) at *Jacobabad*, contrasted with those of a Line Regiment of Native Infantry of the Bombay Army, including Sind Batta, if ordered to serve at that Station.

For 30th Regiment Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles).	Nos.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	For a Line Regiment Native Infantry.	Nos.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Additional Batta when serving at Jacobabad in Sind. Rate per Mensem.	Total Batta per Mensem.
		Rs. a.	Rs. a.			Rs. a.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Subadars, 1st Class	2	100 –	200 –	Subadars, 1st Class	2	100 –	200 – –	15 – –	30 – –
Ditto, 2nd „	2	80 –	160 –	Ditto, 2nd „	2	80 –	160 – –	15 – –	30 – –
Ditto, 3rd „	4	67 –	268 –	Ditto, 3rd „	4	67 –	268 – –	15 – –	60 – –
Jemadars	5	40 –	200 –	Jemadars, 1st „	4	35 –	140 – –	7 8 –	30 – –
Ditto	3	30 –	90 –	Ditto, 2nd „	4	30 –	120 – –	7 8 –	30 – –
Havildars	40	15 –	600 –	Havildars	40	14 –	560 – –	5 – –	200 – –
Naicks	40	12 –	480 –	Naicks	40	12 –	480 – –	5 – –	200 – –
Buglers	16	15 –	240 –	Drummers	16	7 –	112 – –	1 8 –	24 – –
Privates	600	10 –	6,000 –	Privates	600	7 –	4,200 – –	1 8 –	900 – –
				Boys	24	3 8	84 – –	–	–
	712		8,238 –		736		6,324 – –		1,504 – –
Staff Allowances.				*Staff Allowances.*					
Subadar Major	–	–	25 –	Native Adjutant	–	–	17 8 –		
Native Adjutant	–	–	10 –	Subadar Major	–	–	25 – –		
Havildar Major	–	–	15 –	Havildar Major	–	–	7 – –		
Bugle Major	–	–	15 –	Drill Havildar	–	–	5 – –		
Quartermaster Havildar	–	–	10 –	Drill Naick	–	–	2 8 –		
Drill Havildar	–	–	–	Colour Havildars	–	2 –	16 – –		
Drill Naick	–	–	3 –	Pay Havildars	–	5 –	40 – –		
Pay Havildars	–	5 –	40 –	Drum Major	–	–	5 – –		
Mess Allowance	–	–	100 –	Fife Major	–	–	5 – –		
				Quartermaster Havildar	–	–	14 – –		
				Mess Allowance	–	–	100 – –		
			223 –				237 – –		
Educational Establishment.				*Educational Establishment.*					
Schoolmaster	1	–	20 –	Schoolmaster	1	–	20 – –		
School Rent	–	–	10 –	Ditto	1	–	12 – –		
Stationery	–	–	10 –	Ditto	1	–	8 – –		
				School Allowance	–	–	19 2 8		
	1		40 –		3		59 2 8		
Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital Establishment.				*Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital Establishment.*					
Hospital Assistants (with Batta).	2	30 –	60 –	Hospital Assistant	2	25 –	50 – –	5 – –	10 – –
Native Medical Pupil (with Batta).	1	–	10 –	Native Medical Pupil	1	–	8 – –	–	2 – –
Native Medical Pupil (with Batta).	1	–	9 –	Ditto ditto	1	–	7 – –	–	2 – –
Goorgah	1	–	7 –	Goorgah	1	–	5 – –	–	2 – –
Bheesties	2	7 –	14 –	Cook	1	–	7 – –	–	2 – –
Sweepers	2	5 –	10 –	Bheesties	2	7 –	14 – –	2 – –	4 – –
Dooly bearers	4	6 –	24 –	Sweepers	2	5 –	10 – –	2 – –	4 – –
				Dooly-bearers	4	6 –	24 – –	1 – –	4 – –
	13		134 –		14		125 – –		30 – –
Native Followers.				*Native Followers.*					
Tindal	1	–	12 –	Bheesties	8	7 8	60 – –	1 8 –	12 – –
Lascars	8	8 –	64 –	Chowdry	1	–	16 – –	–	5 – –
Bheesties	8	9 –	72 –	Weighmen	2	5 –	10 – –	2 – –	4 – –
Chowdry	1	–	21 –						
Peons	2	7 –	14 –						
Muccadum (Attached to Moveable Column of the Regiment.)	1	–	9 –						
Dooly-bearers (Attached to Moveable Column of the Regiment.)	32	6 –	192 –						
	53		384 –		11		86 – –		21 – –
				TOTAL Rupees	–	–	6,831 2 8	–	1,555 – –
				ADD— Good-conduct Allowance	–	–	700 – –	–	–
							7,531 2 8		1,555 – –
TOTAL Rupees per Mensem			9,019 –	TOTAL Pay and Batta per Mensem				9,086 2 8	

Note.—Washerman and Leechman hitherto attached to the Regimental Hospital of a Line Regiment, and included in the Bombay Controller's Statement, have been thrown out, as the appointments have been abolished under the operation of Bombay G. G. O., No. 840, of 15th December 1875.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 334) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 13 October 1881.

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council your Military Letter, No. 297, dated 12th August 1881, forwarding, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, correspondence regarding the conversion of the 30th Bombay N. I. into a Biluch regiment, on the same footing as regards organisation and service as the other two Biluch regiments of the Bombay Army.

2. The change has already been ordered, and I confirm it; but I have to observe that a measure which involves, as this does, a permanent additional charge of 26,000 rupees a year, should have been submitted for my sanction before being carried out.

3. I must also observe that, at a time when your Excellency proposes to reduce four regiments of Bombay Native Infantry, it was hardly expedient to make a great change in the organisation of the junior regiment of that arm, a regiment incomplete in numbers, and which has been officially declared to be, from its physique, as well as its organisation, the least desirable regiment of that arm to retain.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 382) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 13 December 1883.

Para. 1. IN my Military Despatch, No. 346, of 8th November 1883, on the subject of the state of promotion in the Madras Army, I informed your Lordship's Government that I proposed very shortly to address you on the general subject of the recruitment of the Staff Corps, when replying to that portion of your Military Letter, No. 230 of 1881, which deals with the questions of the mode of officering the Native Army, of the Staff and Army Departments, and the system of recruiting for the Staff Corps.

2. On these points your Lordship's recommendations are thus summarised in para. 43 of your letter, No. 230 of 1881:—

1. That the Staff Corps system be maintained.

2. That, for the purpose of regulating regimental promotions, the officers of Native regiments be arranged in groups of three regiments, within which they are to rise, as a rule, in order of seniority.

3. That limitation be placed on the length of regimental service, and on the tenure of regimental appointments.

4. That officers of the Army Staff, and certain officers of the Army Departments, be seconded on the list of linked regiments to which they belong.

5. That officers of certain civil departments, and in civil employ, be seconded in their regiments for 10 years, from date of first appointment, after which they shall be ineligible to return to regimental duty; and that officers in civil employ, and certain civil departments, shall not rise beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

6. That first appointments to the Staff Corps be made direct from the Royal Military College.

I propose now to communicate my decision on these several subjects in the above order.

3. With regard to the maintenance of the Staff Corps system of promotion, it is not necessary that I should do more than express my concurrence in the reasons

reasons given by your Government for not adopting the proposals made by the Simla Army Commission for forming the officers of each Army Corps into a general list, with a strictly limited establishment of each rank, the promotion in Army rank only taking place as vacancies occur in the rank above. I am entirely in accord with your Lordship in desiring that the existing system shall continue in force in all respects. Hereafter, when a longer experience has shown what the normal rate of promotion in Her Majesty's regiments of the line really is, it may become desirable to readjust the period in which promotion, to the rank of Captain, at any rate, is now obtained in the Staff Corps; but the fact that possibly such readjustment might be become needful, and could then be effected without difficulty, is only an additional proof of the convenience and elasticity of the system which you propose to maintain.

4. I regret, however, that I am unable to agree with your Lordship as to the expediency of introducing a system of multiple battalions for officers by grouping the existing regimental cadres of officers into bodies of three battalions each. I understand that your Government do not at present propose to extend this system to the Native ranks, but desire its introduction solely for the purpose of securing equality of regimental promotion amongst the British officers, but I notice that in para. 34 of your letter it is indicated that you have under consideration a similar system of amalgamation for the Native troops also. As yet, however, no proposals to this effect have reached me, and I accordingly confine my remarks to your recommendation for the formation of three battalion regiments for British officers.

5. The advantages claimed by your Lordship's Government for the proposed system are, that under its operation frequent movements of officers from regiment to regiment, with the consequent supersession and uncertainty now attaching to the prospects of particular individuals, will be prevented; that officers will be identified with a particular establishment, out of which they could not look for regimental advancement; that *esprit de corps* would be engendered, and a much greater equality of promotion be obtained than is possible under the present system. Further, that if one or two of the linked regiments were ordered on service they could be reinforced in the British commissioned ranks from the linked regiment or regiments remaining behind, instead of the vacancies being filled up by young and inexperienced officers brought from elsewhere.

6. Your Government consider that under this system the changes between battalions will be less in number and less objectionable in kind than those which take place under the present system. To reduce transfers, however, to a minimum, you propose that changes shall not be made except in the case of Commandants and seconds in command, and possibly wing Commanders, that is to say, "on a vacancy occurring in the command of a Native regiment the "senior second in command of the three linked battalions will succeed to it, "unless his promotion was objected to by the Commander in Chief; so also with "regard to the second in command."

7. I do not underrate the force of the arguments with which your proposal is sustained, a proposal, however, which is in opposition to the views of the Army Commission, and to those expressed by Lord Northbrook's Government in 1876. Yet I am unable to perceive, either that the evil it is designed to remedy has such prevalence as to justify a change in our military organisation of so material a character as this measure would produce, or, even if it were prevalent, that the linking of three battalions would ensure its removal.

8. It may, I think, be asserted that all the authorities most capable of forming a trustworthy opinion on the subject, agree in considering that the first qualification of a leader of Native troops, in whatever rank, is that he shall be intimately acquainted with and known to his men, and that his value increases in proportion as this object is attained. This element of mutual knowledge and trust seems to me so essential to the well-being of our military system in India, that any proposal which tends, however slightly, to its diminution must establish very strong grounds of necessity to justify its acceptance.

9. It seems to me that, however carefully the linking of the battalions were carried out, the introduction of such a system must result in the frequent

moving of officers from one body of men to another, and thus tend to loosen that bond of intimate personal knowledge which it is desirable to maintain. In this view the existence of some inequality of regimental promotion in different corps seems to be a matter of secondary importance. Some inequality is inseparable from any regimental system, and it obtained in a very remarkable degree in the old Native Army prior to 1857, but I do not discover that at present it exists to any serious extent in the several Native Armies and Forces. Indeed, it is open to doubt whether the preservation of a dead level of regimental advancement in an army is altogether beneficial, or whether in the chance of attaining early distinction, and of earning thereby its consequent advancement, the State does not possess a valuable stimulus to exertion on the part of its younger officers.

10. At the same time it may be admitted that in certain cases the casualties amongst the senior officers may be so exceptionally rapid as to necessitate the appointment of officers from the outside, but I desire to point out that such cases, which must even on actual service be comparatively rare, are fully met by the rules for promotions proposed by Lord Napier of Magdala in 1875, recommended by the Government of India in their Military Letter, No. 53, of 1876, and approved by the Marquis of Salisbury in his Despatch, No. 215, of the same year. I am not aware that these rules have in any way failed in their effect, and I think it should be incontrovertibly shown that after fair trial they have not succeeded before recourse is had to any other measure to provide for the object which those rules were intended to meet.

11. With regard to the proposals that limitation be placed on the length of regimental service, and on the tenure of regimental appointments, I need say nothing here, as they have been already disposed of in my predecessor's Military Despatches, No. 298, of 8th September 1881, and No. 103, of 16th March 1882.

12. In considering the question of the regimental status of the Army Staff and certain officers of the Army Departments, you propose that the rules now in force, under which officers appointed from Native regiments to the Army Staff in appointments tenable for five years are, except in some of the higher appointments, seconded in their corps, shall be made of general application, and that every officer of the Staff Corps or Indian service holding an appointment in the Army Staff or civil departments of the Army, except the Commissariat and Military Accounts Departments and the Department of the Accountant General, shall be attached to some Native regiment to which he will revert on the completion of his term of Staff service. Your Lordship proposes, however, to except from this rule the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in the Military Department, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, with their deputies, and the Director of Army Remount Operations, who should vacate their regimental position on being nominated to any of these appointments. The same rule will apply of course to officers who may be permanently appointed to Brigade or District commands.

13. I approve of these proposals, but I think it should be further ruled that an officer reverting to his regimental position from Army Staff will be required to remain in the performance of regimental duty for at least two years before he is again selected for Staff duties, and that no more than two officers shall be seconded in any one regiment for those Army Staff appointments which are tenable for five years only.

14. I am not of opinion that it will be advantageous to carry out your proposal that an officer of the Commissariat or Military Accounts Department shall be retained on the regimental rolls for a period of 10 years, and at the end of that time be given the option of returning to the regiment or permanently leaving it. I do not think such a measure would, in practice, prove beneficial either to the regiment or to the department, nor would it be in accordance with the general principle on which the Staff Corps was formed. To keep officers on the rolls of regiments for so prolonged a period, eligible to come back when they see an opportunity of regimental distinction, or when they have any departmental difference or dissatisfaction, seems to me likely to revive some of the most objectionable features of the system in force in the Native Army under

its old organisation, while it would tend to create a feeling of unrest among the officers who remain with regiments greater than that which existed in those times, inasmuch as under the proposed system the return of officers after 10 years, or after any prolonged period, would remove officers from higher to lower regimental positions, and render officers at the bottom of the regimental cadre supernumerary. I apprehend further that a system by which officers of departments remained in this uncertain position for 10 years, eligible to revert to their regiments, and watching the whole time to see which line would be most advantageous for them, could not conduce to the welfare of the department.

15. I am of opinion, therefore, that it will be better to sever the connection of such officers with their regiments so soon as they have passed the authorized departmental tests and examinations, and have, as recommended by the Army Commission, fulfilled a period of satisfactory departmental service of two years; officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department being placed on the same footing in this respect as the officers of the Commissariat, Transport, and Military Accounts Departments.

16. There are, however, certain minor civil army appointments which should not all be placed on the same footing in respect to the regimental status of the officers holding them; such, for example, as the Army Clothing Agents at each Presidency, Inspecting Officers of Army Schools, the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of the Remount Depôt in Bengal, the Remount Agents at Hosur and Calcutta, and possibly others. Some of these appointments obviously require special qualifications and experience, which it would be unwise to throw away after a five years' tenure of office, while they would be of little use to a regimental officer. I shall be glad if your Lordship will consider which of these appointments should be permanent, and which of them tenable for five years only. Those which it may be decided to place in the former category will then be dealt with in the same manner as I have authorised for the Commissariat Department, those in the latter class being retained on the strength of regiments on the same footing as officers holding Army Staff appointments.

17. I would take the opportunity here of referring to the proposal made in para. 58 of your Military Letter, No. 401, of 1881, viz., that officers employed with local regiments, such as the Hyderabad Contingent and Central India Horse, shall be borne on the rolls of regiments of the regular Army as supernumeraries. I gather that this proposal, which I observe was not concurred in by His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, was made in view of the organisation of the several Army Corps and the absorption of the Punjab Frontier Force into the regular Army, when it would have been undesirable that any troops should remain outside that organisation. As, however, this measure has not been adopted, I do not think it needful to enter at length into this subject; but I would note in passing that these corps are for the most part in a high state of efficiency, and that to limit service with them to a few years could not but prove detrimental to their well-being, while it would add very largely to the number of supernumeraries in regiments of the regular Army, to the disadvantage of the officers, especially those in the junior grades, of the regular establishment.

18. I will now consider the regimental status of officers employed on purely civil duties unconnected with the army or military administration. These officers, as your Lordship observes, are rapidly decreasing in numbers, fresh appointments being now seldom made to the police or to district duty in the non-regulation provinces. You consider that they should continue to be borne as supernumerary on the strength of their regiments for 10 years from date of first appointment, after which they should be struck off the list, and not be eligible to return to regimental duty, and that they should in no case be promoted beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

19. The reasons I have already given for not desiring the retention of the names of officers of Civil Army Departments for long periods on the regimental rolls apply with even more force to the case of officers in purely civil employment. I consider, therefore, that all officers permanently admitted into the Civil Department should thereupon cease to be borne on the rolls of a regiment, and that

after 10 years' absence from military duty, they should be struck off the effective list of the Army, and placed on a supernumerary list, rising thereon under the regulations in force to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but to no higher grade, retaining, however, all claims to pension under military rules. Neither of these conditions of removal from the regimental rolls, or from the effective list of the Army, will be applicable to officers of rank taken for high political or civil employment, or to officers taken for temporary civil, or political duties in the field or in newly-acquired territories.

20. Though I approve of the restriction of military promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the case of officers employed in purely civil duties, I do not desire that the rule shall be applied to any officers serving in the Civil Army Departments of whatever nature. Should you agree in this view, I will take the necessary steps to give effect to the proposed restriction with this qualification.

See para. 33, p. 592.

21. There remains the question of the system under which the Staff Corps shall be recruited. I have given this subject, the importance of which I fully recognise, my very careful consideration.

22. The system under which the Staff Corps is maintained at its proper establishment is, as your letter describes it, automatic, no officer being taken except where there is a vacancy for him, but an officer being at once admitted on probation in each vacancy as it occurs. If this principle is steadily adhered to there cannot, in normal circumstances, occur any undue number of admissions in any given year, or any consequent stagnation of promotion in the future; at the same time the maintenance of the Native regiments up to their prescribed establishment would be assured. I do not see any grounds on which it would be safe to depart from this principle of supplying the requirements of the Staff Corps. I will, however, deal with this subject in full in replying to your Lordship's Letter, No. 176, of 1883. The question which calls for present consideration is, whether the present system of obtaining these officers is a satisfactory one. Your Lordship's Government, concurring with the opinion expressed by the Army Commission, consider it to be unsatisfactory, or at least not so satisfactory as the alternative scheme of drawing recruits direct from Sandhurst might be expected to prove, and accordingly both your Government and the Army Commissioners recommend that officers for the Staff Corps shall be appointed direct from Sandhurst, instead of, as at present, their being drawn from British regiments serving in India or elsewhere.

23. I have to express regret that I should, on this point also, fail to be in agreement with your Government. The question as to the most effectual method of obtaining suitable officers for the Native Army is essentially one in which actual experience furnishes the safest guide. The results of the present mode of obtaining recruits have been so excellent in respect to the character and qualifications of the officers who, under that system, have joined the Native Army, including many field officers and every captain and subaltern now serving in it, that it seems to me a needless risk to depart from it in any essential degree.

24. The grounds on which the change is recommended by the Army Commissioners appear to be primarily that service with Native troops is not attractive enough to produce a sufficient supply of officers to fill its ranks, in supporting which view they refer to the deficiencies in the lower ranks, especially in the Madras and Bombay Armies. The Commissioners further considered that service with a British regiment in India tends to produce a dislike to service with a Native regiment. Your Lordship agrees with this latter view, and you add that, "The young officer attached to a regiment, especially one which has "been only a short time in the country, too often learns to look down on the "Native soldiers; and that while, on the one hand, many young officers who "come out to India intending to enter the Staff Corps are dissuaded from doing "so, on the other hand, young officers are sometimes driven to enter the Staff "Corps, not from any desire to take service with Native troops, but from want "of means to meet the expenses of service in a British regiment; while there "are probably no conditions of Indian life in which a young man learns less of "the people of a country or sees them to less advantage than when serving with "a British regiment."

25. With

25. With regard to the first reason given by the Commissioners, viz., the paucity of applicants for admission, I would observe that, allowing its correctness at the time the Report was framed, the objection has since that date disappeared, for at present the supply exceeds the demand, and there would be no difficulty now, and I believe will be none in future, in providing a considerably larger number of probationers for the Indian Staff Corps than there are likely to be vacancies for them to fill. It does not, therefore, appear to me that, on this ground, sufficient cause is shown for a departure from the present system of obtaining recruits for the Corps.

26. The other reasons assigned for drawing young officers direct from Sandhurst have, *primâ facie*, considerable force, but I think that, when viewed in the light of actual experience, they do not really establish a case against the qualifications of those officers who have been drawn from regiments. I have found no proof, nor am I aware that it has anywhere been distinctly alleged, that these officers have failed to identify themselves with Native soldiers. On the contrary, taking as my authority the reports on the individual officers in the annual confidential reports of Native regiments, it appears to me to be established that the captains and subalterns serving with them are highly efficient, and I find no trace of any complaint that they undervalue or take little interest in their men.

27. Such a result is, I think, only what might be expected from the present system, which secures that officers join the Native Army on probation at their own request; that during their probation they have to pass examinations in professional knowledge as well as in languages; and that, if during a sufficiently long period of probation they seem not likely to make efficient officers of Native troops, they have to be reported to Army Head-quarters by the officer most directly interested in excluding inefficient officers from his regiment, and who is also bound by regulation to bring to the notice of the Commander in Chief any case of a probationer who, either from temper or other cause, does not appear suitable for employment with Native troops. On the other hand, the present system removes the very appreciable risk (which would attach to direct appointments) that officers so appointed, not having first been tested with Native troops, may on trial be found unsuited for the particular service, or may dislike it, and nevertheless be bound to continue in the service, however distasteful it might be to them.

28. There is another ground on which the proposed alteration might possibly be advocated, viz., that it will ensure a more ready, complete, and manageable source of supply, and this is, apparently, a view taken by the Army Commission in their Report. In my opinion, the existing system is the more advantageous one even in this respect. Under it officers are taken day by day as they are wanted; and, if it is desired to reduce or augment the supply, it can be readily effected at the shortest notice, while a supply received through a military college requires careful forecasts to be prepared considerably in advance. It thus appears to me that the plan of taking officers from regiments possesses an elasticity which would be wanting in a system of direct appointment.

29. There is a financial question connected with this subject which is not, I think, noticed by your Lordship's Government, namely, that if officers are admitted direct through Sandhurst, a heavy contribution will be required towards the maintenance of that establishment, as the payments on account of students fall considerably short of the cost of the institution. This additional charge, would, of course, not be sufficient in itself to require the rejection of the principle of direct appointment, but it forms an additional reason for carefully weighing the merits of the respective systems.

30. There remains a further objection to the proposal, to which I attach much weight, but which is not referred to in your Lordship's letter, that is, the absolute bar which your Government would, apparently, oppose to the existing power of taking officers for the Staff Corps from regiments in India. Such a measure would, I am satisfied, be prejudicial to the interests of your army. Experience has abundantly shown that many officers, after going to India, develope a taste for the country, the people, and the languages, or make it otherwise evident that they possess some special acquirements which promise to make

make them valuable officers for the Native Army, or for some particular appointment in the Indian Service. Under a system of direct appointment there would be no opening for such officers, and the Indian military service, with the Departments which recruit from that service, would be denied the advantages offered by the large supply of specially qualified officers obtainable from regiments serving in India.

31. It is scarcely practicable at present to form more than a generally approximate estimate of the number of recruits which will be required yearly to fill vacancies in the three Staff Corps, but I believe that about 90 may be taken as being within the mark. The batteries and regiments serving in India could, doubtless, furnish this or an even larger number without serious inconvenience, but I am satisfied that, for many reasons, it will be desirable to obtain a proportion of these recruits from corps serving at home or in the colonies, without waiting till the Indian source of supply is exhausted. It is obviously to the advantage of the Indian service that the field of selection should be as wide as possible, and it is also advantageous that the Indian Staff Corps should be regarded from an Imperial rather than an entirely local point of view. The supply from this source would so largely exceed the demand as to afford a real power of selection, which would react in the same direction on India.

32. This source of supply has been drawn on, from time to time, but only intermittently, and on no fixed data. I now propose to inform the Secretary of State for War and His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief that during the trooping season of 1884-85, and thereafter year by year, a fixed number of Staff Corps probationers will be accepted under the rules now in existence, though temporarily in abeyance. I consider that 20 should be laid down as the average yearly number to be sent out from England to be distributed in due proportion between the three Staff Corps, the distribution being made by your Government on the arrival of the officers at Bombay. On the principle I have already referred to, none of these probationers would be admitted except on an actual vacancy, but this could be easily arranged. Your Government being aware that, during the five or six months of the trooping season, 20 probationers would arrive from England for the three Presidencies no practical inconvenience would arise from that number of vacancies being kept open pending their arrival.

33. I do not think that there is any further subject in your Lordship's letter, No. 230, of 1881, now remaining for disposal, and I will only add that, in communicating the decision contained in para. 19, to remove from the effective list all officers in civil employ who may complete 10 years' service in that Department, it should be made clear that these rules will not be applicable to officers already serving in civil and political employ, the Police, the Public Works, or the Survey Departments, but all officers who may be appointed after the 1st April 1884 to these branches of employment will be subject to removal to a Supernumerary List on attaining the rank of substantive Lieutenant Colonel, retaining, however, all claims to Pension and Colonel's allowances they may previously possess.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

— VI. —

TENURE OF REGIMENTAL COMMANDS.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 298) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 8 September 1881.

Para. 1. I HAVE received your Military Letter, No. 230, of 24th June 1881, submitting the proposals of your Lordship's Government upon the several recommendations of the Indian Army Organisation Commission in respect to the Native Army.

2. I hope to reply to your Lordship on all the points contained in that letter at an early date, but with reference to paragraph 21, which deals with the question of limiting the tenure of regimental appointments, as I have had that subject under my immediate consideration in connection with the recently revised scale of Indian pensions, it is desirable that I should at once communicate, for your information and guidance, the decision to which I have come on this matter.

3. While I entirely agree with your Government as to the expediency of introducing a system of limited regimental service, yet it has not seemed expedient to give effect to the measure in precisely the manner indicated by the Indian Army Organisation Commission, nor to follow in all its details the recommendations contained in Government of India Military Letter of 10th March 1876.

4. The Commission Report recommends that regimental commands shall be vacated when officers have attained 31 years' service, and have held their appointment for five years. These data, which apparently follow the system in force in the British line, were assumed before the new scale of pensions was laid down; in that scale the highest rate of pension is attainable in 32 years, and there would be no special advantage, but rather the contrary, in compelling retirement, while the officer would still have some time to serve before he could claim his full pension. In this view I should have preferred 32 years as the time of service, had it been decided to adopt that mode of fixing the limit.

5. While I admit that disqualification by service is the more convenient system when all officers are on the same footing, yet when, as in the case of the present Staff Corps, the actual army service and the service for Indian pension differ so greatly as they do amongst those officers who belonged to the old Indian Army, those who entered the Staff Corps from the British line corps at an early period of its formation, and those who entered it more recently, that is, since the limit of service prior to admission has been reduced, it appears to me that the better plan will be to adopt an age disqualification for regimental service, coupled with a disqualifying term for the tenure of command.

6. I am further of opinion, after very careful consideration of the subject, that unless a limit to the tenure of command to five years be proved hereafter essential to a sufficient flow of promotion, a term of seven years will, in the interests of regiments, be more suitable in every respect. In taking five years as the limit of command, I believe the Commission were influenced by the rule which obtains in the British Army, but the conditions of service in the two branches differ so materially in some important points that an identical rule could not be appropriately applied to both. In the Indian service, an officer removed from his command on the expiration of his prescribed tour will, save in a few exceptional cases, remain permanently without employment, unless selected for a brigade command, which a very limited number could hope to obtain. In the British service there is, on the contrary, a large field of employment for these officers, both in the Army Staff and in district and brigade depôts.

7. To remove officers after a five years' tour of command would have the effect of creating a considerable body of unemployed officers with still some time to serve for the higher rate of pension, and while of an age to render useful regimental service.

8. I have decided, therefore, that the limit of regimental service shall be 52 years of age, with a command tenure of seven years, which will give a mean service of from 32 to 33 years, but with respect to present incumbents and their immediate successors some relaxation of these conditions seems right.

9. With this view, I desire that all who now hold substantive regimental commands be granted an extension of command without any conditions (except, of course, promotion to the grade of general officer, or the attainment of colonel's allowances) to the 1st April 1883, and that present incumbents be allowed to retain their commands until they reach 55 years of age or complete a tenure of seven years' command, whichever may happen first, and further that any present incumbent who may not have completed five years' tenure of command before attaining to 55 years of age be allowed to do so, subject always to the above-mentioned existing restrictions. Their immediate successors will be permitted to hold command until the attainment of 55 years of age, or the completion of seven years' tenure of command, whichever may happen first. Thereafter the restriction will be to 52 years of age, or seven years' tenure of command, whichever may happen first.

10. With regard to the two classes: I., those who immediately succeed to present incumbents, and, II., those who succeed thereafter, where the prescribed limits have been reached before the officer has served for the pension granted for 32 years' service, such officer may, on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, be permitted, should your Government desire it, an extension of command, not exceeding two years, towards his 32 years' pension service, or such less period as may be required for its completion. No portion of these special extensions of regimental service or tenure of command will be permitted to be passed on any leave or furlough except privilege leave.

11. I have not overlooked the fact, that of those now in the Staff Corps many may elect to remain in the service for the attainment of the highest retirement, or colonel's allowances, after 38 years' service, and that for some years these officers, having fulfilled their term of regimental employment, will remain unemployed and drawing their Indian pay and allowances. It is obviously undesirable to have a considerable number of senior officers in India drawing high pay with little prospect of further employment. I accordingly sanction these officers having the option of completing their service at home on the furlough pay of their rank.

12. I have advisedly ameliorated the terms of retirement proposed by your Lordship's Government, as I am of opinion, in the first place, that the introduction of the radical changes in the conditions of Indian service which this measure involves should be carried out with the fullest regard to existing interests, and further, that an assured continuance of service within such limits as are compatible with military efficiency is the most efficacious mode of ensuring the popularity of service in the Indian Army. I believe that the terms I have laid down will not fail in either of these conditions, while they are sufficient to ensure such flow of regimental promotion as the conditions of the service require. Should it, however, hereafter appear that they are in any particular inadequate to the objects aimed at, there will be no difficulty in making such modifications in them as further experience may have shown to be needful.

13. I request that these regulations may be notified in your Lordship's General Orders to come into effect at once throughout India, and until further orders.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 441 of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (received 9 January 1882).

My Lord, Fort William, 16 December 1881.

WE have had the honour to receive your Lordship's Despatch No. 298, of the 8th September, laying down rules for the limitation of the tenure of regimental commands.

2. These rules are embodied in the 9th and 10th paragraphs of your Lordship's Despatch, in which it is ordered that all officers who now hold substantive regimental commands shall "be granted an extension of command without "any conditions (except, of course, promotion to the grade of general officer, or "the attainment of colonel's allowances) to the 1st of April 1883, and that "present incumbents be allowed to retain their commands until they reach "55 years of age or complete a tenure of seven years' command, whichever may "happen first, and further, that any present incumbent who may not have com-"pleted five years' tenure of command before attaining 55 years of age be "allowed to do so, subject always to the above-mentioned restrictions," that is, the restrictions of attaining to the colonel's allowances or being promoted to general officer. The immediate successors of existing incumbents are to be permitted to hold command until the attainment of 55 years of age or the completion of seven years' tenure of command, whichever may happen first. Thereafter the restriction will be to 52 years of age or seven years' tenure of command, whichever may happen first.

3. Before proceeding to publish these rules we gave our consideration to the probable effect they would have with regard to some of the present senior officers of the army. The rules allow a tenure of office up to 55 years of age, subject to certain conditions for existing incumbents and their immediate successors; the reduction of the limit of age to 52 years is to be made with the third in succession in each case, so that existing commandants and their immediate successors are thus placed on more favourable terms than those who come afterwards.

4. In order to ascertain approximately what would be the effect of these rules, we have had tables prepared, which we attach to this Despatch, showing with regard to each Native regiment of the Indian armies:—

I.—The number of years for which present incumbents will have held the command of their respective regiments before they are required to vacate under these rules.

II.—The similar case of the present seconds in command

III.—The case of the officers who stand third in succession.

5. It will be seen from these tables that the last-named class of officers in a large number of cases would have no chance of succeeding to the command at all; that is, the limitation of age of 52 years would operate to disqualify them before their immediate seniors had attained to the limit of 55 years of age or seven years' command. These figures are of course only a rough approximation, because they take no account of the deaths and retirements which may be expected to take place before the time up to which the calculations are made, and the actual result would therefore be much less unfavourable for the officers third in succession than the tables represent. The precise extent of this difference cannot be determined. But, still these figures indicate, we think, very plainly that the juniors will be placed relatively at a great disadvantage as compared with existing commandants and their immediate successors.

6. The matter may be regarded in another way. Including supernumeraries there will usually be about nine officers in a regiment, and assuming the juniors to have two, and the seniors 32, years' service, the average difference of age between each officer will be 3¾ years. This difference will, of course, be unequally distributed; the gaps will be wider at the top and smaller at the bottom; still the difference in age between the first man and the second in each regimental

regimental list will, on the average, not be so great as seven years, and therefore seven years appears to be too long a term to allow for the command of a regiment, if all are to have an equal chance of succeeding to it.

7. In the British service various contrivances have lately been introduced, in the way of compulsory retirement at certain ages and in certain ranks, bonuses, and so forth, in order to induce officers to retire from the lower ranks, so that the chances of succession to the command may be improved for the juniors. Yet, even with those it has been found necessary to reduce the term of command from five to four years. But in the Indian army no such collateral inducement or compulsory retirement are in force; indeed the new pension rules are calculated on the assumption that every officer will hold on for the maximum pension of 32 years' service. Much more, then, does it appear necessary to shorten the limit of command in the latter. There is undoubtedly this difference, that in the British regiment there are more than 20 officers working up to the top of the regiment, while there are only eight in the Indian regiments; still these considerations appear to show that seven years is too long a term to fix if all are to have an equal chance.

8. They, are, moreover, based on the assumption that the officering of the regiments of the Indian Army is in a normal state, that is, that the junior officer is a young man of two years' service, and that the intermediate officers are of ages in proportion. But this is not the condition of the army, especially the Madras Army. The Indian Army now has an undue proportion of senior officers, owing to the fact that the reductions made during the last 20 years in the strength of the establishment have been carried out to a great extent by stopping admissions. In the Madras Army* the field officers are largely in excess of the captains and subalterns; the block at the top is therefore abnormally great; and this would appear to us to be a reason for shortening the term of command in the first instance to even less than five years, which was the term we proposed, rather than lengthening it.

*Madras Army, 1881—

Lieutenant Colonels and Brevet Colonels	248
Majors	226
Captains	60
Subalterns	110
	644

9. We are not unmindful, indeed, that when a change of this sort is introduced into the Army some special consideration is due to the senior officers, because they are the first to come under the operation of it; while those who come afterwards will have received a longer warning. But on the other hand, it has to be remembered that a considerable number of commandants of regiments have already held those posts for a long period, having been appointed to them when comparatively young officers, and that they have thus been standing in the way of juniors who have but little less length of service than themselves. And on the whole, we are disposed to think that the conflicting claims of the two classes would be more fitly dealt with by some modification of the proposed rules in the sense of these suggestions. And as your Lordship has directed that they shall not come into effect until the 31st of March 1883, we have thought it better to refer the matter to you again, with a request that the points we have now brought forward might be first considered by your Lordship. You observed in the 12th paragraph of your Despatch that, if the terms laid down in it are found to be inadequate to the objects aimed at, there would be no difficulty in making such modifications in them as further experience may show to be needful. But having in view the peculiar condition of the regimental lists of the army already referred to, namely, the great block of senior officers, it appears to us at least worthy of consideration whether it would not be better to set out with the five years' limitation of command, and to extend it afterwards if it should be found expedient to do so. We have not, for our part, much expectations that this necessity will arise, especially if, as we proposed on a former occasion, provision be made to allow officers of approved capacity an extension of the term of command. Apart from considerations of the present peculiar condition of the army in the disproportionate number of senior officers, we think that a more limited tenure of command as the rule, with occasional extension, would be generally preferable to the longer term for all now prescribed by your Lordship.

10. When

10. When recommending, in our Despatch, No. 230, of the 24th June 1881, the adoption of the conditions proposed by the Army Commission on this head, which were in general accordance with those already proposed by the Government of India in 1876,* that regimental commands should be vacated when officers have attained 31 years' service, and have held the appointment for five years, we were not unmindful of the fact that the proposed new scale of pensions which has since come into force gives the highest rate of pension attainable after 32 years' service, and we agree with your Lordship in thinking that it would be generally the reverse of advantageous to compel retirements before the officer has served for that highest rate. But we had in view the consideration that, especially in the present condition of the lists, officers will not usually succeed to the command of a regiment until after they have completed 26 years' service, and that in these cases the officer will be able to serve on beyond 31 years in order to complete his five years' tenure of command. But although recommending 31 years as the limit, because this had been already proposed by the Government of India in 1876, as well as by the Army Commission, we think that 32 years would be quite as suitable, and that the limit of age, 52 years, fixed by your Lordship, is even preferable to a limit of service, as it gives a proper advantage to those who enter the army young. The point on which we would ask for reconsideration is whether, for the reasons above given, this limitation of 52 years of age should not take effect with regard to existing incumbents, and also whether, considering that this matter has been under consideration for a long time, and that the nature of the proposals of the Army Commission on this head are well known, sufficient notice has not already been given of the proposed change, and whether it is expedient to defer action until April 1883. We would suggest the 31st October 1882 as a preferable date.

* Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 53, of the 10th March 1877, paras. 15–17.

11. The new pension rules have been framed in view to give officers a maximum pension after 32 years' service, such as may induce them to retire at that point instead of holding on for the colonel's allowance, to which all of the existing senior officers are entitled after 38 years' service. But if officers are allowed to hold their regimental commands up to 55 years of age, the maximum pension remaining unaltered after 32 years' service, the temptation to hold on for the colonel's allowance will be very great, and it is to be feared that the new pension rules will as regards the senior officers be found practically inoperative. This appears to be another reason in favour of the modification we propose.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

TABLES shewing Effects of the recent Orders of Her Majesty's Government regarding the Tenure of Regimental Commands.

BENGAL ARMY.

Taken from last Bengal Army List, corrected to 30th September 1881.

Regiment.	Case of Present Commandant.		Case of Present 2nd in Command.		Case of Present 3rd in Succession.		
	Regiment becomes Vacant.	Number of Years he will have been in Command.	Age on Regiment becoming Vacant.	Tenure of his Appointment as Commandant.	Age on Succeeding to Command.	Tenure of Appointment.	—
1st Bengal Cavalry -	September 1887	7	49 2/12	5 10/12	55	–	
2nd " " - -	March 1887 -	7	50	5	55	–	
3rd " " - -	January 1885 -	7	53	2	50	2	
4th " " - -	December 1881	15	46	7	52	–	
5th " " - -	June 1888 -	7	49	6	57	–	
6th " " - -	September 1883	7	43	7	54	–	
7th " " - -	April 1885 -	6½	45	7	52	–	
8th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	No permanent commandant.
9th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
10th " " - -	December 1887	7	48	7	52	–	
11th " " - -	1st April 1883	7 1/12	51	4	51	1	
12th " " - -	1st April 1883	15½	43	7	50	2	
13th " " - -	1st April 1883	11½	44	7	52	–	
14th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
15th " " - -	1st April 1883	16	49	6	51	1	
16th " " - -	October 1883 -	7	44	7	52	–	
17th " " - -	April 1885 -	7	50	5	51	1	
18th " " - -	April 1883 -	7	44	7	54	–	
19th " " - -	January 1888 -	7	47	7	51	1	
1st Bengal Infantry -	March 1884 -	7	47	7	53	–	
2nd " " - -	1st April 1883	9	53	2	53	–	
3rd " " - -	November 1885	5	45	7	52	–	
4th " " - -	September 1887	7	47	7	53	–	
5th " " - -	March 1887 -	7	51	4	47	5	
6th " " - -	June 1888 -	7	49	6	53	–	
7th " " - -	November 1885	7	46	7	51	1	
8th " " - -	April 1887 -	7	46	7	49	3	
9th " " - -	June 1885 -	4 11/12	47	7	50	2	
10th " " - -	January 1882 -	2½	46	7	50	2	
11th " " - -	December 1886	6½	44	7	53	–	
12th " " - -	May 1888 -	7	46	7	53	–	
13th " " - -	1st April 1883	4½	47	7	46	6	
14th " " - -	1st April 1883	7½	47	7	48	4	
15th " " - -	1st April 1883	21	48	7	51	1	
16th " " - -	1st April 1883	5½	48½	6½	47	5	
17th " " - -	February 1886	7	46	7	47	5	
18th " " - -	1st April 1883	21 10/12	49	6	53	–	
19th " " - -	January 1887 -	7	49	6	54	–	
20th " " - -	1st April 1883	10	48	7	56	–	
21st " " - -	April 1887 -	7	46	7	49	3	
22nd " " - -	February 1885	5	45	7	40	7	
23rd " " - -	January 1888 -	7	45	7	50	2	
24th " " - -	December 1884	5 4/12	43	7	50	2	
25th " " - -	December 1884	7	55	–	44	7	
26th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
27th " " - -	June 1887 -	7	41	7	53	–	
28th " " - -	August 1885 -	7	47	7	52	–	
29th " " - -	1st April 1883	21 11/12	45	7	50	2	
30th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
31st " " - -	February 1885	5	45	7	50	2	
32nd " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
33rd " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	- ditto.
34th " " - -	December 1884	7	48	7	51	1	
35th " " - -	October 1884 -	7	48	7	49	3	
36th " " - -	August 1886 -	7	50	5	52	–	

BENGAL ARMY—*continued.*

Regiment.	Case of Present Commandant.		Case of Present 2nd in Command.		Case of Present 3rd in Succession.		
	Regiment becomes Vacant.	Number of Years he will have been in Command.	Age on Regiment becoming Vacant	Tenure of his Appointment as Commandant.	Age on succeeding to Command.	Tenure of Appointment.	
37th Bengal Infantry -	1st April 1883	$7\frac{11}{12}$	45	7	40	7	
38th " " - -	April 1883 -	7	45	7	56	–	
39th " " - -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	No permanent commandant.
40th " " - -	1st April 1883	$24\frac{10}{12}$	47	7	50	2	
41st " " - -	June 1887 -	7	47	7	42	7	
42nd " " - -	1st April 1883	$8\frac{3}{12}$	54	1	47	5	
43rd " " - -	August 1888 -	7	49	6	53	–	
44th " " - -	August 1888 -	7	46	7	51	1	
45th " " - -	November 1885	7	46	7	47	5	

MADRAS ARMY.

Taken from latest Army List, corrected to 30th June 1881.

1st Regt. Light Cavalry -	May 1888 -	7	54	1	55	–	
2nd " " " -	December 1885	7	45	7	51	1	
3rd " " " -	August 1885 -	6	54	1	51	1	
4th " " " -	October 1884 -	6	49	6	52	–	
1st Regt. Native Infantry -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	No permanent commandant.
2nd " " " -	June 1883 -	5	50	5	54	–	
3rd " " " -	December 1886	$6\frac{1}{2}$	52	3	51	1	
4th " " " -	February 1887	$6\frac{1}{2}$	49	6	53	–	
5th " " " -	September 1887	7	51	4	52	–	
6th " " " -	June 1886 -	6	51	4	54	–	
7th " " " -	January 1886 -	$6\frac{1}{12}$	54	1	50	2	
8th " " " -	December 1884	6	46	7	55	–	
9th " " " -	July 1882 -	$1\frac{10}{12}$	51	4	49	3	
10th " " " -	October 1886 -	$6\frac{1}{2}$	51	4	53	–	
11th " " " -	June 1885 -	6	52	3	52	–	
12th " " " -	February 1884	$5\frac{1}{4}$	52	3	51	1	
13th " " " -	March 1885 -	5	48	$\frac{10}{12}$	48	4	
14th " " " -	June 1883 -	3	52	3	51	1	
15th " " " -	June 1882 -	6	49	6	51	1	
16th " " " -	January 1883 -	6	45	7	55	–	
17th " " " -	April 1888 -	7	51	4	53	–	
19th " " " -	January 1886 -	5	49	6	53	–	
20th " " " -	December 1884	5	$48\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	52	–	
21st " " " -	June 1887 -	7	50	5	53	–	
22nd " " " -	January 1883 -	$2\frac{2}{12}$	46	7	50	2	
23rd " " " -	August 1883 -	$4\frac{1}{2}$	53	2	47	5	
24th " " " -	October 1886 -	$6\frac{1}{2}$	51	4	53	–	
25th " " " -	March 1883 -	2	51	4	51	1	
26th " " " -	February 1884	4	45	3	53	–	
27th " " " -	September 1884	5	$52\frac{8}{12}$	$2\frac{4}{12}$	51	1	
28th " " " -	June 1885 -	5	52	3	50	2	
29th " " " -	December 1885	5	52	3	50	2	
30th " " " -	September 1883	5	46	7	51	1	
31st " " " -	December 1886	6	51	4	49	3	
32nd " " " -	September 1885	5	49	6	54	–	
33rd " " " -	June 1885 -	5	48	7	54	–	
34th " " " -	August 1887 -	7	51	4	53	–	
35th " " " -	December 1883	5	50	5	53	–	
36th " " " -	January 1886 -	6	51	4	52	–	
37th " " " -	March 1883 -	$5\frac{1}{2}$	45	$4\frac{1}{2}$	52	–	
38th " " " -	November 1885	5	52	3	51	1	
39th " " " -	October 1883 -	5	52	3	51	1	
40th " " " -	December 1885	5	50	5	54	–	
41st " " " -	October 1883 -	5	50	5	49	3	

BOMBAY ARMY.

Taken from latest Army List, corrected to 30th July 1881.

Regiment.	Case of Present Commandant.		Case of Present 2nd in Command.		Case of Present 3rd in Succession.		
	Regiment becomes Vacant.	Number of Years he will have been in Command.	Age on Regiment becoming Vacant.	Tenure of his Appointment as Commandant.	Age on Succeeding to Command.	Tenure of Appointment.	
1st Bombay Cavalry -	1st April 1883	8¼	49	6	54	–	
2nd " " - -	January 1888 -	7	49	6	54	–	
3rd " " - -	June 1885 -	7	48	7	50	2	
Poona Horse - - -	April 1883 -	7	49	6	50	2	
1st Regt., Sind Horse -	November 1885	7	47	7	50	2	
2nd " " " - -	——— 1885	7	43	7	46	6	
3rd " " " - -	1st April 1883	10	41	7	43	7	
1st Regt., Native Infantry	May 1886 -	7	48	7	55	–	
2nd " " " -	February 1883	5	45	7	49	3	
3rd " " " -	——— 1885	5	53	2	52	–	
4th " " " -	July 1882 -	5	44	7	49	3	
5th " " " -	—— 1882 -	6	44	7	50	2	
6th " " " -	—— 1887 -	6	50	5	51	1	
7th " " " -	—— 1882 -	7	45	7	54	–	
8th " " " -	—— 1886 -	6	47	7	51	1	
9th " " " -	June 1887 -	7	49	6	54	–	
10th " " " -	May 1888 -	7	50	5	54	–	
11th " " " -	—— 1887 -	6	45	7	59	–	
12th " " " -	—— 1884 -	7	51	4	46	6	
13th " " " -	1st April 1883	6½	47	7	54	–	
14th " " " -	July 1882 -	5	53	2	45	7	
15th " " " -	—— 1887 -	6	52	3	52	–	
16th " " " -	April 1883 -	5	48	7	55	–	
17th " " " -	—— 1883 -	6	47	7	52	–	
18th " " " -	August 1883 -	5	49	6	52	–	
19th " " " -	April 1885 -	5	49	6	51	1	
20th " " " -	June 1887 -	7	52	3	53	–	
21st " " " -	April 1888 -	7	49	6	58	–	
22nd " " " -	—— 1883 -	6	51	4	50	2	
23rd " " " -	1st April 1883	3¼	45	7	49	3	
24th " " " -	- - -	–	–	–	–	–	No permanent commandant.
25th " " " -	December 1885	5	52	3	49	3	
26th " " " -	——— 1883	6	50	5	47	2	
27th " " " -	——— 1886	6	48	7	52	–	
28th " " " -	October 1884 -	7	44	7	51	1	
29th " " " -	——— 1886 -	7	52	3	51	1	
30th " " " -	May 1888 -	7	48	7	54	–	

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 103, Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 16 March 1882.

Para. 1. I HAVE received your Military Letter, No. 441, of 16th December 1881, replying to my Despatch of the 8th September 1881, which communicated to your Lordship's Government the conclusions I had come to in Council on the important question of the limitation of tenure of regimental commands.

2. These conclusions were arrived at after very careful consideration of the measures proposed by your Government in their letter, No. 230, of 24th June 1881, and in full view of their immediate and prospective effect; I have now again had them under careful consideration, in view of the objections raised in your letter under reply. It would have been a satisfaction to me to find that my views were in more complete accordance with those of your Lordship's Government, but while I regret that this should not be so, I find myself still unable to

to accept your original recommendations in their entirety, or to modify the conclusions at which I have already arrived, by any reduction of the periods of command, or of service disqualifying for command, or the introduction of the new system by less gradual steps than those previously communicated to your Government, though, as I need hardly say, I have not decided on adhering to my previous instructions without giving full weight to the objections brought against them. I do not think that any advantage would arise from recapitulating the several grounds on which my conclusions were based, but I would remark that in the preparation of rules for the regulation of the tenure of regimental commands the first object to be regarded is the efficiency of regiments, and I am of opinion, after full consideration, that in the Native Army this object will be better attained by fixing the period of command at seven years rather than at five years. I would also remark that, looking to the very large number of regimental commands which have become vacant in the armies of the three Presidencies during the last two years, without the existence of any rules restricting tenure, except those which require command to be vacated upon succession to colonel's allowances, or on promotion to the rank of general officer, I am not under any apprehension that there will not be, under the rules I have already approved, a sufficient flow of promotion to give all qualified officers a fair prospect of succession to commands, and of retaining them for periods approximating at least to the limit of five years proposed by your Excellency, while I should be very unwilling to add to the number of Commanding Officers who will, under the terms of my Despatch, No. 298 o 1881, be displaced from commands after short notice in the year 1883, some of whom, especially in the Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force, are in the full vigour of life.

3. I would only further refer to one point of difference between the conditions of service in the British and Indian Armies, which appears to have been lost sight of by your Government, but which, as I pointed out in paragraph 6 of my previous Despatch, appeared to me of considerable weight in deciding the question of the tenure of Indian regimental commands, viz., the large field of subsequent employment in the rank of colonel for the British Line officers who lose their regimental commands, which is virtually non-existent for the Indian officer similarly situated.

4. My decision in this matter was communicated to you by telegraph* on the 7th instant.

* "Your Despatch 16th December 1881. After full consideration I decide to adhere to conditions of regimental command tenure laid down in my Despatch, 8th September. Please notify accordingly. Letter follows."

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 86 of 1882—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 23 *May* 1882.)

My Lord, Simla, 1 May 1882.

WITH reference to your Lordship's Despatch, No. 103, dated the 16th March 1882, we have the honour to forward copies of our General Order* notifying the conditions which will henceforward regulate the tenure of regimental commands in the Native Armies of India, as laid down in your previous Despatch No. 298, dated India Office, the 8th September 1881.

* No. 209, dated the 21st April 1882.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
J. Gibbs.
T. F. Wilson.
T. C. Hope.

GENERAL ORDER—MILITARY DEPARTMENT—Simla, 21st April 1882.

(No. 209.)

ORGANISATION.

UNDER the orders of the Secretary of State for India, the following conditions regulating the tenure of regimental commands in the Native armies of India are published for general information and guidance :—

(1.) All officers who now hold substantive regimental commands will be granted an extension of command without any conditions (except promotion to the rank of general officer, or the attainment of the colonel's allowance) to the 1st April 1883.

(2.) Subject to the above conditions, present incumbents will be eligible to retain their commands until they attain the age of 55 years, or complete a tenure of seven years' command, whichever may happen first.

(3.) Any present incumbent, who on or after the 1st of April 1883 may not have completed five years' tenure of command before reaching the age of 55 years, will be eligible to complete his five years' tenure of command.

(4.) The immediate successors of present incumbents will be eligible to hold the command of a regiment until the attainment of 55 years of age, or the completion of seven years' tenure of command, whichever may happen first.

(5.) Thereafter, the limits for regimental command will be the attainment of 52 years of age, or a tenure of seven years, whichever may happen first.

(6.) In any case of the commandant of a regiment, other than present incumbents (paragraph 4), who is required to vacate his command under these rules before he has served for the pension granted for 32 years' service, such officer, on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief in India, Madras, or Bombay, and with the approval of the Government of India, Madras, or Bombay, as the case may be, may be permitted an extension of command, not exceeding two years, towards his 32 years' pension service, or such less period as may be required for its completion. But no portion of such special extension of regimental service, or tenure of command, will be permitted to be passed on any leave or furlough except privilege leave.

(7.) Officers of the Staff Corps or Indian Army who entered the service before 1st July 1881, who may elect, on vacating regimental commands, to remain in the service for the attainment of the highest retirement pension, or the colonel's allowance, will be permitted the option of completing their service at home on the furlough pay of their rank, or of remaining in India on the unemployed Indian pay and allowances of their rank if unemployed.

(8.) All regimental commands will continue to be vacated as at present, on promotion to major-general or succession to the colonel's allowance.

(9.) These rules will take effect from this date, so far that any commandants of regiments hereafter appointed will be the next in succession to present incumbents referred to in paragraph 4.

(10.) These rules are applicable also to the Punjab Frontier Force and the Hyderabad Contingent, and so far as regards the limit of age prescribed by them, to other regiments under the direct orders of the Government of India.

(signed) *G. Chesney*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 283 of 1882, Military Department) to her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 23 *November* 1882.)

My Lord, Simla, 6 November 1882.

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's consideration, a memorial from Colonel Sir Hugh Gough, V.C., K.C.B., Commandant 12th Bengal Cavalry, praying that he may be allowed an extension of command for two years, as sanctioned for successors of present incumbents in clause 6 of G. G. O., No. 209 of 1882.

From Adjutant General in India, No. 4784, dated 18th October 1882, and Enclosure.

2. The exclusion of existing commandants from the benefit of the rule under which the next in succession will be eligible for an extension of command under certain conditions, detailed in the above-quoted G. G. O., was prescribed by your Lordship after full consideration. We are therefore unable to support the memorial, and we invite your attention to our previous decision on Colonel Gough's application given in the proceedings marginally quoted.

Proceedings A., July 1882, Nos. 1172–3.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
T. C. Hope.

From Major General Sir *G. R. Greaves*, K.C.M.G., C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 4784—"Regimental Appointments,"—dated Simla, the 18th October 1882).

WITH reference to Military Department, No. 467 A. S., dated the 7th July 1882, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to submit to Government the accompanying memorial from Colonel Sir Hugh Gough, K.C.B., V.C., Commandant 12th Bengal Cavalry, praying that he may be allowed an extension of command for two years, and to state that, in His Excellency's opinion, some concession should at all events be made to officers of less than 32 years' service, who are to be deprived of the command of their regiments under the operation of G. G. O., No. 209 of 1882.

Simla, 12 October 1882.

To the Right Honourable the Marquis of *Hartington*, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

The respectful Memorial of Colonel Sir *Hugh Gough*, K.C.B., V.C., Commandant 12th Bengal Cavalry.

Respectfully showeth,

THAT your memorialist must vacate the command of his regiment, under the provisions of G. G. O., No. 209, of the 21st April 1882, on the 1st of April 1883.

2. That the provisions of the above-quoted order bear hardly on your memorialist for the following amongst other reasons :—

(*a*) The short period of grace allowed to your memorialist between the issue of the order and its being carried into effect, viz., a period of eleven months and nine days only.

(*b*) That he is expressly excluded from the benefit of the privilege granted to all future incumbents, who may not, like himself, have completed the period of 32 years' service, which entitles officers to retire on the full pension of 700 *l.* a year, viz., an extension of their tenure of command for two years, subject to the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander in Chief.

3. Your memorialist most respectfully submits that this exclusion bears most hardly on him for this reason, that, inasmuch as, if it is reasonable and just to grant this special privilege to "future incumbents," who obtain these commands, *knowing their tenure to be limited*, it would appear to be equally reasonable to extend this privilege to officers who when they were so appointed were permitted by the existing regulations of the service to look forward to retaining their commands until they were either promoted to the brigade staff of the army, or retired on pension, or on colonel's allowances, and on whom, therefore, the present order falls with complete surprise.

4. Your memorialist would also most respectfully bring to notice that in 1871, when orders limiting the tenure of regimental commands of British regiments were promulgated, the then "present incumbents" were alone permitted to retain their command beyond that limit; whereas your memorialist, as above shown, is only permitted to retain his command for eleven months from the publication of the analogous order affecting the Indian Army.

5. Your memoralist would also most respectfully venture to represent that in 1861, when the period of general staff appointments was limited to five years, the then "present incumbents" were allowed a grace of two years' extension of tenure of their appointments in consideration of the circumstances attending their case.

6. Your memorialist would therefore most respectfully submit that it is in accordance with all precedent that "present incumbents," and those immediately affected by such orders, are entitled to all such indulgence as can possibly be extended to them.

7. Your memorialist would most humbly solicit your favourable consideration of his case, and under the circumstances he has ventured to represent, and which he has endeavoured to show will entail very great and unforeseen loss on him, after many years of service, sanction the privilege of a two years' extension of command to him, subject to the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

8. Your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 45—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 31 January 1883.

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council your Military Letter, No. 283, dated 6th November 1882, transmitting a memorial from Colonel Sir Hugh Gough, K.C.B., V.C., Commandant 12th Bengal Cavalry, praying that he may be allowed an extension of command for two years, as sanctioned for successors of present incumbents in clause 6 of G. G. O., No. 209 of 1882.

2. You observe that the exclusion of existing commandants from the benefit of the rule under which the next in succession will be eligible for an extension of command under certain conditions detailed in the above-quoted G. G. O. was prescribed by my predecessor in office after full consideration, and that you are therefore unable to support Colonel Gough's memorial.

G. O., 110, 26 February 1883.

3. I observe that His Excellency the Commander in Chief considers some concession should be made to present commandants who will be deprived of their commands under the operation of your General Order, No. 209 of 1882, before they have completed 32 years' service for pension. It appears also from the Adjutant General's Memorandum of the 23rd June 1882 that, in Sir D. Stewart's opinion, the two years' additional tenure of command which may be granted to next successors who shall have completed seven years in command before they have served 32 years for pension, might more properly be granted to those officers who will now suffer by removal from command.

4. It is, however, to be remarked that probably few of the officers who may hereafter succeed to commands will not have completed 32 years' service for pension

pension when they have been seven years in command, and still fewer will be able to complete a full term of nine years in command. The extension, moreover, is subject in each case to the recommendation of the Commander in Chief and the approval of the Government.

5. On the other hand, Sir Hugh Gough will, on the 1st April next, have been in command of the 12th Bengal Cavalry for a period of 15½ years. Several other commandants, who come under the operation of the order, will also have held their commands for periods considerably in excess of nine years, which is the utmost limit of tenure allowed for any future commandant.

6. I admit, however, that, as urged by Sir Hugh Gough, it has been usual, when orders have been issued restricting the tenure of appointments, to defer the removal of officers affected by the order for a period of two years.

7. The date of the 1st April 1883 was inserted in the draft of the original regulations prepared in this office early in July 1881. As you are aware circumstances prevented the issue of the order until the 21st April 1882 and in consequence present commandants had warning of removal barely 11 months before the date on which they would have to vacate.

8. On a full consideration of all the circumstances, I am of opinion that this notice was too short, and I have decided that existing commandants may retain their commands until the 1st April 1884, notwithstanding that they may have completed a seven years' tenure of command, but this concession will not apply to any commandant who between the 1st April 1883 and the 1st April 1884 shall have completed 32 years' service for pension. Any officer so circumstanced should vacate his command from the date on which he completes that period of pension service on or after the 1st April 1883.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

EXTRACT from a Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 192, dated 15th October 1883. (*Received 7 November* 1883.)

From Adjutant General in India, No. 3795 A., dated the 27th September 1883, and Enclosures.

MEMORIAL of Lieutenant Colonel J. Upperton, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps, Commandant 6th Bengal Cavalry, regarding the operation of G. G. Os., No. 209 of 1882, and No. 110 of 1883, under which he will have to vacate his command on the 1st April 1884, and praying for a modification of those orders.

We are unable to support the prayer of the memorialist.

From Lieutenant Colonel *H. Collett*, Deputy Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 3795 A.—"Regimental Appointments,"—dated Simla, the 27th September 1883).

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to submit for the orders of the Government of India, the accompanying memorial from Lieutenant Colonel J. Upperton, C.B., Commandant 6th Bengal Cavalry, representing the hardships he will suffer by the operation of G. G. Os., No. 209 of 1882, and No. 110 of 1883, which require him to vacate his command on the 1st April 1884, and praying for a modification of those orders.

2. His Excellency is unable to make any recommendation in support of the memorial.

Simla, 13 September 1883.

To the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India.

The respectful Memorial of Lieutenant Colonel *John Upperton*, C.B., Commandant 6th Bengal Cavalry.

Respectfully showeth,

THAT under the provisions of G. G. O., No. 209, of 21st April 1882, modified by G. G. O., No. 110, of the 26th February 1883, your memorialist must vacate the command of his regiment on 1st April 1884.

2. That the provisions of the above-quoted orders are the cause to your memorialist of most serious loss and almost total professional ruin, as the following statement will show.

3. Your memorialist entered the service on the 10th June 1854, and was selected for the command of the late 16th Bengal Cavalry by G. O. C. C. of the 20th November 1876, being then a major of only two years and five months' standing, and succeeded to the command on the 5th December 1876.

On the 30th June 1882 the 16th Bengal Cavalry was reduced, and your memorialist was appointed to the command of the 6th Bengal Cavalry on the same date.

4. On the 1st April 1884 your memorialist will not have completed 29 years and 10 months' service, will still be only a lieutenant colonel, will not be eligible apparently for any appointment of even equal value with the one he must vacate, and being only a lieutenant colonel will of course not be eligible for any superior command.

5. Thus your memorialist's selection for command as a junior major, instead of being the reward and the advantage it was considered to be at the time, becomes, by the introduction of the G. G. Os. above quoted, the very reverse, and is a source of grievous loss and a serious disadvantage.

6. On the 1st April 1884 your memorialist will have held the command of a regiment for seven years three months and twenty-six days; three years and six months as a major and three years and nine months as a lieutenant colonel.

Had the appointment to the command carried with it, as in the British service, the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel, your memorialist would have become a full colonel in the army on the 20th November 1880, and so have been eligible for other appointments of equal and superior value to that he must relinquish; or had your memoralist elected to refuse the command when offered to him on the 20th November 1876, and to wait until he became a substantive lieutenant colonel before accepting the command (and this would have been a matter for grave consideration had your memorialist known of the possibility of such an order as the one quoted above), he would have been entitled to retain the command, under the new regulations, until the 10th June 1887, or until the completion of seven years' service as a substantive lieutenant colonel in command, and then have become entitled to the pension for 32 years' service.

7. But, as at present situated, no such promotion accrues to your memorialist; no such appointments are open to him; he is entitled to no such pension, and has no prospects to look forward to. His professional career is apparently closed.

8. Your memorialist further begs to submit that the very short period of grace allowed to him by the above-quoted G. G. Os. places him in a worse position than commandants who had completed their seven years' tenure of command on or before the 1st April 1883. These, no matter how long they had held command, were allowed a year's extra grace on the ground of the very short notice before the introduction of the order.

Your

Your memorialist, whose tenure of command will be completed after the 1st April 1883, will not be treated with the same liberality, as he will receive only three months and twenty-six days' grace; whereas had he completed his seven years on or before the 1st April 1883, he would have received another year.

9. Your memorialist ventures to submit that this order fell upon him with complete surprise. Your memorialist took furlough to England in 1880-81. Had your memorialist known that any such order was in contemplation, he would not have taken furlough and sacrificed so much pay.

10. Your memorialist has the honour also to submit that the privilege granted to all future commandants who may not, like himself, have completed the period of 32 years' service for pension, viz., an extension of their tenure of command for two years, subject to the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, is withheld from him, and that he is thus treated less liberally than the officer who may succeed him in the command.

11. Your memorialist most respectfully submits that if this special extension be granted to future commandants who obtain their appointments knowing their tenure to be limited, it should also be granted to your memorialist, who, when he was appointed, enjoyed the privilege by the existing regulations of the service, of retaining his command until he should be either promoted to the Brigade Staff of the Army or should retire on pension, or should obtain his colonel's allowances.

12. Your memorialist would also most respectfully bring to notice that in 1871, when orders limiting the tenure of regimental commands of British regiments were issued, the officers then in command were permitted to retain their commands beyond the new fixed limit, whereas your memorialist, as above shown, is only permitted to retain his command for three months and twenty-six days beyond the new limit.

13. Your memorialist would also respectfully venture to submit that in 1861, when the period of general staff appointments was limited to five years, the officers then holding appointments were allowed an extension of two years' tenure of their appointments.

14. Your memorialist, therefore, respectfully ventures to solicit that these and other precedents may be taken into consideration, and that your memorialist may be treated with not less liberality.

15. Your memorialist also ventures to submit with all respect that when he entered the service in 1854, it was, among other privileges, the custom and the privilege for an officer once appointed to hold the command of his regiment until promoted to the Brigade Staff, or until he succeeded to colonel's allowances.

This privilege was highly valued and one of the most esteemed in the service.

On the transfer of the military and naval forces of the East India Company to Her Majesty, the privileges and advantages then enjoyed were guaranteed to all officers by Act of Parliment. Your memorialist ventures to quote the wording of the Act—"and be entitled to the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges, and the like advantages as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the service of the said Company." Your memorialist ventures to submit that this guarantee covers and extends to all privileges enjoyed by officers in the East India Company's service; this privilege of retaining command among others, and not merely to a selection of privileges as may be from time to time determined.

16. This guarantee was repeated and emphasized by the Secretary of State for India in the orders issued on the formation of the Staff Corps, G. G. O., No. 332, of the 10th April 1861, paragraph 23: "In the execution of the measures to bring about the proposed amalgamation, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government that the pledge that due regard shall be paid to the rights

and claims of the officers of Her Majesty's Indian forces shall be scrupulously adhered to."

17. Your memorialist ventures with all respect to submit that G. G. O., No. 209, of the 21st April 1882, and G. G. O., No. 110, of the 26th February 1883, are not in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the above-quoted Act of Parliament or the above-quoted G. G. O., No. 332, of the 10th April 1861, in that they deprive the officers of Her Majesty's Indian forces of a highly valued privilege guaranteed to them by Act of Parliament, which they were in the enjoyment of at the time of the amalgamation.

18. Your memorialist also most respectfully brings to your notice that the deprivation of his command is not only a cause of present loss, but also of future loss, inasmuch as it may seriously affect his pension. Paragraph 98 of G. G. O., No, 332 of 1861, modified to a certain extent by G. G. Os. No. 825 and 826 of the 17th September 1861, lays down that officers may not remain unemployed longer than four years, after which period they are liable to be placed on half-pay or pensioned. It has been ruled that time passed on half-pay does not count as service for pension; therefore, your memorialist, who on the 1st April 1884 will be more than eight years from the date of obtaining his colonel's allowances, is liable to be pensioned on a reduced pension and deprived of his succession to colonel's allowances, or at all events to the full amount of them.

In this instance also your memorialist ventures with all respect to submit that the G. G. Os. above quoted in paragraph 1 are not in accordance with the guarantee of Parliament.

19. Your memorialist, therefore, most respectfully solicits your favourable consideration of his case, and prays that you will be pleased to sanction to him one or other of the following boons:—

(*a*) That he be permitted to retain the privilege of holding the command of his regiment on the regulations existing at the time of his entering the service, at the amalgamation, at the formation of the Staff Corps, and at the time of his appointment to the command.

(*b*) Or that G.G.O., No. 209 of 1882, and G.G.O., No. 110 of 1883, may be so modified as to permit him to retain the command of his regiment for seven years from the date of his substantive lieutenant colonelcy.

(*c*) Or that his tenure of command may be extended for two years as permitted to the officer succeeding him in the command.

(*d*) Or that the substantive rank and pay of a lieutenant colonel may be granted to him with effect from the date of succeeding to the command of his regiment, or from seven years anterior to the 1st April 1883.

(*e*) Or that an appointment of at least equal value may be granted to him from the date of vacating his command.

(*f*) Or that compensation for the loss of his command allowance, 700 rupees per mensem, may be granted to him.

(*g*) Or that he may be permitted to reside in England until re-employed on the Staff Corps pay of his rank, *Rs.* 827. 14 *a.* per mensem (the exchange being calculated at par, your memorialist being one of the officers permitted to receive furlough pay at par). Such residence in England to count as service for pension.

20. Your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 376, Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 6 December 1883.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council paragraph 10 of your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 192, of 15th October 1883, forwarding a memorial by Lieutenant Colonel J. Upperton, C.B., B.S.C., Commandant 6th Bengal Cavalry, praying for a modification of the Regulations of 1882 and 1883 which limit the tenure of regimental commands.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Upperton submits seven alternative measures, one or other of which he prays may be extended to him. Six of these measures are altogether inadmissible, but I shall not object to your extending to him, and to any other present incumbent who may be similarly placed, the provisions of paragraph 6 of the General Order, 209, of 1882; that is to say, that a present Commandant of a regiment who is required to vacate his command under these rules before he has served for the pension granted for 32 years' service may, on the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, or of the Government of India or of his Presidency, be permitted an extension of command not exceeding two years, or nine years in all, towards his 32 years' pension service, or such less period as may be required for its completion; no portion of such extension being permitted to be passed on any leave or furlough except privilege leave.

3. In the event of any officer so situated being now on leave, or applying for leave before the 1st of April 1884, it would be necessary to give him timely information of any intention of his Commander in Chief and Government to extend his tenure of command.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th January 1884.

YOUR Military Despatch, No. 376, of the 6th December last. We propose to alter the wording of paragraph 2 as to the recommendation for extension being made by the Governments of India, Madras and Bombay, and to follow the wording of paragraph 6, G.G.O., No. 209, of 1882, on this point. Any objection?

TELEGRAM from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 9th January 1884.

YOURS 8th; regimental commands. No objection.

— VII. —

ARMY COMMANDS AND STAFF—MILITARY DEPARTMENT—COMMISSARIAT.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 274, of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 16 *August* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 22 July 1881.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch, No. 203, of the 16th June, calling for further information regarding the proposals made in our Military Letter, No. 85, of the 28th of February, for reorganising the administration of the Indian Army in connection with the recommendations of the Army Commission.

2. We shall reply at length to that Despatch by the next mail; we now beg to submit, in continuation of our letter above quoted, our proposals for the future distribution of military commands in India, and for the organisation and distribution of the Army Staff.

3. This matter, the working out of the details of the general scheme of organisation already proposed, has been under our consideration for several weeks. We have already recommended that the Indian armies should be placed under the command of four Lieutenant Generals, all directly in subordination to the Commander in Chief in India; the latter to occupy henceforward the same relations towards the Bengal Army as towards the Armies of Madras and Bombay, our proposal in this respect embracing some of the leading features of the plan put forward by the Army Commission. The proposed distribution of the staff has therefore been arranged with reference to these general principles; and as regards the number of appointments of different classes, we have found the proposals of the Commission to be generally very suitable. The accompanying tables contain a statement of the establishment which we desire to see fixed for the Army Staff, compared under each head with the existing establishment. It will be seen that the proposed establishment agrees pretty closely with that recommended by the Commission; we will proceed to mention the points as to which this scale differs from that contained in the Report and from the existing arrangement.

4. There are at present two lieutenant generals commanding the armies of Madras and Bombay; 12 lieutenant generals and major generals commanding divisions; and 23 brigadier generals commanding first and second class districts. The proposed establishment will consist of four lieutenant generals commanding the Madras and Bombay Armies, and the eastern and western portions of the existing Bengal Army; eight general officers commanding divisions; and 17 general officers commanding first and second class districts; besides six colonels on the staff to command important stations. The present establishment, therefore, comprises 37 general officers, costing 1,02,421 rupees per month; the proposed establishment comprises 35 officers, costing 93,762 rupees per month.

5. The personal staff numbers at present 23 officers on staff, and consolidated salaries aggregating 8,960 rupees per month. The proposed establishment is for 25 officers, on salaries aggregating 8,250 rupees per month.

6. The present staff at the head-quarters of the Commander in Chief in India comprises 25 officers, costing in consolidated and staff salaries 20,924 rupees per

per month; the proposed establishment will comprise *temporarily** 20 officers, costing 18,424 rupees in consolidated and staff salaries.

* *See infra*, para. 10.

7. The present establishment of the general, divisional, and district staff, including the staff at head-quarters in Madras and Bombay, comprises 108 officers, their charge in consolidated and staff salaries being 58,447 rupees per month; the proposed establishment will consist of 108 officers, costing 56,000 rupees per month.

8. The head-quarters staff of the Royal Artillery is shown as unaltered in the new scale. We understand from the Commander in Chief that he is going to propose a modification in this respect, the result of which may be a saving, and will certainly not be an increase, of expense. Pending the receipt and consideration of his Excellency's proposals on this head, we have therefore made no alteration in the head-quarter artillery staff.

9. The following are the principal alterations proposed in the original scheme recommended by the Commission:—

Following the present home practice, the titles of—

Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General,

Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General,

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General,

Brigade Major,

Staff Officer, 1st Class,

Staff Officer, 2nd Class,

might be employed to denote the different grades of staff officer, instead of the briefer title, "Staff Officer, 1st Class, 2nd Class," &c., proposed by the Commission.

10. The Commission proposed a staff of five officers at the head-quarters of the Commander in Chief for general duties, exclusive of heads of departments, artillery staff, &c., in lieu of the present establishment of nine officers. We have it very distinctly in view to avoid over-centralising our military administration, and as far as possible to delegate powers to the four lieutenant generals which shall enable them to dispose of much detailed business which now comes up to Army Head-Quarters; and we are not prepared to say that the establishment proposed by the Commission for the Army Head-Quarters staff may not be eventually found sufficient. But the change of system which we have now in contemplation will, undoubtedly, in the first instance, throw a considerable amount of labour on the Commander in Chief and his staff, and we therefore propose, as a temporary arrangement, to allow an establishment of eight officers for Army Head-Quarters. Of these, some would be drawn, in the first instance, from the Madras and Bombay Armies, which eventually, as existing incumbents vacate their posts, should be as largely represented as the Bengal Army at Army Head-Quarters.

11. The Commission proposed that the chiefs of the staff of the four lieutenant generals should receive a consolidated salary of 2,500 rupees, and that the two senior officers next to the chief of the staff at Army Head-Quarters should receive staff salaries of 1,000 rupees, in addition to the pay of their rank. We recommend that these six officers should all receive the same consolidated salary of 2,000 rupees. This would facilitate that which is very desirable, the interchangeability of these officers.

12. The pay of the Judge Advocate General at Army Head-Quarters should be fixed at 2,000 rupees consolidated, instead of 2,500 rupees.

 13. The

13. The appointment of a staff officer of Royal Engineers at Army Head-Quarters on 600 rupees a month, staff salary, is approved, but the appointment of a staff officer of Engineers to each lieutenant general appears unnecessary.

14. The Commission recommended that the pay of the Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief should be reduced from 1,500 rupees to 1,200 rupees. But for the present, and until it is seen how far business at head-quarters may be susceptible of reduction, we recommend that the emoluments of this officer should remain unaltered.

15. We do not recommend the continuance of the appointment of Director of Gymnasia; but we think that there should be four Directors of Gymnasia, one under the orders of each lieutenant general, on 400 rupees, staff salary.

16. The Commission recommended that staff officers for musketry should be employed for only six months in the year. We think that this arrangement would not be found to work well in practice; and we have accordingly provided in the attached schedule for giving the staff officer of musketry a salary of 400 rupees a month for the whole year.

17. It will be observed that no provision has been made for the command of certain stations, which now are paid commands; the intention is that the senior officer on the spot shall command without pay. Nor are the station staff officers for the smaller stations shown in the tables. The third-class station staff has, therefore, been left out from both sides of the account. We are still awaiting a communication from the Commander in Chief on this subject.

18. Some minor special appointments, as the commands of hill depôts, Fort Chunar, frontier forts, &c., have not been taken into account. It is not expected that any sensible change will be needed in regard to these appointments.

19. Finally, it will be seen that our proposals furnish a saving of about 2,56,692 rupees a year in consolidated and staff salaries alone. To arrive at the actual saving, it would be necessary to include the military pay of the officers drawing staff salaries. This cannot be stated with precision as regards the proposed establishment, as the rank of staff officers in various situations is subject to variation. A statement including the present and probable future charges for military pay for the staff is under preparation, and will follow. The reductions in office establishments, and in the Military Departments of Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab, will be dealt with separately.

20. We attach a table of the proposed distribution of the staff, and another showing the different military stations embraced by the various proposed commands.

21. We earnestly recommend all these proposals to the early consideration and approval of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

ANNEXURE B.

PRESENT and PROPOSED Staff of INDIAN ARMY.—ABSTRACT.

HEADING.	PRESENT.			PROPOSED.		
	Number.	Consolidated.	Staff.	Number.	Consolidated.	Staff.
		Rs.	*Rs.*		*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Commander in Chief in India -	1	8,333	- -	1	8,333	—
General Officers - - -	37	1,02,421	- -	35	93,762	—
Station Commanders - -	17	- -	4,450	4	- -	800
Personal Staff - - -	23	3,500	5,460	25	1,500	6,750
Head-Quarters Staff - -	25	7,900	13,024	20	9,000	9,424
General Staff - - - -	108	12,800	45,647	108	8,000	48,000
Garrison Staff - - - -	40	- -	5,450	12	- -	2,025
TOTAL - - -	251	1,34,954	74,031	205	1,20,595	66,999
Deduct,—Station Commanders and Garrison Staff, who are Regimental Officers.	57	- -	- -	16	—	—
				189	—	—
Reduction - - -	- -	- -	- -	5	—	—
	194	- -	- -	194	—	—

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 283, of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 22 *August* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 29 July 1881.

IN continuation of our Military Letter, No. 274, dated the 22nd July 1881, we have the honour to forward the statement, promised in paragraph 19 of that Letter, showing the present and proposed future charges for the Staff, including the probable charges for military pay.

2. It will be seen that, according to this estimate, our proposals furnish a saving of about three lakhs of rupees a year.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon*,
D. M. Stewart,
W. Stokes,
A. R. Thompson,
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

STATEMENT showing the Present and Proposed Future Charges for

PRESENT.

	Number.	Consolidated.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.
		Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN INDIA - - -	1	8,333 5 4	—	—
GENERAL OFFICERS:				
Commanders in Chief, Madras and Bombay, at 5,500 rupees.	2	11,000 - -	—	—
Commanding Divisions, at 3,500 rupees - -	12	42,000 - -	—	—
Commanding Districts and Brigades, 1st class, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 1,400.	14	- - -	11,590 4 -	19,600 - -
Commanding Districts and Brigades, 2nd class, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 1,200.	9	- - -	7,450 14 -	10,800 - -
	37	53,000 - -	19,041 2 -	30,400 - -
STATION COMMANDERS:				
First Class, at 400 rupees - - - - -	3	- - -	- - -	1,200 - -
Second „ 300 „ - - - - -	1	- - -	- - -	300 - -
Third „ 250 „ - - - - -	7	- - -	- - -	1,750 - -
Fourth „ 200 „ - - - - -	6	- - -	- - -	1,200 - -
	17	- - -	- - -	4,450 - -
PERSONAL STAFF:				
Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to Commander in Chief, at 1,500 rupees.	1	1,500 - -	—	—
Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to Provincial Commanders in Chief, at 1,000 rupees.	2	2,000 - -	—	—
Interpreter to Commander in Chief, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 450.	1	- - -	827 14 -	450 - -
Aide-de-Camp and Interpreter to Provincial Commanders in Chief, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 380.	2	- - -	748 3 -	760 - -
Aide-de-Camp, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 250 - -	8	- - -	2,992 12 -	2,000 - -
„ „ 225. 12. 0. + 250 -	9	- - -	2,031 12 -	2,250 -
	23	3,500 - -	6,600 9 -	5,460 - -
HEAD QUARTERS STAFF:				
Adjutant General, at 3,000 rupees - - -	1	3,000 - -	—	—
Deputy Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 1,000.	1	- - -	827 14 -	1,000 - -
1st Assistant Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 600.	1	- - -	827 14 -	600 - -
Assistant Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	- - -	640 14 -	500 - -
Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 1,002. 4. 0. + 800.	1	- - -	1,002 4 -	800 - -
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400.	1	- - -	640 14 -	400 - -
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	- - -	640 14 -	500 - -
Carried forward - - -	7	3,000 - -	4,580 10 -	3,800 - -

the STAFF, including the Probable Charges for MILITARY PAY.

PROPOSED.

	Number.	Consolidated.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.
		Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN INDIA -	1	8,333 5 4	—	—
GENERAL OFFICERS AND COLONELS ON THE STAFF:				
Commanding Armies, at 4,500 rupees - -	4	18,000 - -	—	—
„ Divisions, at 3,500 „ - -	8	28,000 - -	—	—
„ 1st class Districts, at 2,500 rupees	8	20,000 - -	—	—
„ 2nd „ „ „ 2,000 „	9	18,000 - -	—	—
Colonels on the Staff, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800	6	- - -	4,967 4 -	4,800 - -
	35	84,000 - -	4,967 4 -	4,800 - -
STATION COMMANDERS, at 200 rupees - -	4	- - -	- - -	800 - -
PERSONAL STAFF:				
Military Secretary, at 1,500 rupees - -	1	1,500 - -	—	—
„ „ *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 400	4	- - -	3,311 8 -	1,600 - -
Interpreter to Commander in Chief, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0 + 400.	1	- - -	640 14 -	400 - -
Aides de-Camp, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 250 -	10	- - -	3,740 15 -	2,500 - -
„ „ „ 225. 12. 0. + 250 -	9	- - -	2,031 12 -	2,250 - -
	25	1,500 - -	9,725 1 -	6,750 - -
HEAD-QUARTERS STAFF:				
Chief of Staff, at 3,000 rupees - - -	1	3,000 - -	—	—
Deputy Adjutant General, at 2,000 rupees -	1	2,000 - -	—	—
„ Quartermaster General, at 2,000 rupees	1	2,000 - -	—	—
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 600.	2	- - -	1,655 12 -	1,200 - -
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 600.	1	- - -	640 14 -	600 - -
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	- - -	640 14 -	500 - -
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	1	- - -	374 1 6	500 - -
Carried forward - - -	8	7,000 - -	3,311 9 6	2,800 - -

STATEMENT showing the Present and Proposed Future Charges for

PRESENT.

	Number.	Consolidated.			Pay and Allowances.			Staff Pay.		
		Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Brought forward - - -	7	3,000	–	–	4,580	10	–	3,800	–	–
HEAD-QUARTERS STAFF—*continued.*										
Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 800.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	800	–	–
Quartermaster General, at 2,500 rupees - -	1	2,500	–	–	—			—		
Deputy Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 1,000.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	1,000	–	–
1st Assistant Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 600.	1	-	-	-	374	1	6	600	–	–
Assistant Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	500	–	–
Deputy Quartermaster General, Intelligence, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 600.	1	-	-	-	827	14	–	600	–	–
Assistant Quartermaster General, Intelligence, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6 + 500.	1	-	-	-	374	1	6	500	–	–
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Intelligence, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	1	-	-	-	374	1	6	400	–	–
Judge Advocate General, at 2,400 rupees -	1	2,400	–	–	—			—		
Deputy Judge Advocate General at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800.	1	-	-	-	827	14	–	800	–	–
Inspector General of Royal Artillery in India, at *Rs.* 1,265. 5. 0. + 1,070.	1	-	-	-	1,265	5	–	1,070	–	–
Brigade Major to ditto, at *Rs.* 417. 7. 8. + 354.	1	-	-	-	417	7	8	354	–	–
Director of Garrison Instruction in India, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	500	–	–
Garrison Instructors, at *Rs* 374. 1. 6. + 400 -	3	-	-	-	1,122	4	6	1,200	–	–
" " " 225. 12. 0. + 400 -	1	-	-	-	225	12	–	400	–	–
Inspector of Gymnasia, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	500	–	–
	25	7,900	–	–	13,593	13	8	13,024	–	–
GENERAL STAFF (including Head-Quarter Staff at Madras and Bombay):										
Local Adjutant Generals, at 2,200 rupees -	2	4,400	–	–	—			—		
Local Deputy Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800.	2	-	-	-	1,655	12	–	1,600	–	–
Local Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 600.	2	-	-	-	1,655	12	–	1,200	–	–
Local Assistant Adjutant Generals for Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 1,002. 4. 0. + 500.	2	-	-	-	2,004	8	–	1,000	–	–
Local Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	827	14	–	500	–	–
Local Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	500	–	–
Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500.	2	-	-	-	1,655	12	–	1,000	–	–
Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	10	-	-	-	6,408	12	–	5,000	–	–
Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	2	-	-	-	748	3	–	1,000	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 400.	2	-	-	-	1,655	12	–	800	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400.	5	-	-	-	3,204	6	–	2,000	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	6	-	-	-	2,244	9	–	2,400	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	500	–	–
Carried forward - - -	38	4,400	–	–	23,343	–	–	17,500	–	–

the Staff, including the Probable Charges for Military Pay—*continued.*

PROPOSED.

	Number.	Consolidated.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.
		Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Brought forward - - -	8	7,000 – –	3,311 9 6	2,800 – –
HEAD QUARTERS STAFF—*continued.*				
Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0 + 600.	1	- - -	640 14 –	600 – –
Deputy Quartermaster General, Intelligence, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800.	1	- - -	827 14 –	800 – –
Assistant Quartermaster General, Intelligence, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	2	- - -	748 3 –	1,000 – –
Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 1,002. 4. 0. + 800.	*1	- - -	1,002 4 –	800 – –
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400.	*1	- - -	640 14 –	400 – –
Inspector General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 1,265. 5. 0. + 1,070.	*1	- - -	1,265 5 –	1,070 – –
Brigade Major to Inspector General, Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 417. 7. 8. + 354.	*1	- - -	417 7 8	354 – –
Deputy Adjutant General, R. E., at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 600.	1	- - -	640 14 –	600 – –
Judge Advocate General, at 2,000 rupees -	1	2,000 – –	—	—
Assistant Judge Advocate General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	- - -	640 14 –	500 – –
Director of Military Education, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	1	- - -	640 14 –	500 – –
	20	9,000 – –	10,777 1 2	9,424 – –
GENERAL STAFF (including Head-Quarter Staff of four Armies).				
Chiefs of Staff, at 2,000 rupees - - -	4	8,000 – –	—	—
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800.	4	- - -	3,311 8 –	3,200 – –
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 600.	4	- - -	2,563 8 –	2,400 – –
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	4	- - -	1,496 6 –	2,000 – –
Deputy Adjutant General for Royal Artillery, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 800.	4	- - -	2,563 8 –	3,200 – –
Deputy Judge Advocate General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500.	2	- - -	1,655 12 –	1,000 – –
Deputy Judge Advocate General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	2	- - -	1,281 12 –	1,000 – –
Assistant Judge Advocate General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	4	- - -	1,496 6 –	1,600 – –
Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals for Musketry, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	8	- - -	2,992 12 –	3,200 – –
Garrison Instructors, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400	2	- - -	1,281 12 –	800 – –
,, ,, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400	2	- - -	748 3 –	800 – –
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500.	6	- - -	4,967 4 –	3,000 – –
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	5	- - -	3,204 6 –	2,500 – –
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	5	- - -	1,870 7 6	2,500 – –
Carried forward - - -	56	8,000 – –	29,433 8 6	27,200 – –

* Provisional.

STATEMENT howing the Present and Proposed Future Charges for

PRESENT.

	Number.	Consolidated.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.
		Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Brought forward - -	38	4,400 – –	23,343 – –	17,500 – –
GENERAL STAFF (including Head-Quarter Staff at Madras and Bombay)—*continued.*				
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 300.	1	- - -	640 14 –	300 – –
Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals for Musketry, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 300.	11	- - -	4,115 - 6	3,300 – –
Brigade Majors, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400 -	4	- - -	2,563 8 –	1,600 – –
„ „ at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400 -	10	- - -	3,740 15 –	4,000 – –
Local Quartermaster Generals, at 2,200 rupees	2	4,400 – –	—	—
Local Deputy Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 800.	1	- - -	827 14 –	800 – –
Local Deputy Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 800.	1	- - -	640 14 –	800 – –
Assistant Quartermaster Generals, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500.	2	- - -	1,655 12 –	1,000 – –
Assistant Quartermaster Generals, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500.	3	- - -	1,922 10 –	1,500 – –
Assistant Quartermaster Generals, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 500.	4	- - -	1,496 6 –	2,000 – –
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster Generals, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400.	8	- - -	5,127 – –	3,200 – –
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster Generals, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	6	- - -	2,244 9 –	2,400 – –
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 225. 12. 0. + 400.	1	- - -	225 12 –	400 – –
Local Judge Advocate Generals, at 2,000 rupees	2	4,000 – –	—	—
Judge Advocate, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + *Rs.* 747. 14. 11.	1	- - -	827 14 –	747 14 11
Judge Advocates, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 500 -	6	- - -	4,967 4 –	3,000 – –
„ „ at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 500 -	4	- - -	2,563 8 –	2,000 – –
Garrison Instructor, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400	1	- - -	640 14 –	400 – –
„ „ at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400 -	1	- - -	374 1 6	400 – –
Assistant Inspector of Gymnasia, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 300.	1	- - -	374 1 6	300 - –
	108	12,800 – –	58,291 13 6	45,647 14 11
GARRISON STAFF.				
Garrison Quartermaster, Fort William, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0. + 250.	1	- - -	827 14 –	250 – –
Station Staff Officers :				
1st class at 150 rupees - - - -	26	- - -	- - -	3,900 – –
2nd class, at 100 rupees - - -	13	- - -	- - -	1,300 – –
	40	- - -	827 14 –	5,450 – –

the Staff including the Probable Charges for Military Pay—*continued.*

PROPOSED.

	Number.	Consolidated.			Pay and Allowances.			Staff Pay.		
		Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Brought forward - -	56	8,000	–	–	29,433	8	6	27,200	–	–
GENERAL STAFF (including Head-Quarter Staff of four Armies).										
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 827. 14. 0 + 400.	2	-	-	-	1,655	12	–	800	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0 + 400.	13	-	-	-	8,331	6	–	5,200	–	–
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400.	15	-	-	-	5,611	6	6	6,000	–	–
Brigade-Majors at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 400 -	5	-	-	-	3,204	6	–	2,000	–	–
„ „ at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6. + 400 -	13	-	-	-	4,863	3	6	5,200	–	–
Inspectors of Gymnasia, at *Rs.* 374. 1. 6 + 400.	4	-	-	-	1,496	6	–	1,600	–	–
	108	8,000	–	–	54,596	–	6	48,000	–	–
GARRISON STAFF.										
Garrison Quartermaster, Fort William, at *Rs.* 640. 14. 0. + 200.	1	-	-	-	640	14	–	200	–	–
Station Staff Officers:										
1st class, at 200 rupees - - -	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	–	–
2nd class, at 125 rupees - - -	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	625	–	–
	12	-	-	-	640	14	–	2,025	–	–

STATEMENT showing the Present and Proposed Future Charges for the Staff, including the Probable Charges for Military Pay—*continued.*

ABSTRACT.

	AT PRESENT.					NOW PROPOSED.				
	Numbers.	Consolidated Pay.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.	TOTAL.	Numbers.	Consolidated Pay.	Pay and Allowances.	Staff Pay.	TOTAL.
		Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*		*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Commander in Chief in India -	1	8,333 5 4	- - -	- - -	8,333 5 4	1	8,333 5 4	- - -	- - -	8,333 5 4
General Officers - - -	37	53,000 - -	19,041 2 -	30,400 - -	1,02,441 2 -	35	84,000 - -	4,967 4 -	4,800 - -	93,767 4 -
Station Commanders - -	17	- - -	- - -	4,450 - -	4,450 - -	4	- - -	- - -	800 - -	800 - -
Personal Staff - - - -	23	3,500 - -	6,600 9 -	5,460 - -	15,560 9 -	25	1,500 - -	9,725 1 -	6,750 - -	17,975 1 -
Head-Quarters Staff - - -	25	7,900 - -	13,593 13 8	13,024 - -	34,517 13 8	20	9,000 - -	10,777 1 2	9,424 - -	29,201 1 2
General Staff - - - -	108	12,800 - -	58,291 13 6	45,647 14 11	1,16,739 12 5	108	8,000 - -	54,596 - 6	48,000 - -	1,10,596 - 6
Garrison Staff - - - -	40	- - -	827 14 -	5,450 - -	6,277 14 -	12	- - -	640 14 -	2,025 - -	2,665 14 -
	251	85,533 5 4	98,355 4 2	1,04,431 14 11	2,88,320 8 5	205	1,10,833 5 4	80,706 4 8	71,799 - -	2,63,338 10 -

	Rs.
Present Charges - - - - - - - - - - -	2,88,000
Proposed Charges - - - - - - - - - - -	2,63,000
Saving per Month - - - - - - - - - - -	25,000
Saving per Year - - - - - - - - - - -	3,00,000

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 292 of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 29 *August* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 5 August 1881.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 282, dated the 29th July 1881, we have now the honour to report to your Lordship our proposals for the organisation of the Commissariat Department, in connection with the recommendations of the Army Commission.

2. In that letter we expressed the opinion, at which we have arrived after careful consideration, that the proposals of the Commission on this head should be generally adopted.

3. These are set forth in the 10th Chapter of their Report. The main features of their scheme are as follows :—

4. I.—That the three existing Commissariat Departments shall be placed under the general control of a principal officer, the Commissary General in Chief of the Army in India, who is to be attached to the Military Department of the Government of India.

II.—That for each of the four proposed divisions of the Indian Army there shall be one Commissary General with a personal assistant, the appointments of Deputy Commissary Generals being abolished.

III.—Executive Commissariat Officers to be relieved to a certain extent of their present office work; three account offices to be established for each of the four armies, to deal with all accounts of commissariat expenditure within a certain circle.

It is hoped that by this arrangement the business of the department would not be subject to the degree of confusion which is now liable to occur when, on the outbreak of war, executive officers are withdrawn for active service and their places taken in the various stations by untrained officers. In these circle offices a certain degree of unity of procedure could be maintained under all circumstances, and the business of the department would not suffer disorganisation, such as that which happened during the late war.

5. The present establishment of the Commissariat Department and that proposed by the Commission are as follows :—

ADMINISTRATIVE.

Present.	*Rs.*
1 Commissary General, on	2,500 consolidated.
1 Personal Assistant to ditto, on	600 staff.
2 Commissary Generals, on	2,200 consolidated.
3 Deputy Commissary Generals, on	1,000 staff.
2 Deputy Commissary Generals, on	900 „
Proposed.	
1 Commissary General in Chief, on	2,500 consolidated.
4 Commissary Generals, on	2,000 „

EXECUTIVE.

		Number.	
		Present.	Proposed.
	Rs.		
Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, on staff salaries of - - - - - - - - - - - -	800	9	8
Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, on - - -	600	8	12
Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, on - -	500	12	—
Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, on -	400	12	21*
Sub AssistantCommissary Generals, 1st class, on - -	300	23	25*
Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, on - -	200	13	29*
Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, 3rd class, on - -	150	14	—
		91	95

* With the designation of the class next above.

6. The general result is thus, as regards the executive grades, a staff proposed of 95 officers, inclusive of one officer for each of the 12 account offices, against 91 at present. On the other hand there will be only six superior officers against eight at present, there being thus altogether 101 officers against 100, the present establishment.

7. In regard to the executive grades, it is proposed to abolish the present grade of Deputy Assistant, 1st class, on 500 rupees staff, while the number serving in the next class above is somewhat increased. All the junior sub-assistants, some of whom now only get 150 rupees staff pay, are to receive 200 rupees. This last change we consider a necessary improvement. Employment in the Commissariat Department is not sufficiently attractive, there being at the present time several vacancies and no candidates, a state of things probably due, in a measure, to the fact that the pay on commencing is but little more than that which a young officer draws with his regiment, while the duty is harder and much less agreeable.

8. The designation of Deputy Assistant Commissary General, however, is neither convenient nor appropriate. The third and fourth grades of executive officers might be styled Assistant Commissary General, 3rd and 4th class, respectively.

9. The general result of the Commission's scheme is to reduce the departmental emoluments slightly. The average staff salary in the executive grades is now 378 rupees per month; it will be 371 rupees per month. There are now eight superior officers; there are to be only five. We are of opinion that the Commissariat Department is at present certainly not overpaid, and that it is very important that the service should be attractive and sought after by officers of ability and energy. If, therefore, other circumstances remained precisely the same, we should not think it desirable to recommend a reduction of the emoluments, even to the small extent set forth. But we anticipate that the new pension rules, by stimulating retirements, will probably bring officers up sooner than at present to the higher positions, and these improved pension rules may be regarded as a set-off against the reduction of higher departmental appointments.

10. Although it is proposed to maintain the existing separation of the three different Commissariat Departments for the purposes of promotion, and the members

members of them would generally be employed only within the districts occupied by the armies to which they belong, one great advantage to be looked for from the adoption of the recommendations of the Army Commission is, that it will be possible in times of pressure to draw commissariat officers from all parts of India for the duties which may be required of them. A much larger field will thus be provided, from which could be drafted in time of war an adequate establishment to meet the requirements of a campaign, and the disorganisation which now is liable to fall on any particular branch of the department when the whole stress of a war falls upon it may be prevented.

11. Whether the Bengal Commissariat should be divided eventually into two parts is a matter for future consideration. It does not press for settlement at present.

12. The Commissary General in Chief and the local Commissary Generals should be chosen by selection, and should hold office for five years. They might be eligible for the appointment as Major General, and the Commissary General in Chief might be allowed to complete his term of office if promoted while holding the appointment to Lieutenant General. But no appointment in the commissariat should be tenable by an officer in the receipt of the colonel's allowance.

13. As was stated in our Despatch, No. 230, of the 24th June 1881, we propose that commissariat officers should be seconded in their regiments for 10 years from date of first appointment to the department, during which time they should be eligible to return to regimental duty if desiring to do so. Some officers might be found to avail themselves of this option, and they would constitute, to a certain extent a useful reserve, whose services would be available in times of pressure, when a demand arises for additional officers with departmental experience.

14. There is one point on which we think it would be proper to make a modification of the Commission's proposals. Having regard to the very important duties and responsibilities of the proposed new office of Commissary General in Chief, the magnitude of the interests involved, and the fact that the degree of efficiency and economy with which the department is conducted must depend largely on the qualifications of the officer holding this office, we are of opinion that the salary should be sufficiently high to secure the services of any of the ablest officers of the army, and we therefore recommend that it be fixed at 2,750 rupees.

15. We attach a statement comparing the charge involved in carrying out these proposals with the present commissariat establishments. It will be seen that the proposed establishment will cost 46,650 rupees a month in salaries, the present charge being 46,400 rupees.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

PRESENT and PROPOSED Establishment of Officers of the COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT.

PRESENT.							PROPOSED.						
Numbers.				—	Monthly Staff or Consolidated Pay.		Numbers.				—	Monthly Staff or Consolidated Pay.	
Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.		Consolidated.	Staff.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.		Consolidated.	Staff.
					Rs.	*Rs.*						*Rs.*	*Rs.*
1	–	–	1	Commissary General - - -	2,500	—	–	–	–	1	Commissary General in Chief - -	2,750	—
–	1	1	2	Commissary Generals, at 2,200 rupees each.	4,400	—	-	–	–	1	Assistant to Commissary General in Chief.	- -	600
3	–	–	3	Deputy Commissary Generals, at 1,000 rupees each.	- -	3,000	2	1	1	4	Commissary Generals, at 2,000 rupees each.	8,000	—
–	1	1	2	Deputy Commissary Generals, at 900 rupees each.	- -	1,800	4	2	2	8	Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, at 800 rupees each.	- -	6,400
4	3	2	9	Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, at 800 rupees each.	- -	7,200	6	3	3	12	Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, at 600 rupees each.	- -	7,200
4	2	2	8	Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, at 600 rupees each.	- -	4,800	11	5	5	21	Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, at 400 rupees each.	- -	8,400
6	3	3	12	Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, at 500 rupees each.	- -	6,000	13	6	6	25	Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, at 300 rupees each.	- -	7,500
6	3	3	12	Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, at 400 rupees each.	- -	4,800	15	7	7	29	Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, at 200 rupees each.	- -	5,800
12	6	6	24	Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, 1st class, at 300 rupees each.	- -	7,200							
8	2	3	13	Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, 2nd class, at 200 rupees each.	- -	2,600							
8	3	3	14	Sub-Assistant Commissary Generals, 3rd class, at 150 rupees each.	- -	2,100							
52	24	24	100		6,900	39,500	51	24	24	101		10,750	35 900
					Rs. 46,400.							*Rs.* 46,650.	

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 336 of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 3 *October* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 9 September 1881.

IN continuation of our previous Despatches on the Report of the Special Commission appointed in 1879 to inquire into the organisation and expenditure of the Army in India, we have now the honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, our recommendations on that part of the Report which deals with the organisation of the Military Department.

2. This subject is dealt with in Chapter V. of the Report. The arrangements to be made on this head follow out of, and are necessarily regulated by, those which we have already indicated to be suitable for the general organisation of the Indian Army. It being, in our opinion, essential that those recommendations of the Commission should be adopted which provide for the transfer of the administrative control of the Madras and Bombay Armies from the Local Governments to the Government of India, it necessarily follows that the existing Military Departments of those Governments should be abolished, and that the general administrative business connected with those Armies should be transacted henceforward in the Military Department of the Government of India.

3. We have already given our support to the proposals of the Commission for the appointment of a Commissary General in Chief,* a Director General of Ordnance,† and a Director of Army Remount Operations for the whole Indian Army,‡ which last has already been sanctioned by your Lordship. We have also proposed the appointment of a Director General for the Medical Department in India.§ And in our Despatch, No. 282, of the 29th July last, we stated that the military works throughout India ought to be placed under the supervision of the Inspector General of Military Works. The different local offices of Military Account have already for some years past been amalgamated, and their business is conducted under the direct supervision of the Accountant General, Military Department. These departments, which would thus be provided each with an administrative head in direct communication with the Government of India, make up together the whole military administration of the Indian Army, as distinguished from that part of it which is conducted by the Commander in Chief, and they communicate with the Government of India through the Military Secretariat. It remains to consider what establishment would be suitable for this office, to enable it to discharge the additional work which will be now placed on it.

* Despatch, No. 292, of the 5th August 181.

† Despatch, No. 293, of the 5th August 1881.

‡ Despatch, No. 200, of 27th May 1881.

§ Despatch, No. 315, of the 26th August 1881.

4. This increase of duties will arise out of the transfer to it of the administrative business, which is now conducted by the Military Departments of the Governments of Madras and Bombay, relating mainly to the pay, promotions, leave, pensions, and retirements of the commissioned and warrant European officers, and the estates of deceased officers; and the clothing and armament of the men of the Armies concerned.

There would also devolve on the Military Department such portion of the correspondence now conducted in the office of the Military Secretary to the Punjab Government as would not be transferred to the staff of the Lieutenant General commanding the Forces in the Punjab.

5. The present staff of the Military Department Government of India consists of:—

1 Secretary, on 3,500 rupees, consolidated.

1 Deputy Secretary, on 1,000 rupees, staff.

3 Assistant Secretaries: one on 700 rupees, two on 500 rupees, staff.

*See b low.

6. The Commission propose an establishment as per margin* being in effect a numerical addition of one officer, the Assistant Secretary, who is to be a permanent officer; all the others to be appointed for terms of five years.

7. We think the proposed number of officers would be suitable, but that they should be classed as follows:—

	Rs.
1 Secretary, on - - - - - -	3,500 consolidated.
1 Deputy Secretary, on - - - - -	1,200 staff.
1 Under Secretary, on - - - - -	800 „
3 Assistant Secretaries,—	
the senior on - - - - - -	700 „
and the other two on - - - -	500 „

All these appointments should be tenable for five years; the incumbents, except the Secretary, being seconded in their regiments or departments.

8. We further propose to attach two officers to the Military Department for periods of six months at a time during the summer season, on a salary of 100 rupees in addition to their regimental pay and allowances, the officers returning to their regular duty during the drill season. This arrangement will strengthen the office sensibly in an economical way, while the experience gained of the qualifications of the officers thus appointed from time to time will be useful when selections have to be made for the vacant posts of Assistant Secretary.

The financial result of the proposed arrangement will be as follows:—

DEPARTMENTS to be Abolished.

	Rs.
Deputy Secretary, increase 200 rupees.	200
Under Secretary, say as Major, 800 rupees, *plus* 640 rupees pay,	1,440
Two Attachés† on 100 rupees for six months.	100
Total Increase per Month - - -	1,740
Total Increase per Annum - - -	20,880
Additional Office Establishment, say.	15,000
TOTAL Increase - - Rs.	35,880

† If the Attachés are to bring up their own staff pay with them, some one must be paid half staff for acting for them in their regiments.

	Annual Charge.
	Rs.
Military Department, Madras - -	63,700
Ditto - ditto - Bombay -	86,000
Ditto - ditto - Punjab - -	42,000
	1,91,700
Additional Expenditure as per margin for Military Secretariat, Government of India - - -	35,880
TOTAL Saving per Annum - Rs.	1,55,820

* Page 1742, Appendix LXIV. (Not printed.)
1 Secretary, as at present.
4 Under Secretaries, on 1,000, 800, 700, and 600 rupees, staff, respectively.
1 Assistant Secretary (Civil), on 700 rupees, rising to 1,000 rupees.

9. There will undoubtedly be also a considerable additional saving, due to the diminution of correspondence generally, and in printing, stationery, and other ways; but we prefer to state the direct saving only, which as above stated will be about 1½ lakhs per annum in Secretariat charges.

10. It

10. It may be mentioned here that the Military Department, as at present constituted, is practically of the same strength as it was 30 years ago. The one Assistant Secretary added in 1865 was appointed to meet the special work placed on the office by the transfer to it of the compilation of the Bengal Army List, and other duties which had been previously conducted in the Adjutant General's Office. It is proper to add that during these 30 years the numerical strength of the Native Army has been largely reduced; but, on the other hand, the business of the department has in the meantime very largely increased in consequence, as we pointed out in our letter, No. 282, of the 29th July,* of the much greater complexity of modern military administration, and the much greater degree of minuteness with which the Home Government now deals with the affairs of the Indian Army. As a result, the military secretariat is unquestionably heavily weighted at present; and it might be thought that the moderate increase of establishment which we have now proposed will hardly be sufficient to provide for the extra duties now to devolve upon it.

* Paragraph 18.

11. But, as we have pointed out in the letter already quoted, the transfer of the administration of the Madras and Bombay Armies will not add sensibly to the labours of the Government of India, except as regards the subjects already specified, estates, promotions, pensions, furloughs, and so forth; the fact being that the administration of those armies has already been virtually conducted in all essential particulars by the Government of India for many years past. The change has come about partly in consequence of the altered distribution of those armies, under which they have gradually been moved up to occupy territories beyond the limits of their respective presidencies, a state of things which was never contemplated at the time when those armies were created, and when the present form of government was given to them, but under which the Government of India has come to be almost as much concerned with them as the Government of the Presidency to which they belong; and partly from the fact that all the Indian Armies are subject to one system of audit and control, conducted by an amalgamated department of Account and Finance. The general result is that the Government of India is already almost as much directly concerned with the administration of the Madras and Bombay Armies as it is with the Bengal Army. In all matters involving expenditure, as of equipment, dress, forage, supply, transport, ordnance, and so forth, the three Indian armies are precisely on the same footing with respect to the Government of India, which alone is now authorised to sanction expenditure under these heads. The only difference is one of procedure, that, whereas proposals regarding the Madras and Bombay armies are transmitted through the Local Governments, proposals regarding the Bengal Army come up direct from the Commander in Chief. There is indeed one difference to be noticed, that appointments to the staff of these two armies are made by the Local Governments, but the amount of correspondence arising on this head is comparatively trifling.

12. In estimating, then, the future requirements of the Government of India Secretariat, we have had these considerations in view, and also that there will be attached to the Military Department the administrative heads of each of the great supply services, Commissariat, Ordnance, Remount, Military Works. These officers, being relieved of the conduct of detailed executive business in a greater degree than are the present heads of the respective presidential departments, their services will be available for the disposal of a great deal of business which is now conducted in the Secretariat. In short, they will form part of the Military Department, the procedure here being assimilated in this respect according to the recommendation of the Commission, to that which obtains in the British War Office. But we take this opportunity to express our opinion that the opportunity should be embraced of the great reform in Indian army administration, which we are now pressing on Her Majesty's Government, to introduce a much greater degree of decentralisation into the conduct of that administration. As your Lordship is aware, a great deal has been done in this direction of late years in the various civil branches of Indian administration, and on the whole with excellent results. The change has been brought about partly from the conviction felt of its utility, and partly because it has been forced upon the Government, as the only means of enabling it to cope with the

constantly increasing complexity of business in all branches of the Government. The two causes have in fact reacted one upon the other; pressure of business has rendered decentralisation necessary; while decentralisation has made it possible to bestow greater attention on, and to introduce a higher degree of accuracy into, the conduct of public business. And we are persuaded that the time has come when the same principle should be applied to the conduct of the military departments also. We are aware indeed that the two cases are not analogous. In one sense the control of the army, to be economical and efficient, demands complete unity of administration; while there are many branches of military expenditure, as to which the same sort of financial independence which is now accorded to local Governments would not be suitable, and a careful detailed scrutiny must be exercised by the supreme authority which is financially responsible for the whole. And we are therefore not prepared to say that the same kind of decentralisation which has been gradually in course of application to civil expenditure, ought to, or can be, made applicable to military expenditure. But we hold, nevertheless, a strong opinion that there is a kind of decentralisation practicable, which may be introduced with good results. The tendency of the present system has been certainly too much towards relieving every authority, whether purely military or departmental, from all financial responsibility, save only the Government of India. The various executive authorities are not, as such, at present interested in keeping down expenditure, the result being that, with all their efforts, the Government of India are often unable to cope successfully with the demands made upon it, partly from want of co-operation by those who might but do not give it, and partly from the impossibility of economy being maintained by one central authority, unassisted by its various working agents. And without wishing to impugn the well-known principle which distinguishes between the functions of executive and controlling authority in military matters, we nevertheless are of opinion that it may be quite practicable to enforce responsibility on all parties concerned, and to enlist the sympathies of the various military authorities throughout the country on the side of economy, in a much greater degree than has been hitherto manifested. This is the sort of decentralisation which we have in view.

13. To conclude, we may here once more recapitulate the results of the proposed arrangements. The four armies of India will be each under its commanding lieutenant general, who will communicate with the Government of India through the Commander in Chief. For each army there will be a separate Commissariat, Ordnance, Engineer, and Accounts Department, the heads of which will be in immediate communication with the Lieutenant General Commanding, and also with the respective departmental officials attached to the Government of India, namely, the Commissary General in Chief, the Director General of Ordnance, the Chief Officer for Military Works, and the Military Accountant General, who will communicate with that Government through the Military Secretariat. Instead, therefore, of proposals coming up as at present from one authority or department independently of another, and being then referred back again through a number of different channels before they can be finally disposed of, all proposals connected with the administration of the army will reach the Government of India in a form which will enable it to pass judgment on them at once. They may come from the Lieutenant General of the army through the Commander in Chief, or from the local head of a department to the head of his department with the Government of India, as the case may be. But in any case it will not be an isolated proposal, but will have the concurrence or otherwise of the local military authorities. We believe that quite apart from the general considerations which point to the necessity for introducing the new system of army administration, which we have been advocating for some months past, this new method of doing business will be a vast improvement on the existing complicated and tedious procedure. The simplest method of all, from a purely administrative point of view, would no doubt be one under which the Indian armies were all fused into one body. To this on political grounds we should be entirely opposed. We think indeed the fusion has already gone too far, and our proposals all point to a greater degree of

of separation of these armies than has existed of late years, keeping the Punjab and Hindustani elements of the Bengal Army apart from each other in peace time, and requiring each army to recruit only within its own provinces. But, we believe that, in view of the whole circumstances of the case, the plan which we have now proposed will, in respect of simplicity and efficiency of procedure, be the best that could be adopted.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military, No. 277) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 6 September 1883.

Para. 1. I HAVE to acknowledge your Lordship's Military Letters, Nos. 274, 283, and 336, of 1881, conveying proposals for the future distribution of military commands in India, for the organisation and distribution of the army staff, and for the organisation of the Military Department.

2. These proposals were greatly dependent on the scheme for the organisation of the Indian Army in four corps under the direct control of the Government of India, and in informing your Lordship's Government of the decision I had come to on that scheme, in paras. 54 to 57 of my Despatch, No. 243, dated 26th July 1883, I invited proposals for the reduction of the Staff and other establishments referred to in your letters under acknowledgment, to such extent as your Lordship might consider practicable consistently with the maintenance of the presidential system of control.

3. I accordingly now await any further communication your Lordship may desire to make in respect to these reductions.

4. I shall be glad, at the same time, to receive any suggestions your Lordship may desire to offer in regard to the Commissariat Department, as the recommendations contained in your Military Letter, No. 292, of 5th August 1881, are, like those above referred to, based on the larger change in the organisation of the Indian Army which has not been approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

— VIII. —

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 293 of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 29 *August* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 5 August 1881.

IN paragraph 25 of our Despatch, No. 282, of the 29th July 1881, we stated that our detailed recommendations on the proposals of the Army Commission for the reorganisation of the Indian Ordnance Department would be communicated at an early date. We have now the honour to submit these for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

2. The Ordnance Department is dealt with in Section 3, Chapter X,, of the Report of the Commission; the principal changes proposed by them are as follows:—

I. The amalgamation of the three presidential departments under one Director General, to be attached to the Government of India, and to have direct control of the entire department. A Deputy and Assistant Director General are also proposed.

II. Two Inspector Generals of Ordnance to be appointed, each with an Assistant Inspector General.

III. Executive officers of arsenals and depôts to be borne on one list, and to be available for duty in any part of India, their promotion being regulated by the Director General. The executive branch to be considerably strengthened.

The Commission also recommend the appointment of a Committee to consider the questions of development of articles of local supply; the reduction of obsolete stores; procedure for survey of stores when regiments arrive in England from India, and *vice versâ*; prevention of hasty condemnation of stores, &c.: they also advocate the appointment of an officer to assist the Secretary of State in regard to requisitions from this country, to be placed in direct communication with the Director of Artillery at the War Office and the Director General of Ordnance in India. We will, however, here deal only with the question of departmental organisation and establishment.

3. The present commissioned establishment of the Ordnance Department, and that proposed by the Commission, is as follows:—

II.—ADMINISTRATIVE.

		Rs.
	Present:	
3	Inspector Generals of Ordnance - -	6,900 consolidated.
3	Deputy Inspector Generals of Ordnance -	2,000 staff.
1	Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance in Bengal - - - - - -	500 „
7		
	Proposed:	
1	Director General - - - - -	2,500 consolidated.
1	Deputy Director General - - -	600 staff.
1	Assistant Director General - - -	250 „
2	Inspector Generals on 2,000 rupees, consolidated, each - - - - -	4,000 consolidated.
2	Assistant Inspector Generals on 400 rupees, staff, each - - - - - -	800 staff.
7		

EXECUTIVE.

	Present.	Proposed.
Superintendents of Factories - - - -	10	10
Assistant Superintendents of Factories - -	5	5
Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st Class - -	7	5
Ditto - - ditto - - 2nd Class - -	6	6
Ditto - - ditto - - 3rd Class . - -	6	11
Ditto - - ditto - - 4th Class - -	–	11
	34	48

4. The Commission thus propose an increase of 14 executive officers.

Their reasons for this recommendation are stated fully in the Report, the section of which dealing with the Ordnance Department should be read in connection with this letter, and we consider that the Commission have fully made out their case. The department is unquestionably undermanned at present; the result being that when officers go on sick leave, or, still more, when they are ordered on service, the arsenals are left under insufficient supervision, and confusion and waste often ensue. This has been very strongly exemplified during the late war, when there is reason to believe that serious losses occurred from the paucity of officers. We think that in the interests of economy a staff of young officers should always be under training in the department, so that there may be available a supply of experienced officers to proceed in charge of the field depôts in war time, and officers of the Royal Artillery may no longer have to be taken away from their batteries for this duty, at a time when they can be least spared.

5. The total additional monthly cost on account of the pay of officers in the amalgamated Ordnance Department is estimated* by the Commission to be 2,966 rupees, or annually about 35,000 rupees; but they have also suggested savings in other directions by the abolition of depôts, &c., whereby they believe the actual cost of the amalgamated Ordnance Department will be less than that of the department under its present organisation.

* Paragraph 478 of Report.

6. We consider that the proposals of the Commission in regard to this very important department are reasonable and judicious, and we desire strongly to recommend them to your Lordship for adoption, but with the following modification.

7. It will be observed that the Commission have recommended the appointment of one Director General, and two Inspector Generals, each with an Assistant Inspector General. We have already recommended to your Lordship the adoption of an organisation for the Indian armies in four divisions, each to be as far as possible independent and self-contained. The scheme proposed by the Commission, however, assumes that, while the two Inspector Generals shall have charge of the different arsenals and magazines in their respective circles, one circle comprising Bombay and Madras, and the other Bengal and the Punjab, the Director General shall have immediate charge of the various manufacturing establishments, and that all orders for work to be undertaken in the factories should emanate from him. Having given this proposal our careful consideration, we are of opinion that it involves too much of centralisation. It seems to us very desirable that, just as the Lieutenant General commanding an army is to have his own staff and a separate head of every other Army Department,

ment, so also he should have his responsible adviser for all matters connected with the ordnance, arsenals, and depôts within his command. In this view we consider it would be preferable to have four Inspector Generals, who should be in charge of all the ordnance establishments, factories as well as arsenals, in their respective charges; and who should be the medium of communication between the Director General and those establishments, so that the head of the department may not be overburdened with detailed business.

8. This modification of the arrangement proposed by the Commission can be carried out without much difference in cost. The two Inspector Generals proposed by the Army Commission were to have a consolidated salary of 2,000 rupees, which is equivalent for a lieutenant colonel to a staff salary of 1,000 rupees; and it was proposed to give each of them an Assistant Inspector General on 400 rupees, staff, the total charge for staff salaries being virtually thus:

	Rs.
Two Inspector Generals on 1,000 rupees - - - -	2,000
Two Assistant Inspector Generals on 400 rupees, staff, each - - - - - - - - - -	800
TOTAL - - *Rs.*	2,800

We recommend a staff salary of 800 rupees for each Deputy Inspector General, involving a charge for the four of 3,200 rupees per month.

9. The appointments of Director General and Inspector General should be tenable for five years. The Director General if not appointed in that rank to have the local rank of Major General, and not to be required to vacate if promoted to Lieutenant General during his tour of office. Officers in any rank under that of Lieutenant General to be eligible for the post of Inspector General. Superintendents of Factories to hold office as at present for five years, being eligible for re-appointment, and Assistant Superintendents for three years under existing rules. All other officers of the Ordnance Department should be eligible to remain in it for 10 years, at the end of which time they should return to duty with their batteries. By this means a further reserve of experienced officers will be available in case of urgent need. There is grave reason to believe that much loss occurred during the late war in consequence of the inexperience of artillery officers who had to be temporarily detailed for duty in the arsenals to replace commissaries of ordnance who had gone on service.

10. Having regard to the responsible and onerous duties of the Director General of Ordnance in India, we think that such a salary should be attached to the office as will ensure the Government of India being able to avail themselves of the services of any of the best officers in the Royal Artillery, and we therefore recommend that the pay be fixed at 2,750 rupees per mensem, consolidated, or 250 rupees more than that of the present Inspector General of Ordnance in Bengal.

11. We may observe that the proposal to amalgamate the three separate Ordnance Establishments now maintained in India, placing them under one head officer attached to the Government of India, has been for many years under discussion as a reform to be recommended on its own merits, quite apart from any question of army reform generally, and was recommended to Her Majesty's Government so long ago as 1873, as may be seen from the marginally quoted correspondence. The recommendations then made by the Government of India were based on the same grounds as those which the Commission have endeavoured to establish; that unity of administration was necessary for proper financial control over the large supplies of war material which come to, or are manufactured in, the

Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 407, dated the 20th September 1865.
From the Secretary of State, No. 3, dated the 8th January 1866.
To the Secretary of State, No. 170, dated the 11th August 1873.
From the Secretary of State, No. 218, dated the 16th November 1873.

the country; that economy is to be effected in demands made on England only by dealing with the demands of the army as a whole; and that in this way only would it be practicable to carry out reductions in certain redundant Ordnance establishments, and to prevent excess in accumulation in the one Presidency of stores required in another. On these grounds we consider that the proposals of the Army Commission, and especially the appointment of the Director General for India, should be given effect to on their own merits, and in the interest of efficiency and economy. The time has come, through the improvement in railway communication throughout the country, for dealing with the Ordnance Department in India as a whole, and supervising the distribution of stores, their comparison, check, equalisation, and transfer from one instead of from three different centres. We therefore hope that Her Majesty's Government will sanction the adoption of the recommendations made in this Despatch at as early a date as possible.

12. We attach a statement showing the present and proposed establishment of the Commissioned Staff for the Ordnance Department in India.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

PRESENT and PROPOSED Establishment of OFFICERS of the ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

PRESENT.				PROPOSED.			
Number.	—	Monthly Staff or Consolidated Pay.		Number.	—	Monthly Staff or Consolidated Pay.	
		Consolidated.	Staff.			Consolidated.	Staff.
		Rs.	Rs.			Rs.	Rs.
1	Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal - - -	2,500	—	1	Director General of Ordnance in India - - -	2,750	—
1	" " " Madras - - -	2,200	—	1	Deputy Director General of Ordnance in India -	- -	600
1	" " " Bombay - - -	2,200	—	1	Assistant Director General of Ordnance in India -	- -	250
1	Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal -	- -	800	4	Inspector Generals of Ordnance, at - - - - -	- -	800
1	" " " " Madras -	- -	600	10	Superintendents of Factories, at - - - -	- -	600
1	" " " " Bombay -	- -	600	5	Assistant Superintendents of Factories, at - -	- -	200
1	Assistant to Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal -	- -	500	5	Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class, at - - -	- -	500
3	Senior Superintendents of Factories, Bengal, at -	- -	750	6	" " 2nd " - - -	- -	400
2	Junior " " " -	- -	600	11	" " 3rd " - -	- -	300
5	Superintendents of Factories, Madras and Bombay, at	- -	600	11	" " 4th " - - -	- -	200
5	Assistant Superintendents of Factories, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, at - - - - - -	- -	200				
7	Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, at - - - - - - - -	- -	500				
6	Commissaries of Ordnance, 2nd class, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, at - - - - - - - -	- -	400				
6	Commissaries of Ordnance, 3rd class, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, at - - - - - - - -	- -	250				
41				55			

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 337, Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 8 November 1883.

Para. 1. IN continuation of my Despatch, No. 258, of the 9th August 1883, I have the honour to reply to your Excellency's Despatch of the 5th August 1881, No. 293, in which you submitted detailed proposals for the reorganisation of the Indian Ordnance Department.

2. The existing establishment of commissioned officers in that department is shown in the statement forwarded by you to be as follows :—

No.	OFFICE.	Monthly Pay.	TOTAL.
		Rs. Consolidated.	*Rs.*
1	Inspector General, Bengal - - - - -	2,500	2,500
1	- - ditto - - Madras - - - - -	2,200	2,200
1	- - ditto - - Bombay - - - - -	2,200	2,200
		Staff Salaries.	
1	Deputy Inspector General, Bengal - - - -	800	800
1	- ditto - - ditto - Madras - -	600	600
1	- ditto - - ditto - Bombay - - -	600	600
1	Assistant to Inspector General, Bengal - - -	500	500
3	Senior Superintendents of Factories, Bengal - -	750	2,250
2	Junior Superintendents of Factories, Bengal - -	600	1,200
5	Superintendents of Factories, Madras and Bombay -	600	3,000
5	Assistant Superintendents of Factories in all India -	200	1,000
7	Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st Class, in the three Presidencies.	500	3,500
6	Commissaries of Ordnance, 2nd Class, in the three Presidencies.	400	2,400
6	Commissaries of Ordnance, 3rd Class, in the three Presidencies.	250	1,500
41	- - - TOTAL - - - - - - - *Rs.*	- -	24,250

or a total charge of 2,91,000 rupees per annum, in addition to the regimental pay of 38 of the above officers who are not in receipt of consolidated rates of pay.

3. I have to remark, however, that the establishment of Commissaries of Ordnance given in the statement attached to your Despatch, No. 293, does not exactly correspond with the details shown in the Indian Military Estimates for the present year. In the latter 23 Commissaries of Ordnance are provided for, instead of 19 given as the establishment in your statement, there being apparently one Commissary of the 2nd Class and three of the 3rd Class in excess of the number stated by you, one of the latter class being in charge of the Laboratory and Percussion Cap Factory at Madras. The latest official army lists seem to agree with the information given in the Estimates, and I shall be glad to receive an explanation as to the cause of this discrepancy.

4. The recommendations of the Simla Army Commission were adapted to provide for the requirements of four separate armies, and the Commission pro-

 posed

posed the following establishment for the supervision of the whole Ordnance Department:—

No.	Office.	Monthly Pay.	Total.
		Rs. Consolidated.	*Rs.*
1	Director General of Ordnance - - - -	2,500	2,500
2	Inspectors General of Ordnance - - - -	2,000	4,000
		Staff Salaries.	
1	Deputy Director General of Ordnance - - -	600	600
1	Assistant to Director General of Ordnance - -	250	250
2	Assistant Inspectors General of Ordnance - -	400	800
7	- - - Total - - - - - - - *Rs.*	- - -	8,150

or 97,800 rupees a year, exclusive of the regimental pay of four officers. The approximate cost of the proposed, as compared with that of the existing supervising establishment, was as follows:—

Present Establishment.

No.	Office.	Per Mensem.		
		Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
1	Inspector General of Ordnance - - -	2,500	–	–
2	Inspector Generals of Ordnance, at 2,200 rupees	4,400	–	–
1	Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance (assumed to be Lieutenant Colonel).	1,802	4	–
2	Deputy Inspector Generals of Ordnance (assumed to be Lieutenant Colonels), *Rs.* 1,602. 4.	3,204	8	–
1	Assistant to Inspector General, Bengal (assumed to be a Captain).	917	7	8
7	*Rs.*	12,824	3	8

Proposed Establishment.

No.	Office.	Per Mensem.		
		Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
1	Director General - - - - - - -	2,500	–	–
2	Inspectors General, at 2,000 rupees - -	4,000	–	–
1	Deputy Director General (assumed to be Lieutenant Colonel).	1,602	4	–
2	Assistant Inspectors General (assumed to be Majors), at *Rs.* 1,040. 14.	2,081	12	–
1	Assistant to Director General (assumed to be a Captain).	667	7	8
7	*Rs.*	10,851	7	8

Under

Under this head, therefore, a saving was proposed of *Rs.* 1,972. 12. a month, or 23,673 rupees a year.

5. The Army Commission did not suggest any alteration in the number, establishment, or location of the 10 ordnance manufacturing establishments, but they considered that the higher rate of staff pay now given to the three senior Superintendents of Factories in Bengal, namely, 750 rupees a month, might be reduced to the scale of pay now allowed to all other Superintendents of Factories, namely, 600 rupees a month.

6. The Commission proposed to retain first-class arsenals, as at present, at Fort William, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, and Bombay; to retain as second-class arsenals those now existing at Rawul Pindi, Rangoon, Mhow, Kurrachee, and Aden; to convert the ammunition depôt at Bellary into a second-class arsenal; to reduce the second-class arsenals at Secunderabad and Quetta to ammunition depôts; to retain the existing ammunition depôts at Agra, Peshawur, Mooltan, Dera Ismail Khan, Tonghoo, Poona, Ahmedabad, and Belgaum, and to abolish the depôts at Nagpore, Bangalore, and St. Thomas' Mount.

7. For the executive duties, the Commission recommended a scale of establishment calculated to provide three officers to each first-class arsenal, two for each second-class arsenal, and one for each of the six more important ammunition depôts of Agra, Peshawur, Secunderabad, Quetta, Ahmedabad, and Poona. The establishment, therefore, would consist of 33 officers, instead of 19, as shown in your statement of the existing establishment, but the Commission proposed to divide the Commissaries into four classes, drawing respectively 500 rupees, 400 rupees, 300 rupees, and 200 rupees a month, instead of three classes as at present, with 500 rupees, 400 rupees, and 250 rupees a month, and they proposed to have five first-class, six second-class, 11 third-class, and 11 fourth-class Commissaries, instead of seven first-class, six second-class, and six third-class Commissaries.

8 The financial result of this part of the proposals of the Commission would appear to be as follows:—

	Monthly.
	Rs.
Staff salaries of 33 Officers on scale proposed by Commission	10,400
Staff salaries of 19 Officers at present - - - -	7,400
Difference - - - *Rs.*	3,000

or an increased charge of 36,000 rupees a year. To this must be added the regimental pay of 14 additional officers. If seven of these are assumed to be captains and seven lieutenants, their regimental pay would amount to *Rs.* 4,781. 9. 8. a month, or *Rs.* 57,379. 4. a year, making a total additional charge of *Rs.* 93,379. 4. a year. To this charge must be added the prospective liability for pensions of 14 officers who would be additional to the existing establishment of the Royal Artillery in India.

9. As the savings suggested by the Commission under the heads of supervising establishments and factories would amount to about 29,000 rupees, there would remain, on the whole, an approximate extra charge of about 64,000 rupees a year, exclusive of the liability for pensions of 14 additional officers. It is stated by the Commission that against the increased expense should be set off the savings to be effected from the recommendations of a Special Ordnance Committee, under which the reserves of ordnance, ordnance carriages, and ammunition throughout India have been largely reduced, while the abolition of the depôts at Nagpore, Bangalore, and St. Thomas' Mount, as proposed by the Commission, will cause a further saving. These measures, however, though economical in themselves, seem to me to afford no reason for an increase of commissioned officers in the Department.

10. Your

10. Your Excellency concurs generally in the proposals of the Army Commission, but you recommend a somewhat different arrangement for the supervising staff. The Commission suggested that there should be two Inspectors General of Ordnance, each of these officers having an assistant, and that one Inspector General should be at the head of the arsenals and depôts in Madras and Bombay, and the other at the head of those establishments with the Armies of Bengal and the Punjab, while the Director General should control the Ordnance Factories throughout India. Your Excellency considers that this arrangement would involve too much centralisation, and you propose that there should be four Inspectors General, each of whom would have charge of Ordnance establishments in the Army to which he might be attached. These Inspectors General you recommend should have a staff salary of 800 rupees a month; and as you would dispense with Assistant Inspectors General the whole number of officers required for the supervising staff is the same as that suggested by the Commission. You recommend, however, that the salary of the Director General of Ordnance should be 2,750 rupees a month, instead of 2,500 rupees. The cost of the supervising staff, therefore, according to your Excellency's scheme, approximately would be as follows:—

	Monthly.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
1 Director General - - - - - - - -	2,750	–	–
4 Inspectors General (as Lieutenant Colonels), *Rs.* 1,802. 4.	7,209	–	–
1 Deputy Director General as Major - - - -	1,240	14	–
1 Assistant to Director General as Captain - -	667	7	8
Rs.	11,867	5	8

or *Rs.* 1,42,408. 4. annually, that is, *Rs.* 11,482. 8. less than the present cost, and *Rs.* 12,190. 8. more than the charge proposed for this staff by the Army Commission.

11. In respect to the manufacturing establishments, arsenals, and ammunition depôts, you have suggested no alteration in the scheme of the Army Commission, but in a Despatch, No. 51, of 13th March last, you have supported the recommendation of the Government of Bombay that a second Assistant Superintendent of Factories shall be sanctioned for that Presidency. The cost of this officer, even when he is a lieutenant, will somewhat more than neutralize the saving suggested in the salaries of the three senior Superintendents in Bengal, in addition to which there would be the prospective liability for pension of another officer of Royal Artillery. On the whole, therefore, the recommendations of your Excellency involve, besides a liability for the pensions of 15 additional officers, an extra charge of 81,896 rupees a year, arising from an increased cost for executive staff of *Rs.* 93,379. 4., against a reduction of *Rs.* 11,482. 8., for supervising staff.

12. In my Despatch, No. 243, of the 26th July, I informed your Excellency that it was not my intention to take steps for reorganising the forces in India into four Armies, and for removing the Armies of Madras and Bombay from the control of the Governments of those Presidencies, but I am of opinion, for the various reasons urged by Lord Northbrook's Government in 1873, and by your Lordship, in Despatch, No. 293 of 1881, that it is expedient to consolidate the three separate ordnance establishments in India into one department under a Director General of Ordnance, who shall be subordinate only to the Government of India, and I authorise this measure accordingly. I am not insensible to the consideration that, unless care is taken, inconvenience may be caused by the centralisation under one head, who will usually be at Simla, of a Department which has its branches all over India, but I have no doubt you will cause the business of the Department to be so arranged as to minimise any inconvenience of the kind; and I request you will furnish me with a copy of the instructions you may issue for the conduct of the Department under the new organisation.

13. I observe that you propose to give the Director General of Ordnance a salary of 2,750 rupees a month, instead of 2,500 rupees, as recommended by the Army

Army Commission. I am unable to sanction the higher rate of salary, and cannot doubt that the lower rate will be sufficient to enable you to command the services of a thoroughly competent officer. I sanction your other proposals for the supervising staff, but would suggest for your consideration whether it is necessary to have both a deputy and an assistant attached to the Director General. The recommendation of the Army Commission that he should have this assistance was made concurrently with a proposal that the Director General should control the Ordnance Factories throughout India. Under the arrangement now proposed he will not have this duty, and will be relieved from direct control of all Ordnance Establishments. I trust, therefore, that you will consider one officer, either a deputy or assistant, sufficient to attach to the Director General. With respect to the Inspectors General, it is true that there will be three armies instead of four, as proposed, but as the head of the whole Ordnance Department will be relieved from the immediate control of the establishments in Bengal, it will probably be essential to have two circles of superintendence in that Presidency, and I request that you will arrange the limits of the four Ordnance circles in the manner that may seem to you most convenient. There will thus be a saving on the supervising staff of *Rs.* 14,482. 8., exclusive of that which I hope you will be able to effect by attaching only one officer to the Director General.

14. I further sanction the prospective reduction of the salaries of the three senior Superintendents of Factories in Bengal, and the addition of a second Assistant Superintendent of Factories in Bombay.

15. For the ordinary executive duties of the Department an increase of 14 officers is recommended, and in order partly to meet the increased charge the average rate of salaries is considerably reduced, and the proportion of officers in lower grades largely increased. Your Excellency is in the best position to judge whether the proposed scale of pay is sufficient to attract competent officers of the Royal Artillery to serve in the Department, and assumingthat this point has received full consideration, I sanction the prospective division of the Department into four grades on the staff salaries suggested, viz , 500 rupees, 400 rupees, 300 rupees, and 200 rupees a month, respectively. I desire to leave it to your Excellency to fix the proportion of officers in each grade, but it will be necessary to provide that officers shall have a fair prospect of passing through the various classes of Commissary during the maximum period allotted for service in the Department, and I must point out that the numbers proposed for the two lower grades are out of all proportion to those which prevail in other branches of the Service.

16. Following the views of the Army Commission, your Lordship considers that the Department is undermanned, the result being that when officers go on sick leave, or, still more, when they are ordered on service, that arsenals are left under inefficient supervision, and that confusion and waste often ensue. You observe that this was exemplified in the Afghan War, there being reason to believe that serious losses occurred owing to paucity of officers, and you think that in the interests of economy a staff of young officers should always be under training in the Department, so that experienced officers may be available to proceed in charge of field depôts in time of war, and that officers of Royal Artillery may no longer be taken away from their batteries for this duty at a time when they can least be spared.

17. I have given very careful attention to these reasons, which possess considerable force. On the other hand, I find that until comparatively recent years an establishment limited to one officer was deemed sufficient for each arsenal or magazine, and that it is not many years since a few additional Commissaries of the lower grades were for the first time sanctioned to fill vacancies, and to give assistance in the larger arsenals. Further, I find that when the army was much larger than it now is, when the number of batteries, regiments, and garrisons were more numerous, and when there were more arsenals and magazines than at present, and when communications were more difficult, the establishment of officers allowed never approached the number now proposed. With this lower establishment, too, various important wars were conducted to an entirely successful conclusion without, as far as I know, any complaints as to failure on the part of the Ordnance Department.

 18. The

18. The existing establishment seems to have been fixed after much careful consideration by the Government of the day, and it is to be recollected that the present facilities for professional instruction given to artillery officers must render it more easy than it was formerly to find officers well qualified for the Ordnance Department, and who, at all events, may be relied on to perform the less important duties with efficiency. The system, too, of employment of officers in the Department for limited periods, and of employing officiating officers from time to time in room of those absent on furlough or sick leave, must make it, as time goes on, easy to find officers accustomed to the work of the Department. In the event of a war, however important or extended, it does not appear that it has ever been found necessary to employ more than a very moderate number of officers in responsible situations in the Ordnance Department in the field; and considering that there must always be many batteries in India removed from the scene of war, that if the war is a serious one all officers of Royal Artillery absent on furlough may be required to rejoin, and that practically the whole regiment of Royal Artillery constitutes a reserve, I cannot think that it is likely that sufficient officers could not be obtained to supply the wants of the Ordnance Department, without rendering batteries inefficient at a time when their officers can least be spared.

19. Nor can I omit to point out that, apart from the large body of Officers of Royal Artillery, there are more than 170 European Warrant Officers employed in arsenals, magazines, and depôts. Most of these Warrant Officers must possess great experience, and some of them are entrusted with very responsible charges, while several of them hold honorary commissions as lieutenants and captains. These officers are fully available for field service, and have constantly been employed with armies on active service, as well as in responsible duties in time of peace.

20. On the whole, therefore, I am unable to sanction the large augmentation to the establishment of the Ordnance Department that has been recommended. As stated in para. 3, 23 Commissaries seem to be now actually serving. This number, under the proposed classification of arsenals and depôts, provides two officers for each first-class arsenal, and 13 officers for the six second-class arsenals and six larger ammunition depôts. Should you consider that more officers are still necessary, I sanction an increase that will not exceed in cost the saving to be effected in the supervising staff of the Department, as shown in para. 13, and such further saving as may be effected in the classification and salaries of the Commissaries of Ordnance under the proposals summarized in para. 15 of this Despatch.

21. In regard to the proposed future classification of arsenals and ammunition depôts detailed in para. 6 of this Despatch, I request that, before deciding to convert the ammunition depôt at Bellary into a second-class arsenal, you will obtain the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army as to the necessity of the measure. Your other suggestions as to classification are approved.

22. You propose that the posts of Director General of Ordnance and Inspectors General shall be tenable only for five years; that the Director General of Ordnance, if not appointed in that rank, shall have the local rank of Major General, and not be required to vacate if promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General during his tour of office; that officers of any rank under that of Lieutenant General be eligible for the post of Inspector General; that Superintendents of Factories shall hold office for five years, being eligible for reappointment; that Assistant Superintendents of Factories hold office for three years under existing rules; and that all other officers of the Ordnance Department should be eligible to remain in it for 10 years, when they should revert to regimental duty.

23. With slight modifications I approve of the foregoing proposals, and I therefore sanction the following rules:—

I. That the Director General of Ordnance and the Inspectors General hold their appointments for a term of five years.

II. That no officer above the rank of Major General be appointed Director

Director General, and that no officer above the rank of colonel be appointed an Inspector General of Ordnance, but that the Director General and Inspectors General be allowed to retain their appointments for the full term of five years, notwithstanding that the former be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, or an Inspector General to the rank of Major General.

III. That Superintendents of Factories and all officers of the Ordnance Department (except Assistant Superintendents of Factories) shall be appointed for a term of five years, but they shall be eligible for reappointment for a similar term, after which they should revert to regimental duty.

IV. That Assistant Superintendents of Factories be appointed, as at present, for a term of three years.

V. That no officer hold an appointment in the Department, except those of Director General or Inspector General, after promotion to the rank of Major General.

24. Your recommendation that the Director General of Ordnance, when he is not a Major General, shall have the local rank of Major General, has been referred to the War Office, and on receipt of a reply I will again address you.

25. Meanwhile it will probably be convenient that your Excellency should issue the requisite orders for the reorganisation of the department, and I request that a copy of those orders may be forwarded for my information.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 370—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 6 December 1883.

(From Horse Guards, 17th November 1883, Reference 7348.)

WITH reference to the 24th paragraph of my Military Despatch, No. 337, of the 8th November last, I have to inform you that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, has consented to the local rank of Major General being conferred upon the Director General of Ordnance for India, when not appointed in that rank.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 31 of 1884—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 18 *March* 1884.)

My Lord, Fort William, 26 February 1884.

Military Department, No. 84,D, dated 14th January 1884.
Military Department, No. 86,D, dated 15th January 1884.
Indian Army Circulars, clause 5 of 1884.

WITH reference to your Lordship's Despatch, No. 337, of the 8th November 1883, conveying the decision of Her Majesty's Government on our proposals for the reorganisation of the Ordnance Department in India, we have the honour to forward herewith the papers noted in the margin, showing the action taken by us in order to give effect to that decision.

2. It will be observed that in some respects we have departed from the proposals originally made in our Despatch, No. 293, of the 5th August 1881, but we trust that the following statement of our reasons for so doing will satisfy your Lordship that the change was absolutely necessary.

3. In the first place, we have decided not to disturb the existing arrangements for the administrative staff in Bengal, except so far as the revision of

salaries necessitates a change, and we have therefore retained an Inspector General, with a Deputy Inspector General on 600 rupees, staff, instead of having two Inspectors General, as proposed. As our proposals for the distribution of the army into four divisions, each under a Lieutenant General, were not accepted, there was no object in breaking up the administration of the Bengal Department into two circles, and to have done so at the present moment, when, in view of the changes actually carried out, it is of importance that the administration should work smoothly and without disturbance, would have been specially inconvenient and perhaps embarrassing. The change would, moreover, have caused extra expense in office establishments, accommodation, and other contingent expenses. At the same time, there will be no difficulty hereafter, should it be considered advisable, in breaking up the Bengal Department into two circles, or in placing the arsenals and depôts under one head, and the factories, either of Bengal or of all India, under another.

4. We have also, on further consideration, come to the conclusion that the duties of an Inspector General cannot possibly be carried on without the help of an assistant. As pointed out by the Army Organisation Commission, it would be inexpedient to leave an office of such importance wholly dependent on one man. "Sickness, absence on duty, and other causes would bring his office work in great measure to a standstill till his return to duty. But besides this, there would be more work in the office of the Inspector General of Ordnance than one officer could efficiently and promptly carry out." We have therefore allotted three commissaries of the second class to these posts, but as they are not to be seconded the Inspectors General will be free to select officers of any grade, according to their personal qualifications.

5. We have carefully considered the suggestion made in para. 13 of the Despatch under reply, that it may not be necessary to have both a deputy and an assistant attached to the Director General, and are of opinion that, for the present at any rate, and until further experience of the new system has been obtained, his staff should remain as originally proposed.

6. The accompanying statement shows the cost of the present establishment, and of that notified in India Army Circulars, clause 5, of 1884. It will be seen that there is a saving of 2,928 rupees per annum, which we should be glad, with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, to apply towards an increase to the salaries of the Inspectors General.

The proposals in our Despatch, No. 293 of 1881, for the staff salaries of these appointments were made with some reference to the amount thought suitable for the heads of other departments, such as the Chiefs of the Staff, the Commissary Generals, and the Controllers of Military Accounts, which were fixed at 2,000 rupees, consolidated, for each division of the army. As, however, our proposals on this head have not been carried out, and the pay of the two last-named offices remains on the old footing, it is, we consider, only proper that the staff pay of the administrative staff of the Ordnance Department should be reconsidered.

Rs. 2,500, Bengal.
„ 2,200 { Madras. Bombay.

We would propose, therefore, that the pay of the Inspectors General be consolidated at 2,000 rupees for Madras and Bombay, and 2,200 rupees for Bengal. This would cause an increase of 8,799 rupees per annum, reduced by the above saving to 5,871 rupees. This small increase may be considered as met by the saving referred to in paragraph 3 of this Despatch.

7. As regards the executive staff, the sanctioned establishment, in which there have been various temporary changes of late years, is now as follows :—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Commissaries, 1st Class - - - -	3	2	1	6
„ 2nd „ - - - -	2	1	3	6
„ 3rd „ - - - -	4	2	3	9
			TOTAL - - -	21

There has, we may explain, never been any formal revision of the establishment fixed in our General Order, No. 342 of 1874, but various changes and reductions consequent on the Report of the Ordnance Commission of 1874 have slightly reduced the total establishment as then existing, and the above may be accepted as the present sanctioned strength.

8. The executive staff as now sanctioned will for the present be distributed as follows :—

	1st Class.	2nd Class.	3rd Class.	4th Class.
First class arsenals, Calcutta, Allahabad, Ferozepore, Madras, and Bombay.	5	- -	5	—
Second class arsenals, Rawal Pindi, Rangoon, Secunderabad, Karachi, Mhow, and Aden.	- -	6	—	—
First class depôts, Agra, Quetta, Poona, and St. Thomas's Mount.	- -	- -	- -	4
Assistants to the Inspectors General of Ordnance.	- -	3	—	—
TOTAL - - -	5	9	5	4

This distribution is made according to the existing status and number of our ordnance establishments, and will be subject to such changes as may be found necessary hereafter should the number and position of the second class arsenals or first class depôts be in any way modified.

9. But although we have carried out the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the strength of the executive staff, and have limited the increase, as desired, so as not to exceed in cost the saving effected in the supervising staff, we would again record our opinion that the scale of establishment sanctioned is not sufficient for the efficient and economical management of our arsenals.

10. Since the establishment of officers was originally fixed, the area of supply for each arsenal has been largely widened; the number of warlike stores in their charge is not only far greater in number than it was, but they are also of a more varied and scientific character, requiring special and technical knowledge for their proper care, manufacture, and repair; the arsenal workshops are now fully equipped with a valuable and extensive plant of machinery, worked by steam power; the regulations for the equipment of the army are more minute and exacting than formerly; and, without any disparagement of the administrative or executive staff of former days, it may certainly be said that far more is required from the executive officers of the present time than was expected 30, or even 20, years ago. Not only cannot the duties be efficiently conducted with this limited staff, but we are satisfied that we suffer considerable loss from the want of more supervision in our ordnance establishments, and that the statements to this effect put forward by the Army Organisation Commission (extracted in the margin) are in no degree exaggerated or too highly coloured.

Para. 464. This limited number of executive officers for the supply department has been found utterly inadequate for carrying on the duties efficiently, even in times of peace, and the war in Afghanistan has proved how insufficient this number of officers is for the exigencies of field service. The Bengal Ordnance Department, at the breaking out of hostilities in Afghanistan, could not be strengthened by the transfer of a single ordnance officer from Madras or Bombay, and officers had to be obtained, as best they could, from the artillery. Responsible duties, both in the field, in the arsenals, and in the depôts, had to be entrusted to officers totally unacquainted with the work of the department.

Para. 465. Government have, in several instances, suffered loss from this lack of supervision in the ordnance establishments, and we are satisfied that, having regard to the value of the stores and the political mischief which may result from the theft of ammunition and arms, it is a very false economy to underman the Ordnance Department. It is, therefore, in our opinion, an absolute necessity that the number of commissioned officers of the department should be very largely increased.

11. In deference however to your Lordship's views, as expressed in paragraphs 17-20 of the Despatch under reply, we abstain from making any further proposals for an increase to the establishments of arsenals and depôts, but we would beg that some margin on the present establishment may be allowed, to provide for the absence of officers on furlough, leave, or special duty. As will be seen from the distribution given in paragraph 8 of

of this Despatch, if any officer is absent from any cause, there is absolutely no one to take his place, and it will be necessary to apply to the Commander in Chief for the services of an officer to fill the temporary vacancy. There is always some unavoidable delay in obtaining an officer's services, and when obtained, he is wholly untrained and inexperienced in the duties required of him, the result being, as has been only too plainly proved, inefficient working, and loss and waste of public property.

12. It is true that in future the permanent staff will consist wholly of officers holding their appointments for a limited tenure, and therefore not eligible for long furlough; but even for six months, or for any temporary special duty, it is necessary that the vacancy should be filled; and the fact of their being tenable for so short a period will deter officers from readily coming forward as candidates for these temporary appointments.

13. We therefore request that a reserve of five officers of the fourth class may be allowed for this purpose. The extra cost of this reserve would be partly counterbalanced by the non-appointment of acting officers under the present practice, as such acting appointments would only be necessary when the number of absentees exceeded the number of officers allowed as a reserve; and, apart from this, we are well assured that the outlay will be amply recouped in the increased efficiency and more economical working of our ordnance establishments.

14. We trust that our proceedings may meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and that we may be favoured at an early date with a decision on the proposals put forward in paragraphs 6 and 13 of this Despatch.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
J. Gibbs.
T. F. Wilson.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
T. C. Hope.
A. Colvin.

Ordnance Department.—Organisation.

(No. 84, D, Ordnance Department, Organisation, dated Fort William, 14th January 1884.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of $\frac{\text{Madras}}{\text{Bombay}}$, Military Department.

I am directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, a copy of a draft G. G. O. which has received the approval of the Governor General in Council, and will shortly be issued, notifying that, with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Ordnance Departments of the three presidencies will be amalgamated from the 1st April 1884.

2. I am to add, for the further information of His Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Viceroy in Council has been pleased to appoint Colonel T. E. Hughes, R.A., Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal, to be Director General of Ordnance in India.

(Confidental.—No. 86-D, Ordnance Department, Organisation, dated Fort William, 15th January 1884.)

From Lieutenant Colonel *O. R. Newmarch*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Colonel *T. E. Hughes*, R.A., Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal.

I AM directed to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a draft Government General Order which will shortly be issued, regarding the amalgamation of the Ordnance Departments of the three presidencies from the 1st of April next.

2. You will observe from the letters marginally cited, copies of which are enclosed, that the Governments of Madras and Bombay have been informed that this Government General Order will be soon published, and that the Viceroy in Council has been pleased to appoint you Director General of Ordnance in India.

To the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department, No. 84, D, dated 14th January 1884.
To the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 84, D, dated the 14th January 1884.

3. His Excellency has also approved of the appointment of Major R. F. Lowis as Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal.

4. I am now to request that the Government of India may be favoured with your opinion as to the officers who should form the administrative staff of the amalgamated Ordnance Department, the names of the officers so submitted being selected from the lists of the Ordnance Departments of the three presidencies.

5. The office of the Director General will be with the Government of India at Simla, and that of the Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal, will be permanently located at Calcutta.

(ARMY CIRCULAR.)

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.—Fort William, 31 January 1884.

Clause 5.—Organisation.—Ordnance Department.

Amalgamation of the Ordnance Establishments of the Three Presidencies.

WITH the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the most Honourable the Governor General in Council is pleased to notify that the ordnance establishments of the three presidencies will, from the 1st April 1884, be amalgamated into one department subordinate to the Government of India, but under the immediate control of a Director General of Ordnance, who will be the adviser of Government on all ordnance matters, and be responsible for the efficient and economical working of the whole department.

G. G. O., No. 46 of 1884.

2. The first appointment of commissioned officers to the department will be made by His Excellency the Viceroy, all proposals for their subsequent promotion, transfer, and leave being submitted by the Director General for the orders of the Government of India. He will dispose of all questions relating to the appointment, transfer, and leave of all warrant and non-commissioned officers.

The manufacturing establishments will remain under the superintendence of the Inspectors General of Ordnance, but the general direction as to the nature and amount of work to be undertaken annually in each factory will rest with the Director General. The Director General will be responsible for the supply and distribution of ordnance stores, and for the preparation and submission of the annual estimates, as well as of the annual indents for stores procured from England.

3. The consolidated Ordnance Department for all India will for the present be divided into three circles of superintendence and supply, Bengal, Madras, Bombay, each under the charge of an Inspector General of Ordnance, who will be allowed an assistant taken from the establishment of commissaries, but not seconded. The Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal, will also be assisted by a Deputy Inspector General.

4. The whole establishment of commissioned officers will be as follows :—

	Rs.	
1 Director General of Ordnance - -	2,500	Consolidated.
3 Inspectors General of Ordnance - -	800	
1 Deputy Director General of Ordnance -	600	
1 „ Inspector General of Ordnance -	600	
1 Assistant to the Director General of Ordnance.	250	
5 Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class -	500	Staff salary, with regimental pay and allowances.*
9 „ „ 2nd class -	400	
5 „ „ 3rd class -	300	
4 „ „ 4th class -	200	
FACTORIES.		
10 Superintendents of Factories - -	600	
6 Assistant Superintendents of Factories -		
The first year - - - - -	150	
The second and succeeding years - -	200	

* Majors of artillery draw Staff Corps pay, *Rs.* 640. 14. a month, in addition to staff pay.

Officers now in the department will retain their present rates of staff pay till promoted to a higher grade.

5. The Director General and the Inspectors General of Ordnance will hold their appointments for a term of five years, and the local rank of major general will be conferred upon the Director General when not appointed in that rank.

No officer above the rank of major general will be appointed Director General, nor will any officer above the rank of colonel be appointed an Inspector General, but the Director General and Inspectors General will be allowed to retain their appointments for the full term of five years, even if the former be promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, or the latter to the rank of major general. With this exception no officer shall hold an appointment in the Department after promotion to the rank of major general.

Assistant superintendents of factories will be appointed, as at present, for a term of three years, but all superintendents of factories and commissaries of ordnance will be appointed for a term of five years; they will then be eligible for reappointment for a similar term, after which they will revert to regimental duty.

(signed) *O. R. Newmarch*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

STATEMENT showing the Present and Proposed Establishment and COST of the Commissioned Officers of the ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT in the Three PRESIDENCIES.

DESCRIPTION OF APPOINTMENTS.	PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT AND COST. Nos.	Regimental Pay per Mensem.	Staff Salary.	Total Pay per Mensem.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Administrative Staff:				
Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal - - -	1	Consolidated -	Consolidated -	2,500 – –
Ditto - - ditto - - Madras and Bombay	2	- ditto -	- ditto - -	4,400 – –
Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal -	1	1,002 4 –	(a) 830 – –	1,832 4 –
Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance, Madras and Bombay.	2	1,002 4 –	(a) 630 – –	3,234 8 –
Assistant Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal -	1	417 7 8	(a) 560 – –	977 7 8
TOTAL - - -	7	- - -	- - -	12,944 3 8
Factories:				
Senior Superintendents of Factories, Bengal - -	3	- - -	750 – –	2,250 – –
Junior Superintendents of Factories, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.	7	- - -	600 – –	4,200 – –
Assistant Superintendents of Factories, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.	6	- - -	200 – –	1,200 – –
TOTAL - - -	16	- - -	- - -	7,650 – –
Executive Staff:				
Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class - - -	6	- - -	500 – –	3,000 – –
Ditto - - - ditto 2nd class - - -	6	- - -	400 – –	2,400 – –
Ditto - - - ditto 3rd class - - -	9	- - -	250 – –	2,250 – –
TOTAL - - -	21	- - -	- - -	7,650 – –
GRAND TOTAL Number and Cost per Mensem -	44	- - -	- - -	28,244 3 8
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - -	–	- - -	- - -	3,38,930 12 –

DESCRIPTION OF APPOINTMENTS.	PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AND COST. Nos.	Regimental Pay per Mensem.	Staff Salary.	Total Pay per Mensem.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Administrative Staff:				
Director General of Ordnance in India - -	1	Consolidated -	Consolidated -	2,500 – –
Inspectors General of Ordnance, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.	3	1,002 4 –	(a) 830 – –	5,466 12 –
Deputy Director General of Ordnance in India -	1	1,002 4 –	600 – –	1,602 4 –
Deputy Inspector General of Ordnance, Bengal -	1	1,002 4 –	(a) 630 – –	1,632 4 –
Assistant Director General of Ordnance - -	1	265 12 –	250 – –	515 12 –
TOTAL - - -	7	- - -	- - -	11,717 – –
Factories:				
Superintendents of Factories - - - -	10	- - -	600 – –	6,000 – –
Assistant Superintendents of Factories - - -	6	- - -	200 – –	1 200 – –
TOTAL - - -	16	- - -	- - -	7,200 – –
Executive Staff:				
Commissaries of Ordnance, 1st class - - -	5	- - -	500 – –	2,500 – –
Ditto - - - ditto 2nd class - - -	9	- - -	400 – –	3,600 – –
Ditto - - - ditto 3rd class - - -	5	- - -	300 – –	1,500 – –
Ditto - - - ditto 4th class - - -	4	- - -	200 – –	800 – –
Add—				
Pay of Rank of 1 Captain - - - -	–	417 7 8	- - -	417 7 8
Ditto - - 1 Lieutenant - - - -	–	265 12 –	- - -	265 12 –
TOTAL - - -	23	- - -	- - -	9,083 3 8
GRAND TOTAL Number and Cost per Mensem	46	- - -	- -	28,000 3 8
TOTAL Cost per Annum - - -	–	- - -	- - -	3,36,002 12 –

(a) Including presidency house rent of rank, Bengal and Madras.

ABSTRACT.

	Rs. a. p.
Total annual cost of the present establishment - - - - - - -	3,38,930 12 –
Ditto - - - of the proposed establishment - - - - - - -	3,36,002 12 –
Annual Saving - - - Rs.	2,928 – –

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 130—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 8 May 1884.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 31, of 26th February 1884, showing the action taken by your Government in order to give effect to the instructions conveyed in my Despatch, No. 337, of the 8th November 1883, in respect to the reorganisation of the Ordnance Department in India.

2. Your Government consider that it will be undesirable to divide the Bengal Presidency into two circles of Ordnance administration, and propose, therefore, for the present at any rate, to retain an inspector general, with a deputy inspector general on 600 rupees, staff, for all Bengal, a course which you consider will be more economical than that originally proposed. Your Lordship considers further that each Inspector General of Ordnance should have an assistant, and you have allotted three commissaries of the second class to these posts. These officers are not to be seconded, and the inspectors general are to be left free to select officers of any grade according to their personal qualifications. I approve of these measures, and I sanction a deputy and an assistant being attached to the Director General, as your Government, after carefully considering the matter, are of opinion that, for the present at any rate, and until further experience of the new system has been obtained, his staff should remain as originally proposed.

3. You propose that the pay of the Inspectors General of Madras and Bombay shall be consolidated at 2,000 rupees a month, and that for Bengal at 2,200 rupees, but the reasons assigned for this increase of salaries do not appear to me to justify a departure from the decision already communicated to you.

4. I am prepared, however, on the grounds stated in your Despatch, to modify the decision communicated in my Despatch of the 8th November 1883, No. 337, and sanction the formation of a reserve class of officers to be exclusively employed in arsenals, but I desire that the number may be limited to three, which I consider will meet the requirements of the department. It will be understood, of course, that the vacancies in this reserve class, caused by the employment of any of the officers, will not be filled up until the whole reserve is exhausted.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

— IX. —

MEDICAL SERVICE.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 315 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (*Received* 19 *September* 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 26 August 1881.

IN continuation of our previous Despatches on the proposals of the Indian Army Commission, we have now the honour to lay before Her Majesty's Government our recommendations regarding the organisation of the Medical Service in India.

2. This important and difficult subject is dealt with in Chapter IX. of the Report. The first section deals with the administrative portion of the staff. The Commission propose various changes in the organisation of the Medical Service, framed on the assumption that two separate Medical Departments would be maintained in India, and it will be seen that these proposals have in effect been already anticipated by the measures carried out in pursuance of Lord Cranbrook's Despatches of the 30th October 1879, No. 301, and the 22nd January 1880, No. 6 (Public). The principle involved in this change is briefly that, whereas separate administrative staffs used to be provided for British and Indian troops throughout the country, the Deputy Surgeons General of Divisions are now chosen partly from each service and superintend the medical staff of both services in their respective commands, while the Surgeon General of Her Majesty's Forces in each Presidency exercises a general control over all the officers, both of the British and Indian Medical Departments, who are employed on military duty. The result has been a very considerable saving under this head of expenditure.

3. Section 2 of the chapter deals with the executive staff. A modified regimental system is advocated; but the officers of each service are to be available for duty with the troops of either when needed; and the Commission consider that by the adoption of their plan the number of medical officers on military duty in India may be considerably reduced. A reduction is no doubt practicable, but, so long as the existing organisation of the Medical Services is maintained, it can, in our opinion, be carried out effectively only by the substitution of the station for the regimental hospital system, a change which is now in process of being carried out, and from which we anticipate very satisfactory financial results.

4. But these changes and proposals still leave untouched the great defect, that the medical staff in India is constituted in two separate services, British and Indian. This separation is extremely costly, inasmuch as it involves the necessity for maintaining a double staff, and therefore an unnecessary number of executive medical officers. The officers of one service are not eligible for employment with the troops of the other. If two detachments, however small, of British and Native troops are stationed in one place, two medical officers are required to look after them, although the duty could be perfectly well performed by one.

5. The Commission, indeed, propose to do away with this condition, but we doubt if their proposal would work in practice. And there would remain in any case the grave administrative difficulty, which has been of late so prominently before the notice of the Government and the public, involved in the maintenance of two separate services, competing against each other for candidates, and serving under different and often embarrassing conditions.

6. To remedy these evils it has been more than once proposed to effect an amalgamation of the two services; and, as your Lordship is aware, the War Office at one time professed its readiness to accept the plan of imposing all the medical duties in India, for both British and Native troops, upon the Indian

Medical Department,* and the Commission, in the concluding section of Chapter X. of their Report, put forward the proposal for an Indian Medical Corps, to be recruited from the Army Medical Department, and to undertake the whole medical duty in India.

* *See* Enclosures to Lord Cranbrook's Despatch of the 6th November 1879, No. 326.

7. Of the economical and administrative advantages of such an arrangement there can be no doubt; but we are apprehensive that a definite proposition to carry out such a measure might be met by many weighty objections, among which would be the great reduction involved in the establishment and status of the Army Medical Department, the loss of the prizes afforded by the higher appointments in India now open to its senior members, and the fact that the service would lose the valuable experience afforded by duty with troops in India. We have, however, been deeply impressed with the necessity for a radical reform of the Indian medical system, not only on account of the objections already stated, but because the rule under which officers of the British Medical Service are withdrawn after a tour of only five years' duty in India is very expensive, and because the Indian Government has altogether an insufficient control over the expenditure involved in the conditions of the service. And we are satisfied that the needful improvement, both economical and administrative, is to be found only in some measure of unification.

8. The essential points to be aimed at appear to be, first, that there should be one Medical Service for India; and secondly, that complete authority over the officers of that service while in India as to employment, distribution, and remuneration, should rest with the Government of India. And as the proposals of the Commission and others which have been under our consideration did not appear to provide for this in a satisfactory way, we invited the two heads of the Medical Service in India, Dr. Crawford, Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, and Dr. Cuningham, Surgeon General with the Government of India, to consider the matter, and see if they could not devise a suitable scheme; and we have now to forward a memorandum drawn up by these officers, which appears to us to satisfy all the essential conditions of the case, and to provide a satisfactory solution of the difficulty.

9. For the details of the scheme we would refer your Lordship to the memorandum itself; we will merely notice the following points in it.

10. It is proposed that there shall be a single Medical Service for the British and Indian armies, the officers serving in India forming a local branch of this Imperial Service, which they propose should in future be called the "Royal Medical Service," instead of the Army Medical Department. This Indian branch to be supplied by volunteers of not more than three years' service, whose names on their transfer to it are to be borne on the general list in *Italics*. These officers are to be employed after arrival in India for two years at least on strictly military duty, after which they will be eligible for civil employ, but will be liable at all times to be recalled for military service if wanted. If after 10 years' continuous service in civil employ they do not return to military duty they would not be eligible for promotion to the administrative grade with the army, but must look for such advancement in the civil line only, although their services would continue to be available for military duty if required.

Paragraph 3.

11. Officers of this Indian Branch of the Royal Medical Service are to come under the furlough rules of 1875. It is recommended that no officer shall be allowed to accumulate more than two years' leave at one time, and also that any officer requiring more leave than that for the restoration of his health shall be placed on half-pay, unless he have the necessary amount of furlough at his credit.

Paragraph 11.

12. Officers of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service are to be entirely at the disposal of the Government of India, to be in fact on the same footing in this respect as officers of the old Indian Corps of Engineers; that is to say, their promotion and retirement would be governed by the general rules of the Royal Medical Service, but they would not be eligible to leave India except under the furlough rules. Exchanges, however, should be freely allowed between the Indian branch and the general service, subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for India. Power is also

Paragraphs 6 and 12.

also proposed to be taken to make transfers of officers from one branch to the other, when it may be necessary to do so in the interest of the public service.

13. The half pay and pensions for the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service to be on the scale recently granted to the present Indian Medical Service; the amount being calculated at Home and Indian rates for the portions of service passed at Home and in India respectively.

Paragraph 15.

14. Fourteen good-service pensions are proposed for the Indian branch, to be held after retirement.

Paragraph 16.

15. The head of the Royal Medical Service in India to be an officer attached to the Government of India. The memorandum does not specify the title which should be given to this officer: we think that, with reference to the analogous titles of Commander in Chief in India and Adjutant General in India, the title of "Director General, Royal Medical Service in India," would be appropriate. The pay proposed in the memorandum for this officer, 3,000 rupees per month, appears suitable, with reference to the great responsibility of the office. The post should be tenable for five years, so long as the occupant does not exceed 60 years of age.

Paragraph 18.

16. For the control of that branch of the service employed on military duty, there would be a Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, who would be on the Staff of the Commander in Chief. A Surgeon General is proposed for each of the four armies which we have recommended as the future organisation of the Indian Army, and 16 Deputy Surgeons General, being one for each division and first class district, also nine Brigade Surgeons, as principal medical officers of the second class districts. The pay of a Surgeon General is to be 2,250 rupees, that of the Surgeons General of Madras and Bombay being now 2,500 rupees. The Deputy Surgeons General to have 1,800 rupees each, as at present, the number of these being reduced from 21 to 16. The nine Brigade Surgeons in charge of districts to have each a staff salary of 300 rupees. A Secretary is proposed on 1,200 rupees for the Director General. The Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, to have a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary instead of two Secretaries as at present; the Secretaries to the Surgeons General of the Madras and Bombay Armies to be abolished.

Paragraph 19.

Paragraph 20.

17. As regards the civil administration, the Surgeons General at Madras and Bombay are to be replaced eventually by Deputy Surgeons General. The pay of the Sanitary Commissioners, Madras and Bombay, to be equalised with that of the Sanitary Commissioners in other provinces.

Paragraph 23.

18. The general result of these modifications is given in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the memorandum, and shows a total saving under administrative staff of 73,800 rupees per annum.

19. The memorandum proceeds to deal with the employment of Natives of India in the Civil Medical Service. It is proposed to constitute an "Indian Medical Service," in two grades, Assistant Surgeons, and Civil Medical Officers. These, although primarily engaged in view to civil employ, are to be liable for duty in military hospitals within their province or elsewhere when required. The service to be established on a local basis.

Paragraphs 27-30.

20. The second part of the memorandum deals with the application of the proposed new system to existing circumstances. It is urged that the new organisation should be introduced as early as possible, and that in this view the new mode of recruiting the service should have immediate effect, while it is proposed to carry out the change as regards the existing members of the service in the following way. As soon as the proper strength of the Indian Establishment has been fixed, having regard to the numerical reduction resulting from the station hospital system now in course of being introduced, the deficiencies in numbers, that is to say, the difference between the strength of the present Indian Medical Services (of the three Presidencies) and the number of medical officers altogether required for India, should be made good by inviting officers of the existing Army Medical Department to volunteer for the Indian branch of the new Royal Medical Service. Volunteers thus accepted would pass under the authority of the Indian Government. A further limitation is proposed of the number

Paragraph 31.

number of members permitted to volunteer for the Indian service, who entered the Army Medical Department before the 31st March 1865. The Surgeons General draw the line at this point, because, as they observe, in the Indian Service there is a marked and natural division at this date, caused by a gap of 4½ years during which no admissions took place, and because those who entered the Indian Service on and after the 31st March 1865 are subject to any alterations in the regulations which may be determined on. The authors of the memorandum propose, therefore, that the amalgamation of the Services should take effect absolutely only with those who entered the services after this date, and that as regards the Indian Medical Service, all the members of it who entered after this date shall be admitted to the Indian Branch of the Royal Medical Service. It is evident that the conditions of service of these officers will in no way be affected by the transfer. They will continue to be under the same rules as before as regards pension and furlough; and they will retain all the privileges they now have. The only change as regards them will be in designation, and that they will be eligible to exchange with officers of the Home Branch of the Service, under the conditions stated.

21. Thus when the change is carried out, and until it has taken final effect, the medical officers in India would be comprised in the following classes :—

Paragraph 45.

A. Officers of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Services who entered before 31st March 1865. These officers would continue to be borne on separate lists as at present, until they disappear therefrom.

B. Officers of the Army Medical Department who entered before the 31st March 1865, and have been transferred to the Indian Branch of the Royal Medical Service. These officers would occupy their present position in the transformed Army Medical Department, their names being printed in italics to signify that they belong to the Indian Branch.

C. Officers of the Royal Medical Service, Indian Branch, composed of the Indian officers of the three Presidencies who entered on and after the 31st March 1865, and the officers of the same standing transferred from the Army Medical Department. All these to be arranged in one list in order of seniority.

22. All this is somewhat complicated; but some degree of complication seems inevitable in a great change of this sort, especially if it is desired to carry out the measure in any degree as regards existing members of the Service. Unless this be done, the measure would in effect be postponed for 30 years or more, an arrangement which could not be seriously contemplated. Under the proposed arrangement, the measure of amalgamation will be finally accomplished so soon as the medical officers who entered the services before the 31st March 1865, that is, the officers of classes *A* and *B*, have disappeared from the list, which may be expected to occur in about 10 years.

23. It may be noticed that, whereas when the Indian Corps of Artillery and Engineers were transferred to the British Service in 1861, it was provided that the officers should still be kept on their separate lists for the purposes of promotion until the whole of them had disappeared, it is now proposed to amalgamate the three Indian and the British Services, excluding those only of a certain standing. This separation was necessary in the case of the Artillery and Engineers, because promotion in all these regiments was governed by regimental seniority. But in the Medical Service promotion to the rank of Surgeon Major goes by length of service, and thereafter by selection, so that no inconvenience or complication will arise from the fusion of the three lists into one.

24. It has been pointed out above that the saving in the administrative staff will amount to about three-fourths of a lakh per annum. But this is the smallest part of the saving; the essential economy will occur in the executive grades of the department by the abolition of the embarrassing arrangement which now exists, under which the officers of either service are not available for duty with troops of the other. It is impossible to say precisely what the saving will be under this head; but there is probably no branch of the Army reforms which we have recommended which offers a more promising field for the exercise of economy

economy, without any sacrifice of efficiency, than this plan of the amalgamation of the Medical Services.

25. We may also point out, as has been done in the memorandum, that this measure does not depend in any essential respect upon the general scheme of army reorganisation which the Government of India desire to see carried out, except so far as regards the detailed distribution of the superior officers, but may be brought into operation on its own merits, and quite independently of other changes. We accordingly recommend it confidently for early adoption by Her Majesty's Government.

Paragraph 51.

26. The Surgeons General, in paragraph 14 of their memorandum, refer to another which they have lately submitted, recommending some important modifications in the rules which govern the allowances of medical officers. This is a separate subject which is now under our consideration, and regarding which we shall hereafter address your Lordship. We attach a copy of the memorandum referred to, merely observing here that the existing regulations on this head are certainly very complicated and troublesome, and involve needless expense, and that they call for revision.

27. There is one more point on which we desire to remark. The Surgeons General in their memorandum point out that, under the terms of the Royal Warrant of the 27th November 1879, one-half of the appointments in the Army Medical Department to be made annually may be filled on the nomination of the heads of colleges, leaving the other half to be filled up by open competition. On this we may observe that, while open competition is a very good way of supplying the public service, when the competition is effective, that is to say, when the number of competitors is so much in excess of the available vacancies as to secure a class of successful candidates above the average in point of talent; yet when, as has happened with regard to all the Medical Services, the number of candidates has been but little more than the number of appointments to be filled, the advantage of the competitive system becomes doubtful. Moreover, there is an essential difference between the sort of competition, like that for Woolwich and Sandhurst, where the candidates after being selected by competition subsequently undergo their course of special training, or the open competition which has so long been the mode of selection for scholarships at the universities; and the competition like that which it has been attempted to establish for the Medical Service. In this case the candidates have already completed their professional education, and passed all the examinations necessary to gain their diploma or degree, and are then called upon to undergo a further examination, possibly of a much less complete kind. It is said that the disinclination felt by a young medical man to go through the course of special training necessary before appearing at this competition, and to undergo the risk of discredit involved in failure at a public test of this sort, tends to deter many eligible candidates from presenting themselves. It is difficult to believe that when the good emoluments and assured prospects of the proposed Royal Medical Service are compared with the openings available for the majority of private practitioners, the competition for this branch of the public service should not be sufficiently keen if there were not some special obstacles presented, and there seems good reason to suppose that if a certain number of these appointments were offered to the different medical schools, many of the most distinguished students thereat would be ready to come forward, and that in this way a very superior class of candidates would be obtained. We are therefore of opinion that it would be desirable to give practical effect to the provisions of the warrant which bear upon this point.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

Enclosures to India Government Letter, No. 315 of 1881.

JOINT MEMORANDUM on the Reorganisation of the Medical Service in India.

1. IN accordance with the wishes of the Governor General in Council, as communicated to us by a demi-official letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, dated the 28th ultimo, we have carefully deliberated on the proper organisation of the Medical Service in India. We have taken as our guide the general instructions contained in that letter, which, among other things, prescribed the following conditions as essential for any scheme which could be adopted by the Government of India.

Instructions received.

> "*First*, that there should be only one Medical Service for India; and, *secondly*, that complete authority over the Medical Service serving in India as to employment, distribution, and remuneration, shall rest with the Government of India."

It was further remarked that—

> "Subject to these conditions, the more completely the service in India were amalgamated with the British service at home, as to freedom of exchange, &c., the better.
>
> "Provision would need to be made for the civil medical duties of the Government. This might be effected by lending officers from the Medical Service to the Civil Governments under such tests and conditions as might be determined.
>
> "Provision would also have to be made for the employment of natives in the Civil Medical Service."

On all matters connected with such a scheme we have arrived at certain very definite conclusions, and we have now the honour to submit them for the consideration of His Excellency.

2. We shall first explain how, in our opinion, the one Medical Service for India should be constituted; and then show how this constitution, and the regulations under which it would be governed, may be applied to existing circumstances.

Division of the subject.

I.—*Constitution of a single Medical Service for India.*

3. The general principle on which our recommendations are based is, that the Indian Medical Service should form an integral part of the Imperial service; but we would suggest that this Imperial service, considering the large extension of it which would thereby be caused, and the multifarious duties which its members would be called on to perform, should in future be known as the Royal Medical Service instead of the Army Medical Department. The Indian Medical Service would thus become an integral part of the Royal Medical Service, but under the control of the Indian Government as laid down in the second condition above quoted. In case of any national emergency, however, officers of this Indian branch would always, subject to the sanction of the Indian Government, be available for temporary service in any part of Her Majesty's dominions; and in like manner the officers of the Home branch would be available for temporary service in India, with the sanction of the Home Government; the pay in each case, for the time, being that of the service to which the temporary transfer was made.

General principles followed.

The Indian Service to form a local branch of an Imperial service,

Under the control of the Indian Government, but available for service wherever wanted on emergency.

4. Admission to the Royal Medical Service would be regulated so as to meet the wants of both the Home and Indian branches. Volunteers from it would be called for as required to fill vacancies in India, the time

Mode of admission into this Service.

time for such volunteering being limited to a period not exceeding three years from the date of entering the Royal Medical Service. As volunteers so join, their names would be borne on the list of the Indian branch, but would remain in *Italics* in their proper place on the general list of the service. In this way their relations to their brother officers and the position of all as members of one Imperial service would be clear.

Names of officers of the Indian branch to be borne on the general list in *Italics*.

5. At present, under the terms of the Royal Warrant, one-half of the appointments in the Army Medical Department to be filled annually may be filled on the nomination of the heads of colleges. This provision has never yet been acted on, and all appointments have been put up for public competition; but if it should appear that advantage may be derived by introducing the system of nomination to the extent of one-half of the appointments available, provision for this has been made in existing orders.

Admission by competition or nomination provided for in existing Warrant.

6. The Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service, recruited, as above explained, by means of volunteers from the general list, should be one service for all India, primarily military, so as to meet the wants of the Army, both European and Native, but civil also, so as to meet the very important civil wants of the country. The first two years after arrival in India should be spent in strictly military duty, attached to station or other hospitals of European or Native troops, as may be found most convenient. During this time the officers must pass in the language according to the lower standard. At any time after completing two years of such military duty medical officers, if they have passed the language test, shall be eligible for civil employ; but they would be merely lent to the Local Government requiring them. They would be liable at all times to be recalled for military service, if wanted. They would be promoted to higher rank in the executive grades of surgeon major and brigade surgeon; but if after 10 years' continuous service in civil employ, they do not return to military duty, they must look for advancement to the administrative grade, either as the Principal Medical Officer or Sanitary Commissioner of a province. Such promotions should not run in any particular province, but should be open to all officers in civil employ, irrespective of the province in which they may have served.

Distribution and employment of the officers; Military, Civil.

After 10 years in civil employ, if they do not return to military duty, must look for promotion to the administrative grade on the civil side of the service.

7. There are certain other miscellaneous appointments not included in the above, such, for example, as the Mint appointments or the superintendentship of the Botanical Gardens at Howrah, which should still be open to medical officers. But as such appointments are not really medical, the holders of them cannot properly look for promotion in the medical department, and should not therefore rise above the rank of surgeon major. They have their reward in the advantages which are conferred by the appointments they hold.

Other miscellaneous appointments, of which the holders should not rise above the rank of surgeon-major.

8. The selection of officers for civil employ should rest with the head of the Indian branch. The present system, under which local Surgeons General, with the authority of their respective Governments, select officers from military or other employ as they may think proper, is subversive of all discipline and cohesion in the service. Once transferred to a Local Government, it will rest with that Government to employ them as it may think best.

Officers for civil employ to be selected by the head of the service of India.

9. Care should be taken to maintain the military character of all officers in the service, no matter how long they may be in civil employ. With this view, their military designations should invariably be used in all official documents, and they should be required to wear uniform on all occasions, such as at messes, reviews, levées, &c., when it is worn by their brother officers.

To maintain their military character as to designations and uniform.

10. Under the system above sketched, the rank of medical officers in India would necessarily be the same as that accorded to the Royal Medical Service, of which the Indian branch would form part.

Rank as now.

11. The rules regarding furlough for all officers of the Royal Medical Service in India should be the rules of 1875. All furlough should be granted only by the Government of India, on the recommendation of the head of the department. The rules of 1875, granting, as they do, one year's leave after every five to count as service are so liberal that they should be held to cover everything. Under the new arrangements officers proceeding on furlough would have the advantage in many cases of going home or of returning in charge of troops. Time spent on duty during such voyages should count as service in India. We would recommend, however, in modification of existing rules, that no officer should be allowed to accumulate more than two years' leave at one time; and also that any officer requiring more than two years' leave at one time for the recovery of his health should, unless he have the necessary furlough at his credit, be placed upon half pay. Administrative medical officers should during their five years' tour be allowed to include 10 months' furlough (the proportion due in that period of service according to the rules of 1875), if they have so much to their credit, and such time should count as part of their five years' tour qualifying for the extra pension of their rank.

Furlough to be regulated by the rules of 1875,

with some modifications as to accumulation of ordinary furlough,

extension of sick furlough,

and furlough to administrative medical officers.

12. Exchanges should be freely allowed between officers of the same rank in the Home and Indian branches of the Royal Medical Service, and officers so exchanging into the Indian branch should take their places according to the date of rank. An officer returning to the Home branch would find his place retained for him. All that would be necessary would be to change his name from *Italics* into roman letters. Besides requiring that the officers exchanging shall be of the same rank, it will also be advisable to require that no brigade surgeon of the Indian branch shall be promoted to be a deputy surgeon general of that branch unless he has had five years' Indian service in the ranks of surgeon major or of brigade surgeon, or of both; and that no deputy surgeon general shall be allowed to exchange into the Indian branch who has not this qualifying service. All exchanges should be subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for India.

Exchanges to be freely allowed between Home and Indian branches of the Imperial service,

but to be subject to certain conditions to secure efficiency.

13. But, in addition to exchanges, it is desirable to provide also for transfers. Occasions will arise in which the Home Government may desire to have the services of a particular officer belonging to the Indian branch, or the Indian Government may desire the services of some officer belonging to the Home branch. Such occasions may be few; but it is important to provide for them. Any officer so transferred would take his place according to his date of rank. All transfers, like exchanges, would be subject to the concurrent approval of both the Secretaries of State. At times it may be necessary to extend this power of transfer so as to prevent any marked inequality of promotion in the two branches. As all are borne on the same general list, any great supersession should be avoided as much as possible; but a power of this kind should never be used, except when clearly necessary, and with the consent of the officers to be so transferred.

Transfers also to be allowed when required by the interests of the State.

14. The pay should be regulated according to rank and in such a manner as to make all officers readily available wherever they are most required. We have already submitted our views on this point, and would merely draw attention to the memorandum on the subjcet, copy of which is herewith appended.

Pay to be fixed in such a manner as not to interfere with administration.

Separate memorandum on the subject appended.

15. The half pay and pensions for the Indian branch should be those recently granted to the Indian Medical Service. As all officers must spend more or less of their time in the Home branch their pension would be taken on the whole period of their service, so many years being calculated at Home and so

Pensions to be those lately granted to the Indian Medical Service.

How to be calculated.

so many at Indian rates. It is desirable also that the provisions for retirement by gratuity granted by the late Warrant to the Army Medical Department should be extended to India, the capital sum in each case being augmented in the actuarial proportion of the enhanced Indian pension.

Retirement by gratuity.

16. In addition to ordinary pensions, we would recommend that a fixed number of good service pensions be granted to the Indian branch, and that they should be life pensions. Fourteen such pensions of 100 *l.* per annum are now provided for the Army Medical Department; and an equal number would not be too large for a corps of the strength of the proposed Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service. They would form a valuable means of rewarding good men whose health has broken down and who are obliged to retire before attaining the higher grades, and they would be specially acceptable, as, with the great reduction either already carried out or contemplated in the administrative grade, many officers must be superannuated before they can derive the benefits in the shape of pay and extra pension which service in these grades carries with it.

A certain number of life good service pensions to be granted to the Indian branch.

17. It would necessarily follow that all retired executive officers of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service would, like their brother officers in the Home branch, be available for the reserve up to the age of 55 years.

Retired officers available for reserve.

18. As the service is to be one for all India, the authority over it should be vested in one head, who should be with the Government of India; but it should be understood that this appointment of head of the service is open to every officer in it, including all deputy surgeons general and surgeons general, whether in military or civil employ, and whether they have completed their tour of service in their respective grades or not, provided they have not exceeded the limit of age at which these officers must be retired. As his postion will be one above that of all other administrative officers, and would in fact closely correspond with that of the Director General at Home, his pay should be fixed at a special rate. In all medical and sanitary questions he should be the Head of the Medical Services in India, not only of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service, but also of the new Indian Medical Service, to be recommended in a subsequent paragraph, and of all the subordinate services. He should be in free and direct communication with all the departments of the Government, as their adviser on all such matters. He should recommend for all departmental promotions. He should distribute officers, both commissioned and subordinate, to the several sections requiring them, military, civil, and sanitary. His orders in regard to the distribution of officers between these different sections should be sent direct to the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, or to the Civil Principal Medical Officer concerned. He should have the power of transferring a medical officer from military service to civil service, and *vice versâ*, whenever necessity arises; but should not interfere with the employment of any officer while serving on either the military or the civil side. The postings of officers, their changes from one appointment to another either in military employ or within a local Government, and all such details, would rest with the administrative medical officer immediately concerned. He would communicate with the Director General of the Royal Medical Service in all matters regarding recruiting, exchanges, transfers, and would report all casualties by death, retirement, &c.; he would also, as Sanitary Commissioner, prepare, as at present, an annual sanitary report for the whole of India.

Administration.
One head—with the Government of India; his position and duties.

19. Other principal medical officers would consist of a surgeon general to be responsible for the army, and of deputy surgeons general in the different Local Governments and administrations. The Surgeon General for the Army should be called Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, and should be on the staff of the Commander in Chief. He should be charged with the medical administration of the Army throughout India, and would have control of the medical staff of the forces. He would advise the Commander in Chief on all

Other principal medical officers. Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, with the Commander-in-Chief: his position and duties.

all matters connected with the health of the army, with the administration of its hospitals; and all military and medical institutions would be under his supervision. The distribution of medical officers and subordinates in military employ would be in his hands, subject only to the control of the Commander in Chief, through whom he would report on all matters requiring the consideration of the Military Department in India or of the War Office at home. He should be in free communication with the head of the Medical Service in India, to whom he should give and from whom he should receive any information that may be required. As at present, he would keep the Director General fully informed on all matters concerning British troops; all such communications being forwarded through the Commander in Chief or the head of the Medical Services with the Government of India, as he may be directed.

Administrative staff for the Army under the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces.

20. The Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, would be provided with the necessary staff for the medical administration of the army. This staff should consist of a surgeon general with each army corps, a deputy surgeon general to each division and first class district of this army corps, and a brigade surgeon to each second class district not under a divisional commander, and reporting direct to the head quarters of this army corps. The pay of the surgeon general of the army corps should be the same as that for deputy surgeons general with Local Governments (2,250 rupees), and all brigade surgeons administering a brigade or other independent command should have a staff salary of 300 rupees, in addition to the ordinary pay of his rank. But, while assigning medical officers of these ranks to the different portions of each army corps, we would designate their appointments in each case merely as "principal medical officers," and as such the incumbents would hold official rank on the staff of the general or other officer commanding.

Provincial administrative medical officers.

21. The arrangements for civil medical administration need little change. Each Local Government and Administration would continue to have a head over the medical officers, subordinates, and medical institutions of the province; but the present system of giving these heads the local rank of surgeon general is inconvenient and anomalous, inasmuch as it does not carry the special pension of surgeon general with it. The administrative medical officers with the Local Governments should carry only their army rank of deputy surgeon general. They should continue to receive the enhanced pay now granted them, and should be designated simply as "Principal Medical Officer" of Lower Provinces, North Western Provinces, &c., as the case may be.

Change proposed in the position of the Statistical Officer and Examiner of Medical Accounts.

22. Among other changes which seem desirable are the transfer of the Statistical Officer from the Sanitary Commissioner's Office to that of the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, and the bringing of the Examiner of Medical Accounts into more direct relation with the Medical Department. The Statistical Officer would still do all he does now for the Sanitary Commissioner, but his current every-day work would be more usefully done in immediate connection with the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces. The returns of troops all reach the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, in the first instance; and if the Statistical Officer were to subject them to immediate analysis, a second examination, which is now necessary, would be saved, and the Surgeon General would be put in immediate possession of facts regarding the health of the troops, which now reach him only after considerable delay. The Examiner of Medical Accounts is now of little use in medical administration. The accounts he renders are so late in appearing, and so obsolete in form, that they are of no value in checking expenditure; and, so far as the economical management of hospitals is concerned, his appointment might be abolished without any loss of efficiency. There is no objection to his remaining, as he is now, under the Controller of Military Accounts; but he should also be under the head of the Medical Department, so far as concerns the very early supply of all information that may be required, and all correspondence between him and medical officers in military employ should pass through the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces. Our remarks are based on the experience of the Examiner's Office in Bengal.

23. There

23. There are other matters of detail in the proposed administrative staff, but they will be more conveniently shown in the following summary:—

Summary of administrative staff proposed.

Medical and Sanitary Administrative Staff for India.

1 Head of the Medical Services, who would also be Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India, at 3,000 rupees.
1 Secretary, to hold the appointment for five years, at 850 — 1,400 rupees.
1 Deputy Sanitary Commissioner (a specialist competent to carry out particular scientific investigations), at 850 — 1,400 rupees.

MILITARY.	CIVIL.
1 Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, at 2,700 rupees.	*Medical Staff.*
1 Secretary (a Surgeon Major or Brigade Surgeon, to hold the appointment for five years), at 1,400 rupees.	1 Deputy Surgeon General, Madras, at 2,250 rupees. 1 Deputy Surgeon General, Bombay, at 2,250 rupees. 1 Deputy Surgeon General, Lower Provinces, at 2,250 rupees. 1 Deputy Surgeon General, North Western Provinces and Oudh, at 2,250 rupees. 1 Deputy Surgeon General, Punjab, at 2,000 rupees. (To be designated "Principal Medical Officer.")
1 Assistant Secretary (selected from the Subordinate Medical Department), at 400 — 700 rupees, rising by annual increments of 50 rupees.	
1 Statistical Officer at 1,000 — 1,500 rupees.	*Sanitary Staff.*
4 Surgeons General, one with head-quarters of each army corps, at 2,250 rupees. 16 Deputy Surgeons General, one with each division and first class district, at 1,800 rupees. 9 Brigade Surgeons, one with each second class district, receiving a staff salary of 300 rupees, in addition to their ordinary pay. (To be designated "Principal Medical Officer.")	1 Sanitary Commissioner, Madras, at 1,800 rupees. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, Bombay at 1,800 rupee. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, Lower Provinces, at 1,800 rupees. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, North Western Provinces and Oudh, at 1,800 rupees. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, Punjab, at 1,800 rupees. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, Burma,* at 1,200 rupees.
	Mixed Medical and Sanitary Staff.
	1 Deputy Surgeon General and Sanitary Commissioner, Central Provinces, at 1,800 rupees. 1 Sanitary Commissioner, Berar, superintending all civil medical work, at 1,200 rupees. 1 Residency Surgeon, Indore,† with 150 rupees staff. 1 Superintendent General of Dispensaries, Rajputana,† with 150 rupees. staff. 1 Senior Medical Officer, Port Blair, at 1,200 rupees.

* To be also Inspector General of Jails.

† These appointments should be filled by brigade surgeons. The local corps both in Central India and Rajputana should be placed under them, and removed from the control of the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces; but the returns of sickness and mortality in these corps should be sent to the Statistical Officer, as now, to be incorporated with the other statistics of troops.

To avoid misunderstanding, it may be explained that in the above list the only new appointment proposed is that of Secretary to the Head of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service; but as the two Secretaries of the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, now allowed, are reduced to one, there is no extra expense involved, even in this item. We have not dealt with the staff for the field, as that does not affect the question immediately in hand and may be dealt with separately.

24. In the statement given in the last paragraph the scheme is adapted to the redistribution of the army which is contemplated. The cost of the Medical Administrative staff which we propose for all purposes is compared with that now in force in the annexed statement. The present and proposed staff for the army are given in full; but in the General and Civil Administration only those items are entered in which there is reduction and those in which there is increase.

Advantages of the scheme.

Diminution of expense.

A.—*General Administration.*

	Rs.
Increase to the Head of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service over present salary of Surgeon General with the Government of India - - - - - - - - -	300
Pay of Secretary to ditto at (average) - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,200
Increase per Mensem - - -	1,500

B.—*Military Administration.*

Present Cost.	*Rs.*	*Proposed Cost.*	*Rs.*
1 Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, Bengal - - - -	2,700	1 Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India - - - -	2,700
1 Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, Madras - - - -	2,500	1 Secretary to ditto - - - -	1,400
		1 Assistant Secretary to ditto (average)	550
1 Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, Bombay - - - -	2,500	4 Surgeons General with Army Corps, at 2,250 rupees - - - -	9,000
4 Secretaries (averaging 1,200 rupees)	4,800	16 Deputy Surgeons General, at 1,800 rupees - - - - - -	28,800
21 Deputy Surgeons General, at 1,800 rupees - - - - - -	37,800	9 Brigade Surgeons, staff salary, at 300 rupees - - - - -	2,700
Total - - -	50,300		45,150
		Decrease per Mensem -	5,150

C.—*Civil Administration.*

	Rs.
Madras: Difference between the pay of a Deputy Surgeon General at 2,250 rupees, and that of a Surgeon General at 2,500 rupees - - - - - - - - - - - -	250
Bombay: Difference between the pay of a Deputy Surgeon General at 2,250 rupees, and that of a Surgeon General at 2,500 rupees - - - - - - - - - - - -	250
Madras: Secretary to Surgeon General, abolished - - - - - - - - -	800
Bombay: Secretary to Surgeon General, abolished - - - - - - - - -	800
Madras: Pay of Sanitary Commissioner reduced from 2,000 rupees to 1,800 - - - -	200
Bombay: Pay of Sanitary Commissioner reduced from 2,000 rupees to 1,800 - - - -	200
Decrease per Mensem - - -	2,500

SUMMARY.

	Rs.
Decrease under B per mensem - - - - - - - -	5,150
" " C " - - - - - - - -	2,500
	7,650
Increase under A per mensem - - - - - - -	1,500
Net Decrease per Mensem - -	6,150
or per Annum - -	73,800

The net result is a saving of 6,150 rupees *per mensem*, or 73,800 rupees *per annum*. We consider it of great importance to the general efficiency of the service that a fair share of prizes should be maintained, especially as the number of these prizes has been so largely reduced of late years. We have taken no credit for any saving in executive, and it is here that the chief saving is to be made. We believe that, with one service as we have recommended, greater economy is possible in this respect than could be attained if two distinct Medical Services were maintained.

Increased efficiency.

25. The advantages to be gained in other respects appear to us to be very great. As all the medical officers would be of one and the same service, petty jealousies and rivalries would cease. A service would be provided for India, which, while it had all the advantages of being derived from and of forming an integral part of an Imperial Medical Service, would be really more under the control of the Indian Government than the Medical Service in India has ever yet been; and the whole being welded into one machine, under one administrative head, would be efficient and economical, and at the same time prepared to meet any emergency, either military or civil.

26. We have not lost sight of the fact that in 1862 the Government of India proposed to form Indian medical staff corps to be recruited from the Army Medical Department; and that this proposal was negatived by the Secretary of State, on the ground that the sanction of Parliament which was necessary to the repeal

repeal of the Act of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 95, s. 37, could not be obtained.* We understand that the section in question is not printed in the revised edition of the Statutes. It may therefore be concluded that it has been repealed; but, however that may be, there seems to be no legal difficulty in the way of the proposal now made, for it differs very materially from that which was made by the Government of India in 1862. The proposal of 1862 was to form independent staff corps, which should have no connection with the British Service, beyond being recruited from it. Under the scheme which we have recommended, the Indian Service would be no longer separate, but would form part and parcel of the British Service. Even when the section of the Act above referred to was in force, there appears to have been nothing in that Act to compel the Government to keep up a distinct Medical Service for India. Any doubt on this point would seem to be set at rest by the despatch above quoted, in which a scheme for amalgamating the British and Indian Services is discussed, and abandoned, not because there was any legal difficulty, but because of other reasons, which do not apply to the proposals we have here put forward.

* Secretary of State's Despatch, Military, No. 340, dated 7th November 1864.

There appear to be no legal difficulties.

27. So far, our proposals have been confined to the points affected by the first and second conditions of the demi-official letter referred to in the opening paragraphs of this memorandum. We shall now consider how provision may best be made for the employment of Natives of India in the Civil Medical Service.

Provision for employment of Natives of India in an Indian Medical Service.

28. In the subordinate branches of the Service Natives are already very largely employed as hospital assistants, both civil and military, and as assistant surgeons in a purely civil capacity. Both classes receive a regular medical education. The hospital assistants are taught during a three-year course at a medical school, and pass a qualifying examination. The assistant surgeons after five years' study at a medical college are required to obtain their diplomas as graduates or licentiates of medicine and surgery before they are admitted into the service of the Government. At present there belong to the Bengal Establishment—

Present grades of Hospital Assistant and Assistant Surgeon.

Hospital Assistants, Civil - - - - - - -	1,311
" " Military - - - - - -	391
TOTAL - - -	1,702
Assistant Surgeons:	
Employed - - - - - - - - -	275
Supernumerary - - - - - - - -	59
TOTAL - - -	334

We can deal with the numbers in Bengal only, as we have not sufficient information regarding the other presidencies.

29. The hospital assistants, although a most useful portion of the medical establishment, both in military and civil employ, need not be considered further here; but the assistant surgeons seem to be an excellent basis for forming such a Medical Service as is desired by the Government in which provision may be made for the employment of Natives of India. They are well taught, and the examination test to which they are subjected is quite as stringent as that required for an ordinary diploma in the medical schools of the United Kingdom. Taking them as the basis, it is desirable to constitute a higher grade, which we propose to call "Civil Medical Officers." The title of "Surgeon" which would be the natural designation of a class above assistant surgeon, is barred for military reasons. We observe, however, that the title of native surgeon is employed in Madras; and also that a special class exists there which is known as "civil apothecary." It is very desirable that the same official designations should be used in all parts of India, and that the different classes should be arranged on one system. The Indian Medical Service would thus consist of two grades, viz., *assistant surgeons* and *civil medical officers.*

Basis to be taken for this Indian Service.

30. We must now state shortly the general conclusions at which we have arrived regarding the more important points connected with their admission, employment, pay, and pension. They may be put shortly in the form of draft regulations, which we propose for the department, remarks being added within brackets after any that seem to require explanation:—

Regulations proposed.

(1.) The service will be known as the *Indian Medical Service*, and will consist of two classes, *assistant surgeons* and *civil medical officers*.

(2.) The service will be provincial and the strength fixed for each province.

(3.) Every candidate for admission must be a native of India as defined by law, and must be a licentiate or graduate in medicine of an Indian College.

for admission.

(4.) Admission to the *assistant surgeon* grade will be by competitive examination, and the names of the successful candidates will appear in the Gazette of the province.

(5.) The *assistant surgeons* will be graded as at present into three classes, and be generally governed by the rules now in force.

(6.) Promotion from *assistant surgeon* to *civil medical officer* will be generally by seniority, on passing an examination test which should be entirely of a practical character, and conducted wholly at the bedside in connection with the treatment of the sick; but *assistant surgeons* who have specially distinguished themselves may be promoted irrespective of their place on the list; and it will also rest with the Governor General to appoint direct to the higher grade any medical licentiates or graduates being natives of India whom he may think proper. All appointments to the higher grade will be notified in the "Gazette of India."

[In such appointments no preference should be given to those who hold a diploma from an English school or college. As has been already stated, the Indian examination is quite as stringent as that required for an ordinary British diploma, and it is indeed more searching than that required by some of the British examining bodies. Moreover, there is every prospect of candidates being able to take English University degress in India, by means of answering questions sent out to this country. A purely written examination is a most imperfect test of fitness to practice medicine and surgery, especially where natives of India are concerned, and it is therefore most undesirable to encourage this mode of obtaining degrees.]

(7.) *Assistant surgeons* will be employed as they are now, but certain civil stations will be reserved as charges for *civil medical officers*, and also certain appointments in the vaccination, educational, and other branches of the sanitary and medical departments.

[Under existing practice, *assistant surgeons* may be, and frequently are, placed in medical charge of civil stations; but the arrangement is nearly always of a very temporary character. They are also eligible to be transferred to the present grade of "uncovenated medical officer," a grade which under our proposals would entirely disappear; but such transfer has very rarely occurred. We calculate that there are in India some 80 appointments, which under the scheme now sketched might be filled by *civil medical officers*.]

Employment.

(8.) Though primarily intended for civil employ both *assistant surgeons* and *civil medical officers* will be liable, on emergency to be called on to perform work in military hospitals within their own province or with troops of their own province serving elsewhere.

[The assistant surgeons who volunteered for military duty during the late Afghan campaigns did excellent service under the direction of military medical officers, and showed what valuable use may be made of such material in time of war or other emergency; but they were all volunteers. Although there is a rule that when assistant surgeons are placed in charge of a wing of a Native regiment they shall draw certain extra allowances, it seems doubtful whether they can be ordered for such duty. There would, however, be no practical difficulty

in

n attaching them to Native regiments, because such employment would give those who are now doing nothing a very substantial increase of pay. And owing to the system of taking all licentiates and graduates in medicine for the Government service who may wish to enter it, which has hitherto been in force, and which has still two years to run, the number who are now doing nothing is very considerable, and it is most important to find useful work for them. In the Bengal Presidency there are already about 60 supernumeraries, who might with great advantage and saving to the State be appointed to do duty with Native regiments under military medical officers, the number of whom might in consequence be materially reduced. When, for example, there are two or three Native corps in one station, one military medical officer would suffice if an assistant surgeon were attached to each of the corps. The number of hospital assistants with a regiment might then be reduced to one. The military medical officer would attend all officers and their families, and daily visit each hospital; but all details would be left to the assistant surgeon. Where only one Native regiment is stationed in one place, it would have its military medical officer as now; but even in such cases an assistant surgeon would be a most useful addition, for with his aid one military medical officer might do both civil and regimental work, instead of there being a military medical officer for each class of work as there often is now.

Moreover, if this system were adopted, a very important change might be carried out in hospitals for Native troops. Now many cases of trivial illness are treated in these hospitals which might be treated just as well if they remained in the lines and came for medicine to a dispensary. This would not only reduce the hospital accommodation required, but by doing so would also render it much more easy to make the hospital for serious cases really comfortable, and not, as it so often is now, a barn-like building in which comfort is but little provided for. One good small hospital for serious cases would amply suffice in each station, even when several corps were quartered together. Under such a system the assistant surgeon would be most useful in charge of the dispensary of the regiment, and would also aid in the station hospital.]

Pay.

(9.) The pay of *assistant surgeons* shall remain as it is. That of the *civil medical officers* shall be regulated on the same principle as that of Native civilians; they shall have two-thirds of the pay that would be allowed to officers of the Royal Medical Service filling the same appointments.

Pension according to civil rules.

(10.) The pensions shall be regulated by ordinary civil pension rules.

II.—*How such a constitution may be applied to existing circumstances.*

The new organisation should be carried out as early as possible.

31. Assuming that the views which we have advanced meet with the approval of the Government, it remains to show how they can best be applied to existing circumstances. It is important that any new scheme which may be introduced should be acted on with as little delay as possible. A scheme which can only come into play 20 or 30 years hence would labour under great drawbacks, for during all that time the old jealousies between the two Services would continue. We consider it therefore as an essential to success that the new organisation should come into early play.

Great part should be carried out irrespective of army reorganisation.

32. A very great part of what we have recommended should be carried out at once. It is not necessary to wait for the reorganisation of the army. Even if there be no such reorganisation, it would still be most desirable to introduce the changes in the Medical Services which we have proposed as early as possible. Independent of the other advantages to be gained, it is to be remembered that, owing to the introduction of the station hospital system, some reduction is already being made in British medical officers, that it is necessary to provide for them, and that such provision can easily be made as a convenient and natural part of the general arrangements we have recommended.

 33. Taking

33. Taking the various points in the order in which they occur in Chapter I., the new method of admission (paragraph 4) can be introduced at once. All separate examinations for, and admissions into, the present Indian Service should cease. As volunteers for the Indian branch are required, notice would be given to the authorities in England; the requisite number of admissions into the Royal Medical Service would be provided for, and the ranks of the Indian branch be recruited henceforth by volunteers who had served not more than three years. As they volunteered, their names would be transferred to the Indian branch, and would appear at the bottom of the Indian list. They would remain in the War Office Royal Medical Service List in *italics*.

New system of admitting officers should have immediate effect.

34. The provisions for the distribution and employment of the officers (paragraph 6) can also come into force at once; and it is most important that they should be applied without delay, so as to avoid the waste of executive officers which the present system entails. But it would hardly be fair to apply the 10-years' rule immediately to officers already in civil employ. We therefore recommend (*a*) that it be applied to all who may hereafter be appointed to civil posts; and (*b*) that those officers already in civil employ should be called upon to make their choice 10 years after the scheme came into force, or in sufficient time to qualify for promotion to the administrative grade in military employ according to existing rules.

Also the recommendations for their distribution and employment;

35. The recommendations regarding the selection of officers for civil employ (paragraph 8), and the importance of maintaining their military character (paragraph 9), involve changes which are urgently required. The remarks regarding rank (paragraph 10) and furlough rules (paragraph 11) need no comment.

for selecting those to be lent to civil departments;

36. The system of exchanges (paragraph 12) should come into force at once as well as that of transfers (paragraph 13).

and for exchanges and transfers.

37. Whatever system of organisation be decided on, the pay question (paragraph 14) demands immediate settlement. Pension (paragraph 15) and good service pensions (paragraph 16) call for no remark.

Necessity for early settlement of pay question;

38. The changes in administration, in the position, powers, and duties of the head of the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service, in the relations of the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, in the designations of the provincial administrative medical officers, and in the relations of the Statistical Officer and the Examiner of Medical Accounts, as sketched in paragraphs 18 to 22, are much wanted, and may be introduced as a whole without delay. They seem essential to any proper organisation of the services, and may be carried out with advantage, independent of any other alterations. The details for the administrative staff of the army necessarily wait on any changes in its distribution and organisation; but even under the present presidential system it is most desirable that the Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, should be with the Commander in Chief in India, and that he should exercise more authority over the Military Surgeons General in Madras and Bombay as respects all classes of troops.

and for early introduction of the administrative changes proposed.

39. The only point which is somewhat intricate and which calls for explanation is, how the present strength of the Indian Medical Services is to be most readily and rapidly adapted to the new state of things, how is it to be enlarged so as to be sufficient for all the medical duties required in India? The first step is to fix what the proper strength of the Indian Establishment should be, having due regard to the station hospital system and to army organisation. This will require time, but it does not affect the principles on which the procedure should be based. Having fixed the strength, the deficiencies would be supplied by volunteers from the Royal Medical Service.

Transfers required to complete strength.

40. Before explaining how these volunteers should be disposed of, it will make the matter more clear if one point in the *personnel* of the three Indian Services is adverted to. In each of these services there is a marked and natural division into two parts, viz., the men who entered before 31st March

Present Indian Services divided into those who entered before 31st March 1865 and those who entered afterwards.

March 1865, and the men who entered afterwards. Immediately preceding this date there is a gap of 4½ years, during which no admissions took place. We also understand that those who entered on and after 31st March 1865 are subject to any alterations in the regulations that may be determined on.

Transfers to be divided accordingly: in what proportion?

41. The volunteers to be taken from the British Service may, therefore, be conveniently divided into those who entered the Service before 31st March 1865, and those who entered afterwards. But what proportion is to be taken of each class in order to secure a fair division? The proper way would seem to be to decide that the number of British officers who entered before the 31st March 1865 shall be in the same proportion to the total number of British officers required to complete the Indian Services for all duties, as the number of officers of the present Indian Services above that date is to the present total number of officers of the Indian Services.

Transfers of British officers who entered on and after 31st March 1865:

42. Having in this way decided the number of British officers of each of these classes to be taken, it will be convenient to deal first with those admitted on and after the 31st March 1865. If there are no legal obstacles, and there would appear to be none, they may be added at once to a general Indian list, made up of the officers of the three presidential lists who entered on and after 31st March 1865, and interpolated among these Indian officers according to date of rank.

43. The names of these British officers would remain on the general list of the Royal Medical Service, but in italics. As they would bring with them their full proportion of administrative appointments, the above arrangement would cause no injustice to the Indian officers in respect of such appointments. As to civil appointments, it may be ruled that the officers of the present Indian service have, *cæteris paribus*, the first claim on them. With this *proviso*, the present Indian officers and volunteers from the British service, who entered on and after the 31st March 1865 would be thrown into one general list for all India.

how to be dealt with.

Transfers of British officers who entered before 31st March 1865; how to be dealt with.

44. The British officers who entered before the 31st March 1865, and who may be transferred, should be kept on a separate list, retaining a right to their proper proportion of administrative appointments until they all disappear.

Relative proportion of administrative prizes to be reserved for them till they disappear.

45. If in consequence of army changes or other causes the total number of military administrative appointments be reduced, their proper number of prizes would be secured to British officers of this list by reserving the relative proportion as it is now until they all disappeared.

When the officers who entered before 31st March 1865 had disappeared, the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service would be completely formed.

46. Until all the officers of the Indian service who entered before the 31st March 1865 have disappeared, it would be necessary to show them in three distinct presidential lists, and to keep up separate Surgeons General with the Governments of Madras and Bombay. When these lists have ceased to exist, the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service would alone remain, and the new arrangements would be complete, including the substitution of deputy surgeons general in Madras and Bombay in room of the present surgeons general.

Arrangement of Army lists till that took place.

47. So long as the change is incomplete, the Indian medical establishment would be borne on separate lists: thus—

(A.) Officers of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay services who entered before 31st March 1865 according to presidencies;

(B.) Officers of the Army Medical Department who entered before 31st March 1865, and have been transferred to the Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service (one list for all India);

(C.) Officers of the Royal Medical Service, Indian branch, composed of the Indian officers of the three presidencies, who entered on and after 31st March 1865, and transfers from the Army Medical Department of the same date arranged in order of seniority.

Lists A. and B. would disappear in about 10 years, and C. alone would remain.

48. It would not be possible to transfer the officers on the Indian lists to the general list of the Royal Medical Service, partly because some of them are of mixed parentage, and partly because others might object; but all who may be permitted to exchange, or to be transferred from the Indian list, would necessarily form part of that general list.

Officers of Indian lists cannot be transferred as a whole to general list of Royal Medical Service.

49. Having called for volunteers of all ranks from the Royal Medical Service, the next step would be, with the aid of the Director General, to select those to be taken. Preference would, as far as possible, be given to those whose dates of rank may be convenient. Of the volunteers selected, those serving in India may be taken at once. Those British officers serving in India who either do not volunteer, or who having volunteered are not taken, would on returning to England be replaced by volunteers who have been accepted. In this way the changes we have suggested would come into play, some immediately and others within a few years. Meantime the system would work just as if it were fully in operation.

50. We have not lost sight of the suggestion of His Excellency the Governor General, that it might be well not to attempt an amalgamation of existing services, and that it might probably be the better arrangement to maintain the Indian service on its present footing, and to make the fusion prospective only. We have already explained why as early a fusion as possible is very desirable. We may note that in the proposed arrangement neither class of officers would suffer, whilst both would benefit. Indian officers would gain in the right of exchange and of transfer to the Royal Medical Service; they would have the advantage, in many instances, when proceeding in charge of troops, of free passages to and from England and of counting such time for service. They would at once be eligible for employment with European troops. At the same time they would retain all the advantages they now possess as to pay, promotion, and first claim to civil employment, not to speak of the vastly improved position which their service would occupy.

Suggestion to make the fusion of existing services prospective only not acted on, as the advantages of early fusion are so great; and both Indian and British officers would benefit by it.

The benefits to the British officers would be relatively small; but as they would be prospectively eligible for civil employ, and would enjoy Indian rates of pension, these benefits are by no means inconsiderable.

51. The organisation of the Indian Medical Service proposed in paragraphs 27-30 may be proceeded with at once, the higher branch being constituted as the supernumerary military officers in civil employ are absorbed.

Organisation of Indian Medical Service may be commenced at once.

52. We regret that we have not found it possible to bring this memorandum within shorter limits. We would only add that, although the many points to which it refers have been matter of lengthened discussion and deliberation, the result does not represent a compromise, but what, without any difference of opinion, we believe to be in the best interests of the State, and happily also in the best interests of both the medical services.

T. Crawford, M.D., Surgeon General,
Her Majesty's Forces.
J. M. Cuningham, M.D., Surgeon General
with the Government of India.

Simla, 12 August 1881.

MEMORANDUM on the Pay and Allowances of Medical Officers in military employ in India, by a Committee appointed unofficially under the orders of the Government of India in the Military Department, dated Calcutta, 23 May 1881.

1. THE system by which pay and allowances of medical officers in military employ is regulated differs in several important particulars in the two services, and in some minor particulars also in the different presidencies.

2. In the British Medical Service the pay and allowances in the administrative ranks are consolidated. The Surgeon General in Bengal draws a somewhat

what higher salary, when employed, than the Surgeon General of either of the minor presidencies; but in other respects, unemployed pay, &c., they are the same.

3. In the executive ranks, British Medical Service, the same rule obtains in all three presidencies, the rates of pay, whether employed or unemployed, being as follow, premising that no special rate of pay has yet been fixed for Brigade Surgeons:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Brigade Surgeon:			
Pay of next lower rank according to length of service		—	
Surgeon Major:			
After 25 years' service - - - - - -	1,093	2	–
„ 20 „ „ - - - - - -	1,056	9	7
„ 15 „ „ - - - - - -	825	11	5
Under 15 „ - - - - - - -	789	3	–
Surgeon:			
After 10 years' service - - - - - -	451	14	5
„ 6 „ „ - - - - - -	433	10	2
„ 5 „ „ - - - - - -	335	12	2
Under 5 „ „ - - - - - -	317	8	–

Surgeons when in medical charge of regiments draw under certain circumstances—*see* Table I.—a staff salary of 150 rupees in addition to the above-rates.

4. In Cavalry and Royal Horse Artillery, Surgeons Major and Surgeons after six years' service draw horse allowance for three, and Surgeons under six years' service for two, horses. In batteries of Field Artillery the officer in medical charge, if a surgeon, draws horse allowance for one horse only.

5. With the exception of horse allowance and staff salary, which can only be drawn by medical officers when present or on privilege leave, the other rates of pay are not affected either by general or sick leave in India.

6. General or sick leave to England places all Executive Medical Officers of the British Service on English pay of rank.

7. It is only necessary to add here that these rates of pay and allowances are calculated on the rank and English rates of pay of medical officers in force in 1858, and that the rates of pay granted to the British Service by the Royal Warrant of 1879 have not yet been extended to medical officers serving in India, although the relative rank and other privileges have been so extended.

8. In the Indian Medical Services of all three presidences rules and rates of pay for medical officers in military employ obtain differing from those sanctioned for medical officers of the British Medical Service.

9. The Surgeons General and Deputy Surgeons Generals in military employ draw like pay and allowances during their five years' tour of service in each grade; but on the completion of the tour, Surgeons General and Deputy Surgeons General may revert to unemployed pay in India for a limited period of six months, after which, should they not exercise their right to retire, they are placed on the English pay of their rank at rates very considerably less than those granted to officers of corresponding rank in the British Service by the Royal Warrant of 1879.

10. With regard to Executive Medical Officers of the Indian Medical Services in military employ, several rates of pay are in force, according to the length of service and nature of the appointments held. There is, first, what is called "unemployed pay," which has been made applicable to all military medical duties to which no fixed staff or consolidated salary is attached. This unemployed pay is calculated on the English pay proper and the half batta sanctioned

 for

for the Indian Medical Services by the Royal Warrant of 1864, and is as follows:—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Surgeon Major:			
After 25 years' service - - - - - -	888	12	–
„ 20 „ „ - - - - - -	852	3	7
„ 15 „ „ - - - - - -	677	6	11
„ 12 „ „ or on promotion - - -	640	14	6
Surgeon:			
After 10 years' service - - - - - -	410	9	5
„ 6 „ „ - - - - -	392	5	2
„ 5 „ „ - - - - - -	304	14	2
On appointment - - - - - - -	286	10	–

These rates do not, however, apply to medical officers who entered the service prior to November 1864, and who draw the higher rates given in paragraph 3, whether employed or not.

11. When "employed"—that is when holding a Regimental medical charge for which special rates of pay are sanctioned—the Executive Medical Officers of the Indian Medical Service draw the following "consolidated" salaries:—

	Rs.
Surgeon Major:	
After 20 years' service - - - - - -	1,000
„ 15 „ „ - - - - - -	800
Under 15 „ „ - - - - - -	800
Surgeon:	
After 10 years' service - - - - - -	600
„ 6 „ „ - - - - - -	600
„ 5 „ „ - - - - - -	600
Under 5 „ „ - - - - - -	450

The details given in the margin show how much of these sums are to be considered as pay proper and how much as staff salary.

Surgeons Major.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
25 years - -	888	12	–			
Staff salary -	111	4	–	1,000	–	–
20 years - -	852	3	7			
Staff salary -	147	12	5	1,000	–	–
15 years - -	677	6	11			
Staff salary -	122	9	1	800	–	–
Under 15 years -	640	14	6			
Staff salary -	159	1	6	800	–	–
Surgeons.						
10 years - -	410	9	5			
Staff salary -	189	6	7	600	–	–
6 years - -	392	5	2			
Staff salary -	207	10	10	600	–	–
5 years - -	304	14	2			
Staff salary -	295	1	10	600	–	–
Under 5 years -	286	10	–			
Staff salary -	163	6	–	450	–	–

The rates seem to have been fixed, partly with reference to rank, and partly with reference to length of service; but it is difficult to understand the principle which gives an officer of five years' service an additional allowance of *Rs.* 295. 1. 10. a month for the medical charge of a Native Infantry Regiment, while an officer of 10 years' service is allowed only *Rs.* 189. 6. 7., an officer of four years' only *Rs.* 163. 6., and an officer of six years' *Rs.* 207. 10. 10., for performing the same duty.

There are also, in the case of the officers of the Indian Medical Department, minor allowances, such as horse allowance, which affect the actual amount of pay drawn by the officer who may be fortunate enough to obtain an appointment to Cavalry; but this allowance is not a cause of inconvenience to the service, nor of hardship on other medical officers.

There are besides a number of other staff appointments which carry a special rate of consolidated pay. With them, however, and with civil appointments we do not propose to deal.

12 As regards the officers of both services, it is to be noted that while the relative rank granted by the Royal Warrant of 1879 has been extended to them, the pay clauses of that Warrant have not yet been made applicable to India; moreover, while the officers of the British Medical Service are allowed to draw full batta under all circumstances, all who entered the Indian Service since November 1864 have been placed on half batta or so-called "unemployed pay," till appointed to medical charges carrying staff salary. Although, as a matter of fact, the period during which medical officers are limited to this "unemployed pay,"

pay," has averaged only a few months, the system creates a considerable feeling of annoyance and causes inconvenience in administration.

13. The inconvenience of the present arrangement, by which the half staff salary allowed to an officer officiating in medical charge of a regiment is dependent on the grade pay of the officer for whom he officiates, and the confusion which is attendant upon it, is very great. In the figures above given it has been shown that the staff salary available may vary from *Rs.* 111. 4. to *Rs.* 295. 1. 10., so that an officiating officer in the one case receives *Rs.* 111. 4.÷2=*Rs.* 55. 10., and in the other *Rs.* 295. 1. 10÷2=*Rs.* 147. 8. 11. But to meet this inequality Government have ruled that under no circumstances shall the officiating officer draw less than 100 rupees a month staff pay in the absence of the permanent incumbent on furlough. The same system is followed when the officer holding the permanent charge is transferred to officiate in civil employ. He generally carries the half staff with him, and should he rise to a higher grade during his absence, which may be for years, the officer officiating for him may find the half staff salary available for him materially affected by this cause.

14. But the most urgent reason for a revision of the rules on this point is the inconvenience to the service and loss to the State arising out of the attempt to do justice to the officers by nominating them to permanent appointments, as nearly as practicable, according to their standing in the service. It may, and often does happen that when a charge falls vacant, the officer having the strongest claims to succeed to the vacancy may be hundreds of miles away, and his removal to the new charge may involve the movement of another officer to replace him an equal distance at the public expense. Much time is thus wasted, and not a little expense to the State often results from these moves, while the officer so moved from a doing-duty, or a so-called "unemployed" position, to an officiating medical charge which may not bring him more than 100 rupees a month, but who in consequence of the increased rate of pay he will draw is obliged to join at his own expense, is frequently involved in expenses which months of such allowances will not cover. This not unfrequently has led to the nomination of junior officers out of their turn to permanent charges, to the prejudice of their seniors, who when so superseded complain loudly, and not without reason, attributing, it may be, that which was done as a matter of convenience to the service to other and less legitimate influences.

15. If these points are to be met and settled on any satisfactory basis, it will be necessary to reopen the whole question in regard to both services, and to adopt some general principle which, while doing justice to all grades alike, will not involve the State in extra outlay at a time when any scheme entailing extra expenditure on this country is not likely to be accepted.

16. Bearing this in mind, and having regard to the fact that a rate of pay for Brigade Surgeons of the Indian Medical Department must be fixed, the simplest and easiest solution of the question would seem to be to accept the Royal Warrant of 1879 and apply it in its entirety to India. It will be remembered that while that Warrant gives a small increase of English pay proper to all ranks, it limits the grant of forage to officers of field rank only, except in the case of active service, when it is drawn by all medical officers at home and also under recent orders in India. The saving that would result from the forage clauses being extended to India, would go far to meet the additional cost of the re-adjustment suggested. As soon as the station hospital system is in operation the question of horse allowance will have to be reconsidered in this direction.

17. The present consolidated charge pay for both Surgeons Major and Surgeons should also give place to a grade pay composed of the rates of English pay, according to the Royal Warrant of 1879, and the "full batta" rates of Indian allowances according to relative rank. We propose that a fixed staff salary of, say, 100 rupees a month should be given only in the case of *surgeons* of both services who may succeed to independent charges, such as properly belong to Surgeons Major. This staff salary should be attached to the appointment as in the case of Staff Surgeons of Divisions and Brigades; and officers going on furlough or accepting civil appointments should not be permitted to carry any portion of such staff salary with them. If charges were given, as we are of opinion they ought to be, to senior officers, the number to be filled by juniors would be very small. The present state of things under which so many

charges are permanently held by young surgeons arises in great measure from the fact that the seniors who entered the service before November 1864 draw the same rate of pay whether they hold charges or not.

18. The changes indicated above are shown in the annexed table, and their adoption would involve a reconsideration of furlough pay for the medical service If the English pay proper of all ranks could be accepted as the furlough pay in the Indian Medical Service, as is now the case in the British Service, the auditing of accounts would be greatly simplified, and every officer would know at all times exactly what he was entitled to draw, a matter of some importance to all concerned.

19. It may be urged that to adopt a new rate of English pay for medical officers without extending it to the whole Indian Army, or to the Staff Corps at least, would create possible jealousies and discontent. We have not overlooked this point; but inasmuch as the English rate of pay of Indian medical officers was increased in 1864 without producing any such effect, and as the present re-adjustment involves reduction of allowances as well, we do not see any reason to apprehend objections on this score.

20. We have also considered whether Staff Corps pay with any fixed rate of Indian allowances could be accepted as a basis for calculating Indian pay and allowances of medical officers of both services; but this would not simplify matters, while it would open up questions of allowances to combatant officers which have never been extended in full to medical officers of corresponding rank, and which we refrain from discussing here.

21. We are unable to show the financial result of our proposals, but would observe that, with an increase of pay proper, there would be a large saving in charge allowances, which would almost entirely disappear, in forage allowance, and some saving also in furlough, sick, and general leave pay.

22. We would recommend that the pay entered in column 7, Table I., should be given to all medical officers of both services when employed, irrespective of the nature of that employment; but when on general or sick leave in India their Indian allowances should include only half *batta*, as shown in column 8 of that table.

23. We are aware that these proposals involve changes which cannot be applied to the present members of the Medical Services without their own consent; but, as the whole system of medical reorganisation is under discussion, we believe that they are worthy of consideration. If, as appears not improbable, future recruiting for the Indian Medical Services will be through the Army Medical Department, the system above sketched would greatly facilitate such an arrangement, and could be brought into force in the case of all new admissions, as well as of all now in the service who might prefer it.

24. Should the Government, however, be unable to reopen the question of pay proper, or to modify, in the direction indicated, the rules now in force, we would still urge the expediency as well as the justice of carrying out two important changes without delay: 1st, to make the half staff salary available for the officiating charge of a regiment a fixed sum, independent of the rank of the permanent incumbent, to be paid to all officiating officers so long as this amount with unemployed pay of rank does not exceed the total consolidated salary allowed for the charge of a regiment by an officer of that grade; and 2nd, to fix a period, say two years, as the maximum period during which an officer may be absent either on furlough or in civil employ, retaining his permanent appointment with a regiment. Were these changes carried out, the questions of pay and administration would be very much simplified.

T. Crawford, M.D., Surgeon General,
Her Majesty's Forces.
J. M. Cuningham, M.D., Surgeon General
with the Government of India.
W. J. B. Bird, Lieutenant, Officiating
Assistant Secretary to the
Government of India, Military Department.

TABLE I.—PAY IN INDIA.

Rank and Length of Service.	Service.	Present Unemployed Pay of Rank.	Present Consolidated Pay, =Total for Infantry.	Present Horse Allowance.	Present Total for Mounted Corps.	Proposed Pay,* taking English Pay according to Royal Warrant of 1879 Rates and full Batta.	Proposed Pay on General or Sick Leave in India when taken in excess of Privilege Leave.	Remarks.
1.	2.	3.	.	5.	6.	7.	8.	
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	
Surgeon General, Bengal	British Indian	1,200 – –	2,700 – –	– –	– – –	2,700 – –	1,950 – –	
" " Madras and Bombay	British Indian	1,200 – –	2,500 – –	– –	– – –	2,500 – –	1,850 – –	
Deputy Surgeon General	British Indian	900 – –	1,800 – –	– –	– – –	1,800 – –	1,350 – –	
Brigade Surgeon:†								
After 5 years in rank	British Indian	– – –	– † –	– –	– – –	1,190 8 5	886 2 5	
Under 5 " "	British Indian	– –	– † –	– –	– – –	1,154 – –	849.10 –	
Surgeon Major:								
After 25 years	British	1,093 2 –	1,093 2 –	90	1,183 2 –	1,123 9 –	819 3 –	
	Indian	888 12 –	1,000 – – §*1,093 2 –*	90 *60*	1,090 – – *1,153 2 –*			
" 20 "	British	1,056 9 7	1,056 9 7	90	1,146 9 7	1,093 2 –	788 12 –	
	Indian	852 3 7	1,000 – – §*1,056 9 7*	90 *60*	1,090 – – *1,116 9 7*			
" 15 "	British	825 11 5	825 11 5	90	915 11 5	880 8 –	652 3 6	
	Indian	677 6 11	800 – –	90	890 – –			
Under 15 "	British	789 3 –	789 3 –	90	879 – –	850 1 –	621 12 6	
	Indian	640 14 6	800 – –	90	890 – –			
Surgeon:‡								
After 10 years	British	451 14 5	451 14 5	90	541 14 5	476 4 –	384 15 –	An additional allowance of 100 rupees per mensem to be given to medical officers of these grades who may be actually holding a medical charge. As a rule, the juniors would hold no such charge, except for short periods.
	Indian	410 9 5	600 – –	90	690 – –			
" 6 "	British	433 10 2	433 10 2	90	523 10 2	460 4 8	368 15 8	
	Indian	392 5 2	600 – –	90	690 – –			
" 5 "	British	335 12 2	335 12 2	60	395 12 2			
	Indian	304 14 2	600 – –	60	660 – –			
Under 5 "	British	317 8 –	317 8 –	60	377 8 –	426 15 4	335 10 4	
	Indian	286 10 –	450 – –	60	510 – –			

* Includes horse allowance according to English Forage Warrant, but does not include forage for one horse for Surgeons when in the field.

† Officers of this rank now draw the pay of the next lower rank, according to length of service.

‡ Under certain circumstances, a Surgeon of the British Medical Department holding actual medical charge of a regiment of British Cavalry or Infantry, or brigade of Artillery, in the absence of a Surgeon Major, is entitled to a medical charge allowance of 150 rupees in addition to the pay of his grade.—*Pay Code, Vol. I.*, 570.

These figures in *italics* show rates of pay drawn by officers entering before 1864.

TABLE II.—FURLOUGH PAY.

RANK AND LENGTH OF SERVICE.	Furlough Pay admissible to British Medical Department under Royal Warrant of 1879, and recommended for Indian Medical Service.	FURLOUGH PAY NOW ADMISSIBLE TO THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE. To Officers holding Permanent Charge of Regiments.		To Officers entitled to Unemployed Pay only.	
	Per diem.	Per mensem.	Per diem.	Per mensem.	Per diem.
	£. s. d.	Rs.	£. s. d.	Rs. a. p.	£. s. d.
Surgeon General - - -	* 2 15 –	† 1,950	† 5 6 10	—	—
After 25 years' service -	- -	- -	* 2 5 –	—	—
Under 25 „ „ -	- -	- -	* 2 – –	—	—
Deputy Surgeon General -	* 2 – –	† 1,350	† 3 14 3½	—	—
After 30 years' service -	- - -	- -	* 1 14 –	—	—
„ 25 „ „ -	- - -	- -	* 1 10 –	—	—
Under 25 „ „ -	- - -	- -	* 1 8 –	—	—
Brigade Surgeon:					
After 5 years in the rank -	1 13 –	—	—	—	—
Under 5 „ „ -	1 10 –	—	—	—	—
Surgeon Major:					
After 25 years' service -	1 7 6	500	1 7 4¾	444 6 –	1 4 4
„ 20 „ „ -	1 5 –	500	1 7 4¾	426 1 9	1 3 4
„ 15 „ „ -	1 2 6	400	1 1 11	338 11 5	– 18 6¾
Under 15 „ „ -	1 – –	400	1 1 11	320 7 3	– 17 6¾
Surgeon:					
After 10 years' service -	– 15 –	300	– 16 5¼	250 *l.* yearly	– 13 8¼
„ 5 „ „	250 *l.* yearly - 13*s.* 8¼*d.* per diem	300	– 16 5¼	250 *l.* yearly	- 13 8¼
Under 5 „ „	200 *l.* yearly - 10*s.* 11½*d.* per diem	250 *l.* yearly	– 13 8¼	250 *l.* yearly	– 13 8¼

The rate of exchange taken is 1*s.* 8*d.* the rupee as a convenience in calculation. We are aware that many officers can claim their furlough pay at two shillings the rupee.

* English pay of rank admissible to an administrative officer when at home on "private affairs" during tour of service.

† Pay and Indian allowances, *plus* half staff, admissible to administrative officers of both services in Bengal when at home on six months' sick leave during tour of service. Surgeons General in Madras and Bombay draw 100 rupees a month less.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 86, Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 28 February 1883.

Para. 1. THE recommendations submitted by your Lordship's Government in your Military letter, No. 315, of the 26th August 1881, regarding the organisation of the Medical Service in India, having been very fully considered both by this Office and the War Office, I am now in a position to address your Government on the subject.

2. At the outset your Government remark that the amalgamation of the British and Indian Administrative Staffs in India effected in 1879–80 has led to a very considerable saving, and that the substitution of the station for the regimental hospital system has sensibly reduced the number of executive officers required.

3. These changes, however, your Government observe, leave untouched the great defect that the Medical Department in India consists of two separate services, the British and the Indian. The essential points to be aimed at appear to be, in the opinion of your Excellency, first, that there should be one Medical Service for India, and secondly, that complete authority over the officers of that service while in India, as to employment, distribution, and remuneration, should rest with the Government of India.

4. As

4. As the several proposals which had been laid before your Government did not afford a satisfactory solution of the problem, the two heads of the Medical Service in India, Dr. Crawford, Surgeon General, Her Majesty's Forces, and Dr. Cuningham, Surgeon General with the Government of India, were requested to consider the matter, and the scheme devised by these officers appears to your Government to satisfy all the essential conditions of the case.

5. The main features of your proposals are as follow :—

I. The new service to be under the control of the Indian Government, but available, on emergency, for service in any part of Her Majesty's dominions.

II. It is to be recruited by volunteering from the whole Royal Service. Volunteers for India to be of not more than three years' service.

III. After electing for Indian service, such officers to be at the disposal of the Indian Government permanently, and not, as army medical officers sent out to India now are, for tours of only five years' duration.

IV. The service to be primarily military, but civil also. On joining, the first two years to be passed on military duty. The conditions of civil employ, its effect on promotion, and the appointments open to medical officers, are referred to in paragraphs 6 to 8 of the Joint Memorandum. Rank and uniform to be the same as in the Royal Medical Service.

V. Exchanges between the Home and Indian branches to be allowed, subject to the consent of the Secretaries of State for War and for India. Transfers also to be allowed in the interests of the service.

VI. The furlough of Indian officers to be governed by the 1875 rules. No officer to be allowed to accumulate more than two years' leave at a time, and, if requiring more for the restoration of his health, to be placed on a half-pay list, unless he have the necessary amount of furlough to his credit.

VII. Half-pay and pensions to be on the new scale for the Indian Medical Service announced in General Order No. 279, of 1881; 14 good service pensions to be allotted to the Indian branch.

VIII. The head of the service to bear the title of "Director General, Royal Medical Service in India," who would also be Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India.

IX. The proposed Administrative Staff, described in detail in paragraphs 19 to 24 of the Memorandum, is estimated by your Government to result in a saving of 73,800 rupees a year.

X. The new Service to be formed, in the first instance, as follows :—

(*a.*) By drafting into it all officers of the old Indian Medical Service.

(*b.*) The balance of the required strength being made up by volunteers from the British Service.

Both these classes being divided into those who entered before and those who entered after 31st March 1865.

6. This scheme would exclude Natives of India who at present, in some numbers, compete for and enter the existing Indian Medical Service. In lieu of this, your Government propose the establishment of a new Indian Medical Service, to be purely local, manned by Natives of India solely, the qualifications being a degree or license of an Indian College. This service would consist of two grades, Assistant Surgeons and Civil Medical Officers.

7. These officers to be primarily intended for civil employ, but to be liable on emergency for duty in military hospitals.

8. The proposals of your Government were submitted to the Secretary of State for War, and I now enclose the reply* which Mr. Secretary Childers caused to be addressed to this office on the 24th February 1882.

* M. 731, of 1882.

9. From this communication your Lordship's Government will learn that the Secretary of State for War dissents from the essential feature of the scheme of reorganisation submitted by your Government, viz., the substitution of permanent service in India for the limited tours for which the British Medical Officers now engage.

10. The arguments adduced by Mr. Childers in opposition to the scheme do not afford any reasonable hope that further discussion would lead to its adoption

adoption by the War Office, and I am constrained to remit the subject for the further consideration of your Government.

11. Any fresh proposals which your Government may desire to lay before me will receive my early and careful attention, but before your Excellency determines upon forwarding any revised scheme for the reorganisation of the Medical Department in India, I desire that full consideration may be given to the following observations :—

I. Any scheme by which Natives will be excluded from the commissioned Medical Service of India would give rise to serious objections, and this difficulty would not be removed by the expedient of forming what would evidently be an inferior service composed solely of Natives of India.

II. The proposal that a certain number of appointments for the Medical Service might be given annually to candidates nominated by the Heads of the principal Medical Colleges is hardly one that would commend itself to public opinion in this country, while it certainly would be difficult to carry it out in practice. There seems also no object to be gained by such a scheme, for there is now a sufficient supply of excellent candidates under the existing system of admission by competition.

III. The inconveniences of the present system, under which there are two Medical Services, may, perhaps, on reconsideration, seem to admit of amendment, and, especially, it is not apparent why a Medical Officer of one Service should not in partiular cases perform duties belonging to both Services. Indeed, this is understood to be a not uncommon practice, though, of course, it is inexpedient that a Medical Officer ignorant of the Native language should be in medical charge of Natives. It is also desirable that fuller explanation should be given of the want of control over expenditure, said to be occasioned by the existing system.

IV. In paragraph 25 of your letter you state your belief that the measures now proposed do not in any essential respect depend upon the adoption of the scheme of Army reorganisation forwarded by you. It appears to me, nevertheless, that the Medical Services of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras would be considerably affected by your proposals, especially as regards the allotment of officers and their advancement to the higher grades. I request, therefore, that, before submitting any fresh scheme, the Governments of Madras and Bombay may be consulted, and that their opinions may be forwarded to me, together with their views as to the effect of any new proposals on the administration of the Civil branch of the Medical Service.

V. It is worthy of consideration whether any considerable further reduction of the higher Medical Staff is desirable so recently after the subject has been dealt with, and it should be borne in mind that, if service in India is to be thoroughly acceptable, there should not be a less proportion of the higher grades in India than in England.

VI. In any revised proposals, it is necessary that the exact financial result should be shown, as far as it is possible to do so. General Hannyngton reports on your present scheme that, after a careful perusal, he finds "that the arrangements consequent upon the proposed reorganisation are not given in such detail as would enable" him "to form definite conclusions respecting the financial results." The savings, as shown in your letter, depend only upon a reduction of administrative appointments.

Having made these remarks, I desire to leave it to your Excellency to make fresh suggestions or not, as may seem to you expedient.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 26th October 1881, No. 867, W.

Sir,

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying copy of a communication* from the Government of India, conveying their recommendations for the future organisation of the Medical Service for India.

* No. 315, dated 26 August 1881.

2. Lord

2. Lord Hartington has these proposals under his immediate consideration, and in view to coming to a speedy decision his Lordship requests to be favoured, as early as practicable, with any remarks on the subject which the Secretary of State for War may, after communication with His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, desire to offer.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 24th February 1882, No. 4831-1-249.

Sir,

1. I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Childers to acknowledge the receipt of Colonel Johnson's letter of the 26th October last, M., 867, W., enclosing communications from the Government of India on the subject of the Medical Service in that country.

2. From these documents Mr. Childers learns that great changes are contemplated—

(1) in the administration,
(2) in the numbers,
(3) in the constitution,

of the Medical Services in India.

3. Taking these items into consideration separately, Mr. Childers fully concurs in the desirability of abolishing any duality in the administration which may continue to exist; also in the establishment of station hospitals in lieu of a regimental service, and also in the reservation to the Government of India of entire control over all Medical Officers serving there.

4. With reference to (2) numbers, Mr. Childers feels that it is a portion of the subject as to which he is not called on to express an opinion, beyond saying generally that it is indispensable that there should be in India an adequate body of qualified European Medical Officers to attend to the sanitation of the European troops there. For the rest, Mr. Childers readily admits that the formation of a subordinate service of Native Medical Officers may be advantageous, both as regards Indian finance and as diminishing the demand on this country for Medical candidates.

5. Passing to (3) the constitution of the Medical Services, it would seem that the subject resolves itself into two parts; first, the gradual substitution of officers of the Army Medical Department for members of the present Civil Medical Service of India; and, secondly, a total change in the terms of service for officers of the Army Medical Department generally.

As regards the first of these points, Mr. Childers sees no objection to vacancies occuring in the Civil Medical Service of India being filled by additions to the Army Medical Department; but, with reference to the second point, a constitutional change in the nature of the service of the Army Medical Department, I am to express Mr. Childers' regret that he is unable to concur in the proposal.

6. Before expressing in detail the objections to the specific proposal now made, I am to observe that, for many years, the condition of the Army Medical Department had been highly unsatisfactory. The officers were dissatisfied with their position and prospects, and the greatest difficulty was experienced in obtaining candidates for it. One ground of complaint which was raised, and which, there was good reason to believe, militated against the success of the Department, was that there had been no fixity of principle in the constitution of the Department and the treatment of its officers. In 1878 a Committee was appointed to consider the question generally, and, after a full investigation, their recommendations, so far as accepted, were embodied in a Royal Warrant of the 27th November 1879. The effect of that Warrant has been very encouraging.

Candidates in ample numbers and of excellent quality have been forthcoming, and the Department is understood to be in a condition of efficiency and contentment.

Bearing this result in view, Mr. Childers is very unwilling to alter radically the conditions of service of Army Medical Officers after so short an interval, even if the scheme proposed in substitution were not in itself open to grave objections.

7. The Indian proposal appears to be, broadly, that one Medical Service should undertake, on the one hand, the duties of the Army out of India, and, on the other hand, those of the Army and Civil Service of India; but that the two services, that is, the branch in India and the branch out of India, should be practically distinct.

They would have the slender connexion of a common origin (inasmuch as during the probation represented by the first year or two of service all officers would be in the home branch), and there would be a further slight connexion in the power of exchange, but, beyond these points, the branches would constitute essentially two departments, serving under different conditions, on different rates of pay, and with different retired pay to look forward to. The relationship would, in effect, be that of an Indian Staff Corps to the British list of officers from which it is recruited.

The officers who are once appointed to the Indian branch would give the remainder of their service in India, subject to the rare exception of exchanging into the home branch.

It is true that, in the letter from this office of the 28th July 1879, it was stated that Secretary Colonel Stanley would not raise any objection to the Government of India taking entirely into its own hands the supply of Medical Officers for duty in India; but that suggestion was only put forward as a logical alternative to the proposals made at the time (which involved expense to India), to which alternative it was not denied that the Indian Government might have recourse.

There was no suggestion that such a course on the part of the Indian Government would be desirable, even for India itself, on any ground, either of efficiency or economy. On the other hand, the suggestion had reference to an Indian Medical Department, formed and organised, from first to last, by the Indian Government, but did not refer to a separate branch as now proposed.

8. A limited tour of Indian service has always been an attraction for Medical Officers, and, under the present system of tours of five years' foreign service, nearly every Medical Officer has his turn of Indian service. The probability of serving in India is, therefore, a conspicuous factor in determining an eligible candidate to compete for the Army Medical Department.

If, as now proposed, Indian service were practically limited to a body of officers whose whole service should be Indian, the number who would proceed to India out of those entering the Department in a given year would be relatively very limited. Consequently, the attraction of Indian service as an inducement held before the whole body of candidates would be seriously diminished, and probably eligible medical officers would be procured with more difficulty.

9. Further, as an Indian tour of service tends to attract good candidates, and all medical officers have equal chances of going to India, it may be assumed that the average tone of the whole Department is raised by such prospect of Indian service. When, however, it shall be evident that only a few of those entering yearly can ever look for service in India, it would appear probable that the best of the entrants will succeed in obtaining the Indian vacancies. The British branch of the service would then have left, instead of, as now, an average of all the officers who join, the least eligible of the entrants, the Indian probationers who would lack experience, and the few officers who, from failure of health in India or other causes, had been compelled to exchange to the lower pay of home service. Such an arrangement appears to Mr. Childers to be very prejudicial to British interests.

10. Again, both India and Great Britain would be losers in the matter of varied experience on the part of Medical Officers. India gives a Medical Officer more opportunities of seeing active service than can usually be obtained in other parts of the empire.

The

The Medical Officer, therefore, who has served his tour of Indian service returns home more valuable for general army duty than if he had not been to India.

Similarly, it is to be supposed that a Medical Officer going to India after a tour of European duty, during which he would have been in contact with modern science, would be more valuable for Indian purposes than one who had passed his whole professional life away from England.

The whole of this interchange of experience will be stopped by the adoption of the proposal contained in your letter.

11. Thus far, I have been directed to show that Mr. Childers, with a view to British interests mainly, has a decided preference for the present system of five-year tours of service in India over the proposed life service of a smaller body of officers. I am now to point out that, so far as Mr. Childers sees, the proposed system would be more expensive to India than the present (assuming that the same number of officers would be employed in either case). It is suggested that, for every five years in India, a Medical Officer shall have a year on full pay out of India, by way of relaxation, thus adding nearly 20 per cent. to the charge for full pay. Under the present system this charge is saved to India, inasmuch as the tour of home service affords, at British charge, the necessary relaxation after Indian service; and, further, as the home tour is longer than the year's leave, it may be supposed that, on his next return to India, the officer will have a constitution better adapted to contend with the climate, and, therefore be less likely to be invalided.

Again, under the proposed plan, all officers who serve in India will retire on Indian rates of retired pay, whereas, under the present plan, the retired pay is only at British rates. Without doubt, the high Indian retirement would be an inducement to candidates to come forward, but, as the prospect of British rates of retirement already draws a sufficient supply, it is difficult to justify the offer of a higher scale.

12. I am to add that, while objecting to the form in which it is proposed to provide for Indian medical requirements, Mr. Childers is far from wishing to interpose any obstacle to the administrative changes which are held to be requisite in India. He regards with pleasure the suggested amalgamation of the Civil with the Military Service, as throwing more prizes in the way of candidates, and as putting a stop to the competition between the two services which is now felt at the entrance examination.

Mr. Childers would therefore suggest, for Lord Hartington's consideration, that when a vacancy shall occur in the Civil Medical Service of India to which a junior officer has not already a guaranteed right of succession, an officer of the Army Medical Department should be appointed to it. In this way the one department would gradually, and without any violent change, take the place of the other.

Further, as the number of appointments to be supplied by the Army Medical Department would thus be gradually increased, Mr. Childers would not object to the tour of service in India being raised from five years to seven years in the case of all Executive Medical Officers hereafter sent out. An officer selected for a Civil Medical appointment in India might, at the conclusion of his seven years' tour of service in India, be allowed to volunteer for another tour of seven years, returning home at the end of it, unless in very exceptional circumstances, in order that the Home Service might have the benefit of his Indian experience.

13. If this suggestion be adopted, all the reforms otherwise required can be carried out equally as well as if the proposal sent from India were adopted, and, as it appears to Mr. Childers, at a smaller charge to India. On the other hand, the Army Medical Department, as a whole, will not be disturbed by a new system, will not lose for its officers the advantages of Indian appointments, nor for itself the experience derived from Indian duty.

14. Should difficulties occur in the arrangement of details, I am to suggest that a Committee appointed by this Office and the India Office would probably have little difficulty in removing any apparent obstacles.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

— X. —

VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 340 of 1881, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (received 10 October 1881).

My Lord, Simla, 16 September 1881.

IN continuation of our previous Despatches on the Report of the Commission on the organisation of the Indian Army, we have now the honour to communicate our opinions and recommendations on that part of the Report* which deals with the veterinary service.

* Chapter X., Section 5.

2. Irrespectively of the Report of the Commission, the organisation of the veterinary service has during the last two years frequently engaged our attention, with reference to the correspondence marginally noted;† and the subject has had our careful consideration in connection particularly with the papers underlying your Lordship's Despatches, No. 81, dated 24th March 1881, and No. 227, dated 7th July 1881. We have also obtained the opinions of the Commander in Chief in India,‡ the Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India, § and the General Superintendent, Horse-breeding Operations.‖

Note.—For correspondence here quoted, *see* pages 725 to 740.

† From Secretary of State, No. 180, dated 26th June 1879, para. 4.
From Secretary of State, No. 2, dated 15th January 1880.
From Secretary of State, No. 265, dated 19th August 1880.
To Secretary of State, No. 476, dated 9th November 1880, para. 12.
From Secretary of State, No. 81, dated 24th March 1881.
From Secretary of State, No. 227, dated 7th July 1881.
Telegram from Secretary of State, dated 26th August 1881.
Telegram to Secretary of State, dated 29th August 1881.

See page 685.

‡ From Adjutant General in India, No. 2563, B., dated 18th June 1881, and Enclosures.

§ *Vide* Enclosure of above.

See page 696.

‖ Letter No. 16, M.D., dated 31st May 1881, and Enclosures. Copies enclosed.

3. And first, as to the strength of the establishment. The Army Commission (para. 511 of their Report) consider that a large reduction of the present establishment is practicable, by the adoption of the system which they propose, whereby the requirements of the army for veterinary staff may be dealt with by stations, instead of by separate corps and batteries.

4. The introduction of the medical station hospital system is now in course of being carried out successfully; the application of a similar system to the Veterinary Department is a far easier matter; and we have every reason to believe that it will be attended with similar satisfactory results, and be productive of considerable economy in the present, and still more in the future. We propose to introduce it without further delay.

5. The Commission estimate the possible reduction of the veterinary staff in India by this arrangement to be from a total of 73 officers at present, to 50. The fixed establishment which we propose is 49. In view of this reduction we intend to restrict the employment of the veterinary surgeons' duties to the British mounted branches of the service in India, relieving them from the performance of such duties connected with the veterinary care of horses of Native cavalry, police, commissariat cattle, and (in peace time) transport trains, as have in a more or less indefinite way been placed upon them. This should remove the cause of complaint which has been raised that the Department is overworked. These duties can be performed by Native veterinarians, who will become more efficient as they get the advantage of training at the veterinary schools. By fostering such institutions, and creating a good Subordinate Veterinary Department, real economy can be effected, irrespective of the advantages to be looked for from the spread of veterinary knowledge through the agricultural districts. It will be in your Lordship's recollection that in our Despatch, No. 247, dated 8th July 1881, proposals have already been submitted for the formation of a veterinary class in connection with the Lahore Medical College; one already exists at Hapur in the Bengal Presidency, one at Poona in the Bombay Presidency, and one at Rangoon for Burmese students.

6. By the adoption of the station veterinary hospital system, then, we feel assured that the reduced number of officers will suffice for the requirements of the service, without imposing arduous duties upon them.

7. Next,

7. Next, as to the organisation of the service. In this point we may observe that the considerations which point to the maintenance of a permanent connection between the British troops and their medical staff does not hold good in regard to the Veterinary Department. The European troops form part of the British Army in India, and come and go to and fro; but the horses employed with the British mounted troops in India are the property of the Government of India and remain permanently in the country. Moreover, while medical officers are needed to accompany the troops to and from England, there is no such necessity for veterinary aid on the voyage. It is only reasonable, therefore, that veterinary surgeons also should remain permanently in the country, in the service of the Government of India to whom the horses belong. Further, while the army surgeon's patient is his own countryman, able to make known his wants and symptoms in their common tongue, the veterinary surgeon has to carry on his work through the agency of native farriers and grooms; and to do his work properly it is essential that he should be familiar with the vernacular language, which is not to be expected of officers who come out here merely for a short tour of service.

8. All these considerations appear to point to the constitution of the veterinary department in this country as a purely local service, subject entirely to the Indian Government. But, although this arrangement might be intrinsically the best, there are some advantages to be looked for in maintaining a certain degree of connection between the army veterinary surgeons at home and those serving in this country; and, on the whole, we recommend that the Indian Veterinary Department be established as a separate Indian branch of the British Veterinary Department, on the lines of the proposed Indian branch of the Army Medical Department, as laid down in our Despatch, No. 315, of the 26th August 1881.

9. The only argument advanced by Major General Fitzwygram's Committee* against the formation of a local veterinary department is, that members of an Indian Veterinary Department would "not gain the opportunities which occasional service in England affords of keeping up their professional knowledge;" but this objection, we submit, is outweighed by the fact that for Indian service local experience is more essential than English, because there are diseases in India which are not known at home, and for these practical local training and experience are necessary. The practice afforded in India also is far greater than that obtained in England; while furlough affords ample opportunity of keeping up such professional knowledge as is said to be obtainable only at home.

* Report forwarded with Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 81, of the 24th March 1881.

10. The future Indian branch of the Veterinary Department, to comprise 49 officers, might be at once formed of, first, the remaining officers of the old Indian Veterinary Department, six † in number; the other 43 officers to consist of volunteers from the British Veterinary Department.

† Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon J. H. B. Hallen, Bombay.
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon W. Lamb, Bombay.
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon G. Kettlewell, Bengal.
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon F. G. Shaw, Madras.
1st Class Veterinary Surgeon G. Western, Madras.
1st Class Veterinary Surgeon E. J. Batt, Bengal.

11. The proportions of the different grades might be as follows for India:—

Principal Veterinary Surgeon for India and General Superintendent, Horse-breeding Operations	1
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons	4
1st Class " "	15
2nd " " "	29
TOTAL	49

12. The required numbers in the various grades, allowing for the officers still serving in the Indian Veterinary Department, would have to be supplied by calling for volunteers from the British Veterinary Department as follows:—

Administrative Officers	2
1st Class Veterinary Surgeons	13
2nd " " "	28
TOTAL	43

13. The

13. The proposed distribution of these 49 officers is shown in the following statement:—

STATEMENT showing the Distribution of the Officers of the Veterinary Department.

VETERINARY SURGEON'S HEAD-QUARTER STATION.		VISITING STATIONS.		Number of Government Horses at Head-quarters.	Number of Government Horses at Visiting Stations.	Total Number of Government Horses.	Number of Veterinary Surgeons required.
		BENGAL.					
Allahabad	1 battery, F.A.	Benares Dinapore Agra	1 battery, F.A. 1 „ „ 1 „ „	110	330	440	–
Barrackpore	1 battery, F.A.	Ballygunge	Remount Depôt and Veterinary Adviser to Remount Agent, Calcutta.	110	Remount Agency.	110	1
Lucknow	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 „ F.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry	Fyzabad Bareilly Cawnpore	1 battery, F.A. 1 „ „ 1 „ „	724	330	1,054	2
Meerut	2 batteries, R.H.A. 2 „ F.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil	–	1,012	–	1,012	2
Morar	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 „ F.A.	Nil	–	288	–	288	1
Meean Meer	2 batteries, F.A.	Mooltan Ferozepur	1 battery, F.A. 1 „ „	220	220	440	1
Peshawar	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 „ F.A.	Campbellpur	1 battery, R.H.A.	288	178	466	1
Rawalpindi	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 „ F.A. 1 regiment of British Cavalry.	Nil	–	724	–	724	2
Sialkot	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil	–	614	–	614	1
Saugor	1 battery, F.A. 1 regiment, Madras Cavalry.*	Nowgong	1 battery, F.A.	440	110	550	1
Umballa	2 batteries, R.H.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil	–	792	–	792	2
		Add,—Per-centage for leave, c.		–	–	–	15 4
					TOTAL		19
		MADRAS.					
Bangalore	1 battery, R.H.A. 2 batteries, F.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil	–	834	–	834	2
Bellary	1 battery, F.A. 1 regiment, Madras Cavalry.*	Nil	–	440	–	440	
Kamptee	2 batteries, F.A. 1 regiment, Madras Cavalry.*	Nil	–	550	–	550	
Madras	Body Guard	St. Thomas' Mount	2 batteries, F.A.	128	220	348	1
Secunderabad	1 battery, R.H.A. 2 batteries, F.A. 1 regiment, British Cavalry. 1 „ Madras Cavalry.*	Nil	–	1,164	–	1,164	2
							7
		Add,—Per-centage for leave, &c.		–	–	–	2
					TOTAL		9
		BOMBAY.					
Ahmedabad	1 battery, F.A.	Deesa and Baroda	1 battery, F.A.	110	110	220	1
Belgaum	1 battery, F.A.	Nil	–	110	–	110	1
Kirkee	2 batteries, F.A.	Poona	Army Veterinary School	220	Veterinary School.	220	2
Karachi	1 battery, R.H.A. 1 „ F.A.	Hyderabad	1 battery, F.A.	228	110	338	1
Mhow	1 regiment, British Cavalry	Nasirabad Neemuch	1 battery, F.A. 1 „ „	436	220	656	1
							6
		Add,—Per-centage for leave, &c.		–	–	–	2
					TOTAL		8

* Veterinary aid to the horses of the Madras Native Cavalry has to be afforded, as the horses are the property of Government.

SUMMARY.

Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India and General Superintendent, Horse-breeding Operations	1
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons	4
Veterinary Surgeons, Bengal	19
„ „ Madras	9
„ „ Bombay	8
Remount Depôt, Saharunpore	1
„ „ Oossoor	1
Veterinary Surgeons for Horse-breeding Department, Bengal	2
„ „ „ „ „ Bombay	1
Lahore Veterinary School	1
Civil Duties	2
TOTAL	49

14. We

14. We believe that the veterinary surgeons will find their pay go further if they are permanently stationed in the country, going home only on furlough, than if they come out as at present for a short tour of duty. But in order to make Indian service sufficiently attractive, and to induce eligible candidates to come forward for the Local Veterinary Department, we are of opinion that the pay of all but the highest grades should be somewhat raised above the present rates as laid down in General Government Order, No. 1095, of 31st October 1879.

15. The scale which we would propose is as follows:—

———	Proposed.	Present.
	Rs.	*Rs. a. p.*
Veterinary Surgeon, under 5 years' service - - -	400	377 8 –
" " after 5 " " - - -	425	401 13 7
" " " 10 " " - - -	450	432 7 4
" " 1st Class - - - - -	600	578 6 10
" " after 5 years' service as such -	650	602 12 5
" " " 10 " " " -	700	627 2 –
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, including Staff Pay of 250 rupees per month.	1,250	1,300 15 – to 1,361 13 –
Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India, including Staff Pay of 400 rupees per month.	1,650	1,583 2 – to 1,644 – –

16. It will be observed that this scale gives a moderate increase in the executive grades, whilst the pay of the inspecting veterinary surgeons is reduced.

17. We have recommended that, in the first instance, the Indian branch of the British Veterinary Department be formed from the existing staff of veterinary surgeons in India; hereafter vacancies might be filled up by the transfer of veterinary surgeons from the British service of not more than four years' service. It appears worthy of consideration whether the united service might not advantageously be recruited through the veterinary schools by giving nominations to each veterinary college to be competed for by the students.

18. Veterinary surgeons of the Indian branch would be eligible for furlough under the same rules as officers of the Indian service generally.

19. We consider that, as in the case of the proposed Indian branch of the Royal Medical Service, exchanges should be freely allowed between the officers of the Indian and British branches of the Veterinary Departments, subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for India. In the same manner also power should be taken to make transfers of officers from one branch to the other, when it may be necessary to do so in the interests of the public service.

20. The following would be the principal conditions of the Indian branch of the service:—

Veterinary surgeons to be promoted to 1st class veterinary surgeons on completion of 10 years' service instead of after 12 years, the term fixed for the British Service by the Royal Warrant of the 25th June 1881, Article 384, provided they have passed in the Native language (Urdu) according to the lower standard.

Veterinary surgeons, 1st class, to be promoted to the rank of inspecting veterinary surgeons on completion of 25 years' total service, without reference to the occurrence of vacancies in that grade.

The limit of tenure of appointment of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India to be five years, on the completion of which period he will be retired on the pension to which he is entitled by length of service.

The limit of tenure of appointment of an inspecting veterinary surgeon in charge of a circle to be also five years, when, should his services be no longer required by the State, he will be retired on a pension.

A veterinary surgeon or an inspecting veterinary surgeon to be retired on pension on attaining the age of 55 years, and a principal veterinary surgeon on attaining the age of 60 years.

The terms of the Veterinary Warrant (Article 387, Royal Warrant, 1881), which require that the services of a veterinary surgeon shall be dispensed with after the completion of 10 years' service, unless he be specially selected for further employment in the Veterinary Department, should not be held to apply to the Indian branch of the Veterinary Department.

Veterinary surgeons of the old Indian Veterinary Department to continue on the furlough regulations on which they may be serving. Veterinary surgeons of the Indian branch of the proposed local Veterinary Department to come under the furlough rules of 1875 in the same manner as is detailed in paragraph 11 of Despatch, No. 315 of 1881, regarding the proposed Medical Service in India.

21. With regard to the reduction in veterinary officers, which will result from the introduction of the station system, we propose that the 24 officers rendered supernumerary should be placed on unattached pay under Clause 88, Royal Warrant, Veterinary Department, War Office Army Circular, dated 1st May 1878, paragraph 13, pending vacancies occurring in either the British or Indian Veterinary Department, when they would have the option of either reverting to the British Veterinary Department, or would be allowed to elect for the Indian Veterinary Department. As India has of late years been supplied with a larger proportion of second than first class veterinary surgeons, so the unattached pay which would have to be defrayed from Indian sources would approximate more nearly to the rate for the former class. This unattached pay would amount, in the first instance, to about 3,236 rupees per mensem, or 38,832 rupees per annum for 24 officers, taken at the average of the four rates of pay for the different periods of service, as laid down in paragraph 19 of the Army Circular above referred to.

22. The following statement shows the cost and strength of the present establishment, that recommended by the Army Commission, and that which we now propose. It will be observed that the annual cost of the present establishment is 4,66,551 rupees, and that of the establishment proposed by the Army Commission is 3,67,862 rupees, affording a saving of 98,689 rupees. But in the Commission's schedule no Principal Veterinary Surgeon has been allowed for, it having been proposed that the Director of the Remount Department should be placed at the head of the service. But the Director of the Remount Department is not a veterinary surgeon, and it will be necessary to appoint an officer of that service to the duty. We are of opinion, however, that the duties of this appointment and those of the General Superintendent of Horse-breeding Operations might be advantageously and economically combined.

STATEMENT showing the COST of the Present Establishment of the VETERINARY DEPARTMENT, that Proposed by the Army Commission, and that now Proposed by the Government of India.

Present.

		Per Mensem. Rs. a. p.
	ADMINISTRATIVE.	
1	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Bengal; also Principal Veterinary Surgeon, India, with staff pay.	1,644 – –
1	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Bengal, with staff pay.	1,300 15 –
1	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Madras, with staff pay.	1,400 15 –
1	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, Bombay, with staff pay.	1,425 4 7
4		5,771 2 7
	EXECUTIVE.	
9	Regiments of British Cavalry; nine Veterinary Surgeons, at *Rs.* 419. 7. $\frac{9}{9}$. each.	3,774 15 4
4	Regiments of Native Cavalry (Madras); four Veterinary Surgeons, at *Rs.* 389. 10. $9\frac{1}{4}$. each.	1,558 11 2
	Madras Body Guard; one Veterinary Surgeon -	432 4 7
15	Batteries of Horse Artillery; 15 Veterinary Surgeons, at *Rs.* 440. 0. $0\frac{7}{15}$. each.	6,600 – 7
43	Batteries of Field Artillery; 25 Veterinary Surgeons, at *Rs.* 394. 4. $9\frac{4}{5}$. each.	9,857 8 5
	Bengal Stud Department; five Veterinary Surgeons, at *Rs.* 1,076. 4. $8\frac{3}{5}$. each.	5,381 7 7
	Oossoor Depôt, Madras, one Veterinary Surgeon	778 6 10
	Reserve, nine Veterinary Surgeons, taken at an average of different present rates of pay of 1st and 2nd Class Veterinary Surgeons.	4,724 12 2
73	- - - - TOTAL - - - - - *Rs.*	38,879 5 3
	Rs. 38,879. 5. 3. × 12 =	4,66,551 15 –

Proposed by Army Commission.

		Per Mensem. Rs. a. p.
	ADMINISTRATIVE.	
	No Principal Director of the Veterinary Department, the Director of the Remount Department giving advice and assistance.	
4	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons, at the average of the different present rates of pay of several grades of Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons, with staff pay at 400 rupees each per mensem.	5,717 6 –
	EXECUTIVE.	
	Military requirements distributed by stations, 32, viz., 11 1st Class Veterinary Surgeons, at the average of the different present rates of pay of several grades of 1st Class Veterinary Surgeons.	6,898 6 –
21	2nd Class Veterinary Surgeons at the average of the different present rates of pay of several grades of 2nd Class Veterinary Surgeons.	8,481 6 –
	Two depôts - - - 2.	
2	1st Class Veterinary Surgeons at the average of the different present rates of pay of several grades of 1st Class Veterinary Surgeons, with staff pay of 200 rupees each per mensem.	1,654 4 –
	Horse-breeding Operations - - 3.	
1	General Superintendent, including staff pay - -	1,644 – –
2	Assistant Superintendents, including staff pay - -	1,535 1 –
	Per-centage for leave, &c. - - 9.	
	Average taken as per "Reserve" above - - -	4,724 12 2
50	- - - - TOTAL - - - - - *Rs.*	30,655 3 2
	Rs. 30,655. 3. 2. × 12 =	3,67,162 6 –

Now Proposed by the Government of India.

		Per Mensem. Rs. a. p.
	ADMINISTRATIVE.	
1	Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India and General Superintendent, Horse-breeding Operations in India.	2,044 – –
4	Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons - - - -	5,000 – –
	EXECUTIVE.	
15	1st Class Veterinary Surgeons, at an average of rates of pay.	9,750 – –
29	2nd Class Veterinary Surgeons, at an average of rates of pay.	12,325 – –
	Staff pay of two Veterinary Surgeons for two Depôts, at 200 rupees each per mensem.	400 – –
	Staff pay of two Assistant Superintendents, Horse-breeding Operations, at 250 rupees each per mensem.	500 – –
49	- - - - TOTAL - - - - - *Rs.*	30,019 – –
	Rs. 30,019 × 12 =	3,60,228 – –

	Rs. a. p.
Cost of present Establishment - - - - - - - - - - - -	4,66,551 15 –
Cost of proposed Establishment - - - - - - - - - - - -	3,60,228 – –
TOTAL eventual Savings - - -	1,06,323 15 –
Deduct,—Charges for 24 Officers placed on Unemployed Pay - -	38,832 – –
TOTAL Saving in first instance - - - *Rs.*	67,491 15 –

23. The duties of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India during the summer months are light, although the office is a necessary one; while the cold weather inspections which have to be carried out by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon may well be made at the same time with those which devolve on the General Superintendent of Horse-breeding Operations. And the tour of service of Principal Veterinary Surgeon Collins having expired,* the opportunity is afforded to carry out this amalgamation by nominating Mr. Hallen to this appointment, an officer whose tact, energy, and judgment in the various appointments he has held under Government indicate him as a very fit person to carry out the proposed measure should her Majesty's Government approve of it. Mr. Hallen would remain attached to the Government of India in respect of the horse-breeding operations, but would be subordinate to His Excellency the Commander in Chief in regard to the business of the Veterinary Department.

* Extended to 24th January 1882, *vide* your Lordship's telegram, dated 5th September 1881.

24. We recommend special Indian rates of pensions for the Indian branch of the Veterinary Department. For the senior grades they would be those fixed in your Lordship's recent Despatch, No. 260, dated 4th August 1881. For the whole service, including the junior grades, they might be as follows:—

	£.
After 10 years' service, if compelled to retire on account of ill health contracted in and by service in India -	75
After 17 years' service, including 1⅔ years' furlough -	200
After 20 years' service, including 2 years' furlough -	250
After 25 years' service, including 3 years' furlough -	350
After 30 years' service, including 4 years' furlough -	450

The savings in salaries to be effected by these proposals, including the charge for the 24 veterinary surgeons made supernumerary, are estimated at 67,491 rupees per annum, as shown in the statement in paragraph 22. When these are absorbed, there will be a further saving of 38,832 rupees per annum.

25. We propose that the Superintendent of Horse-breeding Operations should receive a sum of 400 rupees per mensem, in addition to his present pay, for undertaking the combined duties referred to. This will effect a further saving of 14,928 rupees per annum.

26. We solicit the early sanction of Her Majesty's Government to the introduction of the measures herein proposed, believing that they will provide, in the most efficient and economical way practicable, for the veterinary requirements of the Indian service.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

Enclosure to 340 of 1881.

From Major General Sir *G. R. Greaves*, K.C.M.G., C.B., Adjutant General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 2563, B., "Veterinary Department," dated Simla, 18th June 1881).

INreply to Military Department letter, No. 269, S. D., of the 27th April 1881 (Veterinary Department), I am directed to forward, for the information of Government, the accompanying Report, with Appendices, from the Principal Veterinary Surgeon, regarding the veterinary surgeons required for service in India.

2. The duties therein laid down, and the number of animals to be attended to, appear to the Commander in Chief to be exaggerated, but at the same time it must be evident that the number of veterinary surgeons recommended by the Army Organisation Commission will not suffice for the requirements of the service in this country unless, as the Principal Veterinary Surgeon points out, their duties are restricted purely to British regiments and batteries.

3. The scale of pay proposed by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon is, in His Excellency's opinion, equitable, having regard to the emoluments of the other branches of the service in India.

4. His Excellency considers that the service would gain by having all veterinary surgeons in a department, instead of, as at present, having some regimental and some departmental.

5. As regards the third point contained in the letter under acknowledgment, I am to state that the Commander in Chief is decidedly against a local veterinary department, local establishments being against all recent legislation founded on the experience of the past.

From *F. F. Collins*, Esq., Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India, to the Adjutant General in India (No. 345, "Veterinary Department," dated Simla, 20th May 1881).

WITH reference to the three points specially referred to in Government of India letter, No. 269, S. D., dated 27th April 1881, in connection with the Report by a Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Veterinary Department in India, and upon which you wish an expression of my opinion in your Memorandum, No. 1741, B., dated 10th May 1881, under cover of which the report and letter above referred to were received, I have the honour to forward, as regards point (1), "the possibility of reducing the number of veterinary surgeons in accordance with the views of the Army Organisation Commission," a tabular statement (Appendix A.) of the approximate strength of horses, ponies, mules, cattle, camels, and elephants at the various stations throughout Bengal.

2. By the Appendix A. it will be seen that there are in Bengal (1st), 48 British cavalry regiments and batteries of an approximate strength, including chargers, grass cutters' ponies, mules, elephants, and bullocks, of 12,521; (2nd), 25 Native cavalry regiments of an approximate strength, including all animals, of 15,754; (3rd), chargers belonging to officers of the dismounted branches of the service, 991 demand veterinary attention under G. O. 401, dated 30th December 1875, and these from being scattered often occupy more of a veterinary surgeon's time than his legitimate duties; (4th), commissariat and transport, at the lowest calculation 20,000, making a grand total of 49,266 animals demanding, directly or indirectly, attention from the Veterinary Department.

3. If it is decided to confine the services of a veterinary surgeon to the British mounted branches only, then it is just possible that the number (18) recommended

mended for Bengal by the Army Commission may suffice (*vide* Appendix B.), provided 16 veterinary surgeons can be guaranteed to be always present, which I doubt. But if veterinary surgeons have to render professional assistance, as at present, to every arm of the service, besides every civil veterinary requirement of the Presidency, such as fairs, Government stallions, local outbreaks of disease in districts, remount requirements at Calcutta, then the number 18 is utterly unequal to such extended duties. Appendix C. will show the present sanctioned establishment and the disposition of each number of the Department in Bengal. Therefore, until a veterinary surgeon's duties are definitely defined, it is impossible for me to fix the number required for the Presidency.

4. With regard to the second point referred to in the Government letter under reply ("the scale of pay which His Excellency would suggest for adoption"), I would suggest that 1st class veterinary surgeons and veterinary surgeons should have an average increase of 62½ per cent. of Indian over British emoluments, calculated at 2 *s.* the rupee, the same as combatant officers (*vide* Appendix D).

5. With reference to the third point of the letter, viz., "the suggestion made in paragraph 8 of the Report of the Committee presided over by General Sir F. Fitzwygram, to have a local veterinary department," I quite concur in the opinion expressed by the Committee in the latter part of paragraph 8, viz.: "We are of opinion, however, that such a measure would not be conducive to the efficiency of the Department in India, as it would deprive its members of the opportunities which occasional service in England affords of keeping up their professional knowledge." In nearly every country in England veterinary medical associations exist, and army veterinary surgeons residing within reach are invariably made honorary members, and partake in the professional discussions at their fortnightly meetings. The best members of the veterinary profession are members of these associations, and I can speak from personal experience of the fund of practical information to be gleaned at these discussions. Then, again, if an army veterinary surgeon finds himself at fault upon any particular line of study, he has at home four colleges within his reach at his disposal.

6. Veterinary literature has certainly not to thank any of the members of the old local Veterinary Department for contributions upon any of the diseases peculiar to India, and I do not believe there is in existence one single literary production from such a source upon any professional subject. I cannot, therefore, but fully concur in the expression of opinion recorded by Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee in paragraph 8 of the Report referred to.

7. The enclosures of your Memorandum are herewith returned as requested.

APPENDIX A.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH at each Station in *Bengal*, in Horses, Cattle, Mules, Ponies, Camels, and Elephants.

STATIONS.	British Cavalry and Artillery, Mountain and Heavy Batteries.					Native Cavalry and Body Guard.					Infantry Chargers and Staff.		Commissariat.	Grand Total.
	Name of Regiment or Battery.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name of Cavalry or Body Guard.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name.	Chargers.		
Allahabad - - -	B.-4th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	16th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	35th Native Infantry - 22nd British Infantry - Staff - - - -	14 9 15	Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.	853
Total - - -	1	110	10	50	170	1	450	15	180	645	3	38		
Cawnpore - - -	N.-3rd Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	1st Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	2nd Native Infantry - 6th British Innfantry -	13 8		836
Total - - -	1	110	10	50	170	1	450	15	180	645	2	21		
Dinapore - - -	L.-3rd Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	70th British Infantry -	7		177
Benares - - -	G.-1st Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	10th Native Infantry -	11		181
Segowlie - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	6th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	- - - -	–		645
Meean Meer -	C.-4th Royal Artillery - E.-4th Royal Artillery -	110 110	10 10	50 50	170 170	3rd Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	22nd Native Infantry - 23rd Native Infantry - 8th British Infantry - Staff - - - -	12 11 8 15		1,031
Total - - -	2	220	20	100	340	1	450	15	180	645	4	46		
Ferozepore - - -	B.-1st Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	25th Native Infantry - 81st British Infantry -	11 7		188
Total - - -	1	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	2	18		

APPROXIMATE Strength at each Station in *Bengal*, in Horses, Cattle, Mules, Ponies, Camels, and Elephants—*continued.*

STATIONS.	BRITISH CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY, MOUNTAIN AND HEAVY BATTERIES.					NATIVE CAVALRY AND BODY GUARD.					INFANTRY CHARGERS AND STAFF.		Commissariat.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Name of Regiment or Battery.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	TOTAL.	Name of Cavalry or Body Guard.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	TOTAL.	Name.	Chargers.		
Mooltan - - -	L.-5th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	15th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	24th Native Infantry - 88th British Infantry - Staff - - - -	12 8 15	Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.	850
TOTAL - - -	1	110	10	50	170	1	450	15	180	645	3	35		
Meerut - - -	1st Dragoon Guards - E.-A. Royal Horse Artillery. B.-C. Royal Horse Artillery. M.-3rd Royal Artillery - G.-4th Royal Artillery -	436 178 178 110 110	60 12 12 10 10	180 80 80 50 50	676 270 270 170 170	9th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	38th Native Infantry - 68th British Infantry - Staff - - - -	11 10 15		2,237
TOTAL - - -	5	1,012	104	440	1,556	1	450	15	180	645	3	36		
Agra - - - -	O.-3rd Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	12th Native Infantry - 29th Native Infantry - 5th British Infantry - Staff - - - -	13 11 8 15		217
TOTAL - - -	1	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	4	47		
Muttra - - -	13th Hussars - -	436	60	180	676	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–		676
Dehra Dun - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	Viceroy's Body Guard -	120	4	50	174	- - - -	–		174
Lucknow - - -	10th Hussars - - - C.-C. Royal Horse Artillery. H.-6th Royal Artillery -	436 178 110	60 12 10	180 80 50	676 270 170	2nd Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	7th Native Infantry - 11th Native Infantry - 33rd British Infantry - 72nd British Infantry - Staff - - - -	13 11 8 6 15		1,814
TOTAL - -	3	724	82	310	1,116	1	450	15	180	645	5	53		

Chakrata	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23rd British Infantry -	10	Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.	10
Delhi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15th Native Infantry -	13		13
Roorkee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	54th British Infantry -	8		8
Sitapur	-	-	-	-	-	-	15th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	-		645
Fyzabad	-	-	-	F.-4th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	36th Native Infantry -	12
													12th British Infantry -	8
TOTAL	-	-	-	1	110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	2	20
Gorakhpur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9th Native Infantry -	12
Rawalpindi	-	-	-	8th Hussars -	436	60	180	676	4th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	8th Native Infantry - 14
				D.-A. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270						32nd Native Infantry - 13
				D.-4th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170						Rifle Brigade - - 6
				11-11th Royal Artillery -	183	11	-	194						Staff - - - - 15
TOTAL	-	-	-	4	907	93	310	1,310	1	450	15	180	645	4 48
Jhelum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12th Bengal Cavalry -	450	15	180	645	26th Native Infantry - 13
														30th Native Infantry - 12
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	450	15	180	645	2 25
Sialkot	-	-	-	6th Dragoon Guards -	436	60	180	676	10th Bengal Lancers -	450	15	180	645	19th Native Infantry - 11
				I.-A. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270						Staff - - - - 15
TOTAL	-	-	-	2	614	72	260	946	1	450	15	180	645	2 26
Campbellpur	-	-		F.-A. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270	-	-	-	-	-	- - - - -
Umballa	-	-	-	A.-B. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270	-	-	-	-	-	14th Native Infantry - 13
				D.-C. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270	-	-	-	-	-	100th British Infantry - 8
				9th Lancers - - -	436	60	180	676	-	-	-	-	-	Staff - - - - 15
TOTAL	-	-	-	3	792	84	340	1,216	-	-	-	-	-	3 36
Jullundur	-	-	-	H.-1st Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	-	- - - - -
Subathu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9th British Infantry - 7
Dagshai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60th British Infantry - 7

	190
	12
	2,003
	670
	1,617
	270
	1,252
	170
	7
	7

APPROXIMATE Strength at each Station in *Bengal*, in Horses, Cattle, Mules, Ponies, Camels and Elephants—*continued.*

STATIONS.	British Cavalry and Artillery, Mountain and Heavy Batteries.					Native Cavalry and Body Guard.					Infantry Chargers and Staff.		Commissariat.	Grand Total.
	Name of Regiment or Battery.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name of Cavalry or Body Guard.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name.	Chargers.		
Jutogh - - -	11-9th Royal Artillery -	183	11	–	194	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	-	Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.	194
Shillong - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	44th Native Infantry -	12		12
Dibrogarh - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	43rd Native Infantry -	13		13
Cachar - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	34th Native Infantry -	11		11
Kohima - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	42nd Native Infantry -	12		12
Morar - - -	G.-A. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270	14th Bengal Lancers -	450	15	180	645	39th Native Infantry -	12		1,442
	K.-5th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	- - - -	–	–	–	–	65th Bengal Infantry -	8		
	12-9th Royal Artillery -	317	5	–	322	- - - -	–	–	–	–	Staff - - - -	15		
Total - - -	3	605	27	130	762	1	450	15	180	645	3	35		
Jhansi - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	5th Native Infantry -	11		21
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	17th Bengal Infantry -	10		
Total - - -	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	2	21		
Peshawar - - -	A.-C. Royal Horse Artillery.	178	12	80	270	13th Bengal Lancers -	450	15	180	645	21st Native Infantry -	10		2,138
	O.-5th Royal Artillery -	110	10	50	170	19th Bengal Lancers -	450	15	180	645	28th Native Infantry -	10		
	10-11th Royal Artillery -	317	5	–	322	- - - -	–	–	–	–	31st Native Infantry -	12		
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	41st Native Infantry -	11		
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	45th Native Infantry -	12		
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	2nd Bengal Infantry -	8		
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	25th Native Infantry -	8		
	- - - -	–	–	–	–	- - - -	–	–	–	–	Staff - - - -	15		
Total - - -	3	605	27	130	762	2	900	30	360	1,290	8	86		

Nowshera	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11th Bengal Lancers	450	15	180	645	1st Native Infantry	11	666
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14th British Infantry	10	
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	450	15	180	645	2	21	
Fort William	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90th British Infantry	7	7
Dum-Dum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34th British Infantry	8	8
Barrackpore	L.-5th Royal Artillery				110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	33rd Native Infantry	15	211
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40th Native Infantry	11	
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Staff	15	
TOTAL	1				110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	3	41	
Baxa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18th Native Infantry	13	13
Bareilly	H.-5th Royal Artillery				110	10	50	170	17th Bengal Cavalry	450	15	180	645	37th Native Infantry	13	852
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51st British Infantry	9	
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Staff	15	
TOTAL	1				110	10	50	170	1	450	15	180	645	3	37	
Moradabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6th Native Infantry	12	12
Ranikhet	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30th British Infantry	8	16
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40th British Infantry	8	
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	16	
Jubbulpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30th Bengal Infantry	10	10
Saugor	M.-5th Royal Artillery				110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	Staff	15	185
Nowgong	K.-3rd Royal Artillery				110	10	50	170	-	-	-	-	-	-	170
Kohat	2nd Mountain Battery				150	5	-	155	3rd Punjab Cavalry	450	15	200	665	13th Native Infantry	14	989
	5th Garrison Battery				150	5	-	155	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL	2				300	10	-	310	1	450	15	200	665	1	14	
Edwardesabad	4th Mountain Battery				150	5	-	155	4th Punjab Cavalry	450	15	200	665	-	-	820
Dera Ismail Khan	3rd Mountain Battery				150	5	-	155	1st Punjab Cavalry	450	15	200	665	-	-	975
	1st Mountain Battery				150	5	-	155	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL	2				300	10	-	310	1	450	15	200	665	-	-	
Dera Ghazi Khan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2nd Punjab Cavalry	450	15	200	665	-	-	665

Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.

APPROXIMATE Strength at each Station in *Bengal*, in Horses, Cattle, Mules, Ponies, Camels, and Elephants—*concluded.*

STATIONS.	British Cavalry and Artillery, Mountain and Heavy Batteries.					Native Cavalry and Body Guard.					Infantry Chargers and Staff.		Commissariat.	Grand Total.
	Name of Regiment or Battery.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name of Cavalry or Body Guard.	Strength.	Chargers.	Grass-Cutters' Ponies.	Total.	Name.	Chargers.		
Rajanpore	-	-	-	-	-	5th Punjab Cavalry	450	15	200	665	-	-	Commissariat Animals, including Elephants, Camels, Mules, Ponies, Cattle (Draught and Slaughter); Sheep about 20,000.	665
Kandahar	6-8th Royal Artillery	183	11	-	194	7th Bengal Cavalry	450	15	180	645	3rd Native Infantry	12		1,527
	-	-	-	-	-	8th Bengal Cavalry	450	15	180	645	4th Native Infantry	13		
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17th Native Infantry	13		
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63rd British Infantry	5		
Total	1	183	11	-	194	2	900	30	360	1,290	4	43		
Togh	1-8th Royal Artillery	183	11	-	194	18th Bengal Cavalry	450	15	180	645	-	-		839
Thull	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20th Native Infantry	10		10
Lundi Kotal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27th Native Infantry	11		17
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18th Native Infantry	6		
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	17		
Ali Masjid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16th Native Infantry	13		13
Total	48	8,822	769	2,930	12,521	25	10,920	364	4,470	15,754	-	991	-	29,266
Commissariat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000	20,000
GRAND TOTAL	48	8,822	769	2,930	12,521	25	10,920	364	4,470	15,754	-	991	20,000	49,266

APPENDIX B.

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of the Eighteen Executive and Two Administrative VETERINARY SURGEONS recommended by the Army Commission for *Bengal*, with their Proposed Charges with the Two Army Corps.

BENGAL ARMY CORPS, Head-Quarters, Allahabad.

1 Administrative Veterinary Surgeon at Head-Quarters.

Executive Number.	STATIONS.	The various Charges.
2	Lucknow - - - -	1 British Cavalry and 2 Batteries of Artillery.
2	Meerut - - - -	1 British Cavalry and 3 Batteries; Bareilly, 1 Battery.
1	Morar - - - -	2 Batteries; Agra, 1 Battery.
1	Dinapore - - - -	1 Battery; Barrackpore, 1 Battery; Fyzabad, 1 Battery.
1	Nowgong - - - -	1 Battery.
1	Allahabad - - - -	1 Battery and Staff Horses; Cawnpore, 1 Battery.
8	Executive.	
1	Executive supernumerary to be sent to Bareilly when available.	

PUNJAB ARMY CORPS, Head-Quarters, Rawal Pindi.

1 Administrative Veterinary Surgeon at Head Quarters.

Executive Number.	STATIONS.	The various Charges.
2	Rawal Pindi - - -	1 British Cavalry, Staff Horses, and 2 Batteries; Sialkot, 1 Battery.
2	Umballa - - - -	1 British Cavalry and 2 Batteries.
1	Meean Meer - - -	1 Battery; Ferozepore, 1 Battery; Mooltan, 1 Battery.
1	Peshawar - - - -	2 Batteries.
1	Nowshera - - - -	1 Battery.
1	Kurum - - - -	1 Battery.
8	Executive.	
1	Supernumerary to be sent to Mooltan when available.	

APPENDIX C.

BENGAL DISTRIBUTION of VETERINARY SURGEONS, 19th May 1881, and Nature of their various Charges, British and Native.

Number of Executive Veterinary Surgeons.	STATIONS.	CHARGES.	Names of Veterinary Surgeons.	REMARKS.
1	Peshawar - -	2 Batteries, 2 Native Cavalries	Hagger - - -	Ludiana Station.
1	Campbellpur - -	1 Royal Horse Artillery - -	Davis.	
2	Rawal Pindi - -	1 British Regiment, 1 Native Cavalry, and 2 Batteries.	Flintoff and Mann -	- ditto.
1	Meean Meer - -	1 Native Cavalry and 2 Batteries.	Day.	
2	Sialkot - - -	1 British Cavalry, 1 Native Cavalry, and 1 Battery.	Poyser and Burton -	- ditto.
2	Umballa - - -	1 British Cavalry and 2 Batteries.	Skoulding and Woods	- ditto.
1	Mooltan - - -	1 Native Cavalry and 1 Battery	Forsdyke.	
1	Jullundur - -	1 Battery - - - -	Lees.	
1	Quetta - - -	1 British Cavalry - - -	Moore.	
2	Meerut - - -	1 British Cavalry, 1 Native Cavalry, and 4 Batteries.	Longhurst and Edwards.	
1	Morar - - -	1 Native Cavalry and 2 Batteries.	Walker - - -	- ditto.
2	Lucknow - - -	1 British Cavalry, 1 Native Cavalry, and 2 Batteries.	Drake and Goldsmith	- ditto.
1	Allahabad - -	1 Native Cavalry and 1 Battery	Killick.	
1	Bareilly - - -	- - ditto - - ditto -	Philips - - -	- ditto.
1	Barrackpore - -	1 Battery and Body Guard -	Kemp - - -	- ditto.
	Ferozepore - -	1 Battery - - - -	10 stations without Veterinary Surgeons.	
	Khyragully - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Agra - - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Benares - - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Fyzabad - - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Dinapore - - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Nowgong - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Saugor - - -	1 „ - - - -		
	Cawnpore - -	1 Battery and 1 Native Cavalry		
	Jutogh - - -	1 Battery - - - -		

20	Executive Veterinary Surgeons, Military Duty.
4	Veterinary Surgeons in Civil employ. Queripel, Frost, Nunn, and Oliphant.
2	„ „ in Transport, Plomby and Pringle.
5	At home sick. Boulter, Rowe, Garratt, Mitchell, and Slattery.
3	Local Veterinary Surgeons. Hallen, Kettlewell, and Batt, Breeding and Remount Depôts.
2	Administrative. Collins and Appleton.
1	On leave at home. Adams.
3	„ in Bengal. Clayton, Morgan, and Savage.
1	Not joined. Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon Shaw, from Madras.
41	- - - GRAND TOTAL.

APPENDIX D.

TABLE showing the BRITISH and INDIAN EMOLUMENTS respectively now allowed to Officers of the VETERINARY DEPARTMENT, as compared with those allowed to Officers in other Branches of the ARMY.

DESIGNATION OF OFFICER.	British Emoluments (Pay and Allowances) per Year.	Indian Emoluments per Month.	Increase per Cent. of Indian over British Emoluments, calculated at 2 *s.* the Rupee.		Proportion of Indian to British Service.	Proposed Indian Emoluments at 62½ per Cent. Increase over British Emoluments, calculated at 2 *s.* the Rupee per Month.
	£.	*Rs.*	Per Cent.	Average Increase per Cent.		*Rs.*
1st Class Veterinary Surgeon (relative rank of Captain):						
On appointment - - - -	476	578	45			645
After 5 years' service as such -	512	602	41			693
„ 10 „ „ - -	548	627	37			742
„ 15 „ „ - -	584	651	33			791
„ 20 years' total service	620	675	30			840
Veterinary Surgeon under the new Warrant (relative rank of Lieutenant).	417	377	8	29⅔	½	565
Veterinary Surgeon under the old Warrant (relative rank of Lieutenant):						
Under 5 years' service - -	350	377	29			474
After 5 „ „ - - -	386	401	24			523
„ 10 „ „ - - -	431	432	20			584
Captain of Cavalry - - - -	407	563*	65	62½	⅔	
Lieutenant of Cavalry of 3 years' service, or Riding Master on appointment.	273	365*	60			
Paymaster attached to a Cavalry Regiment (honorary rank of Captain):						
On entering the department -	395	566*	71			
After 5 years' service - - -	441	597*	62	62⅓	½	
„ 10 „ „ - - -	486	627*	54			

* Including horse allowance.

From *J. H. B. Hallen*, Esq., Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, General Superintendent, Horse-breeding Operations in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 16, M. D., dated Simla, 31st May 1881).

No. 81, dated the 24th March 1881 (herewith returned).

In obedience to the instructions conveyed in your Department Memorandum, No. 269, S. D., dated the 27th April 1881 (Confidential), I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, my opinion on the proposals contained in the Despatch from the Secretary of State for India, and the accompanying Report of a Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Veterinary Department of the army.

2. The services of army veterinary surgeons in India have hitherto been considered necessary for Royal Artillery batteries, British cavalry regiments, and they also should be, whenever required, available for the horses of Native cavalry and police, commissariat cattle, and transport train animals, in the event of a transport train being established, as there are no other duly qualified veterinary surgeons, civil practitioners in India, except in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay.

Although the horses of Native cavalry and police are not the property of the State, still the State pays a monthly sum for every cavalry and police horse, which it is expected shall be in good working order; therefore it will be an economical measure for the Government to allow veterinary surgeons to treat sickly animals, and to render advice with a view of keeping the horses in good health, and to report when these horses become unfit for further work.

Moreover, the aid of veterinary surgeons is occasionally required by the civil authorities with regard to the diagnosing of the nature of murrains, always more or less prevailing in India, and to recommend measures for preventing the spread of those of a contagious character.

3. To ensure having practical veterinarians, well versed in the nature, causes, symptoms, and treatment of diseases occurring in India, some of which have never been seen by practitioners in England, it is evident that inducements should be offered to veterinary surgeons to continue for some years in India, so as to become really useful advisers.

The demands on the Veterinary Department in India are, as above shown, varied, and always more or less existing in civil districts amongst agricultural stock, as well as among the horses and cattle, the property of the State, or for those for which hire is paid for by Government; and in order to allow a veterinary surgeon to conduct his manifold duties satisfactorily, he must possess a knowledge of the animal diseases prevailing in India, and which can only be acquired by a course of continued practical and local experience.

It may be said that the Government veterinary surgeons are expected to attend only to Government animals, but practically they have to give their services in directions above indicated, and very properly so, especially with reference to contagious maladies ever more or less existing amongst stock not belonging to the State, in order that the health of the Government animals may not suffer from contagious disease spreading amongst them.

4. The young army veterinary surgeon in India, let him be ever so diligent and zealous at his duties, knows full well that he only becomes a really valuable Government servant and adviser after some years of practical experience in India; and to become a useful member of his profession he must acquire at least a good colloquial proficiency, if not a higher knowledge, of the Native language commonly spoken (Urdu), as all animals are, as a rule, attended to by Natives; even in British artillery and cavalry a certain number of syces (Native grooms) are employed, and for instructions regarding the care of sick and lame animals to be duly carried out they must be given in the language of the Native attendants.

This colloquial knowledge is most specially necessary to veterinary surgeons in the Department of Horse-breeding Operations, as in conducting their duties they are brought in contact with Native gentlemen, agriculturists, and horse-breeders, to whom they have to proffer advice.

5. At

5. At present the Government of India is dependent on the services of veterinary surgeons of the British Department, there being only six veterinary surgeons of the Indian service remaining. The former are sent out to India for periods of five years, and many of them come against their wishes, preferring home service, and their great aim is to return home as soon as possible.

A department officered with many members possessing such feelings cannot be considered in a satisfactory state; it is practically found to be in a very unsatisfactory condition. Certain reasons are assigned for this in the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Veterinary Department of the army.

Paragraph 8 of Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army.

6. With reference to the opinion of the Committee on the subject of India providing her own establishment of veterinary surgeons, viz. "We are of opinion, however, that such a measure would not be conducive to the efficiency of the Department in India, as it would deprive its members of the opportunities which occasional service in England affords of keeping up their professional knowledge," I do not think the reasoning sound, as the practice of an army veterinary surgeon at home is, as a rule, limited daily to few, probably from 6 to 12, patients; often a less number than six; whereas the number of patients usually in charge of a Government veterinary surgeon in India is more, and may be counted by tens or scores; he therefore has a much better chance of acquiring practical knowledge than his professional brother serving at home; and, by carefully reading the standard veterinary works of the day, he is able to keep himself conversant with the advancing views of his profession, and will maintain his position as a theoretical member, and excel as a practitioner, of veterinary science. Moreover, when a veterinary surgeon of the Indian Department goes to England on furlough, he can then zealously inquire into all new views, and see with what results they are practically carried out; far better by associating with the professors of the several colleges, and watching the practice laid down by them, as well as the numerous experienced civil practitioners in Great Britain and Ireland, than by attending to the limited practice obtained in a barrack veterinary hospital. My views and opinions are based upon experience, by having led a professional life, both in and without the Army, at home as well as in India; and I feel assured I am recording a judgment worthy of being accepted.

7. I would, therefore, most earnestly advise that the Indian Government should have a local Veterinary Department, manned by duly qualified veterinary surgeons, who of their own free will will elect for the Indian service, and will come out, having selected their career, determined to do their best in adopting it for a period of from 20 to 30 years. A man electing a career for 20 or more years of his life in India shows that he is prepared for the life, and it betokens that he has the spirit and energy to undertake it. A veterinary surgeon so electing will probably prove a good servant of the State. The veterinary surgeon who elects for the British Veterinary Department will prefer home life, thereby admitting his not desiring to serve in India.

8. That a Veterinary Department for India, so constituted, will be supported by veterinary surgeons I hold no doubt, provided sufficient inducement be offered to them to enter it; and, as tropical service has always been deemed worthy of a higher rate of pay and pension than service at home, in founding a local Veterinary Department those principles should not be lost sight of.

9. The scale of pay should be based upon—

1st. Sufficient inducement to be offered by pay to the most proficient of young veterinary surgeons to enter the Indian Veterinary Department.

2nd. That the pay should be relatively more than that given in the British Veterinary Department for home service.

3rd. That the pensions likewise should be more, on the grounds that by tropical service a higher rate of pension is merited.

4th. That the Warrant to be introduced for the proposed Indian Veterinary Department should be on similar lines to those now ruling in the Indian Medical Department.

5th. Especially with reference to *certain* promotion to the higher grades after defined periods of service.

Royal Warrant, Veterinary Department, of 1st May 1878.

6th. That the terms of the recent Veterinary Warrant for the British service, as noted in Articles 502 to 508, especially as regards the services of a veterinary surgeon being dispensed with on the completion of 10 years' service (Article 503), should be carefully excluded; as at that period of service a veterinary surgeon has become, as a rule, a practical and useful veterinarian for continued employment in India.

7th. That in the event of any veterinary surgeon not proving fit for his duties, either by ill health within a certain period, or not able or willing, from other causes, to perform his duties satisfactorily, the power to dispense with his services could be exercised by Her Majesty.

8th. That increase of pay or promotion to a higher grade should not be granted, until a veterinary surgeon passes in the Native language, according to the lower standard proficiency.

9th. In the event of the services of a veterinary surgeon being no longer required, he will be retired on the pension of the number of years of his service.

10th. Veterinary surgeons to enter the service not older than 25 years.

11th. A veterinary surgeon, or an inspecting veterinary surgeon, will be retired on the pension of the number of years of his service on attaining the age of 55 years, and a principal veterinary surgeon on attaining the age of 60 years.

10. I believe, too, that the amount required for the maintaining of a local Veterinary Department will not exceed the estimate laid down by the Army Organisation Commission in paragraph 512 of their Report, and probably it will become less.

11. The Veterinary Department of India at present is shown by recent Army Lists of the three presidencies to be as follows :—

BENGAL:		
Principal Veterinary Surgeon	1	
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon	1	
1st Class Veterinary Surgeons	7	
Veterinary Surgeons	30	
		39
MADRAS:		
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon	1	
1st Class Veterinary Surgeons	2	
Veterinary Surgeons	15	
		18
BOMBAY:		
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons	2	
1st Class Veterinary Surgeons	2	
Veterinary Surgeons	9	
		13
TOTAL		70

The total cost may be obtained from the Military Accounts Department.

12. I would suggest that the proposal laid down in paragraph 512 of the Army Organisation Commission Report be adopted as a basis for a future supply of veterinary surgeons, and that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India provide that number of veterinary surgeons to form the Indian Veterinary Department in a like manner as the Indian "Commissariat Department, Engineer Department, and Chaplain's Department" are maintained; also that the batteries of Royal Artillery and regiments of British Cavalry, when sent out to India, should not have any veterinary surgeons accompanying them. They

Paragraph 8 of Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army.

They do not require veterinary aid on the voyage, as they do not bring out their horses, and on their arrival in India they are provided with horses the property of the Indian Government.

I recommend that veterinary surgeons be furnished from the local Indian Veterinary Department to all military stations where Royal Artillery batteries and British Cavalry corps are quartered, so that their horses would receive due veterinary care, and commanding officers would have the benefit of veterinary advice, as regards sanitation of the stables and environs, and the prevention of preventable and contagious diseases, &c.

13. The services of Government Veterinary Surgeons in India are found to be required for the following duties:—

(1.) Army purposes—Royal Artillery and British Cavalry.

(2.) Remount Department—Depôts and Agency.

(3.) Horse-breeding Operations Department.

(4.) Commissariat and Transport Train.

(5.) Occasionally Government postal service horses and bullock-train cattle.

(6.) Not infrequently to report on and advise regarding murrains more or less prevailing among agricultural stock, causing great pecuniary loss to agriculturists and cattle-owners, and damaging revenue prospects.

14. Therefore the expediency of having an Indian Veterinary Department is apparent, as it cannot be supposed that veterinary surgeons now sent out under terms in force in the British Veterinary Department can be utilised for the various duties above noted.

15. Objections may be raised to the instituting of a local Department, on the ground that by having a dual Department, viz., the British Veterinary Department and Indian Veterinary Department, the competition would be disadvantageous to the State; but a dual Veterinary Department in India would be obviated by having only one local Department, and letting it supply all veterinary aid required by Royal Artillery and British Cavalry.

16. It will not be necessary to have a veterinary surgeon at every station, but at the chief stations, as proposed by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon in his letter, dated War Office, Pall Mall, 14th April 1879, quoted in paragraph 511 of the Report of the Army Organisation Commission; and stations where Government horses are few should be periodically visited by the nearest veterinary surgeon: thus I am led to believe that a fewer number of veterinary surgeons than there are at present would suffice, probably about 46, as laid down by the Army Organisation Commission in paragraph 512 of their Report.

17. But, with this reduced number of veterinary surgeons, it will be expedient to raise the standard of education of farrier-majors and serjeants in the several Royal Artillery batteries and regiments of British Cavalry; and this can be done by having them instructed in veterinary schools similar to the Veterinary School at Poona, so that they may acquire that local experience which the run of farrier-majors and serjeants sent out to India are deficient in.

The teaching in these schools, which should be established at the larger stations where many Government horses are collected, should be conducted by selected officers of the Indian Veterinary Department; veterinary surgeons of experience, with a fondness for teaching, and possessing a good colloquial knowledge of the Hindustani language, so that also the farrier-majors of Native cavalry, and Natives in charge of commissariat animals, may receive a practical veterinary education, and become useful members of their corps or department. The instituting and due conducting of veterinary schools forms a very important and necessary feature in the proposed local Veterinary Department, as by having duly taught veterinary subordinates in batteries, regiments, &c., the necessity of having so large a number of European veterinary surgeons will become lessened, and economy will entail.

 18. By

18. By a perusal of the following tabular statement, the proposal as to the distribution of the officers of a local Veterinary Department will be understood :—

VETERINARY SURGEON'S HEAD-QUARTER STATION.		VISITING STATIONS.		Number of Government Horses at Head-quarters.	Number of Government Horses at Visiting Stations.	Total Number of Government Horses.	Number of Veterinary Surgeons required.
		BENGAL.					
Allahabad -	1 Battery, F.A. -	Benares - - - Dinapore - - Agra - - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Battery, F.A. 1 Battery, F.A.	110	330	440	1
Barrackpore -	1 Battery, F.A. -	Ballygunge - -	Remount Depôt and Veterinary Adviser to Remount Agent, Calcutta.	110	Remount Agency.	110	1
Lucknow - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Fyzabad - - - Bareilly - - - Cawnpore - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Battery, F.A. 1 Battery, F.A.	724	330	1,054	2
Meerut - -	2 Batteries, R.H.A. - 2 Batteries, F.A. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil - - -	- - -	1,012	–	1,012	2
Morar - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Battery, F.A.	Nil - - -	- - -	288	–	288	1
Meean Meer -	2 Batteries, F.A. -	Mooltan - - - Ferozepur - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Battery, F.A.	220	220	440	1
Peshawar - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Battery, F.A.	Campbellpur - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. -	288	178	466	1
Rawal Pindi -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Battery, F.A. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil - - -	- - -	724	–	724	2
Sialkot - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil - - -	- - -	614	–	614	1
Saugor - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Regiment, Madras Cavalry. (*a*)	Nowgong - -	1 Battery, F.A. -	440	110	550	1
Umballa - -	2 Batteries, R.H.A. - 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil - - -	- - -	792	–	792	2
							15
		Add,—Percentage for leave, &c. -		–	–	–	4
					TOTAL - -		19
		MADRAS.					
Bangalore - -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 2 Batteries, F.A. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nil - -	- - -	834	–	834	2
Bellary - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Regiment, Madras Cavalry. (*a*)	Nil - -	- - -	440	–	440	1
Kamptee - -	2 Batteries, F.A. - 1 Regiment, Madras Cavalry. (*a*)	Nil - -	- - - "	550	–	550	1
Madras - -	Body Guard - -	St. Thomas' Mount -	2 Batteries, F.A. -	128	220	348	1
Secunderabad -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 2 Batteries, F.A. 1 Regiment, British Cavalry. 1 Regiment, Madras Cavalry. (*a*)	Nil - - -	- - -	1,164	–	1,164	2
							7
		Add,—Percentage for leave, &c. -		–	–	–	2
					TOTAL - -		9

VETERINARY SURGEON'S HEAD-QUARTER STATION.		VISITING STATIONS.		Number of Government Horses at Head-quarters.	Number of Government Horses at Visiting Stations.	Total Number of Government Horses.	Number of Veterinary Surgeons required.
		BOMBAY.					
Ahmedabad -	1 Battery, F.A. -	Deesa and Baroda -	1 Battery, F.A. -	110	110	220	1
Belgaum - -	1 Battery, F.A. -	Nil - - -	- - -	110	–	110	1
Kirkee - -	2 Batteries, F.A. -	Poona - - -	Army Veterinary School.	220	Veterinary School.	220	2
Kurrachee -	1 Battery, R.H.A. - 1 Battery, F.A.	Hyderabad - -	1 Battery, F.A. -	228	110	398	1
Mhow - -	1 Regiment, British Cavalry.	Nasirabad - - Neemuch - -	1 Battery, F.A. - 1 Battery, F.A.	436	220	656	1
							6
		Add,—Percentage for leave, &c. -		–	–	–	2
					TOTAL - -		8

NOTE.—(*a*) Veterinary aid to the horses of the Madras Native Cavalry has to be afforded, as the horses are the property of Government.

SUMMARY showing Number of VETERINARY SURGEONS at present required in *India* for Army purposes, and the Department of Horse-breeding Operations.

Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India - -	–	1
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons for four Army Corps - - - - - - - - -	–	4
Veterinary Surgeons for the Army:		
Bengal - - - - - - - -	19	
Madras - - - - - - - -	9	
Bombay - - - - - - - -	8	
		36
Veterinary Surgeons for Remount Department:		
Saharanpur - - - - - - -	1	
Oossoor - - - - - - - -	1	
		2
Veterinary Surgeons for Horse-breeding Operations Department:		
Bengal - - - - - - - -	3	
Bombay - - - - - - - -	1	
		4
TOTAL - - -		47

The above number will probably be sufficient in time of peace, but whenever a field operation necessitate an increase, an additional number will, in due course, be obtained from Native veterinarians, educated in schools, proposed in paragraph 19 of this letter, or should more European veterinary surgeons be required, either for field operation, or for civil work in agricultural districts, then the extra supply could be furnished by Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

19. It is urged that the time has arrived for veterinary aid being granted in agricultural districts of India on occasions when cattle plagues are ravaging the herds and flocks. Civil officers are often at fault regarding the nature of epizootics occurring within their districts, and the pecuniary loss resulting from these murrains is very heavy; the subject thus becomes a revenue question. Certainly hitherto civil veterinary surgeons have not as yet been appointed, but that fact

fact does not show they are not wanted; they are urgently required, and the aid should be granted, if not at all times, certainly when murrains prevail. When veterinary schools are established, it will be possible for districts to be supplied with Native veterinarians, in a like manner as they have at present medical practitioners from the Subordinate Medical Department.

Students from veterinary schools will, in due course, be eligible to enter such a subordinate veterinary department, which should be constituted on lines similar to those of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department. The services of these civil Native practitioners would, as stated by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Kennedy, K.C.S.I., R.E., Controller General of Supply and Transport, be available in time of war for employment with the Commissariat and Transport Trains.

Paragraph 161, page 41, of Memorandum, dated 23rd October 1880, proposing a permanent and organised Transport Service in India.

These important questions prove the expediency of having an Indian Veterinary Department, the officers of which by a lengthened local experience will be able to develope veterinary science throughout India, by educating Natives, whose services will be at the disposal of the State, and thereby much economy will be effected.

20. The Indian Veterinary Department should consist of the following administrative and executive officers:—

	No.
ADMINISTRATIVE.	
Principal Veterinary Surgeon and Sanitary Veterinary Adviser to the Government of India and His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India - - - -	1
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeons, one for each Army Corps, as suggested in paragraph 512 of the Report of Army Organisation Commission - - - - - -	4
EXECUTIVE.	
Military requirements - - - - - - - -	28
Army Remount Department - - - - - -	2
Horse-breeding Operations Department - - - -	4
Percentage for leave, &c. - - - - - - - -	8
TOTAL - - -	47

The Principal Veterinary Surgeon should be the chief veterinary adviser to the Government of India and Local Governments; also to His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India.

The inspecting veterinary surgeons should be the advisers of the lieutenant generals commanding the army corps to which they may be severally attached.

First class veterinary surgeons should be in charge of the most important stations as regards number of horses, &c.

21. The standard of education of the veterinary surgeon is now as high as that of a surgeon was a few years ago; therefore it seems reasonable that, having been at the extra cost of a higher education, he should be recouped with a higher rate of pay and pensions. Viewing the subject in a commercial light, the services of a Government veterinary surgeon are now worth more than they were a few years back; but his pay in India, when in the junior grades, though nominally increased, does not allow of his being so well off as he was some 25 years ago, when he received a less sum, simply from the necessaries of life having risen at least 30 per cent., and during the last few years the silver rupee having become of about three-fourths its original value; therefore, the Indian Army veterinary surgeon who, 25 years ago, drew from 310 rupees to 370 rupees per mensem, was better off than his professional brother now drawing from 377 rupees to 432 rupees; hence why the veterinary surgeon of the British Veterinary Department prefers remaining at home on 250 *l.* per annum, with free quarters and allowances, to coming out to India to receive pay of comparatively less value.

The

The position of the officers of the proposed Indian Veterinary Department should therefore be based on a scale of pay, promotion, and pension on similar lines to those of the Indian Medical Department, modified in amount as may be deemed necessary with reference to the comparative commercial worth of the surgeon and the veterinary surgeon.

22. But, as living costs so much now-a-days in India, the newly-appointed veterinary surgeon should receive not less than 400 rupees per mensem, and obtain increase of pay after definite periods, and in accordance with promotion, as below suggested :—

	Per Month.
	Rs.
Veterinary Surgeon, under 5 years' service -	400
Ditto - - after 5 - ditto - -	425
Ditto - - after 10 - ditto - -	450
Veterinary Surgeon, 1st class - - - -	600
Ditto - - after 5 years' service as such	650
Ditto - - after 10 - ditto - -	700
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon - - -	1,000 = 1,250
Ditto - - with Staff pay of 250 rupees per month.	
Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India - -	1,250 = 1,650
Ditto - - with Staff pay of 400 rupees per month.	

23. Veterinary surgeons to be promoted to 1st class veterinary surgeons on completion of 10 years' service, if passed in the Native language (Urdu), according to the lower standard proficiency.

Veterinary surgeons, 1st class, to be promoted to inspecting veterinary surgeons on completion of 20 years' total service, when a vacancy in that grade occurs.

24. The limit of tenure for appointment of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India to be five years, on the completion of which period he will be retired on the pension of the number of years of his service, together with the additional pension noted in paragraph 25.

The limit of tenure for appointment of an inspecting veterinary surgeon to be five years, when, should his services be no longer required by the State, he will be retired on the pension of the number of years of his service, together with the additional pension noted in paragraph 25.

25. Referring to the recently published increased rates of pension granted to officers of the Indian Medical Department, it is suggested that the following scale of pension should be sanctioned for veterinary surgeons of the Indian Veterinary Department :—

	Per Annum.
	£.
After 10 years' services, if compelled to retire on account of ill-health contracted in and by the service in India - -	75
After 17 years' service, including $1\frac{2}{3}$ years' leave and furlough	200
After 20 years' service, including 2 " " - -	250
After 25 years' service, including 3 " " - -	350
After 30 years' service, including 4 " " - -	500

with additional pension of 250 *l.* and 150 *l.* per annum, respectively, to Principal Veterinary Surgeon in India and inspecting veterinary surgeon on completion of tour of appointment.

26. In the event of my suggestions meeting with the approval of the authorities, I would respectfully submit that if it be determined to inaugurate a local Indian Veterinary Department, it will be desirable that veterinary surgeons should receive, as recommended by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon, War Office, in Memorandum, Appendix C., of Report of a Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, a share of the honours and good service pensions which officers of other branches of Her Majesty's Services have graciously bestowed upon them.

27. Veterinary surgeons of the British Veterinary Department might be permitted to volunteer for the Indian Veterinary Department; indeed, the latter might be partly officered in the same manner as the Indian Staff Corps are by officers of Her Majesty's British Army electing for it, and by other veterinary surgeons furnished direct by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 160—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 26 April 1883.

Para. 1. IN my Military Despatch, No. 86, dated 28th February 1883, I explained the grounds on which I felt obliged to remit, for the further consideration of your Lordship's Government, your proposals for the reorganisation of the Indian medical service.

2. I regret that, on similar grounds, I am compelled to return also the proposals made for the reorganisation of the Veterinary Department in your Military Letter, No. 340, of 16th September 1881.

3. From the correspondence which accompanies this Despatch, your Lordship will perceive that the late Secretary of State for War, Mr. Childers, after consultation with His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, states that, while offering no objection to the proposals of your Government from an Imperial point of view, he is of opinion that the Indian veterinary service should be quite separated from the Home veterinary service, and he expressly adds that, under the proposed organisation, the veterinary service at Home must not be regarded as a reserve for Indian service, and that in time of emergency whatever arrangements may be considered necessary for reinforcing the department must be carried out entirely by the Indian Government.

4. These conditions are a direct negation to the principles which underlie the scheme your Lordship has submitted for the organisation of an Indian branch of the veterinary service. I have no reason to believe the authorities will modify the conclusions at which they have arrived, and it is incumbent on me, therefore, to request your Government to take the subject again into consideration.

5. Failing the proposed organisation, there remain the alternatives either of continuing the present system with such modifications as may commend themselves to your Government, or of creating a purely local service.

6. With regard to the latter alternative, though I incline to believe that the retention, under modified conditions, of the present system would prove the more economical course, yet I shall be prepared to give a ready consideration to any measures you may propose for the organisation of such a local service.

7. I apprehend that in making any such recommendations the regulations for the pay, pension, and promotion of the members of the service would be generally based on those suggested in your letter under reply as being suitable for the proposed Indian branch of the Veterinary Department. In this view I would remark that, with respect to pensions, it is of course necessary that they shall be more favourable for the officers of a purely local service than for those whose service is mainly passed in the United Kingdom. I believe the pensions proposed in para. 24 of your Lordship's letter would fulfil this condition and be found sufficiently attractive, with the exception that veterinary surgeons, who on account of ill-health contracted by service in India may be compelled to retire before completing any full pensionary service, should, in my opinion, be placed on the same footing as other officers of the Indian service and receive the half pay, at British rates, of their relative rank.

8. With regard to the rates of pay and allowances for the different grades of the department, these also should at least compare favourably with those granted to the corresponding ranks at home or in the colonies, but as this is a question which bears as much on the present organisation of the department in India as on the question of the creation of a local service, I will remark on it in connection with the former subject.

9. With respect to the rates of promotion suggested for the Indian branch of the service, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government have

have already decided to promote veterinary surgeons to the first class after the completion of 10 instead of, as now, 12 years' service, a provision which I propose to follow in India. With regard, however, to your other proposal, I am indisposed to sanction promotion to any administrative grade except in actual succession to an officer in performance of its duties. In place of this, I should be willing to accede to the grant of a higher rate of pay to all first class veterinary surgeons on their completing 25 years' total service.

10. I do not wish, in making these remarks, to give your Lordship to understand that I require your Government to put forward any scheme for a local service. I merely think it convenient to indicate, in anticipation of your doing so, the points on which at present my views differ from some of those contained in your letter under reply. In the event, however, of your Lordship determining to propose a local service, I request that the scheme may be accompanied by a fully detailed and comparative financial report, embracing all charges both effective and non-effective.

11. With regard to the alternative measure, viz., the continuance of the present system under modified conditions, I wish to draw the attention of your Lordship's Government to the following points, which appear to me to be deserving of your careful notice.

12. In reducing the existing establishment to 49 officers in all, as proposed in paragraph 5, and detailed in paragraph 13 in your letter under reply, I am of opinion the requirements of the Veterinary Service are under-estimated. The proposed establishment of 49 officers includes an allowance of eight only as a reserve for those on furlough on medical certificate or private affairs, as well as for the temporary performance of the duties of absentees on short leave or privilege leave in India. According to the proposed distribution of veterinary surgeons it seems doubtful whether any officer would be able to give assistance outside his own circle of supervision, and, as out of the 21 proposed circles 14 are single officer's charges, I think it questionable whether a reserve of eight officers would be found strong enough to provide for the temporary absence or occasional sickness of the officers in India for occasional special duties, as well as for the vacancies created by absentees on furlough.

13. I think it further open to doubt whether, apart from any question of absentees, sufficient provision is made for the demands which would necessarily be made on the Veterinary Department in time of active service, when the mounted units would often be separated by the exigence of field service, and when further duties would fall on the Department in the supervision of the horses of the Staff and of all mounted infantry officers, of the transport animals pertaining to the force, its supply, reserves, the base hospitals, and the remount depôts of the army corps in the field.

14. I am also of opinion that, on the assumption that the present system is to be maintained, it will be necessary for your Government to review the question of the Indian pay and allowances to be granted to the several grades of this service. I forward, for your Lordship's information, the accompanying copy of correspondence which has recently passed on the subject between this Office and the War Department. From this your Government will perceive how greatly the position of the veterinary surgeon at home has been improved of late years. I have no reason to believe that the statements of the War Office as to the actual emoluments of these officers are at all over-estimated, and I think, therefore, that your Government should institute a careful comparison between the actual rates of pay and allowances of veterinary officers at home and in India, in view to arriving at a decision whether the scale proposed in paragraph 15 of your letter does, at any rate as respects the junior executive grades, adequately represent a fair Indian equivalent of the emoluments drawn by them in this country. At the same time I desire it to be understood that I by no means accept the pretension put forward by the Committee of which Sir F. Fitzwygram* was President, that the veterinary officers should be placed in identically the same relative position as the combatant officers of the mounted branches. On the contrary, I think that the conditions of the two classes, into which it is needless I should enter, differ in so many respects as to render any close co-ordination inappropriate.

*Copy forwarded with the Marquis of Hartington's Military Despatch, No. 227, 7th July 1881.

15. I shall

15. I shall be glad to receive the further views of your Lordship's Government as early as convenient; meanwhile, I have caused the Secretary of State for War to be informed that an Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon for India, of the British Establishment, may be now sent out, but on the express understanding that his appointment is conditional on the decision which may be arrived at as to the future organisation of the Veterinary Service in India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

ENCLOSURES referred to.

No. 1.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 26 October 1881, No. 868 W.

Sir,

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying copy of a communication* from the Government of India, conveying their recommendations for the future organisation of the Veterinary Service for India.

* No. 340, dated 16th September 1881.

2. Lord Hartington has these proposals under his immediate consideration, and, in view to coming to a speedy decision, His Lordship requests to be favoured, as early as practicable, with any remarks on the subject which the Secretary of State for War may, after communication with His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, desire to offer.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 2.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 14 December 1881, No. 1023 W.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to state that the Marquis of Hartington will be glad to receive, as early as practicable, a reply to my letter of the 26th October last, No. 868 W., on the subject of the future organisation of the Veterinary Service for India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 3.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated Horse Guards, War Office, 20 December 1881, No. 7017—1147.

Sir,

BY direction of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, addressed to the Under Secretary of State for War, and to acquaint you that the proposal for the future reorganisation of the Veterinary Service in India, transmitted in your previous letter of the 26th October, No. 868 W., is under consideration, and a reply will be furnished as soon as practicable.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. B. Hawley*,
Deputy Adjutant General.

No. 4.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 20 January 1882, No. M. 288.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acquaint you that the following telegram, dated 14th January 1882, has been received from the Government of India :—

"Despatch 287. Has successor to Collins been appointed, or may Hallen officiate, pending orders on scheme proposed in our 340 of 1881?"

With reference to previous correspondence, and to your Adjutant General's letter, dated 20th December 1881, No. 7017—1147, I am to request to be informed whether a reply may be expected in a few days on the proposal of the Government of India for the reorganisation of the Veterinary Service in that country, as Lord Hartington is anxious to answer the above telegram as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

No. 5.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 24 February 1882, No. 7017—1127.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th October 1881, M. 868 W., forwarding a copy of a communication from the Government of India, conveying their recommendations for the future organisation of the Veterinary Service in India, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that Mr. Childers, in consultation with His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, having carefully considered the recommendations in question, he has no objection to offer to them from an Imperial point of view, but he is of opinion that the Indian Veterinary Service should be quite separated from the Home Veterinary Service.

He further considers that, in effecting the reductions proposed, whether it takes the form of the payment of supernumeraries on full pay, or that of improved terms of voluntary retirement, the whole cost should be borne by the Indian Government; any other mode of carrying out the reductions would inflict great hardships on individuals, and seriously inconvenience the Department in this country.

Mr. Childers would also point out that, under the proposed organisation, the Veterinary Service at home must not be regarded as a reserve for Indian service, and that, in time of emergency, whatever arrangements may be considered necessary for reinforcing the department must be carried out entirely by the Indian Government.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

No. 6.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 25 February 1882, No. 7017—1127.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 24th instant, on the subject of the recommendations for the future organisation of the Veterinary Service in India, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you a copy of a Minute by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon on the proposed reorganisation of the Veterinary Department in India.

As the arguments used by Mr. Collins deal mainly with the way in which Indian interests will be affected by the proposed change, Mr. Childers directs me to transmit the Minute for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India in Council, without expressing any opinion on it.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

Enclosure in No. 6.

REPORT by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

THE union of the Home with the Indian Veterinary Service has not been in any way advantageous to the former. On the contrary, it has suffered from the connection, for reasons which have been fully explained by Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee. The terms now existing at home, if coupled with the prospect of continuous service in the United Kingdom, would render the service very popular, and attract the best men in the profession. Speaking, therefore, exclusively in the interests of the Home establishment, I would recommend complete separation. It is better to have only one branch inefficient, rather than both should be so.

With regard to the proposition now submitted, Major General Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee pointed out that the chief causes of the unpopularity of the Indian Service were, (1) insufficient pay, and (2) overwork. The Committee pointed out that, whereas all other branches of the service received an increase of some 62½ per cent. over their British pay in India, the Veterinary Service received only 29½ per cent. I attach a Paper, showing (1) what are the present rates, (2) the rates now proposed in the new scheme, and (3) what the rates would be at 62½ per cent. increase, from which it will be seen that the complaint of insufficient pay is not remedied. I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that, under any circumstances, whether the service is completely separated, completely united, or only partly united as now proposed, if the radical grounds of dissatisfaction are not removed, the result will be unsatisfactory.

If, on the other hand, the causes of complaint were removed, there would be no necessity for changing the existing organisation, for the Indian Service would then become popular.

The scheme is to establish a local service, but not to sever it completely from the home branch. This, as proposed, is impracticable and undesirable. It is proposed, (1) to start the local establishment by calling for volunteers from those now serving in India, (2) to maintain it by transferring volunteers from the home establishment of not more than four years' service.

In the first place, no provision is made in the event of an insufficiency of men volunteering in either case.

In the next place, young men would enter for both services through the same portals, and although they might have the option of volunteering for India, yet the connection would be prejudicial to the home establishment, for, with the rates of pay now offered, the unpopularity of India would reflect on the whole, and the present distaste for military service would continue.

The proposition in para. 17 to give certain nominations to the principals of schools would never answer, for several reasons, which it is not necessary here to go into.

The terms and conditions of service proposed differ materially from the present, as laid down in the Veterinary Warrant, as follows:—

> *To promote Veterinary Surgeons to the rank of first class on attaining 10 years' service, instead of at 12 years.*
>
> To promote 1st class Veterinary Surgeons to the inspecting grade on the completion of 25 years' service, irrespective of numbers.
>
> To abolish the ten years' system.
>
> And to allow of free exchange between the two services.

It is hardly necessary to point out that, if any connection is to exist between the two branches, the conditions, as regards promotion and status, must be identical.

I would also point out that the proposed reduction of 24 Veterinary Surgeons, which will probably be carried out at once under any circumstances, would seriously inconvenience the home establishment, as several young Veterinary Surgeons, who have been specially posted to cavalry regiments, would have to be removed. On the other hand, the number 24 (in reality 22, for Messrs. Constant and Marshall's vacancies were not filled up) will be immediately reduced to 20, and could be absorbed in three years at the rate of seven a year.

With regard to the advisability, on general grounds, of having a purely local service, and speaking from my experience of 12 years in India, six as an Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon, I think it would be a serious retrograde step, and that it is false economy, quite as much in the agricultural as in the military interest of India, to starve the Veterinary Service. The enormous losses which occur in India from bovine diseases of a preventible nature must sooner or later be dealt with by the Veterinary Service, and the sooner the better. The establishment of Veterinary Schools cannot be too fully carried out, but European skill will for a long time be required. It is also a great mistake, in my opinion, to withdraw European veterinary aid from the commissariat and transport cattle. In this direction alone, if Veterinary Surgeons were upheld in the performance of their legitimate duties, they could effect a great saving to the State.

The chief argument made use of (para. 9) for a purely local service is as follows:—"Local experience is more necessary than English, because there are diseases in India which are not known at home, and for these practical local training and experience are necessary." Speaking not only from my own experience, but of those who have not served exclusively in India, far too much is sought to be made of this argument. It is a fact that all discoveries with regard to special Indian diseases, or the elucidation of equine or bovine epizootics, have either originated in England or have been carried out by men fresh from England, who have kept well abreast of the scientific teaching of the times. It was only the other day that a well-known disease peculiar to India, viz., "bussatti," the nature of which had perplexed Veterinary Surgeons in India up to the present time, was clearly demonstrated by a young Veterinary Surgeon who had never been in India at all!

There are certain novelties in regard to forage and stable management which a few weeks' residence are sufficient to overcome.

The skill of the Veterinary Surgeon, like that of the medical man, should be ever advancing; the question is, whether professional skill is cultivated and improved by long residence in India. All experience shows the reverse to be the case. Under a local service system about three fresh men would enter India annually. Under the present system about 15 enter during the same time, and, if the conditions of service were better, some of the best veterinary surgeons would seek Indian service. For the various veterinary schools which it is proposed to establish, men not only well abreast of the times, but who are full of freshness and energy for their work, will be absolutely necessary if they are to do any good as teachers.

On this subject paragraph 9 concludes, "While furlough affords ample "opportunities of keeping up such professional knowledge as is said to be ob-"tainable only at home." If it is not obtainable at home, it certainly cannot be obtained

obtained in India. Officers coming home are usually too much reduced by disease, or from the effects of climate, to devote much time to improving them in this respect.

We have now established at Aldershot an excellent veterinary school, which is daily increasing in usefulness and popularity. To it all young veterinary surgeons are sent when they first join, and all veterinary surgeons who have recently returned from India. They are instructed in the modern improvements in medicine and surgery, and all recent discoveries in the nature and cure of diseases, both in their application to India and England. A veterinary surgeon of Indian experience delivers lectures on Indian stable management and special diseases. Specimens of all the grains and grasses used as forage are provided. Diseases of camels, elephants, and cattle are dealt with, and a collection of diseased specimens is gradually being formed. In fact, every effort is being made to provide an efficient training school, suitable for Indian as well as Home service.

In conclusion, I respectfully submit, for the information of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief and the Secretary of State for War,—

1. That any connection with the Indian branch is not to the advantage of the Home establishment.

2. That the connection now existing is very prejudicial to the Home establishment.

3. That a connection, as proposed in the scheme under consideration, would also be prejudicial to the Home establishment.

4. That the grounds of objection to service in India are not removed in the proposed scheme.

5. That the establishment of a local service would, in the general interests of India, be a serious retrograde step.

6. That if the grounds of complaint set forth in Sir. F. Fitzwygram's Committee were fully met, the present system would work satisfactorily.

7. That if the grounds of complaint are not fully removed, there should be complete separation between the two Services.

8. That the proposed reduction in the number of veterinary officers be effected by absorption.

(signed) *J. Collins,*
Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

17 November 1881.

PAY of Veterinary Surgeons in *India.*

Designation of Officers.	Present Rate of Pay.			Rates according to proposed Scheme.			Rates at 62½ per Cent. over Home Rates.		
	Per Mensem.			Per Mensem.			Per Mensem.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Veterinary Surgeons (under new Warrant, 1st April 1878) - - - - -	377	8	–	400	–	–	556	–	
Veterinary Surgeons, under 5 years' service -	377	8	–	400	–	–	466	2	10
Ditto, after 5 years - - - - -	401	13	7	425	–	–	514	2	10
Ditto, after 10 years - - - -	432	7	4	450	–	–	574	2	10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class - - -	578	6	10	600	–	–	634	2	10
Ditto, after 5 years as such - - -	602	12	5	650	–	–	682	2	10
Ditto, after 10 years as such - - -	627	2	–	700	–	–	730	2	10
Ditto, after 15 years as such - - -	651	7	7	-	-	-	788	2	10
Ditto, after 30 years' total service - -	675	13	2	-	-	-	826	2	10

Permanent Under Secretary.

Para. 1. I respectfully request that the following memorandum may be attached to the reply to the India Office from the War Office on the subject of the reorganisation of the Indian Veterinary Service.

2. The present conditions of the Indian Veterinary Service are so unsatisfactory that, if it is to be maintained in any degree of efficiency, it is necessary that some alteration should be made. Candidates will not accept the terms, whilst veterinary surgeons who are compelled in the ordinary course of service to serve there, take the earliest opportunity of leaving the country. So great is this aversion to India, that offers of 300 *l.* to 500 *l.* are made to avoid going out.

3. The causes of this unpopularity are principally insufficient pay and overwork.

4. From the improved condition of veterinary surgeons in civil life, and the improved terms now existing for the Home branch, service in India has, by comparison, fallen into disrepute. This reacts unfavourably on the whole Department, and thus tends to render the home service less efficient, as was fully pointed out by Major General Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee.

5. The terms now proposed by the Government of India do not remedy the two objections complained of, viz., insufficient pay and over-work. I attach a table showing, (1) present rates, (2) proposed rates, (3) the rates at the same percentage of increase as exists in other branches of the Service, but which the veterinary surgeons do not derive the advantage of, whilst a glance at the proposed distribution and duties, as given at page 5 of the Government of India's proposition, will show that the work is, if anything, more likely to be increased than diminished.

6. There is an improvement in the proposed scheme of promotion and retirement; there is also a slight improvement in pay in the junior grades, but these do not, to any appreciable extent, lessen the objections.

7. As long as the Indian branch contrasts unfavourably with the Home, Military, and Civil, so long will its service remain either under-officered or officered by inefficient veterinary surgeons.

8. As the conditions are not improved in the proposed scheme, taking the service as a whole, it becomes necessary, in order not to reduce the standard of efficiency of the home branch, that there should be complete separation.

9. This is how the matter now stands, I believe, between the War Office and the Government of India, and which induces the former to offer no objection to a distinct local service.

10. But, in the interests of India, there are important considerations which do not fall within the province of the War Office to deal with.

11. First of all, is it desirable that there should be a purely local veterinary service?

12. One side of the question only has been represented by the Government of India. Having served 12 years in India, six as an administrative veterinary surgeon, and having now served upwards of five years as principal veterinary surgeon of the army, and, in addition to my own experience, being in a position to ascertain the opinion of those who are best acquainted with both the Indian and Home branches, I venture to submit a few remarks on the other side, before a final decision is arrived at. I think those who have had ample experience of both branches of the veterinary service are in a better position to form a correct judgment than those who have served in India or England exclusively.

13. I do not hesitate to say that the establishment of a local Veterinary Service for India is a retrograde step, and that it will diminish the efficiency, that is, the utility, of the veterinary surgeons who may be employed in that country, for three reasons:—

1. A lengthened residence does not maintain that freshness and energy so essential in one leading the active life of a veterinary surgeon.

2. A lengthened

2. A lengthened residence does not maintain, or add to, his scientific or professional knowledge.

3. The terms now offered will attract only an inferior class of men.

14. The truth of the two first are well known in the Department; of the third, experience will answer.

15. The argument for a local service put forth by the Indian Government, viz., that certain local diseases require local experience, is fallacious. Every new discovery in equine or bovine diseases originates in Europe, not in Asia. There are certain novelties in feeding and stable management which a few weeks' residence enables an intelligent novice to acquire.

16. If the present terms are inadequate to attract good candidates, although assisted by the improved home conditions, and the right to a fair share of home service, what prospect will there be of attracting desirable men when the terms offered are only slightly improved, and the right to a tour of home service is cut off?

17. I do not say that candidates, even on these terms, will not be found, but they will not be the men it is desirable to admit into the service. On this point I cannot do better than quote from the minute by Major General Sir F. Fitzwygram. Sir Frederick was three times President of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, and is intimately acquainted with the whole subject.

"I do not think it will be possible, on such terms, to obtain properly qualified men for the local service. Probably it may be possible to obtain candidates from the schools (they will not be obtained from the Imperial list), but they will be of a very inferior class.

"It must be remembered that veterinary surgeons differ very much in *class*, as well as in capacity. A large proportion of those who go through the schools are socially very inferior, and quite unfit to hold commissions. It is only a limited proportion who are so fitted, and recruits for India on the terms proposed would necessarily be drawn from the lower substratum. This is, however, a matter for the consideration of the Indian Government.

"I must, however, strongly object to the above class being allowed to exchange to the Imperial service.

"A veterinary surgeon has more temptations to fraud thrown in his way than almost any other officer in the service; and it is of the utmost importance, in fact an absolute necessity, to get men of high character.

"Speaking in the interest of the Imperial Service, I see no objection to total separation; but, speaking in the interests of India, of which country I have a good knowledge, I would strongly urge the advantage of a united service."

18. It is, I submit, of great importance to India that the veterinary services should be fully efficient. I need only mention the cost of the horses, cattle, and other animals employed, the great losses which occurred in Afghanistan, which, had the service been efficient, might have saved its cost a thousandfold. In the general agricultural districts of the country I need only point to the report of a writer on Indian affairs, extracted from "The Times," where he estimates the loss in cattle, from preventible diseases, at six millions sterling annually; yet, in the face of all this, it is now proposed to reduce the number of veterinary surgeons, to offer such terms as will attract only the most inefficient veterinary surgeons, and for what? To effect a saving of 67,491 *l.*

I state, with confidence, that the losses, owing to a defective veterinary service, will far exceed any saving effected in the proposed manner.

19. The establishment of veterinary schools, and the systematic instruction of natives, is a most essential measure, and the more fully intelligent and well-educated natives are instructed, the better will it be for the country.

20. A reduction in number of the present establishment of veterinary officers could be effected if a good subordinate veterinary service existed, but the arrangement and duties of the veterinary surgeons must be very different to those marked out in the proposed scheme.

21. If the Indian terms are made to equal the Home, they would, of course, attract equally good men, but it would not remedy the two first objections mentioned in para. 13 of this Memorandum.

22. But, with such improved terms, there would then be no necessity for separation, for every condition would be fulfilled for maintaining an efficient and contented service, one in every way most beneficial to India.

(signed) *J. Collins*,
Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

20 February 1882.

PAY of Veterinary Surgeons in *India*.

Designation of Officers.	Present Rate of Pay.			Rates according to proposed Scheme.			Rates at 62½ per Cent. over Home Rates.*		
	Per Mensem.			Per Mensem.			Per Mensem.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
Veterinary Surgeons (under new Warrant, 1st April 1878) - - - - -	377	8	–	400	–	–	556	–	–
Veterinary Surgeons, under 5 years' service -	377	8	–	400	–	–	466	2	10
Ditto, after 5 years - - - - -	401	13	7	425	–	–	514	2	10
Ditto, after 10 years - - - - -	432	7	4	450	–	–	574	2	10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class - - -	578	6	10	600	–	–	634	2	10
Ditto, after 5 years as such - - -	602	12	5	650	–	–	682	2	10
Ditto, after 10 years as such - - -	627	2	–	700	–	–	730	2	10
Ditto, after 15 years as such - - -	651	7	7	-	-	-	778	2	10
Ditto, after 30 years' total service - -	675	13	2	-	-	-	826	2	10

* *See* Report of Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee.

— No. 7. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 13 October 1882; No. 13,604.

Sir,

I AM directed to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Childers, that the Marquis of Hartington has, since the receipt of your Letter, No. 7017—1127, of 24th February 1882, had under careful consideration the general question of the veterinary organisation best suited for Indian service, but that, before coming to any conclusion on the subject, or further referring the question to the Government of India, his Lordship desires to be informed as to the most extended fixed tour of Indian service which, assuming the continuance of the existing system and organisation, the War Office could, in future, exact from the officers of the Department.

2. In making this inquiry I am to observe that it would, in Lord Hartington's view, be very important, both on departmental and economical grounds, that the tour of Indian service should be of very considerable duration.

3. I am to request that Lord Hartington may be favoured with an early reply.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

— No. 8. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 27 October 1882; No. 7017—1327.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of Major General Johnson's letter of the 13th instant, No. M. 13,604, and to acquaint you, in reply, for the information of the Marquis of Hartington, that if the rates of pay for Veterinary Surgeons serving in India are improved, as was recommended by Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee, and the same percentage of increase over English rates as exists in other branches of the service be adopted (a schedule copy annexed), the period of service in India might be extended to seven or eight years, not otherwise.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

PAY of Veterinary Surgeons in *India.*

Designation of Officers.	Present Rates of Pay per Mensem.	Rates at 62½ per Cent. over Home Rates. *See* Appendix 2, Proceedings of Committee, Sir F. Fitzwygram, President.
	Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*
Veterinary Surgeons under new Warrant, 1st April 1878.	377 8 –	556 – –
Veterinary Surgeons, under 5 years' service	377 8 –	466 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, after 5 years' service	401 13 7	514 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, after 10 years' service	432 7 4	574 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class - - -	578 6 10	634 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class, after 5 years as such.	602 12 5	682 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class, after 10 years as such.	627 2 –	730 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class, after 15 years as such.	651 7 7	778 2 10
Veterinary Surgeons, 1st Class, after 30 years' total service.	675 13 2	826 2 10

— No. 9. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 6 November 1882; No. M. 8323.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge your letter, No. 7017—1327, of 27th October 1882, regarding the pay of Veterinary Surgeons, and I am to request that Lord Hartington may be informed of the precise items which are included in the several rates of "British Emoluments (Pay and Allowances)" given in Appendix B. of Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

— No. 10. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 13 November 1882; No. 7017—1335.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter received in this office on the 7th instant, further regarding the pay of Veterinary Surgeons, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquis of Hartington, the accompanying return, showing the precise items which are included in the several rates of "British Emoluments (Pay and Allowances)" given in Appendix B. of Sir F. Fitzwygram's Committee's Report.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. G. Deedes.*

Enclosure in No. 10.

ARMY VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

STATEMENT of British Pay and Allowances, as per Estimates.

Designation of Officers.	Annual Pay.	Allowance in lieu of Servant.	Allowance in lieu of Forage,* 2 Horses.	Allowance in lieu of Fuel and Light.	Allowance in lieu of Lodgings.	Total Pay and Allowances, as per Estimate.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon:—						
On appointment	456 5 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	28 17 –	73 – –	666 – –
After 25 years' service	492 15 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	28 17 –	73 – –	702 10 –
„ 30 „ „	547 10 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	28 17 –	73 – –	757 5 –
1st Class Veterinary Surgeons (relative rank of Captain):—						
On appointment	292 – –	18 5 –	89 13 –	22 15 3	54 15 –	477 8 3
After 5 years' service, as such	328 10 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	22 15 3	54 15 –	513 18 3
„ 10 „ „ „	365 – –	18 5 –	89 13 –	22 15 3	54 15 –	550 8 3
„ 15 „ „ „	401 10 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	22 15 3	54 15 –	586 18 3
„ 30 „ total service	438 – –	18 5 –	89 13 –	22 15 3	54 15 –	623 8 3
Veterinary Surgeons under the new Warrant	250 – –	18 5 –	89 13	18 19 9	41 1 3	417 19 –
Veterinary Surgeons under the old Warrant:—						
Under 5 years' service	182 10 –	18 5 –	89 13 –	18 19 9	41 1 3	350 9 –
After 5 „ „	219 – –	18 5 –	89 13 –	18 19 9	41 1 3	386 19 –
„ 10 „ „	264 12 6	18 5 –	89 13 –	18 19 9	41 1 3	432 11 6

* The allowance for forage fluctuates at the different stations, according to the market. The amount stated is the maximum for the year.

9 November. *J. Collins*, P.V.S.

— No. 11. —

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 25 April 1883; No. M. 2822.

Sir,

I AM desired by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 7017—1127, of 24th February 1882, in which the Secretary of State for War, in replying to the proposals of the Government of India for the organisation of the Veterinary Service in India, practically declines to entertain them.

A reference will be made at once to the Government as to the measures now to be adopted for providing for the future Veterinary Service in India.

Meanwhile,

Meanwhile, I am to point out that the post of Principal Veterinary Surgeon for India is vacant, and I am to state that, should the Marquis of Hartington desire to fill it up by an officer of the British Veterinary Department, Lord Kimberley will raise no objection, but on the express understanding that the officer appointed is liable to be withdrawn without relief at any time the Secretary of State for India may deem it needful to do so.

I am to add, that Lord Kimberley has read with disappointment and some surprise the concluding paragraph of your letter, in which it is stated, "that under the proposed organisation the Veterinary Service at home must not be regarded as a reserve for Indian Service, and that, in time of emergency, whatever arrangements may be considered necessary for reinforcing the Department must be carried out entirely by the Indian Government."

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Major General,
Military Secretary.

MEMORANDUM.

Indian Veterinary Establishment Reorganisation.

In the Military Letter, No. 340 of 1881, dated 16th September, the Government of India proposes an establishment of 49 officers, and suggests that the proportions of the different grades might be as noted in Column A.

	A.	B.
Principal Veterinary Surgeon - - -	1	1
Inspecting - - - - - - - -	4	4
1st Class - - - - - - -	15	22
2nd „ - - - - - - - -	29	22
	49	49

Using a life table prepared by Messrs. Robinson and Davey, of the War Office, on the experience of the British Medical Officers on active service, I have obtained Column B., which shows the probable normal state of the Veterinary Service, and from this it appears that the proportions, as proposed in Column A., are not likely to afford an equable rate of promotion in the two lower grades.

The establishment is so small that any general conclusion must be offered with much hesitation, but it may be advisable, if possible, to equalise more nearly the establishments of the 1st and 2nd Class.

As to the non-effective charge, the uncertainty is even more considerable, but it may be roughly estimated that the number of voluntary retirements with pension at ages under 55 will be about *three* in each period of *five* years, and of the compulsory retirements at age 55 about *two* in each period of *three* years. The total numbers at all ages, and the cost in the normal state, will be :—

		£.
Retired under 55 - - - - - -	14	2,934
„ at 55 - - - - - - -	11	5,130
Total Yearly Charge - - -	25	8,064

5 December 1881. (signed) *J. Hannyngton.*

INDIAN VETERINARY DEPARTMENT.

MEMORANDUM.

WITH reference to the question whether a local establishment of Veterinary Officers in India, on a system of drawing such officers as required from the Home Service, would be he more or less economical in respect of non-effective charges, I am led to conclude that the proposed Indian scale of pensions would probably be the more expensive. The proposed Indian scale for length of service, without reference to rank, is entered in the margin.

Completed Service.	Pension.
Years.	£.
10	75 (if invalided.)
17	200
20	250
25	350
30	450

The pensions do not appear to be unduly large.

The BRITISH SCALE is as follows;—

	If Retiring Voluntarily.		
	After 20 Years' Service on Full Pay.	After 25 Years' Service on Full Pay.	If Retired on account of Age or Disability contracted in the Service.
	£.	£.	£.
Principal Veterinary Surgeon			500
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon:—			
After 20 years' service	228⅛		319⅜
„ 25 „ „	246⅜	344 37/45	346¾
„ 30 „ „		383¼	383¼
Veterinary Surgeon, 1st Class:—			
After 15 years' service			191⅝
„ 20 „ „	164¼		237¼
„ say 22 „ „	182½		237¼
„ 25 „ „	182½	255½	292
„ say 27 „ „	200¾	281 1/10	292
„ 30 „ „		306⅗	292
Veterinary Surgeon:—			
Under 5 years' service			73
After 5 „ „			127¾
„ 10 „ „			155⅛
„ 15 „ „			173 11/16

Voluntary retirement is guarded by other restrictions besides length of service. The retiring officer must have served three years in grade, or 10 years abroad, in all ranks, or five years with army in the field.

Failing one of these the retired pay of the grade below.

The conditions under which voluntary retirement is possible are complex, and almost penal. Compulsory retirement is more liberally treated.

Retirement

Retirement with pension is in a good measure stopped by a system of gratuities after short periods of service.

Completed Years of Service on Full Pay.	If Services be dispensed with.	If the Officer be Disabled.
	£.	£.
10	800	—
9		720
8		640
7		560
6		480
5		400

It is evidently impossible to make a comparative estimate of the final outcome of two systems so unlike as the proposed Indian and the present British. I must own that I have doubts as to the stability of the latter.

Indian pay and allowances would be the same under either system. But the employment of the British officers would involve some outlay for passages.

25 May 1882. (signed) *J. Hannyngton.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 147 of 1883—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 22 *August* 1883.)

My Lord, Simla, 27 July 1883.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Military Despatch, No. 160, dated the 26th April 1883, regarding the proposed reorganisation of the Veterinary Service for this country.

2. Your Lordship requests the Government of India to take the subject again into consideration, as the conditions imposed by the War Office are incompatible with the proposals we had ubmitted for the organisation of an Indian Branch of the Veterinary Service.

3. These conditions are that, if an Indian Veterinary Service be created, it should be quite separate from the Home Veterinary Service; further, that the latter must not be regarded as a reserve for Indian Service, so that in time of emergency whatever arrangements may be necessary for reinforcing the Department must be carried out by the Indian Government.

4. We are much concerned to find that the organisation proposed by us, and which we believe would have been well suited to all the requirements of the case, should have been thus negatived by the War Office. There remains, your Lordship observes, to consider the alternatives, either of continuing the present system with such modifications as may be thought necessary, or of creating a purely local service.

5. Having given the subject our careful consideration, we have no hesitation in recommending that the second alternative of a local service should be adopted, as best adapted to the wants and circumstances of this country.

6. One reason in favour of this course appears to be the probability of a considerable and extending demand arising for the services of veterinary surgeons for civil duties under the different provincial Governments. Such officers would be most conveniently organised in a purely local service, in which, if pay and promotion were regulated by length of service, any expansion or reduction of the establishment which might be found necessary from time to time would be practicable without either creating undue promotion or affecting injuriously the position and prospects of its members.

 7. Another

7. Another reason is that such a local service would probably be less expensive than the employment of the Army Veterinary Department. We concur indeed with your Lordship in thinking that it will be necessary to reconsider the pay and allowances of veterinary surgeons in this country, especially in the light of the opinions expressed in your Despatch now under acknowledgment; but we doubt whether any rates of pay which we should be prepared to recommend would satisfy the expectations of the Army Veterinary Department, and we believe that if the Indian and British services were entirely dissociated, there would be less room for individious comparisons between the allowances drawn in and out of India, and that only in this way is there a reasonable chance of obtaining a contented and efficient service for India.

8. For these reasons then we recommend that a local service be established. But before proceeding to consider the subject in detail, which is one of some complexity, we should wish to be quite sure that the proposal will beyond doubt be accepted. It is true that in the papers which accompany your Lordship's Despatch, the War Office has offered to accept this solution of the matter. But so at one time did the War Office profess to be ready to assent to the establishment of a local medical service for British as well as Native troops in India; yet it can hardly be doubted that a definitive proposal to replace the Army Medical Department by local officers throughout the country would have been strenuously resisted. And we cannot but feel doubts whether, when the Army Veterinary Department find that the Government of India are prepared to do without them, they and the War Office may not be disposed to abate somewhat the terms set forth in the papers attached to your Lordship's Despatch, as to which we share in the surprise and disappointment which you express; and that eventually a compromise might be proposed in the direction of our original proposal, which would render unnecessary that for a local service. We are unwilling to trouble your Lordship with any more elaborate schemes which may come to nothing; but on hearing that your Lordship's final decision is in favour of a local service, and that the War Office do not raise objections to its formation, we shall lose no time in submitting definitive and detailed proposals in accordance therewith. We would ask that meanwhile, pending the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the general question, the staff of the Army Veterinary Department in India be kept up to the sanctioned establishment. In our Military Letter, No. 340, dated the 16th September 1881, we expressed the intention of introducing a system of veterinary station hospitals, which would admit of a considerable reduction in the staff of the department. But, owing to the absence of a permanent head to the department, and other causes, it has not yet been found practicable to carry it out; and, although we still think the measure should be adopted as soon as possible, we do not propose to proceed with it until the larger question is settled of the organisation of the service.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
T. C. Hope.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 153—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 29 May 1884.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Military Letter, No. 147, dated the 27th July 1883, on the question of the reorganisation of the veterinary service for India.

2. I caused the subject of that letter to be communicated to the Secretary of State for War, and inquired whether the Marquis of Hartington was prepared to modify in any way the adverse decisions arrived at by his predecessor on your recommendations

recommendations of 1881, and if not, whether any objection would be raised by his Lordship to the formation of a local Indian veterinary establishment.

3. I forward herewith a copy of that letter, and of the War Office reply. From the latter your Lordship will observe that the Secretary of State for War still feels it necessary to dissent from the proposals of your Government for the formation of a Veterinary Staff Corps, and desires instead the formation of "a completely unified service for the two countries in which the remuneration for duty in India shall be placed on such a footing that candidates shall not, as is the case at present, be deterred from coming forward for the department."

4. In para. 14 of my Despatch of the 26th April 1883, I referred to this question of the comparative rates of pay of veterinary officers at home and in India, and indicated my opinion that the existing Indian rates might fairly be improved, a view in which I understand your Lordship's Government to concur. I am ready, therefore, to accept such proposals as your Government may desire to make for a reasonable enhancement of the present rates, and thereby to remove any legitimate grounds for the assertion that the liability to Indian service now imposed on the Veterinary Department keeps the better class of students from joining it. I do not consider that any important addition to the military charges will be required in order to attain this object, for, as I have already informed your Lordship, I by no means support the pretension put forward by the Committee (copy of whose Report was forwarded to you with my predecessor's Despatch, No. 227, of 7th July 1881), that veterinary officers should be placed in the same relative position in regard to their emoluments as the combatant officers of the mounted branches.

5. But though I admit the desirability of placing the officers of the Veterinary Department in India on a better footing, and share Lord Harrington's opinion as to the advantage which the service at large derives from the possession of an Indian field of experience, I cannot think that the interests of India would be served by the creation of a unified department, such as his Lordship desires to see established.

6. I am desirous, therefore, of devising some mode, acceptable at the same time to your Government and to the War Office, by which both Imperial and Indian interests may be effectually served. I believe that this may be found in a measure of more complete separation of the military and civil veterinary duties than has yet been contemplated.

7. I understand that the officers of the department sent out on tour from England have been found fully capable of efficiently performing all the purely military services that can be required of them. Equal efficiency cannot, however, reasonably be looked for in their performance of the civil duties of the department, which require linguistic attainments coupled with special knowledge and prolonged local experience. At present the number of veterinary civil positions is not numerous, and till quite lately these duties have been almost entirely performed by the remaining officers of the former Indian Veterinary Department. While, however, on the one hand this source of supply of qualified officers is rapidly disappearing, the number of posts in which their services would be required will certainly increase. I desire therefore to suggest, for your Lordship's consideration, whether it would not be practicable to vest the performance of these civil veterinary duties in a distinct and permanent civil department, disconnected altogether from the Military Department, and coming under civil rules for promotion, furlough, and pension. Such a service would naturally be recruited from the Army Veterinary Department, as affording a proved and professionally well-educated class of officers, habituated to the public service, and possessing other important qualifications which might be found wanting in men drawn directly from the Veterinary College at home, or trained in India.

8. If your Government concur in this view, I shall be glad to receive a scheme based on the following principles, viz., first, that the whole military veterinary duty in India shall be undertaken by officers of the Army Veterinary

Department, sent out by roster, as now, under the orders of the War Office, each being required to complete a tour of five or seven years' service before relief; and, secondly, that the whole of the civil veterinary duties shall be undertaken by a civil veterinary department, the term "civil" comprising all duties which are not performed directly under the orders of the Commander in Chief, but excluding duties connected with the Transport Department.

9. With respect to the Military Department, I shall be glad to receive the opinion of your Government on the point already referred to, viz., the adequacy of the existing rates of Indian pay and allowances relatively to those contained in the Royal Warrant for officers of the department serving in the colonies and at home. It will be very desirable to fix, as nearly as practicable, the strength actually required for the performance of military duties, administrative and executive, throughout India, but, in doing so, it should be borne in mind that it will not be needful to provide for the maintainance of a larger reserve than is wanted for your immediate and local requirements, as all officers quitting India during their tour of duty, whether on account of health or on promotion, would be at once replaced from home, whence also would be drawn such additional officers as might be temporarily required during a time of war. It further appears desirable that you should express your opinion as to the proportions of the several grades, administrative and executive, to be maintained in India, and also whether the tour of duty should be for five years or more.

10. With respect to the second point, viz., the formation of a civil department, I shall be glad to be favoured with your views as to the details of its organisation, the relative position it will occupy, the terms of service, the distribution of the officers, their promotion, pay, furlough, and retirement, points on which doubtless you will consider it necessary to consult the local administrations, regard being of course had to the terms of their employment in the home service.

11. For the reasons I have given and for the further reason that the prospect of permanent civil employment will, I believe, tend to popularise the department, and thus react favourably on the Military Department, I am strongly of opinion that the European element of the Civil Department should, as a rule, be recruited from the Military, somewhat under the same conditions as are prescribed for admission to the Indian Staff Corps from the line, candidates who should not be over seven years' total service, of which two shall have been passed on duty in India, being admitted on probation for one year, at the end of which term they should, with the approval of the Civil Government, be required to join the Civil Department permanently, or to revert to military duty. During such probation the officer would, of course, be seconded in his Department, and should he revert to it, would become supernumerary until absorbed.

12. I forwarded a copy of the foregoing for the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, observing that it appeared to me to be the only alternative to the formation of a purely local veterinary department for all India. Your Lordship will observe, from the further correspondence which is enclosed, that the Marquis of Hartington entirely concurs in the scheme, with the proviso that the liability of the whole pension of those who join the Civil Department is to be accepted by the Indian Government, a condition which appears to me to be reasonable. I would suggest that, in giving effect to this arrangement, the whole of any previous service, in the case of those now admitted should be allowed to count as service towards whatever pension may be laid down for the Department. With respect, however, to those who may hereafter enter the Civil Department, I think they should be restricted to the maximum period of home service towards Indian pension allowed for officers of the Staff Corps.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

ENCLOSURES referred to.

No. 1.

LETTER to the War Office, dated India Office, 3 October 1883; No 13,211.

Sir,

IN General Johnson's letter of the 25th April last, No. 2822, you were informed that a reference would be made to the Government of India as to the measures which should now be adopted for providing for the future Veterinary Service in India.

Consequent on the practical rejection by the Secretary of State for War of the proposals submitted by the Government of India in September 1881, for the organisation of the Veterinary Service in India, the Government of India have considered the alternatives which offer themselves, viz., the continuance of the present system, with such modifications as may be thought necessary, or the creation of a purely local service.

They state that they have no hesitation in recommending the adoption of the second alternative of a local service, as best adapted to the wants and circumstances of India. One reason in favour of this course is the probability of a considerable and extending demand arising for the services of veterinary surgeons for civil duties under the different Provincial Governments. Such officers would be most conveniently organised on a purely local service.

The Government of India are further of opinion that a local service would probably be less expensive than the employment of the Army Veterinary Department. At the same time they admit the necessity for a revision of the pay and allowances of veterinary surgeons serving in India.

Before requiring the Government of India to submit a detailed scheme for the resuscitation of a local service, and to draft regulations for its organisation, I am directed to state that Lord Kimberley desires to be informed whether the Secretary of State for War is prepared to modify in any way the adverse decision arrived at on the recommendations submitted in 1881 for the organisation of an Indian Branch of the Army Veterinary Department, and if not, whether any objection will be raised on the part of the War Office to the formation of a local Indian Veterinary Department.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Edmund Neel,*
Assistant Military Secretary.

No. 2.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 23 November 1883; No. 7017—1488.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquis of Hartington to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Neel's letter of the 3rd October, M. 13,211, relative to the question of forming a local Veterinary Department in India.

In reply, I am to state, for the consideration of the Earl of Kimberley, that the Secretary of State still feels it necessary to dissent from the formation of a local Department connected with the Imperial Department in the manner proposed by the Indian Government in the year 1881. In thus expressing Lord Hartington's decision, it may be desirable to enter, at somewhat greater length than was done in my letter of the 24th February 1882, into the reasons which lead to it.

In the first place I am to advert to the correspondence which took place in 1881-82 on the parallel question of establishing in India a local branch of the Army Medical Department. In that case Mr. Childers felt it his duty to object to the proposed departure from the system of an unified Department. The grounds were that Indian experience was of benefit to a medical officer when serving elsewhere; and that service in India was so attractive as to constitute a considerable factor in inducing an eligible medical candidate to come forward for the Department. These advantages would have been sacrificed by the practical separation of the Departments proposed by the Indian Government.

As regards the Veterinary Department, the converses reasoning holds. The remuneration for veterinary duties in India has hitherto been so low that the prospect of serving in India during a considerable portion of their career has been found in practice to deter good men from entering the department. As a result the Indian connection has been a disadvantage to the British Veterinary Department.

The proposal of the Indian Government was that a local veterinary department should be formed by drawing volunteers from the Imperial Department, who after such volunteering would have no connection with the Home Department.

It is evident from past experience that unless the attractions of Indian veterinary service were materially increased, the system would scarcely work at all. On the other hand, if the Indian appointments were increased in value sufficiently to induce veterinary surgeons of a high class to accept them, the best men in the Imperial service would probably be drawn from it, leaving it an asylum for the less competent in their profession and a nursery for the Indian branch, whose Indian experience would not benefit it in any degree.

It is on these grounds that Lord Hartington disagrees with the proposal of the Indian Government.

I am, however, to observe that Lord Hartington not only entertains no objection to, but desires the formation of a completely unified service for the two countries, in which the remuneration for duty in India shall be placed on such a footing that candidates shall not, as in the case at present, be deterred by it from coming forward for the Department.

On the other hand, for the reasons stated earlier in this letter, his Lordship cannot object to the institution of an entirely local service in India, though he cannot but think that such an arrangement would have less advantage for India, financially and otherwise, than the completely unified Department.

Further, the experience of recent campaigns has tended to show that little reliance can be placed on Native veterinary skill.

I am to take this opportunity of explaining that, by the last paragraph of my letter of the 24th February 1882, it was not Mr. Childer's meaning that in times of emergency any of the resources of this Department would not be at the disposal of the Indian Government; but that he wished to point out that the number of the separate British establishment would not be more than sufficient for home requirements in time of peace.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

No. 3.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated India Office, 22 February 1884; No. M. 7490.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd November 1883, on the question of the organisation of the Veterinary Department in India.

In reply, I am to state, for the information of the Marquis of Hartington, that Lord Kimberley has again given the subject his earnest consideration, with a full desire to meet the wishes of the Secretary of State for War, so far as they are compatible with the interests of the Government of India.

I am desired to forward a draft Despatch which it is proposed to send to the Government of India, and to express Lord Kimberley's belief that the measure which he proposes for adoption will be advantageous to both Governments.

The proposed civil branch or department will probably not exceed at any time 25 in all; at present there are only nine officers holding civil posts. Lord Kimberley is satisfied that this service, to be efficient, should be drawn from the Imperial Veterinary Department, and the scheme now to be sent to the Government of India seems to his Lordship to be the only alternative to the formation of a purely local Veterinary Department for all India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson,* Major General,
Military Secretary.

No. 4.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated War Office, 9 April 1884; No. 7017—1552.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 22nd February last, M. 7490, relative to the organisation of the Veterinary Department in India, and to acquaint you, for Lord Kimberley's information, that Lord Hartington concurs in the plan proposed in the draft Despatch which it is proposed to send to the Government of India, on the condition that the Indian Government accepts the liability for the whole pension of those who accept the Civil Department.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

CORRESPONDENCE QUOTED IN THE MARGIN OF PARA. 2 OF LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA; No. 340 of 1881, page 678.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 180—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 26 June 1879.

Para. 1. I HAVE received and considered in Council your Lordship's Despatch, No. 326 of 1878, conveying the proposal of your Excellency's Government that Clause 88 of Army Circulars, dated 1st May 1878, "Veterinary Department," should be made applicable to India.

2. I observe that the Accountant General, Military Department, calculates that the cost of giving effect to this Warrant will involve an additional charge of 19,382 rupees yearly.

3. Being satisfied that it is really necessary to hold out the greater inducements offered by the Royal Warrant to attract candidates to this service, I approve of the proposals in your letter under reply, but it is essential that in doing so no increased expenditure, which can possibly be avoided, shall thereby be incurred.

4. In this view I enclose copy of a communication received from the Horse Guards* in which the Principal Veterinary Surgeon to the Forces puts forward his opinion that the existing establishment in India might be reduced by at least one-fourth, and I recommend the point to the careful consideration of your Lordship's Government, in view to an early decision as to the reductions which can be immediately effected.

* Dated 17th April 1879, and enclosure.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cranbrook.*

ENCLOSURES referred to.

(7017—688.)

Sir, Horse Guards, War Office, 17 April 1879.

I AM directed by the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to transmit herewith, for submission to the Secretary of State for India in Council, copy of a letter from the Principal Veterinary Surgeon, relative to the organisation of the Veterinary Department in India.

I am to draw attention to the statement made by Mr. Collins respecting the number of veterinary surgeons in Madras and Bombay respectively.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. H. Brownlow*, Colonel,
for Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Enclosure in foregoing.

Sir, War Office, Pall Mall, 14 April 1879.

I HAVE the honour respectfully to request that you will bring the following subject to the notice of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief.

In May last a Royal Warrant was published which improved the pay, &c., of the veterinary surgeons of the army on home service. The Warrant was published, to a great extent, on account of the growing unpopularity of the Department generally, which deterred candidates from offering themselves for admission. A considerable part of this unpopularity was due to the requirements, pay, &c., for service in India.

It appears, however, that up to the present time no corresponding move on the part of the Indian Government has been made to improve the pay, &c., of the veterinary officers serving in that country; in this respect their position remains absolutely unchanged.

When the Warrant first appeared, I succeeded in completing the establishment, as much was expected from it, but of late the applicants have again fallen below the number of vacancies. Considering that half of a veterinary surgeon's service must of necessity be passed in India, including those who join under the ten years' rule, it is little wonder that they hesitate about entering when the pay for five years out of the ten remains the same as before the Warrant appeared.

For many reasons Indian service is at present very unpopular in the Department generally, and some means should be considered in order that the causes may be removed. If I may be permitted, I would make a suggestion for the serious consideration of the Indian authorities. Having served 12 years in India, six as an inspecting veterinary surgeon, I can with the more confidence do so.

The peace establishment of veterinary surgeons for India is, all told, 72. I have no hesitation in saying that this number is excessive, and that by a judicious reorganisation a considerable reduction might be made without in any way impairing the efficiency of the department.

In many stations in India where there are only one or two batteries of artillery a resident veterinary surgeon is unnecessary. If a veterinary surgeon visited these stations once a month to make a sanitary inspection, perform operations, give advice as to the treatment of sick and lame horses, &c., it would amply suffice. With railways available, one veterinary officer could embrace within his district several stations, each of which now possesses a resident veterinary surgeon.

A reference to the comparative number of veterinary surgeons on the establishment of Madras and Bombay will show at once the necessity for some reorganisation. Madras has 19, whilst Bombay has only nine, and yet, with the exception of an extra British Cavalry regiment in Madras, the strength of the mounted forces of the two Presidencies does not materially differ, and there are no complaints of the paucity of veterinary surgeons in Bombay.

With a reduction in the establishment, which, by a judicious distribution, I estimate at one-fourth, liberal terms could be offered to the Department in India, and a considerable saving be effected to the country.

Veterinary surgeons from India complain that, unless on medical certificate, they have, unlike other officers, great difficulty in obtaining leave in the hot weather. The hot season is usually a healthy one for horses in India, and probably at no other season could the veterinary surgeons' services be so well spared. A month or two at the Hills would often prevent the necessity of a medical certificate to Europe.

In suggesting a reduction, I am, of course, speaking of the peace establishment. In time of war extra veterinary aid would be required for the increase number of transport animals which are at that time entertained.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. Collins*,
Principal Veterinary Surgeon to the Forces.

The Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 2—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 15 January 1880.

Para. 1. WITH reference to my Military Despatch, dated 26th June 1879, No. 180, sanctioning the application to India of the Royal Warrant of 22nd April 1878, regarding the Veterinary Department, and forwarding, for your consideration, certain proposals for the reduction of the veterinary establishment in India, I transmit herewith, for your information and report, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin,* in which you will observe that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief suggests that, with a view to induce eligible candidates to come forward for the Veterinary Department, the rates of pay laid down in your General Order, No. 1095, of 31st October 1879, for Veterinary Surgeons under five years' service, and those of over five and under 10 years' service, should be reconsidered.

* Letter from Horse Guards, dated 26th November 1879.
Letter to Horse Guards, dated 4th December 1879, No. 1043 H.
Letter from Horse Guards, dated 15th December 1879.

2. I have to call your attention to the fourth paragraph of my Despatch of the 26th June 1879, No. 180, relative to a recommendation by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon that the existing establishment of Veterinary Surgeons in India be reduced by one-fourth, and shall be glad to receive your views on the subject at an early date.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cranbrook.*

ENCLOSURES referred to.

No. 1.

(No. 7017—748.)

Sir, Horse Guards, War Office, 26 November 1879.

I AM directed by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to request your attention to my letter of the 17th April last, enclosing a communication from the Principal Veterinary Surgeon relative to the reorganisation of the Veterinary Department, and asking for information as to the proposed improvement in the pay, &c., of Veterinary Surgeons serving in India.

No reply has been received to the above correspondence, and Mr. Collins again urges the difficulty of recruiting his department while the terms of service in India are so unfavourable as compared with home service.

I am, &c.
(signed) *M. Dillon.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

No. 2.

LETTER to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards, dated India Office, 4 December 1879; No. 1043 H.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of yonr letter of the 26th ultimo, No. 7017—748, and to acquaint you, in reply, for the information of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, that the application to India of the Royal Warrant of 1st May 1871, regarding the Veterinary Department has been sanctioned, and I am to transmit herewith a copy of the General Order of the Government of India, No. 1095, dated 31st October last, notifying the revised scale of pay and allowances now issuable to Veterinary Surgeons of Her Majesty's British and Indian Forces serving in that country.

2. I am further to state that Lord Cranbrook, in sanctioning the adoption of the Royal Warrant above referred to, transmitted for the consideration of the Government of India a copy of your letter of 17th April 1879, with its enclosures, relative to the possible reduction of the Veterinary Establishment in India. No reply has yet been received to Lord Cranbrook's Despatch on the subject, but I am to state that no time will be lost in communicating to you the views of the Government of India, when received.

I am, &c.
(signed) *T. F. Wilson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 3.

(7017—765.)

Sir, Horse Guards, War Office, 15 December 1879.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th instant, No. 1043 H., relative to the Veterinary Department in India, I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that His Royal Highness observes in the General Order by the Government of India, No. 1095 of 1879, that the rates of pay and allowances for Veterinary Surgeons under five years' service are the same as before, viz., *Rs.* 377. 8. per mensem, whilst for those of over five and under ten years' service there is an increase of only *Rs.* 6. 1. 4. per mensem.

Considering that Veterinary Surgeons now join for ten years only, and that one-half at least of that period must be passed in India, it is to be feared that the good effects of the Royal Warrant published last year will be in a great measure abrogated, unless some modification be introduced in the rates of pay for these two classes of Veterinary Surgeons above referred to.

As it is most important to induce a sufficient number of eligible candidates to come forward for the Veterinary Department, His Royal Highness suggests that the rates for these two classes might receive reconsideration.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. H. Brownlow*,
for Military Secretary.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

EXTRACT of a Letter from the Government of India, No. 476, dated 9 November 1880.—(*Received* 1 *December* 1880).

WITH reference to your Lordship's Despatch, No. 265,* dated the 19th August 1880, we beg to state that the question of reduction in the Veterinary Department in India is under our immediate consideration, and we hope shortly to be able to reply to your Lordship's Despatch, No. 2, dated the 15th January 1880.

* This Despatch called attention to certain Despatches remaining unanswered, of which No. 2. of 1880 was one.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 81—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 24 March 1881.

Para. 1. WITH reference to Lord Cranbrook's Military Despatch, No. 2, dated 15th January 1880, forwarding, for your information and report, a copy of correspondence with the Horse Guards, relative to a suggestion that the pay of certain classes of officers of the Veterinary Department in India should be reconsidered, and calling attention to a recommendation by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon that the existing establishment of Veterinary Surgeons in India should be reduced by one-fourth, I transmit herewith, for your consideration

consideration, a copy of a letter from the War Office, dated 22nd February 1881, enclosing a Report by a Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, and asking for my opinion upon the proposals therein contained; as regards the service in India.

2. The position of the Veterinary Department in India being under your consideration, I have refrained from expressing any opinion on the subject, but I request that I may be favoured with your views at an early date, and I would call your attention to the statements given in evidence before the Committee presided over by General Sir F. Fitzwygram, from which it would appear that the duties imposed on officers of the Department have undergone a very material increase over what was formerly required of them.

3. I shall be glad to be informed whether steps might not be taken in the direction of a reduction of these duties without prejudice to the efficiency of the service.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

ENCLOSURE referred to.

No. 1.

(No. 7017.—909.)

Sir, War Office, 22 February 1881.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India in Council, a copy of a Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, and to request that you will move the Marquis of Hartington to favour Mr. Childers with his opinion upon the proposals contained therein as regards the service in India.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Ralph Thompson.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

REPORT of the Committee appointed to Inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army.

1. THE present scale of British pay of officers of the Veterinary Department was fixed by the Royal Warrant of the 22nd April 1878 (Clause 88, Army Circulars, 1878). The rates of pay granted under this scale are considerably higher than those previously allowed, and no complaint has been made of their insufficiency; yet it is still found that candidates of the necessary qualifications cannot be obtained in such numbers as to keep up the establishment of the Department.

2. The chief cause of this is, that the conditions of Indian service bear much more hardly upon veterinary surgeons than upon officers of the other branches of the army. While the greater part of the veterinary surgeon's service has to be passed in India, his pay in that country has not been raised in anything like the same proportion as his British pay, and he is also placed at a great disadvantage in other respects in comparison with officers of the British Army generally when serving in India, as will be seen from extracts of evidence (Appendix A,) taken by the Committee, which are attached to this Report.

3. As regards the service in India, this must always be longer than the British, while the present proportion of 62 veterinary surgeons on the Indian to 58 on the British Establishment is maintained. But the veterinary surgeons coming in under the new Warrant have, under the present system, to serve in India much longer than their colleagues who were appointed under previous warrants. Of the 58 veterinary surgeons on the Home Establishment, there are 30 who,

30 who, for various reasons, principally because they hold commissions in cavalry regiments, do not come into the general roster for Indian service; so that there remain only 28 veterinary surgeons at home to relieve the 62 in India. The consequence is, that some veterinary surgeons, who have already served six or ten years in India, are now first on the roster for that country, after having been at home less than four years, although there are many others who had from eight to 22 years' continuous Home service, and some have never served abroad at all.

4. We are of opinion that this anomalous state of things should cease, and that all the veterinary surgeons now holding regimental commissions should be transferred to the department and made available for general service, excepting only such veterinary surgeons of over 15 years' service as may prefer to retire after 20 years' service, or, if having already served more than 20 years, after 25 years' service.

5. The extra charge involved in the above proposal would be 1 *s.* 9 *d.* a day for each veterinary surgeon transferred to the department, while on the British Establishment; but this charge would be more than counterbalanced by the saving which would be caused by the senior veterinary surgeons, who would become available for Indian service, being paid out of Indian instead of British funds, as hitherto.

6. Even, however, after all the veterinary surgeons have become departmental officers, those under the rank of inspecting veterinary surgeon will still be at a great disadvantage as compared with other officers. The Veterinary Establishment for India was originally calculated to meet the requirements of the European mounted troops only (excepting certain native cavalry regiments in Madras), and of the studs and semi-civil appointments. Of late years, however, it has been the practice to place officers of the department in veterinary charge of irregular cavalry, commissariat animals, staff officers' horses, &c., in addition. The veterinary surgeon has, in fact, often an entire district, widely scattered, to attend to. He is consequently overworked; he is unable, like other officers, to obtain leave to the hills for health or recreation, and no personal or detention allowance is granted to him when visiting out-stations. We are of opinion that if it be considered necessary by the Indian authorities to impose such duties upon veterinary surgeons, the number of veterinary surgeons on the Indian Establishment should be increased so as to make it correspond to the work to be done, and that personal allowance should be given them as to other officers when they are detached on duty from headquarters.

7. As regards the Indian emoluments of the veterinary surgeons, it will be seen from the Table annexed (Appendix B.) that although their service in India will be much longer than that of other officers, the increase of pay allowed to veterinary surgeons under the rank of inspecting veterinary surgeon for service in India is relatively much less. While the average increase for Indian service in the case of these veterinary surgeons is only 29⅔ per cent., in the case of inspecting veterinary surgeons it is 74⅓ per cent., and of officers of cavalry 62½ per cent., and in that of cavalry paymasters 62½ per cent. and the veterinary surgeons appointed for 10 years under the new Warrant only get a nominal increase of eight per cent. to their emoluments, which, owing to the depreciation of the rupee, entirely disappears when their emoluments are converted into English money. This naturally creates great discontent among the members of the Department, and deters qualified veterinary surgeons from coming forward as candidates.

8. The difficulty of completing the establishment of the Department has, indeed, now become so serious that unless the Indian rates of pay of the 1st class veterinary surgeons and veterinary surgeons are increased so as to bear a similar proportion to their British emoluments as exists in other branches of the Army, it will become necessary to consider whether the officers of the Veterinary Department should not be exempted from Indian service altogether, leaving India to provide her own establishment of veterinary surgeons, as she already does her Commissariat Department, Engineer Department, and Chaplains Department. We are of opinion, however, that such a measure would not be conducive

conducive to the efficiency of the Department in India, as it would deprive its members of the opportunities which occasional service in England affords of keeping up their professional knowledge.

Our recommendations, therefore, are :—

(*a*) That all Regimental Veterinary Surgeons be transferred to the Department, and treated in all respects as Departmental Officers, subject to the condition in paragraph 4.

(*b*) That the Secretary of State for India be moved to take steps for fixing the establishment of the Veterinary Surgeons in India at a strength more in accordance with the duties they have to perform, and for increasing the Indian emoluments of the 1st class Veterinary Surgeons and Veterinary Surgeons, so as to remove the disproportion now existing in this respect between them and officers of other branches of the army.

We would also draw attention to the Memorandum from the Principal Veterinary Surgeon as to honours and rewards, which is attached to this Report (Appendix C.).

(signed) *F. W. Fitzwygram*, Major General.
Adam Gielgud.
G. T. Brown.

APPENDIX A.

EXTRACTS from Evidence taken by the Committee.

The Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

The regimental system.

UNDER the regimental system there is no alternative, in meeting the demands for India, but to send out all young newly-joined Veterinary Surgeons. There are now serving in India only 11 first-class Veterinary Surgeons and 53 Veterinary Surgeons, while at home the numbers are 29 first-class Veterinary Surgeons and 26 Veterinary Surgeons, showing that India has much less than her right proportion of Veterinary Surgeons of the higher rank and of more trustworthy experience. Those who are newly appointed are fresh from the colleges, and, however well instructed they may be in the theory of their profession, they are, from want of experience, often very deficient in practical knowledge, especially with regard to veterinary matters peculiar to India, such as dieting, stable management, diseases incidental to climate, &c., and it takes some time for them to gain this experience. No sooner, however, has the necessary experience been gained, than they take advantage of the earliest opportunity for leaving the country; this forms the subject of well-grounded complaints from the Indian authorities of the inefficiency of the Department, and it is obviously not in the interests of the service to continue a system which perpetuates such inefficiency. At the same time it should be borne in mind that a prolonged residence in India, especially for professional men, is not at all desirable, from the want of the opportunities which an occasional service in England affords of keeping up their professional knowledge abreast of the times.

Prolonged residence in India not desirable.

The reasons why the matter has not before come to a crisis are these :

Reasons of present deadlock.

1. The Indian establishment has been gradually increased since the mutiny, for an increased mounted establishment.

2. The old local service is gradually dying out, to be replaced by Veterinary Surgeons who are on the Imperial list.

3. They now have the option of returning after five years' service. Formerly the period was indefinite; in fact they only got home by exchange or sickness.

4. Veterinary Surgeons will not now volunteer for India.

5. They will not exchange to go out.

Unpopularity of Indian service.

The chief reason of 4 and 5 is the growing unpopularity of Indian service.

The cause of this is, briefly, that whilst the attractions of Home service have been materially improved, no corresponding equivalent has been offered by the Indian Government.

Remedies.

The remedy would be, first, to place all in one Department, thereby compelling every veterinary surgeon to take his share of service; and, secondly, so to increase the attractions of India that Veterinary Surgeons will be anxious to go out.

There is no doubt that the immediate effect of the former measure would be to force many of the seniors to retire as soon as they could. Others would go out, but to return home sick; in fact, every effort would be made to avoid an unpopular service, until I should be unable to fill the vacancies. I can barely keep the Department complete as it is, owing to the unpopularity of India.

I respectfully beg to point out that unless the Indian Government take some means to make their service more popular, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep their establishment complete. This unpopularity reacts on the home establishment, and Department generally, for the best candidates are deterred from entering the army.

Complaint of insufficient establishment in India.

Great complaints are made by the veterinary authorities in India of the paucity of veterinary surgeons in that country. It is alleged that there is not a sufficient number to meet the requirements of the service, and that on that account the veterinary surgeons generally are overworked.

Reason of insufficient numbers.

The true reason of this apparent paucity is, that a considerable war across the frontier has now been going on for some time, with a peace establishment of veterinary surgeons. This circumstance affects the Veterinary Department to a far greater extent than perhaps any other department in the Army, for this reason, that in time of war an enormous transport train is organised, and the number of animals entertained is probably quadrupled, for which veterinary aid is essential.

Peace and war establishments.

So that to make your peace establishment of veterinary officers do all the work in time of war, shows plainly either that there are too many veterinary surgeons kept in time of peace, or that the war establishment is insufficient. All accounts go to prove that the latter is the case, and great losses have been the result. On the termination of hostilities the surplus animals are at once disposed of. This would seem to point out the way in which the veterinary establishment should in future be dealt with, viz., to maintain a permanent staff for a peace establishment, and a temporary staff in addition in time of war. The home is essentially a peace establishment; should war break out additional men would be at once entertained, as was done during the Zulu war.

Other causes of complaint.

But independently of this, there appear to be other causes which lead to great complaints from the veterinary surgeons in India of overwork and frequent changes. The veterinary establishment for India was originally calculated to meet the requirements of the European mounted troops only (excepting certain Native cavalry regiments in Madras who are not on the Sillidar system), and of the studs and semi-civil appointments. Of late years, however, it has been the practice to place officers of the Department in veterinary charge of Irregular Cavalry, Commissariat animals, Staff Officers' horses, &c., in addition. The veterinary surgeon has, in fact, often an entire station, widely scattered, to attend to. He complains that he is at the beck and call of every one, that he has no rest, and that, unlike all other officers, he is unable to obtain leave to the hills for health or recreation.

Overwork.
No leave to the hills.

Letter from a junior veterinary surgeon.

I cannot do better than quote passages from a letter just received from a veterinary officer who recently went on to India from Natal, one who entered under the 10 years' system. This officer writes:

Frequent changes.

> "I arrived in India in the beginning of this year. I had a regiment of Hussars and three batteries of Artillery to take charge of for a week; I was then ordered to march with a battery a two months' march; I was afterwards posted to the Lancers, then to the Light Cavalry, and afterwards to my present regiment."

He continues: "At this station I have a battery of Artillery, elephants and

Extensive districts.
Elephants and bullocks as well as horses to look after.

and bullocks, in addition to my own regiment. Then I have a squadron of cavalry, and all the Commissariat elephants and bullocks at a large station 130 miles off, and further down the line, 150 miles, another troop of cavalry. In a different direction, I have a battery of Artillery five days' journey from here. When I go to these places, I simply get a warrant, and no personal allowance of any sort; and still, house, servant, and regimental expenses are going on just the same. With a charge and responsibility of this kind I think that one is entitled to something besides one's bare pay, but such is not the case; not a single pice extra do I get. I am just off in the jungle to see some elephants, 30 miles off; some epidemic is reported amongst them, and I must take my own provisions with me. Every elephant that dies they require a post-mortem examination and full report. I consider, putting item against item, that one has four times as much work, and proportionately far less pay out here to what we have at home. One would be better off at home on 16 *l.* per month, with allowances. With regard to his emoluments, he states, "I think there is great room for improvement in the Indian Warrant; if we come to compare the pay and allowances at home, one cannot fail to be struck with the inadequate rates here. The commanding officer has to certify that you have your chargers, and the rent of house, combined with the number of servants it is absolutely necessary to keep, make one's pay look very ridiculous as compared to what we get at home."

No personal allowance.

More work and less pay than at home.

For a long time past this has been the burden of the complaints received from India, from all grades except the highest.

It should be decided what the work of the veterinary officer in India is to be. If he is to afford aid to strictly European mounted corps, then the peace establishment is too large. On the other hand, if he is to afford aid to irregular cavalry, commissariat, and staff, then the present establishment is insufficient. A distinction should also be made between a peace and war establishment, on an intelligible basis.

Professor Brown, of the Veterinary Department of the Privy Council and of the Royal Veterinary College.

Referring to the unpopularity of the army as a career for young and efficient veterinary surgeons, I may say that, as I understand the case, the duties are more onerous than they were some years ago, and the pecuniary and other advantages have decreased. This remark applies especially to foreign service. Some 30 years ago the Indian service was highly estimated on account of the liberal pay, moderate amount of work, and leisure for private practice, which was stated to be of a very remunerative kind. Under present circumstances, joining the Army involves loss of personal freedom to a certain extent, and a certainty of being called upon for foreign service, the duties of which are arduous. Against these disabilities there are not placed any corresponding advantages. I have frequently heard the statement that the pay does not more than meet the current expenses which a young man is almost compelled to incur. Of late years I have observed that young veterinary surgeons have got into the habit of looking upon the Army as a very good refuge of which they can avail themselves if no satisfactory openings of the pursuit of their profession in civil life should present themselves. I may remark that I find no difficulty in my own department in securing the services of good men, some of them in the highest positions in the profession, as inspectors at ports where foreign animals may be landed. The salaries which are paid are small, but the duties are light and do not interfere with the inspector's ordinary professional pursuits. When it has been necessary to require the officer to devote his whole time to official work, it has necessarily followed that a high rate of remuneration has had to be paid. My statement of reasons might conveniently be compressed into one short sentence. Army service is attended with certain disadvantages, and the pay and other inducements do not, in the estimation of the rising generation of veterinary surgeons, counterbalance those disadvantages.

Duties greater and pay less.

Professor McCall, Principal of the Veterinary College, Glasgow.

The objection I have heard urged against the army as a career for young and efficient veterinarians has been the smallness of the remuneration allowed for their services. The pay is certainly not in keeping with the position, and the future prospects are so discouraging that no thoughtful teacher, when applied to, can conscientiously advise his pupil to become a candidate for an appointment in the army, after he has obtained his diploma.

Veterinary Surgeon Sartin, Royal Artillery.

The reasons why Indian service is unpopular in the Veterinary Department are:—

1. The great difficulty there is in obtaining leave to England.

2. The uncertainty as to how long you will be kept in India.

3. Insufficiency of pay and allowances, particularly now that head money and country medicine allowances are done away with.

4. Expensive and unnecessary moves.

5. Being compelled to attend the Commissariat cattle, elephants, &c., without any remuneration, and Staff Corps officers' chargers for 2 rupees a month,

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Veterinary Surgeon Percival, 11th Hussars.

From experience I ascribe the unpopularity of the Indian service with the Veterinary Department to the causes hereafter named:—

1. The small pay.

2. The uncertainty and the difficulty of obtaining leave in the country during the hot seasons.

3. The effects of the climate and the natural repugnance many have to serve abroad. Departmental men have, I believe, a great cause for complaint in the frequent moves to which they are subjected, which are always attended with more or less expenditure and actual loss.

Nos. 1 and 2 are, in my opinion, essentially the grievances which our Department complain of, and, if remedied, I know no reason why veterinary surgeons should not be as eager for Indian service as other men.

Veterinary Surgeon Matthews, 4th Hussars.

The unpopularity to which you refer, and which undeniably exists, is due to the following causes, viz.:—

1. The almost inevitable ruin of health that a prolonged stay in India involves, with the utter absence of any inducement to able-bodied professional men to throw away health and strength in the continuous exposure that a conscientious performance of their duty entails.

2. I consider I enjoy a far better position in England than I should in India, my pay there, in certain stations, being absolutely inadequate for current expenses, as from various causes the prices of all necessaries have, as far as we can see, permanently and most materially risen.

3. The limited establishment of veterinary surgeons there rendering leave, which in India is a necessity, so difficult to obtain, and causing frequent

frequent moves to remote places a matter of frequent recurrence, entailing heavy loss on the individual.

4. Although in receipt of forage allowance for two horses, and compelled to keep them (*vide* letter from Commander in Chief at Madras 1876, now in my possession), the veterinary surgeon is only allowed free passage for one by rail, having to sell or provide for the passage of the other himself; furthermore, he is only allowed to select one from the ranks, whereas an officer of the Combatant Branch of corresponding rank may select two. Both travelling and detention allowances are denied him when changing quarters.

These I consider the leading objections.

Veterinary Surgeon Phillips.

Regarding the causes of Indian service being so unpopular with the Army Veterinary Department; I beg to state as follows:—

I had to serve seven years in the country before receiving orders to return to England. I never knew at what moment, during hot or cold season, I might receive an order to proceed at once to another station. This, of course, caused great uncertainty and extra expense. Veterinary surgeons appeared to be moved about more suddenly and oftener than other officers; just as one was becoming acquainted with the proper working of his department at his station, the chances were a sudden order to proceed elsewhere. This could not be beneficial to the service at large. It was, of course, due to the paucity of veterinary officers in India; also, a veterinary surgeon's duties in an Indian station are very heavy. He is fortunate if he obtains leave of absence during the hot weather. He sees many officers going to the hills for six, four, or two months, and considers himself very fortunate if he obtains two. But often he is obliged to remain in the plains the whole of the hot weather. His duties often include the care of all elephants, camels, oxen, and sheep of the Commissariat Department. This, of course, entails a great increase in office work, and also responsibility; but no extra pay is granted. His Indian pay is not a sufficient enticement to exchange willingly and cheerfully the comparatively easy duties and enjoyment of good health in England, for the heavy duties, responsibilities, cares, and troubles to be met with in a tropical country.

Veterinary Surgeon Crawford, Royal Artillery.

I submit a few of the chief causes that, in my experience, render Indian service unpopular, viz.:—

1. The frequent expensive and, what seems to most people, unnecessary removals from one station to another. One can never settle down or make oneself in any way comfortable like other branches of the service, and the expense of buying furniture at each new station, transport of servants, &c., is great.

2. Difficulty of getting leave. Very rarely does a veterinary surgeon get leave, except on medical certificate. This inability to get leave in the hot weather is a serious evil, and means neither more nor less than ruined health.

3. Poorness of pay, especially in the junior ranks. Indian pay being in no way anything equivalent to English pay allowance.

These are several of the chief drawbacks that cause unpopularity of Indian service.

Veterinary Surgeon Wilson.

I think the unpopularity of Indian service in the Veterinary Department is mainly due to the insufficiency of pay to officers of the Department. Of late years all expenses have very much increased in India; living is very much more expensive than formerly, but no increase has been made in the veterinary surgeon's pay to meet these demands. I found it quite impossible, during my last tour of Indian service, to keep my expenses within my pay, which was only 393 rupees per month, inclusive of all allowances. The rupee was only valued at about 1*s.* 7*d.*, so this again was a severe loss.

Veterinary Surgeon Powell.

I consider the following to be the chief reasons why Indian service is unpopular amongst the officers of the Veterinary Department:—

1. The uncertainty as to length of tour.

2. The great difficulty experienced in obtaining privilege leave of absence.

3. No detention allowance granted when on inspection duty.

4. Frequent change of stations.

5. Taking into consideration the extraordinary outlays a veterinary officer has through ill health, owing to the enervating effects of the climate, frequently to incur, together with having to provide himself with quarters, forage, extra horses, servants, &c., I am of opinion that the scale of pay, more especially as affecting the junior grade of the department (many members of which are married and have families), is not commensurate with that received in this country.

Veterinary Surgeon (1st Class) J. P. Berne.

As to the cause of Indian service being so unpopular with the Veterinary Department, I believe it is owing—

1. To the insufficiency of the pay. In consequence of the depreciation of the rupee, it is very little better than the English rate (which itself cannot be considered excessive), the difference being so small as not to compensate, in any degree, for the enhanced cost of living, the climate and campaigning, with the expenses incidental to privilege and sick leave, and the necessary calls which many, as family men like myself, have to meet.

2. Increased duties without corresponding increase of emoluments. In addition to our ordinary regimental work, according to General Order 401, Veterinary Department Letter, dated 17th December 1875, the services of veterinary surgeons are now at the disposal of all officers of the staff, of regiments of British Infantry, Native Cavalry and Infantry, and of officers doing general duty, and this for a fee of 2 *s.* 6 *d.* per mensem, or a penny a day for each horse. I need hardly say that before this Order was promulgated the veterinary surgeon who was called on to attend horses in the above category was paid according to private arrangement with the owners, and this, in most stations, was a substantial increase to his income.

3. And when we consider that the position of veterinary surgeon debars him from all honours and rewards, and that his chances of promotion, as compared with other branches of the service, may be said to be almost *nil*, he might naturally look forward to service in India as being at least a financial benefit to him, instead of which it is a decided loss,

loss, as matters now obtain. The only rank in which he receives anything approaching a pecuniary equivalent is in the inspecting grade, a position which only a few can hope to attain.

4. I may also mention that the uncertainty of the length of service is objectionable. It was so to me. I was kept 10 years in India without relief, when I would gladly have hailed a tour of service at home at a much earlier period than I got it.

5. I consider, therefore, that to make service in India at all palatable, the pay should be such as to enable a man to put by something to supplement his too scanty retiring allowance, and his service should be reduced to a fair and limited period.

APPENDIX B.

TABLE showing the British and Indian Emoluments respectively now allowed to Officers of the Veterinary Department, as compared with those allowed to Officers in other Branches of the Army.

Designation of Officer.	British Emoluments (Pay and Allowances).	Indian Emoluments.	Increase per Cent. of Indian over British Emoluments, calculated at 2 s. the Rupee.		Proportion of Indian to British Service.
	Per Year.	Per Month.		Average Increase.	
Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon,—	£.	Rs.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	
On appointment - - - - -	666	1,000	80		
After 25 years - - - - -	702	1,025	75	$74\frac{1}{3}$	
After 30 years - - - - -	757	1,061	68		
1st Class Veterinary Surgeon (relative rank of Captain),—					
On appointment - - - -	476	578	45		
After 5 years' service as such - -	512	602	41		
„ 10 „ „ - - -	548	627	37		
„ 15 „ „ - - -	584	651	33		
„ 30 years' total service - - -	620	675	30		$\frac{1}{2}$
Veterinary Surgeon under the new Warrant (relative rank of Lieutenant) - - -	417	377	8	$29\frac{2}{3}$	
Veterinary Surgeon under the old Warrant (relative rank of Lieutenant),—					
Under 5 years' service - - - -	350	377	29		
After 5 „ „ - - - -	386	401	24		
After 10 „ „ - - - -	431	432	20		
Captain of Cavalry - - - - -	407	563*	65		
Lieutenant of Cavalry of 3 years' service - or Riding Masters on appointment - - -	273	365*	60	$62\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
Paymaster attached to a Cavalry Regiment (honorary rank of Captain),—					
On entering the Department - - -	395	566*	71		
After 5 years' service - - - -	441	596*	62	$62\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{5}$
After 10 „ „ - - - -	486	627*	54		

* Including horse allowance.

APPENDIX C.

MEMORANDUM from the Principal Veterinary Surgeon as to Honours and Rewards.

THE veterinary officers of the army feel that the provisions of the Warrant under which they are induced to seek Government employ are not complied with in the matter of honours and rewards. Article 145, Royal Warrant, 1st May 1878, states that "relative rank shall carry all precedence and advantages attaching to corresponding military rank," &c. Quite irrespectively of this provision of the Warrant not being adhered to, they labour under a deep sense of unjust and unfair treatment as regards honours and rewards, which tends to render the Army Veterinary Department very unpopular with the profession, and to create discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the members in it. Throughout the operations in Afghanistan the Veterinary Department, on a peace establishment, has been greatly overworked; yet so little have its services been estimated, that not one officer's name has been brought to notice. Although it is well known that the veterinary surgeons have had to labour under the greatest difficulties, their services in India appear to be studiously ignored.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 227—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

India Office London, 7 July 1881.

My Lord Marquis,

Para. 1. IN continuation of my Military Despatch, dated 24th March 1881, No. 81, I transmit herewith, for your consideration, a copy of further correspondence with the War Office, as noted in the margin,* relative to the pay and establishment of veterinary surgeons to be maintained in India.

Letter to War Office, dated 15th March 1881, No. 235 W.
Letter from War Office, dated 28th March 1881.
Letter to War Office, dated 2nd April 1881, No. 299 W.
Letter from War Office, 27th May 1881.

2. I hope to receive a report on the subject from your Government at an early date.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Hartington.*

ENCLOSURES referred to.

No. 1.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State, War Office, dated India Office, 15 March 1881, No. 235 W.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, No. 7017—909, forwarding a copy of a Report by a Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, and requesting the Marquis of Hartington to favour Mr. Childers with his opinion upon the proposals of the Committee as regards India.

In

In reply, I am to observe, with reference to the correspondence noted in the margin,* that the questions of the adoption of measures to induce eligible candidates to come forward for the Veterinary Department by increasing the pay of certain classes of officers of the Department in India, and of the possible reduction by one-fourth of the existing establishment of veterinary surgeons in that country, as suggested by the Principal Veterinary Surgeon to the Forces, in his letter of 14th April 1879, are still under the consideration of the Government of India, and that Lord Hartington feels himself precluded from expressing any opinion on the subject at present. He will, however, transmit a copy of your letter and its enclosure to the Government, and request them to favour him with their views at an early date.

* Letter from Horse Guards, dated 17th April 1879, No. 7017—688.
Letter from Horse Guards, 23rd July 1879.
Letter to Horse Guards, dated 15th August 1879, No. 624. H.
Letter from Horse Guards, dated 26th November 1879, No. 7017—748.
Letter to Horse Guards, dated 4th December 1879, No. 1043 H.
Letter from Horse Guards, dated 15th December 1879, No. 7017—765.
Letter to Horse Guards, dated 9th January 1880, No. 43 H.

I am to request that you will be so good as to furnish this Department with two copies of the Report of the Committee, should there be no objection.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 2.

(No. 7017—909.)

Sir, War Office, 28 March 1881.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of 22nd ultimo, forwarding a copy of the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, and requesting to be favoured with the opinion of the Secretary of State for India in Council upon the proposals contained therein as regards the service in India, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Marquis of Hartington, that he was advised that any further delay in carrying out the recommendation (*a*) in the above-mentioned Report would make it impossible to meet Indian requirements; he has, therefore, given orders for the immediate transfer of veterinary surgeons from regiments to the Department. As will be seen by para. 1 of the Committee's Report, a sufficient number of eligible candidates cannot be found to keep up the proper strength of the Department, although by Royal Warrant of April 1878 the rates of pay have been considerably increased. The chief cause of this appears to be that the rates of pay in India are not sufficient to compensate officers for serving in that country, and the liability to Indian service, instead of being an assistance in recruiting for the Veterinary Department, acts in an entirely opposite direction.

Mr. Childers would direct the special attention of Lord Hartington to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Report, and he entirely concurs in the opinion expressed in the concluding sentence of paragraph 8, viz., that a separate establishment for India would not be conducive to the efficiency of the Department.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Childers would beg Lord Hartington to urge upon the Indian Government the immediate consideration of this important subject, with a view to the pay of the officers of the Veterinary Department in India being placed upon an equitable basis at the earliest possible period.

Two copies of the Report are herewith enclosed, in compliance with the request contained in your letter of 15th instant.

I am, &c.
The Under Secretary of State for India. (signed) *Ralph Thompson*.

No. 3.

LETTER to the Under Secretary of State, War Office, dated India Office, 2nd April 1881; No. 299 W.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th March, No. 7017—909, and to acquaint you, in reply, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that a copy of

of your letter of 22nd February last, with the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Organisation of the Veterinary Department of the Army, was forwarded, for the consideration of the Government of India, in a Military Despatch, dated 24th March 1881, and that they were reqnested to favour the Marquis of Hartington, at an early date, with their views on the position of the Veterinary Department in India.

2. I am to state that a further communication will now be made to the Government of India, but that, before addressing them, Lord Hartington would be glad, with reference to the fifth paragraph of the Report of the Committee, if Mr. Childers would inform him what proportion it is proposed that the senior shall bear to the junior veterinary surgeons on the Indian Establishment.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Allen Johnson*, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

No. 4.

(No. 7017 – 1018.)

Financial Secretary's Department,
War Office, 27 May 1881.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Childers to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 2nd ultimo, No. 299 W., Military, inquiring what proportion it is proposed that the senior shall bear to the junior veterinary surgeons on the Indian Establishment, and to acquaint you, in reply, that as half of the Army Veterinary Department is maintained by India, at least half of the first-class grade should, in Mr. Childers' opinion, be on the Indian Establishment.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Campbell-Bannerman.*

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, dated
25th August 1881.

War Office presses for early decision on Veterinary Department. Please expedite your Report.

TELEGRAM from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated
29th August 1881.

Yours 25th. The Report on the Veterinary Department will probably be despatched next mail.

— XI. —

MILITARY WORKS.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 345 of 1881—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 18 *October* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 24 September 1881.

IN continuation of our previous Despatches on the Report of the Indian Army Commission, we have now the honour to forward our proposals regarding that part of it which deals with the subject of Military Works.

2. This is treated of in Section 4, Chapter X., of the Report, and the conclusions which we have arrived at thereon have been already stated in brief in paragraphs 28 to 33 of our Despatch, No. 282, of the 29th July last. The general scheme of army administration which we have already proposed in pursuance of the recommendations of the Commission, for the assumption by the Government of India of the direct administration of all the Indian armies, necessarily involves that the conduct of all business connected with the service of the Army should also come under the control of the Government of India. And in our Despatch, No. 282, we recorded our opinion that the proper organisation necessary for this branch of the army administration would be furnished by the extension to all India of the system under which the military works of the greater* part of the Bengal Presidency are now dealt with, namely, by a special military works department. In the other parts of India military works are at present carried out by the agency of the provincial public works establishments. The arrangement which we propose involves, therefore, the separation of the establishments at present engaged on military works from those employed on other duties connected with the Public Works Department. To ascertain how this should be effected involved a very detailed and minute examination of the works to be undertaken throughout the country, and the establishment necessary for the charge and maintenance of them. The subject has been very carefully considered in the Military and Public Works Departments, and the tables attached to this Despatch give the result of this examination, with estimates of the establishment required and its cost.

* Bengal. North-Western Provinces. Punjab. Part of Central Provinces.

3. The leading features of the proposed new organisation, which have been adapted from the existing organisation of the Public Works Department, are as follows:—

I.—The existing Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department to be constituted a Department of Military Works for the charge of these works throughout India, the head of the department being attached to the Military Department of the Government of India.

II.—The head-quarters establishment to consist of a Director-General of Military Works, a Deputy Director-General, two Assistant Directors-General, and a personal assistant to the Director-General. This is in effect what was proposed by the Commission, except that they provided two Deputy Directors-General, one for barrack works, the other for fortifications; but in the present stage of matter connected with fortifications, the appointment of a second Deputy Director-General appears unnecessary. We may observe that the present establishment attached to the office of the Inspector-General of Military Works for the Bengal Presidency also comprises five officers.

III.—For each of the four armies an Inspector-General of Military Works with an assistant is provided, to be stationed at the head-quarters of that army, and to carry on his duties in close and immediate association with the Lieutenant-General Commanding.

IV.—For each military division, district, or brigade, there would be a Royal Engineer officer in charge, with a staff of officers proportionate to the

the requirements of the command. These requirements have been arrived at on a very careful consideration of the stations in each district, with due regard to the number of troops at each station and the works to be undertaken there. The result is given in the detailed statement, Annexure A.

* Despatch, No. 274, of 22nd July 1881.

V.—In the eight military divisions which have been proposed* as General Officers' commands, and in the larger military districts where there are more than two executive charges of military works, the Commanding Royal Engineer would occupy a position, as regards responsibility for expenditure and executive conduct of work, corresponding with that of a Superintending Engineer in the Public Works Department; that is to say, he would superintend works, but not execute them himself. But in the smaller commands the senior engineer would also be the executive officer, and would be directly responsible for the disbursement of money in his charge, occupying in fact departmentally the position of an executive officer.

This arrangement is proposed, because we consider it very desirable that the boundaries of the different circles of works charges should be conterminous with those of the military divisions and districts; that is to say, that while the commander of each division or district, whether a Major General, or Brigadier General, or Colonel on the staff, will be under the direct orders of the Lieutenant General commanding the army; so the senior engineer officer of that division or district, whether a superintending or executive officer, should be directly subordinate to the Inspector General of Military Works for that army.

VI.—The executive officers of the department to be divided into two classes: Garrison Engineers and Assistant Garrison Engineers. The Garrison Engineers, in respect of departmental responsibility and duties, would correspond with the Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department, and the Assistant Garrison Engineer with the Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department. Each Garrison Engineer would be in direct account with the Deputy Examiner's Office attached to the Inspector General; the Assistant Garrison Engineer would be a sub-divisional officer, rendering his accounts to the Garrison Engineer to whom he is subordinate.

VII.—The total staff of the Department would comprise 127 officers, as follows, the existing staff of the Public Works Department being correspondingly reduced:—

	Officers.
Director General and staff with the Government of India	5
Examiner of Accounts (if a Royal Engineer officer) - -	1
Inspectors General and Assistants to Inspectors General for the four armies.	8
Commanding Royal Engineers, one for each military district.	24
Garrison Engineers, one for each important military station where there are European troops.	42
Assistant Garrison Engineers - - - - - - -	47
TOTAL - - -	127

VIII.—The Director General to hold office for five years, and to be eligible to hold it in the rank of Major General; the Deputy Director General and Inspectors General to hold their appointments for seven years, but not more than five years after promotion to the higher class.

IX.—Next, with respect to salaries. Considering the great responsibility, pecuniary and otherwise, placed upon the Director General, a consolidated salary of 3,000 rupees per mensem appears appropriate. This is a little more than a Chief Engineer of the first class, if a regimental colonel or general officer, now draws in the Public Works Department; but no provincial chief engineer at present has anything like so extensive and responsible a charge.

4. Of

4. Of the five next senior officers, namely, the Deputy Director General and the four Inspectors General, it is proposed that two should have a staff salary of 1,200 rupees, and the other three a staff salary of 1,000 rupees per mensem. This would give the two higher paid ones emoluments nearly as much as those of a chief engineer, second class, Public Works Department, and the three juniors emoluments somewhat than those of chief engineer, third class.

5. The Commanding Royal Engineers of divisions and districts to be divided into two classes, on staff salaries of 700 and 600 rupees respectively. This would put a Commanding Royal Engineer, first class, if a Lieutenant Colonel, intermediately in point of emoluments between a superintending engineer, first and second class. If a major and in the second class, he would get about 40 rupees less salary than a superintending engineer, third class.

6. Garrison Engineers to be in three classes, on staff salaries of 500, 400, and 300 rupees respectively.

7 Assistant Garrison Engineers to have 200 rupees staff salary.

8. These salaries have all been fixed with reference to the existing emoluments of the Public Works Department; with this difference, that as the whole department will consist of military officers, staff instead of consolidated salaries have been provided, so that officers will get the benefit of their military rank and promotion, as seems proper. A comparison between the salaries of the two departments for military officers is given in the attached table, annexure C., from which the comparative emoluments of the two services can be readily seen. It will be observed that on the whole the rates of the Military Works Branch will be rather below than above those of the Public Works Department.

9. The total strength of the department being 127 officers, as above stated, they would be distributed, according to the proportion of ranks allowed in the Engineer Corps, in the following order:—

General Officer or Colonel	1
Lieutenant Colonels	13
Majors	22
Captains	29
Lieutenants	62
TOTAL	127

10. Their distribution departmentally is shown in the accompanying table (B). Five of the lieutenant-colonels holding superior appointments, eight of the commanding engineers of divisions and districts would be of that rank also, and 16 in the rank of major. Of the 42 garrison engineers, four would ordinarily be in the rank of major, 28 would be captains, and 10 lieutenants. But although seniority would so far be maintained, that a senior officer should not be required to serve directly under a junior, the distribution of officers over the various districts throughout the country would admit of a reasonable degree of selection of officers to posts of responsibility, without reference to seniority only.

11. The Examiner of Accounts, Military Works Department, might continue to render his accounts to the office of the Accountant General, Public Works Department, according to the arrangement already in force, there being at present no central office of Military Accounts. The accounts would pass through this office into the books of the Comptroller General, to be therein recorded against the military estimates. The necessary establishment for the accounts of military works has been carefully worked out, and is shown in the general estimate, annexure D.

12. An establishment of 140 upper European and 161 lower Native subordinates has also been provided for.

13. At present the Barrack Department of the Bengal Army is attached to and forms a part of the Military Works Branch of the Public Works Department; in Madras it is under the orders of the Quartermaster General of the Army; while in Bombay, although it has been lately taken over by the Public Works Department, it is organised on a somewhat extensive footing to meet the

requirements of military service in that Presidency, under which Commissariat and Ordnance supplies are furnished through the agency of the Barrack Department.

14. As regards the Madras Barrack Department, the only change necessary is to attach it to the Military Works Department, and to make the same rules applicable to the two. We have every reason to believe that the Barrack Department of the Bombay Army will admit of reduction to the amount of fully 20,000 rupees per annum, but this reduction can only gradually be effected.

15. Provision has been made in the estimate for all necessary office and petty establishments, based on existing requirements.

16. The total estimate (Annexure D.) for the establishment of the Military Works Department amounts to about 25½ lakhs. The grant for military works throughout India, excluding Burma (which under existing arrangements spends three lakhs of provincial revenues on military works), has been fixed at 100 lakhs of rupees per annum. The establishment, therefore, will cost in round numbers 25 per cent. of the whole grant.

17. This estimate, which has been arrived at independently on a consideration of the wants of administration, thus gives the same percentage on total expenditure as the present Military Works Branch of the Bengal Army, which is the result of some years' working experience, and the establishments of which have certainly been kept down to the lowest point consistent with the efficient performance of the duty required from them. We think, therefore, that the proposed establishment may be accepted as proper and sufficient, but not more than sufficient for the proposed service. And it must be remembered that a large part of the business of the Military Works Branch consists quite as much in preventing expenditure as in incurring it. There is also a great deal of work done by the engineers of military stations in connection with the service of troops, which has no particular connection with the expenditure of money, as for example surveys—projects for proposed improvement which are never carried out, as to which nothing can be predicated from the ratio between the cost of the establishment and the expenditure incurred by it. This also holds good with respect to the Barrack Department, which forms a considerable item in the whole Military Works establishment. Whether establishments are merely sufficient or excessive, can in fact only be ascertained by the scrutiny of each particular case, comparing the amount of work to be done,—that is, not merely the expenditure of money, but the preparation of projects and reports, and the other multitudinous duties which fall on the Engineer Department,—with the staff available for the purpose. The Bengal Military Works Branch is certainly not overmanned at present; and considering that the ratio of Provincial Public Works establishments to total expenditure, taking one province with another, is almost precisely the same as that obtained from this estimate, we think the proposed establishment may be accepted as being by no means in excess of the actual wants of the case.

18. It may be proper to add a few words as to what will be the relations between the Military Works Branch and the rest of the Public Works Department.

19. According to present regulations the Royal Engineer officers are to be relieved every few years, like the officers of the Medical and Veterinary Department, their places being taken by other officers fresh from England. These regulations have not yet come into full effect, because they apply only to officers of the British List; the senior officers, who almost all belong to the old Indian Lists, have passed their service entirely in India, and these occupy the highest posts in the department; so far it has been only the junior officers who come and go. But as the officers of the old Indian Lists gradually pass away, and their places are taken by officers of the British List, the time will come when it will have to be seriously considered whether it is practicable to carry on the business of the Civil Works of the country with a staff of officers thus frequently changed, and succeeded by others who have no experience of the language and people of the country. This is, however, a matter to be considered in the Public Works Department as well as in the Military Department of this Government. We may say that, so far as regards the Military Works

Works Department, we are prepared to accept this system of relieving officers, if it should be deemed necessary on further consideration to maintain it. For dealing with any question of harbour defences or fortifications, there would be a decided advantage in having the services of officers of English experience. And in general it may perhaps be said that it is desirable that the Royal Engineer officers should be relieved at intervals like the rest of the British Army, so long as they are employed on duties connected with the army. Whether however the term of service should not be somewhat prolonged, and whether officers should be eligible to stay for a second term, without being exchanged, if they desire to do so, will be matters for future consideration. The point does not press for decision at present while the senior officers still belong to the local service.

20. But the time has come for placing the employment and distribution of Royal Engineers under some more specific rule. We propose that for the future all officers of Royal Engineers on first coming to India shall be appointed to the Military Works Branch, from which they would be transferred to the Sappers and Miners, as vacancies occur in the establishments of these corps, and from which also they would be transferred at their own request to the Public Works Department.

21. Thus the officers of Royal Engineers in India would be divided into three parts—

(*a*) Officers attached to the Sappers and Miners under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

(*b*) The establishment of the Military Works Department.

(*c*) Officers serving in the Public Works Department.

22. The strength of the establishment required for the first two portions may be arrived at on a consideration of the actual wants of the service.

23. The requirements for the Sappers and Miners may be set down at 50 officers, which is about the strength of a nominal battalion of Royal Engineer officers; and according to the estimate furnished with this Despatch, 127 officers, or about 2½ battalions, will be required for the Military Works Department. Allowing half a battalion for absentees on furlough, there would be a total of four battalions required for military duty and military works; but this provision for furlough absentees would not be required if the short service system be maintained.

24. There remains to determine the requirements in Royal Engineers of the Public Works Department. This is now under consideration; and as soon as we have determined in that Department what proportion of the whole establishment should consist of Royal Engineer officers, we shall be able to propose a fixed establishment for the Royal Engineer corps in India for the three branches, to be maintained without further fluctuations, and also the conditions of service appropriate for the respective branches, and rules for the transfer of officers from one branch to the other. But the final determination on the proposals contained in this Despatch need not, and we hope will not, be deferred until this general question of the total establishment of Royal Engineer officers in India is settled, the two things having no necessary connection with each other. The total nominal establishment of Royal Engineers now paid from Indian revenues is nine battalions, out of the 17 of which the corps consists. As we have shown above, the requirements for military duty and military works involve the employment of four battalions; consequently any reduction of the total establishment of Royal Engineers serving in India should be made by reducing the number serving in the Public Works Department.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Ripon.*
D. M. Stewart.
W. Stokes.
A. R. Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
T. F. Wilson.

ANNEXURE A.

MILITARY WORKS DEPARTMENT.

DISTRIBUTION of Engineer and Subordinate Executive Establishment, by Stations, throughout *India*.

Commands.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
BENGAL.					
Inspector General's Office -	–	1	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	–	1	–	–	–
Presidency District.					
Fort William - - - -	1	2	2	4	4
Alipore - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Dum Dum - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Barrackpore - - - -	–	1	1	1	2
Dorunda and Detachments -	–	–	–	–	–
Bhagalpur - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Darjeeling - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Dinapore - - - -	–	–	1	2	2
Segowlie - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Benares - - - - -	–	–	–	1	2
Jalpaiguri - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	1	3	4	10	13
Eastern Frontier District.					
Shillong - - - - -	1	1	–	2	2
Sadiya - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Cachar - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Baxa - - - - -	–	–	1	2	2
Dacca - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Kohima - - - - -	–	–	1	1	2
TOTAL - - -	1	1	2	5	6
Agra District.					
Agra - - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
Morar - - - - -	1	1	1	3	4
Gwalior - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	2	1	6	7
Carried forward - - -	3	7	7	21	26

Commands.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
Brought forward -	3	7	7	21	26
BENGAL—*continued.*					
Saugor District.					
Jubbulpore - - - -	–	1	–	1	2
Saugor - - - - -	1	1	1	2	2
TOTAL - - -	1	2	1	3	4
Lucknow Division.					
Lucknow - - - -	1	1	1	4	4
Allahabad - - - -	–	1	1	2	2
Fyzabad - - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Cawnpore - - - -	–	1	1	2	3
Fatehgarh - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Gorakhpore - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Sitapore - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Nowgong - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	4	3	12	13
Bareilly District.					
Bareilly - - - - -	1	–	2	2	3
Ranikhet - - - -	–	1	–	3	3
Naini Tal - - - -	–	–	1	1	–
Almora - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Moradabad - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	1	3	7	8
Meerut Division.					
Meerut - - - - -	1	1	1	3	4
Roorkee - - - - -	–	–	–	1	2
Dehra - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Chakrata - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
Delhi - - - - -	–	–	1	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	2	2	7	10
GRAND TOTAL, BENGAL - -	7	16	16	50	51

ANNEXURE A.—Distribution of Engineer and Subordinate Executive Establishment, &c.—*continued.*

Commands.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
PUNJAB.					
Inspector General's Office -	-	1	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	–	1	–	–	–
Umballa District.					
Umballa - - - - - -	1	1	1	3	3
Dagshai and Kasauli - -	–	1	–	2	2
Subathu - - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Jutogh - - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Jullundur - - - - -	–	–	1	2	2
TOTAL - - -	1	2	2	9	9
Lahore Division.					
Meean Meer - - - -	1	1	1	3	3
Govindgarh - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Ferozepore, Dharmsala - -	–	–	1	1	2
Dalhousie - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Bukloh - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Sialkot - - - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Mooltan - - - - - -	–	–	1	1	2
TOTAL - - -	1	2	3	7	11
Rawalpindi Division.					
Rawalpindi - - - - -	1	1	2	3	3
Murree Hills - - - - -	–	–	1	2	2
Abbotabad - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Attock - - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	1	3	6	7
Peshawar District.					
Nowshera - - - - -	–	–	–	1	2
Hoti Mardan - - - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Peshawar - - - - -	1	1	1	3	3
Cherat and outposts - -	–	1	–	2	2
Kohat - - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	2	1	7	9
Derajat District.					
Dera Ismail Khan - -	-	–	–	1	1
Tank - - -	–	–	–	–	1
Dera Ghazi Khan - - -	1	1	1	1	1
Rajanpur - - - - -	–	-	–	–	1
Edwardesabad - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	1	1	3	5
GRAND TOTAL, PUNJAB -	5	9	10	32	41

Commands.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
MADRAS ARMY.					
Inspector General's Office -	–	1	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	–	1	–	–	–
Bangalore Division.					
Bangalore - - - - -	1	1	1	3	3
French Rocks - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Wellington - - - - -	–	–	1	1	1
Cannanore - - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Trichinopoly - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
TOTAL - - -	1	2	2	6	6
Secunderabad Division.					
Secunderabad - - - - -	1	1	2	5	5
Ramandroog - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Bellary - - - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
TOTAL - - -	1	2	2	7	7
Madras District.					
Madras - - - - - -	1	1	2	3	3
Poonamalee - - - - -	–	–	–	1	–
Waltair - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Berhampore - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Cuttack - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	1	1	2	5	4
Nagpur District.					
Nagpur - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Kamptee - - - - -	1	–	2	2	2
Seroncha - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Raipur - - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Sambalpur - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	1	–	2	3	3
British Burma District.					
Rangoon - - - - -	1	1	1	2	2
Thyetmyoo - - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Tounghoo - - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Moulmein - - - - -	–	–	–	–	2
Shweygheen - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Port Blair. - - - - -	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL - - -	1	3	1	5	5
GRAND TOTAL, MADRAS ARMY - - - -	5	9	9	26	25

ANNEXURE A.—Distribution of Engineer and Subordinate Executive Establishment, &c.—*continued.*

Commands.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
BOMBAY ARMY.					
Inspector General's Office -	–	1	–	–	–
TOTAL - - -	–	1	–	–	–
Mhow District.					
Mhow - - - - -	1	1	2	3	3
Aseergur - - - -	–	–	–	–	–
Neemuch - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
Mehidpore - - - - } Augur - - - - - }	–	–	–	–	1
Nasirabad - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
TOTAL - - -	1	3	2	7	8
Poona Division.					
Poona - - - - -	1	1	2	4	4
Satara - - - - - } Sirur - - - - - }	–	–	–	–	1
Belgaum - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
TOTAL - - -	1	2	2	6	7
Ahmedabad Brigade.					
Ahmedabad - - - -	1	1	1	2	2
Baroda - - - - -	–	–	–	1	1
Deesa - - - - -	–	1	–	2	2
Rajkot - - - - - } Bhuj - - - - - } Surat - - - - - } Abu - - - - - }	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL - - -	1	2	1	6	5
Sind Division.					
Karachi - - - - -	1	1	1	2	2
Hyderabad - - - -	–	1	–	1	1
Jacobabad - - - -	–	–	–	1	–
Quetta, Sibi and outposts -	1	2	2	4	5
TOTAL - - -	2	4	3	8	8
Bombay District.					
Bombay - - - -	1	–	2	2	3
Deolali - - - -	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL - - -	1	–	2	3	3
Aden District.					
Aden - - - - - -	1	–	2	2	3
TOTAL - - -	1	–	2	2	3
GRAND TOTAL, BOMBAY ARMY - - - -	7	12	12	32	34

Commands.	Inspector General.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Upper Subordinates.	Lower Subordinates.
RECAPITULATION.						
BENGAL.						
Inspector General's Office -	1	–	1	–	–	–
Presidency District - -	–	1	3	4	10	13
Eastern Frontier District -	–	1	1	2	5	6
Agra District - - - -	–	1	2	1	6	7
Saugor District - - -	–	1	2	1	3	4
Lucknow Division - - -	–	1	4	3	12	13
Bareilly District - - -	–	1	1	3	7	8
Meerut Division - - -	–	1	2	2	7	10
GRAND TOTAL, BENGAL -	1	7	16	16	50	61
PUNJAB.						
Inspector General's Office -	1	–	1	–	–	–
Umballa District - - -	–	1	2	2	9	9
Lahore Division - - -	–	1	2	3	7	11
Rawalpindi Division - -	–	1	1	3	6	7
Peshawar District - - -	–	1	2	1	7	9
Derajat District - - -	–	1	1	1	3	5
GRAND TOTAL, PUNJAB -	1	5	9	10	32	41
MADRAS ARMY.						
Inspector General's Office -	1	–	1	–	–	–
Bangalore Division - -	–	1	2	2	6	6
Secunderabad Division - -	–	1	2	2	7	7
Madras District - - -	–	1	1	2	5	4
Nagpur District - - -	–	1	–	2	3	3
British Burma District - -	–	1	3	1	5	5
GRAND TOTAL, MADRAS ARMY - - - -	1	5	9	9	26	25
BOMBAY ARMY.						
Inspector General's Office -	1	–	1	–	–	–
Mhow District - - -	–	1	3	2	7	8
Poona Division - - -	–	1	2	2	6	7
Ahmedabad Brigade - -	–	1	2	1	6	5
Sind Division - - - -	–	2	4	3	8	8
Bombay District - - -	–	1	–	2	3	3
Aden District - - - -	–	1	–	2	2	3
GRAND TOTAL, BOMBAY ARMY - - - -	1	7	12	12	32	34
GRAND TOTAL FOR ALL INDIA - - -	4	24	46	47	140	161

ANNEXURE B.

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION by Regimental and Departmental Ranks of the Net Number of Royal Engineer Officers required for the MILITARY WORKS DEPARTMENT.

REGIMENTAL RANK.	DEPARTMENTAL RANK.						TOTAL.
	Director General's Staff.	Inspector General's Staff.	Commanding Royal Engineers.	Garrison Engineers.	Assistant Garrison Engineers.	Accounts.	
Colonel or General -	1	–	–	–	–	–	1
Lieutenant Colonel -	1	4	8	–	–	–	13
Majors - - -	2	–	16	4	–	-	22
Captains - - -	–	–	–	28	–	1	29
Lieutenants - -	1	4	–	10	47	–	62
TOTAL - - -	5	8	24	42	47	1	127

ANNEXURE C.

COMPARATIVE TABLE of Salaries drawn in the PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT and those proposed for corresponding Ranks in the Military Works Department.

Public Works Department.		Military Works Department.	
COLONEL.			
Chief Engineer, 1st Class:	*Rs.*	*Director General* (1):	*Rs.*
Salary - - - - - - - -	2,500	Consolidated salary - - - - -	3,000
Military pay proper - - - - -	340		
TOTAL - - -	2,804		
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			
Chief Engineer, 2nd Class:	*Rs.*	*Deputy Director General and Inspector General* (2) *higher rate:*	*Rs.*
Salary - - - - - - - -	2,000	Staff salary - - - - - - -	1,200
Military pay proper - - - - -	243	Military pay - - - - - - -	1,002
TOTAL - - -	2,243	TOTAL - - -	2,202
Chief Engineer, 3rd Class:	*Rs.*	*Deputy Director General and Inspector General* (3) *lower rate:*	*Rs.*
Salary - - - - - - - -	1,800	Staff salary - - - - - - -	1,000
Military pay proper - - - - -	243	Military pay - - - - - - -	1,002
TOTAL - - -	2,043	TOTAL - - -	2,002
Superintending Engineer, 1st Class:	*Rs.*	*Commanding Royal Engineer, 1st Class* (8):	*Rs.*
Salary - - - - - - - -	1,600	Staff salary - - - - - - -	700
Military pay proper - - - - -	243	Military pay - - - - - - -	1,002
TOTAL - -	1,843	TOTAL - - -	1,702
Superintending Engineer, 2nd Class:	*Rs.*		
Salary - - - - - - - -	1,350		
Military pay proper - - - - -	243		
TOTAL - - -	1,593		

ANNEXURE C.—Comparative Table of Salaries drawn in the Public Works Department, &c.—*contd.*

Public Works Department.		Military Works Department.	
MAJOR.			
Superintending Engineer, 2nd Class:	*Rs.*	*Commanding Royal Engineer, 1st Class* (2):	*Rs.*
Salary	1,350	Staff salary	700
Military pay proper	182	Military pay	640
TOTAL	1,532	TOTAL	1,340
Superintending Engineer, 3rd Class:	*Rs.*	*Commanding Royal Engineer, 2nd Class, and Assistant Director General* (16):	*Rs.*
Salary	1,100	Staff salary	600
Military pay proper	182	Military pay	640
TOTAL	1,282	TOTAL	1,240
Executive Engineer, 1st Grade:	*Rs.*	*Garrison Engineer, 1st Class* (4):	*Rs.*
Salary	950	Staff salary	500
Military pay proper	182	Military pay	640
TOTAL	1,132	TOTAL	1,140
CAPTAIN.			
Executive Engineer, 2nd Grade:	*Rs.*	*Garrison Engineer, 1st Class* (6):	*Rs.*
Salary	800	Staff salary	500
Military pay proper	140	Military pay	433
TOTAL	940	TOTAL	933
Executive Engineer, 3rd Grade:	*Rs.*	*Garrison Engineer, 2nd Class* (9):	*Rs.*
Salary	650	Staff salary	400
Military pay proper	140	Military pay	433
TOTAL	790	TOTAL	833
Executive Engineer, 4th Grade:	*Rs.*	*Garrison Engineer, 3rd Class* (13):	*Rs.*
Salary	550	Staff salary	300
Military pay proper	140	Military pay	433
TOTAL	690	TOTAL	733
LIEUTENANT.			
Executive Engineer, 4th Grade:	*Rs.*	*Garrison Engineer, 3rd Class* (15):	*Rs.*
Salary	550	Staff salary	300
Military pay proper	70	Military pay	265
TOTAL	620	TOTAL	565
Assistant Engineer, 1st Grade:	*Rs.*		
Salary	450		
Military pay proper	70		
TOTAL	520	*Assistant Garrison Engineer* (47):	*Rs.*
Assistant Engineer, 2nd Grade:	*Rs.*	Staff salary	200
Salary	350	Military pay	265
Military pay proper	70		
TOTAL	420	TOTAL	465

ANNEXURE D.

DETAIL of Proposed Establishments for the Department of MILITARY WORKS.

No.	PARTICULARS.	Salary of Office.	Per Mensem.	Per Annum.	TOTAL.
	DIRECTION AND INSPECTION.	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
	Director General's Establishment.				
1	Director General of Works and Fortifications -	3,000 (con.)	3,000		
1	Deputy Director General of Works and Fortifications.	1,000 (staff)	1,000		
2	Assistant Directors General of Works and Fortifications.	600 „	1,200		
1	Personal Assistant to Director General - -	300 „	300		
5			5,500	66,000	
	Military pay and allowances - -	- -	- -	30,570	
	Accounts.				
1	Examiner of Accounts, IV. Class, I. Grade -	1,090 (con.)	1,090		
1	Accountant, I. Grade - - - - -	400 „	400		
1	Accountant, II. „ - - - - -	295 „	295		
3			1,785	21,420	
	Office establishments - - - - -	- -	- -	56,000	
	Presidency allowances and house rents - -	- -	- -	3,360	
	Travelling allowances - - - - -	- -	- -	6,200	
	Contingencies - - - - - - -	- -	- -	6,800	
	TOTAL, Director General's Establishment - - -				1,90,350
	Inspector General's Establishment.				
2	Inspectors General of Works, Class I. - -	1,200 (staff)	2,400		
2	Inspectors General of Works, Class II. - -	1,000 „	2,000		
4	Garrison Engineers, Class III. - - - -	300 „	1,200		
8			5,600	67,200	
	Military pay and allowances - -	- -	- -	60,840	
	Accounts.				
4	Deputy Examiners of Accounts, I. Grade - -	550 (con.)	2,200		
1	Accountant, I. Grade - - - - -	400 „	400		
4	Accountants, II. „ - - - - -	295 „	1,180		
1	Accountant, III. „ - - - - -	200 „	200		
8	Accountants, IV. „ - - - - -	135 „	1,080		
18			5,060	60,720	
	Office establishments - - - - -	- -	- -	42,800	
	Temporary establishments - - - - -	- -	- -	2,050	
	Travelling allowances - - - - -	- -	- -	14,300	
	Contingencies - - - - - - -	- -	- -	12,000	
	TOTAL, Inspector General's Establishments - - -				2,59,910
	TOTAL, DIRECTION AND INSPECTION - - - *Rs.*				4,50,260

ANNEXURE D.—DETAIL of Proposed Establishments for the Department of Military Works—*continued.*

No.	PARTICULARS.	Salary of Office.	Per Mensem.	Per Annum.	TOTAL.
	CONSTRUCTION.				
	Royal Engineer Establishment.	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
10	Commanding Royal Engineers, I. Class - -	700 (staff)	7,000		
14	" " " II. " - -	600 "	8,400		
10	Garrison Engineers, I. Class - - - -	500 "	5,000		
9	" " II. " - - - -	400 "	3,600		
23	" " III. " - - - -	300 "	6,900		
47	Assistant Garrison Engineers - - - -	200 "	9,400		
113			40,300	4,83,600	
	Military Pay and Allowances - -	- -	- -	5,76,700	
	Upper Subordinate Establishment.				
7	Sub-Engineers, I. Class - - - - -	400 (con.)	2,800		
9	" II. " - - - - - -	300 "	2,700		
12	" III. " - - - - - -	250 "	3,000		
18	Supervisors, I. Class - - - - - -	200 "	3,600		
32	" II. " - - - - - - -	150 "	4,800		
62	Overseers, I. " - - - - - - -	100 "	6,200		
140			23,100	2,77,200	
	Sub-divisional allowances and differences between consolidated and military pay - - -	- -	- -	34,000	
161	*Lower Subordinate Establishment* - -	40-75 (con.)	7,353⅓	88,240	
	Accounts Establishment.				
10	Accountants, III. Grade - - - - -	200 (con.)	2,000		
16	" IV. " - - - - - -	135 "	2,160		
26			4,160	49,920	
	Petty establishments - - - - - -	- -	- -	17,700	
	Office establishments - - - - - -	- -	- -	1,52,240	
	Temporary establishments - - - - - -	- -	- -	6,800	
	Presidency allowances and house-rents - -	- -	- -	13,580	
	Travelling allowances - - - - - -	- -	- -	67,060	
	Contingencies - - - - - - - -	- -	- -	28,700	
			TOTAL CONSTRUCTION - -	*Rs.*	17,95,740

ANNEXURE D.—DETAIL of Proposed Establishments for the Department of Military Works—*continued.*

No.	PARTICULARS.	Salary of Office.	Per Mensem.	Per Annum.	TOTAL.
	BARRACK DEPARTMENT.	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
14	Barrackmasters, I. Class - - - -	120 (staff)	1,680		
11	" II. " - - - - - -	70 "	770		
6	" III. " - - - - - -	50 "	300		
5	Assistant Barrackmasters - - - - - -	20 "	100		
86	Barrack Sergeants - - - - - - -	20 "	1,720		
122			4,570	54,840	
	Military pay and allowances; compensation for quarters, rations, bedding, clothing, soap, brushes, fuel, &c., &c., family allowances for wife and children, and sub-divisional and travelling allowances - - - - - - -	- -	- -	2,54,160	
	TOTAL BARRACK DEPARTMENT - - -				3,09,000
	GRAND TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT - - - *Rs.*				25,55,000

ABSTRACT.

Direction and inspection - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	4,50,260
Construction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	17,95,740
Barrack Department - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	3,09,000
GRAND TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	25,55,000

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 206 of 1883, Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 22 *November* 1883.)

My Lord, Simla, 29 October 1883.

WITH reference to our Military Despatch, No. 345, dated the 24th September 1881, submitting proposals for the reorganisation of the Military Works Department, we have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's consideration, copy of a letter* from the Government of Madras proposing the formation of a Military Works Branch in that presidency.

No. 2382-W., dated the 24th August 1883, and enclosure.

2. It will be seen that the proposal of the Government of Madras is in some respects similar to that which we have made, and which still awaits the orders of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(signed) *T. F. Wilson.*
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
A. Colvin.

From Major General *R. H. Sankey*, C.B., R.E., Secretary to the Government of Madras, Public Works Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department (No. 2382 W., "Buildings and Road, Military Works," dated Madras, 24th August 1883).

I AM desired to submit, for the favourable consideration and orders of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, the accompanying Memorandum on the formation of a Military Works Branch for military buildings in this Presidency. I am to add thereto the following observations.

2. The object of the proposal is, I am to say, to meet more promptly and effectually the many and various requirements of the Madras Army, to secure to the Military authorities fuller control over the funds assigned by the Government of India to this service, and to ensure the utilization of the same on works and repairs in the order of their urgency. Its scope, embracing as it does the requirements of the whole Presidential Army, extends to limits outside the jurisdiction of this Government, and to stations officered departmentally by a Public Works staff independent of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and therefore to some extent less influenced by his views and wishes than appears to be desirable.

3. The formation of a separate and distinct branch of the Public Works Department for the sole execution of military works pertaining to the Madras Army, on the same footing as that which has for some years worked successfully in Northern India, must, it can hardly be doubted, lead to economy and efficiency in work, and will enable the Commander-in-Chief to have that close control and supervision over military works outlay which it is essential he should exercise in the interests of the Army under his command. In fact, the conditions which called into existence the system of military works in the several provinces of Northern India apply with equal force to Madras, and that system having been found successful, the time has apparently, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, arrived for extending it to the Southern Presidency.

4. The Superintending Engineer in charge of this Department of the military administration would, on the one hand, be, through Army head-quarters, immediately *en rapport* with the Generals of Divisions and Districts, and, on the other hand, through the same channel, in correspondence with the Inspector General of Military Works. Thus he would be fully cognisant of the necessities of the several military sub-divisions of this Presidency, and of their relative importance, whilst he would be in a position to suit the style and mode of work to the real requirements.

5. To organise the establishment required, according to Chief Engineer's Appendix B, the Government of Madras is prepared to nominate as the Military Superintending Engineer an Executive Engineer, R.E., of the 1st grade, and to transfer for charge of divisions two Royal Engineer officers. The Government of India will, it is hoped, have no difficulty in arranging to complete the Engineer staff from Central Provinces, Burma, and other Provinces affected by the scheme.

6. The minor details connected with the assistant and subordinate establishments, the distribution and extent of ranges, the *personnel*, &c., can best be dealt with hereafter; but I am directed by his Excellency in Council to solicit that, should the Government of India assent to the general terms formulated above, very early orders may be issued so that the Military Budget of 1884-85 may be framed on the new basis, and thus admit of the scheme coming into working effect on the 1st April 1884.

—

Proposals by Major General *R. H. Sankey*, R.E., Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, for the formation of a Military Works branch of the Public Works Department for the Madras Command (No. 235 E., dated 20th July 1883).

FOR several years all the military buildings connected with the Bengal Army, distributed over the northern provinces of India, some of the minor Administrations, and Burma, have formed a charge distinct from the several local Departments of Public Works, designated the Military Works Department.

2. This Department has as its head the Inspector General of Military Works (at present Colonel J. J. McLeod Innes, V.C., R.E.), who is in direct communication with the Commander-in-Chief in India, and who has himself all the powers of a Local Government in regard to sanctions for works.

3. Possessed

3 Possessed thus not only of large independent powers, but brought into intimate relations with the Commander-in-Chief, and through him with the Government of India, the wants and requirements of the Bengal Army receive prompt and effectual attention.

4. In Bombay, where, however, disproportionately large sums have, as in regard to civil works, been the rule, difficulties have been experienced (*see* the Quartermaster General's Memorandum of 14th November 1882), from the fact that the Bombay Army is distributed over five different Civil Administrations, through each of which, correspondence having to take place before reaching the Commander-in-Chief of that Presidency, there is a great deal of circumlocution, and funds are said at times to be diverted in a manner which could not occur if there were a responsible head, such as an Inspector General for the Military Presidency.

5. In Madras owing to an analogous distribution of the local Army, as shown in Appendix A, correspondence has to pass through the heads of several Administrations, the Provinces, &c., being —

(1.) Madras.
(2.) Mysore.*
(3.) Travancore.
(4.) Orissa.
(5.) Central Provinces.
(6.) Hyderabad.
(7.) British Burma, to which must be added three stations in the Presidency of Bengal now occupied by Madras troops.

6. Where, as in the Central Provinces, the garrison is drawn from more than one Army, a close scrutiny has to be maintained by the officer commanding as to the distribution of the budgeted amounts for the troops of the respective Armies, and in order to prevent any diversion or misapplication of the funds intended for each.

7. From the difficulty experienced in obtaining adequate establishment for the general works of this Presidency, it has been found expedient to place all the military works, like those for irrigation, and navigation, &c, under the general establishment.

8. It thus arises that there is only one Executive Engineer's charge, and that of late formation, viz., of Fort St. George, Madras, and Bangalore, which may be said to be an exclusively Military Works Division. In it even there are some civil works.

9. Not only are the great irrigation and navigation works of the country more generally attractive to the professional engineer than military buildings, but as must, with such an amalgamation of charges as that adverted to, frequently happen, the military works fall to the charge of a civil engineer and even to a Civil Upper Subordinate who, in addition to lacking the needful experience, looks, it is to be feared, on such works as of secondary importance.

10. As a fact also from the relatively small amounts which have been assigned by the Government of India for the Madras Military Budget (*see* margin), it has been found quite impossible to devote adequate funds to the repair and maintenance of the important military building of the Presidency. Not only are the fortifications and buildings in Fort St. George a striking example of neglect, but it is notorious that all over the Presidency a large outlay is now required to replace defective roof timbers and effect much renewal which with the possibility of timely attention should never have been required, and which if left much longer unattended to, must lead to the most serious results.

Demand compared with the Grants as made by the Government of India.

Year.	Demand.	Grant.
	Rs.	*Rs.*
1878-79 - - -	11,55,000	7,50,000
1879-80 - - -	11,47,500	6,96,712
1880-81 - - -	8,02,497	4,13,877
1881-82 - - -	4,10,629	4,10,000
1882-83 - - -	15,79,419	6,20,000

N.B.—In 1880-81 and 1881-82 the demands were, as a fact, much below the known urgent requirements.

11. Another material point connected with the inadequate supply of funds, and more particularly during the enforced rigid economy throughout the Afghan War, when this Presidency suffered more probably than any other, is the difficulty experienced in making a selection of military work projects for entry in the Budget in their order of relative importance.

12. An inspection of the lists of military requirements which reach the chief engineer

engineer from the Quartermaster General year by year exhibits a very singular state of matters in this respect; demands of the most pressing character jostling one another in a manner which prove how inadequate has been the supply of means in the past, and rendering selection a matter of the utmost difficulty.

13. The criticism of our Military Works Budget by the Government of India has latterly been most severe (undeservedly so, I would respectfully submit, if the facts were known), but the difficulties arising from the dearth of funds, both in regard to the supply of what is needful for repairs and for new buildings as above adverted to, are such that it is most essential to place this branch of the Public Works business as soon as possible on a well-defined footing, under a responsible head who, while acting under the general control of the Inspector General, should be in immediate communication with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Madras.

14. The change now advocated is in accordance with what has long been understood to be the aim of the Government of India in constituting a Military Works Branch for the Bengal Army.

15. To the best of my judgment the officer specially selected for this responsible post should have the position of Superintending Engineer, and his circle of superintendence should extend to the whole Madras Command, with an establishment of four Executive Engineers, whose divisions would be somewhat as indicated in Appendix B.

16. At the present moment it would be needless to attempt to go into further detail, as it will be seen that before giving effect to the scheme several questions affecting other provinces as well as Madras have to be decided by the Government of India.

17. Looking to the requirements of the civil works in this Presidency, it would be impossible to eliminate any of the superintending engineers on the last sanctioned scale of the general Madras Public Works Establishment, in order to create without increase the proposed post for the Military Works Branch, although there is an officer, in every way highly qualified for the post, whose services could be placed at disposal.

18. Of the four executive engineers it may be assumed that two, and possibly three, of the officers in this grade, who are employed on military works in Burma, Central Provinces, and Hyderabad, would be available, leaving only one to be supplied by reduction of the Madras Establishment, which I think may be fairly counted on.

19. Although the details of the establishment now engaged exclusively on military works are not available, and would be difficult to ascertain, there can, I venture to think, be no doubt that even if leading to a slight increase of the general establishment charges, such will be amply repaid by improved efficiency in the management of the works.

20. Already in their Resolutions, Nos. 1450—1472 G., dated 29th November 1881, the Government of India have decided to transfer "all the business hitherto conducted in the Public Works Department in connection with military works * * to the Military Department," with effect from 1st January 1882, and the proposals now put forward are not only in consonance with this decision, but also with what is understood to be the recognised policy of the Government of India, to place these works everywhere throughout India under a separate branch of the Department, officered by Royal Engineers.

21. That in the interests of the buildings and works generally such a change is now urgently called for has, I trust, been made abundantly clear from the foregoing remarks, and that the Quartermaster General's Department would experience the greatest relief, can hardly, I think, be questioned.

22. His Excellency the Commander in Chief would, moreover, have on his staff an officer, in the person of the superintending engineer, who could at once give him a reliable professional opinion, instead of having to seek this through a circuitous channel.

23. Incidentally, moreover, it may be remarked, with reference to the question raised some little time since about the position of the Barrack Department in this Presidency, that the creation of a separate Military Works Branch would at least facilitate the transfer, including the supplies of furniture, &c., to the Public Works Department, should such be desired.

APPENDIX A.

LIST of Military Stations, Madras Presidency.

Military Stations.	Provinces, Districts, &c.	Remarks.
Fort St. George	Madras Proper.	
St. Thomas' Mount		
Poonamalee		
Pallávaram		
Vellore		
Sámalkót		
Vizianagram		
Berhampore		
Wellington		
Trichinopoly		
Bellary		
Cannanore		
Malapuram		
Calicut		
Mangalore		
Bangalore	Mysore Provinces.	
Hosúr		
Trichoor	Travancore State.	
Trivandrum		
Cuttack	Orissa Commission.	
Kamptee	Central Provinces.	
Raipur		
Hoshungabad		
Sambalpur		
Seetabuldee		
Secunderabad	Hyderabad State.	
Tirumalgiri		
Rangoon	Provinces of British Burma.	
Moulmein		
Thayetmyo		
Toungoo		
Port Blair		

N. B.—Dorunda, Hazaribagh, Saugor, and Jubbulpore, in Bengal Presidency, are occupied by Madras Troops.

Mercara, French Rocks, Mysore, Palamcottah, Chanda, and Seroncha have been abandoned last year as military posts.

Ootacamund,
2 July 1883.

(signed) *R. C. Stewart*, Colonel,
Officiating Quartermaster General.

APPENDIX B.

THE four Executive Divisions under the proposed Superintending Engineer might be composed as follows:—

Divisions.	Military Stations.
1. The Madras Division - - - - - -	Fort St. George. St. Thomas' Mount. Pallávaram. Vellore. Bangalore. Hosúr. Bellary. Trichinopoly.
2. The Secunderabad Division - - - - -	Secunderabad. Tirumalgiri. Kamptee. Seetabuldee.
3. The Cannanore Division - - - - -	Mangalore. Cannanore. Calicut. Malapuram. Wellington. Trichoor. Trivandrum.
4. The Burma Division - - - - - -	Rangoon. Moulmein. Thayetmo. Toungoo. Port Blair.

N.B.—The work at all such minor stations as Hoshungabad, Raipur, Sambalpur, Berhampore, Vizianagram, Sámalkót, &c., can easily be executed by the Divisional Executive Engineers. These Stations need not, therefore, form part of the scheme for the Military Works Branch.

— XII. —

MILITARY ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT.

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 399 of 1881.—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received* 21 *November* 1881.)

My Lord, Simla, 29 October 1881.

IN continuation of our previous Despatches in connection with the recommendations of the Indian Army Commission, we have now the honour to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, our proposals for the organisation of the Military Account Department.

2. The subject is dealt with in the 6th section of Chapter X. of the Commission's Report. This part of the administration of the Indian Army has already been brought under the direct control of the Government of India, by the amalgamation which was carried out in 1876 of the presidential departments of Account and Audit into one Department of Military Accounts, which carries on its duties under one code of regulations, subject to the immediate control of the Governor General in Council. The recommendations of the Commission are therefore mainly directed to the needful reorganisation of establishments, under the assumption that the Indian Armies will henceforward be administered as four separate bodies instead of three as at present.

3. Since the Report of the Commission was submitted, another of the Bombay pension circles has been absorbed into the Military Account Department, and to provide for the duties of this circle, an addition to the grade of Military Accountant, 3rd class, has been sanctioned by India Army Circular, No. 101 of 1880.

4. The strength and the salaries of the Department are now as follows :—

		Consolidated.
		Rs.
3	Controllers, one on - - - - - - - - -	2,500
	and two on - - - - - - - - -	2,200
		Staff.
		Rs.
3	Military Accountants, 1st class, 1st grade - - - -	1,000
5	Military Accountants, 1st class, 2nd grade - - - -	800
5	Military Accountants, 2nd class, 1st grade - - - -	600
5	Military Accountants, 2nd class, 2nd grade - - - -	500
5	Military Accountants, 3rd class - - - - - - -	300
7	Assistant Military Accountants with 100 rupees, staff, while on probation, and 200 rupees at a Presidency town, or 150 rupees elsewhere, after they have passed their final examination.	
33	Total Officers.	
3	Medical Examiners (in addition to unemployed pay of rank) -	400

These officers are employed as shown in paragraph 517 of the Commission's Report :—

3 as Controllers.

3 as Commissariat Examiners.

4 as Pay Examiners (2 Bengal, 1 Madras, 1 Bombay).

3 as Ordnance Examiners.

3. In

3 in charge of the Accounts Branch of the Controller's Office.

5 as Circle Paymasters (Calcutta, Allahabad, Rawalpindi, Madras, Bombay).

5 as Pension Paymasters (4 Bengal, 1 Bombay).

7 Assistants, Probationers learning their work or acting for officers on furlough. One is permanent assistant to the Circle Paymaster, Bombay, and also pays the pensioners of that circle.

3 as Medical Examiners. They also have charge of the Military, Medical, Orphan, and Indian Service Family Pensions, for which they receive an extra allowance of 300 rupees per mensem in Bengal, and 150 rupees in Madras and Bombay.

5. We would, however, observe that since the department was constituted as one body in 1876, experience has shown that the establishment is not sufficient to provide for the percentage of officers ordinarily absent on furlough, and that, apart from the proposals made by the Commission, it would have been necessary to add to its numbers.

It will be seen from the details in paragraph 4 that there are 27 appointments, and a reserve of only six officers, of whom one or two are usually on probation, and not available to take charge of any departmental office. It has, indeed, only been possible to carry on the work by the employment of the pension paymasters on other duties, and by obtaining temporarily the services of regimental and other officers for the payment of pensioners, an arrangement which it is not desirable to perpetuate.

6. The scale of establishment which we recommend for the sanction of Her Majesty's Government is framed on the assumption which has guided us in our recommendations for all the other departments of the army, that the army will be divided for administrative purposes into four parts; it is as follows:—

		Rs.
4	Controllers—consolidated - - - - - - - -	2,250
5	Military Accountants, 1st class, Staff - - - - - -	800
5	" " 2nd " " - - - - - -	600
5	" " 3rd " " - - - - - -	500
5	" " 4th " " - - - - - -	400
5	" " 5th " " - - - - - -	300
8	Assistant Military Accountants " - - - - - -	200
37	Total Officers.	
4	Medical Examiners, Staff (with unemployed pay of rank) -	400

The distribution of these officers for each of the four proposed divisions of the Indian Army would be—

One Controller.
One Pay Examiner.
One Commissariat Examiner.
One Ordnance Examiner.
One Circle Paymaster.
One Officer in charge of Accounts Branch.
One Medical Examiner.

Five officers would, as at present, be pension paymasters, and the assistants would be employed wherever their services might be required.

7. A comparative statement of the cost of the present and proposed establishment is attached, from which it will be seen that there is an annual increase of 57,552 rupees, which appears to be unavoidable. This department, it must be remembered, has to examine, account for, and to a considerable extent control, an expenditure of 12 millions a year. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that the establishment should be amply sufficient for the careful performance of this duty, and that the emoluments should be fixed on a scale which will attract and retain officers of zeal, industry, and ability.

8. Although an establishment is now proposed to cost about 60,000 rupees per annum more than the establishment at present sanctioned, it has to be observed that the department has of late years been largely reduced, as will be seen by the enclosed statement, which shows that since 1861 the department has undergone a reduction of 20 officers at a charge of about 3 lakhs of rupees. The fact is, that reduction has been carried too far, and, as is shown in paragraph 5, the reserve was not sufficient, even assuming that only 25 per cent. of the

the officers were absent on furlough or sick leave, a proportion which has usually been exceeded. If, as has always been the case, some of the probationers had not passed their final examination and were not qualified to take charge of an office, the reserve was altogether inadequate, and it has been necessary to obtain untrained assistance from the officers on general or regimental duty, and even to borrow an officer temporarily from the Civil Account Department.

9. For the last three years the difficulty in arranging for the proper conduct of the duties of the department has been a source of constant anxiety and embarrassment, such as should not, we consider, occur in so important a department of the army, and we have only hitherto abstained from urging on Her Majesty's Government the necessity for an increase to the establishment, because we hoped to deal fully and finally with this question in connection with the report of the Army Commission.

10. Our present proposals, it will be seen, provide (excluding the Medical Examiners) 37 officers, 29 for actual appointments and eight as a reserve of 25 per cent., assuming that one officer will always be on probation, and not qualified to take charge of an office. A smaller reserve than this will not, we are satisfied, enable us to arrange adequately for the important duties of the Military Account Department.

* Para. 526 of Report.

11. We do not concur in the proposal made by the Commission* that the Accounts Branch of the Controller's office should be placed in charge of civil officers. It is, we consider, essential that the officers of the department should be trained in, and have experience of, every branch of the system of pay, audit, and account, with which they have to deal, and which any one of them, on reaching the post of Controller, may be called on to administer. To place the Accounts Branch in the hands of civil assistants appointed specially to that part of the business of the Military Accounts Department and to no other, would be to deprive the Military Accountants of any efficient training in one branch of their duties which is certainly not the least important of them. Whether the whole department might not be so far modified in its organisation as that a part of the staff should consist of civil officers is another matter. This change may be desirable; but the consideration of it does not press at present. But whatever the composition of the staff, we think that the account as well as the audit should be conducted by that staff.

12. Having regard also to the very important and responsible functions of the Controllers, we consider that the reduction of salaries proposed for these officers by the Commission is inexpedient.

13. The present rate being 2,500 rupees for the senior and 2,200 rupees for the two others, we recommend a salary for all of 2,250 rupees. The Controller should hold his appointment for five years. He should be eligible to continue in the office on promotion to the rank of Major General, so long as officers of the Accounts Department are eligible to attain that rank, but not after succession to the Colonel's allowance.

14. We desire here to record our entire concurrence in the general principle advocated in paragraphs 529 to 531 of the Report, for the extension of the financial powers of the Controller of Military Accounts and of the Lieutenant Generals commanding the four great divisions of the army. This matter will have our careful attention, and we shall be prepared to give effect to that principle, in such way as on consideration may seem most appropriate, when the time comes for carrying out the general measure of reorganisation of the Indian Army, which we have laid before Her Majesty's Government.

15. The question whether the whole system of paying pensioners in the three presidencies should be assimilated will be reserved for future consideration.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Ripon.*
W. Stokes.
Rivers Thompson.
J. Gibbs.
E. Baring.
J. T. Wilson.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of Cost of present and proposed Establishments, MILITARY ACCOUNT DEPARTMENT.

PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT.	Cost per Mensem.	PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT.	Cost per Mensem.
	Rs.		*Rs. a. p.*
1 Senior Controller, consolidated pay - - - - - - - - -	2,500	4 Controllers - - - - Consolidated pay 2,250 rupees each	9,000 – –
2 Controllers - - - - Consolidated pay 2,200 rupees each	4,400	5 Military Accountants, 1st class - - Staff pay 800 rupees each	4,000 – –
3 Military Accountants, 1st class, 1st grade - Staff pay 1,000 „	3,000	5 Ditto 2nd class - - ditto 600 „	3,000 – –
5 Ditto 1st class, 2nd grade - ditto 800 „	4,000	5 Ditto 3rd class - - ditto 500 „	2,500 – –
5 Ditto 2nd class, 1st grade - ditto 600 „	3,000	5 Ditto 4th class - - ditto 400 „	2,000 – –
5 Ditto 2nd class, 2nd grade - ditto 500 „	2,500	5 Ditto 5th class - - ditto 300 „	1,500 – –
5 Ditto 3rd class - - - ditto 300 „	1,500	8 Assistant Military Accountants - - ditto 200 „	1,600 – –
7 Assistant Military Accountants - - - ditto 150 „	1,050	4 Medical Examiners - - - - ditto 400 „	1,600 – –
3 Medical Examiners - - - - - ditto 400 „	1,200	Total - - -	25,200 – –
36 Officers.		41 Officers.	
		Add Staff Corps pay of 1 Lieutenant Colonel - - - -	827 14 –
		Ditto 1 Major - - - - - - -	640 14 –
		Ditto 1 Captain - - - - - -	374 1 6
		Ditto 1 Lieutenant - - - - - -	225 12 –
		Unemployed pay of 1 Surgeon Major of 15 years' service -	677 6 11
Total per Mensem - - -	23,150	TOTAL per Mensem - - -	27,946 – 5
Per Annum - - - *Rs.*	2,77,800	Per Annum - - - *Rs.*	3,35,352 5 –

ABSTRACT.

	Rs.
Proposed Cost - - - - - - - - - - -	3,35,352
Present Cost - - - - - - - - - - -	2,77,800
Increase - - - *Rs.*	57,552 per annum.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Cost of the Officers of the MILITARY ACCOUNT DEPARTMENT in *India* in 1861–62 and 1881–82.

Cost in 1861-62.			Cost in 1881-82.		
Nos.	Grades.	Total Staff Pay.	Nos.	Grades.	Total Staff Pay.
		Rs.			*Rs.*
3	Controllers of Military Accounts	7,667	3	Controllers of Military Accounts (consolidated)	6,900
3	Military Accountants	3,200	3	Military Accountants, 1st class, 1st grade	3,000
6	Examiners, Pay Department	4,150	5	Ditto 1st class, 2nd grade	4,000
3	Examiners, Commissariat and Stud Accounts	3,264	5	Ditto 2nd class, 1st grade	3,000
1	Assistant Examiner, Commissariat and Stud Accounts	700	5	Ditto 2nd class, 2nd grade	2,500
3	Examiners, Medical Accounts	2,200	5	Ditto 3rd class	1,500
3	Examiners, Ordnance, Barrack, and Clothing	1,200	7	Assistant Military Accountants	1,050
3	Compilers of Military Expenditure	1,900	3	Medical Examiners	1,200
20	Paymasters of circles	11,800	1	Pension Paymaster	250
1	Assistant Paymaster of circles	250	1	Superintendent, Family Pensions	600
1	Paymaster of Invalids	500			
9	Deputy and Pension Paymasters	2,340			
2	Superintendents of Family Pensions	1,350			
58		40,521	38		*Rs.* 24,000

	Rs.
Saving in staff pay as compared with 1861-62	16,521
Add,—Saving in military pay of 17 officers (excluding the three Compilers of Military Expenditure who were not military officers) at average rates	8,627
TOTAL Saving per Mensem	25,148
TOTAL Saving per Annum *Rs.*	3,01,776

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (No. 258—Military) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 9 August 1883.

Para. 1. HAVING in my Despatch, No 243, of 26th July 1883, conveyed to your Lordship the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the Army in India shall continue to be divided into three Presidential Armies, I am now able to convey to you my instructions on the proposals you have made for the organization of the various Army Departments, and in the present Despatch I desire to inform your Excellency of the conclusions at which I have arrived on the recommendations relating to the Military Accounts Department contained in your Despatch, No. 399, of the 29th October 1881.

2. The Simla Army Commission, basing their proposals on the assumption that the Indian Army would be divided into four Army Corps, recommended that the establishment for military accounts should consist of 35 officers, including four medical examiners, at a cost of 2,67,900 rupees a year. This is stated, in para. 524 of the Report of the Commission, to be a reduction in cost of 6,300 rupees a year from the charge for the Department at the time the Report was made, while it provided the same number of officers as was then allowed, but substituted a fourth medical examiner for a military officer reduced.

3. I observe, however, that in the estimate of the Army Commission no provision is made for officers in charge of the Accounts Branch of the Controller's offices; and in para. 526 of their Report, the Commission recommend that this duty should be discharged by uncovenanted officers, receiving a somewhat higher salary than that at present given to the head assistants in the Controller's offices, for they saw no reason why the duty should be performed by military officers. It thus appears that, while the existing number of military and medical officers was to be retained for the Accounts Branch, the Commission contemplated an addition of four uncovenanted officers, who could hardly have cost less than 30,000 rupees a year. If, therefore, the scheme of the Commission were adopted, the result would be an additional charge of about 24,000 rupees a year, instead of a saving of 6,300 rupees, apart from the prospective liability for pensions.

4. Your Excellency points out, in para. 3 of your Despatch that, since the Report of the Commission was submitted, one of the pension circles in Bombay has been absorbed into the Military Accounts Department, and that to provide for the duties of this circle, an addition was made to the establishment of a military accountant, 3rd class. The existing establishment, therefore, is 36 officers, including three medical examiners, at a cost of 2,77,800 rupees a month, exclusive of the pay of their rank of 33 of these officers who are not in receipt of consolidated salaries.

5. It appears that your Excellency does not agree with the view of the Army Commission as to placing the Accounts Branches of the Controller's offices in the hands of civil assistants specially appointed to that part of the business. You consider that such an arrangement would deprive the military accountants of an efficient training in an important branch of their duties, and accordingly you propose to provide for the duties of the four Army Corps contemplated by the Commissioners by an establishment of 41 officers, including four medical examiners. The cost of this establishment is estimated by you at 3,35,352 rupees per annum, or 57,552 rupees in excess of the present charge, while the increased establishment would involve prospective liabilities for pensions of four officers of the Staff Corps, and one medical officer.

6. The reasons assigned for recommending this increase are, that the reductions made under the authority of your Excellency's predecessors were carried too far, and that the work of the Department has been therefore performed with difficulty, while the reserve is not sufficient to provide for the duties of absentees, so that it has at times been necessary to supply untrained assistance from officers

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on general or regimental duty, and even to borrow an officer temporarily from the Civil Accounts Department.

7. In point of fact, I observe that the increase of five officers corresponds with the number of new appointments proposed to be created for service with a fourth Army, namely, a Controller, a Commissariat Examiner, an Ordnance Examiner, a Medical Examiner, and an officer in charge of the Accounts Branch, and the additional charge thereby incurred is only partially met by a reduction in the salary of certain grades.

8. On the whole, as no fourth Army is to be organized, I have come to the conclusion that there is not sufficient ground for the largely increased charge proposed for this Department, although I agree with your Excellency that there should be an adequate reserve of qualified officers within the Department to perform the duties of absentees, and that unqualified officers should only be brought into the Department as probationers, save in cases of real urgency.

9. If your Excellency should, on further consideration, be of opinion that it is necessary, in order to provide this reserve, to add one or two officers to the Department in the lower grades, I sanction your doing so on the understanding that the cost of the measure is eventually met, to its full extent, by some such revision of salaries as that shown in the scale contained in the sixth paragraph of your Despatch.

10. I shall be glad to receive a report as to the action your Excellency may take in this matter.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

DESPATCH from the Government of India (No. 226 of 1883—Military Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(*Received 27 December 1883.*)

My Lord, Fort William, 4 December 1883.

WITH reference to Military Despatch, No. 258, dated India Office, the 9th August 1883, conveying your Lordship's decision on the proposals for the reorganisation of the Military Accounts Department, we have the honour to say that at present we propose to take no further action on the matter.

Secretary of State's Despatch, No. 90, dated 7th May 1874.
Military Department letter, No. 533 B, dated 20th November 1883.

2. We have, however, thought it desirable to reconsider the arrangement sanctioned in 1874, and in view of the extra work and responsibility which devolve on the Controller of Military Accounts serving in the Bengal Presidency, as compared with the Controllers serving in Madras and Bombay, we have decided that the higher salary of 2,500 rupees, now given to the senior Controller serving in India for the time being, shall in future be allotted to the Controller actually serving in the Bengal Presidency.

3. We trust that the decision will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ripon.*
J. Gibbs.
C. P. Ilbert.
S. C. Bayley.
T. C. Hope.
A. Colvin.

ORGANISATION.

No. 533 B, Organisation, dated Fort William, 20th November 1883.

From Major *E. H. H. Collen*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Deparment, Calcutta, to the Secretary to the Governments of Madras and Bombay, Military Department, and the Controller of Military Accounts, Bengal.

I AM directed to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Governor in Council, that the Governor General in Council has decided, in modication of the arrangement sanctioned in my No. 1096/1097/1098, dated 19th June 1874, that the higher salary of 2,500 rupees now drawn by the senior Controller of Military Accounts for the time being, shall in future be allotted to the Controller actually serving in the Bengal Presidency. On his departure on general leave or furlough, his leave allowance or furlough pay will be calculated as if his salary were 2,200 rupees per mensem.

2. An officer acting as Controller of Military Accounts in the Bengal Presidency will draw acting allowance calculated as if the salary of the appointment were 2,200 rupees, and in addition an extra allowance of 300 rupees per mensem.

Copy of the above forwarded to the Accountant General, Military Department, for information.

DESPATCH from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India (Military—No. 16) to the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord Marquis, India Office, London, 24 January 1884.

IN compliance with the request contained in your Excellency's Military Letter, No. 226, of 4th December 1883, I sanction your recommendation that the higher salary of 2,500 rupees now given to the Senior Controller of Military Accounts serving in India for the time being shall, in future, be allotted to the Controller actually serving in the Bengal Presidency.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Kimberley.*

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